Key takeaways
An expanded view of the working class
- The working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight, but there is no universal definition of what it is.
- A commonly used definition of working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree.
- The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.
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- Given these factors, a broader definition of the working class can be considered people in the labor force whose family income is in the bottom 75%, regardless of educational level or job type. This works out to a family income below $150,000 per year.
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- Under this broader definition, 31.5% of those in the working class have a bachelor’s degree or higher; a majority of working-class college graduates hold professional or managerial jobs.
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- Traditionally women-dominated jobs related to teaching, child care, or nursing make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations.
A racially diverse group
- In 1979, the working class (defined by less than a bachelor’s degree) was 81.5% white.
- Shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. Now, the working class is:
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- 52% white
- 26.8% Hispanic
- 15.1% Black
- 4.7% Asian American
- 1.4% Native American
- One-fifth of the working class was born outside the United States, and 11.6% are non-U.S. citizens.
- The working class is similarly diverse when defined by family income level.
Differences by state (using family income to define working class)
- There is considerable variation in the working-class composition of states, based on differences in costs of living and labor force participation.
- The five states (including Washington, D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares are:
- Massachusetts (42.9%)
- Washington, D.C. (42.9%)
- New Jersey (44.9%)
- Maryland (47.8%)
- Washington state (47.9%)
- The five states with the highest working-class population shares are:
- South Dakota (66.7%)
- Iowa (64.9%)
- Wyoming (64.7%)
- Kansas (63.9%)
- Nebraska (62.7%)
What is the working class?
The working class remains an often-used rhetorical concept that carries tremendous political weight. Despite having no official definition, “working class voters” are a heavily courted constituency during election years. In the most general sense, the “working class” as a political economic category describes people who rely almost exclusively on wage labor through steady employment to support themselves and their families.
Historically, the term working class has been closely associated with nonmanagerial blue-collar workers and unions, often represented in the popular imagination by white tradesmen in hard hats. This popular image, however, has never represented a complete picture. Due to occupational segregation, Black workers have always made up a significant portion of nonmanagerial laborers commonly identified as working class. Additionally, since the 1970s, increases in women’s labor force participation and immigration have resulted in growing shares of women, Hispanic, and Asian workers in the U.S. labor force. Along with these demographic shifts, there have been changes in the composition of “working class” jobs over time. For example, as traditional blue-collar production and manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell sharply between 1998 and 2019, job opportunities for noncollege graduates were largely replaced by growth in service-sector employment (Scott et al. 2022).
Who is working class?
Contemporary views about who is included in the working class range from narrow to extremely broad: those earning very low wages, those without a bachelor’s degree, and anyone who works for a wage or salary, irrespective of their wage or education level. The latter definition, currently being pushed by the growing Democratic Socialist movement, has generated some debate around whether highly educated, relatively high-income wage and salary workers belong in a category with traditional blue-collar, noncollege-educated workers who often live vastly different material lives (Rotondaro 2026).
What are some factors that complicate the traditional distinction between college-educated and other workers?
For many, however, the line between the economic status of college- and noncollege-educated workers is not that clear and has been blurred by rising inequality and labor market discrimination. Over the last 10 years, the college wage premium has declined. In other words, the wage boost from a bachelor’s degree is lower than it used to be, and workers in many jobs that were once considered white collar now experience relatively modest pay and limited control over the pace and content of work (Fast and Gould 2026).
Research also shows that Black college graduates are more likely than white college graduates to work in jobs that don’t require a college degree, and even after controlling for college major, graduates of color, foreign-born graduates, and women of all races are much more likely to work alongside nongraduates (Williams and Wilson 2019; Attewell and Witteveen 2023). In addition to these forms of underemployment, racial and gender pay disparities among college graduates result in lower pay for women and Black and Hispanic men relative to white men (Quadlin, VanHuevelen, and Ahearn 2023; Wilson 2016a; Mora and Dávila 2018). Facing limited returns on their college education, debt-burdened bachelor’s degree holders may even find themselves in a more precarious position than nongraduate co-workers who are free of student debt.
Which topics will this report cover?
Taking these factors into consideration, this report updates prior EPI research on the changing demographics of the working class and presents a more expansive definition of this group that includes labor force participants in the bottom 75% of the family income distribution (Wilson 2016b). This report presents the working class as more racially diverse than ever before but also includes workers with and without college degrees employed in a range of blue-, pink1- and white-collar jobs that afford different standards of living across the United States. This analysis supports the idea that policies that strengthen labor standards and protect civil and workers’ rights will improve the lives of working people across traditional class lines defined by education or occupation.
How are we defining the working class in this report?
This report considers two definitions of the working class. Consistent with previous EPI research, the first definition is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Education captures much of what people typically associate with class, and in the labor market, a bachelor’s degree is commonly interpreted by employers as a signal of skill acquisition required for many white-collar occupations. Since educational categories have been more consistently coded in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) than other commonly used indicators of working-class status, like occupation or income, we use this definition in Part I of the report when comparing working-class demographic and economic outcomes over time.
The second definition, used in Part II of our analysis, is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with family income at or below the 75th percentile. In our sample, this corresponds to individuals with less than $150,000 in family income.2 The income-based definition captures people in similar economic circumstances, regardless of education or occupation. Implicit in this income-based definition of working class is the assumption that a job loss could result in significant economic hardship for most families below this threshold. We apply this more expansive definition to our more detailed analysis of the working class for disaggregated groups of workers by race, ethnicity, gender, nativity, geography, education, and occupation using pooled 2024–2025 CPS data (Part II).
Though slightly different, there is considerable overlap between these definitions: 82.9% of those who qualify as working class under the education-based definition are also defined as working class using the income-based definition.
Part I: Changes in working-class demographic characteristics and economic conditions since 1979
Shifting demographic characteristics of the working class
The demographic composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last five decades, as shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation among different groups have contributed to a more diverse workforce. For comparability over time, this part of our analysis relies on the education-based definition of working class: 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Since labor force participation fluctuates across different points in the business cycle, and to varying degrees for different groups of workers, we focus on demographic comparisons across peak years in the business cycle when employment and labor force participation are highest. Those years are 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, and 2019. The current time period covers 2024 and 2025, which combines the year with the highest rate of prime age employment since the 2019 business cycle peak (2024) and the most recent full year of data (2025) (EPI 2026b).
