There were 47.8 million migrants and immigrants who resided in the United States as of 2023 (see Figure A), which includes all foreign-born persons of any immigration status and those who lack a status.

This estimate is based on American Community Survey (ACS) data, a commonly used source for the size of the immigrant population. Because the latest ACS data only run through 2023, we also show more recent data based on the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS counts 51.2 million foreign-born persons residing in the United States in 2024.

While the absolute number of foreign-born persons in the United States has increased by about 17 to 21 million since 2000, and by about 8 to 13 million since 2010, they make up just a slightly higher share of the total U.S. population today. As Figure B shows, about 11.1% of the U.S. population were foreign-born in 2000 according to the ACS, and this figure increased by almost 2 percentage points a decade later (with immigrants making up 12.9% of the total U.S. population in 2010) and then rose to 14.3% in 2023. According to the Current Population Survey, the immigrant population has increased its share by less than 5 percentage points between 2000 and 2024.1

As the figures above suggest, 2023 and 2024 saw an increase in immigration, but there is some uncertainty about the exact size of that increase.2

Notes

1. EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey (ACS), 1-Year 2022 microdata and Current Population Surveys.

2. See for example, Congressional Budget Office, “The Demographic Outlook: 2024 to 2054,” January 2024; Wendy Edelberg and Tara Watson, New Immigration Estimates Help Make Sense of the Pace of Employment, The Hamilton Project, The Brookings Institution, March 2024; Justin Fox, “Illegal US Border Crossings Aren’t Really Breaking Records,” Bloomberg, March 20, 2024.

Foreign-born persons in the United States generally fall into four major categories in terms of immigration status. Two of the statuses provide nearly full and equal rights to foreign-born persons on par with U.S.-born citizens, one is temporary, and the last one is the absence of a status:

• lawful permanent residence (commonly referred to as having a “green card”)
• citizenship (meaning they have become naturalized U.S. citizens after having a green card)
• temporary lawful status (known as a “nonimmigrant” status because they are residing in the United States with a nonimmigrant visa, which only provides a temporary status)
• the lack of a lawful immigration status (often referred to as being in an undocumented, unauthorized, or irregular status)

Some migrants who lack a formal immigration status may, nevertheless, be in an authorized period of stay in the United States where they are temporarily “lawfully present,” which can occur if they have qualified for some sort of temporary immigration relief like deferred action, parole, or Temporary Protected Status, or if they are pursuing an asylum claim.3 Because of their temporary nature, we refer to them as precarious statuses (see the forthcoming section on precarious statuses in this FAQ). Other analysts like those at the Migration Policy Institute have referred to them as “twilight,” “liminal,” or “limbo” statuses.4 For the purpose of broader population estimates—in part because of data limitations—the migrants who have qualified for some sort of precarious temporary immigration relief are counted as unauthorized immigrants, even though they technically have a form of authorized stay.5

According to an analysis by the Pew Research Center, represented in Figure A, as of 2022, roughly half of all immigrants were naturalized U.S. citizens (49%), nearly one-quarter were lawful permanent residents (24%), 4% were temporary lawful residents, and 23% were unauthorized immigrants (lacking an immigration status).6

Our analysis of American Community Survey data in Figure B looks at the immigrant population over time according to citizenship status. Figure B shows that of the roughly 48 million immigrants in the United States, slightly more than half (52.3%) are naturalized U.S. citizens. The share of naturalized immigrants has increased by 12.1 percentage points over the last two decades, from 40.2% in 2000 to 52.3% in 2023. As a result, the share of immigrants who are noncitizens has decreased since 2000: Less than half (47.7%) of immigrants were noncitizens in 2023. In terms of the absolute number of immigrants who report noncitizen status, it has changed relatively little since 2010 when it totaled 22.5 million.

Notes

3. For more discussion on lawful presence and lawful status, see for example, Beth Werlin, “Digesting the Argument in U.S. v. Texas: What Is Lawful Presence and Why Does It Not Mean What It Sounds Like?” Immigration Impact, American Immigration Council, April 16, 2016.

4. See for example, Muzaffar Chishti and Kathleen Bush-Joseph, “In the Twilight Zone: Record Number of U.S. Immigrants Are in Limbo Statuses,” Policy Beat, Migration Policy Institute, August 2, 2023; Muzaffar Chishti, Kathleen Bush-Joseph, and Colleen Putzel-Kavanaugh, “Biden at the Three-Year Mark: The Most Active Immigration Presidency Yet Is Mired in Border Crisis Narrative,” Policy Beat, Migration Policy Institute, January 19, 2024.

