How to Make the Labor Market Work for Women

Today is Equal Pay Day, which means that policymakers, including the president, are talking about how to close the gender wage gap. In 2013, the typical female worker made $15.10 an hour, while the typical male worker made $18.11 an hour. And the gap in wages between women and men extends beyond those at the middle; it affects earners at all wage levels. High-wage women make less than high-wage men, and low-wage women make less than low-wage men.

A key backdrop to any discussion of how gender wage gaps have evolved is the fact that since the 1970s, the country has seen dramatically rising wage inequality among both men and women. Between 1979 and 2013, the median woman’s wages grew 21.7 percent, but the 95th percentile woman saw her wages grow more than three times that fast, while the 10th percentile woman saw her wages decline. Among men, high-wage workers also saw strong growth—the 95th percentile man saw his wages grow 40.1 percent over this period—but the entire bottom 60 percent of the male wage distribution saw wage losses. The forces holding back wage growth for low- and moderate-wage men—factors such as declining unionization, the erosion of other labor standards and institutions, the lack of full employment, trade agreements that eroded labor standards, and skyrocketing executive and finance professional pay that left less for everyone else—were also holding down the wage growth of low- and moderate-wage women. However, gains made by women over this period in educational attainment, work experience, and occupational upgrading (i.e., moving into higher-paying occupations) more than overcame these adverse forces (at least until the last decade, when the entire bottom 60 percent of female wage earners also saw wage losses).

How has the gender wage gap evolved over time? In short, while still large, it is smaller than it used to be. In the late 1970s, after a long period of holding fairly steady, the gap in wages between men and women began improving as women’s gains in education, work experience, and occupational upgrading, along with greater legal protections against discriminatory pay, began boosting their pay. Since the 1970s, the gender wage gap has improved at all parts of the wage distribution, meaning that low-wage, middle-wage, and high-wage women all saw stronger wage growth over this period their male counterparts.

Read more

Third Way’s Surprising Retirement Proposal

After getting into hot water for criticizing Sen. Elizabeth Warren for wanting to expand Social Security, self-styled centrist Democrats Jonathan Cowan and Jim Kessler of Third Way are testing the retirement waters again by proposing, in a New York Times op-ed, to expand savings in IRAs.

This by itself would not be blog-worthy, since every Wall Street-friendly policy wonk wants workers to put more money into IRAs. What surprised me, though, was that they propose requiring employers to contribute 50 cents per hour in these accounts. This amounts to $1,000 per year for full-time workers, and, unlike many proposals, could actually make a difference to workers’ retirement security if savings aren’t siphoned off with high fees. Cowan and Kessler’s default investment would be a low-fee lifecycle fund overseen by a Thrift Savings Plan-like board. Though TSP’s lifecycle funds, which are composed of index funds, are too aggressive—the share invested in stocks ranges from 86% to 52% during the accumulation phase—at least they’re not obvious rip-offs like many 401(k) and IRA investment options.

Cowan and Kessler take pains to assure readers that their proposal has nothing in common with President George W. Bush’s plan to privatize Social Security. But it’s not clear whether they have renounced their previous support for Social Security cuts. If not, they don’t explain why we should shrink a well-functioning social insurance system in order to expand an individual savings system that leaves families financially exposed when breadwinners die or are disabled, financial markets tank, or inflation rises. Under the Third Way plan, retirees could also outlive their savings if they opt out of the default annuity. In the end, back-door privatization may not be that much better than a frontal assault.

Read more

Tagged

Larry Summers, Jeremy Stein, and the Better Off Budget

Larry Summers gave a talk earlier this week at the launch of the Full Employment project headed by Jared Bernstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP). In a reasonable, evidence-based world, his talk—and the paper he co-authored with Larry Ball and Brad DeLong for the event—would be deeply influential to policymakers.

The best summation of it is the first paragraph of the accompanying paper:

“At present and going forward, activist fiscal policy is likely to be essential for the American economy to operate near potential levels of output and employment. This conclusion is a substantial change in view from the near-consensus of economists that monetary policy alone could and should be left to carry out the stabilization policy mission, a view that prevailed for nearly a generation prior to the 2008 financial crisis”

Basically, what Summers et al. are saying is that the Federal Reserve won’t be able to engineer a full recovery from the Great Recession (a recovery that remains far from complete) with the monetary policy tools that they have at their disposal. And unless fiscal policy changes sharply from its current contractionary stance to one that supports growth and jobs, the U.S. economy could throw away years of potential income growth (totaling trillions of dollars) and consign millions of workers and families to years of completely needless economic misery.

Besides arguing that the Fed alone couldn’t generate a full recovery with the tools at its disposal, Summers also echoed a point made recently by Jeremy Stein, a member of the Fed’s Board of Governors: that these tools currently being used by the Fed to try to generate recovery—keeping interest rates extraordinarily low for an extended period of time—carry the danger of spurring financial market bubbles that would sow the seeds for the next economic downturn.

