Don’t be fooled—U.S.-born workers are facing a worse labor market in 2025
It seems likely that the Trump administration will use Friday’s jobs report to continue to argue that their immigration policies are creating job market opportunities for U.S.-born workers, but this claim is false and based on a misreading of data from the household survey. If anything, the job market for U.S.-born workers is worse so far in 2025 than it was in preceding years. Analysts following demographic trends from the household survey should concentrate on unemployment rates and employment ratios, rather than levels.
The unemployment rate for the U.S.-born population is higher in 2025 than previous years (see Figure A). The July rate of 4.7% has not been this high since 2021. Similarly, the prime-age employment-to-population ratio for U.S.-born workers may be moving downwards and is certainly not consistent with booming employment (see Figure B).
Financial disparities will deepen economic insecurity for Black and Hispanic households amid the 2025 slowdown
Recent evidence from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) shows that disparities in income variability, hardship, and savings are deepening Black and Hispanic individuals’ vulnerability to economic insecurity. The Fed Board has conducted this survey annually since 2013, with a focus on capturing how households identify and assess the U.S. economy, their own economic wellbeing, and the potential risks that may impact their finances. The findings published earlier this year reflect the results of questions fielded in the last quarter of 2024, before the economic chaos wrought by the Trump-Vance administration increased fears of a recession. Read more
Trump is the biggest union-buster in U.S. history: More than 1 million federal workers’ collective bargaining rights are at risk
Since Inauguration Day, the Trump administration has taken a flurry of actions that have put our federal agencies, economy, and democracy at risk. One alarming line of attack that directly threatens workers’ economic security has been on labor unions and workers’ right to engage in collective action.
For decades, large corporations and unscrupulous employers have undermined workers’ right to collective bargaining. But throughout this period, the federal government has largely recognized the existence of these rights and respected the independent bodies that enforce our labor laws. No more. Trump has tossed aside the rule of law and advanced a strategy to not only weaken but effectively eliminate many workers’ ability to engage fully in collective action and bargaining. Below are some of Trump’s most egregious actions so far.
Union-busting the federal workforce. In March, Trump issued an executive order that stripped union protections from more than 1 million federal workers across dozens of federal agencies. And in advance of Labor Day, Trump issued another executive order expanding these actions to additional agencies. Despite ongoing litigation, some agencies have unilaterally canceled collective bargaining agreements with the unions that represent its employees. For example, the Department of Veterans Affairs announced in early August that union contracts for 400,000 employees were terminated, eliminating crucial protections for federal workers.
As the federal workforce continues to be under attack, unions are crucial to protecting these workers’ jobs and ensuring a fair transition and compensation in the event of large-scale downsizing at agencies. Trump’s action represents the single largest retaliatory action against unions and workers and sends an alarming signal to employers across the country. Trump cited thinly veiled national security reasons to pursue these blatantly retaliatory actions against unions that were fighting back against Trump’s attack on the federal workforce. The federal government should be modeling high-road employer practices. Instead, Trump has implemented the most egregious union-busting tactics and normalized illegal actions for private-sector employers across the country.
Stacking the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in his favor. In January, Trump fired NLRB Board member Gwynne Wilcox and severely jeopardized the independence of the agency. When Trump fired Wilcox, he cited that her opinions on the Board had “unduly disfavored” employers—an implicit warning about how any future Board members should rule if they want to keep their jobs.
With only one member remaining on the Board—and therefore unable to meet quorum—the NLRB cannot hear cases on unfair labor practices or union representation, nor can it issue decisions. While Wilcox continues to fight her firing in court, Trump has nominated Scott Mayer and James Murphy to be Board members. If confirmed, the NLRB would have enough members to establish a quorum and a Republican majority. If Mayer and Murphy are confirmed, workers and unions are likely to find their cases ultimately before a Board that is heavily influenced, if not controlled by, Trump and the interests of bosses over workers.
