More states have strengthened child labor laws than weakened them in 2024: This year, state advocates were better equipped to organize in opposition to harmful bills
Click here for the latest version of our 50-state maps showing the status of legislation to roll back or strengthen child labor protections.
Early this year, we detailed the continued state legislative attacks on child labor protections as well as bills to strengthen child labor standards. Despite the recent rise of child labor violations and several high-profile child labor cases, the industry-backed effort to roll back child labor protections state by state continued, with state bills targeting youth work permits, work hours, and protections from hazardous work. At the same time, many state legislators have recognized the urgent need to strengthen standards and have instead proposed legislation to improve state child labor laws and their enforcement.
Now that most state legislative sessions have ended for the year, here is a look back at how these child labor proposals fared.
Jobs report indicates a strong labor market: Unemployment has been at or below 4% for 30 months running
Below, EPI economists offer their insights on the jobs report released this morning, which showed 272,000 jobs added in May.
From EPI senior economist, Elise Gould (@eliselgould):
Jobs report comes in strong this morning with payroll employment increasing by 272,000 in May. Some notable weakness in the household survey, but most measures tell a consistent story of a strong but not hot labor market. Here, we see consistently strong job growth continuing. pic.twitter.com/g9ilEKcxGK
— Elise Gould (@eliselgould) June 7, 2024
The topline household survey numbers suggest some mild weakness though it's important to remember that the payroll survey is the gold standard.
I'm not concerned by the mild uptick in the unemployment rate to 4.0%, which has remained at or below 4.0% for 30 months in a row. pic.twitter.com/Z7erPObbYm
— Elise Gould (@eliselgould) June 7, 2024
Again, a more volatile series, the Black unemployment rate ticked up to 6.1% in May.
Getting to full employment is particularly important for historically disadvantaged groups (e.g. young, noncollege, Black and Hispanic workers) who always experience a tougher labor market. pic.twitter.com/bs2jSJ6skh
— Elise Gould (@eliselgould) June 7, 2024
From EPI president, Heidi Shierholz (@hshierholz):
This labor market just keeps cranking out huge numbers of jobs. We’ve added almost a million jobs in the last 4 months alone, and the unemployment rate has been at 4% or less for TWO AND A HALF YEARS. It really is incredible.
— Heidi Shierholz (@hshierholz) June 7, 2024
What to watch on jobs day—revenge of the managers: Evidence of manager wage growth rising while typical workers’ wage growth slows
Over the last few months, there’s been much talk about the return to normal in the labor market. A normal rate of job openings, hires, and quits. Unemployment back to pre-pandemic levels for a sustained period and the stability of the prime-age employment-to-population ratio at an even slightly higher rate than pre-pandemic. Will a return to “normal” also mean wages for the vast majority rise slower and that those with more power exert their leverage through faster wage gains? Recent evidence shows a worrying trend emerge: Wage growth for production/nonsupervisory workers has slowed while manager wage growth has mildly accelerated.
Over much of the current economic recovery, lower-wage workers experienced faster wage growth than other groups. They lost their jobs in greater numbers during the pandemic, but a policy response that matched the scale of the problem translated into a tremendous bounceback in jobs. It also meant that workers who lost their jobs weren’t as desperate to take the first one when those jobs returned. Employers had to scramble to attract and retain workers, leading to faster wage growth for those lower-wage workers with historically less bargaining power.
A similar—though more muted—phenomenon happened for production/nonsupervisory workers (roughly the bottom 82% of the wage distribution). Hourly wages for production/nonsupervisory workers started growing faster than overall private-sector wages in mid-2021, as shown in Figure A below. By March 2022, year-over-year hourly wages grew 7.0% for production/nonsupervisory workers, compared with 5.9% overall. Over the last two years, nominal wage growth for both groups of workers has decelerated, but the deceleration is more pronounced among production/nonsupervisory workers. The latest April 2024 data show that production/nonsupervisory workers are still experiencing slightly faster year-over-year wage growth than the overall private sector, but that’s likely to reverse soon given recent trends.
