Key takeaways
- Public sentiment about the economy and headline indicators seem at odds with each other again. Decent topline numbers reported in recent data releases are coinciding with growing dissatisfaction from households.
- Unlike earlier this decade, however, this divergence is easily explained since there is really only one source of strength in the economy right now—spending associated with the great race to build out AI tools.
- The spending associated with this race concentrates its benefits narrowly in the economy while imposing costs broadly on typical families. And it has done little to boost the wider labor market, where softness has led to consistent decelerating wage growth over the past year.
Starting this summer and even continuing past the midterm elections, President Trump has been trying to convince Americans that the United States “has the hottest economy in the world.” And by some measures the U.S. economy does seem pretty warm: The Federal Reserve raised interest rates six weeks ago in response to stubbornly high inflation. While they held off raising rates at last week’s meeting, there were two dissenters arguing for higher rates.
Further, third-quarter growth in gross domestic product (GDP) picked up to 3.4%, after averaging 2% for a few years, and both private investment and consumption growth were strong.
Yet the public seems unimpressed by all of this—the 12-month average of the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment series hit its lowest point in history in the past month.
This all raises the question of whether this is just one more period of divergence between perceptions and hard economic data that has been a feature of the economy since COVID-19. The short answer is “no.” Unlike in 2023 and 2024, the hard economic data just one step below the headlines actually provide plenty of reasons explaining why the public is sour on the economy. Specifically:
- All the heat in the economy is coming from the race to build data centers and other investments in artificial intelligence (AI).
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- Boom times and a modern gold rush for billionaires shouldn’t be expected to make normal people all that happy—particularly when the gold the billionaires are looking for is technology that will steal jobs from typical workers.
- The labor market—where normal people earn their incomes—is not hot. And it’s cooling noticeably. Nominal wage growth is now consistent with below 2% price inflation, yet inflation is a lot higher than that.
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- This labor market coolness is driven in part by the damaging effects of the Trump administration’s policy of cruel and arbitrary mass deportations. Growth in the U.S. labor force has slowed significantly in the past 15–18 months, and cities subject to large-scale ICE operations have suffered demonstrable economic damage.
- Despite a cool labor market and weak wage growth that should be pulling down prices, inflation has risen sharply over the past year. The sources of these price increases are obviously linked to Trump administration policy choices—most notably their bombing of Iran.
The hot: The AI build-out and how it’s not great for typical families
Over the past year or more, well over half the growth in the U.S. economy was coming directly from spending associated with the race for AI dominance. Part of this spending is the capital expenditures on data centers, hardware, and research and development. The other part is consumption spending financed by rising wealth that is the result of the stock market boom—or bubble—that is being driven by the excess valuation of firms associated with the AI race.
Neither of these spending flows benefits typical families in the here and now, while both are currently imposing real costs on families. The boom in AI capital expenditure is combining with the large increase in deficits driven by the 2025 Republican tax and spending bill to push up interest rates and make inputs across a range of industries more expensive. Construction labor and materials, for example, are notably more expensive due to the AI data center build-out. Most notably, AI data centers have significantly increased electricity demand in many localities across the country, often translating into notably higher electricity costs. The same holds true for hardware. Chips of all kinds, including those for consumer electronics like TVs and phones and computers, have seen very rapid inflation.
One could argue that while the AI build-out is pressuring typical families’ affordability by driving up interest rates and a range of costs, the payoff from this build-out will eventually be good for these families, if AI notably increases the pace of productivity growth in the economy. That could happen, but it’s far from guaranteed. Further, the stated goal of many of the companies racing to build AI tools is to replace human labor at scale. This likely makes plenty of typical workers understandably skeptical about what’s in it for them.
The consumption spending financed by the stock market bubble is by definition mostly being enjoyed by wealthy, not typical, families. 85% of corporate equities are held by the wealthiest 10% of families, and roughly half are held by the top 1%. To the degree this extra consumption spending by the wealthy makes it harder to bring down overall inflation, it is affirmatively imposing a cost on typical families.
The Trump administration seems to understand none of this, or perhaps they don’t care. They are enormous boosters of AI companies. It is hardly a stretch to say that the industrial policy of the U.S. has switched from a push to build out renewable energy and supply-chain resilience under the Biden administration to a push to build out AI as quickly as possible under the Trump administration. Among other activities, they have tried to bully localities into accepting AI data centers, regardless of the costs to communities; the administration has greatly relaxed oversight of the industry; they tried to insert a provision into their 2025 tax and spending bill that would have preempted state governments from undertaking any AI regulation; and they have sought to open public lands to data center construction.
