Each decennial Census since 2000 has revealed a more racially and ethnically diverse U.S. population. While the share of people who identify as Black (about 12%) or American Indian and Alaskan Native (0.7%) has remained constant, the non-Hispanic white share of the population has declined from 69.1% in 2000 to 57.8% in 2020. On the other hand, a growing share of U.S. residents identify as Hispanic (increasing from 12.5% in 2000 to 18.7% in 2020) or Asian American and Pacific Islander (increasing from 3.7% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2020). These changing population demographics reflect different trends in birth, mortality, and immigration rates across groups. Since 2000, there have also been significant changes in how people identify racially. Notably, a growing share of people identify as being of two or more races (this would include people who, for example, identify as Black and AAPI, but would not include people who identify as Black and Hispanic, as they are identifying Black alone as their race and Hispanic as their ethnicity). Also, a growing but still small share of people identify as being of a race other than those explicitly defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

As Trevon Logan notes in his essay, it is the OMB that issues regulations regarding the classifications of race and ethnicity by federal agencies, including the U.S. Census Bureau, which conducts the major household and business surveys used by researchers. There are six permitted race categories and two ethnicity classifications, Hispanic and non-Hispanic. As such, everyone is a member of both a race and ethnicity. For more on the current classifications, see Logan’s essay.

Across all racial and ethnic groups, an overwhelming majority of people in the United States are U.S. citizens, according to data from the Current Population Survey. However, nativity shares vary across racial groups. White persons (97.8%), American Indian and Alaskan Native persons (92.2%), and Black persons (87.4%) are most likely to have been born citizens (born in the United States or to United States citizens abroad), compared with just over half of the Hispanic population (55.1%) and about one-fourth (24.8%) of the Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) population.

Immigration status also varies widely. AAPI residents are most likely to be immigrants: nearly half (46.2%) were not born U.S. citizens but became U.S. citizens (i.e., are naturalized U.S. citizens), while another 29.0% are not citizens. Hispanic residents are next most likely to be immigrants: 18.4% are naturalized citizens and 26.5% are not citizens. These statistics highlight only a fraction of the diversity represented within and across different racial and ethnic groups. As several essays in the Advancing Anti-Racist Economic Research and Policy guide explain, analyses that use categories or group descriptions that are too broadly defined can lead to inaccurate conclusions.

The changing racial and ethnic makeup of the U.S. population is foretold in the age distribution of different racial and ethnic groups. In 2019, almost a third (31.3%) of people who identified as Hispanic were under the age of 18, as were about a quarter of those who identified as Black (26.5%), AIAN (26.4%) and AAPI (23.0%). A smaller share of the white population (19.5%) belonged to this younger age cohort while over a third of white residents were near or at retirement age (age 55 or older)—a much larger share than for other racial and ethnic groups. As the current population ages, the older population will remain predominantly non-Hispanic white while Black, Hispanic, AAPI, and AIAN persons will be a growing share of the younger population. This racial and ethnic generation gap will require balancing the interests of a younger, less wealthy, more racially and ethnically diverse population with those of an older, wealthier, predominantly white population. However, these generations are linked in important ways. Older workers and retirees have a stake in worker, economic, and racial justice for those younger workers who in the years ahead will be a growing share of workers driving the national economy and providing many of the services the aging population relies on. Census population projections from 2018 (the latest available) indicate that in 2045, non-Hispanic white persons will account for less than half (49.7%) of the U.S. population (see U.S. Census Bureau, 2017 National Population Projections Tables, Table 4).

The term working class has been used to describe working-age adults who have less than a bachelor’s degree. Based on their high shares without a bachelor’s degree or more education, American Indian and Alaskan Native (AIAN) (85.5%), Hispanic (84.0%), and Black (80.3%) men are more likely to be considered working class (under this definition) than are white (63.5%) or AAPI (43.6%) men. Even among the groups of men most likely to be considered working class, there is still a wide range of educational attainment that includes everything from less than a high school diploma to some college. The some college category includes attendance at a four-year or two-year institution, but no degree;  it also includes completion of a two-year associate or technical degree. The groups with the highest shares of people with less than a high school education are Hispanic men (30.6%) and AIAN men (19.6%) and 60.5% of Hispanic men and over half of AIAN men (53.8%) have no education beyond high school. While about half (49.7%) of Black men also have no education beyond high school, Black men are more likely than either Hispanic or AIAN men to have a bachelor’s or advanced degree, but still much less likely to have that level of education than either white or AAPI men. AAPI men lead all other racial groups in the share (56.4%) who have a bachelor’s or advanced degree. These patterns of educational attainment are shaped by multiple factors, including differences in immigration policies applied to Asian versus Latin American countries, as well as the legacy of racial discrimination and oppression that severely limited educational opportunities for generations of Black and Native Americans.