5. See further discussion of persons in “twilight” statuses in Ariel G. Ruiz Soto, Julia Gelatt, and Jennifer Van Hook, “Diverse Flows Drive Increase in U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population,” Commentaries, Migration Policy Institute, July 2024.

6. Jeffrey S. Passel and Jens Manuel Krogstad, “What We Know About Unauthorized Immigrants Living in the U.S.,” Pew Research Center, July 22, 2024.

The U.S. foreign-born population is not a monolith in terms of race and ethnicity. Most immigrants (78.1%) self-identified as being of a single race, while 21.9% of immigrants identified as being multiracial with two or more races in 2023.7

Figure A shows the breakdown among immigrants who identify as a single race: 26.8% Asian, 20.1% white (15.9% were white alone, not Hispanic or Latino), 9.2% Black, 1.3% American Indian and Alaska Native, and less than 1% Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander. About 1 in 5 (20.4%) foreign-born individuals identified as being of some other race in 2023.

Figure B looks specifically at the portion of the U.S. immigrant population that identifies as Hispanic or Latina/Latino. It shows that, perhaps contrary to popular perception, less than half (44.8%) of all immigrants in the United States identified as Hispanic or Latina/Latino in 2023. Only 33.5% (or 21.5 million) of the 65.1 million Hispanics and Latinos in the United States are foreign-born.8

Notes

7. U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Characteristics of the Native and Foreign-Born Populations, American Community Survey, ACS 1-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S0501, 2023. Accessed March 10, 2025, from https://data.census.gov/table/ACSST1Y2023.S0501?q=Native+and+Foreign+Born.

8. U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Population Profile in the United States. American Community Survey, ACS 1-Year Estimates Subject Tables, Table S0201, 2023. Accessed March 10, 2025, from https://data.census.gov/table/ACSSPP1Y2023.S0201?t=400&d=ACS+1-Year+Estimates+Selected+Population+Profiles.

For the United States as a whole, immigrants’ share of total output was 18.0% in 2023 (see Table 1) or $2.1 trillion in 2024 dollars. This means that the contribution of immigrants to economic output is larger than their share of the total population, as immigrants made up 14.3% of the total U.S. population in the same year.

One way to quantify the contribution of immigrants to the U.S. economy is by accounting for the wages and salaries they earn, as well as the income of immigrant-owned businesses, as a share of all wages, salaries, and business income during a given period. For the United States as a whole, immigrants’ share of total output was 18.0% in 2023 (see Table 1) or $2.1 trillion in 2024 dollars. This means that the contribution of immigrants to economic output is larger than their share of the total population, as immigrants made up 14.3% of the total U.S. population in the same year.

Immigrants have an outsized role in U.S. economic output because they are disproportionately likely to be working and are concentrated among prime working ages. Despite accounting for 14.3% of the population, immigrants made up 18.6% of the labor force in 2023.9 Immigrants are also more likely to start businesses. Relative to their share of the population and to native-born peers, immigrants are significantly more likely to start companies of all sizes, including those that generate employment.10 Between 2005 and 2010, by one measure, immigrants had an 80% higher rate of firm founding than their U.S.-born peers.11 Even if many of these business openings ultimately result in closings, the constant churn is important to economic growth. According to another study, immigrants in 2013 accounted for 16% of the U.S. labor force but were 18% of business owners, and 28% of main street businesses, which are defined by the authors as retail, food services and accommodation, and neighborhood services such as nail salons, beauty shops, and gas stations).12

Notes

9. EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population Survey public data series, Table A-7: Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Nativity and Sex, Not Seasonally Adjusted. Retrieved March 10, 2025.

10. Pierre Azoulay, Benjamin F. Jones, J. Daniel Kim, and Javier Miranda, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship in the United States,” American Economic Review: Insights 4, no. 1 (March 2022): 71–88.

11. Pierre Azoulay, Benjamin F. Jones, J. Daniel Kim, and Javier Miranda, “Immigration and Entrepreneurship in the United States,” American Economic Review: Insights 4, no. 1 (March 2022): 71–88.

12. David Dyssegaard Kallick, Bringing Vitality to Main Street: How Immigrant Small Businesses Help Local Economies Grow, Fiscal Policy Institute and Americas Society/Council of The Americas, January 2015.

The size of the immigrant workforce in the United States has steadily increased over the last three decades. As Figure A shows, immigrants comprised 19.2% of the total labor force in 2024, up from 9.8% in 1994, according to the Current Population Survey.

