Key takeaways:
- So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.
- States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies.
- Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.
- As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.
- The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).
- Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:
-
- At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.
-
- At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.
-
- Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.
Key takeaways:
- So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.
- States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies.
- Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.
- As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.
- The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).
- Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:
-
- At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.
-
- At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.
-
- Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.
In the United States, so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws are anti-union state policies promoted by big business interests to weaken unions and limit workers’ bargaining power. Despite the name, RTW laws do not provide any sort of job protection or right to a job. Rather, the deceptively named policy starves unions of resources, making it harder for them to negotiate collectively for better wages, benefits, and working conditions.
RTW laws emerged in the 1940s as part of anti-union campaigns to suppress worker organizing and maintain Jim Crow labor relations in Southern states; these campaigns worsened economic inequality and racial disparities (Childers 2024). Today, 26 states have active “right-to-work” statutes.1
As intended, RTW laws reduce union density (the share of workers who are either members of a union or covered by a union contract). These policies prohibit unions and employers from negotiating over union security—the contract terms under which workers covered by a union contract either join the union or pay an agency fee covering their share of representation costs. This deprives unions of critical resources and suppresses union membership (Sherer et al. 2026). RTW states—specifically those with RTW laws for at least 25 years—have an average union density rate of 6.2%, far less than half the union density rate in non-RTW states (16.0%) (see Appendix Table 1).
RTW laws not only reduce the number of workers with collective bargaining agreements but also limit unions’ political power to advocate for stronger labor standards for workers more broadly. This is, in part, why states without anti-union restrictions are more likely to pass protections such as prevailing wage mandates, restrictions on noncompete agreements, higher minimum wages, and pay transparency laws.
To assess the effects of RTW laws on outcomes for workers, we analyze whether wages are lower in RTW states after controlling for key demographic-, job-, and state-level characteristics (see Appendix Table 1 for full demographic controls as well as median and average wages by RTW status). We find that wages in “right-to-work” states are, on average, 6.7% lower than in non-RTW states. This penalty is worse for Black and Hispanic workers, as well as young workers and those without college degrees. Notably, the penalty is also larger for nonunion workers. This is because strong unions benefit workers across the state, not just those in unionized workplaces (Shierholz et al. 2026). In RTW states with weaker unions, nonunionized workers do not experience these positive “spillover” effects.
Pro-worker policies are more common in states without RTW laws
The strong correlation between wages and states’ RTW status is not surprising. Not only do RTW states have lower unionization rates, leaving workers with less leverage to bid up wages, but they often maintain other anti-worker policies. Combined, these anti-worker policies tilt bargaining power toward employers, weakening workers’ ability to garner higher wages. States without RTW laws are more likely to have a wide array of stronger labor standards in place that raise pay, protect workers’ ability to switch jobs, and support those who lose one. These same states—where unionization rates have not been suppressed by RTW laws—have a better safety net and stronger labor standards in part because stronger unions give workers more political power and the ability to better lobby for pro-worker policies writ large (Shierholz et al. 2026).
Figure A displays the incidence of these labor standards for states with and without anti-union RTW laws.2 This is far from a complete list of relevant policies that may correlate with RTW status and wage levels, but they are illustrative.
Policies that raise wages are more prevalent in states without anti-union laws: Share of states with selected policies and unemployment insurance (UI) recipiency based on "right-to-work" (RTW) status
| Policy | Non-RTW | RTW |
|---|---|---|
| Prevailing wage mandates | 96.0% | 23.1% |
| Restrictions on noncompetes | 44.0% | 11.5% |
| Minimum wage above federal floor | 92.0% | 30.8% |
| Pay transparency protections | 64.0% | 7.7% |
| UI recipiency rate | 32.8% | 18.7% |
Notes: Policy status as of August 2026. UI recipiency rates are calculated with a simple average of 2023-2025 data within the RTW and non-RTW state groupings to minimize year-to-year fluctuations.
Source: Author’s analysis of Department of Labor, “Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws”; Economic Innovation Group, “State Noncompete Law Tracker”; Economic Policy Tracker, “Minimum Wage Tracker”; GovDocs, “Pay Transparency Laws by State and Province”; Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Chartbook; and author analysis of state-level legislative websites. All accessed August 2026.
Prevailing wage
Prevailing wage laws apply to certain contracts for public works and require that contractors and subcontractors pay the employees performing such work a prevailing wage rate. The prevailing wage rate is defined as the average wage paid to similarly employed workers in a specific occupation in the area of intended employment. Federal law requires this of federal contracts while state and local laws may apply to state and local contracts.
Prevailing wage laws are more common in non-RTW states. Figure A shows that nearly all (96.0%) of non-RTW states have prevailing wage laws, while only 23.1% of RTW states have these protections for workers on state contracts.3 Without prevailing wage requirements, contractors may reduce their workers’ wages to win bids on government contracts—putting contractors who pay their workers fair wages at a disadvantage.
