USMNT team soars, job growth does not
Below, EPI senior economist Elise Gould offers her insights on the jobs report released this morning. Read the full thread here.
Immigration enforcement won’t just hurt immigrants—it will follow their classmates into public schools too
Immigration enforcement hurts many aspects of public life, and public schools have not been spared. ICE enforcement campaigns in cities like Washington and Minneapolis have turned public schools into staging grounds for raids: ICE agents are arresting parents and students who are suspected to be undocumented, and spreading fear among immigrant children and their families and school officials. Additionally, anti-immigration advocates are making a play to overturn a landmark Supreme court ruling, Plyler v. Doe, which ruled that states cannot deny students a free public education based on their immigration status.
In the last two years, Republicans in Tennessee have attempted to push legislation that would violate Plyler to set the stage to challenge the court decision (although neither proposal passed). Last year, the state proposed charging undocumented students tuition for public schools, and this year, Tennessee attempted to pass legislation to track the immigration status of all public school students.
The 1982 ruling of Plyler v. Doe is notable because it stated that the harm of not educating undocumented children would be worse for society than providing a basic education to all children in the U.S. The ruling recognized the huge positive spillovers public education has on the U.S. labor market, public health, and civil society and that leaving immigrant children out of public education would create an “underclass” in U.S. society.
Moreover, if the move to deny public education to children in the U.S. is successful, particularly in pockets of the country where immigrant children are a substantial share of the student population, it will lead to an extraordinarily high cost for the students who remain in public school.
Seventeen states and localities are increasing their minimum wage this July
On July 1, the minimum wage will increase in Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, D.C.—lifting wages for more than 361,000 workers and collectively raising their earnings by more than $221 million (see Figure A). In addition to these two states and D.C., 14 cities and counties are also increasing their minimum wage this summer, including Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
Trump’s war in Iran has wiped out 1.5 years of wage growth
The Trump administration’s decision to start a war with Iran has imposed disastrous costs—both economic and humanitarian—around the world. The U.S. has been more insulated from these costs than most other countries, yet even here they are extremely large. The war’s effect in pushing up U.S. energy prices has erased all the real (inflation-adjusted) wage gains workers have made during his second term.
According to today’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) release, overall inflation was 4.2% over the last year. The sudden burst in inflation, along with slowing nominal wage growth, means that the average hourly real wage for private-sector workers is now no higher than it was in January 2025.
So far, excessive inflation has been limited to energy and airfares. But as long as the war continues, there is a heightened threat that price increases will spill over to the broader economy, triggering a more permanent increase in the cost of living and further reductions in real earnings.
U.S. House could soon pass legislation making it easier for workers to secure a first union contract
Update: The U.S. House passed the Faster Labor Contracts Act on June 9.
Over the last five years, workers have won unions in several high-profile campaigns, including Amazon workers in Staten Island and Starbucks workers in Buffalo. These examples are a testament to workers’ determination and desire for greater agency in their workplace. But these Amazon and Starbucks workers have yet to reach a first contract with their employer, illustrating the issues many workers face when they win a union and begin collectively bargaining. Far too often, employers refuse to bargain in good faith with workers, significantly delaying a first contract. Currently, on average, it takes workers 465 days to bargain a first contract.
Today, the U.S. House of Representatives will likely consider legislation aimed at ensuring workers can reach a first contract without unnecessary delay. The Faster Labor Contracts Act establishes a timeline from bargaining to mediations and, if necessary, binding arbitration. These provisions discourage delay and promote good-faith bargaining, which is exactly how the law should work.
Corporate mergers and acquisitions are an example of how quickly employers can reach a deal when they want to: these complicated, multibillion-dollar deals can often be reached in a matter of weeks. When these corporate deals take longer, it is often due to government regulators challenging the legality of the corporate merger—not corporate conduct.
May job growth was stronger than expected, but slowing wage growth exacerbates affordability concerns
Below, EPI senior economist Elise Gould offers her insights on the jobs report released this morning, which showed 172,000 jobs added in May. Read the full thread here.
State lawmakers continued to weaken child labor protections in 2026: Efforts to strengthen protections have stalled
Key takeaways:
- So far this year, at least 13 states have introduced bills weakening child labor protections, and four have enacted them.
- Meanwhile, only three states have introduced bills to strengthen standards in 2026, compared with 15 in 2025.
- Industry-backed attacks on child labor standards have followed four troubling trends: 1) lowering minimum wages for teen workers; 2) weaponizing “youth apprenticeships”; 3) eliminating youth permits; and 4) weakening safeguards for teen child care workers.
- The Trump administration has undermined federal enforcement of child labor standards, even amid rising violations.
- Oregon enshrined current federal child labor standards into state law, offering a replicable model for states to hold the line against potential federal rollbacks.