Read more

The State of Black and Brown America

This week, the Urban League released the 38th edition of its annual State of Black America report, with the theme One Nation Underemployed: Jobs Rebuild America. With an emphasis on growing economic inequality, the report features the 10th installment of the Urban League’s Black-White Equality Index, and the 5th installment of the Hispanic-White Equality Index. At the national level, these numbers tell an all too familiar story of racial economic inequality in America that persists through the ups and downs of the business cycle.

Though the recession briefly narrowed the black-white unemployment rate gap to a ratio of 1.7-to-1 in 2009, the black unemployment rate is again double the rate for whites, while the Hispanic unemployment rate has remained between 1.4 and 1.5 times higher than whites since 2007. The widening disparity between low, middle, and high incomes—i.e. increasing overall inequality—has also expanded racial income gaps, since African American and Latino households are more likely to have incomes below the national median. According to the report, black median household income is about 60 percent of that of whites (down from 62 percent before the recession) and Hispanic median household income is 71 percent of that of white households (down from 74 percent before the recession).

With the addition of a metro-level analysis of unemployment and income inequality in State of Black America 2014, a slightly more nuanced picture of racial and ethnic inequality in America emerges. Based on data from the 1-year sample of the 2012 American Community Survey, the report suggests that the state of black and brown America depends on what part of America you live in—although at least for African Americans, it’s really not all that great anywhere. According to the report’s listing of metro area unemployment rates, the black unemployment rate ranged from a low of 9.0 percent in Oklahoma City, Okla. (the only metro area with a black unemployment rate under 10 percent) to a high of 24.5 percent in Sacramento, Calif. When it comes to the income gap, at best, the median black household income has 78 cents for every dollar of white income in the Riverside, Calif. metro area.

Read more

March Jobs Report Shows Labor Market Still Requires Federal Jobless Aid

Job opportunities have been so weak for so long that jobless workers have gotten stuck in unemployment for unprecedented lengths of time. Currently more than one-third of unemployed workers (35.8 percent) have been unemployed for more than six months—which, as the figure below shows, is far higher than at any other point on record outside of the last five years. It is important to note that the cause of today’s long-term unemployment crisis is no mystery: it is entirely explained by the length and severity of the current period of labor market weakness, along with long-term trends in long-term unemployment. In other words, the long-term unemployment crisis is exactly what we would expect given how long our labor market has been as weak as it has been. It is not the fault of individual unemployed workers failing to exert enough effort or flexibility in their job search.

Nevertheless, Congress allowed federal unemployment insurance to expire in at the end of 2013. In the first sign of progress in months, the Senate is expected to approve a temporary extension of federal unemployment insurance next week. It would be retroactive to January 1st and would extend federal jobless aid through May 31st, but is expected to face an uphill battle in the House.

Figure B

The share of the unemployed who have been jobless for six months or more, 1948–2014