In short, the primary source of heat in the U.S. economy right now is associated with the race to build out AI. This race is having negative effects on typical families by driving up interest rates and making borrowing more expensive. And the combination of costs including electricity and hardware, and the extra spending the AI race is driving from the wealthiest families is a reason why inflation rates remain stubbornly high. Further, typical families are reminded again and again that the goal of this race is to make their working lives less secure, and they see the Trump administration applauding that race every day.
Is there any possible reason why it’s a surprise normal Americans aren’t impressed with the economy’s “heat”?
The not: The labor market is downright cool
While the AI race is a source of heat in the U.S. economy, the labor market—where typical families have to earn the vast majority of their money—is decidedly cool.
The overall unemployment rate and the share of prime-age adults (25–54 years old) with a job have been roughly stable over the past year, but both are worse than in 2023–2024. But what is striking is the continuing deceleration of nominal wage growth (wages not adjusted for inflation).
Nominal wage growth was running at roughly 4% in January 2025, but it has since decelerated to just over 3%, with most of that deceleration happening just in the past year. Nominal wage growth of 3.5%–4% is essentially consistent with the Federal Reserve’s inflation target in the long run (because nominal wages can grow with both inflation and productivity, they can grow 1.5%–2% faster than prices without putting upward pressure on the 2% inflation target).
Wage growth has slowed noticeably in the past 18 months: Year-over-year % change in wages, both overall and for nonsupervisory workers, 2019–currently
| Production and nonsupervisory workers | All private sector | Production and nonsupervisory workers | All private sector | Production and nonsupervisory workers | All private sector | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/1/2019 | 0.034436494 | 0.03255988 | ||||
| 2/1/2019 | 0.03480589 | 0.0355273 | ||||
| 3/1/2019 | 0.035571365 | 0.034264432 | ||||
| 4/1/2019 | 0.0345898 | 0.032701598 | ||||
| 5/1/2019 | 0.03539823 | 0.033358043 | ||||
| 6/1/2019 | 0.036187114 | 0.034776175 | ||||
| 7/1/2019 | 0.036563877 | 0.034317343 | ||||
| 8/1/2019 | 0.03643547 | 0.034178611 | ||||
| 9/1/2019 | 0.035870516 | 0.030746706 | ||||
| 10/1/2019 | 0.037570992 | 0.031786628 | ||||
| 11/1/2019 | 0.036086957 | 0.032798834 | ||||
| 12/1/2019 | 0.03202077 | 0.029753266 | ||||
| 1/1/2020 | 0.033722438 | 0.030445814 | ||||
| 2/1/2020 | 0.03622251 | 0.030697003 | ||||
| 3/1/2020 | 0.036581686 | 0.031246105 | 0.036581686 | 0.031246105 | ||
| 4/1/2020 | 0.036940862 | 0.031795207 | ||||
| 5/1/2020 | 0.037300039 | 0.03234431 | ||||
| 6/1/2020 | 0.037659215 | 0.032893412 | ||||
| 7/1/2020 | 0.038018391 | 0.033442515 | ||||
| 8/1/2020 | 0.038377567 | 0.033991617 | ||||
| 9/1/2020 | 0.038736744 | 0.034540719 | ||||
| 10/1/2020 | 0.03909592 | 0.035089822 | ||||
| 11/1/2020 | 0.039455096 | 0.035638924 | ||||
| 12/1/2020 | 0.039814272 | 0.036188027 | ||||
| 1/1/2021 | 0.040173449 | 0.036737129 | ||||
| 2/1/2021 | 0.040532625 | 0.037286232 | ||||
| 3/1/2021 | 0.040891801 | 0.037835334 | ||||
| 4/1/2021 | 0.041250978 | 0.038384436 | ||||
| 5/1/2021 | 0.041610154 | 0.038933539 | 0.041610154 | 0.038933539 | ||
| 6/1/2021 | 0.04196933 | 0.039482641 | ||||
| 7/1/2021 | 0.051842851 | 0.043211977 | ||||
| 8/1/2021 | 0.053225806 | 0.043743642 | ||||
| 9/1/2021 | 0.059629331 | 0.049813623 | ||||
| 10/1/2021 | 0.064814815 | 0.054163846 | ||||
| 11/1/2021 | 0.064955894 | 0.053643725 | ||||
| 12/1/2021 | 0.063593005 | 0.049481779 | ||||