Figure A clearly shows that the working class has grown more racially and ethnically diverse over the last 46 years. In 1979, the working class was over 80% white, but after 2000, the combined shares of Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN or Native American) workers increased rapidly. While white workers remain the largest single racial group, workers of color collectively accounted for nearly half of the working class in 2024–2025. Currently, the working class is 52% white, 26.8% Hispanic, 15.1% Black, 4.7% AAPI, and 1.4% Native American.
The working class has become more racially diverse over the years: Working-class population by race and ethnicity, select years
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | Other | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 81.5% | 11.3% | 5.7% | 1.5% | ||
| 1989 | 76.3% | 12.2% | 9.0% | 1.9% | 0.6% | |
| 2000 | 68.5% | 12.7% | 14.6% | 3.2% | 1.0% | |
| 2007 | 64.2% | 12.9% | 18.1% | 3.5% | 1.2% | |
| 2019 | 55.7% | 14.5% | 23.9% | 4.5% | 1.4% | |
| 2024–2025 | 52.0% | 15.1% | 26.8% | 4.7% | 1.4% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other“ is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
The changing race and gender composition of the working class are displayed separately for women and men in Figure B so that changes for each group are easier to see over time, but the combined percentages of men and women in each year sum to 100%. Overall, men have maintained a small majority over women in the working class (between 53% and 57%) since 1979. While there hasn’t been a huge shift in the overall gender demographics of the working class, an increase in the share of women between 1979 and 1989 reflects rising women’s labor force participation at a time when men were leaving the labor force (EPI 2026d). Women decline as a share of the working class after 2000 as the share of women with a bachelor’s degree or higher rose faster and surpassed the share of men with college degrees (Census 2022).
The intersection of race and gender in Figure B brings these joint demographic shifts in the working class into even sharper focus. For example, in 1979, white men alone accounted for nearly half (46.3%) of the working class. By 2024–2025, white men were less than a third (29.6%) of the working class. Over the same time, the share of working-class women of color more than doubled from 8.4% in 1979 to 21.2% in 2024–2025, with the largest increase occurring among Hispanic women (from 2.2% in 1979 to 11.1% in 2024–2025).
Women’s working-class share peaked in 2000, then fell as more women completed college degrees: Working-class population by race and ethnicity and gender, select years
: Women's working-class population by race and ethnicity, select years
| Year | White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 35.30% | 5.40% | 2.20% | 0.80% | ||
| 1989 | 35.40% | 6.10% | 3.60% | 1.00% | 0.30% | |
| 2000 | 32.20% | 6.70% | 5.80% | 1.50% | 0.50% | |
| 2007 | 29.50% | 6.70% | 6.90% | 1.70% | 0.60% | |
| 2019 | 24.40% | 7.30% | 9.80% | 2.10% | 0.70% | |
| ’24–’25 | 22.40% | 7.30% | 11.10% | 2.20% | 0.60% |
: Men's working-class population by race and ethnicity, select years
| Year | White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | Other |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 46.30% | 5.90% | 3.40% | 0.80% | ||
| 1989 | 40.90% | 6.10% | 5.40% | 0.90% | 0.30% | |
| 2000 | 36.20% | 6.00% | 8.80% | 1.70% | 0.50% | |
| 2007 | 34.70% | 6.20% | 11.10% | 1.80% | 0.60% | |
| 2019 | 31.30% | 7.20% | 14.00% | 2.30% | 0.80% | |
| ’24–’25 | 29.60% | 7.80% | 15.80% | 2.50% | 0.80% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other” is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
An increase in immigration also contributed to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the working class since 1979 (Kramer and Passel 2025). While the immigrant population has grown increasingly diverse over the last 46 years, between 2010 and 2024, the 10 largest U.S. immigrant groups have come from Latin American or Asian countries. This has contributed to the growth in working-class Hispanic and Asian workers shown in Figures A and B (MPI 2025). Figure C further shows that the share of the working class that is foreign-born has grown from 13.8% in 2000 (the earliest year these data are available in the CPS) to 19.8% in 2024–2025 (a 43.5% increase). Currently, 11.6% of the working class are non-U.S. citizens.
The foreign-born share of the working class has steadily grown over the last 25 years: Working-class population by nativity, select years
| Year | Native-born | Foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen | Foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2000 | 86.3% | 4.6% | 9.2% |
| 2007 | 83.5% | 5.6% | 10.9% |
| 2019 | 82.0% | 7.9% | 10.2% |
| 2024–2025 | 80.2% | 8.2% | 11.6% |

Note: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. Data may not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Changing economic conditions for the working class
One of the most prominent narratives regarding the working class has been how people without a bachelor’s degree have been stripped of opportunities to earn a decent living and left behind in the modern economy. All too often, this narrative centers the white working class, and white men in particular, to the exclusion of all others. This section presents a more inclusive picture of changing economic conditions among the working class that depicts both shared class struggles and racial inequities within this group.
Figure D shows that employment among prime-age (25–54-year-olds) adults without a bachelor’s degree peaked in 2000 but has since fallen for most groups. However, even at the high point in 2000, there were considerable gaps between racial and ethnic groups. As many as 80.9% of prime-age white adults with less than a bachelor’s degree were employed in 2000, compared with just 68.7% of similarly educated Native Americans in that age cohort. While employment among prime-age working-class white workers has fallen 4.0 percentage points since 2000, they have maintained the highest rates of employment among the working class, even as the gaps between white, Hispanic, and AAPI workers narrowed significantly after 2007. Over the decades, employment rates among prime-age working-class Black and Native American workers have been significantly lower than their white counterparts.
With the exception of Hispanic workers, employment rates for prime-age adults with less than a bachelor’s degree have fallen since 2000: Prime-age employment-to-population ratio for working-age population with less than a bachelor's degree, select years
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 72.9% | 68.7% | 66.2% | ||
| 1989 | 79.2% | 70.4% | 71.0% | 71.4% | 65.9% |
| 2000 | 80.9% | 74.0% | 75.6% | 75.5% | 68.7% |
| 2007 | 78.8% | 71.2% | 75.5% | 74.7% | 67.6% |
| 2019 | 77.0% | 71.7% | 75.6% | 74.1% | 65.8% |
| 2024–2025 | 76.9% | 72.2% | 76.0% | 74.7% | 66.8% |

Notes: Prime age refers to ages 25 to 54. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Prime-age refers to ages 25 to 54. Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other” is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
In addition to a shared peak in employment from the strong economy of the late-1990s–2000, the working class has also shared the experience of inconsistent, often tepid, wage growth since 1979 because of policy choices that suppressed wages for the vast majority of workers (Gould and Wething 2026). Figure E shows annualized rates of inflation-adjusted median hourly wage growth for each group between business cycle peaks. This chart notably shows that all racial and ethnic groups suffered real wage losses (adjusted for inflation) during the 1980s, as globalization and concerted efforts to weaken unions stripped many in the working class of good-paying union jobs and bargaining power.
