Do Disability Trends Reflect a Liberalization of the Program’s Medical Criteria? 

(This is the fifth of six blog posts on disability.)

Earlier blog posts in this series questioned Stanford economist Mark Duggan’s Senate testimony that disability incidence is rising because low-wage workers have an increasing incentive to apply for benefits instead of working or looking for work. This post considers a related claim made by Duggan: that an increase in the share of beneficiaries with mental health disorders and musculoskeletal conditions reflects “the liberalization of the program’s medical eligibility criteria that occurred in the mid-1980s” and is problematic because “the employment potential of SSDI applicants with these more subjective conditions is substantial and it is often difficult to verify the severity of these conditions.”

The first part of Duggan’s claim is true, but somewhat misleading with respect to mental health. After Congress expanded and clarified eligibility criteria in 1984 in response to an ill-conceived effort by the Reagan Administration to reduce disability rolls, there was a rebound in disabled worker awards for mental health and other conditions. But the share of awards for mental health conditions declined as the baby boomers approached retirement because mental health problems don’t increase with age as much as other conditions.

On the other hand, the share of awards due to musculoskeletal conditions has grown steadily, more than offsetting declines in the shares due to mental health, cancer, and cardiovascular disease (see Figure 1). As discussed in earlier blog posts, there has been no upward trend in overall disability incidence over the past 20 years. Moreover, the employment potential of disability applicants is very low, even among those denied benefits. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask why there has been an increase in the share of awards for musculoskeletal conditions, and why increases in life expectancy due to such factors as a steep decline in smoking and advances in the treatment of cardiovascular disease haven’t led to a decline in overall disability, especially since fewer jobs now require hard physical labor.

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Does Disability Insurance Reduce Labor Force Participation?

(This is the fourth of six blog posts on disability.)

In Senate testimony earlier this year, Stanford economist Mark Duggan claimed that Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) was an “important factor” in the decline in labor force participation in the United States relative to other industrialized countries. In an earlier blog post, I showed that even research cited by Duggan found that disability receipt had a negligible impact on overall employment. Is it still possible that SSDI has a noticeable impact on labor force participation, a measure that includes unemployed workers actively looking for work? It might, if you believe—as Duggan does—that the process of applying for benefits is enough to make people stop looking for work. But as will be detailed in this blog post, there are more likely explanations for the relative decline in labor force participation in the United States compared to Europe, including more supportive labor market policies in Europe.

In his testimony, Duggan points to an increase since 1990 in the prime-age (25-54) labor force participation rate for the EU-15 countries (countries that belonged to the European Union before it expanded into Eastern Europe) and a decline in the same measure in the United States. (Note that Duggan focuses on a measure that excludes older workers who have higher disability rates. The labor force participation of older workers is higher in the United States than in Europe, a fact that does not support Duggan’s claim that disability insurance is keeping Americans out of the labor force.)

Research that considers multiple causes for recent declines in participation in the United States generally finds that an aging workforce and unemployment—especially long-term unemployment—have been the main drivers (see, for example, research from the Council of Economic Advisors and Harvard University). The question is whether SSDI caused some unemployed workers to exit the labor force, or whether they would have exited regardless.

Looking at longer-term trends, the biggest difference between the United States and the EU-15 has been an increase in female employment and labor force participation in Europe, in which the adoption of family-friendly labor policies likely played a role. Prime-age employment rates in Europe are now similar to the United States (solid lines in the figures below) though they remain lower for older workers (dashed lines).

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Clinton Speech Confirms That Presidential Campaigns Will Focus on Wage Stagnation

Hillary Clinton appropriately defines her economic policy goal as raising “incomes for hardworking Americans so they can afford a middle-class life” rather than “hitting some arbitrary growth target untethered to people’s lives and livelihoods.” The object of economic policy, in other words, is not growth or redistribution but higher living standards for the vast majority! Bravo. Equally important is that one of her three pillars of growth—fair growth—focuses on ending the wage stagnation that has limited median incomes for the past generation. America “needs a raise” and we need to reward “actually building and selling things.” As Clinton said, “If you work hard, you ought to be paid fairly.” So, if there was any doubt that addressing wage stagnation would be the central economic policy issue debated in the upcoming Presidential election then Hillary Clinton’s economic vision speech ended it.

