Don’t be fooled by calls for a ‘regional’ minimum wage

Federal law is supposed to be the backstop that protects the vulnerable when lower levels of government fail to act. But a recent proposal to establish a regionally-adjusted federal minimum wage would undermine this principle, codifying disparities into federal law that in many cases are not the result of benign economic forces.

For one thing, it is impossible to separate the prevalence of low wages in the South from the persistent racial hierarchies there. Fortunately, the historical record shows that federal lawmakers do not need to accept this legacy. Establishing a federal $15 minimum wage in 2024, as over 200 Congressional Democrats have proposed, is economically achievable nationwide.

For decades, lawmakers—particularly in southern states—have refused to raise minimum wages and have prohibited cities and counties from doing so. The proposed regionally-adjusted federal minimum would simply accept this outcome, locking in these areas’ low-wage status, and leaving behind millions of workers—particularly workers of color—in the process. The Economic Policy Institute estimates 15.6 million fewer workers would get a raise under the regional proposal compared with a universal $15 minimum wage, and over 40 percent of these excluded workers are people of color.

It is true that states and sub-state areas have varying wage and price levels and there are times when policies should take those differences into account. The good news is regional wage differences are far smaller today than in past decades. This means implementing a more livable national minimum wage is easier now than for previous generations.

Doing so will generate a universal federal minimum wage that states and cities can exceed if needed, so that no worker fails to receive a livable wage and policy gradually shifts upward those at the bottom of the wage scale. A uniform federal minimum wage would help combat inequality across both racial and gender lines.Read more

The PRO Act: Giving workers more bargaining power on the job

Our economy is out of balance. Corporations and CEOs hold too much power and wealth, and working people know it. Workers are mobilizing, organizing, protesting, and striking at a level not seen in decades, and they are winning pay raises and other real change by using their collective voices.

But, the fact is, it is still too difficult for working people to form a union at their workplace when they want to. The law gives employers too much power and puts too many roadblocks in the way of workers trying to organize with their co-workers. That’s why the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act—introduced today by Senator Murray and Representative Scott—is such an important piece of legislation.

The PRO Act addresses several major problems with the current law and tries to give working people a fair shot when they try to join together with their coworkers to form a union and bargain for better wages, benefits, and conditions at their workplaces. Here’s how:Read more

What to Watch on Jobs Day: An expected and continued return of workers into the labor force

Over the last several years, the economy has continued on a slow-but-steady march to full employment. Along with improvements in nominal wage growth, we’ve seen evidence that more and more sidelined workers continue to pour into the labor market, seeking work and getting jobs. This growing labor force participation rate (LFPR), which has beaten many experts’ more pessimistic projections, is the subject of this jobs day preview post.

Projections of labor force participation changed dramatically once the Great Recession hit and many experts quickly decided that cyclical drop-offs in participation were actually structural trends. Think of cyclical changes as being short term, driven by the aggregate demand shortfall that caused the Great Recession and its aftermath. Structural changes are due to long-run trends, such as the aging of the workforce or the retirement of baby boomers. In and immediately following the Great Recession, there was a steady and deep decline in labor force participation. Even after the unemployment rate began to recover after a sharp spike, the participation rate continued to decline. That relationship is clearest when you look at the prime-age population, as I’ve pointed out before, but is true when you look at overall labor force participation and unemployment as well.

The figure below shows the relationship between the unemployment rate and the labor force participation rate between 1989 and 2019. It’s clear that the labor force participation rate continued to decline even as the unemployment rate started to recover in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Remember that to be counted as unemployed, you must be actively looking for work in the four weeks prior. With so many would-be workers falling off the official count of the unemployed, because the weak economy meant they did not believe there were job opportunities for them, many analysts began to question whether they would ever return.

Figure A

The labor force participation rate continued to decline long after the unemployment rate began recovering in the aftermath of the Great Recession: Labor force participation and unemployment rates, ages 16 and older, 1989–2019