Higher wage growth for production/nonsupervisory workers wanes in recent months: Year-over-year change in private-sector nominal average hourly earnings, 2007–2024
| date | Production/nonsupervisory workers | All private-sector employees |
|---|---|---|
| Jan-2019 | 3.4% | 3.2% |
| Feb-2019 | 3.5% | 3.6% |
| Mar-2019 | 3.6% | 3.5% |
| Apr-2019 | 3.5% | 3.2% |
| May-2019 | 3.5% | 3.3% |
| Jun-2019 | 3.6% | 3.4% |
| Jul-2019 | 3.7% | 3.4% |
| Aug-2019 | 3.7% | 3.4% |
| Sep-2019 | 3.6% | 3.1% |
| Oct-2019 | 3.7% | 3.1% |
| Nov-2019 | 3.7% | 3.3% |
| Dec-2019 | 3.1% | 3.0% |
| Jan-2020 | 3.3% | 3.1% |
| Feb-2020 | 3.4% | 3.0% |
| Mar-2020 | 3.6% | 3.5% |
| Apr-2020 | 7.8% | 8.0% |
| May-2020 | 6.9% | 6.7% |
| Jun-2020 | 5.6% | 5.1% |
| Jul-2020 | 4.8% | 4.9% |
| Aug-2020 | 5.1% | 4.8% |
| Sep-2020 | 4.8% | 4.8% |
| Oct-2020 | 4.6% | 4.6% |
| Nov-2020 | 4.6% | 4.5% |
| Dec-2020 | 5.6% | 5.4% |
| Jan-2021 | 5.3% | 5.2% |
| Feb-2021 | 5.2% | 5.3% |
| Mar-2021 | 4.9% | 4.5% |
| Apr-2021 | 1.5% | 0.7% |
| May-2021 | 2.8% | 2.3% |
| Jun-2021 | 4.1% | 3.9% |
| Jul-2021 | 5.1% | 4.3% |
| Aug-2021 | 5.2% | 4.4% |
| Sep-2021 | 6.0% | 4.9% |
| Oct-2021 | 6.5% | 5.5% |
| Nov-2021 | 6.6% | 5.4% |
| Dec-2021 | 6.4% | 5.0% |
| Jan-2022 | 6.9% | 5.7% |
| Feb-2022 | 6.8% | 5.3% |
| Mar-2022 | 7.0% | 5.9% |
| Apr-2022 | 6.9% | 5.8% |
| May-2022 | 6.7% | 5.6% |
| Jun-2022 | 6.7% | 5.4% |
| Jul-2022 | 6.5% | 5.5% |
| Aug-2022 | 6.2% | 5.4% |
| Sep-2022 | 5.9% | 5.1% |
| Oct-2022 | 5.8% | 5.0% |
| Nov-2022 | 5.9% | 5.1% |
| Dec-2022 | 5.5% | 4.9% |
| Jan-2023 | 5.2% | 4.6% |
| Feb-2023 | 5.4% | 4.7% |
| Mar-2023 | 5.4% | 4.6% |
| Apr-2023 | 5.2% | 4.7% |
| May-2023 | 5.1% | 4.6% |
| Jun-2023 | 5.0% | 4.7% |
| Jul-2023 | 5.0% | 4.7% |
| Aug-2023 | 4.8% | 4.5% |
| Sep-2023 | 4.7% | 4.5% |
| Oct-2023 | 4.6% | 4.3% |
| Nov-2023 | 4.6% | 4.3% |
| Dec-2023 | 4.5% | 4.3% |
| Jan-2024 | 4.7% | 4.4% |
| Feb-2024 | 4.5% | 4.3% |
| Mar-2024 | 4.2% | 4.1% |
| Apr-2024 | 4.0% | 3.9% |
Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics public data series.