Date Share of the unemployed
1948-01-01 6.4%
1948-02-01 5.2%
1948-03-01 4.6%
1948-04-01 4.4%
1948-05-01 5.1%
1948-06-01 5.3%
1948-07-01 4.9%
1948-08-01 5.3%
1948-09-01 5.5%
1948-10-01 6.2%
1948-11-01 4.3%
1948-12-01 4.1%
1949-01-01 4.1%
1949-02-01 4.5%
1949-03-01 3.8%
1949-04-01 4.8%
1949-05-01 5.1%
1949-06-01 6.5%
1949-07-01 7.5%
1949-08-01 8.0%
1949-09-01 8.6%
1949-10-01 7.8%
1949-11-01 10.6%
1949-12-01 10.0%
1950-01-01 10.0%
1950-02-01 10.5%
1950-03-01 11.3%
1950-04-01 13.4%
1950-05-01 12.3%
1950-06-01 12.3%
1950-07-01 10.8%
1950-08-01 10.5%
1950-09-01 10.6%
1950-10-01 10.9%
1950-11-01 9.9%
1950-12-01 8.1%
1951-01-01 8.0%
1951-02-01 9.4%
1951-03-01 7.2%
1951-04-01 7.2%
1951-05-01 6.9%
1951-06-01 5.6%
1951-07-01 6.6%
1951-08-01 6.0%
1951-09-01 5.7%
1951-10-01 4.6%
1951-11-01 7.1%
1951-12-01 5.2%
1952-01-01 5.5%
1952-02-01 4.5%
1952-03-01 4.7%
1952-04-01 6.3%
1952-05-01 4.3%
1952-06-01 3.6%
1952-07-01 3.4%
1952-08-01 3.0%
1952-09-01 3.3%
1952-10-01 4.8%
1952-11-01 3.9%
1952-12-01 6.2%
1953-01-01 4.8%
1953-02-01 4.8%
1953-03-01 5.0%
1953-04-01 3.9%
1953-05-01 2.9%
1953-06-01 5.8%
1953-07-01 4.4%
1953-08-01 4.0%
1953-09-01 3.8%
1953-10-01 3.4%
1953-11-01 4.5%
1953-12-01 4.0%
1954-01-01 4.9%
1954-02-01 4.6%
1954-03-01 6.5%
1954-04-01 7.6%
1954-05-01 8.5%
1954-06-01 8.8%
1954-07-01 9.1%
1954-08-01 11.0%
1954-09-01 10.6%
1954-10-01 12.3%
1954-11-01 12.3%
1954-12-01 12.1%
1955-01-01 13.3%
1955-02-01 14.7%
1955-03-01 13.4%
1955-04-01 13.5%
1955-05-01 13.1%
1955-06-01 12.2%
1955-07-01 11.4%
1955-08-01 9.9%
1955-09-01 9.2%
1955-10-01 8.6%
1955-11-01 9.9%
1955-12-01 10.4%
1956-01-01 9.6%
1956-02-01 10.6%
1956-03-01 8.6%
1956-04-01 7.7%
1956-05-01 6.9%
1956-06-01 6.2%
1956-07-01 7.1%
1956-08-01 8.7%
1956-09-01 9.1%
1956-10-01 9.5%
1956-11-01 8.4%
1956-12-01 9.2%
1957-01-01 6.5%
1957-02-01 8.6%
1957-03-01 8.6%
1957-04-01 9.0%
1957-05-01 8.7%
1957-06-01 8.9%
1957-07-01 9.2%
1957-08-01 8.4%
1957-09-01 7.4%
1957-10-01 9.6%
1957-11-01 8.2%
1957-12-01 7.4%
1958-01-01 7.7%
1958-02-01 8.1%
1958-03-01 7.7%
1958-04-01 10.5%
1958-05-01 11.6%
1958-06-01 14.2%
1958-07-01 16.6%
1958-08-01 19.0%
1958-09-01 20.7%
1958-10-01 20.3%
1958-11-01 19.5%
1958-12-01 19.2%
1959-01-01 19.4%
1959-02-01 18.3%
1959-03-01 18.1%
1959-04-01 18.2%
1959-05-01 16.7%
1959-06-01 15.9%
1959-07-01 14.0%
1959-08-01 13.4%
1959-09-01 11.8%
1959-10-01 11.4%
1959-11-01 12.1%
1959-12-01 12.6%
1960-01-01 12.9%
1960-02-01 13.0%
1960-03-01 11.7%
1960-04-01 11.9%
1960-05-01 10.8%
1960-06-01 10.5%
1960-07-01 10.5%
1960-08-01 10.4%
1960-09-01 12.0%
1960-10-01 13.4%
1960-11-01 12.8%
1960-12-01 11.8%
1961-01-01 13.6%
1961-02-01 13.7%
1961-03-01 14.5%
1961-04-01 16.9%
1961-05-01 17.7%
1961-06-01 18.9%
1961-07-01 19.9%
1961-08-01 19.0%
1961-09-01 18.0%
1961-10-01 17.9%
1961-11-01 17.8%
1961-12-01 17.3%
1962-01-01 16.5%
1962-02-01 17.7%
1962-03-01 16.3%
1962-04-01 16.2%
1962-05-01 16.5%
1962-06-01 15.2%
1962-07-01 14.9%
1962-08-01 14.7%
1962-09-01 13.1%
1962-10-01 13.3%
1962-11-01 11.1%
1962-12-01 12.8%
1963-01-01 13.3%
1963-02-01 14.0%
1963-03-01 14.8%
1963-04-01 14.7%
1963-05-01 14.4%
1963-06-01 12.4%
1963-07-01 13.5%
1963-08-01 13.2%
1963-09-01 14.0%
1963-10-01 13.3%
1963-11-01 12.6%
1963-12-01 12.3%
1964-01-01 12.5%
1964-02-01 12.4%
1964-03-01 12.8%
1964-04-01 12.1%
1964-05-01 13.4%
1964-06-01 13.1%
1964-07-01 14.5%
1964-08-01 13.7%