Clinton’s speech sets the foundation for the emerging debate on wages by asserting that: (1) wage stagnation is the result of policy choices (it should be added, “on behalf of those with the most income, wealth and power”); and (2) ending wage stagnation is the “core economic challenge” to boosting middle class incomes and lifting more households into the middle class. Let the debate begin. We look forward to hearing from other candidates not only how they plan to obtain growth, but also how such growth will translate to higher pay for the vast majority. That generally hasn’t happened since 1979.

This is, of course, exactly the debate we hoped for when the Economic Policy Institute launched its Raising America’s Pay initiative in June 2014, and it is also how we framed the debate in our initial paper (“Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge”) and in our Raising America’s Pay policy agenda. In fact, making wage growth the central economic issue has been a key conclusion of every State of Working America published since its inception in 1988. Thanks are due to the fast-food and Walmart workers and their allies for establishing that wage growth for the vast majority is the immediate and central economic policy issue. Let the debate begin among the Democrats, among the Republicans, and then between the parties in the general election.

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Do Disability Benefits Reduce Work Effort?

(This is the third of six blog posts on disability.)

In two earlier blog posts, I look at evidence compiled in Senate testimony by Stanford economist Mark Duggan arguing that financial incentives are driving a growth in disability rolls. I cite research showing that disability benefits aren’t growing relative to earnings and that age-adjusted disability incidence isn’t rising, though there has been a modest increase for women offset by a modest decline for men.

This isn’t surprising, because as we’ll see in today’s blog post, even research cited by Duggan and other critics shows that disability receipt has a negligible impact on work effort. Very few beneficiaries would be able to support themselves by working if they weren’t receiving benefits, based on the dismal employment prospects of rejected applicants who were on the margin of being accepted.

Though Duggan and other critics claim disability insurance reduces employment, the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program creates strong incentives for beneficiaries to stay in, or return to, the workforce. Beneficiaries are allowed to earn up to $1090 a month (the current threshold for “substantial gainful activity”) with no reduction in benefits. Since most disabled beneficiaries rely on modest government benefits for most of their incomes (see the Center on Budget and Policy Priority’s informative chartbook), the fact that fewer than 10 percent avail themselves of this opportunity suggests that for most, even part-time or intermittent work isn’t an option. Another 4 percent are able to resume “substantial gainful activity” as their health and job prospects improve. Though the latter will forgo cash benefits if they remain gainfully employed above the SGA threshold for more than 12 months, they retain health benefits regardless of earnings for a longer period and are eligible for expedited reinstatement of cash benefits if their earnings drop. In short, the SSDI program is designed to encourage beneficiaries to return to or stay in the workforce.

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The Game Is Rigged Against Hardworking Americans

The referee might miss an occasional handball, but a soccer game isn’t rigged in favor of one group of players over another. Unlike a soccer game, the most powerful economic actors have rigged the labor market against everyday hardworking Americans. The weak economy following the Great Recession and its aftermath came on the heels of three decades of the systematic reduction of workers bargaining power in the workplace. It’s no surprise then that this morning’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) report shows that the quits rate remains depressed as workers continue to be stuck in jobs that they would leave if they could.

The figure below shows the hires, quits, and layoff rates through May 2015. The layoff rate shot up during the recession but recovered quickly and has been at pre-recession levels for more than three years. The fact that this trend continued in May is a good sign. That said, not only do layoffs need to come down before we see a full recovery in the labor market, but hiring also needs to pick up–the hires rate dipped slightly in May, and is still below where it was at the end of 2014. It had been generally improving, but has shown concerning signs as of late and still remains significantly below its pre-recession level.