Restrictions on noncompetes
Noncompete agreements are employment provisions that ban workers at a company from joining a competing business or starting their own for a set period after leaving a job. Noncompetes undermine economic dynamism and innovation; they depress business formation and labor mobility, hurt productivity and growth, raise prices, shrink workers’ wages, and restrict workers’ freedom (Shierholz 2024).
One of the most effective ways workers achieve higher wages is by securing another offer, and then either renegotiating their current salary or leaving for the new higher-paying job. It is not surprising then that workers in states that enforce noncompetes are paid less than similar workers in states that do not enforce noncompetes (Starr 2019). States without anti-worker RTW laws are nearly four times as likely to restrict noncompetes as RTW states (44.0% vs. 11.5%).4 In this analysis, we include only full bans on noncompetes and states with income-based restrictions. States with only small carve-outs for certain occupations provide a much weaker standard and are, by definition, less broad, so those aren’t included.
Minimum wage
Raising the minimum wage is particularly important for lower-wage workers. While the federal minimum wage has sat at $7.25 an hour since 2009, losing over 30% of its purchasing power, workers in 31 states enjoy a higher wage floor (Zipperer 2026). Non-RTW states are three times as likely to have minimum wages higher than the federal minimum compared with RTW states (92.0% vs. 30.8%). This is not a small difference. As of 2026, the average value of the minimum wage in non-RTW states is 60% higher—$5.36 more per hour—than in RTW states.5
Pay transparency
Pay transparency laws prevent employers from lowballing wage offers by requiring them to include wage information in job postings. While they vary, all laws include some requirement that employers provide salary information in job postings or if directly requested by applicants. Lack of knowledge about wages and benefits keeps potential workers in the dark and limits their ability to learn about and apply for better paid opportunities. A study on Colorado’s newly passed wage transparency law found that wages increased 4.2% faster than those in neighboring states without such laws (Shedge 2025). Further, wage transparency has the potential to reduce gender- and race-based discrimination by arming jobseekers with more information and limiting employers’ ability to pay different amounts to similarly qualified candidates. Only two RTW states have a pay transparency law, compared with 64% of non-RTW states.6
Unemployment insurance
Access to unemployment insurance (UI) also shapes workers’ ability to seek better wages. When a worker is laid off and their household income falls, unemployment insurance supports them and their family until they find another job. UI is a joint federal-state program that relies on state UI systems to effectively deliver benefits to unemployed workers. States differ in their rules and approaches under the federal UI framework, leading to wide variation in the share of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits (the UI recipiency rate).
Better UI not only cushions workers and their families but also provides workers with additional leverage in the labor market. When UI access and generosity fall, job seekers are forced to settle for lower wages and employers leverage this by offering less (Dahl and Knepper 2026). On the flip side, research shows a positive relationship between more UI generosity and wages (Rinz and Wasser 2026). The UI recipiency rate is significantly higher in non-RTW states compared with RTW states (32.8% vs. 18.7%).7 This is not surprising because non-RTW states have stronger unions, which fight to increase UI eligibility, ease of access, benefit levels, and benefit duration—to the benefit of all workers, union and nonunion (Hertel-Fernandez and Gould-Werth 2020). As with other pro-worker policies, better UI access can contribute to higher wages in non-RTW states.
Other policy levers
Not only do workers in non-RTW states enjoy higher wages, but they also benefit from increased economic security thanks to higher health insurance rates, higher public education spending, paid family and medical leave access, and no preemptions against higher labor standards. Every non-RTW state expanded Medicaid compared with fewer than two-thirds of RTW states (61.5%).8 Unsurprisingly, the uninsured rate is higher in RTW states than in non-RTW states (8.9% vs. 6.2%).9
Investments in public education deliver a more productive workforce and more informed and engaged society. Increased funding for schools not only improves educational attainment, but also increases wages and family incomes (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). Non-RTW states spend 45% more on public education than RTW states ($24,084 vs. $16,620).10 Paid family and medical leave provides essential benefits that help workers maintain their livelihoods while taking care of themselves and their families. These laws are also shown to increase labor force participation, job retention, and earnings (Glynn 2020). Only one RTW state has comprehensive paid family and medical leave provisions for private-sector workers, compared with 56% of non-RTW states.11
Finally, some cities, counties, and other local governments enact policies that raise standards for working people, but some state legislatures force those standards back down with preemption—the use of state law to void local ordinances. Preemptions apply to policies such as minimum wage, prevailing wages, paid leave, and fair scheduling (EPI 2025). Preemption laws interfere with local governments’ ability to set job quality standards. They suppress wages, exacerbate racial inequities, and reduce worker power (Sherer, Cohn, and Ahdoot 2025). These preemptions are more common in RTW states.