Undercutting efforts to foster and support labor-management mediation. In March, Trump directed the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to eliminate “non-statutory components” and to “reduce the performance of their statutory functions and associated personnel to the minimum presence and function required by law.” Since 1947, the FCMS has helped resolve difficult labor disputes, especially those that have resulted in strikes. There is a clear interest for the federal government to encourage parties to continue engaging in the collective bargaining process: workers who go on strike can experience economic hardship and broader economic impacts may be felt. Trump’s directive to undermine the FMCS, however, signals to employers and labor the exact opposite. At a time when employer power usually far outweighs worker power—and unions struggle to secure first-time contracts—Trump’s actions may have a significant chilling effect on workers’ ability to get employers to engage in good faith at the bargaining table.
In the coming months, we will no doubt continue to see more attacks undermining workers’ right to organize and collectively bargain. You can find a comprehensive catalogue of all policies relevant to working people and the economy at Federal Policy Watch, an EPI online tool documenting actions by the Trump administration, Congress, federal agencies, and the courts.
A ‘$30 by 2030’ minimum wage in New York City is a bold proposal: The first step is giving the city the freedom to set its own wage floor
Last spring, New York City mayoral candidate Zohran Mamdani proposed a “$30 by 2030” minimum wage for New York City workers.1 Ambitious strategies to raise wages and lower costs are needed given that New York City’s current $16.50 minimum wage is inadequate compared with any reasonable measure of a living wage in the city.
Without a policy change, we project there will be 1.68 million NYC workers earning less than $30 an hour in 2030, or 36.7% of the city’s wage-earning workforce. It is likely that the vast majority of these workers would experience significant wage gains if a $30 minimum wage were implemented.
An enormous body of research on the effects of higher minimum wages has shown that past minimum wage increases have meaningfully raised pay for low-wage workers without causing significant increases in unemployment. However, the “$30 by 2030” proposal would go beyond the levels of minimum wages studied in past research, making it more difficult to precisely estimate the number of workers who would benefit and any additional impacts of the measure, such as reductions in hours or employment.
New York City’s current minimum wage does not come close to a living wage
NYC workers face some of the highest living costs in the nation. EPI’s Family Budget Calculator (FBC) measures the income a family needs to attain a modest yet adequate standard of living in every U.S. county. The FBC thresholds are conservative amounts: they account for necessities like housing, food, transportation, health care, and child care but do not provide any allowance for savings for retirement, emergencies, or college. As Figure A shows, a family of two adults and two children in the Bronx faces annual costs of nearly $135,000.2 In Manhattan, these costs are greater than $167,000 a year. For a single adult with no children, annual costs range from $62,913 in the Bronx to $87,038 in Manhattan.
A family of four in NYC needs at least $134,000 a year to make ends meet: FBC living cost data across five boroughs in NYC
| 1 adult, no children | 2 adults, 2 children | |
|---|---|---|
| The Bronx | $62,913 | $134,773 |
| Brooklyn | $74,620 | $150,186 |
| Manhattan | $87,038 | $167,753 |
| Queens | $79,929 | $155,998 |
| Staten Island | $78,790 | $156,133 |
Source: EPI Family Budget Calculator.
With the FBC cost data we can estimate a living wage that would allow workers to support their families.3 Table 1 shows that the living wage in 2025 is already above $30 an hour in Manhattan ($33.89), Queens ($31.31), and Staten Island ($30.68). While Brooklyn and The Bronx do not exceed this threshold, the costs facing these families will almost certainly continue to rise between today and 2030. These figures make it clear that discussions of a $30 minimum wage in New York City are not superfluous—they reflect the very real needs of working people throughout the city.
Relative to the actual living wage, New York City’s minimum wage is significantly lower than many other high-cost-of-living cities in the country. NYC’s $16.50 minimum wage is around half of the living wage in most of the city’s boroughs. By comparison, the minimum wage is around three-quarters the estimated living wage in Seattle, Washington D.C., and Los Angeles. Chicago’s and Denver’s minimum wages are each more than 80% of a living wage, while the minimum wage is 69.3% of the living wage in San Francisco. All these cities have room to push for higher wages for their workers, but it is clear that New York City’s minimum wage leaves workers further behind than many other major cities in the country.