The total number of immigrants grew fastest in the late 1990s and then gradually slowed until rising again in 2023 and 2024. After a fall in immigration during the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, the immigrant workforce grew to a total of 32.2 million in 2024.

Immigration is an important source of growth in the size of the U.S. workforce, particularly because overall U.S. population growth has been slowing. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau recently estimated that if there were no future immigration, the overall U.S. population would begin to shrink in absolute terms.13

In terms of the workforce, immigration is a major reason the U.S. labor force has grown in recent years. As Figure A shows, the number of people in the labor force in their prime working years (ages 25 through 54) grew by 13.6 million between 1994 and 2024. Almost all of the increase was due to a growing immigrant population. Without immigrants, the prime-age labor force in 2024 would essentially be at 1994 levels.

Notes

13. U.S. Census Bureau, “U.S. Population Projected to Begin Declining in Second Half of Century” (press release Number CB23-189, November 9, 2023.

The commonly held belief that most immigrants work in low-wage jobs is inaccurate. As depicted in Figure A, the Immigration Research Initiative found that among persons who work full-time and year-round, immigrants are just as likely as U.S.-born workers to have higher-wage jobs that pay more than twice the median earnings level (both are at 17%). They also found that 65% of immigrant workers who work full-time and year-round earn at least two-thirds of median earnings.

Immigrants may be overrepresented in some jobs and underrepresented in others, but the difference between the U.S.- and foreign-born shares is rarely as dramatic as is often assumed. Immigrants are strongly represented in some high-wage jobs and play a significant role in many middle-wage jobs. For example, 25.0% of dental, nursing, and health aides are immigrants, as are 38.7% of computer software developers—well above immigrants’ 19.1% share of employment overall.14 While immigrants are overrepresented in low-wage occupations, immigrants are a significant part of the top, middle, and bottom of the economic ladder in the workforce.

Immigrants and U.S.-born workers have similar levels of college education. As Figure B shows, 39% of immigrants in the labor force have an undergraduate degree or higher, compared with 41% of those who are U.S.-born. Immigrants, however, are much more likely to have less than a high school diploma compared with U.S.-born workers, although they are equally as likely to have only a high school diploma as U.S.-born workers, at 26%.

Notes

14. Analysis of the 2024 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata. “Dental, nursing, and health aides” refers to the occupations Home Health Aides, Personal Care Aides, Nursing Assistants, Orderlies and Psychiatric Aides, Occupational Therapy Assistants and Aides, Physical Therapist Assistants and Aides, Massage Therapists, Dental Assistants, and Medical Assistants.

In 2024, immigrants made up about 19.1% percent of U.S. employment, and many are disproportionately concentrated within a select number of occupations. Table 1 shows the top-10 major occupation groups with the highest shares of immigrants. The “Immigrant share of occupation” column shows the share of all workers in the occupation who are foreign-born. Table 1 shows that these top-10 occupations have immigrant shares of employment ranging from about 22% to 40%, and altogether the top 10 comprise just over half of all employed immigrants in 2024.

In 2024, 2.3 million immigrants were employed in “building and grounds cleaning and maintenance” occupations, like janitors, custodial workers, and landscapers, accounting for 40% of employment in the occupation, making it the top occupation, along with “farming, fishing, and forestry,” an occupation within the broader agricultural industry, which was also 40%. Immigrants were also about one out of every four (24%) workers in “healthcare support occupations,” which includes jobs like home care aides and nursing, dental, and medical assistants.

While immigrants work in some high-paying occupations, many of the occupations where immigrants are disproportionately concentrated typically pay low wages. Table 1 shows that a majority of the top-10 occupation groups with higher shares of immigrants have median hourly wage rates that are substantially lower than the overall national median wage. For example, building and grounds cleaning and maintenance workers, who had a national median wage of $17.95 an hour in 2023, were paid 29% less than the 2024 national median wage of $25.28 per hour.

Health care support occupations are also paid a wage that is much lower than the median national wage (28% lower). These occupations, however, are expected to be among the fastest-growing occupations over the next decade according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).15 If BLS employment projections turn out to be correct and if we assume that immigrant workers will continue to fill the same share of jobs in the occupation that they do now (24%), then that implies that nearly 275,000 more immigrants will be needed for those jobs alone between 2023 and 2033.16 A higher share of immigrants in the occupation would mean more immigrants would be needed. The second-fastest growing occupation according to BLS will be in computer and mathematical occupations, which are expected to grow by 12.9% in the next decade and in which 27% of current workers are immigrants.17

Notes

15. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment Projections and Occupational Outlook Handbook News Release,” Economic News Release USDL-24-1776, August 29, 2024.

16. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) projected that employment health care support occupations would grow by 1,142,400 between 2023 and 2033. See BLS, “Table 1.1 Employment by Major Occupational Group, 2023 and Projected 2033,” U.S. Department of Labor. Last accessed March 25, 2025.

17. The BLS projected that employment in computer and mathematical occupations would grow by 12.9% between 2023 and 2033. See BLS, “Table 1.1 Employment by Major Occupational Group, 2023 and Projected 2033,” U.S. Department of Labor. Last accessed March 25, 2025.

Immigration expands the economy and does not lead to higher jobless rates among U.S.-born jobseekers. The year 2023 was a prime example of this. While the United States likely saw higher-than-usual levels of new immigrant arrivals, the unemployment rate for U.S.-born workers hit a record low, while the share of prime-age U.S.-born individuals with a job and the prime-age labor force participation rate for U.S.-born individuals hit its highest rate in more than two decades.18

It’s important to remember that the number of jobs in an economy is not fixed. As the labor force grows—regardless of the source of this growth—policymakers have both the ability and the responsibility to ensure that there is sufficient demand to provide employment for all willing workers. Policymakers’ ability to generate demand to quickly drive unemployment rates back down after adverse shocks has been confirmed by the experience after the COVID-19 economic shock. The economy returned to the pre-pandemic unemployment rate after just two years (and essentially just one year after vaccines allowed for substantial renormalization of economic activity) because policymakers took their obligation to restore pre-crisis levels of unemployment seriously.

Additionally, immigration does not make the job of ensuring that there is enough demand to keep the available labor supply fully employed much more difficult because new immigrants who join the labor force also create growth in demand, which, in turn, helps create jobs. In other words, immigrants are potential workers, but they are also consumers who increase the demand for goods and services, expanding the overall economy.

Notes

18. Daniel Costa and Heidi Shierholz, “Immigrants Are Not Hurting U.S.-Born Workers: Six Facts to Set the Record Straight,” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), February 20, 2024.

The most rigorous work on the effect of immigration on wages finds extremely modest effects for native-born workers, including those with low levels of education. A review by Giovanni Peri of more than 270 estimates from 27 published studies found that the average effect of immigration on native-born wages is essentially zero.19 Two-thirds of these studies were clustered around zero, finding small positive or small negative effects. The comprehensive National Academies of Science review from 2017 found that “when measured over a period of more than 10 years, the impact of immigration on the wages of natives overall is very small.”20 A recent study by Alessandro Caiumi and Giovanni Peri found even more positive effects, with immigration raising the wages of the average U.S.-born worker, even those with lower levels of education.21

There are several reasons why immigration does not significantly depress U.S.-born workers’ wages at the macro level. One is that while immigration increases the supply of labor available to employers, it does not necessarily push down market wages because immigration also increases the demand for goods and services, as immigrants purchase food and housing, raising the overall demand for labor. Capital investment adjusts to the change in population, reducing the possibility of negative effects on average wages.

Figure A shows estimates from Caiumi and Peri of the effect on wages by education level for U.S.-born workers stemming from immigration flows from 2000–2022.22 The estimates are very small, but positive: Over more than two decades, immigration has raised the average U.S.-born worker’s wage by 0.8%. Workers with a high school diploma or less education saw slightly larger increases in the range of 2.8% to 3.2%. The estimated impact for college-educated workers is slightly negative, but its effect translates into less than 4 cents per hour over more than two decades.23

It is important to note that the above results are for U.S.-born workers only. Previous research by Ottaviano and Peri (from 2012) showed that wage effects of larger immigration flows were more negative for immigrant workers who already resided in the United States.24 This is likely still true,25 as newly arriving immigrants are more likely to possess skills that are similar to those of previous immigrant arrivals. This fact reinforces our emphasis that immigration policies must ensure that immigrant workers arrive in the United States with full labor and workplace rights.

Moreover, because these studies assess immigration at the macro level, they may obscure important differentials in impact based on the immigration status of workers. For example, a recent EPI report discusses the impact of immigration status on wages and working conditions.26 EPI has also published research that demonstrates how work visa programs may permit employers to underpay migrant workers relative to average wage rates, and there is evidence that industries with high concentrations of unauthorized immigrant workers also experience high rates of wage theft and other violations that can undermine standards more broadly.27

Notes

19. Giovanni Peri, “Do Immigrant Workers Depress the Wages of Native Workers?” IZA World of Labor 42: 1–10, May 2014.

20. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, The Economic and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration, National Academies Press, 2017.