Workers in RTW states are paid less
Our analysis of the relationship between wages and RTW status puts states into three categories: long-term RTW states, always non-RTW states, and “switcher” states that have changed their RTW status since 2011.12 Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these three groups of states, and Appendix Figure A provides a map of states by RTW status. Our estimates focus on comparisons between long-term RTW states and always non-RTW states.
A simple comparison of hourly wages, the primary variable of interest, reveals that average wages are 22.9% higher in non-RTW states ($40.28 in non-RTW states vs. $32.78 in RTW states). Median wages are 19.2% higher in non-RTW states ($28.79 vs. $24.16). Because there are differences between worker-, job-, and state-level characteristics in RTW and non-RTW states, and since some of these characteristics will directly impact workers’ wages, it is important to control for these factors in a multivariate regression model. This allows us to more accurately identify the relationship between RTW status and wages.
We estimate log wage equations using Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) data for 2023–2025. We pool three years of data to minimize any spurious year-specific economic relationships, thereby helping us achieve more precise estimates. The total sample consists of 234,155 workers, ages 16+, who earn wages and salaries. About 42% of the sample lives in states with RTW laws (see Appendix Table 1 for the sample’s full demographic breakdown).13
In Table 1, we construct a regression model, starting with an unadjusted framework and building up to a model that controls for the full range of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages.
The variable of interest is an indicator variable when the worker lives in a long-term RTW state. We also include an indicator in the regression for a switcher state, though that is not our focus of interest (see Appendix Table 2 for a complete set of regression results, including the coefficient for switcher states). There are currently 26 states with RTW laws on the books and 25 without them including Washington, D.C. (see Appendix Figure A). There are five switcher states that have adopted RTW in recent years: Indiana (2012), Michigan (2013), Wisconsin (2015), West Virginia (2016), and Kentucky (2017). In 2023, Michigan became the first state to repeal its RTW statute. We separate the five switcher states from the analysis to better isolate the relationship between wages and the long-run effects of RTW.
The naïve model, without any controls, suggests that workers in RTW states are paid 17.8% less than workers in non-RTW states (Model I in Table 1).14 But many factors contribute to wage differences: demographic characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, and level of education are relevant as well as job-related factors such as work hours, occupation, and industry. Since these vary across states, they reduce the measured relationship between RTW status and wages. Model II shows that when the analysis compares more similar workers with each other, the RTW penalty drops to 14.0%.15
There are other factors that are different in RTW states, aside from these individual and job-related characteristics. Most importantly, the cost of living. The cost of living in non-RTW states is higher than in RTW states, as shown in Appendix Table 1. In prior research, Gould and Kimball (2015) showed that choice of price indicator makes no material difference on the measured relationship between RTW and wages. Here we include the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Price Parity index: The regional price parity index is higher in non-RTW states.16 Not surprisingly, this correlates with wage levels and therefore is important to include in the model. As with earlier studies, we also include state unemployment rates to control for differences in economic conditions.
After including the full set of demographic, individual-, and state-level labor market and cost of living controls (Model III), our analysis finds that workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less than similar workers in non-RTW states. For the average worker, this is a difference of $2.70 per hour, or more than $5,600 for full-time workers at 2,080 hours over the year. However, because the average is skewed upward due to wage inequality, an assessment at the middle of the wage distribution provides a more conservative but perhaps more robust estimate of the RTW wage penalty. Acknowledging that this is a likely understatement of the full relationship, the RTW wage penalty for the median worker at full-time hours is over $4,000 for the year.
Log wage regression results (2023–2025)
| (I) | (II) | (III) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent variable: Natural log of hourly wage | Model with no controls | Model adds demographic and individual-level labor market controls | Final model, adds state-level labor market controls and cost-of-living measures |
| Long-term RTW states | -0.196*** | -0.150*** | -0.070*** |
| (0.031) | (0.028) | (0.020) | |
| Implied wage penalty (%) | -17.8% | -14.0% | -6.7% |
Notes: Full regression results are in Appendix Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, two indicate significance at the 5% level, and one indicates significance at the 10% level. All models include year indicators. Demographic controls include variables for gender, experience (age and age squared), marital status, race/ethnicity, metropolitan status, and education, which are specified as dummy variables for less than high school, some college, associate degree, college, and advanced degree. Log of hourly wage is the dependent variable. Allocated wages are excluded. Individual-level labor market controls include variables for full-time status, hourly status, public sector status, occupations, and industries. State-level labor market control is the unemployment rate. The cost-of-living control is the log of BEA's RPP all items measure.
Source: Author’s analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2026. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8 and Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities.