1964-09-01 12.4%
1964-10-01 11.7%
1964-11-01 12.3%
1964-12-01 11.9%
1965-01-01 11.1%
1965-02-01 11.0%
1965-03-01 10.2%
1965-04-01 10.3%
1965-05-01 10.2%
1965-06-01 10.7%
1965-07-01 9.8%
1965-08-01 10.0%
1965-09-01 11.1%
1965-10-01 10.8%
1965-11-01 10.1%
1965-12-01 9.9%
1966-01-01 9.9%
1966-02-01 9.5%
1966-03-01 9.2%
1966-04-01 9.0%
1966-05-01 9.5%
1966-06-01 7.9%
1966-07-01 7.3%
1966-08-01 7.0%
1966-09-01 7.1%
1966-10-01 7.9%
1966-11-01 7.3%
1966-12-01 7.5%
1967-01-01 6.9%
1967-02-01 6.9%
1967-03-01 6.2%
1967-04-01 6.1%
1967-05-01 5.3%
1967-06-01 5.0%
1967-07-01 5.2%
1967-08-01 6.7%
1967-09-01 5.4%
1967-10-01 5.6%
1967-11-01 5.9%
1967-12-01 6.5%
1968-01-01 6.6%
1968-02-01 5.9%
1968-03-01 6.2%
1968-04-01 5.5%
1968-05-01 5.0%
1968-06-01 5.4%
1968-07-01 5.5%
1968-08-01 5.5%
1968-09-01 4.9%
1968-10-01 5.0%
1968-11-01 4.8%
1968-12-01 6.0%
1969-01-01 4.9%
1969-02-01 4.3%
1969-03-01 4.4%
1969-04-01 4.8%
1969-05-01 4.7%
1969-06-01 4.4%
1969-07-01 5.6%
1969-08-01 4.6%
1969-09-01 4.9%
1969-10-01 4.5%
1969-11-01 5.1%
1969-12-01 4.6%
1970-01-01 4.5%
1970-02-01 4.6%
1970-03-01 5.0%
1970-04-01 5.3%
1970-05-01 5.9%
1970-06-01 5.5%
1970-07-01 5.7%
1970-08-01 5.9%
1970-09-01 6.3%
1970-10-01 5.6%
1970-11-01 6.7%
1970-12-01 7.6%
1971-01-01 8.5%
1971-02-01 9.2%
1971-03-01 9.3%
1971-04-01 9.2%
1971-05-01 10.2%
1971-06-01 10.9%
1971-07-01 11.3%
1971-08-01 10.6%
1971-09-01 11.0%
1971-10-01 11.7%
1971-11-01 11.2%
1971-12-01 11.4%
1972-01-01 11.7%
1972-02-01 13.4%
1972-03-01 12.8%
1972-04-01 13.6%
1972-05-01 11.9%
1972-06-01 11.2%
1972-07-01 10.6%
1972-08-01 10.8%
1972-09-01 11.2%
1972-10-01 10.6%
1972-11-01 10.2%
1972-12-01 10.2%
1973-01-01 9.5%
1973-02-01 8.4%
1973-03-01 8.9%
1973-04-01 7.5%
1973-05-01 8.0%
1973-06-01 7.5%
1973-07-01 6.5%
1973-08-01 7.7%
1973-09-01 6.8%
1973-10-01 8.0%
1973-11-01 8.0%
1973-12-01 7.4%
1974-01-01 7.2%
1974-02-01 7.1%
1974-03-01 7.1%
1974-04-01 7.6%
1974-05-01 7.5%
1974-06-01 7.4%
1974-07-01 7.7%
1974-08-01 7.7%
1974-09-01 7.2%
1974-10-01 7.2%
1974-11-01 7.1%
1974-12-01 8.1%
1975-01-01 8.3%
1975-02-01 9.7%
1975-03-01 9.7%
1975-04-01 11.9%
1975-05-01 13.0%
1975-06-01 15.8%
1975-07-01 17.3%
1975-08-01 18.3%
1975-09-01 19.6%
1975-10-01 18.0%
1975-11-01 21.0%
1975-12-01 20.3%
1976-01-01 20.8%
1976-02-01 21.0%
1976-03-01 20.7%
1976-04-01 19.7%
1976-05-01 17.5%
1976-06-01 18.3%
1976-07-01 16.8%
1976-08-01 16.9%
1976-09-01 16.0%
1976-10-01 16.4%
1976-11-01 16.8%
1976-12-01 17.6%
1977-01-01 16.6%
1977-02-01 16.2%
1977-03-01 16.0%
1977-04-01 16.1%
1977-05-01 15.6%
1977-06-01 14.4%
1977-07-01 14.3%
1977-08-01 12.9%
1977-09-01 13.7%
1977-10-01 13.4%
1977-11-01 13.2%
1977-12-01 13.4%
1978-01-01 12.6%
1978-02-01 10.6%
1978-03-01 11.2%
1978-04-01 11.1%
1978-05-01 11.3%
1978-06-01 10.5%
1978-07-01 10.4%
1978-08-01 10.1%
1978-09-01 10.2%
1978-10-01 10.0%
1978-11-01 8.8%
1978-12-01 8.2%
1979-01-01 8.8%
1979-02-01 9.0%
1979-03-01 9.6%
1979-04-01 9.0%
1979-05-01 8.8%
1979-06-01 8.8%
1979-07-01 7.8%
1979-08-01 8.5%
1979-09-01 8.6%
1979-10-01 8.5%
1979-11-01 9.0%
1979-12-01 8.6%
1980-01-01 8.3%
1980-02-01 7.6%
1980-03-01 9.1%
1980-04-01 9.3%
1980-05-01 8.9%
1980-06-01 9.6%
1980-07-01 10.7%
1980-08-01 11.3%
1980-09-01 12.0%
1980-10-01 13.1%
1980-11-01 14.2%
1980-12-01 14.8%
1981-01-01 15.7%
1981-02-01 15.5%
1981-03-01 15.2%
1981-04-01 14.4%
1981-05-01 14.0%
1981-06-01 14.0%
1981-07-01 13.8%