Further, we can impute average hourly wages for managers using their shares of the overall private-sector workforce and the wages for overall private and production/nonsupervisory workers. When we do that, we see a mild acceleration in managerial wage growth over the last few months, though the series is notably volatile (see Figure B). This wage differential between typical workers and managers will be important to watch in Friday’s jobs report as well as future months. While the return to normal may be welcome in other metrics, it would not be welcome to see managerial pay growth exceeding growth for non-managers such that rising inequality rears its ugly head again.
Manager wage growth rises as wage growth for production/nonsupervisory workers slows in recent months: Year-over-year change in private-sector nominal average hourly earnings, 2007–2024
| date | Production/nonsupervisory workers | Managers |
|---|---|---|
| Jan-2019 | 3.4% | 2.9% |
| Feb-2019 | 3.5% | 3.7% |
| Mar-2019 | 3.6% | 3.4% |
| Apr-2019 | 3.5% | 2.5% |
| May-2019 | 3.5% | 2.4% |
| Jun-2019 | 3.6% | 2.5% |
| Jul-2019 | 3.7% | 2.2% |
| Aug-2019 | 3.7% | 2.3% |
| Sep-2019 | 3.6% | 1.4% |
| Oct-2019 | 3.7% | 1.4% |
| Nov-2019 | 3.7% | 2.1% |
| Dec-2019 | 3.1% | 2.2% |
| Jan-2020 | 3.3% | 2.2% |
| Feb-2020 | 3.4% | 1.9% |
| Mar-2020 | 3.6% | 2.5% |
| Apr-2020 | 7.8% | 3.2% |
| May-2020 | 6.9% | 1.5% |
| Jun-2020 | 5.6% | 0.5% |
| Jul-2020 | 4.8% | 1.8% |
| Aug-2020 | 5.1% | 1.5% |
| Sep-2020 | 4.8% | 2.2% |
| Oct-2020 | 4.6% | 2.2% |
| Nov-2020 | 4.6% | 2.4% |
| Dec-2020 | 5.6% | 2.9% |
| Jan-2021 | 5.3% | 3.0% |
| Feb-2021 | 5.2% | 3.3% |
| Mar-2021 | 4.9% | 1.7% |
| Apr-2021 | 1.5% | 1.5% |
| May-2021 | 2.8% | 3.3% |
| Jun-2021 | 4.1% | 4.6% |
| Jul-2021 | 5.1% | 3.0% |
| Aug-2021 | 5.2% | 2.7% |
| Sep-2021 | 6.0% | 2.7% |
| Oct-2021 | 6.5% | 3.3% |
| Nov-2021 | 6.6% | 2.8% |
| Dec-2021 | 6.4% | 2.2% |
| Jan-2022 | 6.9% | 3.0% |
| Feb-2022 | 6.8% | 2.2% |
| Mar-2022 | 7.0% | 3.8% |
| Apr-2022 | 6.9% | 3.6% |
| May-2022 | 6.7% | 3.4% |
| Jun-2022 | 6.7% | 2.9% |
| Jul-2022 | 6.5% | 3.2% |
| Aug-2022 | 6.2% | 3.7% |
| Sep-2022 | 5.9% | 3.2% |
| Oct-2022 | 5.8% | 3.1% |
| Nov-2022 | 5.9% | 3.1% |
| Dec-2022 | 5.5% | 3.2% |
| Jan-2023 | 5.2% | 2.9% |
| Feb-2023 | 5.4% | 2.8% |
| Mar-2023 | 5.4% | 2.3% |
| Apr-2023 | 5.2% | 3.0% |
| May-2023 | 5.1% | 3.0% |
| Jun-2023 | 5.0% | 3.6% |
| Jul-2023 | 5.0% | 3.8% |
| Aug-2023 | 4.8% | 3.6% |
| Sep-2023 | 4.7% | 3.8% |
| Oct-2023 | 4.6% | 3.3% |
| Nov-2023 | 4.6% | 3.4% |
| Dec-2023 | 4.5% | 3.5% |
| Jan-2024 | 4.7% | 3.5% |
| Feb-2024 | 4.5% | 3.7% |
| Mar-2024 | 4.2% | 4.0% |
| Apr-2024 | 4.0% | 3.8% |
Note: Manager wages are constructed using their shares of the overall private-sector workforce and the wages for overall private-sector and production/nonsupervisory workers.
Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics public data series.
Nursing home owners are pushing Congress to block a new minimum staffing rule
Opposition to a new nursing home staffing standard has come to a boil with owners seeking to overturn the rule via a Congressional Review Act resolution, a “salted earth” strategy that would prevent the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services from ever issuing an amended rule. Given the life-saving implications of implementing a minimum staffing rule—which would require nursing homes to provide a minimum of 3.48 hours of care per resident—here’s a summary of comments EPI submitted in support of the rule, pushing back against unfounded industry claims of a worker shortage that would prevent nursing homes from meeting the new standard.
The nursing home industry has attempted to equate a staffing decline with a worker shortage. But this decline mirrored a decline in occupancy, and, if anything, suggests that there’s a pool of sidelined workers who could be lured back if pay and working conditions improved. This is true in both urban and rural areas.
The industry trade organization issued a report that described the 13.3% decline in nursing home jobs during the pandemic as a “workforce shortage” causing “wage increase pressures and reliance on contracted or agency nursing.” But this was a decline in jobs, not in available workers, as 168,579 residents died and would-be residents opted for alternative care arrangements due to the rapid spread of COVID-19 in facilities. It’s misleading to characterize reduced demand as a workforce shortage when staffing ratios actually improved somewhat during this period.
Job openings continue to trend toward pre-pandemic levels
Below, EPI senior economist Elise Gould offers her insights on today’s release of the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) for April. Read the full thread here.
Job openings continue to trend toward pre-pandemic levels, down nearly 300k between March and April, and down 1.8 million over the year. High levels of job openings at the height of the pandemic recovery were driven by faster churn. The job openings rate is nearly back to normal. pic.twitter.com/TA9uoNaCC6
— Elise Gould (@eliselgould) June 4, 2024
Since the peak in March 2022 when churn was high as employers scrambled to find workers after massive layoffs and many workers quit in search of better opportunities, job openings are now more than 80% of the way back to “normal” (and the job openings rate is 90% back to normal). pic.twitter.com/mgsfS9gffO
— Elise Gould (@eliselgould) June 4, 2024
Alabama’s and Maryland’s similar Black unemployment rates mask major differences in labor market conditions
Nationally, the Black unemployment rate remains below historic norms, averaging 6% in the first quarter of 2024. Since 2019, two states—Maryland and Alabama—stand out as consistently having Black unemployment rates below the national average. Among states where Black workers comprise at least 5% of the labor force, the state with the lowest Black unemployment rate has been either Maryland or Alabama for the last 13 quarters (back to 2021 Q1). In fact, these two states have had the lowest and second lowest Black unemployment rates (not always in the same order) for eight of the last nine quarters (from 2022 Q1 to 2023 Q4).