In 2019, across most racial and ethnic groups, at least half of women age 25 or older had some education beyond a high school diploma. Latinas were the exception—only 45.0% had some level of education beyond high school and 28.5% had less than a high school education, a much higher percentage than any other group of women (1.6 to nearly 5 times as much). Those women least likely to have a bachelor’s or advanced degree were American Indian and Alaskan Native (AIAN) women (17.6%) and Latinas (19.2%).  Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) and white women had the highest levels of educational attainment with 52.9% of AAPI women and 37.3% of white women having at least a bachelor’s degree, followed by 25.0% of Black women. As with men, these patterns of educational attainment are shaped by multiple factors, including differences in immigration policies applied to Asian versus Latin American countries, as well as the legacy of racial discrimination and oppression that severely limited educational opportunities for generations of Black and Native Americans. But compared with male educational attainment by race and ethnicity women tend to have higher levels of educational attainment than their male counterparts (see Chart 5).

In response to the demand for criminal justice reform and a shift away from the “tough on crime” politics of the 1980s and 1990s, imprisonment rates for Black and Hispanic people have fallen over the last decade. But Black and Hispanic people are still much more likely to be incarcerated than white people, whose imprisonment rate has stagnated over the past decade. Over 1,000 out of every 100,000 U.S. residents who are Black were imprisoned in 2019, followed by 525 out of 100,000 Latino U.S. residents and 214 out of 100,000 white U.S. residents. Thus, the approximately 2.1 million people being held in U.S. prisons and jails at the end of 2019—an often-forgotten segment of the U.S. population—are disproportionately Black, Hispanic, and other people of color.

Data on the size of the overall incarcerated population come from the “Correctional Populations in the United States, 2019—Statistical Tables” published by the U.S. Department of Justice in July 2021.

This chart makes two facts very clear: That imprisonment in the United States is not only a gendered issue—with men being much more likely to be imprisoned—but also an issue of racialized gender, with Black men being far and away the most highly imprisoned group. Among women, Black residents had an imprisonment rate (83 per 100,000) second only to residents who identified as some race other than Black or white (Hispanic is an ethnicity) in 2019 (109 per 100,000). The “other” category includes Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, Native Hawaiians, American Indians, and Alaskan Natives. Among men, Black residents had the highest imprisonment rate (2,203 per 100,000), followed by other men (1,176 per 100,000).  Black men were more than twice as likely to be imprisoned as Hispanic men and nearly six times as likely to be imprisoned as white men.

The right to vote is the most powerful right of U.S. citizenship—and widespread voter participation is essential to a functional democracy. Yet many U.S. citizens ages 18 and older do not vote. Data on voter participation during presidential election years since 1992 reveal that turnout varies significantly by race and ethnicity and changes over time. Since 1992, voter turnout has typically been highest among white voters—ranging from 60.7% to 70.9%—although Black voter turnout saw a huge increase in 2008 and 2012 during the election and reelection of the nation’s first Black president, Barack Obama. In fact, 2012 was the only election in which Black voter turnout (66.2%) exceeded white voter turnout (64.1%). Hispanic and Asian voter turnout was less than 50% in all presidential election years between 1996 and 2016, until both groups had the largest turnout in decades in 2020 (53.7% and 59.7% respectively). While one’s personal decision to participate in an election can be influenced by any number of factors—including enthusiasm about a particular candidate or confidence in the democratic process—rampant forms of voter suppression in some states undoubtedly contribute to these disparities as well.

For more on the impact of state laws that limit access to voter registration, revoke the right to vote for returning (formerly incarcerated) citizens, or otherwise make it more difficult for certain populations to cast a ballot, see “State Voting Laws,” Brennan Center for Justice, accessed May 5, 2022;  “State Voting Rights Tracker,” Voting Rights Lab, accessed May 5, 2022.