This does not mean that RTW laws are a causal explanation for this 6.7% wage penalty. As demonstrated earlier in this report, RTW status correlates strongly with a number of other anti-worker policies. Other research has attempted to calculate the causal effects of RTW laws on wages. Using the switcher states in the most recent period, Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (2022) found smaller wage penalties, which is to be expected given the shorter time frame for measurement post-adoption. Our wage penalty for switcher states—shown in the final column of Appendix Table 2—is much smaller (closer to zero) than the coefficient for long-term RTW states, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. Dasgupta and Merchant (2023) also examine states recently adopting RTW laws and find a statistically significant decline in annual wages by almost $1,900. Again, these states are more recent RTW adopters, so the full effects we find may take time to materialize.
We find that this relationship between long-term RTW status and wages remains economically and statistically significant under alternative specifications of our econometric model. For instance, removing major industries and occupations changes the coefficient to -0.071. Restricting the model to RTW status as of 2026—removing the separate indicator for states that switched since 2011—yields a coefficient estimate of -0.060. Doing the same but dropping Michigan (since its status changed in the measurement period) results in a coefficient of -0.064. In our final model, we do not include an indicator for unionization, unlike Gould and Kimball (2015). If we reintroduce that variable, the coefficient is -0.063.
In each of our regressions discussed above, we include a three-year average as it improves data reliability and allows us to run smaller groups of the data (see next section). When we run our analysis using just 2025, our results do not change. In fact, when we run our three-year final model for the periods 2021–2023, 2022–2024, and 2023–2025, our coefficients remain in the -0.070 to -0.068 range.
Wage penalties are steeper for women, Black, Hispanic, and nonunion workers in RTW states
The RTW penalty is not uniform across demographic groups and other labor market characteristics. Table 2 below shows the results of a series of final-model regressions (comparable to Model III in Table 1) for a set of demographic groups.
We find that women’s wages in RTW states are penalized at a higher rate (7.3%) than men’s (6.3%). The wage penalty also persists across all racial and ethnic groups, but it is almost twice as large for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic (10.0%) workers as for similar white workers (5.4%) and more than twice as large as for Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers (4.6%). Young workers between the ages of 16 and 24 face a greater penalty (8.4%) than older workers. And workers without a college degree experience a much higher penalty (7.8%) than workers with a college degree (4.7%).
"Right-to-work" wage penalty estimates for restricted samples by demographic
| Demographic | Wage penalty |
|---|---|
| Gender | |
| Women | -7.3%*** |
| Men | -6.3%*** |
| Race/ethnicity | |
| White | -5.4%*** |
| Black | -9.7%*** |
| Hispanic | -10.0%*** |
| AAPI | -4.6%* |
| Age | |
| 16-24 | -8.4%*** |
| 25-54 | -6.6%*** |
| 55+ | -5.6%*** |
| Education | |
| Less than a college degree | -7.8%*** |
| College degree | -4.7%** |
| Union status | |
| Union | -3.6%* |
| Nonunion | -6.3%*** |
Notes: Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, two indicate significance at the 5% level, and one indicates significance at the 10% level. This table shows the penalty in percent terms using the final regression, including controls for year, gender, experience (age and age squared), marital status, race/ethnicity, metropolitan status, and education (specified as dummy variables for less than high school, some college, associate degree, college, and advanced degree), full-time status, hourly status, public sector status, occupations, industries, state unemployment rate, and adjustments for cost-of-living differences across states (except where restricted sample disallows variable inclusion). AAPI stands for Asian American and Pacific Islander. Race/ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race). "Less than a college degree" includes Associate's degrees. Allocated wages are excluded.
Source: Author’s analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2026. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8 and Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities.
It is particularly important to note that RTW laws have a statistically significant negative effect on the wages of nonunion workers, as shown in the last row of Table 2. Our analysis indicates that nonunion workers in RTW states have wages that are 6.3% lower, on average, than their counterparts in non-RTW states. Union members likely experience a smaller penalty (3.6%) because their wages tend to be higher than those in nonunionized workplaces, regardless of the state’s RTW status (McNicholas et al. 2025). However, the wage impact of unions extends beyond those directly covered by a union contract. Unions lift wage standards across entire industries, meaning that nonunion workers in states with higher union density are more likely to receive better pay.
As the gap in wages and labor standards between RTW and non-RTW states has grown, so has the wage penalty
Using our final model (Model III in Table 1) with pooled 2023–2025 data, we find a 6.7% RTW wage penalty—a larger penalty than we found in earlier examinations. For example, we found a 3.2% wage penalty using data for 2009 (Gould and Shierholz 2011) and pooled 2010–2012 data (Gould and Kimball 2015). Some of the increase in the current estimate of the RTW wage penalty reflects small changes (likely improvements) in our methods. But part of the higher estimate persists even when we apply our current methods to earlier data: Applying these methods to the 2010–2012 data yields an RTW wage penalty of 4.7%.