Black unemployment rates in Maryland and Alabama have been consistently lower than the national average in recent years: Black quarterly unemployment rates, 2018 Q4–2024 Q1
| Alabama | Maryland | United States | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 Q4 | 6.70% | 5.70% | 6.40% |
| 2019 Q1 | 6.30% | 5.70% | 6.50% |
| 2019 Q2 | 5.80% | 5.10% | 6.20% |
| 2019 Q3 | 5.30% | 4.40% | 6.00% |
| 2019 Q4 | 4.80% | 4.20% | 6.00% |
| 2020 Q1 | 4.70% | 4.70% | 6.30% |
| 2020 Q2 | 15.00% | 11.80% | 18.40% |
| 2020 Q3 | 9.90% | 10.30% | 12.50% |
| 2020 Q4 | 7.20% | 8.60% | 9.60% |
| 2021 Q1 | 5.90% | 7.80% | 8.80% |
| 2021 Q2 | 5.30% | 7.80% | 9.00% |
| 2021 Q3 | 4.30% | 6.60% | 7.90% |
| 2021 Q4 | 4.20% | 5.20% | 6.70% |
| 2022 Q1 | 4.10% | 4.20% | 6.30% |
| 2022 Q2 | 4.20% | 3.40% | 6.10% |
| 2022 Q3 | 4.00% | 3.70% | 6.00% |
| 2022 Q4 | 3.60% | 3.70% | 6.00% |
| 2023 Q1 | 3.20% | 3.20% | 5.70% |
| 2023 Q2 | 2.70% | 2.90% | 5.80% |
| 2023 Q3 | 3.10% | 3.00% | 5.90% |
| 2023 Q4 | 3.70% | 3.30% | 5.80% |
| 2024 Q1 | 4.30% | 3.30% | 6.00% |
Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) data and Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
Despite the remarkable similarity in unemployment rates shown in Figure A, Black workers in Maryland and Alabama may not be as equally well off as they appear to be. Figure B reveals that between 2018 and 2023, a much larger share of Maryland’s Black population was employed than Alabama’s. In 2023, the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) in Maryland was 64.6%, compared with just 55.5% in Alabama and 59.6% for the United States as a whole.
Employment-to-population ratios reveal Maryland employs a much larger share of Black residents than Alabama: Black employment-to-population ratios, 2018–2023
| Year | United States | Maryland | Alabama |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2018 | 58.30% | 61.10% | 52.00% |
| 2019 | 58.80% | 66.20% | 53.60% |
| 2020 | 53.70% | 62.40% | 52.10% |
| 2021 | 55.70% | 62.20% | 52.70% |
| 2022 | 58.50% | 62.50% | 54.70% |
| 2023 | 59.60% | 64.60% | 55.50% |
Source: EPI analysis of Current Population Survey microdata from the U.S. Census Bureau
If Black unemployment rates are so similar in both states, why are employment-to-population ratios so different? Because of fundamental differences in each state’s approach to social and economic policy. While Alabama adopts the Southern economic development strategy, for example, Maryland does not. This strategy seeks to disempower workers—especially Black and brown workers—to ensure employers can extract their labor for as little compensation as possible. In practice, this translates to higher rates of incarceration in Alabama than in Maryland, especially for Black men. Alabama has no minimum wage, compared with Maryland’s $15 per hour wage floor. Alabama lacks pro-worker, family-supportive labor policies like Maryland’s paid sick days and paid family and medical leave laws. And Alabama underinvests in public services.
Class of 2024: Young high school graduates have seen strong wage growth over the pandemic recovery
Key findings:
- In the pandemic recovery, young high school graduates have experienced a much faster rebound in job prospects and stronger wage growth than any recovery in recent history.
- The unemployment rate for young high school graduates—defined as workers ages 18 to 21—recovered in two years in the pandemic recovery compared with almost 9.5 years following the Great Recession of 2008–09. Meanwhile, the underemployment rate recovered more than five times faster in the pandemic recovery than the aftermath of the Great Recession.
- Young high school graduates experienced 9.4% real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth between February 2020 and March 2024.
- Gaps in labor market outcomes across race and ethnicity and gender persist even among high school graduates who have the same basic level of education and little variation in professional experience.
- The unemployment and underemployment rates of Black, Hispanic, and AAPI young high school graduates are much higher than their white counterparts.
- On average, Black workers are paid 93.2% of what white workers are paid per hour, while women are paid 87.6% compared with their male counterparts.