It is notable that among the cities in Table 1, those with local control over minimum wage policy have been significantly more successful at approaching living wage targets. While New York City’s minimum wage is higher than the upstate region, the policy is currently set by state lawmakers in Albany, not at the local level. Boston (Suffolk County, MA) uses the Massachusetts state minimum wage of $15.00, which is around half of the living wage in the city. Portland, OR, also has its minimum wage set by state lawmakers and has a slightly stronger minimum wage floor (69.8% of the living wage), but every city with a wage floor of at least 70% of the living wage has local control over the policy.4 This pattern suggests that when given the power to do so, local government officials are more responsive to the wage floor needs of workers in their city.
Without a policy change, 1.68 million New York City workers will be paid less than $30 an hour by 2030
Under the status quo minimum wage policy in New York City, we project there will be 1.68 million workers earning less than $30 in 2030, a little more than a third (36.7%) of the total wage-earning workforce in the city. These workers would likely be directly affected by the minimum wage increases in Mamdani’s policy proposal. In addition, economic research shows that workers already earning above the new minimum wage also typically benefit through spillover wage effects as employers seek to maintain organizational wage ladders.
Most minimum wage research finds that increasing the wage floor significantly increases earnings for affected workers, while causing little to no loss in employment. That’s because businesses are able to adjust to increased labor costs through modestly increasing prices, reductions in turnover, and the movement of workers from less-productive firms to more-productive firms.
Moreover, even if a minimum wage increase did result in reduced employment, it’s important to understand what that actually means for low-wage workers. The low-wage job market is characterized by high levels of turnover and churn, as workers are typically always looking for any new position that will offer them more livable pay. Many low-wage workers also spend some portion of the year not employed—due to care responsibilities, participating in education or training programs, or seeking other work. In this context, what researchers would describe as reduced employment does not mean that some set of workers will now be permanently unemployed. Rather, it likely would mean that some low-wage workers would work fewer hours over the course of the year or spend more time between jobs. Of course, these workers would now be earning more per hour when they do work because of the higher minimum wage—what really matters is the net outcome on their annual earnings.
We are cautious about extending the general conclusions of minimum wage research on employment to a $30 minimum wage in New York City. The proposal is more ambitious than the levels that economists have studied extensively. One tool economists use to assess the “bite” of a minimum wage is the minimum-to-median-wage ratio (sometimes called the “Kaitz index”). When underlying wages in the labor market are higher, as proxied by the median wage, the minimum-to-median-wage ratio is lower, and a given minimum wage affects a smaller share of employment. For example, a $17 minimum wage will have a much smaller effect on workers and employers in a higher wage place like New York City than it would have in places where wages are generally much lower.
Table 2 estimates the minimum-to-median-wage ratio for a $30 NYC minimum wage in 2030, as well as other wage thresholds. The ratio of a $30 minimum wage in 2030 would be around 0.76, higher than most other policies in the U.S.5 In a 2021 paper, economists Arindrajit Dube and Attila Lindner compared minimum-to-median-wage ratios across the 10 most populous U.S cities with minimum wages above the state level and found a population-weighted average minimum-to-median-wage ratio of 0.64.6 At the time, Los Angeles’s minimum wage had a Kaitz index of 0.75, but this policy has not been studied enough to understand its employment effects. According to Dube and Lindner, most state minimum wage policies greater than the federal minimum sit at a minimum-to-median-wage ratio of around 0.50. Among international peers, it is notable that the United Kingdom officially targets a minimum wage policy that is two-thirds the median wage (ratio of 0.67). Other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries also have high minimum-to-median-wage ratios, including France (0.62), New Zealand (0.69), Mexico (0.74), Chile (0.75), Costa Rica (0.87), and Colombia (0.92).
The cost-of-living crisis in New York City requires bold steps forward as part of a cohesive strategy to create a more equitable economy. Increasing the minimum wage should be one key part of this strategy, which must also include tackling the cost of housing, child care, and health care. The experience of other high-cost cities also indicates that local lawmakers are better positioned than state officials to set appropriate and livable minimum wages for their jurisdiction’s workers. New York state lawmakers can be much more ambitious in setting high standards for New York City, but it likely would be better to let the city set its own wage standards above the state floor, much in the same way that states can set their own minimums above the federal minimum.