After decades of slower wage growth, median hourly wages grew fastest for all groups between 2019 and 2025, with workers of color experiencing faster wage growth than white workers—from 1.2% a year for Black workers to 1.7% a year for Native Americans. This is consistent with research that shows between 2019 and 2023, the lowest-wage workers—a group that includes many working-class people of color—had the strongest wage growth (Gould and deCourcy 2024).
After decades of slower wage growth, working class wages grew fastest between 2019 and 2025: Annual real median hourly wage growth by race and ethnicity, select years
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979–1989 | -0.4% | -0.4% | -0.9% | ||
| 1989–2000 | 0.5% | 0.7% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.7% |
| 2000–2007 | 0.6% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 0.2% | 0.5% |
| 2007–2019 | 0.3% | 0.5% | 1.2% | 0.5% | 0.2% |
| 2019–2025 | 0.9% | 1.2% | 1.3% | 1.6% | 1.7% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other“ is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Working-class Hispanic and Black workers are most likely to have wages lower than their state’s median wage: Share of workers paid less than their state's median hourly wage by race and ethnicity, select years
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 53.1% | 64.9% | 68.7% | ||
| 1989 | 54.8% | 67.1% | 72.9% | 68.8% | 62.6% |
| 2000 | 56.2% | 69.4% | 76.0% | 66.5% | 63.5% |
| 2007 | 56.3% | 71.4% | 75.3% | 68.2% | 64.6% |
| 2019 | 59.5% | 76.0% | 74.2% | 71.1% | 68.9% |
| 2024–2025 | 61.0% | 74.9% | 75.1% | 71.7% | 66.2% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other” is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Unfortunately, for most groups, the much-needed wage boost in recent years was not large enough to recover the prior four decades of lost ground, relative to state median wages. The wage boost failed to significantly reduce the share of working-class people whose hourly wage fell below their state median, as racial pay disparities within the working class persist. Figure F shows that between 1979 and 2019, the share of working-class Black and white workers whose wages were below the median hourly wage in their state increased by 11.1 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively. While wages among the Hispanic working class grew faster than other groups between 2000–2007 and 2007–2019, Figure F also shows they remained most likely to have wages below their state’s median in 2024–2025 (75.1%), followed closely by Black workers (74.9%). Even after receiving a stronger pandemic recovery wage boost, the median hourly wages of Black ($19.59) and Hispanic workers ($19.99) with less than a bachelor’s degree were significantly lower than those of similarly educated white workers ($22.65), as Table 1 shows.
Median hourly wages for workers with less than a bachelor's degree by race and ethnicity, select years (2025 dollars)
| 1979 | 1989 | 2000 | 2007 | 2019 | 2024–2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| White | $19.63 | $18.79 | $19.84 | $20.68 | $21.49 | $22.65 |
| Black | $16.62 | $15.97 | $17.20 | $17.29 | $18.31 | $19.59 |
| Hispanic | $16.56 | $15.00 | $15.39 | $16.21 | $18.59 | $19.99 |
| AAPI | $17.05 | $17.65 | $17.89 | $18.92 | $20.68 | |
| AIAN | $16.36 | $17.60 | $18.23 | $18.67 | $20.59 |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other“ is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Over the same time period that the hourly pay of more working-class wage earners dropped below the state median wage, a declining share of those workers were union members or covered by a union contract (see Figure G). The decline is especially stark among Black workers for whom union coverage in 2024–2025 (12.2%) was less than a third of what it was in 1979 (36.9%).
Working-class Black workers experienced the sharpest decline in union coverage over the last 46 years: Share of working class represented by a union as a member or covered by contract, select years
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1979 | 27.7% | 36.9% | 29.7% | ||
| 1989 | 18.3% | 24.9% | 16.4% | 18.2% | 14.5% |
| 1990 | 18.1% | 24.0% | 16.0% | 19.6% | 14.9% |
| 2000 | 14.6% | 18.4% | 12.1% | 12.9% | 11.0% |
| 2007 | 12.8% | 14.4% | 9.9% | 13.1% | 11.8% |
| 2010 | 12.4% | 13.9% | 9.9% | 12.1% | 10.6% |
| 2019 | 11.0% | 11.0% | 9.0% | 11.2% | 10.0% |
| 2020 | 11.4% | 12.9% | 9.8% | 10.9% | 8.8% |
| ’24–’25 | 10.7% | 12.2% | 8.7% | 11.5% | 9.6% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Notes: Working class is defined as those with less than a bachelor's degree who are in the labor force. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). For 1979 data, “Other” is inclusive of AAPI and AIAN respondents. From the data for 2007, “Black” includes all respondents listing Black alone or in any combination. Prior to 2003, survey race categorization did not include multiracial identities.
Source: Author's analysis of 1979 Current Population Survey May, and 1989, 2000, 2007, 2019, and pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Part II: Current demographic and economic characteristics of the working class
The remainder of this report is based on the more expansive definition of working class that includes all 18–64-year-old labor force participants in the bottom 75% of family income, regardless of educational level or occupation. This portion of the analysis takes a more detailed look at the current demographic and labor market characteristics of the working class in 2024–2025.
Figure H shows the share of each group, by race, ethnicity, or nativity, that meets this more expansive definition of working class. As shown in Figure H, over 60% of Black and Hispanic adults between the ages of 18 and 64 meet this definition of working class, compared with more than half of Native American and white adults and 43.4% of AAPI adults.3 Similarly, a larger share of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens is working class—62.1% compared with about 54% of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized.
Over 3 out of 5 Black, and Hispanic adults, and foreign-born non-U.S. citizens are working class, based on family income: Share of each population group that is in the labor force and has family income less than $150,000, 2024–2025
| Race/ethnicity | Share that is working class |
|---|---|
| White | 51.7% |
| Black | 61.0% |
| Hispanic | 63.3% |
| AAPI | 43.4% |
| AIAN | 56.3% |
| Native-born | 53.9% |
| Foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen | 53.7% |
| Foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen | 62.1% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Figure I presents the educational distribution of the working class. Even under this broader definition that is unrestricted by educational level, the majority of those in the working class (68.5%) have less than a bachelor’s degree, with the largest group being those with only a high school diploma (32%).