JOLTS

Hires, quits, and layoff rates, December 2000-May 2015

Month Hires rate Layoffs rate Quits rate
Dec-2000 4.1% 1.4% 2.3%
Jan-2001 4.4% 1.6% 2.6%
Feb-2001 4.1% 1.4% 2.5%
Mar-2001 4.2% 1.6% 2.4%
Apr-2001 4.0% 1.5% 2.4%
May-2001 4.0% 1.5% 2.4%
Jun-2001 3.8% 1.5% 2.3%
Jul-2001 3.9% 1.5% 2.2%
Aug-2001 3.8% 1.4% 2.1%
Sep-2001 3.8% 1.6% 2.1%
Oct-2001 3.8% 1.7% 2.2%
Nov-2001 3.7% 1.6% 2.0%
Dec-2001 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Jan-2002 3.7% 1.4% 2.2%
Feb-2002 3.7% 1.5% 2.0%
Mar-2002 3.5% 1.4% 1.9%
Apr-2002 3.8% 1.5% 2.1%
May-2002 3.8% 1.5% 2.1%
Jun-2002 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Jul-2002 3.8% 1.5% 2.1%
Aug-2002 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Sep-2002 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Oct-2002 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Nov-2002 3.8% 1.5% 1.9%
Dec-2002 3.8% 1.5% 2.0%
Jan-2003 3.8% 1.5% 1.9%
Feb-2003 3.6% 1.5% 1.9%
Mar-2003 3.4% 1.4% 1.9%
Apr-2003 3.6% 1.6% 1.8%
May-2003 3.5% 1.5% 1.8%
Jun-2003 3.7% 1.6% 1.8%
Jul-2003 3.6% 1.6% 1.8%
Aug-2003 3.6% 1.5% 1.8%
Sep-2003 3.7% 1.5% 1.9%
Oct-2003 3.8% 1.4% 1.9%
Nov-2003 3.6% 1.4% 1.9%
Dec-2003 3.8% 1.5% 1.9%
Jan-2004 3.7% 1.5% 1.9%
Feb-2004 3.6% 1.4% 1.9%
Mar-2004 3.9% 1.4% 2.0%
Apr-2004 3.9% 1.5% 2.0%
May-2004 3.8% 1.4% 1.9%
Jun-2004 3.8% 1.4% 2.0%
Jul-2004 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Aug-2004 3.9% 1.5% 2.0%
Sep-2004 3.8% 1.4% 2.0%
Oct-2004 3.9% 1.4% 2.0%
Nov-2004 3.9% 1.5% 2.1%
Dec-2004 4.0% 1.5% 2.1%
Jan-2005 3.9% 1.4% 2.1%
Feb-2005 3.9% 1.4% 2.0%
Mar-2005 3.9% 1.5% 2.1%
Apr-2005 4.0% 1.4% 2.1%
May-2005 3.9% 1.4% 2.1%
Jun-2005 3.9% 1.5% 2.1%
Jul-2005 3.9% 1.4% 2.0%
Aug-2005 4.0% 1.4% 2.2%
Sep-2005 4.0% 1.4% 2.3%
Oct-2005 3.8% 1.3% 2.2%
Nov-2005 3.9% 1.2% 2.2%
Dec-2005 3.7% 1.3% 2.1%
Jan-2006 3.9% 1.3% 2.1%
Feb-2006 3.9% 1.3% 2.2%
Mar-2006 3.9% 1.2% 2.2%
Apr-2006 3.8% 1.3% 2.1%
May-2006 4.0% 1.4% 2.2%
Jun-2006 3.9% 1.2% 2.2%
Jul-2006 3.9% 1.3% 2.2%
Aug-2006 3.8% 1.2% 2.2%
Sep-2006 3.8% 1.3% 2.1%
Oct-2006 3.8% 1.3% 2.1%
Nov-2006 4.0% 1.3% 2.3%
Dec-2006 3.8% 1.3% 2.2%
Jan-2007 3.8% 1.2% 2.2%
Feb-2007 3.8% 1.3% 2.2%
Mar-2007 3.8% 1.3% 2.2%
Apr-2007 3.7% 1.3% 2.1%
May-2007 3.8% 1.3% 2.2%
Jun-2007 3.8% 1.3% 2.0%
Jul-2007 3.7% 1.3% 2.1%
Aug-2007 3.7% 1.3% 2.1%
Sep-2007 3.7% 1.5% 1.9%
Oct-2007 3.8% 1.4% 2.1%
Nov-2007 3.7% 1.4% 2.0%
Dec-2007 3.6% 1.3% 2.0%
Jan-2008 3.5% 1.3% 2.0%