One method change concerns “switchers”—states that changed from non-RTW to RTW status (or back) since 2019. In the 2010–2012 period, there were no switchers to affect the data.17 In our analysis, we isolate switchers from the long-term RTW group, but the RTW penalty remains negative and significant no matter how one deals with the issue of switcher states. For example, recategorizing the five switchers to match their 2012 status (all non-RTW) lowers the measured RTW wage penalty in the 2010–2012 period to 4.1%, but it remains significant.
Other changes relative to our earlier research include controlling for public-sector status; removing union as an independent variable from the regression; using the full working age range of 16 and up (as opposed to 18–64); and correcting an issue with nonrandom missing values to the metropolitan variable. We’ve further clustered standard errors at the state level as suggested by Douglas (2024), which does not affect the size of the coefficients, only the size of their standard errors and resulting statistical significance.18
Setting those minor model differences aside, a consistent comparison over time sees the RTW wage penalty rising from 4.7% in 2010–2012 to 6.7% in 2023–2025. One possible reason why this RTW wage penalty grew could be the increasingly divergent policy trajectories of RTW and non-RTW states over this period.
For example, the gap between minimum wages in RTW states and non-RTW states has grown since 2010, largely because policymakers in most RTW states have refused to increase their minimum wage despite the fact that the federal minimum wage has been stagnant in nominal terms since 2009. In that year, the average minimum wage in RTW states was $7.25 while the average minimum wage in non-RTW states was $7.54. That gap has grown enormously, from just $0.29 per hour in 2009 to $5.36 per hour by 2026 ($14.24 in non-RTW states vs. $8.89 in RTW states).
There were other potentially relevant policy changes between 2012 and 2025. The first state-level pay transparency law was passed in Maryland in 2020. Seventeen states followed suit in subsequent years, 15 of which were non-RTW states. On the flip side, six states have repealed their prevailing wage laws since 2012—all of which were RTW. Only one state, Michigan, reinstated its prevailing wage law. It did so in 2023, the same year it repealed RTW. While this is far from an exhaustive list, it’s not surprising that the measured RTW wage penalty has grown over time.
Repealing anti-union “right-to-work” laws and strengthening labor law is key to raising wages
The wage penalty for workers in RTW states has grown since the last time we conducted this research a decade ago. Long-standing and more recently enacted anti-union RTW laws in 26 states, in tandem with other anti-worker policies, have further eroded workers’ collective bargaining power, suppressed wages, and lowered labor standards. These outcomes are linked to clear policy choices, and lawmakers at every level of government have the tools they need to restore workers’ union rights, strengthen labor standards, and lift wages. Across the U.S., 56 million workers say they want a union in their workplace, yet only 10% of all workers have one (Shierholz et al. 2026). Current federal and state labor laws—including anti-union RTW laws—place too many obstacles in workers’ path to unionizing and give employers too much power to interfere with workers’ free choice.
First and foremost, states with RTW laws should follow Michigan’s recent lead and repeal them. Repealing state RTW laws will enable workers to unionize and raise wages across the country. Indeed, recent EPI research finds that equalizing collective bargaining rights across all states by repealing RTW laws that affect private employees and ensuring collective bargaining rights for public employees would increase national union density by almost 50% (from 9.9 to 14.4%) (Shierholz et al. 2026). States should also consider passing constitutional amendments that affirm collective bargaining rights and explicitly bar RTW-style restrictions, such as the 2022 Workers’ Rights Amendment in Illinois (Sherer 2026).
At the federal level, lawmakers should pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act. The PRO Act is designed to address major weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which has been severely eroded by amendments and court decisions. Among many other reforms, the PRO Act would eliminate the option for states to maintain anti-union RTW laws—restoring full bargaining rights to workers in all states as intended when the NLRA was originally passed in 1935 (McNicholas, Poydock, and Rhinehart 2021). Since its first introduction in 2019, the PRO Act has passed the House of Representatives twice with bipartisan support (Shierholz et al. 2026).
In addition to proposed PRO Act reforms that would enable newly unionized workers to pursue arbitration to achieve a first contract (if an employer fails to negotiate in good faith), federal labor law should set a minimum standard that such contracts include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). To further expand the benefits of collective bargaining, Congress should amend the NLRA to require default collective bargaining at any firm where CEO-to-worker pay ratios exceed 100 times what a typical worker makes in their industry (as this ratio would be one proxy for whether conditions at an employer are particularly unequal) (Shierholz et al. 2026).
Legislators at both the state and federal level should also look to the list of anti-worker laws that are typically found in RTW states for more opportunities to rebalance unequal power in the labor market and improve wages and working conditions. These policies include:
- Raising the minimum wage;
- Banning noncompete agreements;
- Strengthening federal unemployment insurance guidelines and state UI systems;
- Removing state restrictions that preempt local governments from raising wages and strengthening labor standards.
These are among just a few of the policy levers states can use to raise wages and standards (EPI 2026b).