Labor Force Participation Rate Unemployment Rate
Jan-1989 66.5% 5.4%
Feb-1989 66.3% 5.2%
Mar-1989 66.3% 5.0%
Apr-1989 66.4% 5.2%
May-1989 66.3% 5.2%
Jun-1989 66.5% 5.3%
Jul-1989 66.5% 5.2%
Aug-1989 66.5% 5.2%
Sep-1989 66.4% 5.3%
Oct-1989 66.5% 5.3%
Nov-1989 66.6% 5.4%
Dec-1989 66.5% 5.4%
Jan-1990 66.8% 5.4%
Feb-1990 66.7% 5.3%
Mar-1990 66.7% 5.2%
Apr-1990 66.6% 5.4%
May-1990 66.6% 5.4%
Jun-1990 66.4% 5.2%
Jul-1990 66.5% 5.5%
Aug-1990 66.5% 5.7%
Sep-1990 66.4% 5.9%
Oct-1990 66.4% 5.9%
Nov-1990 66.4% 6.2%
Dec-1990 66.4% 6.3%
Jan-1991 66.2% 6.4%
Feb-1991 66.2% 6.6%
Mar-1991 66.3% 6.8%
Apr-1991 66.4% 6.7%
May-1991 66.2% 6.9%
Jun-1991 66.2% 6.9%
Jul-1991 66.1% 6.8%
Aug-1991 66.0% 6.9%
Sep-1991 66.2% 6.9%
Oct-1991 66.1% 7.0%
Nov-1991 66.1% 7.0%
Dec-1991 66.0% 7.3%
Jan-1992 66.3% 7.3%
Feb-1992 66.2% 7.4%
Mar-1992 66.4% 7.4%
Apr-1992 66.5% 7.4%
May-1992 66.6% 7.6%
Jun-1992 66.7% 7.8%
Jul-1992 66.7% 7.7%
Aug-1992 66.6% 7.6%
Sep-1992 66.5% 7.6%
Oct-1992 66.2% 7.3%
Nov-1992 66.3% 7.4%
Dec-1992 66.3% 7.4%
Jan-1993 66.2% 7.3%
Feb-1993 66.2% 7.1%
Mar-1993 66.2% 7.0%
Apr-1993 66.1% 7.1%
May-1993 66.4% 7.1%
Jun-1993 66.5% 7.0%
Jul-1993 66.4% 6.9%
Aug-1993 66.4% 6.8%
Sep-1993 66.2% 6.7%
Oct-1993 66.3% 6.8%
Nov-1993 66.3% 6.6%
Dec-1993 66.4% 6.5%
Jan-1994 66.6% 6.6%
Feb-1994 66.6% 6.6%
Mar-1994 66.5% 6.5%
Apr-1994 66.5% 6.4%
May-1994 66.6% 6.1%
Jun-1994 66.4% 6.1%
Jul-1994 66.4% 6.1%
Aug-1994 66.6% 6.0%
Sep-1994 66.6% 5.9%
Oct-1994 66.7% 5.8%
Nov-1994 66.7% 5.6%
Dec-1994 66.7% 5.5%
Jan-1995 66.8% 5.6%
Feb-1995 66.8% 5.4%
Mar-1995 66.7% 5.4%
Apr-1995 66.9% 5.8%
May-1995 66.5% 5.6%
Jun-1995 66.5% 5.6%
Jul-1995 66.6% 5.7%
Aug-1995 66.6% 5.7%
Sep-1995 66.6% 5.6%
Oct-1995 66.6% 5.5%
Nov-1995 66.5% 5.6%
Dec-1995 66.4% 5.6%
Jan-1996 66.4% 5.6%
Feb-1996 66.6% 5.5%
Mar-1996 66.6% 5.5%
Apr-1996 66.7% 5.6%
May-1996 66.7% 5.6%
Jun-1996 66.7% 5.3%
Jul-1996 66.9% 5.5%
Aug-1996 66.7% 5.1%
Sep-1996 66.9% 5.2%
Oct-1996 67.0% 5.2%
Nov-1996 67.0% 5.4%
Dec-1996 67.0% 5.4%
Jan-1997 67.0% 5.3%
Feb-1997 66.9% 5.2%
Mar-1997 67.1% 5.2%
Apr-1997 67.1% 5.1%
May-1997 67.1% 4.9%
Jun-1997 67.1% 5.0%
Jul-1997 67.2% 4.9%
Aug-1997 67.2% 4.8%
Sep-1997 67.1% 4.9%
Oct-1997 67.1% 4.7%
Nov-1997 67.2% 4.6%
Dec-1997 67.2% 4.7%
Jan-1998 67.1% 4.6%
Feb-1998 67.1% 4.6%
Mar-1998 67.1% 4.7%
Apr-1998 67.0% 4.3%
May-1998 67.0% 4.4%
Jun-1998 67.0% 4.5%
Jul-1998 67.0% 4.5%
Aug-1998 67.0% 4.5%
Sep-1998 67.2% 4.6%
Oct-1998 67.2% 4.5%
Nov-1998 67.1% 4.4%
Dec-1998 67.2% 4.4%
Jan-1999 67.2% 4.3%
Feb-1999 67.2% 4.4%