As with young college graduates, young high school graduates are experiencing a much stronger labor market today than before the pandemic and at any point since 2000. The fast economic recovery from the pandemic shock is a direct result of the aggressive fiscal policy response that matched the scale of the problem—in stark contrast to policy responses following previous recessions.
In this blog post, we start by examining employment and enrollment outcomes for young high school graduates, defined as workers ages 18 to 21. We then analyze their short- and long-run trends in unemployment, underemployment, and wages, looking at those with only a high school degree and who are not enrolled in further schooling.1
To most accurately capture the choices that young high school graduates are making, we include all young people between the ages of 18 and 21 who have less than a bachelor’s degree (including those with some college) in our initial sample. We group this population into four categories: “employed only” and not enrolled in further schooling, “enrolled only” and not employed, employed and enrolled, or “idled” (not enrolled and not employed, which includes the unemployed). Among these young high school graduates, most are either “employed only” and not enrolled in further schooling (32.7%) or “enrolled only” and not employed (31.1%). Since 1989, the share of young high school graduates who are “employed only” has fallen 11.8 percentage points, while the share of those who are “enrolled only” has risen 10.1 percentage points. As of March 2024, the share of young high school graduates who are employed and enrolled (21.5%) and idled (14.7%) remains roughly similar from 1989 (21.0% and 13.5%, respectively).
How much do companies spend on union-busters? The Department of Labor has improved reporting requirements and enforcement—but more is needed
Companies spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year hiring professional union-busters to campaign against and defeat union organizing drives. However, only a fraction of this spending is publicly reported because of loopholes and other weaknesses in the law and its enforcement.
A new report by the Inspector General at the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) found that the Office of Labor Management Standards (OLMS)—which oversees and enforces the union-buster (persuader) reporting requirements—“did not effectively enforce persuader activity requirements to protect workers’ rights to unionize.” While the report rightfully explains that more work must be done, there are many reasons the current OLMS should be commended for taking meaningful steps toward meeting its responsibility, and the report should be viewed as a roadmap for the agency moving forward.
OLMS is a tiny agency of fewer than 200 employees charged with enforcing the many provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), which include persuader reporting, union financial reporting, ensuring fair union elections, certifying compliance with labor standards as a condition of federal transit funding, and more. However, since its inception, OLMS has overwhelmingly prioritized enforcing the LMRDA’s union compliance provisions while failing to apply the same level of scrutiny required under the law to employers and union-busters. The Inspector General (IG) report makes clear that OLMS must begin allocating its resources more equitably to fulfill its obligation to protect the right of workers to engage in collective bargaining, mutual aid, and union representation.
Just by having a union vote, Mercedes workers in Alabama won major concessions and proved the importance of worker power
Last week, more than 4,500 workers at Mercedes-Benz’s plant in Vance, Alabama, voted on whether to organize with the United Auto Workers (UAW). After Mercedes and Republican elected leaders in Alabama waged a vicious anti-union campaign, the workers narrowly voted against the union. While this result shows the power of corporations and state governments to smother worker efforts to unionize, even in defeat the UAW helped Mercedes workers win substantial improvements in pay and benefits. Worker organizing can benefit workers whether or not they end up with a union.
As EPI has long documented, U.S. labor laws are heavily stacked against workers. Evidence suggests that more than 60 million workers wanted to join a union in 2023 but couldn’t do so. Employers spend more than $400 million annually on consultants to oppose worker organizing efforts, and employers are charged with violating the law in more than 40% of all union election campaigns. Many states, including Alabama, have helped employers by passing so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) laws; on average, workers in RTW states are paid 3.2% less than similar workers in non-RTW states, which translates to $1,670 less per year for a full-time worker. RTW laws have always been intended, first and foremost, to prevent workers from successfully organizing.