Minimum wage levels, living wage levels, and ratio of minimum wage to living wage for select counties in the U.S.
| County | State | Living wage | Effective minimum wage for major city | Ratio of minimum wage to living wage | Note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| New York City area | |||||
| The Bronx | NY | $24.50 | $16.50 | 67.3% | NY state minimum wage for NYC area |
| Brooklyn | NY | $29.06 | $16.50 | 56.8% | NY state minimum wage for NYC area |
| Manhattan | NY | $33.89 | $16.50 | 48.7% | NY state minimum wage for NYC area |
| Queens | NY | $31.13 | $16.50 | 53.0% | NY state minimum wage for NYC area |
| Staten Island | NY | $30.68 | $16.50 | 53.8% | NY state minimum wage for NYC area |
| High cost-of-living cities | |||||
| King County | WA | $27.41 | $20.76 | 75.7% | Seattle minimum wage |
| San Francisco County | CA | $27.66 | $19.18 | 69.3% | San Francisco city minimum wage |
| Los Angeles County | CA | $23.97 | $17.87 | 74.6% | Los Angeles city minimum wage |
| District of Columbia | DC | $24.31 | $17.95 | 73.8% | Washington, D.C minimum wage |
| Cook County | IL | $20.20 | $16.60 | 82.2% | Chicago minimum wage |
| Santa Clara County | CA | $31.18 | $17.95 | 57.6% | San Jose minimum wage |
| San Diego County | CA | $27.81 | $17.25 | 62.0% | San Diego city minimum wage |
| Suffolk County | MA | $29.69 | $15.00 | 50.5% | MA state minimum wage |
| Denver County | CO | $22.48 | $18.81 | 83.7% | Denver city minimum wage |
| Multnomah County | OR | $23.36 | $16.30 | 69.8% | OR state minimum wage for Portland Urban Growth Boundary |
| Other major cities | |||||
| Philadelphia County | PA | $18.29 | $7.25 | 39.6% | PA state minimum wage (federal minimum wage) |
| Dallas County | TX | $19.67 | $7.25 | 36.9% | TX state minimum wage (federal minimum wage) |
| Miami-Dade County | FL | $22.93 | $13.00 | 56.7% | FL state minimum wage |
| Harris County | TX | $17.22 | $7.25 | 42.1% | TX state minimum wage (federal minimum wage) |
| Maricopa County | AZ | $21.05 | $14.70 | 69.8% | AZ state minimum wage |
Notes: Minimum wage values effective July 2025. Effective minimum wage chosen for major city within relevant county. Oregon and New York state minimum wage law establish distinct regional minimum wage levels. The policy is controlled by the state legislature. Living wage values assumed to be for a single adult with no children receiving 81% of their income from wages.
Source: Family Budget Calculator living wage standards and EPI Minimum Wage Tracker.
Projected 2030 count and share of workers below minimum wage and minimum-to-median-wage ratio in NYC for $30 minimum wage and other thresholds
| Scenario | Count of workers below threshold | Share of NYC wage-earning workforce | Minimum-to-median-wage ratio |
|---|---|---|---|
| $25 by 2030 | 1,358,700 | 29.7% | 0.64 |
| $28 by 2030 | 1,579,900 | 34.5% | 0.71 |
| $30 by 2030 | 1,680,900 | 36.7% | 0.76 |
| $32 by 2030 | 1,868,200 | 40.8% | 0.82 |
Notes: Assumes annual nominal wage growth rate of 3.3% based on CBO projections of Employment Cost Index. Annual population growth of 0.97%.
Source: EPI analysis of 2023 1-year ACS data and CBO January 2025 Economic Projections.
Notes
1. The proposal also calls for indexing the minimum wage to inflation or productivity increases, whichever is greater, thereafter. The tipped minimum wage in New York is set at two-thirds the regular minimum wage.
2. The FBC data is organized by county, but for the purposes of this analysis we refer to the corresponding New York City boroughs.