Mar-1999 67.0% 4.2%
Apr-1999 67.1% 4.3%
May-1999 67.1% 4.2%
Jun-1999 67.1% 4.3%
Jul-1999 67.1% 4.3%
Aug-1999 67.0% 4.2%
Sep-1999 67.0% 4.2%
Oct-1999 67.0% 4.1%
Nov-1999 67.1% 4.1%
Dec-1999 67.1% 4.0%
Jan-2000 67.3% 4.0%
Feb-2000 67.3% 4.1%
Mar-2000 67.3% 4.0%
Apr-2000 67.3% 3.8%
May-2000 67.1% 4.0%
Jun-2000 67.1% 4.0%
Jul-2000 66.9% 4.0%
Aug-2000 66.9% 4.1%
Sep-2000 66.9% 3.9%
Oct-2000 66.8% 3.9%
Nov-2000 66.9% 3.9%
Dec-2000 67.0% 3.9%
Jan-2001 67.2% 4.2%
Feb-2001 67.1% 4.2%
Mar-2001 67.2% 4.3%
Apr-2001 66.9% 4.4%
May-2001 66.7% 4.3%
Jun-2001 66.7% 4.5%
Jul-2001 66.8% 4.6%
Aug-2001 66.5% 4.9%
Sep-2001 66.8% 5.0%
Oct-2001 66.7% 5.3%
Nov-2001 66.7% 5.5%
Dec-2001 66.7% 5.7%
Jan-2002 66.5% 5.7%
Feb-2002 66.8% 5.7%
Mar-2002 66.6% 5.7%
Apr-2002 66.7% 5.9%
May-2002 66.7% 5.8%
Jun-2002 66.6% 5.8%
Jul-2002 66.5% 5.8%
Aug-2002 66.6% 5.7%
Sep-2002 66.7% 5.7%
Oct-2002 66.6% 5.7%
Nov-2002 66.4% 5.9%
Dec-2002 66.3% 6.0%
Jan-2003 66.4% 5.8%
Feb-2003 66.4% 5.9%
Mar-2003 66.3% 5.9%
Apr-2003 66.4% 6.0%
May-2003 66.4% 6.1%
Jun-2003 66.5% 6.3%
Jul-2003 66.2% 6.2%
Aug-2003 66.1% 6.1%
Sep-2003 66.1% 6.1%
Oct-2003 66.1% 6.0%
Nov-2003 66.1% 5.8%
Dec-2003 65.9% 5.7%
Jan-2004 66.1% 5.7%
Feb-2004 66.0% 5.6%
Mar-2004 66.0% 5.8%
Apr-2004 65.9% 5.6%
May-2004 66.0% 5.6%
Jun-2004 66.1% 5.6%
Jul-2004 66.1% 5.5%
Aug-2004 66.0% 5.4%
Sep-2004 65.8% 5.4%
Oct-2004 65.9% 5.5%
Nov-2004 66.0% 5.4%
Dec-2004 65.9% 5.4%
Jan-2005 65.8% 5.3%
Feb-2005 65.9% 5.4%
Mar-2005 65.9% 5.2%
Apr-2005 66.1% 5.2%
May-2005 66.1% 5.1%
Jun-2005 66.1% 5.0%
Jul-2005 66.1% 5.0%
Aug-2005 66.2% 4.9%
Sep-2005 66.1% 5.0%
Oct-2005 66.1% 5.0%
Nov-2005 66.0% 5.0%
Dec-2005 66.0% 4.9%
Jan-2006 66.0% 4.7%
Feb-2006 66.1% 4.8%
Mar-2006 66.2% 4.7%
Apr-2006 66.1% 4.7%
May-2006 66.1% 4.6%
Jun-2006 66.2% 4.6%
Jul-2006 66.1% 4.7%
Aug-2006 66.2% 4.7%
Sep-2006 66.1% 4.5%
Oct-2006 66.2% 4.4%
Nov-2006 66.3% 4.5%
Dec-2006 66.4% 4.4%
Jan-2007 66.4% 4.6%
Feb-2007 66.3% 4.5%
Mar-2007 66.2% 4.4%
Apr-2007 65.9% 4.5%
May-2007 66.0% 4.4%
Jun-2007 66.0% 4.6%
Jul-2007 66.0% 4.7%
Aug-2007 65.8% 4.6%
Sep-2007 66.0% 4.7%
Oct-2007 65.8% 4.7%
Nov-2007 66.0% 4.7%
Dec-2007 66.0% 5.0%
Jan-2008 66.2% 5.0%
Feb-2008 66.0% 4.9%
Mar-2008 66.1% 5.1%
Apr-2008 65.9% 5.0%
May-2008 66.1% 5.4%
Jun-2008 66.1% 5.6%
Jul-2008 66.1% 5.8%
Aug-2008 66.1% 6.1%
Sep-2008 66.0% 6.1%
Oct-2008 66.0% 6.5%
Nov-2008 65.9% 6.8%
Dec-2008 65.8% 7.3%
Jan-2009 65.7% 7.8%
Feb-2009 65.8% 8.3%
Mar-2009 65.6% 8.7%
Apr-2009 65.7% 9.0%
May-2009 65.7% 9.4%
Jun-2009 65.7% 9.5%