Like the constitutional right to vote in civil society, union membership gives workers a voice—in this case, a voice at work. But as the chart shows, since 1973, union membership has declined for all racial and ethnic groups. Union membership is an important metric of the state of the American worker given the role that labor unions play in giving workers a stronger, collective voice to advocate for higher pay, better benefits, and training and promotional opportunities, as well as protections against discrimination and harassment. In a unionized workforce, for example, collective bargaining results in labor contracts that help to create greater transparency through clearly defined policies and pay structures. These contracts help reduce the potential for pay discrimination by limiting an employer’s discretion in paying different wages to comparably qualified individuals doing the same job and by providing workers with critical protections and direct recourse against other forms of exploitation or mistreatment. The benefits of union membership are a likely contributor to the higher union membership rate of Black workers, given their long history of unequal treatment relative to other groups of workers. Between 1973 and 1980, Hispanic workers also had higher rates of union membership than white workers. While the subsequent across the board decrease in union membership has brought union membership rates by race and ethnicity closer together, in 2021, Black workers were still more likely to be union members (11.6%) compared with white workers (10.7%), Hispanic workers (9.0%), and Asian American and Pacific Islander workers (8.2%). 

Still, the labor movement, like any other U.S. institution, is not immune to racism. Unions must continue to become more diverse, inclusive, and dynamic as they serve the vital role of leveling the playing field for all workers.

For more on the benefits and protections conferred by union membership, see Celine McNicholas et al., Why Unions Are Good for Workers—Especially in a Crisis Like COVID-19, Economic Policy Institute, August 2020 and Valerie Wilson, “The Costs of Racial and Ethnic Labor Market Discrimination and Solutions That Can Contribute to Closing Employment and Wage Gaps,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth, January 20, 2022.

The labor force participation rate is an important indicator of economic well-being. It shows the number of people in the labor force—people who are employed or unemployed but looking for work—as a share of the number of civilian, noninstitutionalized people ages 16 and older. Across racial and ethnic groups, women’s labor force participation rose significantly from the 1970s through the 1990s. After leveling off during most of the first decade of the 2000s, labor force participation by women declined during or after the Great Recession of 2007–2009. And it declined again during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and recession as the burden of job losses and care responsibilities disproportionately impacted women. In 2021, Black women had the highest labor force participation rate at 58.8%, followed by Asian (56.8%), Hispanic (55.8%), and white women (55.4%). While Latinas have historically had the lowest rates of labor force participation among women, their labor force participation rate had been climbing steadily in the four years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Historically, Black women have had stronger labor force attachments than other groups of women. This is part of the legacy of being forced to work as enslaved people, but the necessity of work has continued for Black women who are often co-breadwinners if not sole earners for their households.

Across all racial and ethnic groups, men’s labor force participation rates have declined significantly since the 1970s, with the sharpest decline occurring during and since the Great Recession of 2007–2009. While this trend in part reflects an aging population with a growing share of retirees, researchers have suggested that labor force participation has fallen among prime-age men (ages 25–54) due to a rise in serious health conditions that are a barrier to work, the emerging opioid crisis, or technological changes that encourage younger men  (under age 30) to allocate less time to work and more time to leisure activities like playing video games. Unlike with Black women, who have the highest labor force participation rate among women, Black men in 2021 had the lowest labor force participation rate among men (63.5%). And unlike with Hispanic women, who have historically had the lowest labor force participation rates among women, Hispanic men have had the highest labor force participation rate, which reached 75.4% in 2021. The ranking of men’s labor force participation rates by race and ethnicity has remained constant over the last three decades.

For more on the likely reasons for declining male labor force participation see Alan Krueger, Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiry into the Decline of the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, September 2017; and Mark Aguiar et al., “Leisure Luxuries and the Labor Supply of Young Men,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23552, June 2017.

Relative rates of unemployment by race and ethnicity have been remarkably consistent over time. Typically, the annual unemployment rates of Black and Hispanic workers are significantly higher than those of white workers. The difference between Asian and white unemployment rates is smaller, and the size of the gap fluctuates, as does which group has the lower unemployment rate. In 2021, this pattern held, with an unemployment rate of 8.6% for Black workers, followed by 6.8% for Hispanic workers, 5.0% for Asian workers, and 4.7% for white workers. One of the most enduring features of the U.S. labor market is the roughly 2-to-1 ratio of the Black and white unemployment rates.  