3. Gould, Mokhiber, and deCourcy (2024) suggest living wages can be approximated by 81% of the associated FBC thresholds because middle-income families receive about 81% of their income through wages and 19% from other non-wage sources, including government transfers (such as refundable tax credits) and non-wage market income (such as interest on savings).
4. Of course, any state action is more beneficial than using the stagnant federal minimum wage, which is still the effective wage floor in Philadelphia, Dallas, Houston, and other cities in states where local minimum wage increases are preempted. These localities all have effective minimum wages that are less than half of the living wage.
5. Our projections assume a nominal annual wage growth of 3.3% based on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections of the Employment Cost Index. If we vary this assumption ±0.5%, the outcomes of a $30 minimum wage in 2030 vary as follows: Kaitz ratio: 0.73–0.79. Share of workers under $30 an hour: 36.0%–40.0%.
6. At the time New York City had a 0.66 Kaitz index, higher than it does today (approximately 0.5).
Extreme heat is deadly for workers and costly for the economy: States can’t afford to wait to pass protective heat standards
The start of this summer brought dangerous heat waves to the U.S. that killed at least two people, including a letter carrier in Dallas (the second letter carrier death due to extreme heat in three years). Labor unions and public health advocates have long been pushing the federal government to enact a standard to protect workers against extreme heat exposure. These efforts led to progress in 2024 when the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) formally proposed a new heat standard based on years of intensive research. This summer, OSHA held informal hearings on the proposal, but whether and in what form the Trump administration might move forward with adopting a final version of the heat standard rule remains uncertain. In the meantime, states have every reason to move forward with enacting their own strong standards to protect workers from preventable heat illness and death on the job.Read more
Unions can play a critical role in safeguarding reproductive freedom: Union density is twice as high in abortion-protected states compared with abortion-restricted states
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned the federal constitutional right to abortion. Since the Dobbs decision in 2022, 12 states have banned abortion and a dozen more have added significant restrictions on reproductive health care and abortion access. In contrast, several states—including Colorado, Montana, Ohio, and Vermont—have voted to amend their state constitutions to enshrine abortion protections. As shown in Figure A, the Dobbs decision has made abortion access vary widely by state.
Policies around abortion access and restrictions vary widely by state: Categorization of all 50 states and Washington, D.C., into abortion-protected and abortion-restricted groupings
Note: States in the “abortion-protected” category have very few restrictions or limits on abortion access. States in the “abortion-restricted/banned” category have restrictions or total bans.
Source: Adapted from Guttmacher Institute, “US Abortion Policies and Access After Roe” (interactive map), updated August 19, 2025; KFF, “Abortion in the United States Dashboard” (interactive map), updated June 2, 2025.
When looking at these state policies, it’s worth noting that many of the states with abortion protections are also states with higher levels of unionization. Our recent report documents the strong correlation between high union density and a range of economic, personal, and democratic well-being metrics. In the same way unions give workers a voice at their workplace, unions also give workers a voice in shaping their communities. In the report, we show that residents in states with higher union density are more likely to have health insurance, access to paid sick and family leave, and live in a state with Medicaid expansion. This correlation holds true when evaluating state abortion policies. Figure B shows that states with abortion protections have an average union density twice as high as that of states with varying degrees of abortion restrictions and bans.
Union density is twice as high in abortion-protected states compared with abortion-restricted states: Percent of workers represented by a union as a member or covered by a contract, 2024
| Abortion status | Union Density |
|---|---|
| Abortion-protected | 14.3% |
| Abortion-restricted | 7.0% |
Notes: See Figure A for state abortion status groupings. Union density is defined as the share of workers in the state who are represented by a union, including union members and other workers who are covered by a union contract, based on the variable “union” from EPI extracts of CPS-ORG microdata. We average union density data across 2022 to 2024 for each state to give a more accurate estimate of states’ typical unionization rates over time.
Source: EPI analysis of 2022–2024 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) microdata for all workers ages 16 and older; abortion status categories from Table 1.