Feb-2008 3.5% 1.4% 2.0%
Mar-2008 3.4% 1.3% 1.9%
Apr-2008 3.5% 1.3% 2.1%
May-2008 3.3% 1.3% 1.9%
Jun-2008 3.5% 1.5% 1.9%
Jul-2008 3.3% 1.4% 1.8%
Aug-2008 3.3% 1.6% 1.7%
Sep-2008 3.1% 1.4% 1.8%
Oct-2008 3.3% 1.6% 1.8%
Nov-2008 2.9% 1.6% 1.5%
Dec-2008 3.2% 1.8% 1.6%
Jan-2009 3.1% 1.9% 1.5%
Feb-2009 3.0% 1.9% 1.5%
Mar-2009 2.8% 1.8% 1.4%
Apr-2009 2.9% 2.0% 1.3%
May-2009 2.8% 1.6% 1.3%
Jun-2009 2.8% 1.6% 1.3%
Jul-2009 2.9% 1.7% 1.3%
Aug-2009 2.9% 1.6% 1.3%
Sep-2009 3.0% 1.6% 1.3%
Oct-2009 2.9% 1.5% 1.3%
Nov-2009 3.1% 1.4% 1.4%
Dec-2009 2.9% 1.5% 1.3%
Jan-2010 3.0% 1.4% 1.3%
Feb-2010 2.9% 1.4% 1.3%
Mar-2010 3.2% 1.4% 1.4%
Apr-2010 3.1% 1.3% 1.5%
May-2010 3.3% 1.3% 1.4%
Jun-2010 3.1% 1.5% 1.5%
Jul-2010 3.2% 1.6% 1.4%
Aug-2010 3.0% 1.4% 1.4%
Sep-2010 3.1% 1.4% 1.5%
Oct-2010 3.1% 1.3% 1.4%
Nov-2010 3.1% 1.4% 1.4%
Dec-2010 3.2% 1.4% 1.5%
Jan-2011 3.0% 1.3% 1.4%
Feb-2011 3.1% 1.3% 1.4%
Mar-2011 3.3% 1.3% 1.5%
Apr-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
May-2011 3.1% 1.3% 1.5%
Jun-2011 3.3% 1.4% 1.5%
Jul-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Aug-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Sep-2011 3.3% 1.3% 1.5%
Oct-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Nov-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Dec-2011 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Jan-2012 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Feb-2012 3.3% 1.3% 1.6%
Mar-2012 3.3% 1.3% 1.6%
Apr-2012 3.2% 1.4% 1.6%
May-2012 3.3% 1.4% 1.6%
Jun-2012 3.2% 1.3% 1.6%
Jul-2012 3.2% 1.2% 1.6%
Aug-2012 3.3% 1.4% 1.6%
Sep-2012 3.1% 1.3% 1.4%
Oct-2012 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Nov-2012 3.3% 1.3% 1.6%
Dec-2012 3.2% 1.1% 1.6%
Jan-2013 3.3% 1.2% 1.7%
Feb-2013 3.4% 1.2% 1.7%
Mar-2013 3.2% 1.3% 1.5%
Apr-2013 3.3% 1.3% 1.7%
May-2013 3.3% 1.3% 1.6%
Jun-2013 3.2% 1.2% 1.6%
Jul-2013 3.3% 1.2% 1.7%
Aug-2013 3.4% 1.2% 1.7%
Sep-2013 3.4% 1.3% 1.7%
Oct-2013 3.3% 1.1% 1.8%
Nov-2013 3.4% 1.1% 1.8%
Dec-2013 3.3% 1.2% 1.7%
Jan-2014 3.3% 1.3% 1.7%
Feb-2014 3.4% 1.2% 1.8%
Mar-2014 3.4% 1.2% 1.8%
Apr-2014 3.5% 1.2% 1.7%
May-2014 3.5% 1.2% 1.8%
Jun-2014 3.5% 1.2% 1.8%
Jul-2014 3.6% 1.3% 1.8%
Aug-2014 3.4% 1.2% 1.8%
Sep-2014 3.6% 1.2% 2.0%
Oct-2014 3.7% 1.2% 2.0%
Nov-2014 3.6% 1.1% 1.9%
Dec-2014 3.7% 1.2% 1.9%
Jan-2015 3.5% 1.2% 2.0%
Feb-2015 3.6% 1.2% 1.9%
Mar-2015 3.6% 1.3% 2.0%
Apr-2015 3.6% 1.3% 1.9%
May-2015 3.5% 1.2% 1.9%