Over two-thirds of the family income-defined working class has less than a bachelor's degree: Working-class population by education, 2024–2025
| Education level | Share of working-class population |
|---|---|
| Less than high school | 8.4% |
| High school diploma | 32.0% |
| Some college | 28.1% |
| Bachelor’s degree | 22.1% |
| Advanced degree | 9.4% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Defined in part by labor force participation, a large majority (69.2%) of those in the working class are between 25- and 54-years-old, or prime age. With large shares of younger people attending college and not working, the working class also includes more people ages 55–64 (17.1%) than under age 25 (13.7%) (see Figure J) (Gould et al. 2025).
25- to 54-year-olds make up most of the working class; half are between ages 25 and 44: Working class population by age, 2024–2025
| Age | Share of working-class population |
|---|---|
| 18–24 | 13.7% |
| 25–34 | 26.1% |
| 35–44 | 23.6% |
| 45–54 | 19.4% |
| 55–64 | 17.1% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
In addition to labor force participation, family income at or below the 75th percentile (less than $150,000 per year) is used to identify members of the working class under this more expansive definition. However, the relative precarity of families at the same income level can vary, based on family size and the number of household earners.
Figure K summarizes basic family structures within the working class, based on marital status and the presence of minor children (under age 18). It shows that almost half of those in the working class are unmarried and childless (46.0%), while 30.8% have at least one child under age 18. The majority of working-class parents are married.
Almost half of the family income-defined working class is unmarried and childless: Working-class population by parental and marital status, 2024–2025
| Married | Not married | |
|---|---|---|
| Has child under 18 | 21.8% | 9.0% |
| No child under 18 | 23.2% | 46.0% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Working-class family income
Although we are using a single-income threshold to define working class, Figure L reveals racial differences in family income among the working class that replicate differences in the overall population. For example, white and AAPI families are more likely to be at the upper end of the income distribution. One-third of each group has a family income of $100,000–$149,999 per year, compared with one-fourth of working-class AIAN families and one-fifth of working-class Black and Hispanic families. At the same time, all working-class families of color are more likely to be in the lower end of the income distribution than white families. More than a third of Hispanic (38.4%), Black (38.0%), and AIAN (35.8%) families have an income of less than $50,000 per year, compared with 25.2% of working-class AAPI families and 22.1% of white families. Most working-class Black and Hispanic families have income between $50,000 and $75,000 per year.
Working-class white and AAPI workers have higher family incomes than their Black, Hispanic, and AIAN counterparts: Family income by race and ethnicity, 2024–2025
| Family income bin | Less than $10,000 | $10,000–$29,999 | $30,000–$49,999 | $50,000–$74,999 | $75,000–$99,999 | $100,000–$149,999 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| White | 1.9% | 6.6% | 13.6% | 21.6% | 21.9% | 34.3% |
| Black | 4.3% | 12.6% | 21.1% | 25.4% | 17.6% | 19.0% |
| Hispanic | 3.3% | 12.6% | 22.5% | 24.6% | 17.7% | 19.3% |
| AAPI | 2.8% | 8.0% | 14.5% | 20.6% | 21.1% | 33.0% |
| AIAN | 4.4% | 13.4% | 18.0% | 21.7% | 17.9% | 24.6% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author's analysis of 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
The number of workers contributing to family income also varies by race and ethnicity. The number of family earners is both a function of family structure and employment status. Consistent with the fact that over half of our working-class sample is not married (55%, as shown in Figure K), Figure M shows that most families include a single earner. However, lower rates of employment among Black and Native American families further contribute to their being most likely to be single-earner families (70.8% and 69.3%, respectively). White families (27.8%) are most likely to have two earners, while Hispanic (9.9%) and Asian (7.5%) families are more likely than other groups to include more than two earners.
Across race and ethnicity, most working-class families have one earner: Number of earners in a family by race and ethnicity, 2024–2025
| 0 earners | 1 earner | 2 earners | 3 earners | 4+ earners | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| White | 2.8% | 64.2% | 27.8% | 4.2% | 1.0% |
| Black | 4.9% | 70.8% | 19.6% | 3.9% | 0.8% |
| Hispanic | 3.0% | 60.2% | 26.8% | 7.5% | 2.4% |
| AAPI | 2.6% | 64.0% | 25.8% | 5.5% | 2.0% |
| AIAN | 5.3% | 69.3% | 20.9% | 3.7% | 0.8% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive. Only families with at least one person identified as working-class were included in the sample. Earners are defined as those currently employed at the time of the survey and who are not unpaid family members. Because the working class definition includes those who are unemployed but in the labor force, a small share of families with working-class members may have no earners. The race and ethnicity of the reference person is used to determine the demographic representation of the family. Families include single-person units either living alone or living in a shared dwelling.
Notes: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). Only families with at least one person identified as working-class were included in the sample. Earners are defined as those currently employed at the time of the survey and who are not unpaid family members. Because the working class definition includes those who are unemployed but in the labor force, a small share of families with working-class members may have no earners. The race and ethnicity of the reference person is used to determine the demographic representation of the family. Families include single-person units either living alone or living in a shared dwelling.
Source: Author's analysis of 2024–2025 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Working-class jobs
Another consideration in defining what it means to be working class is the type of jobs people have. Separating professional or managerial roles from more traditionally working-class jobs closely aligned with the typical “blue-collar” definition sorts most of the occupations associated with a low degree of control and autonomy at work from those in which workers have more control over the pace and content of their work. As professionals, however, teachers and nurses would not be considered working class under a traditional blue-collar occupation definition of working class, despite teachers’ low pay relative to their years of education and nurses’ lack of control over the pace and content of their work (Allegretto 2026; Stimpfel et al. 2025).
Figure N shows that overall, those employed in nonprofessional and nonmanagement occupations are much more likely to be working class. Between 70% and 87% of people employed in jobs other than professional or management occupations have a family income at or below the 75th percentile, compared with less than 60% of professionals and managers. This further supports the idea that even under our broader definition, working class is more often a label that applies to those in traditional blue-collar jobs.