Many abortion-restricted states have also enacted anti-union and so-called “right-to-work” (RTW) laws. These laws are designed to suppress worker power by prohibiting unions and employers from negotiating union security clauses into collective bargaining agreements, making it difficult for workers to join, form, and sustain unions. As a result, states with RTW laws—many in the South and Midwest—have low levels of union density. Research shows that RTW laws are associated with higher income inequality, lower wages and benefits, and increased workplace fatalities.
Unfortunately, federal attacks on reproductive freedom have continued since the Dobbs decision. This summer, President Trump signed into law the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which makes draconian spending cuts—mostly to health care and food assistance for children and families—in order to give massive tax cuts to the wealthiest households. The OBBBA also poses significant obstacles to reproductive freedom by prohibiting health care clinics that provide abortion services from receiving federal Medicaid payments for one year for any other services they provide. This provision specifically targets Planned Parenthood, putting 1 in 3 centers at risk of closure and taking away vital reproductive services—such as cancer screenings, prenatal care, and contraception—from more than 1 million people. Planned Parenthood is currently pursuing a legal challenge to this OBBBA provision—but Trump’s undermining of reproductive freedom and health care does not stop there.
Since returning to office, Trump has withheld millions in Title X funds for family planning services, scrubbed government websites of vital information about reproductive health care, and nominated individuals with anti-abortion views to key positions at the Department of Health and Human Services. Earlier this month, the Trump administration issued a proposed rule that would exclude abortion services for veterans as part of reproductive health care covered under the Department of Veterans Affairs. The proposed rule seeks to rescind a 2022 Biden-era rule that expanded reproductive health care and abortion access in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision.
As attacks on reproductive freedom and health care continue at the federal level, unions can play a critical role in safeguarding reproductive freedom in the states. However, union density levels are not as high as they could or should be. While nearly half of all nonunion workers say they want a union in their workplace, only 11.1% of all workers were covered by a union contract in 2024. This is because current labor law does not provide workers with a meaningful right to a union and collective bargaining.
Federal policymakers should pass the Protecting the Right to Organize Act and the Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act to strengthen private- and public-sector workers’ right to organize and access a union. Further, states with RTW laws should restore private-sector workers’ full bargaining rights by repealing these anti-union state laws. Building union density is not just a worker or workplace issue, but also a fundamental component to strengthening reproductive freedom in our communities.
2025 worker-led state policy victories show how states can—and must—do more to hold the line against escalating federal attacks on workers’ rights
State action to strengthen worker rights and protections has become critically important at a moment when long-standing U.S. labor standards are under acute threat. Escalating threats include Trump administration attempts to roll back (or stop enforcing) standards that set a national floor for minimum wage, overtime pay, health and safety, nondiscrimination, child labor, and other rights and protections long taken for granted in most U.S. workplaces.
Amid this crisis, states have urgent obligations to shore up basic protections. The crisis also presents states with big opportunities to remedy long-standing weaknesses and exclusions in outdated labor laws and take leadership in addressing major economic challenges like wage suppression, growing income inequality, racial and gender wage gaps, and declining job quality.Read more
Trump is making it easier for federal contractors to discriminate—and it will be underwritten by your tax dollars
Since returning to office, the Trump administration has gutted the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP)—which has long ensured that employers conducting business with the federal government comply with equal employment opportunity laws. This has made equal employment laws effectively unenforceable for the entire civilian federal contracting workforce.
What’s happening?
In January, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 14173 that drastically cut OFCCP’s enforcement oversight and ended affirmative action requirements for federal contractors established by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965. In a total about-face from six decades of leveraging the purchasing power of the federal government to encourage private-sector employers to adopt more equitable employment practices and establish written affirmative action programs for women and minorities, Trump’s executive order explicitly discourages any efforts to remedy racialized or gendered patterns of discrimination in employment or pay. Instead, it derisively and inaccurately labels such efforts as “DEI-based discrimination”, implying that they result in workers of color and women unfairly displacing more qualified (assumptively white male) candidates.