1981-08-01 14.5%
1981-09-01 13.5%
1981-10-01 13.2%
1981-11-01 12.7%
1981-12-01 12.6%
1982-01-01 12.6%
1982-02-01 13.2%
1982-03-01 13.6%
1982-04-01 14.6%
1982-05-01 15.5%
1982-06-01 17.0%
1982-07-01 16.8%
1982-08-01 17.0%
1982-09-01 17.8%
1982-10-01 19.5%
1982-11-01 19.5%
1982-12-01 21.3%
1983-01-01 22.9%
1983-02-01 23.5%
1983-03-01 24.4%
1983-04-01 24.6%
1983-05-01 24.9%
1983-06-01 26.0%
1983-07-01 24.5%
1983-08-01 23.6%
1983-09-01 23.5%
1983-10-01 23.1%
1983-11-01 22.7%
1983-12-01 22.0%
1984-01-01 22.4%
1984-02-01 20.8%
1984-03-01 20.4%
1984-04-01 20.3%
1984-05-01 20.0%
1984-06-01 19.3%
1984-07-01 18.7%
1984-08-01 17.6%
1984-09-01 17.2%
1984-10-01 17.1%
1984-11-01 17.4%
1984-12-01 16.7%
1985-01-01 15.5%
1985-02-01 16.2%
1985-03-01 16.1%
1985-04-01 16.4%
1985-05-01 14.8%
1985-06-01 15.3%
1985-07-01 15.0%
1985-08-01 14.9%
1985-09-01 14.8%
1985-10-01 14.5%
1985-11-01 16.0%
1985-12-01 14.8%
1986-01-01 13.9%
1986-02-01 14.1%
1986-03-01 14.0%
1986-04-01 13.9%
1986-05-01 13.8%
1986-06-01 15.0%
1986-07-01 14.7%
1986-08-01 14.7%
1986-09-01 14.8%
1986-10-01 14.8%
1986-11-01 14.3%
1986-12-01 14.6%
1987-01-01 14.3%
1987-02-01 14.2%
1987-03-01 14.3%
1987-04-01 14.4%
1987-05-01 14.8%
1987-06-01 14.5%
1987-07-01 13.5%
1987-08-01 14.5%
1987-09-01 13.9%
1987-10-01 13.3%
1987-11-01 13.1%
1987-12-01 13.0%
1988-01-01 12.5%
1988-02-01 12.9%
1988-03-01 12.3%
1988-04-01 12.3%
1988-05-01 12.5%
1988-06-01 12.3%
1988-07-01 11.9%
1988-08-01 11.7%
1988-09-01 12.3%
1988-10-01 11.8%
1988-11-01 10.8%
1988-12-01 11.4%
1989-01-01 11.0%
1989-02-01 10.0%
1989-03-01 10.7%
1989-04-01 11.0%
1989-05-01 9.9%
1989-06-01 9.3%
1989-07-01 9.5%
1989-08-01 8.7%
1989-09-01 9.1%
1989-10-01 9.8%
1989-11-01 9.8%
1989-12-01 9.6%
1990-01-01 9.7%
1990-02-01 9.4%
1990-03-01 9.6%
1990-04-01 9.5%
1990-05-01 9.5%
1990-06-01 9.5%
1990-07-01 9.8%
1990-08-01 10.2%
1990-09-01 10.6%
1990-10-01 10.4%
1990-11-01 10.8%
1990-12-01 10.6%
1991-01-01 10.9%
1991-02-01 10.9%
1991-03-01 11.1%
1991-04-01 11.6%
1991-05-01 11.9%
1991-06-01 12.6%
1991-07-01 12.9%
1991-08-01 13.5%
1991-09-01 13.7%
1991-10-01 13.9%
1991-11-01 15.4%
1991-12-01 16.4%
1992-01-01 17.5%
1992-02-01 18.1%
1992-03-01 18.8%
1992-04-01 18.9%
1992-05-01 20.6%
1992-06-01 21.3%
1992-07-01 21.5%
1992-08-01 21.0%
1992-09-01 21.5%
1992-10-01 23.1%
1992-11-01 20.7%
1992-12-01 21.4%
1993-01-01 21.2%
1993-02-01 20.7%
1993-03-01 20.0%
1993-04-01 18.2%
1993-05-01 19.6%
1993-06-01 19.5%
1993-07-01 19.8%
1993-08-01 20.1%
1993-09-01 20.2%
1993-10-01 20.4%
1993-11-01 21.0%
1993-12-01 20.8%
1994-01-01 20.1%
1994-02-01 20.7%
1994-03-01 21.2%
1994-04-01 21.3%
1994-05-01 21.3%
1994-06-01 19.9%
1994-07-01 19.6%
1994-08-01 19.6%
1994-09-01 20.0%
1994-10-01 20.8%
1994-11-01 19.7%
1994-12-01 18.9%
1995-01-01 18.3%
1995-02-01 17.2%
1995-03-01 18.8%
1995-04-01 18.7%
1995-05-01 17.5%
1995-06-01 16.8%
1995-07-01 16.7%
1995-08-01 16.3%
1995-09-01 16.9%
1995-10-01 16.5%
1995-11-01 16.7%
1995-12-01 16.4%
1996-01-01 16.2%
1996-02-01 16.5%
1996-03-01 18.2%
1996-04-01 18.3%
1996-05-01 18.1%
1996-06-01 19.4%
1996-07-01 18.3%
1996-08-01 18.2%
1996-09-01 17.4%
1996-10-01 16.7%
1996-11-01 15.7%
1996-12-01 16.1%
1997-01-01 16.1%
1997-02-01 15.7%
1997-03-01 15.6%
1997-04-01 16.2%
1997-05-01 15.7%
1997-06-01 15.8%
1997-07-01 16.3%
1997-08-01 16.2%
1997-09-01 16.2%
1997-10-01 16.0%
1997-11-01 14.8%
1997-12-01 15.4%