Workers that are not in managerial or professional occupations are much more likely to be working class: Shares of workers in each occupation that are working class, based on family income, 2024–2025
| Major occupation group | Share that is working class |
|---|---|
| Farming, fishing, and forestry | 86.6% |
| Production | 84.5% |
| Transportation and material moving | 84.4% |
| Construction and extraction | 84.0% |
| Service | 82.9% |
| Installation, maintenance, and repair | 81.8% |
| Office and administrative support | 77.4% |
| Sales and related | 70.9% |
| Professional and related | 59.2% |
| Management, business, and financial | 53.5% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Occupation also captures much of the variation associated with education, given that education is used as a credential for access to different kinds of employment. Figure O shows the distribution of major occupation groups within the working class by level of education. Again, even under this broader definition of working class, education is still a major determinant of the types of jobs available to those in the working class. More than two-thirds of the jobs held by members of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in two major categories—professional and related occupations (43.9%), and management, business, and financial occupations (23.3%)—but the income threshold largely excludes the more highly paid college graduates in these occupations.4 While the most common jobs among those with less than a bachelor’s degree are service occupations (24.4%), at that level of education, workers are more evenly split between office and administrative occupations (11.8%), transportation and material moving occupations (11.7%), professional and related occupations (10.2%), and management, business, and financial occupations (10.0%).
A majority of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in management or professional occupations, whereas workers with less than a bachelor’s degree are more evenly distributed across occupations: Composition of working class by major occupation group and educational level, 2024–2025
| Construction and extraction | Farming, fishing, and forestry | Installation, maintenance, and repair | Management, business, and financial | Office and administrative support | Production | Professional and related | Sales and related | Service | Transportation and material moving | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bachelor’s degree or higher | 1.6% | 0.2% | 1.1% | 23.3% | 8.9% | 2.0% | 43.9% | 6.9% | 9.0% | 3.1% |
| Less than a bachelor’s degree | 8.9% | 1.0% | 4.8% | 10.0% | 11.8% | 7.9% | 10.2% | 9.3% | 24.4% | 11.7% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
One limitation of using a strictly occupational definition is that the professional and management categories also include jobs that have many of the qualities traditionally associated with membership in the working class: modest pay and limited workplace autonomy, among other things. There are over 220 detailed occupations within the major occupation categories for managers and professionals, but just 22 of those occupations, depicted in Figure P, account for half of all working-class managers or professionals. Among those 22 occupations, nine are traditionally women-dominated, or pink-collar, jobs related to teaching and child care (depicted in orange) or nursing (depicted in green) that account for 22.4% of working-class managers and professionals. Seven of the 22 occupations are management positions (depicted in blue) that account for 17.8% of working-class managers and professionals. Besides the generic “all other managers” category, the most common working-class management positions are food service, general and operations, construction, and financial managers. The remainder of the occupations represented in Figure P includes other types of professional occupations (depicted in purple) such as accountants and auditors, social and human resource workers, and technology-related occupations.
‘Pink-collar’ jobs make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations: Most common detailed occupations of working-class people in managerial and professional occupations, 2024–2025

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
The types of jobs held by members of the working class can also vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, following broader patterns of occupational segregation. Figure Q shows how the six most common occupations for working-class men and women are distributed by race, ethnicity, and gender. The distribution across all 10 major occupational categories can be found in Appendix Table 1.
Figure Q shows that working-class women’s employment is more concentrated than working-class men’s, with more than 80% of women of any race or ethnicity employed in just five job categories. More than half of all working-class women are employed in just two types of jobs: service, and professional and related occupations. As shown in Figure P, this is consistent with the fact that a large number of working-class professional jobs include female-dominated occupations like teachers, child care workers, and nurses. Service occupations are most common among Black (28.3%), Hispanic (32.7%), and Native American (27.6%) women, while professional occupations are most common among white and AAPI women. Across all racial and ethnic groups, similar shares of working-class women are employed in office and administrative occupations.
Employment of all groups of working-class women is highly concentrated in service and professional occupations: Select occupational distribution of the working-class population by race and ethnicity and gender, 2024–2025
| Construction and extraction | Management, business, and financial | Office and administrative support | Professional and related | Service | Transportation and material moving | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| White women | 0.5% | 16.8% | 16.9% | 30.6% | 19.1% | 3.2% |
| White men | 10.0% | 17.3% | 5.8% | 18.2% | 12.4% | 10.9% |
| Black women | 0.3% | 13.0% | 16.6% | 24.2% | 28.3% | 5.4% |
| Black men | 5.9% | 10.5% | 7.7% | 13.2% | 20.7% | 20.8% |
| Hispanic women | 1.2% | 9.8% | 15.7% | 17.0% | 32.7% | 6.6% |
| Hispanic men | 21.7% | 9.1% | 5.3% | 7.9% | 18.8% | 14.3% |
| AAPI women | 0.3% | 15.2% | 12.7% | 31.6% | 24.5% | 3.0% |
| AAPI men | 3.3% | 14.6% | 6.3% | 31.5% | 14.5% | 11.4% |
| AIAN women | 0.5% | 14.5% | 16.2% | 23.6% | 27.6% | 4.1% |
| AIAN men | 13.6% | 9.3% | 6.1% | 13.6% | 17.1% | 13.8% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
By comparison, except for AAPI men, fewer than 80% of working-class men are employed across six job categories. Among men, however, there is more variation in the types of jobs by race or ethnicity. For example, the most common jobs held by Black working-class men are transportation (20.8%) and service (20.7%) occupations, while Hispanic working-class men are most concentrated in construction (21.7%) and service (18.8%) occupations. The most common occupations for working-class AAPI and white men are professional and related, and management, but like AAPI women, AAPI men are largely concentrated in professional and related occupations (31.5%).
Job characteristics for working-class women and men by race and ethnicity
Table 2 further details how the employment characteristics of working-class men and women vary by race and ethnicity, underscoring differences in the work intensity required to sustain working-class family incomes. Among working-class women, Black women are most likely to work full time (83.4%) and to be represented by a union (11.6%). Although working-class Black women are more likely to have full-time jobs than their counterparts, they are still more likely to hold multiple jobs than most other groups of women. Native American women are most likely to hold multiple jobs (8.4%) and to be self-employed (5.7%) but are less likely than Black women to be employed in full-time jobs.