Jul-2009 65.5% 9.5%
Aug-2009 65.4% 9.6%
Sep-2009 65.1% 9.8%
Oct-2009 65.0% 10.0%
Nov-2009 65.0% 9.9%
Dec-2009 64.6% 9.9%
Jan-2010 64.8% 9.8%
Feb-2010 64.9% 9.8%
Mar-2010 64.9% 9.9%
Apr-2010 65.2% 9.9%
May-2010 64.9% 9.6%
Jun-2010 64.6% 9.4%
Jul-2010 64.6% 9.4%
Aug-2010 64.7% 9.5%
Sep-2010 64.6% 9.5%
Oct-2010 64.4% 9.4%
Nov-2010 64.6% 9.8%
Dec-2010 64.3% 9.3%
Jan-2011 64.2% 9.1%
Feb-2011 64.1% 9.0%
Mar-2011 64.2% 9.0%
Apr-2011 64.2% 9.1%
May-2011 64.1% 9.0%
Jun-2011 64.0% 9.1%
Jul-2011 64.0% 9.0%
Aug-2011 64.1% 9.0%
Sep-2011 64.2% 9.0%
Oct-2011 64.1% 8.8%
Nov-2011 64.1% 8.6%
Dec-2011 64.0% 8.5%
Jan-2012 63.7% 8.3%
Feb-2012 63.8% 8.3%
Mar-2012 63.8% 8.2%
Apr-2012 63.7% 8.2%
May-2012 63.7% 8.2%
Jun-2012 63.8% 8.2%
Jul-2012 63.7% 8.2%
Aug-2012 63.5% 8.1%
Sep-2012 63.6% 7.8%
Oct-2012 63.8% 7.8%
Nov-2012 63.6% 7.7%
Dec-2012 63.7% 7.9%
Jan-2013 63.7% 8.0%
Feb-2013 63.4% 7.7%
Mar-2013 63.3% 7.5%
Apr-2013 63.4% 7.6%
May-2013 63.4% 7.5%
Jun-2013 63.4% 7.5%
Jul-2013 63.3% 7.3%
Aug-2013 63.3% 7.2%
Sep-2013 63.2% 7.2%
Oct-2013 62.8% 7.2%
Nov-2013 63.0% 6.9%
Dec-2013 62.9% 6.7%
Jan-2014 62.9% 6.6%
Feb-2014 62.9% 6.7%
Mar-2014 63.1% 6.7%
Apr-2014 62.8% 6.2%
May-2014 62.9% 6.3%
Jun-2014 62.8% 6.1%
Jul-2014 62.9% 6.2%
Aug-2014 62.9% 6.1%
Sep-2014 62.8% 5.9%
Oct-2014 62.9% 5.7%
Nov-2014 62.9% 5.8%
Dec-2014 62.8% 5.6%
Jan-2015 62.9% 5.7%
Feb-2015 62.7% 5.5%
Mar-2015 62.6% 5.4%
Apr-2015 62.7% 5.4%
May-2015 62.9% 5.6%
Jun-2015 62.6% 5.3%
Jul-2015 62.6% 5.2%
Aug-2015 62.6% 5.1%
Sep-2015 62.4% 5.0%
Oct-2015 62.5% 5.0%
Nov-2015 62.6% 5.1%
Dec-2015 62.7% 5.0%
Jan-2016 62.7% 4.9%
Feb-2016 62.8% 4.9%
Mar-2016 62.9% 5.0%
Apr-2016 62.8% 5.0%
May-2016 62.7% 4.8%
Jun-2016 62.7% 4.9%
Jul-2016 62.8% 4.8%
Aug-2016 62.9% 4.9%
Sep-2016 62.9% 5.0%
Oct-2016 62.8% 4.9%
Nov-2016 62.7% 4.7%
Dec-2016 62.7% 4.7%
Jan-2017 62.9% 4.7%
Feb-2017 62.9% 4.7%
Mar-2017 62.9% 4.4%
Apr-2017 62.9% 4.4%
May-2017 62.8% 4.4%
Jun-2017 62.8% 4.3%
Jul-2017 62.9% 4.3%
Aug-2017 62.9% 4.4%
Sep-2017 63.1% 4.2%
Oct-2017 62.7% 4.1%
Nov-2017 62.8% 4.2%
Dec-2017 62.7% 4.1%
Jan-2018 62.7% 4.1%
Feb-2018 63.0% 4.1%
Mar-2018 62.9% 4.0%
Apr-2018 62.8% 3.9%
May-2018 62.8% 3.8%
Jun-2018 62.9% 4.0%
Jul-2018 62.9% 3.9%
Aug-2018 62.7% 3.8%
Sep-2018 62.7% 3.7%
Oct-2018 62.9% 3.8%
Nov-2018 62.9% 3.7%
Dec-2018 63.1% 3.9%
Jan-2019 63.2% 4.0%
Feb-2019 63.2% 3.8%
Mar-2019 63.0% 3.8%
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Now you see them, now you don’t: Vanishing benefits for U.S. workers in NAFTA-2 (USMCA) deal