Our analysis suggests that repealing anti-union RTW laws and enabling workers to increase unionization levels are key to raising wages, both because RTW laws directly suppress unionization rates (and unions raise wages), and because weakening unions limits workers’ collective ability to shape other public policies.
Acknowledgements
The authors are grateful to Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Hilary Wething, and Ben Zipperer for their helpful comments and expertise.
Appendix
In 2026, 26 states had so-called right-to-work laws: States by "right-to-work" (RTW) status
| State | Key | Right-to-work status |
|---|---|---|
| Alabama | 0 | RTW |
| Alaska | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Arizona | 0 | RTW |
| Arkansas | 0 | RTW |
| California | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Colorado | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Connecticut | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Delaware | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Florida | 0 | RTW |
| Georgia | 0 | RTW |
| Hawaii | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Idaho | 0 | RTW |
| Illinois | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Indiana | 2 | Switcher |
| Iowa | 0 | RTW |
| Kansas | 0 | RTW |
| Kentucky | 2 | Switcher |
| Louisiana | 0 | RTW |
| Maine | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Maryland | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Massachusetts | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Michigan | 2 | Switcher |
| Minnesota | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Mississippi | 0 | RTW |
| Missouri | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Montana | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Nebraska | 0 | RTW |
| Nevada | 0 | RTW |
| New Hampshire | 1 | Non-RTW |
| New Jersey | 1 | Non-RTW |
| New Mexico | 1 | Non-RTW |
| New York | 1 | Non-RTW |
| North Carolina | 0 | RTW |
| North Dakota | 0 | RTW |
| Ohio | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Oklahoma | 0 | RTW |
| Oregon | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Pennsylvania | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Rhode Island | 1 | Non-RTW |
| South Carolina | 0 | RTW |
| South Dakota | 0 | RTW |
| Tennessee | 0 | RTW |
| Texas | 0 | RTW |
| Utah | 0 | RTW |
| Vermont | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Virginia | 0 | RTW |
| Washington | 1 | Non-RTW |
| Washington D.C. | 1 | Non-RTW |
| West Virginia | 2 | Switcher |
| Wisconsin | 2 | Switcher |
| Wyoming | 0 | RTW |
Notes: "Right-to-work" status determined as of 2026. The four recent "switcher" states to become RTW did so in 2012 (Indiana), 2015 (Wisconsin), 2016 (West Virginia), and 2017 (Kentucky). Michigan, also classified as a switcher state, enacted RTW in 2013. However, in 2023, it became the first state in nearly 60 years to repeal a RTW law. This change took effect February 13, 2024.
Source: Author's analysis of "Right-to-Work States," National Conference of State Legislatures.
Characteristics of workers, by so-called right-to-work (RTW) status (2023–2025)
| RTW | Non-RTW state | Switchers | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Demographics | |||
| Average age | 40.8 | 41.4 | 40.7 |
| Sex (male) | 51.8% | 51.1% | 52.0% |
| Race/ethnicity | |||
| White | 56.4% | 59.6% | 80.5% |
| Black | 14.9% | 9.2% | 8.2% |
| Hispanic | 22.0% | 19.4% | 7.3% |
| Asian | 5.3% | 10.9% | 3.2% |
| Other | 1.4% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| Education | |||
| Less than high school | 7.8% | 6.9% | 6.5% |
| High school | 25.0% | 22.2% | 27.7% |
| Some college | 15.8% | 14.0% | 15.9% |
| Associate’s degree | 11.3% | 9.9% | 12.6% |
| College degree | 25.6% | 28.0% | 24.9% |
| Advanced degree | 14.5% | 18.9% | 12.6% |
| Marital status (married) | 52.6% | 51.7% | 52.5% |
| Metropolitan area | 88.3% | 91.1% | 77.3% |
| Worker characteristics | |||
| Hourly worker | 52.8% | 52.5% | 60.2% |
| Full-time | 84.0% | 81.5% | 80.8% |
| Union/union contract | 6.2% | 16.0% | 10.8% |
| Average hourly wage (2025$) | $32.78 | $40.28 | $31.50 |
| Median hourly wage (2025$) | $24.16 | $28.79 | $24.58 |
| State characteristics | |||
| Unemployment rate | 3.6% | 4.3% | 4.0% |
| Cost of living (BEA RPP) | 95.9 | 104.0 | 92.9 |
| Number of observations | 99,234 | 114,325 | 20,596 |
Notes: Switcher states include the five most recent states to become RTW: Indiana (2012), Michigan (2013), Wisconsin (2015), West Virginia (2016), and Kentucky (2017). Note: In 2023, Michigan became the first state in nearly 60 years to repeal a RTW law. This change took effect February 13, 2024. AAPI stands for Asian American and Pacific Islander. Race/ethnicity categories are mutually exclusive (i.e., white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, AAPI non-Hispanic, and Hispanic any race).