A breakdown of unemployment rates by race, ethnicity, and education level shows the limits of educational attainment as a factor in addressing inequitable economic outcomes. As the chart shows, racial and ethnic disparities in unemployment rates exist at every level of educational attainment. And Black workers have the highest rates of unemployment among all groups. In fact, even at historically low rates of unemployment in 2019, only the most highly educated Black workers approached anything near unemployment rate parity with their counterparts. The figure also shows that while education can contribute to better outcomes—unemployment rates are lower for all groups at higher levels of education—education alone does not necessarily create equal outcomes. Reading this chart alongside Chart 13 suggests that differences in the average unemployment rates of racial and ethnic groups can only be partially explained by relative differences in education, skill, experience or local labor market conditions—discrimination remains an undeniable factor.

There are sharp differences in the wages earned by typical workers of different racial groups in the United States. Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) and white workers are paid the highest wages at the median, while Black and Hispanic workers are paid significantly less. The gender differences are also greater among AAPI and white workers than among Black and Hispanic workers. While AAPI and white men far out-earn AAPI and white women, Black and Hispanic men and women have much more similar median wages.

Women of all racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. have a significant pay penalty by virtue of their gender, even when we account for several factors that could reasonably influence a worker’s productivity or wage rate, including education, age (a measure of potential experience) and geographic area (a measure of local labor market conditions). Black, Hispanic and AAPI women face an additional pay penalty by virtue of their race or ethnicity. The chart depicts these wage gaps, presented as how much less women make than non-Hispanic white men. The fact that Black and Hispanic women earn about one-third less than white men on average when calculating regression-adjusted wage gaps mean, then, that the pay penalty is not a result of differences in formal education between those groups of women and white men. One partial explanation for these wage disparities is occupational segregation, by which women of color are more highly concentrated in occupations with low pay, even relative to their education level. However, women of all races and ethnicities also often earn less than men in the same occupation (not shown in the chart), an indication of potential pay discrimination.

For more on occupational segregation and on gender pay gaps by occupation, see Jessica Schieder and Elise Gould, Women’s Work” and the Gender Pay Gap: How Discrimination, Societal Norms, and Other Forces Affect Women’s Occupational Choices—and Their Pay, Economic Policy Institute, July 2016; Emily Carew and Valerie Wilson, “Latina Equal Pay Day: Latina Workers Remain Greatly Underpaid, Including in Front-Line Occupations,” Working Economics Blog, Economic Policy Institute, October 20, 2021; Valerie Wilson, “Black Women Face a Persistent Pay Gap, Including in Essential Occupations During the Pandemic,” Working Economics Blog, Economic Policy Institute, August 2, 2021.

In the United States, households of different racial and ethnic backgrounds bring in significantly different amounts of income and have done so for decades. At the median, Black and Hispanic households earn the least on an annual basis, while Asian and white households earn the most. Significant gaps in employment opportunities (shown in Chart 13) and lower wage levels (shown in Chart 15) translate into lower incomes among Black and Latino households. Household income is also a function of the number of earners in a household. Though not shown here, past EPI research found that in the pre-pandemic economy, about a third of Black nonelderly households (where the head of household is age 18–64) had two or more earners, compared with nearly half of white and Hispanic nonelderly households. This racial disparity in the number of household earners is not just a function of how many working-age adults live in the household, or family structure, but is another measurable consequence of the persistent 2-to-1 ratio between the Black and white unemployment rates (shown in Chart 13). As income inequality in the United States has increased in general over the past 50 years, disparities between the least and most well-off groups have continued to persist and, in some cases, have grown.

For more on earners per household by race, see Elise Gould and Valerie Wilson, Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Economic Inequality, Economic Policy Institute, June 2020. For more on increasing income inequality, see Elise Gould, “Decades of Rising Economic Inequality in the U.S.,” testimony before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2019.

This chart extends beyond the data on median or midpoint of household income shown in Chart 17 to provide a more detailed look at where different groups fall across the entire household income distribution. In 2020, 29.7% of Black households and 20.4% of Hispanic households had annual incomes under $25,000, compared with just 15.6% of white households and 13.7% of Asian households. This $25,000 figure is well below the 2020 official poverty threshold for a family of two adults and two children ($26,246). In fact, the largest share of Black households were in this lowest income bracket, while other groups were more concentrated within the $50,000–$99,000 annual income bracket. Conversely, 19.9% of Asian households and 11.7% of white households had annual incomes at or above $200,000—the highest income category—compared with only about 5% of Black and Hispanic households.

Poverty threshold data can be found in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Poverty Thresholds: 2020 data tables, last revised October 8, 2021.

