Young workers have experienced a strong labor market coming out of the pandemic recession, with better job opportunities and faster wage growth than they experienced in much of the prior four decades. However, the Trump administration’s recent attacks on the federal workforce, higher education, and registered apprenticeships—as well as imposing extreme tariffs—threaten to reverse these gains. In this first post in a series on young adults, we examine their labor market prospects as they graduate from high school and college this spring and discuss how policy changes might impact their prospects.1

Young adults have experienced historically fast wage growth in this business cycle

Figure A shows that real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth has been strong for workers of all ages in the pandemic recovery, but young workers have experienced faster wage growth (9.1%) than workers ages 25 and older (5.4%). Compared with the previous four business cycles, real wage growth in this recovery has been extraordinarily fast for young workers. It was not only significantly above zero for the first time in the early stages of a recovery, but also 14.4 percentage points faster than the recovery following the Great Recession of 2008.

Though the difference is not as stark, it is worth noting that workers ages 25 and older have also experienced faster wage growth this business cycle than in prior business cycles. This is no accident—all age groups have seen strong wage growth during the pandemic recovery because of intentional policy decisions.

After the huge job losses in March and April 2020 (specifically in industries most likely to employ young workers), policymakers passed large fiscal recovery packages that spurred rapid rehiring efforts, which gave workers leverage to secure higher wages and better working conditions. Further, pandemic relief efforts like expanded unemployment insurance coverage and economic impact payments gave these workers the economic security to be more selective than normal when job hunting.

Wages for young workers have grown faster than rent and college tuition

We also compare nominal wage growth with the growth in prices of goods and services that stress the budgets of young adults. In addition to exceeding overall inflation, nominal wage growth for young workers (40.3%) has significantly outpaced growth in the cost of rent (27.4%) and college tuition (8.6%) since February 2020 (Figure B).

While rent and college tuition are unaffordable for many young adults and their families, the rate of growth since 2020 suggests they have not become any more unaffordable over this period. This is a crucially under-recognized achievement: strong labor markets directly made both college attendance and the cost of rent more affordable for young workers in recent years.

Young adults are less likely to experience unemployment and underemployment now than in the past

Labor market outcomes for young workers have also been more promising recently than on average over the prior three decades. Figure C below shows the unemployment rate, underemployment rate, and “idling” rate in March 2025 and the average in the July 1990 to March 2024 period.2

The unemployment rate for young workers now is 9.2% compared with 12.1% on average between 1990 and 2024. The underemployment rate is also lower today compared with the prior three decades. The underemployment rate is the share of the labor force that either 1) is unemployed, 2) is working part time but wants and is available to work full time (an “involuntary” part timer), or 3) wants and is available to work and has looked for work in the last year but has given up actively seeking work in the last four weeks (“marginally attached” worker).

Another important measure of opportunities for young adults is what we call the idled rate—the share of young adults who are neither employed nor enrolled in school. This idled rate is useful because it is often hard to judge whether higher employment of young people is unambiguously good. For example, in some states that have weakened child labor laws, 16- and 17-year-olds are now at higher risk of facing exploitative conditions like subminimum wages, safety hazards, or long hours that interfere with high school completion. But it is almost always unambiguously bad when young people lack opportunities to either work or be enrolled in school—and this is what the idled rate measures. The share idled in 2025 is lower than on average between 1990 and 2024.

Recent Trump policy decisions could harm the economic futures of young adults

These promising outcomes for young workers are a tremendous policy achievement. The decision to use large fiscal relief and recovery packages to heal the labor market as quickly as possible after the pandemic recession has paid off enormously for the nation’s young workers. However, recent actions by the Trump administration threaten to reverse these gains.

Specifically, attacks on higher education in the form of cuts to university funding and uncertainty around student loans will make college less attainable for all, but in particular for young women and Black and Hispanic people. This will only further exacerbate significant gaps in education, wages, and lifetime earnings across race/ethnicity and gender.

The administration has also attacked federal initiatives to expand access to registered apprenticeships, another accredited system through which young workers advance their careers and reach higher earnings. Data show that union registered apprenticeships are increasingly important pathways to living-wage skilled trades careers for young and low-income people, women, and Black and Hispanic workers, illustrating the disproportionate harm that these attacks will have.

Additionally, the current administration has launched large-scale attacks on the federal workforce, supported drastic cuts to Medicaid, pursued mass deportations, and imposed extreme tariffs.

Cuts to the federal workforce mean that young people interested in public service careers will have fewer opportunities. Further, major staffing cuts to the Department of Labor and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health will weaken the enforcement of laws that keep workers safe and investigate wage violations (which disproportionately harm young workers, women, people of color, and immigrants). Meanwhile, Medicaid cuts would directly harm young people who are lower income and rely on Medicaid to meet their health care needs, including the high share of women who depend on Medicaid for their pregnancy.

Those cuts—combined with current immigration and tariffs policies—could lead to an economic recession. Young workers are often hurt more in a recession due to the “last hired, first fired” phenomenon and their lack of a significant foothold in the labor market. Graduating into a recession can set them back for years to come, depending on the depth and duration of the recession. To prevent a recession and remove the threat of undoing gains made over the pandemic recovery, these policy actions must be halted immediately.

In the next blog post in this series, we will delve deeper into the wages of high school and college graduates, respectively, and discuss gaps that exist across race and ethnicity and gender.

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1. We define young workers as 16–24 years old. For all of our data in this post we use 12-month moving averages. For example, March 2025 data represent the average of April 2024 to March 2025. Smoothing over 12 months allows for sufficient sample sizes for analysis and to account for seasonal fluctuations throughout the year. Data for young workers, in particular, may vary by season given changes in their schedule between the academic year and the summer.

2. The idling data are available starting in 1984, but we use July 1990 as the start date to capture only full business cycles.