 

ChartData Download data

The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

Economic Policy Institute

Note: Shaded areas denote recessions. The hires rate is the number of hires during the entire month as a percent of total employment. The layoff rate is the number of layoffs and discharges during the entire month as a percent of total employment. The quits rate is the number of quits during the entire month as a percent of total employment.

Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey

Copy the code below to embed this chart on your website.

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Supreme Court: Fair Housing Act Bars Policies that Segregate, even if Segregation is not Intentional

In June, Supreme Court decisions on Obamacare and same-sex marriage overshadowed another important decision, this one on housing discrimination, confirming that the Fair Housing Act not only prohibits actions or policies that are intentionally bigoted, but also those that have the effect of disadvantaging minorities, even where no racist intent can be proven.

The decision, whose background and implications I have discussed in more detail for The American Prospect in “The Supreme Court’s Challenge to Housing Segregation,” was widely interpreted as a civil rights victory, but yesterday a New York Times editorial disagreed. Supreme Court experts on Scotusblog, the excellent independent journalistic enterprise devoted to covering the court and its decisions, had in the moments after the court’s opinion was handed down, also denied that the decision was an advance for civil rights. On closer examination, however, the Times/Scotusblog theory doesn’t hold up.

“This might seem to be a ‘liberal’ result”, the Times wrote, “except that 11 federal appeals courts had agreed on this reading for decades. There was no legal dispute, in other words, only the persistent efforts of some justices to reverse accepted law because they didn’t like it.” The Scotusblog experts also noted that although Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion endorsed a prohibition on policies that have a discriminatory effect, it also described so many conditions required for proof of discriminatory effects that it seemed to make it more difficult to win cases where only such effects, not intent, have been proven. In sum, the argument went, the fact that this case was heard at all was a civil rights defeat–it is quite unusual for the court to take up a case where all lower courts are in agreement–and although the civil rights opponents lost the case, it gave these opponents tools to narrow, if not eviscerate, the power of the Fair Housing Act.

Justice Kennedy’s warnings about the narrow circumstances in which policies can be prohibited because of their effects, without provable intent, were generally warnings that were already present in appellate and previous Supreme Court decisions–for example, that a policy does not violate civil rights laws simply because there are statistical differences in how it impacts minorities; it also must be “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary”.

In important ways, Justice Kennedy’s opinion may have breathed life into the Fair Housing Law that the law had not previously possessed. The opinion did so by effectively acknowledging that the “Fair Housing Act” is a euphemism–it is not really about “fair” housing, whatever that may mean, but about desegregated housing, which is what the Act was intended to roll back when it was adopted in 1968.

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Tagged

Professor Hubbard’s Claim about Wage and Compensation Stagnation Is Not True

How to combat the wage stagnation that has afflicted the vast majority of American workers has emerged as a key economic issue addressed in speeches and policy deliberations by politicians and candidates in both parties. This is a very positive development–as we at EPI have been saying for quite a while, wage stagnation ranks beside addressing global climate change as the key economic challenge of our time.

A New York Times editorial points out, however, that Glenn Hubbard, a leading conservative economist and key adviser to GOP candidate Jeb Bush, does not seem to believe there is a wage stagnation problem. As an earlier New York Times article pointed out: “Mr. Hubbard argued that ‘compensation didn’t stagnate,’ citing large increases that employers have paid out in health and pension benefits.”

Hubbard is definitely mistaken, as the New York Times indicates and as I demonstrate below by examining actual wage and benefit trends. Shifting the discussion from wages to compensation (wages and benefits) does not alter any of the salient facts about stagnant pay in recent years, especially for the typical worker or for low-wage workers, and not even for the ‘average’ worker (including high wage as well as low and middle-wage workers). In fact, there has been an even greater growth of inequality in total compensation than there has been in wages alone.