Employment characteristics of working-class men and women by race and ethnicity, 2024–2025
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| Works full time | 77.9% | 89.6% | 83.4% | 87.7% | 76.4% | 89.4% | 76.8% | 87.4% | 78.5% | 87.8% |
| Has more than one job | 6.8% | 5.4% | 7.0% | 5.9% | 4.1% | 3.2% | 4.9% | 4.3% | 8.4% | 4.5% |
| Union- represented | 10.4% | 12.6% | 11.6% | 13.0% | 9.3% | 8.8% | 11.0% | 10.9% | 8.0% | 10.9% |
| Self-employed | 5.4% | 6.6% | 3.2% | 5.9% | 5.4% | 8.1% | 5.1% | 5.5% | 5.7% | 5.6% |
| Median hourly wage | $23.19 | $27.05 | $20.52 | $21.66 | $19.37 | $21.64 | $23.56 | $28.52 | $19.88 | $23.17 |
| Share below state median hourly wage | 49.8% | 36.7% | 59.3% | 54.4% | 68.3% | 55.3% | 49.5% | 37.2% | 67.8% | 56.4% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly and Outgoing Rotation Group microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Working-class men are more likely than women to work full time and therefore, less likely to hold multiple jobs. Working-class men are also more likely to be self-employed than working-class women. Among working-class men, AAPI, Black, and Native American men are least likely to be employed full time; however, Black men hold an advantage over other groups of men in union representation (13.0%) and multiple job holdings (5.9%). Hispanic working-class men are most likely to be self-employed (8.1%).
The lower half of Table 2 provides estimated median hourly wages by race, ethnicity, and gender in 2024–2025 as well as the share of workers in each group whose wage falls below the median hourly wage in their state. These estimates differ from those presented in Part I because they are disaggregated by gender and are based on the more expansive income-based definition of working class, which includes some college graduates. Table 2 further shows significant race and gender pay gaps within the working class. For example, larger shares of women than men in each race or ethnic group earn wages lower than their state’s median, including as many as two-thirds of Hispanic (68.3%) and Native American (67.8%) women.
Working class across the country
Differences in local labor market conditions, costs of living, and structural inequities across and within state boundaries introduce many more factors to consider in understanding what it means to be working class in different parts of the country. While we don’t attempt to reconcile all those things in this report, we do explore what share of people in each state fits our family income-based definition of working class and how that applies to people with different types of occupations and educational backgrounds.
On average, a larger share of those in nonmetropolitan areas, or in the Midwestern or Southern regions of the country fall within this definition of working class (see Table 3), largely because incomes and the cost of living are lower. For example, according to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, a family of two adults and two children in Boston, Massachusetts (the state with the lowest working-class share), would require over $66,000 more for a modest but adequate lifestyle than they would in the Midwestern city of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, (the state with the highest working-class share) (EPI 2026c). In fact, 26 metropolitan areas require a family income greater than $150,000 for a two adult and two child household to achieve a moderate lifestyle, of which all but one are located in the Northeast and the West.
Nonmetropolitan areas and the South and Midwest have greater working-class population shares: Share of population that is working class by metro status and Census region, 2024–2025
| Geographic group | Share of population that is working class |
|---|---|
| Metropolitan | 54.0% |
| Nonmetropolitan | 60.3% |
| Northeast | 49.8% |
| South | 56.6% |
| Midwest | 59.0% |
| West | 51.8% |

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
The map in Figure R shows what share of each state’s 18–64-year-old population is working class, including by occupation and education. Since we are using a nationwide family income threshold to identify individuals in the working class, the map also reports the state median hourly wage, as well as working-class median hourly wages by broad occupation and educational category to help contextualize how the working-class family income limit translates to individual workers’ wages in each state.
The map shows that there is considerable variation in working-class shares across states and within regions. While the Midwest and South in aggregate have the highest working-class population shares, in the West, there is notable variance in state working-class population shares. For example, in Idaho and Wyoming, more than 62% of the population is working class compared with states like California and Washington where less than half of the population fit our working-class definition.
Working-class population shares differ significantly by state: Share of state population that is working class by type of occupation and educational attainment, 2024–2025
| State | Share of overall population that is working class | Share of managers & professionals that are working class | Share of all other occupations that are working class | Share of those with a bachelor’s or higher that are working class | Share of those with less than bachelor’s degree that are working class | State median hourly wage | Median hourly wage of | Working class managers & professionals | All other working class | Working class with bachelor’s degree or higher | Working class with less than a bachelor’s degree |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 57.6% | 67.8% | 85.9% | 52.9% | 59.6% | $24.28 | – | $29.74 | $20.12 | $29.68 | $20.28 |