The workers at the UAW campaign in Alabama experienced a full-court press from the state and the company. In the run-up to the election, Governor Kay Ivey joined five other Southern Republican governors in issuing a statement warning that “unionization would certainly put our states’ jobs in jeopardy.” This was part and parcel with the South’s long history of anti-union efforts motivated by racial animus. While the statement rebuked the UAW for supposed “scare tactics,” it was Ivey who made the most of scare tactics, signing a law during the union campaign to punish companies that voluntarily agree to work with unions.
Mercedes subjected workers to a constant barrage of “captive audience” meetings where anti-union talking points and videos were repeated ad nauseam (at least seven states have banned captive audience meetings in order to protect workers’ freedom of thought and association). Mercedes workers report that company management targeted team leaders, who often have hopes of promotion, and applied daily pressure to get them to change their minds and vote against the union.
Focusing solely on the anti-union efforts of Alabama and Mercedes, however, misses a vital point: Even when workers lose union elections, they can still win substantial improvements in their working conditions. Just a month after the UAW announced that 30% of Mercedes workers had signed union cards, the company gave a $2-per-hour raise to the highest-paid workers, and eliminated the two-tier wage system that had prevented many workers from reaching that higher pay level. The company also fired its longtime U.S. CEO, ridding the workers of an unpopular boss. The new CEO made promises to “create a culture that puts you [the workers] first” and to “make decisions that are in your best interest.” If the company doesn’t live up to its promises, the workers may try again and win, just like workers did at Volkswagen’s Chattanooga, Tennessee, plant earlier this year.
Vouchers undermine efforts to provide an excellent public education for all
Since the early 2000s, many states have introduced significant voucher programs to provide public financing for private school education. These voucher programs are deeply damaging to efforts to offer an excellent public education for all U.S. children—and this is in fact often the intention of those pushing these programs. In this post we argue that:
- Public education is worth preserving—it should be seen as one of the most important achievements in our country’s history and crucial for the social and economic welfare of future generations.
- The economic logic behind voucher programs is weak; it rests on ideological commitments to markets over public provision of goods and services, even in realms of activity where the virtues of markets do not hold—like public education.
- Most damagingly, introducing significant voucher programs has gone hand in hand with steep declines in public school spending relative to states that have not adopted these policies.
- This spending stagnation has had profound effects in generating larger “adequacy gaps” in school funding in voucher states.
- Paradoxically, even while they take resources away from public schools, many newly introduced voucher programs could result in more total state spending in coming years.
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- This would be a particularly perverse result given the expansive research literature showing that vouchers do not improve educational outcomes. In essence, states that have introduced large-scale voucher programs are looking to substitute a more expensive and less effective system for educating kids than public education. The only reason for this policy thrust is ideology rooted in hostility to public education.
Background on public education and the voucher debates
Universal public education was perhaps the most important reason why the United States became the richest country in the world in the 20th century. As Claudia Goldin, the most recent Nobel Prize winner in economics, has written:
At the dawn of the twentieth century the industrial giants watched each other cautiously. The British sent high-ranking commissions to the United States and the United States sent similar groups to Britain and Germany. All were looking over their shoulders to see what made for economic greatness and what would ensure supremacy in the future… Earlier delegations focused on technology and physical capital. Those of the turn-of-the-century turned their attention to something different. People and training, not capital and technology, had become the new concerns…For the twentieth century to become the human capital century required vast changes in educational institutions, a commitment by governments to fund education, a readiness by taxpayers to pay for the education of other people’s children, a belief by business and industry that formal schooling mattered to them, and a willingness on the part of parents to send their children to school (and by youths to go). The transition occurred first in the United States and was accompanied by a set of “virtues” or principles, many of which can be summarized by the word “egalitarianism.”
In the 21st century, unfortunately, too many policymakers seem determined to squander this legacy by starving public education of money and legitimacy, often in the name of “school choice.” Their central claim (when they bother to make one with any clarity) is that public provision of goods or services is ineffective by definition and that a dose of private, market-like competition will lead to better schooling outcomes for the nation’s children.