The purported benefits of the U.S.-Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA, or NAFTA-2) for American workers are so tiny, one can hardly see them.

The U.S. International Trade Commission’s recent study of the economic impacts of the USMCA finds that it will have small, but positive, effects on U.S. output (GDP up 0.35 percent over six years), employment (176,000 jobs or 0.12 percent) and wages (up 0.27 percent). However, these projections are based on a number of questionable assumptions about the impacts of the trade deal, “assuming” for example that Mexico will adopt new labor legislation that will improve labor rights in that country, and “that these provisions are enforced” and Mexican union wages increase by 17.2 percent as a result. Furthermore, the ITC claims that U.S. wages will rise as a direct result of improved labor rights enforcement in Mexico, although that conclusion is not supported by the results of their own model.

These findings illustrate a much larger problem with the outdated modeling approach used by the ITC, which assumes that the purpose of trade and investment deals, such as the USMCA, is to reduce tariffs. However, the most important provisions of modern international economic agreements, such as the USMCA and the World Trade Organization, lay down rules governing matters such as foreign investment, services trade, government procurement, data transmission and storage, food and product safety standards, as well as labor rights and environmental standards. These rules govern how countries trade and businesses invest and how our economies are governed and regulated. At the end of the day, they determine who wins and loses, how income is distributed, the tradeoffs between corporate power and control, and whether the rights of workers, the public and the environment will be protected from transnational abuses from big business and big government.

Chapter 8 of the ITC report on the USMCA (p. 215) makes the following erroneous claim: The Commission estimates that the collective bargaining legislation will likely increase unionization rates and wages in Mexico and also increase Mexican output. This, in turn, would be expected to increase U.S. output and employment also, resulting in a small (0.27 percent) increase in U.S. real wages to attract the new workers.

This claim is not supported by the model results. Appendix F of the ITC report (Modeling the Labor Provisions, Table F.5 (p 327)) reports the results of a sensitivity analysis showing the impacts of various assumptions about the size of the Mexican union wage premium (17.5 percent, 32.7 percent, and 37.5 percent) on US macroeconomic variables, including GDP, total employment and wages. The first of these is the base case for the ITC’s overall estimates. These simulations resulted in no significant changes between the base case and alternatives (despite much higher assumed union wage premiums in Mexico) in the estimated impact of the USMCA on GDP (0.35 percent), wages (0.27 percent), or employment (176,000 jobs) in the United States, despite roughly doubling the assumed impact of collective bargaining on wages in Mexico (GDP and total U.S. employment increased very slightly in these simulations, by between 1/10 to 3/10 of 1 percent, as the Mexican wage premium was doubled).

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Toxic stress and children’s outcomes

Toxic Stress and Children’s Outcomes, a new report published jointly by the Economic Policy Institute and the Opportunity Institute, urges policymakers and educators to join health care researchers and clinicians in paying greater attention to the contribution of “toxic stress” to deterioration in children’s academic performance, behavior, and health.

The epidemiological research literature is rich with discussions of how toxic stress in children predicts depressed outcomes. And yet policymakers, educators, researchers, and clinicians have only recently begun to explore policies and interventions that might help to mitigate toxic stress and its effects on children.

“Stress” is a commonplace term for bodily chemical changes in response to frightening or threatening events or conditions. A normal response to a frightening or threatening situation is the production of hormones that can affect almost every tissue and organ in the body. Tolerable stress can contribute to better performance if individuals react by heightening their focus on the fright or threat without distraction.

But when frightening or threatening situations occur too frequently or are too intense, and when protective factors are insufficient to mitigate children’s stress to a tolerable level, these hormonal changes are deemed “toxic” and can impede children’s behavior, cognitive capacity, and emotional and physical health. Toxic stress produces not heightened focus but the opposite, a decrease in performance levels.

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Millions of workers are paid less than the ‘average’ minimum wage

Last week, the New York Times published an article in “The Upshot” by Ernie Tedeschi, which argues that after accounting for state and local minimum wages, the United States currently has its highest average effective minimum wage ever at $11.80 per hour. The article correctly underscores how after 10 years of inaction at the federal level, so much of the policy work being done to boost wages for low-wage workers is happening at the state and local level. Yet, it is important to recognize that even with state and local governments taking action in many places, there are still millions of workers being paid significantly lower wages than the “average” minimum wage as calculated in the Upshot piece. In fact, raising the federal minimum wage to $11.80 would directly lift wages for 18.6 million workers, or 12.8 percent of the wage-earning workforce. Moreover, calculating the average effective minimum wage is very sensitive to how one defines the workforce affected by the policy. One would arrive at a much lower average minimum wage if considering the broader low-wage workforce for whom minimum wage policy is relevant.

The Upshot piece explores how the share of workers being paid exactly the federal minimum wage is relatively small. There are two reasons why this is the case. First, the article observes that 89 percent of minimum-wage workers are paid more than the federal $7.25, because 29 states and some 40+ cities and counties have set their own minimum wages above the federal floor. Higher state and local minimum wages—all of which can be found in EPI’s Minimum Wage Tracker—are the result of federal inaction and also due to the tremendous success of the Fight for 15 movement in raising awareness about low wages and pushing for minimum wage increases across the country.