| Alaska | 52.0% | 55.9% | 74.4% | 43.6% | 55.4% | $28.33 | – | $32.50 | $23.08 | $34.65 | $23.78 |
| Arizona | 55.7% | 59.5% | 77.8% | 47.7% | 59.8% | $24.79 | – | $30.45 | $20.20 | $30.80 | $20.57 |
| Arkansas | 60.3% | 72.4% | 85.8% | 57.4% | 61.5% | $22.53 | – | $27.48 | $19.29 | $29.23 | $19.48 |
| California | 48.9% | 46.8% | 77.1% | 37.9% | 55.8% | $28.25 | – | $34.75 | $20.75 | $34.18 | $21.09 |
| Colorado | 52.6% | 52.6% | 75.5% | 43.0% | 60.2% | $29.24 | – | $34.87 | $22.21 | $35.54 | $22.43 |
| Connecticut | 48.0% | 46.0% | 72.6% | 38.1% | 55.0% | $29.69 | – | $35.16 | $20.71 | $35.87 | $20.78 |
| Delaware | 57.6% | 63.3% | 79.8% | 50.8% | 61.5% | $25.40 | – | $31.81 | $20.45 | $32.51 | $21.19 |
| Washington D.C. | 42.9% | 41.6% | 76.7% | 38.7% | 52.9% | $43.38 | – | $39.72 | $20.03 | $39.13 | $19.46 |
| Florida | 58.2% | 66.9% | 84.2% | 53.0% | 61.1% | $24.37 | – | $31.25 | $19.84 | $30.52 | $20.18 |
| Georgia | 55.7% | 62.1% | 82.7% | 51.3% | 58.4% | $24.68 | – | $30.62 | $19.72 | $31.60 | $19.69 |
| Hawaii | 50.5% | 55.7% | 70.0% | 46.3% | 52.7% | $25.23 | – | $30.86 | $20.90 | $30.18 | $20.67 |
| Idaho | 62.2% | 67.6% | 84.4% | 53.7% | 66.1% | $23.73 | – | $28.93 | $20.23 | $30.53 | $20.48 |
| Illinois | 54.2% | 54.1% | 80.2% | 46.0% | 59.9% | $27.03 | – | $32.89 | $20.49 | $33.39 | $20.52 |
| Indiana | 61.3% | 65.3% | 84.9% | 54.9% | 64.2% | $23.89 | – | $29.80 | $20.32 | $29.77 | $20.46 |
| Iowa | 64.9% | 66.9% | 85.8% | 56.6% | 69.1% | $23.54 | – | $29.30 | $20.26 | $28.74 | $20.67 |
| Kansas | 63.9% | 65.3% | 85.0% | 54.7% | 68.7% | $24.13 | – | $28.36 | $20.57 | $28.40 | $20.72 |
| Kentucky | 59.1% | 69.7% | 85.6% | 56.0% | 60.3% | $21.89 | – | $29.40 | $19.46 | $30.60 | $19.66 |
| Louisiana | 56.6% | 69.1% | 84.7% | 54.0% | 57.5% | $22.30 | – | $27.09 | $18.32 | $29.27 | $18.61 |
| Maine | 57.4% | 61.4% | 80.8% | 52.9% | 60.0% | $26.58 | – | $30.86 | $21.71 | $29.96 | $22.18 |
| Maryland | 47.8% | 46.6% | 72.7% | 39.7% | 54.7% | $30.13 | – | $34.68 | $20.83 | $34.22 | $21.15 |
| Massachusetts | 42.9% | 39.5% | 68.5% | 34.3% | 52.0% | $31.39 | – | $35.62 | $21.58 | $34.50 | $21.88 |
| Michigan | 58.0% | 62.3% | 82.7% | 50.8% | 61.7% | $25.17 | – | $31.31 | $20.42 | $32.05 | $21.07 |
| Minnesota | 60.7% | 62.5% | 79.1% | 51.7% | 66.4% | $26.65 | – | $31.67 | $21.70 | $32.17 | $22.51 |
| Mississippi | 59.8% | 77.0% | 89.7% | 61.6% | 59.3% | $21.36 | – | $26.03 | $18.43 | $27.39 | $18.76 |
| Missouri | 60.6% | 63.1% | 84.1% | 54.7% | 63.5% | $24.35 | – | $28.63 | $20.16 | $28.49 | $20.29 |
| Montana | 61.9% | 67.7% | 83.2% | 56.1% | 65.1% | $24.99 | – | $30.57 | $20.91 | $30.70 | $21.29 |
| Nebraska | 62.7% | 65.0% | 81.6% | 57.1% | 65.8% | $24.75 | – | $29.84 | $20.85 | $30.18 | $21.13 |
| Nevada | 59.6% | 64.5% | 82.6% | 52.4% | 62.5% | $23.78 | – | $31.32 | $20.17 | $31.20 | $20.58 |
| New Hampshire | 52.5% | 53.3% | 74.2% | 45.6% | 57.7% | $29.40 | – | $34.00 | $23.20 | $33.88 | $23.78 |
| New Jersey | 44.9% | 41.4% | 71.7% | 34.8% | 54.2% | $29.97 | – | $36.69 | $20.44 | $34.63 | $20.72 |
| New Mexico | 58.6% | 70.0% | 86.9% | 55.3% | 59.9% | $23.12 | – | $30.11 | $18.76 | $32.74 | $19.06 |
| New York | 50.8% | 52.3% | 78.6% | 43.3% | 56.5% | $27.90 | – | $34.46 | $20.40 | $34.68 | $20.33 |
| North Carolina | 57.9% | 64.5% | 85.3% | 50.5% | 62.0% | $24.21 | – | $31.22 | $19.46 | $31.72 | $19.77 |
| North Dakota | 62.4% | 64.1% | 79.4% | 56.3% | 65.4% | $25.46 | – | $29.79 | $21.98 | $30.23 | $22.25 |
| Ohio | 57.7% | 61.8% | 80.9% | 51.6% | 60.8% | $24.90 | – | $30.45 | $20.77 | $30.86 | $21.14 |
| Oklahoma | 61.9% | 69.0% | 87.1% | 57.1% | 63.7% | $22.41 | – | $27.88 | $19.11 | $27.81 | $19.72 |
| Oregon | 55.3% | 56.8% | 79.6% | 46.5% | 60.5% | $27.52 | – | $32.47 | $21.56 | $32.45 | $22.09 |
| Pennsylvania | 54.7% | 56.5% | 79.7% | 46.9% | 59.6% | $26.88 | – | $32.82 | $20.62 | $32.85 | $20.88 |
| Rhode Island | 52.4% | 54.1% | 73.9% | 46.3% | 56.8% | $27.56 | – | $33.51 | $21.07 | $32.72 | $21.19 |
| South Carolina | 58.5% | 65.4% | 84.0% | 50.8% | 62.2% | $23.23 | – | $28.82 | $19.75 | $28.76 | $20.08 |
| South Dakota | 66.7% | 71.1% | 84.9% | 62.3% | 69.0% | $24.03 | – | $28.44 | $20.96 | $28.09 | $21.26 |
| Tennessee | 57.6% | 64.6% | 84.0% | 53.7% | 59.6% | $24.72 | – | $29.86 | $20.38 | $30.34 | $20.52 |
| Texas | 56.3% | 57.5% | 82.6% | 46.9% | 61.4% | $24.31 | – | $29.74 | $19.32 | $30.08 | $19.65 |
| Utah | 58.2% | 61.5% | 79.5% | 51.3% | 62.0% | $24.50 | – | $31.27 | $20.31 | $33.09 | $20.45 |
| Vermont | 59.8% | 63.1% | 81.4% | 56.3% | 62.7% | $26.56 | – | $30.87 | $22.30 | $30.37 | $22.30 |
| Virginia | 50.6% | 49.2% | 77.5% | 41.0% | 58.1% | $28.10 | – | $33.77 | $19.94 | $33.96 | $20.26 |
| Washington | 47.9% | 45.6% | 75.3% | 37.1% | 55.3% | $29.76 | – | $35.45 | $22.15 | $35.47 | $22.55 |
| West Virginia | 58.3% | 72.3% | 85.8% | 58.5% | 58.2% | $23.53 | – | $28.47 | $20.08 | $29.48 | $20.32 |
| Wisconsin | 59.8% | 60.1% | 81.7% | 50.7% | 65.0% | $26.17 | – | $31.29 | $21.99 | $30.55 | $22.47 |
| Wyoming | 64.7% | 72.9% | 86.6% | 60.7% | 66.2% | $24.33 | – | $29.02 | $20.77 | $29.40 | $21.06 |
–

Note: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000.