The intuition behind Hubbard’s claim is that the costs of benefits provided by employers–especially those for health care insurance–have risen rapidly, suggesting that compensation has risen far more quickly than wages. What this ignores, of course, is that many workers in the bottom half receive very few health or pension benefits and employers provide fewer and fewer workers with health insurance and pension benefits each year. Hubbard’s intuition also ignores that employers have actually cut back on some benefits, particularly pensions, with a concomitant decline in the quality of those benefits (such as by providing defined contribution rather than defined benefit plans).

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How Overtime Rules Could Help the Middle Class

This post originally ran in the Wall Street Journal’s Think Tank blog.

The overtime rules the Obama administration announced Tuesday target genuine problems that middle-wage households face. They also do not require approval from Congress.

American workers’ hourly wage growth has nearly stagnated in recent decades. While this broad-based stagnation affects essentially thebottom 70% of the U.S. workforce, policy proposals to boost wage growth too often begin and end with increasing legislated minimum wages. Such minimum-wage increases, while important policies, generally will not filter up to most middle-class households.

One specific change that could help these middle-class households was proposed Tuesday: raising the salary threshold that determines eligibility for overtime pay.

This wonky-sounding change could have large ramifications: potentially giving 15 million workers rights to higher pay.

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Public Sector Employment Is Stuck in the Doldrums

A big fat zero. That’s how many jobs the public sector added in June. Zero.

To be clear, zero is better than a negative number, which is what we saw for most of the recession. It looks like public sector job losses finally turned a corner in 2014, when the economy added 74,000 public sector jobs. But growth has flattened out in 2015, adding only 8,000 jobs so far this year.

As a direct result of austerity policy, public sector jobs are still nearly half a million down from where they were before the recession began. Moreover, this fails to account for the fact that we would have expected these jobs to grow with the population–taking that into consideration, the economy is short 1.8 million public sector jobs. This shortfall in public sector jobs in turn removes the multiplier effect on private sector demand, snowballing into an even slower recovery.

 

Paltry Wage Growth in June Is Another Sign the Economy Is Only Sputtering Along

Average hourly earnings held steady between May and June at $24.95 per hour, a paltry increase of 2.0 percent over June 2014. Annual growth of 2.0 percent is slow by any measure, but is certainly far below any reasonable wage target. In previous months, there had been some indication that wages might show signs of improvement, but this month’s disappointing report clearly illustrates that the economy has not tightened enough for strong wage growth.

Wage growth needs to be both stronger and consistently strong for a solid spell before we call this a strong economy. As shown in the figure below, nominal wage growth since the recovery officially began in mid-2009 has been low and flat. This isn’t surprising–the weak labor market of the last seven years has put enormous downward pressure on wages. Employers don’t have to offer big wage increases to get and keep the workers they need. And this remains true even as a jobs recovery has consistently forged ahead in recent years.

Given the continued slack in the economy, it’s unfortunate that the most effective policy lever at our disposal for generating a faster recovery–fiscal policy–has been pulled in the wrong direction for years now, with austerity dragging on growth over the recovery. The lack of prospects for any additional fiscal stimulus has only left us with monetary policy levers. Pressure is building on the Fed to reverse its monetary stimulus by raising short-term interest rates to slow the recovery in the name of stopping wage-fueled inflation. Today’s data provide further evidence that these rate hikes should not happen any time soon.

Nominal Wage Tracker

Nominal wage growth has been far below target in the recovery: Year-over-year change in private-sector nominal average hourly earnings, 2007-2016