Source: Author’s analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2026. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8 and Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities.
Full log wage regression results from Table 1 regressions
| (I) | (II) | (III) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Model with no controls | Model adds demographic and individual-level labor market controls | Final model, adds state-level labor market controls and cost-of-living measures |
| RTW indicator | -0.196*** | -0.1503*** | -0.0698*** |
| (0.03124) | (0.02784) | (0.01997) | |
| Switcher indicator | -0.1307*** | -0.0369 | |
| (0.02901) | (0.02243) | ||
| Black | -0.0838*** | -0.0888*** | |
| (0.007) | (0.00625) | ||
| Hispanic | -0.0922*** | -0.1295*** | |
| (0.0169) | (0.00681) | ||
| AAPI | 0.0225* | -0.0135 | |
| (0.01267) | (0.00843) | ||
| Other race/ethnicity | -0.044** | -0.0364*** | |
| (0.01781) | (0.01268) | ||
| Female | -0.1362*** | -0.1351*** | |
| (0.00394) | (0.00406) | ||
| Less than high school | -0.5196*** | -0.5113*** | |
| (0.01641) | (0.0162) | ||
| High school | -0.4458*** | -0.44*** | |
| (0.00771) | (0.00695) | ||
| Some college | -0.3857*** | -0.3831*** | |
| (0.00665) | (0.00652) | ||
| Associate’s degree | -0.3317*** | -0.3275*** | |
| (0.00796) | (0.00708) | ||
| College degree | -0.1993*** | -0.1977*** | |
| (0.00618) | (0.00625) | ||
| Age | 0.0247*** | 0.0241*** | |
| (0.00063) | (0.00063) | ||
| Age squared | -0.0002*** | -0.0002*** | |
| (0.00001) | (0.00001) | ||
| Married | 0.087*** | 0.0903*** | |
| (0.00328) | (0.00316) | ||
| Hourly worker | -0.2056*** | -0.203*** | |
| (0.0041) | (0.00434) | ||
| Full-time worker | 0.1274*** | 0.1305*** | |
| (0.00569) | (0.00551) | ||
| Metro area | 0.0982*** | 0.0644*** | |
| (0.0095) | (0.00725) | ||
| State unemployment rate | 1.1477 | ||
| (1.26775) | |||
| Cost-of-living (BEA RPP) | 0.943*** | ||
| (0.15297) | |||
| Industry and occupation indicators | No | Yes | Yes |
| Constant | 3.400012*** | 3.1263*** | -1.2541* |
| (0.025268) | (0.02809) | (0.69007) | |
| Observations | 234,155 | 234,155 | 234,155 |
| R-squared | 0.02437 | 0.480787 | 0.487749 |
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Three asterisks (***) indicate significance at the 1% level, two indicate significance at the 5% level, one indicates significance at the 10% level. All models include year and public sector indicators.
Source: Author’s analysis of Economic Policy Institute. 2026. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8 and Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Price Parities.
Notes
1. See Appendix Figure A for RTW status. As of 2026, these states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
2. States are categorized as “RTW” or “non-RTW” based on their status as of 2026.
3. Authors’ analysis of prevailing wage laws from DOL (2023) and state legislative websites.
4. Authors’ analysis of noncompete restriction policies from EIG (2026).
5. Authors’ analysis of minimum wage data from EPI (2026c).
6. Authors’ analysis of pay transparency laws from GovDocs (2026).
7. Authors’ analysis of UI recipiency rate data from DOL-ETA.
8. Authors’ analysis of Medicaid expansion policies from KFF (2026).
9. Authors’ analysis of uninsurance rates by state, 2023 through 2025, from Carter (2025).
10. Authors’ analysis of per-pupil education spending data from NCES-NPEFS (2024).
11. Authors’ analysis of paid family and medical leave policies from Wielk (2026).
12. Prior to 2012, the last state to change its status was Oklahoma in 2001.
13. This analysis builds on earlier work by Gould and Kimball (2015); see the report for a full description of the methodology and list of controls.
14. Interpreting the results from these semilogarithmic functions requires utilizing the exponential function on the coefficient. Specific to the binary variable coefficient (β1) for RTW, the percent change in workers’ wages resulting from a state being RTW can be calculated by the formula: 100*[exp(β1)-1]. Typically, the result of this equation will be very close to the coefficient itself but will differ more as the coefficient becomes larger. We show the coefficient in the first row of Table 1 and the exponentiated result as a percent in the third row.
15. Full regression results for covariates in all three models can be found in Appendix Table 2.
16. Because the 2025 BEA RPP data were not yet available at the time of publication, we assign an average of 2022–2024 data to all years in our sample (2023–2025).
17. Gould and Kimball (2015) classify Indiana as non-RTW as its RTW law had just taken effect.
18. We do not control for state-level fixed effects, as Douglas (2024) suggested, because state-level fixed effects perfectly correlate with RTW status and would deem our results uninterpretable.