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
In each of the five states with the highest working-class population shares—South Dakota (66.7%), Iowa (64.9%), Wyoming (64.7%), Kansas (63.9%), and Nebraska (62.7%)—the state median hourly wage is below $25.00. In the five states (including D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares—Massachusetts (42.9%); Washington, D.C. (42.9%); New Jersey (44.9%); Maryland (47.8%); and Washington state (47.9%)–the state median hourly wage is over $29.00. Across all 50 states and D.C., the median hourly wage for members of the working class with less than bachelor’s degree ranges from $18.61 in Louisiana to $23.78 in Alaska and New Hampshire.
Figure R also illuminates how filtering the working class by occupation or education can surface different realities faced by workers across the country. Several states register lower-than-expected overall working-class population shares, given their reputation for being low-wage, low-income states. Even after filtering the map by people without a bachelor’s degree, in four states—Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, in descending order—fewer than 60% are working class. Those four states also have some of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the country, eliminating larger shares of their population from our working-class count. Since the Great Recession, the South has had the lowest labor force participation rate compared with other regions of the country, and people with less than a bachelor’s degree have much lower labor force participation rates than those with a bachelor’s or advanced degree (Childers 2024a; EPI 2026d).
On the other hand, when we use nonprofessional and nonmanagerial (all other) occupations as the filter, it narrows the sample to a group of people who are in the labor force, and working-class shares rise to over 80% in those four states. Mississippi, the state with the lowest median hourly wage and a working-class population share of just 59.8%, has the nation’s highest share of working class among nonprofessional and nonmanagerial workers (89.7%).
This look into state working-class population shares sheds light on some of the conditions that produce unique labor dynamics across regions and states. The long-standing anti-worker policies of the Southern economic development model not only shape the configuration of the working class in the South, including characteristically low wages, but low labor force participation also creates a sub-working class (Childers 2023; Childers 2024b). It also demonstrates the need for strong and comprehensive labor standards and workers’ rights protections nationwide to reduce such large interstate disparities.
Conclusion
While there is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of working class, this report proposes that based on similarities in family income and labor force participation, membership may reasonably extend to more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than previously considered. The decline in the college-wage premium, the teacher pay gap, and growing racial and gender pay gaps among college graduates have each contributed to this trend over the last 10–20 years. At the same time, more than 40 years of policy decisions that suppressed wages and led to a sharp decline in union density have undercut traditional opportunities for noncollege graduates to make a decent living, as increasing shares of those in the working class have an hourly wage that falls below their state’s median. In comparing what it means to be working class across different states, we find that the Southern economic development model not only contributes to lower working-class wages in some Southern states but also creates a sub-working class through low labor force participation (Childers 2023).
Finally, this analysis also shows that the working class has long outgrown the old image narrowly represented by white tradesmen in hard hats. Rather, shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. In the face of the growing diversity and interconnectedness of the working class, the racist and anti-immigrant policies being pushed by the current administration stand to alienate a larger share of this group. Elected leaders seeking to win support from today’s working class should prioritize issues and policies that improve the lives of workers across race, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and occupation. Previous EPI research demonstrates that some effective strategies for accomplishing this include tripling union density, ending mass deportations, curbing employer misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage (Bivens et al. 2026; EPI 2026e; Cid-Martinez et al. 2026; Zipperer 2026).
Appendix
Occupational distribution of the working-class population by race and ethnicity and gender, 2024–2025
| White | Black | Hispanic | AAPI | AIAN | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | Women | Men | |
| Construction and extraction occupations | 0.5% | 10.0% | 0.3% | 5.9% | 1.2% | 21.7% | 0.3% | 3.3% | 0.5% | 13.6% |
| Farming, fishing, and forestry occupations | 0.3% | 0.8% | 0.1% | 0.3% | 1.3% | 2.1% | 0.1% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 1.1% |
| Installation, maintenance, and repair occupations | 0.3% | 7.5% | 0.4% | 4.6% | 0.3% | 6.6% | 0.4% | 3.2% | 0.5% | 9.0% |
| Management, business, and financial occupations | 16.8% | 17.3% | 13.0% | 10.5% | 9.8% | 9.1% | 15.2% | 14.6% | 14.5% | 9.3% |
| Office and administrative support occupations | 16.9% | 5.8% | 16.6% | 7.7% | 15.7% | 5.3% | 12.7% | 6.3% | 16.1% | 6.1% |
| Production occupations | 3.0% | 8.3% | 3.8% | 8.5% | 5.7% | 8.0% | 3.8% | 6.4% | 3.1% | 8.0% |
| Professional and related occupations | 30.6% | 18.2% | 24.2% | 13.2% | 17.0% | 7.9% | 31.6% | 31.5% | 23.6% | 13.6% |
| Sales and related occupations | 9.3% | 8.9% | 8.0% | 7.7% | 9.7% | 6.3% | 8.3% | 8.6% | 9.5% | 8.5% |
| Service occupations | 19.1% | 12.4% | 28.3% | 20.7% | 32.7% | 18.8% | 24.5% | 14.5% | 27.6% | 17.1% |
| Transportation and material moving occupations | 3.2% | 10.9% | 5.4% | 20.8% | 6.6% | 14.3% | 3.0% | 11.4% | 4.1% | 13.8% |

Notes: Working class is defined as those who are 18- to 64-years-old, in the labor force, with an annual family income of less than $150,000. AAPI refers to Asian American and Pacific Islander, and AIAN refers to American Indian and Alaska Native. Race and ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, AIAN non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author's analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, https://microdata.epi.org.
Notes
1. The term pink-collar is commonly used to refer to jobs that are predominantly done by women and pay less than more male-dominated occupations. Examples include many clerical, administrative, and service jobs as well as teaching, nursing and care work.
2. Family income is reported in bands in the monthly CPS, with $150,000 as the lower limit for the highest income band, and 73.9% of the 18–64-year-old population have a family income below that level.
3. Though not depicted in the report, the shares of each group that met our education-based definition of working class were AIAN (79.1%), Hispanic (78.8%), Black (71.6%), white (57.8%), and AAPI (39.4%). Shares based on nativity were foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen (68.5%); native-born (63.0%); and foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen (54.6%).
4. We estimate that 36.4% of working-class managers and professionals in our sample are early career or under age 35.
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