All nonfarm employees Production/nonsupervisory workers
Mar-2007 3.59% 4.11%
Apr-2007 3.27% 3.85%
May-2007 3.73% 4.14%
Jun-2007 3.81% 4.13%
Jul-2007 3.45% 4.05%
Aug-2007 3.49% 4.04%
Sep-2007 3.28% 4.15%
Oct-2007 3.28% 3.78%
Nov-2007 3.27% 3.89%
Dec-2007 3.16% 3.81%
Jan-2008 3.11% 3.86%
Feb-2008 3.09% 3.73%
Mar-2008 3.08% 3.77%
Apr-2008 2.88% 3.70%
May-2008 3.02% 3.69%
Jun-2008 2.67% 3.62%
Jul-2008 3.00% 3.72%
Aug-2008 3.33% 3.83%
Sep-2008 3.23% 3.64%
Oct-2008 3.32% 3.92%
Nov-2008 3.64% 3.85%
Dec-2008 3.58% 3.84%
Jan-2009 3.58% 3.72%
Feb-2009 3.24% 3.65%
Mar-2009 3.13% 3.53%
Apr-2009 3.22% 3.29%
May-2009 2.84% 3.06%
Jun-2009 2.78% 2.94%
Jul-2009 2.59% 2.71%
Aug-2009 2.39% 2.64%
Sep-2009 2.34% 2.75%
Oct-2009 2.34% 2.63%
Nov-2009 2.05% 2.67%
Dec-2009 1.82% 2.50%
Jan-2010 1.95% 2.61%
Feb-2010 2.00% 2.49%
Mar-2010 1.77% 2.27%
Apr-2010 1.81% 2.43%
May-2010 1.94% 2.59%
Jun-2010 1.71% 2.53%
Jul-2010 1.85% 2.47%
Aug-2010 1.75% 2.41%
Sep-2010 1.84% 2.30%
Oct-2010 1.88% 2.51%
Nov-2010 1.65% 2.23%
Dec-2010 1.74% 2.07%
Jan-2011 1.92% 2.17%
Feb-2011 1.87% 2.12%
Mar-2011 1.87% 2.06%
Apr-2011 1.91% 2.11%
May-2011 2.00% 2.16%
Jun-2011 2.13% 2.00%
Jul-2011 2.26% 2.31%
Aug-2011 1.90% 1.99%
Sep-2011 1.94% 1.93%
Oct-2011 2.11% 1.77%
Nov-2011 2.02% 1.77%
Dec-2011 1.98% 1.77%
Jan-2012 1.75% 1.40%
Feb-2012 1.88% 1.45%
Mar-2012 2.10% 1.76%
Apr-2012 2.01% 1.76%
May-2012 1.83% 1.39%
Jun-2012 1.95% 1.54%
Jul-2012 1.77% 1.33%
Aug-2012 1.82% 1.33%
Sep-2012 1.99% 1.44%
Oct-2012 1.51% 1.28%
Nov-2012 1.90% 1.43%
Dec-2012 2.20% 1.74%
Jan-2013 2.15% 1.89%
Feb-2013 2.10% 2.04%
Mar-2013 1.93% 1.88%
Apr-2013 2.01% 1.73%
May-2013 2.01% 1.88%
Jun-2013 2.13% 2.03%
Jul-2013 1.91% 1.92%
Aug-2013 2.26% 2.18%
Sep-2013 2.04% 2.17%
Oct-2013 2.25% 2.27%
Nov-2013 2.24% 2.32%
Dec-2013 1.90% 2.16%
Jan-2014 1.94% 2.31%
Feb-2014 2.14% 2.45%
Mar-2014 2.18% 2.40%
Apr-2014 1.97% 2.40%
May-2014 2.13% 2.44%
Jun-2014 2.04% 2.34%
Jul-2014 2.09% 2.43%
Aug-2014 2.21% 2.48%
Sep-2014 2.04% 2.27%
Oct-2014 2.03% 2.27%
Nov-2014 2.11% 2.26%
Dec-2014 1.82% 1.87%
Jan-2015 2.23% 2.01%
Feb-2015 2.06% 1.71%
Mar-2015 2.18% 1.90%
Apr-2015 2.34% 2.00%
May-2015 2.34% 2.14%
Jun-2015 2.04% 1.99%
Jul-2015 2.29% 2.04%
Aug-2015 2.32% 2.08%
Sep-2015 2.40% 2.13%
Oct-2015 2.52% 2.36%
Nov-2015 2.39% 2.21%
Dec-2015 2.60% 2.61%
Jan-2016 2.50% 2.50%
Feb-2016 2.38% 2.50%
Mar-2016 2.33% 2.44%
Apr-2016 2.49% 2.53%
May-2016 2.48% 2.33%
Jun-2016 2.64% 2.48%
Jul-2016 2.72% 2.57%
Aug-2016 2.43% 2.46%
Sep-2016 2.59% 2.65%
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Economic Policy Institute

*Nominal wage growth consistent with the Federal Reserve Board's 2 percent inflation target, 1.5 percent productivity growth, and a stable labor share of income.

Source: EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Employment Statistics public data series

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