1998-01-01 15.7%
1998-02-01 15.2%
1998-03-01 14.1%
1998-04-01 14.7%
1998-05-01 13.8%
1998-06-01 12.6%
1998-07-01 13.3%
1998-08-01 13.2%
1998-09-01 14.5%
1998-10-01 13.6%
1998-11-01 14.4%
1998-12-01 13.5%
1999-01-01 12.0%
1999-02-01 13.2%
1999-03-01 12.2%
1999-04-01 11.4%
1999-05-01 12.4%
1999-06-01 13.7%
1999-07-01 12.3%
1999-08-01 12.1%
1999-09-01 12.0%
1999-10-01 12.4%
1999-11-01 11.9%
1999-12-01 12.1%
2000-01-01 12.7%
2000-02-01 10.8%
2000-03-01 11.0%
2000-04-01 10.7%
2000-05-01 11.1%
2000-06-01 11.2%
2000-07-01 12.3%
2000-08-01 12.2%
2000-09-01 11.5%
2000-10-01 11.3%
2000-11-01 10.6%
2000-12-01 11.4%
2001-01-01 11.3%
2001-02-01 11.7%
2001-03-01 11.1%
2001-04-01 11.0%
2001-05-01 10.0%
2001-06-01 11.2%
2001-07-01 10.8%
2001-08-01 12.2%
2001-09-01 11.5%
2001-10-01 11.8%
2001-11-01 13.9%
2001-12-01 13.6%
2002-01-01 14.6%
2002-02-01 14.9%
2002-03-01 15.9%
2002-04-01 16.8%
2002-05-01 18.8%
2002-06-01 19.6%
2002-07-01 19.0%
2002-08-01 18.9%
2002-09-01 19.1%
2002-10-01 19.9%
2002-11-01 20.5%
2002-12-01 22.1%
2003-01-01 20.5%
2003-02-01 21.8%
2003-03-01 21.0%
2003-04-01 21.9%
2003-05-01 21.6%
2003-06-01 22.8%
2003-07-01 22.0%
2003-08-01 22.2%
2003-09-01 22.5%
2003-10-01 22.4%
2003-11-01 23.4%
2003-12-01 23.1%
2004-01-01 22.7%
2004-02-01 22.9%
2004-03-01 23.6%
2004-04-01 22.1%
2004-05-01 21.9%
2004-06-01 22.5%
2004-07-01 20.7%
2004-08-01 20.3%
2004-09-01 21.4%
2004-10-01 21.5%
2004-11-01 21.4%
2004-12-01 20.8%
2005-01-01 21.2%
2005-02-01 20.4%
2005-03-01 21.8%
2005-04-01 21.0%
2005-05-01 20.1%
2005-06-01 18.5%
2005-07-01 18.7%
2005-08-01 18.9%
2005-09-01 18.9%
2005-10-01 18.9%
2005-11-01 18.0%
2005-12-01 18.7%
2006-01-01 16.7%
2006-02-01 18.7%
2006-03-01 18.6%
2006-04-01 18.6%
2006-05-01 18.9%
2006-06-01 16.6%
2006-07-01 18.3%
2006-08-01 18.3%
2006-09-01 18.1%
2006-10-01 15.9%
2006-11-01 16.4%
2006-12-01 16.2%
2007-01-01 16.3%
2007-02-01 18.0%
2007-03-01 18.6%
2007-04-01 17.4%
2007-05-01 16.5%
2007-06-01 16.4%
2007-07-01 18.3%
2007-08-01 17.5%
2007-09-01 17.5%
2007-10-01 17.7%
2007-11-01 18.9%
2007-12-01 17.4%
2008-01-01 18.5%
2008-02-01 17.8%
2008-03-01 16.9%
2008-04-01 17.7%
2008-05-01 18.3%
2008-06-01 18.2%
2008-07-01 18.9%
2008-08-01 19.8%
2008-09-01 21.3%
2008-10-01 22.3%
2008-11-01 21.1%
2008-12-01 23.1%
2009-01-01 22.6%
2009-02-01 23.4%
2009-03-01 24.2%
2009-04-01 27.1%
2009-05-01 27.0%
2009-06-01 29.0%
2009-07-01 34.0%
2009-08-01 34.3%
2009-09-01 36.6%
2009-10-01 36.6%
2009-11-01 39.3%
2009-12-01 40.4%
2010-01-01 41.6%
2010-02-01 40.8%
2010-03-01 43.4%
2010-04-01 45.3%
2010-05-01 44.9%
2010-06-01 44.8%
2010-07-01 44.7%
2010-08-01 42.6%
2010-09-01 42.2%
2010-10-01 42.6%
2010-11-01 42.3%
2010-12-01 44.7%
2011-01-01 44.0%
2011-02-01 43.3%
2011-03-01 44.9%
2011-04-01 42.9%
2011-05-01 44.7%
2011-06-01 44.3%
2011-07-01 44.6%
2011-08-01 43.2%
2011-09-01 45.0%
2011-10-01 42.7%
2011-11-01 43.1%
2011-12-01 42.9%
2012-01-01 43.1%
2012-02-01 41.8%
2012-03-01 41.6%
2012-04-01 40.8%
2012-05-01 42.6%
2012-06-01 41.9%
2012-07-01 40.7%
2012-08-01 40.0%
2012-09-01 40.4%
2012-10-01 40.9%
2012-11-01 39.8%
2012-12-01 39.1%
2013-01-01 37.9%
2013-02-01 39.7%
2013-03-01 39.1%
2013-04-01 37.4%
2013-05-01 37.4%
2013-06-01 36.9%
2013-07-01 37.2%
2013-08-01 38.0%
2013-09-01 36.9%
2013-10-01 36.0%
2013-11-01 37.4%
2013-12-01 37.7%
2014-01-01 35.8%
2014-02-01 37.0%
2014-03-01 35.8%
ChartData Download data