Many state lawmakers took encouraging steps in 2023 and 2024 to strengthen their child labor standards—in response to high-profile reporting of widespread child labor violations across the U.S. and simultaneous efforts to weaken state child labor standards in the wake of COVID-19. But trends in 2026 suggest that this momentum may be waning despite continued increases in child labor violations. Meanwhile, opponents of strong child labor standards have continued to erode state standards and—in effect—chip away at the basis for federal standards, which have also come under threat.Read more
Who are the Asian American and Pacific Islander workers in commonly misclassified occupations?
Key takeaways:
- Misclassification of workers as independent contractors is a pervasive and widespread problem. AAPI workers are overrepresented in three of the 11 commonly misclassified occupations: manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides. Vietnamese, Bangladeshi, Filipino, Samoan, and other Pacific Islander workers are overrepresented within these occupations.
- Groups with lower median hourly wages also have larger shares of their working populations in the 11 commonly misclassified occupations.
- Federal protections against misclassification are limited and currently under attack by the Trump administration. The state and local landscape for curbing misclassification is varied, which leaves some workers less protected than others.
In March, EPI published updated research highlighting the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified occupations. Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers were overrepresented in three of those occupations—manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides—relative to their share of the overall workforce.
Most federal, state, and local labor laws apply only to employees and not to independent contractors, so misclassification strips workers of key protections such as minimum wage laws or qualifying for employer-provided health insurance and retirement benefits. Additionally, both misclassified workers and social insurance funds lose out on income: the report conservatively estimates that for the three jobs in which AAPI workers are overrepresented, misclassification costs workers at least $7,000 annually and costs social insurance programs $600 to $800 per worker each year.
With the understanding that the umbrella term “AAPI” encompasses an immensely diverse population both in ethnic origin but also in economic outcomes, this piece goes beyond the narrow view that all AAPI workers are high-wage earners. Below, we provide more detail on which groups of AAPI workers are most likely to be employed in lower-wage commonly misclassified occupations.
Class of 2026: What occupation data show about AI and the young college graduate workforce
Key takeaways:
- The vast majority (85%) of young college graduates work in occupations that have seen strong employment growth in recent years.
- Young college graduates, like college graduates in general, are more likely to work in AI-exposed occupations than the overall workforce—and considerably more likely than young noncollege workers.
- But both young college graduates and young noncollege workers have experienced rising unemployment over the last three years, suggesting AI is not likely to be driving labor market weakness.
In the first blog post of our Class of 2026 series, we showed that the strong labor market for young college graduates of the early 2020s had begun softening in recent years. A growing share of young college graduates are seeking employment, but because their employment rates have not kept up with this job search, their unemployment rate has risen faster than the overall rate. The second blog post in the series discussed the industries where young college graduates worked. We found that recent graduates work in growing industries, but are forced to enter a weakened labor market with less job turnover, deteriorating their ability to break in. Young college graduates work in the tech sector at a similar rate to college graduates, and there is no clear evidence that tech sector employment is significantly decreased despite warnings about the advancement of AI.
In this blog post, we delve deeper into the occupations where young college graduates are likely to work.1 We examine whether it has been relatively more difficult to secure employment in these fields as the labor market has weakened. We also scour the data for signs that exposure to AI-related occupations may disproportionately affect the prospects for young college graduates as they enter the labor market.Read more
Class of 2026: A depressed hires rate is a major cause of labor market weakness for young college graduates
Key takeaways
- The depressed overall hires rate is a key driver of new labor market weakness for young college graduates, as it makes it harder for them to break into the labor market. This is true across industries, not just in those that disproportionately employ young college graduates—suggesting the culprit is not a structural change in the economy like AI but a labor market in which employers are hiring less and workers are holding onto the jobs they have.
- The information sector—posited to be more AI-exposed—has experienced recent job losses but employs only 2.3% of young college graduates.
- High-tech industries, which employ about 1 in 10 college workers, expanded at a historically rapid pace in the early 2020s but have shown signs of softening over the last three years.
The early 2020s labor market for young college graduates was strong. But, as we showed in this series’ first blog post, the Class of 2026 is graduating college into a labor market that has notably weakened in the past two years. A growing share of young college graduates are looking for jobs, but their employment rates have not kept pace—meaning unemployment is rising faster for young graduates than for the overall workforce. While their outcomes remain better than those of their noncollege counterparts, the uptick in unemployment has been a rising concern.
In this blog post, we delve deeper into the industries where young college graduates are likely to work,1 examining whether it has been relatively more difficult to secure employment in these fields as the labor market has weakened. Our analysis first examines employment changes, then turns to labor market flows, including hires and separations rates. We also scour the data for signs of contraction in the tech sector that may disproportionately affect the prospects for young college graduates as they enter the labor market.
In the third blog post in the series, we will examine the occupations where young college graduates work with particular attention to occupations that may have grown or shrunk, as well as to those most exposed to AI.