21. Alessandro Caiumi and Giovanni Peri, “Immigration’s Effect on US Wages and Employment Redux,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 32389, April 2024.

22. Alessandro Caiumi and Giovanni Peri, “Immigration’s Effect on US Wages and Employment Redux,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper no. 32389, April 2024.

23. The mean wage in 2023 for those with a college degree or higher level of education was $47.72, and a 0.075% change translates into less than $0.04 per hour.

24. Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri, “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages,” Journal of the European Economic Association 10, no. 1: 152–197, February 1, 2012.

25. See for example, Heidi Shierholz, Immigration and Wages: Methodological Advancements Confirm Modest Gains for Native Workers, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #255, February 2010.

26. Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, The U.S. Benefits from Immigration but Policy Reforms Needed to Maximize Gains: Recommendations and a Review of Key Issues to Ensure Fair Wages and Labor Standards for All Workers, Economic Policy Institute, October 2024.

27. See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, H-1B Visas and Prevailing Wage Levels: A Majority of H-1B Employers—Including Major U.S. Tech Firms—Use the Program to Pay Migrant Workers Well Below Market Wages, Economic Policy Institute, May 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, New Evidence of Widespread Wage Theft in the H-1B Visa Program: Corporate Document Reveals How Tech Firms Ignore the Law and Systematically Rob Migrant Workers, Economic Policy Institute, December 2021; Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, September 2009.

To the extent that there are challenges with respect to the nexus of immigration and wages, it is not related to the scale of immigration flows, nor to the characteristics of immigrants, but instead from employers who take advantage of migrant and immigrant workers who lack an immigration status or only have a temporary or precarious status. One need look no further than the landmark study and survey of 4,300 workers in three major cities that found that unauthorized immigrants were more than twice as likely to be victims of wage theft for minimum wage violations than U.S.-born citizens (37.1% to 15.6%).28 Further, the study found that an astounding 84.9% of unauthorized immigrants were not paid the overtime wages they worked for and were legally entitled to.

Employers also take advantage of temporary work visa programs in which workers have limited rights and are tied to one employer.29 Immigration policy with respect to work visas often intentionally gives employers “monopsony power” over workers—tying workers to a single employer and short-circuiting their ability to shop around for better jobs.30 This monopsony power prevents migrants with work visas from getting better jobs and raising their wages, which can have negative spillover effects on U.S.-born workers in the same sectors.

A useful framework for thinking about this is that any situation where workers’ individual bargaining power is reduced is going to put downward pressure on their wages, and therefore, also on the wages of workers in similar occupations and industries. (See more discussion about this in the previous subsection.) The simple policy solution for this is to provide legal status to unauthorized immigrants and to provide a quick path to a permanent status to those who only have a temporary or precarious status. Doing so will allow all immigrant workers to have full workplace rights and hold lawbreaking employers accountable, as well as to more easily join and form unions without fear of retaliation.

To explain further, migrants employed in temporary work visa programs who don’t have the legal right to change employers have greatly reduced bargaining power. If their employer violates their rights and breaks the law, they have very little recourse to hold their employers accountable. If these workers are fired, they become deportable and lose their right to work and remain in the United States. Additionally, some “prevailing” wage rules in temporary work visa programs often allow employers to pay migrants a lower wage than the market rate.

It’s a similar story for unauthorized immigrants. They face real and practical constraints on their bargaining power and labor and employment rights. For example, if they complain about workplace safety violations or about being paid less than the minimum wage, an employer can fire them or threaten them with deportation.

For both groups of workers, their weak bargaining position affects the wages and working conditions of all workers—both native- and foreign-born—in the occupations in which they are employed. Degrading wages and working conditions for one group drags them down for all groups. Granting a permanent immigration status and workplace rights to these workers, however, will raise wages and improve conditions, not just for the workers themselves, but also the native-born workers who work alongside them.

Notes

28. Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2009.

29. For more background, see Daniel Costa, Employers Increase Their Profits and Put Downward Pressure on Wages and Labor Standards by Exploiting Migrant Workers, Economic Policy Institute, August 2019.

30. Bivens and Shierholz broadly define “monopsony power” as “the leverage enjoyed by employers to set their workers’ pay.” See Josh Bivens and Heidi Shierholz, What Labor Market Changes Have Generated Inequality and Wage Suppression?: Employer Power Is Significant but Largely Constant, Whereas Workers’ Power Has Been Eroded by Policy Actions, Economic Policy Institute, December 2018. See also Eric M. Gibbons et al., “Monopsony Power and Guest Worker Programs,” IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper no. 12096, January 2019.