The data below can be saved or copied directly into Excel.

Economic Policy Institute

Source: Author's analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey public data series

Copy the code below to embed this chart on your website.

Certainly No Sign in March of Excessive Wage Growth Which Would Trigger Inflation

Average hourly wages of private sector workers and of production/nonsupervisory both dropped slightly in March. The chart shows year-over-year growth in hourly wages for both groups. Both are seeing growth rates far below what they were seeing before the recession started, and the “all private sector employees” series has seen no increase whatsoever in nearly three years. In recent months, many commentators have, perhaps surprisingly, raised concerns that our labor market may be tightening enough to be causing excessive wage growth that would trigger inflation. There is no sign of that here. Instead, today’s jobs report shows there remains a tremendous amount of slack in the labor market, which shifts bargaining power away from workers and keeps wages low. Employers do not have to pay substantial wage increases to get and keep the workers they need when workers lack outside options.

nominal wages

No Signs of a Skill Mismatch in Today’s Jobs Report

In an update to last month’s post, the table below shows the March unemployment rate, the unemployment rate in 2007, and the ratio of the two, for a variety of demographic categories and by occupation and industry. Again we see that while (as per usual) there is considerable variation in unemployment rates across groups, the unemployment rate is substantially higher now than it was before the recession started for all groups. The unemployment rate is between 1.3 and 1.7 times as high now as it was six-plus years ago for all age, education, occupation, industry, gender, and racial and ethnic groups. Elevated unemployment across the board, like we see today, means that the weak labor market is due to employers not seeing demand for their goods and services pick up in a way that would require them to significantly ramp up hiring, not workers lacking the right skills or education for the occupations or industries where jobs are available. This commentary provides a more in-depth look at this issue.

Table 1

Unemployment rates of various demographic groups, 2007 and today

2007 March 2014 Ratio
All 4.6 6.7 1.5
Male 4.7 6.8 1.4
Female 4.5 6.6 1.5
White 4.1 5.8 1.4
Black 8.3 12.4 1.5
Hispanic 5.6 7.9 1.4
Age 16–24 10.5 14.5 1.4
Age 25–54 3.7 5.7 1.5
Age 55+ 3.1 4.7 1.5
Workers age 25 and older
High school 4.4 6.3 1.4
Bachelor’s and advanced degree 2.0 3.4 1.7
Workers under age 25, not enrolled in further schooling
High school degree 12.0 18.5* 1.5
Bachelor’s and advanced degree 5.4 8.2* 1.5
Occupation
Management, professional, and related occupations 2.1 3.4* 1.6
Service occupations 5.9 8.3* 1.4
Sales and office occupations 4.3 6.9* 1.6
Construction and extraction occupations 7.6 11.6* 1.5
Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 3.4 5.2* 1.5
Production, transportation, and material moving occupations 5.8 8.7* 1.5
Industry
Construction 7.4 10.5* 1.4
Manufacturing 4.3 6.2* 1.4
Wholesale and retail trade 4.7 7.1* 1.5
Transportation and utilities 3.9 6.4* 1.6
Information 3.6 6.0* 1.7
Financial activities 3.0 4.3* 1.4
Professional and business services 5.3 7.9* 1.5
Education and health services 3.0 4.6* 1.5
Leisure and hospitality 7.4 9.7* 1.3
Economic Policy Institute

* This is a 12-month average (April 2013–March 2014), since this series is not seasonally adjusted.