References
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Price Parities by State and Metro Area: All items (BEA-RPP). Various years [Release date: February 19, 2026]. Public data series accessed via the Regional Data interactive tool. Accessed August 1, 2026.
Carter, Caitlin. 2025. “Health Insurance Coverage by State: 2023 and 2024.” U.S. Census Bureau, September 11, 2025.
Childers, Chandra. 2024. The Evolution of the Southern Economic Development Strategy: Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: Part One. Economic Policy Institute, May 2024.
Dahl, B. Gordon, and Matthew Knepper. 2026. “Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs: Evidence from Multi-state Firms.” The Review of Economic Studies, rdag056. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag056.
Dasgupta, Kabir, and Zofsha Merchant. 2023. “Understanding Workers’ Financial Wellbeing in States with Right-to-Work Laws.” FEDS Notes (The Federal Reserve), September 8, 2023.
Department of Labor (DOL). 2023. “Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws.” Last modified January 1, 2023.
Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (DOL-ETA). Various years. Unemployment Insurance Chartbook. Public data series accessed via the interactive tool. Accessed August 6, 2026.
Douglas, Christopher C. 2024. Right-to-Work States Do Not Have Lower Wages. Mackinac Center, December 2024.
Economic Innovation Group (EIG). 2026. “State Noncompete Law Tracker.” Last modified March 24, 2026.
Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2025. “Workers’ Rights Preemption in the U.S.” Last modified February 2025.
Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8, https://microdata.epi.org.
Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. Holding the Line: State solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis.
Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026c. “Minimum Wage Tracker.” Last Modified July 1, 2026.
Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Neil Lloyd. 2022. “Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and Wage Setting.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 30098, June 2022. http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098.
Glynn, Sarah Jane. 2020. “The Rising Cost of Inaction on Work-Family Policies.” Center for American Progress, January 21, 2020.
Gould, Elise, and Will Kimball. 2015. “Right-to-Work” States Still Have Lower Wages. Economic Policy Institute, April 2015.
Gould, Elise, and Heidi Shierholz. 2011. The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws. Economic Policy Institute, February 2011.
GovDocs. 2026. “Pay Transparency Laws by State and Province.” Last modified July 2026.
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, and Alix Gould-Werth. 2020. Labor Organizations and Unemployment Insurance: A Virtuous Circle Supporting U.S. Workers’ Voices and Reducing Disparities in Benefits. Washington Center for Equitable Growth, October 2020.
Jackson, C. Kirabo, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico. 2016. “The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, no. 1: 157–218. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036.
KFF. 2026. “Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions.” Last modified May 21, 2026.
McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Lynn Rhinehart. 2021. “How the PRO Act restores workers’ right to unionize” (fact sheet). Economic Policy Institute, February 4, 2021.
McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, Heidi Shierholz, and Hilary Wething. 2025. Unions Aren’t Just Good for Workers—They Also Benefit Communities and Democracy. Economic Policy Institute, August 2025.
National Center for Education Statistics, National Public Education Financial Survey (NCES-NPEFS). 2024. Public data series accessed via the Common Core of Data database. Accessed July 1, 2026.
Rinz, Kevin, and David Wasser. 2026. “Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Wage Determination.” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper no. 26-11, May 2026. https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611.
Shedge, Nirav. 2025. Pay Transparency Laws and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Colorado. Social Science Research Network, November 2025.
Sherer, Jennifer. 2026. Rights to Unionize and Collectively Bargain: State Solutions to the U.S. Workers Rights Crisis. Economic Policy Institute, February 2026.
Sherer, Jennifer, Emma Cohn, and Ruby Ahdoot. 2025. “Updated EPI Tracker Shows More States Obstructing Progress on Workers’ Rights: Harmful Preemption Laws are Increasing Inequality and Repressing Democracy.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), March 6, 2025.
Sherer, Jennifer, Nina Mast, Elise Gould, and Emma Cohn. 2026. Everything You Need to Know About Anti-Union “Right-to-Work” Laws. Economic Policy Institute, forthcoming 2026.
Shierholz, Heidi. 2024. “Banning Noncompete Agreements.” Testimony before the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy, July 30, 2024.
Shierholz, Heidi, Celine McNicholas, Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Ben Zipperer, and Margaret Poydock. 2026. The Case for Tripling Union Membership: How Rebuilding Union Power Would Strengthen Workers, the Economy, and Our Democracy. Economic Policy Institute, July 2026.
Starr, Evan. 2019. “Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete.” ILR Review 72, no. 4 (August): 783–817. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919826060.
Wielk, Emily. 2026. “State Paid Family Leave Laws Across the U.S.” Bipartisan Policy Center. Last updated April 23, 2026.
Zipperer, Ben. 2026. Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage. Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.