Second, the share of workers being paid the federal minimum wage potentially overlooks millions of workers in states with low minimum wages who are earning only somewhat above the required federal minimum. For example, in Texas, a state stuck at the federal minimum wage, 2.7 percent of workers reported earning less than $7.50 per hour last year. But four times as many workers in Texas, or 11.0 percent, earned less than $10.00 per hour. This contrasts sharply with California, where there are higher state and local minimum wages: there, only 3.8 percent of the workforce reported earning less than $10.00 per hour last year. (These calculations use Current Population Survey data.)

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Nevada state government has fiscal challenges–but granting state employees the right to bargain collectively does not add to them

A bill introduced in the Nevada State Senate (SB135) would allow state workers to collectively bargain over wages and benefits, a right they have been denied since 1965.

Opponents of public sector unions have begun making the usual arguments against granting Nevada state employees these rights. In two recent reports the Las Vegas Metro Chamber of Commerce (COC) and the Nevada Policy Research Institute (NPRI) make two essential arguments: granting state employees the right to bargain collectively will increase state spending and hence the tax burden on Nevadans, and these state employees are already overpaid, and collective bargaining rights would just make this worse. This logic ranges from myopic to misleading to outright false.

Take the first argument—that collective bargaining rights will reliably lead to higher state spending and a higher tax burden on Nevadans. The opposition to SB135 is trying to invoke a knee-jerk response from Nevadans to see higher spending as a bad thing always and everywhere; but what’s the evidence that Nevada’s spending has become bloated instead of inefficiently low? Take higher education. In the decade between 2008 and 2018 inflation-adjusted higher education spending per student in Nevada fell by 22.2 percent, a much worse performance than the national average. These cuts led directly to a staggering 56 percent increase in tuition for public universities over this same time period—one of the ten steepest tuition increases across the 50 states. Given this track record, the real problem facing Nevadans doesn’t seem to be ever-growing spending, but savage austerity that is sacrificing the future.

But maybe granting collective bargaining rights will radically overcorrect this problem and lead to Nevada becoming a profligate spender? It hasn’t happened in the K-12 education sector, where local government employees (including all teachers) currently have the right to bargain collectively. Even in this sector the downward pressure leading to inefficiently low spending has been ferocious. In a recent report card on education in Nevada, the Children’s Advocacy Alliance (CAA) gave the state an ‘F’ on funding, with low funding leading to some of the highest student-to-teacher ratios in the nation (48th out of 50). As recent teacher strikes over starved resources (not just pay) have shown in states like Oklahoma and West Virginia, lack of collective bargaining rights can lead to inefficiently low educational investments in states.

In short, the claim that collective bargaining rights always lead to bloated spending levels is a caricature. Instead, sometimes these rights provide a check (often insufficient) against relentless downward pressure on spending that leads to destructive cuts. The best empirical research linking public sector collective bargaining and state and local government spending finds mixed results, with the causal effect of collective bargaining rights in pushing up state spending either weak or non-existent. Given this evidence, the empirical claims made by opponents of SB135 about the magnitude of state spending increases that would occur should it pass are frankly absurd—they would require state employees’ compensation to rise by over 30 percent, with no beneficial effects on the state budget stemming from higher productivity or lower turnover or fewer state workers drawing public assistance benefits—all offsets that we know often accompany wage increases. The Chamber of Commerce study forecasts an even more outlandish increase—with total state spending forecast to rise more than the total amount spent on state employee compensation in the latest year of data.

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Evidence that tight labor markets really will increase labor’s share of income: Economic Policy Institute Macroeconomics Newsletter

Josh Bivens, Director of Research

In a previous edition of this newsletter, I highlighted the labor share of income as a target variable the Fed should be monitoring to assess whether or not the U.S. labor market has returned to full health. Specifically, I argued that a period of above-trend growth in wages should be allowed if it leads to steady clawbacks in the share of national income that labor lost during earlier phases of the economic recovery and expansion. Figure A shows the evolution of labor’s share of income in the corporate sector in recent decades; it clearly documents that the post–Great Recession collapse in labor’s share has still largely not been reversed.1

Figure A

Workers' share of corporate income hasn't recovered: Share of corporate-sector income received by workers over recent business cycles, 1979–2018