Source: Author's analysis of the Current Population Survey public data series

Copy the code below to embed this chart on your website.

In March, the Unemployment Rate Masked Some Good News For Once

The unemployment rate held steady in March, but in a departure from the usual story in this recovery, that masked some good news. The share of the working-age population with a job ticked up by one-tenth of a percent—and the share of the prime-age population with a job, which is my favorite measure of labor market trends in recent years—ticked up by two-tenths of a percent. If more people were finding work, why didn’t the unemployment rate go down?  Because more people came into the labor force. The labor force participation rate rose by two-tenths of a percent. The number of “missing workers”—workers who have left, or never entered, the labor force due to weak job opportunities—dropped from 5.7 million to 5.3 million. That is still a lot of missing workers (the unemployment rate would be 9.8% if they were counted as unemployed), and there is a great deal of month-to-month variability in the number of missing workers (meaning we can’t make too much of one’s month’s drop), but this is a step in the right direction.

Interestingly, most of the decline in missing workers in March was due to the increase in labor force participation of men under age 25. Men under age 25 had seen a steep decline in labor force participation over the prior five months, and March’s increase almost entirely reverses that decline. There are still 580,000 missing men under age 25, but again, March’s drop was a step in the right direction.

Congress Passes Up Yet Another Opportunity to Reconsider Tax Giveaways

Earlier this week, Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) unveiled his proposal to retroactively renew the “tax extenders”—a group of just more than fifty “temporary,” unrelated tax incentives, breaks, loopholes, and outright giveaways that Congress routinely extends as they lapse.

My earlier analysis of this abdication of responsible policymaking concluded that instead of renewing the entire slate of tax extenders, lawmakers should conduct a thorough review of each individual provision to see if it efficiently targets useful policy goals. They should then improve and make permanent the provisions that pass muster, and shelve those that don’t.

Taking a close look at each tax incentive on a case-by-case basis is absolutely necessary. Some of the policies, like the “active financing exception”—a loophole by which financial services firms and manufacturers can defer U.S. taxes on overseas income from specific types of financial transactions—are simply giveaways to some of America’s largest corporations. (There’s a reason why keeping this provision around is a “top lobbying priority for companies such as GE and JP Morgan.”) Meanwhile, other tax extenders seem to benefit society—such as the provision that lets teachers deduct $250 worth of school supplies they buy for their classrooms with their own money—but these are regressive, and could better accomplish their goals (in this case, decreasing the cost of school supplies as borne by teachers) outside of the tax code (say, by giving more money directly to schools). For still other provisions, like the ones that benefit thoroughbred racehorse owners or Puerto Rican rum distillers, the punchlines just about write themselves. And because the extenders would go into effect retroactively, it’s hard to claim they’re helping incentivize any particular desired behavior.

Read more

College Completion: Why Getting Kids in the Door Isn’t Enough

As we enter graduation season, the media will get flooded with stories of labor market prospects of young people, college graduates, and of course, student debt. EPI will do its fair share of flooding (with a 2014 update to our Class of 2013 paper), but one aspect that often gets overlooked are those who have started college but will never graduate. Young adults with some college but no degree are stuck in a catch-22, without the better employment opportunities and wage increases that comes with a college degree, but with a similar mountain of student debt. The number of people that fail to complete college—and the burdens this places on them—is one of the most corrosive aspects of the higher education system.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics recently released new data from their National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a survey that follows women and men born between 1980 and 1984 in an effort to provide long-term information on the employment experiences and educational attainment of young people. The educational makeup of young adults by the time they are 27 is such: 28.1 percent have a college degree, 25.5 percent have a high school degree or equivalent with no further education, and 8.7 percent have not finished high school. That leaves nearly 40 percent of young adults who have some college education by age 27 (this includes individuals with an associate’s degree or any enrollment in college after high school). Put another way, of the 66 percent of young adults who began college, 37.5 haven’t completed their degree by age 27.

While it’s encouraging to see that more young adults are getting their foot in the door at colleges, you need to graduate to reap the higher wages of a college degree. This is seen most obviously in the entry-level wages young adults. Currently, entry-level college graduates (age 23-29) make $20 an hour, while young adults with some college (ages 21-27) make $12 an hour. An hourly wage of $12 is much closer to high school graduates’ wages of $10 an hour than to the wages of their college graduated peers.

Read more