Recently, the agency proposed regulations to further unwind its own work and authority. One of the proposed rules would formally rescind the regulations implementing President Johnson’s original EO to establish the agency’s existence and authority. Another would risk weakening data collection on whether federal contractors are meeting “utilization goals”—benchmarks for evaluating the representation of people with disabilities in the federal contracting workforce. These actions showcase the Trump administration’s embrace of Project 2025’s anti-worker and anti-equity agenda, which included a policy proposal to eliminate OFCCP.
Trump’s 2026 budget formally requests Congress to defund OFCCP’s operations. If Congress were to agree to zero out OFCCP’s budget—and if the regulatory unwinding of the agency’s primary mandate proceeds without obstacles—there would no longer be any federal agency dedicated to ensuring that federal contractors operate fair, nondiscriminatory workplaces. In other words, taxpayer dollars could essentially subsidize persistent discrimination. Under the Trump administration’s plans, OFCCP’s remaining legal responsibilities to enforce equal employment opportunity for certain veterans and for workers with disabilities would shift over to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Veterans Employment and Training Service (VETS) or to the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC)—agencies with different mandates and areas of expertise than the federal contracting workforce.
In one promising sign, fortunately, the Senate Appropriations Committee recently voted to advance a bipartisan funding proposal that rejected the Trump administration’s request to zero out OFCCP’s budget. It remains to be seen how appropriators in the House or the Trump administration will respond.
Shuttering the OFCCP will hurt Black and women workers the most
As a relatively small DOL division, OFCCP’s work has gone largely unnoticed by the broader public even though it has achieved important results for workers. According to historical data that the Trump administration removed from the OFCCP website, OFCCP conducted reviews at contractor sites employing over 10.3 million workers between 2014 and 2024. OFCCP investigations resulted in 250,900 workers obtaining financial relief totaling $260.8 million during that period—and over 22,600 individuals employed by federal contractors received new job opportunities or salary adjustments.
Table 1 presents historical monetary relief data by class, revealing the groups most likely to be harmed by Trump’s actions. Black workers and women received most of the monetary relief resulting from OFCCP investigations between 2020 and 2024, demonstrating just how targeted the impact of Trump’s executive order will be.
Stripped of its authority and with only minimal staff remaining, OFCCP’s only remaining equal employment compliance oversight is for disabled workers under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act (Section 3) and protected veterans under the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (VEVRAA). However, as Table 1 shows, no more than 0.1% of monetary relief resulting from OFCCP investigations over the past five years was awarded based on disability or veteran status.
Trump's dismantling of the OFCCP will hurt Black and women workers the most: Distribution of Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) monetary relief by class, 2020–2024
| Class | FY 2020 | FY 2021 | FY 2022 | FY 2023 | FY 2024 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women | 23.4% | 29.4% | 30.8% | 42.6% | 15.0% |
| Black | 63.8% | 38.6% | 53.0% | 42.1% | 79.0% |
| Hispanic | 2.4% | 1.4% | 0.2% | 1.8% | 2.7% |
| Asian/Pacific Islander | 2.8% | 7.5% | 7.8% | 1.7% | 0.0% |
| Native American | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 0.4% | 0.2% |
| Unknown Minority Group | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% |
| Disability | 0.0%* | 0.1% | 0.0%* | 0.0%* | 0.0%* |
| Veteran | 0.0% | 0.0%* | 0.0%* | 0.0%* | 0.0%* |
| Total Class Members | 68,695 | 21,971 | 9,890 | 13,861 | 9,679 |
Notes: Percentages reflect the distribution of monetary relief across classes. "*" indicates that while the percentage of class members to the nearest tenth rounded to 0.0, there were between one to five beneficiaries in this class for a particular year, representing less than 0.05%. Percentages do not sum to 100% because classes are not mutually exclusive, and pay discrimination cases related to discussing compensation at work may not include any of the classes listed above.
Source: Archived Department of Labor website, "Discrimination Cases Completed (Compliance Evaluations and Complaint Investigations)" [excel table]. Archived January 23, 2025.