A cruel and unfortunate reality of structural racism in the U.S. economy is that even in the “best” of economic times, Black and Hispanic children experience much higher rates of poverty than white children. In 2019—a year characterized by record low unemployment and the highest (inflation-adjusted) median household incomes in 20 years—26.4% of Black children and 20.9% of Hispanic children lived below the official poverty threshold, compared with just 8.3% of non-Hispanic white children and 7.3% of Asian children. While child poverty has fallen significantly for Black, Hispanic, and Asian American children over the past 40 years, Black and Hispanic child poverty rates remained over 20% in 2020. This large and persistent disparity in child poverty combined with the fact that Black and Hispanic children have become an increasing share of the under age 18 population over time (see Chart 1 and Chart 4) has resulted in very little change in the overall child poverty rate since 1974. Given the long-term effects of exposure to poverty in childhood, addressing these persistent disparities must play a role in our approach toward building equity and moving the needle on child poverty.

For more on the long-term effects of exposure to poverty in childhood, see Kerris Cooper and Kitty Stewart, “Does Money Affect Children’s Outcomes? An Update,” CASEpapers (203), The London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2017; Randall Akee et al., “Parents’ Incomes and Children’s Outcomes: A Quasi-Experiment,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, January 2010.

While poverty across the working-age population (ages 18 to 64) is lower than that for children (see Chart 19), disparities by race and ethnicity follow a similar trend, with Black and Hispanic Americans more likely to be impoverished than white and Asian Americans. Poverty is a measure of economic deprivation, and among working-age adults in particular, reflects disparities in unemployment, wages, and income. Life circumstances, such as severe disability and major illness—which can also limit earned income or quickly deplete any available savings—also contribute to poverty for this age group. The racially coded misrepresentation of poverty as some kind of moral or cultural pathology has hindered the political will needed to sustain and strengthen vital income supports that have proven effective in fighting poverty. 

For more on the misrepresentation of poverty as a cultural pathology see William “Sandy” Darity Jr., “Revisiting the Debate on Race and Culture: The New (Incorrect) Harvard/Washington Consensus.” Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 8, no. 2, 467–476. For more on the vital income supports that would lessen poverty see Asha Banerjee and Ben Zipperer, “Social Insurance Programs Cushioned the Blow of the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020,” Working Economics Blog, Economic Policy Institute, September 14, 2021.

The poverty seen among older Americans in the chart is most likely the result of a lifetime of low earnings and a lack of retirement preparedness. While research shows that Social Security plays a critical role in keeping poverty rates among older Americans lower than they otherwise would have been (not depicted in the chart), older Black and Hispanic Americans still have relatively high poverty rates. Older Asian Americans are also more likely to live in poverty than older white Americans. Additionally, older Asian Americans have higher poverty rates than younger Asian Americans (see Chart 19 and Chart 20). This is likely due to a larger share of older Asian Americans having worked comparatively few years in the United States, or in jobs where they were unable to accumulate the necessary years for Social Security eligibility, leaving them less able to take advantage of work-based social safety net programs like Social Security.

For more on the causes of poverty among older Americans and the capacity of Social Security to lift older Americans—particularly women and people of color—out of poverty, see Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts More People Above the Poverty Line Than Any Other Program, Center on Budget and Policy priorities, April 2022. For more on the economic condition of the older Asian American population, see Victoria Tran, “Asian American Seniors Are Often Left Out of the National Conversation on Poverty,” Urban Wire (Urban Institute blog), May 31, 2017.

The chart shows sharp racial and ethnic disparities in net worth observed across time in the United States. Though not shown in the chart, these disparities reflect the differences in lived economic experiences between white, Black, Hispanic, and other families. Wealth can be accumulated both within and across generations, such that a high net worth can result from the benefit of prime earning years with 1) relatively few employment disruptions, 2) access to wealth-building savings and investment vehicles, 3) relatively few serious negative health shocks, and 4) well-timed wealth transfers from parents and grandparents.  The typical white household has many times the wealth of the typical Black or Hispanic household due to 1) their privileged position in the American labor market, which grants them access to more consistent and higher-quality employment opportunities, 2) their more limited exposure to the health risks brought on by poorer living conditions and discrimination, and 3) their history of access to wealth-building opportunities from which other groups have been excluded.

For more on the systemic barriers to Black wealth building see Natasha Hicks, Fenaba Addo, Anne Price, and William Darity Jr., Still Running Up the Down Escalator: How Narratives Shape Our Understanding of Racial Wealth Inequality, The Samuel Dubois Cook Center on Social Equity, 2021. For more on the barriers to Hispanic wealth building see Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, Alexandra Perez, and Jamie Buell, “Racial Wealth Snapshot: Latino Americans.” National Community Reinvestment Coalition, September 17, 2021.