date Labor share
Jan-1979 79.08%
Apr-1979 79.52%
Jul-1979 80.29%
Oct-1979 80.81%
Jan-1980 81.28%
Apr-1980 82.76%
Jul-1980 81.96%
Oct-1980 80.65%
Jan-1981 80.38%
Apr-1981 80.46%
Jul-1981 79.67%
Oct-1981 80.48%
Jan-1982 81.52%
Apr-1982 80.90%
Jul-1982 81.02%
Oct-1982 81.59%
Jan-1983 81.00%
Apr-1983 79.95%
Jul-1983 79.47%
Oct-1983 79.07%
Jan-1984 77.85%
Apr-1984 78.02%
Jul-1984 78.52%
Oct-1984 78.41%
Jan-1985 78.50%
Apr-1985 78.73%
Jul-1985 78.43%
Oct-1985 79.77%
Jan-1986 80.14%
Apr-1986 80.99%
Jul-1986 81.75%
Oct-1986 82.02%
Jan-1987 81.98%
Apr-1987 81.16%
Jul-1987 80.66%
Oct-1987 81.23%
Jan-1988 81.24%
Apr-1988 81.20%
Jul-1988 81.07%
Oct-1988 80.46%
Jan-1989 80.93%
Apr-1989 81.15%
Jul-1989 81.20%
Oct-1989 82.18%
Jan-1990 82.04%
Apr-1990 81.91%
Jul-1990 82.95%
Oct-1990 83.44%
Jan-1991 82.47%
Apr-1991 82.72%
Jul-1991 83.04%
Oct-1991 83.54%
Jan-1992 83.17%
Apr-1992 83.35%
Jul-1992 83.77%
Oct-1992 83.19%
Jan-1993 83.67%
Apr-1993 82.89%
Jul-1993 82.86%
Oct-1993 81.60%
Jan-1994 81.59%
Apr-1994 81.44%
Jul-1994 80.82%
Oct-1994 80.51%
Jan-1995 80.82%
Apr-1995 80.55%
Jul-1995 79.69%
Oct-1995 79.86%
Jan-1996 79.30%
Apr-1996 79.26%
Jul-1996 79.40%
Oct-1996 79.48%
Jan-1997 79.13%
Apr-1997 79.05%
Jul-1997 78.40%
Oct-1997 78.69%
Jan-1998 79.81%
Apr-1998 80.08%
Jul-1998 79.99%
Oct-1998 80.64%
Jan-1999 80.45%
Apr-1999 80.71%
Jul-1999 81.10%
Oct-1999 81.48%
Jan-2000 81.93%
Apr-2000 82.01%
Jul-2000 82.48%
Oct-2000 83.19%
Jan-2001 83.32%
Apr-2001 82.92%
Jul-2001 83.09%
Oct-2001 84.12%
Jan-2002 82.22%
Apr-2002 82.04%
Jul-2002 81.95%
Oct-2002 80.92%
Jan-2003 80.50%
Apr-2003 80.34%
Jul-2003 79.97%
Oct-2003 79.99%
Jan-2004 78.89%
Apr-2004 78.78%
Jul-2004 78.69%
Oct-2004 78.56%
Jan-2005 77.12%
Apr-2005 76.94%
Jul-2005 77.10%
Oct-2005 75.90%
Jan-2006 75.55%
Apr-2006 75.48%
Jul-2006 74.82%
Oct-2006 76.10%
Jan-2007 77.40%
Apr-2007 76.97%
Jul-2007 78.18%
Oct-2007 79.22%
Jan-2008 79.66%
Apr-2008 79.73%
Jul-2008 80.03%
Oct-2008 83.77%
Jan-2009 79.96%
Apr-2009 79.64%
Jul-2009 78.60%
Oct-2009 77.57%
Jan-2010 76.47%
Apr-2010 76.86%
Jul-2010 74.87%
Oct-2010 74.95%
Jan-2011 77.04%
Apr-2011 75.86%
Jul-2011 75.91%
Oct-2011 74.14%
Jan-2012 73.77%
Apr-2012 74.02%
Jul-2012 74.30%
Oct-2012 75.08%
Jan-2013 74.67%
Apr-2013 74.86%
Jul-2013 75.03%
Oct-2013 74.66%
Jan-2014 75.95%
Apr-2014 74.21%
Jul-2014 73.42%
Oct-2014 73.85%
Jan-2015 74.22%
Apr-2015 74.44%
Jul-2015 75.02%
Oct-2015 75.56%
Jan-2016 75.47%
Apr-2016 75.44%
Jul-2016 75.44%
Oct-2016 75.62%
Jan-2017 76.14%
Apr-2017 75.85%
Jul-2017 76.28%
Oct-2017 76.32%
Jan-2018 76.25%
Apr-2018 75.87%
Jul-2018 75.27%
Oct-2018 75.67%

 

ChartData Download data

The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

Notes: Shaded areas denote recessions. Federal Reserve banks’ corporate profits were netted out in the calculation of labor share.

Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis National Income and Product Accounts (Tables 1.14 and 6.16D)

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That newsletter wasn’t the first time I’ve stressed that the Fed should allow ever-tighter labor markets until the labor share of income normalizes or until there is an extended period of above-target price inflation. The argument, put simply, is this: If price inflation accelerates well before the clawback of labor’s share of income, this would be some evidence that structural changes (perhaps growing industrial concentration of product markets) have contributed to the fall in labor’s share, and that tighter labor markets by themselves will not be enough to return this measure to pre–Great Recession levels. However, if we don’t see this outbreak of extended above-trend price inflation well before any clawback, it means the Fed can and should strive to restore labor’s share by keeping labor markets tight.

In today’s newsletter, I follow up on those arguments, looking specifically at whether there really is a reliable positive effect of tight labor markets on labor income shares. If there is such a reliable effect, this provides a strong argument that the Fed should keep labor markets tight until labor’s share moves much closer to its pre-recession levels.