While there are no public data on the demographic composition of workers employed by federal contractors, current labor force demographics illustrate the potential magnitude of those changes. Figure A shows the share of the labor force by race, ethnicity, and gender that is either disabled or a veteran. Among Black workers—the largest share of monetary relief recipients—less than 8% of Black women and 13% of Black men would be eligible for monetary relief based on disability or veteran status alone. Across all racial groups, a smaller share of women than men would remain eligible.
Disabled and veteran share of the civilian labor force by race and ethnicity and gender, 2024
| Women | Men | |
|---|---|---|
| White | 6.9% | 14.4% |
| Black | 7.8% | 12.9% |
| Hispanic | 4.8% | 6.9% |
| Asian | 3.4% | 5.0% |
| Other | 11.1% | 20.5% |
Note: Race and ethnicity are mutually exclusive. Counts are limited to individuals 16 years and older and in the labor force.
Source: Author's analysis of Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version Version 2025.6.11, https://microdata.epi.org.
According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the federal government obligated $755.1 billion through contracts in 2024 to procure products and services ranging from aircraft and software to health care and engineering support. The planned elimination of OFCCP represents the Trump administration’s surrender of this tremendous federal leverage to enforce nondiscrimination compliance among private-sector employers. It is also a major shirking of the federal government’s responsibility to demand accountability from businesses who profit from billions in taxpayer dollars, including tax dollars paid by people they now have a lot less obligation to employ and pay fairly. This would be a clear retreat from the principles of economic, racial, and gender justice which are the basis for equal rights and full participation in our society. The American people deserve better.
Weak jobs report may signal a coming recession: Average job growth just 35,000 over the past three months
Below, EPI economists offer their insights on the jobs report released this morning, which showed 73,000 jobs added in July.
From EPI senior economist Elise Gould:
Big news in today’s #jobs report are the revisions. The labor market is much weaker than originally reported the last two months. While payrolls grew 73k in July, May and June data were revised down a total of 258k to 19k and 14k, respectively, bringing 3-month average growth down to 35k.
#EconSky— Elise Gould (@elisegould.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 7:46 AM
Health care jobs grew the strongest in July. Private-sector job losses were reported in professional and business services, manufacturing, and wholesale trade. The surprising uptick in state and local government jobs for June was revised down as federal jobs continued to fall in July.
#NumbersDay— Elise Gould (@elisegould.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 8:01 AM
Federal cuts continue to cost jobs as federal employment fell another 12k in July. Federal employment is now down 84,000 since January. The latest federal UI claims data for mid-July shows the economic pain continues and the full extent of the job losses won’t be seen until we get data for October.
— Elise Gould (@elisegould.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 8:11 AM
From EPI chief economist Josh Bivens:
To me, today’s jobs report is what entering a recession looks like. Could we pull up? Sure. But if we look back and end up dating an official recession that starts 3-6 months from now, this is what it would look like today – rapid softening/deterioration in the labor market.
— Josh Bivens (@joshbivens-econ.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 7:41 AM
From EPI president Heidi Shierholz:
Whoa, the jobs numbers are really bad. With the new July numbers and revisions to May/June, the avg monthly job growth of the last 3 months is 35,000. As Josh says, if we were entering a recession, this is what it would look like.
— Heidi Shierholz (@hshierholz.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 7:47 AM
Trump’s war on immigrants shows up clearly in the data: the age 16+ immigrant popn has dropped 3.8%—1.9 million—since January. It’s a moral catastrophe, and an economic one. Deporting 1 million immigrants per year will cost ~6 million jobs over Trump’s term.
www.epi.org/publication/…
— Heidi Shierholz (@hshierholz.bsky.social) Aug 1, 2025 at 8:19 AM
D.C. Council should support tipped workers by maintaining I-82: There is no evidence that the policy is harming the restaurant industry in the District
The D.C. Council is debating watering down or eliminating Initiative 82 (I-82), a law passed overwhelmingly by D.C. voters in 2022 that gradually phases out the subminimum wage for tipped workers through 2027. The D.C. Council has already postponed wage increases for tipped workers this year, delaying a scheduled July increase to October.1 Further actions interfering with I-82 will deny this group of low-wage workers vital wage gains and economic security in one of the highest cost-of-living metro areas in the country.Read more