The longer life expectancy for white Americans than Black Americans shown in the chart has been documented as far back as statistics on life expectancy have been recorded (at least 200 years) and this disparity has existed in the U.S. for generations. In 2018, white men were expected to live an average of nearly five years longer than Black men and white women were expected to outlive Black women by about three years. Hispanic Americans, as a group, have higher life expectancy rates than both Black and white Americans. In 2018, Hispanic men were expected to outlive white men by nearly three years but were expected to live an average of almost eight years longer than Black men. Hispanic women were expected to outlive their Black and white counterparts by six and three years, respectively. Women’s life expectancy rates exceed those of men both within and across the racial and ethnic groups shown in the chart.

Though not shown in the chart, throughout the first half of the 20th century life expectancy at birth for Black Americans dramatically improved as infant mortality rates fell. The latter half of the 20th century saw comparatively slower gains in life expectancy for Black Americans and a slower convergence. In recent years life expectancy gains have disproportionately gone to people in the highest income categories, who are disproportionately white (see Chart 18). However, the opioid crisis and its attendant “deaths of despair” measurably lowered white life expectancy rates. The life expectancy advantage of Hispanic Americans has been shown to diminish with subsequent generations of U.S.-born Latinos. This suggests that there may be something uniquely deleterious about living as a minority in the United States.

For more on gaps in life expectancy, effects of the opioid crisis, and Hispanic life expectancy see Congressional Research Service, The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Recent Evidence and Implications for the Social Security Retirement Age, CRS Report R44846, July 6, 2021; Helena Hansen and Julie Netherland, “Is the Prescription Opioid Epidemic a White Problem?” American Journal of Public Health 106, no. 12 (December 2016), 2127–2129 (doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303483); Osea Giuntella, “The Hispanic Health Paradox: New Evidence from Longitudinal Data on Second and Third-Generation Birth Outcomes,” SSM – Population Health, vol. 2 (December 2016), 84–89 (doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.02.013).

The Affordable Care Act (the ACA or “Obamacare”) expanded health insurance coverage to middle- and low-income Americans, which disproportionately benefited those groups with the least access—Hispanic Americans and American Indians and Alaska Natives (AIAN), and to a lesser extent Black Americans. Despite the marked improvement in health insurance coverage rates since the implementation of ACA, disparities between groups remain stark, with Hispanic and AIAN uninsured rates nearly double Black rates, and approaching three times as high as the uninsured rates of white and Asian Americans. Early diagnosis and treatment are essential to minimizing the severity of chronic illnesses, and regular health care is important for promoting better overall health. The lack of health insurance often results in a choice to delay receiving health care until one’s condition is critical, contributing to racial disparities in health outcomes and life expectancy.

For more on how the ACA expanded health coverage, particularly to certain groups, see Samantha Artiga, Latoya Hill, Kendal Orgera, and Anthony Damico. “Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity, 2010–2019,” Kaiser Family Foundation, July 16, 2021; Jesse Cross-Call, Medicaid Expansion Has Helped Narrow Racial Disparities in Health Coverage and Access to Care, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2020.

Maternal mortality rates are a stark indicator of racial disparities in public health in the United States. Black women are over twice as likely to die from a pregnancy-related cause as white women, and three times as likely as Hispanic women. Although not shown in the chart, these racial disparities persist regardless of a woman’s social or economic status. Health status and differential access to quality prenatal care play a major role in maintaining these disparities, as does structural racism more generally. To adequately address these disparities in maternal health outcomes, we must confront racism and bias in the U.S. health care system and the implications for how health care providers and personnel communicate with and treat patients.

For more on the causes and solutions to Black maternal mortality, see “Working Together to Reduce Black Maternal Mortality,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 6, 2022.

While COVID-19 has affected populations across the world, in the United States the burden of the disease has not been distributed equally. When examining lab-confirmed COVID-19 hospitalization rates (per 100,000) since the start of the pandemic in March 2020, American Indians and Alaska Natives, Black Americans, and Hispanic Americans are and have been the worst off since its earliest months, while white and Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders have experienced relatively less severe outcomes. The known severity of COVID-19 hospitalization suggests that these disparities themselves will and likely are already having economic consequences, from short-term loss of the ability to work, to long-term labor market disruptions from the need to care for a close relative affected by COVID-19 or the effects of “long-COVID.”