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Social Security trustees report shows modest improvement in financial outlook

The big news in the Social Security trustees report released yesterday is that the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) trust fund depletion date was extended 20 years, to 2052. Recent declines in SSDI applications and in assumed SSDI take-up going forward contribute to a small improvement in Social Security’s overall financial status, as did higher-than-projected mortality in recent years.

Other demographic factors—recent and projected declines in the birth rate and immigration—had negative effects on the program’s finances, though not enough to offset higher-than-expected mortality. However, when combined with the “valuation period” effect—the retirement of the large Baby Boomer cohort and subsequent slowdown in the growth rate of the working-age population—the demographic factors are essentially a wash—reducing the projected long-term deficit by .01 percent of payroll.

Economic factors included both positive and negative factors, but on balance increased the projected deficit by .04 percent of payroll. The positive factors include lower expected inflation, slightly higher long-term wage growth, and the current strong economy as a starting point for projections. The negative factors were lower productivity growth and interest rate assumptions. With the aforementioned positive effect of changes to disability experience and assumptions, which reduced the projected deficit by .07 percent of payroll, and minor technical adjustments, the overall effect was to shrink the projected deficit by .06 percent of payroll over the 75-year window.

Is this good news? Yes, in the sense that the annual release of the report often serves as an excuse for fearmongering. It’s more challenging to put a doom-and-gloom spin on an improved financial outlook—though some will inevitably try. One possible news hook is the fact that the combined “old age” and “disability” trust funds (often simply referred to as “the [combined] trust fund”) will start to shrink next year as more Baby Boomers retire. This is entirely proper and predictable—the Baby Boomers are the reason we built up the trust fund in the first place—but it has never stopped anyone from yelling “Social Security is going bankrupt!” in a crowded theater of bad ideas. (The challenge for the doomsayers, rather, is that they’ve been saying this ever since Social Security revenues minus the interest on trust fund assets weren’t enough to cover benefit payments, so this talking point has become a bit dull with time.)

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And if you believe this, I’ve got a great deal to sell you: The economic impacts of the revised NAFTA (USMCA) Agreement

The North American Free Trade Agreement resulted in growing trade deficits with Mexico and steep U.S. job losses after it was implemented in 1994, increasing the bilateral trade gap by at least $97.2 billion and costing at least 682,900 jobs through 2010.

Can NAFTA 2.0 do any better?

The U.S. International Trade Commission’s (ITC) new report on the economic impact of the U.S.—Mexico–Canada Trade Agreement, released last week, projects that the revised NAFTA (USMCA) will have tiny impacts on the economy. The ITC estimates the deal will increase GDP by 0.35% when it is fully implemented (six years after it takes effect), or roughly 10 weeks of growth. Similarly, it projects that 175,000 jobs will be added in the domestic economy, a 0.1 percent increase in total employment (based on CBO projections for the economy in 2025), or roughly as many jobs as the economy adds in a normal month, over the next six years. And it claims real wages will rise about one-quarter of a percentage point (0.27 percent), roughly 4 percent of what workers are expected to gain, in real terms, over the next six years, if promised gains in output and employment are realized.

But there are strong reasons to doubt that these gains will be achieved. The ITC results show that the deal will yield remarkably small gains, and those gains rest on questionable assumptions about how the deal will help workers and the economy. Perhaps the most problematic finding in the ITC study (p. 25) was that labor provisions in the USMCA “would increase Mexico union wages by 17.2 percent, assuming that these provisions are enforced.” Given that unionization rates in the durable goods sectors of Mexican manufacturing are reported to be 20.2 percent (Table F.4), these would be massive impacts, indeed. Yet Mexican workers will not benefit unless there are mechanisms to ensure that labor rights enforcement does improve, but those provisions do not yet exist in the agreement.

Thus, it is not surprising to find that the AFL-CIO, other labor unions, and many members of Congress are demanding that “swift [and] certain enforcement tools” are included in the deal before it is submitted to Congress. These concerns also apply to segments of the agreement that pertain to the environment, access to medicines. Furthermore, the assumption that Mexican union wages will increase 17.2 percent seems especially heroic, within the 6-year adjustment period in the ITC model (p 23.), in light of the struggles that will be required to unionize such a large share of the labor force.

The ITC’s economic impact projections are built on a series of heroic assumptions that are built into its “computable general equilibrium (CGE) model.” The ITC model assumes the economy is always at full employment; that trade deals do not cause trade imbalances, job losses, growing income inequality, or downward pressure on the wages of most workers, and environmental damages;, and that the more expensive drugs, movies and software don’t otherwise harm consumers or the economy.

In particular, the ITC study assumes that the overall U.S. trade balance is unchanged by the deal (despite its significant changes in the rules of governing, trade, labor and the environment). Peter Dorman pointed out the problems with CGE models nearly two decades ago, as have many others, and yet the ITC staff, and other economists keep using them anyway.

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