| 1/1/2022 | 0.069554849 | 0.055796859 | ||||
| 2/1/2022 | 0.068118812 | 0.052911814 | ||||
| 3/1/2022 | 0.069877615 | 0.058941059 | ||||
| 4/1/2022 | 0.068965517 | 0.057577763 | ||||
| 5/1/2022 | 0.066978193 | 0.055573824 | ||||
| 6/1/2022 | 0.065840434 | 0.054027505 | ||||
| 7/1/2022 | 0.065075087 | 0.054794521 | ||||
| 8/1/2022 | 0.062404288 | 0.053931124 | ||||
| 9/1/2022 | 0.059695817 | 0.051323434 | ||||
| 10/1/2022 | 0.058223062 | 0.050096339 | ||||
| 11/1/2022 | 0.058358434 | 0.050912584 | ||||
| 12/1/2022 | 0.054559043 | 0.049378783 | ||||
| 1/1/2023 | 0.052025269 | 0.044936709 | ||||
| 2/1/2023 | 0.053763441 | 0.047724399 | ||||
| 3/1/2023 | 0.053874539 | 0.046226415 | ||||
| 4/1/2023 | 0.052052786 | 0.045994994 | ||||
| 5/1/2023 | 0.050364964 | 0.043613707 | ||||
| 6/1/2023 | 0.049781977 | 0.046598322 | ||||
| 7/1/2023 | 0.048806941 | 0.046691404 | ||||
| 8/1/2023 | 0.047207207 | 0.044697904 | ||||
| 9/1/2023 | 0.047003947 | 0.044212465 | ||||
| 10/1/2023 | 0.045373348 | 0.042201835 | ||||
| 11/1/2023 | 0.044823906 | 0.041133455 | ||||
| 12/1/2023 | 0.044294826 | 0.040983607 | ||||
| 1/1/2024 | 0.04592017 | 0.04391278 | ||||
| 2/1/2024 | 0.043631246 | 0.0413273 | ||||
| 3/1/2024 | 0.042717087 | 0.04147881 | ||||
| 4/1/2024 | 0.040069686 | 0.039784625 | ||||
| 5/1/2024 | 0.041348158 | 0.041492537 | ||||
| 6/1/2024 | 0.040844583 | 0.039180766 | ||||
| 7/1/2024 | 0.039641503 | 0.03633678 | ||||
| 8/1/2024 | 0.04163799 | 0.039244615 | ||||
| 9/1/2024 | 0.041466758 | 0.039106145 | ||||
| 10/1/2024 | 0.041695147 | 0.040492958 | ||||
| 11/1/2024 | 0.040517535 | 0.041849576 | ||||
| 12/1/2024 | 0.040380048 | 0.04082823 | ||||
| 1/1/2025 | 0.039851402 | 0.039744706 | ||||
| 2/1/2025 | 0.041469993 | 0.041135574 | ||||
| 3/1/2025 | 0.041638684 | 0.042135642 | ||||
| 4/1/2025 | 0.041541039 | 0.039125432 | ||||
| 5/1/2025 | 0.041041041 | 0.039839496 | ||||
| 6/1/2025 | 0.041237113 | 0.038560411 | ||||
| 7/1/2025 | 0.040782493 | 0.039623717 | ||||
| 8/1/2025 | 0.040303931 | 0.039750142 | ||||
| 9/1/2025 | 0.038499506 | 0.038483305 | ||||
| 10/1/2025 | 0.040026247 | 0.039199098 | ||||
| 11/1/2025 | 0.040248691 | 0.039325843 | ||||
| 12/1/2025 | 0.03816047 | 0.03726534 | ||||
| 1/1/2026 | 0.037349789 | 0.036551339 | ||||
| 2/1/2026 | 0.037228877 | 0.037006121 | ||||
| 3/1/2026 | 0.035460993 | 0.034339518 | ||||
| 4/1/2026 | 0.036667739 | 0.035714286 | ||||
| 5/1/2026 | 0.035576923 | 0.033351709 | ||||
| 6/1/2026 | 0.034174385 | 0.033828383 | ||||
| 7/1/2026 | 0.032812998 | 0.032081163 | ||||
| 8/1/2026 | 0.03366148 | 0.03113053 | ||||
| 9/1/2026 | 0.033903676 | 0.031607629 | ||||
| 10/1/2026 | 0.033123028 | 0.031207598 |

Note: Data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. To smooth volatility, I take the rolling 3-month level of wages and compute annualized growth rates relative to the previous 3-month level. To smooth out distracting, large fluctuations caused by the mammoth pandemic job losses in the year between March 2020 and March 2021, I take the endpoints in the data and just extrapolate steady growth between them.
But while nominal wage growth is now consistent with very low inflation, we don’t actually have very low inflation today. The huge progress made in tamping down post-pandemic inflation between 2022 and 2024 has decisively reversed. The large spike in inflation post-pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine peaked in mid-2022 at just under 9%. By the end of 2024 it was 2.7%. As of the third quarter of 2026, it stood at 3.5%, and the most recent October data saw it rise further.
Much of this is obviously due to the Trump administration’s decision to begin bombing Iran and the subsequent spike in oil prices. But the downward march of inflation had clearly stopped even before this. The Trump administration’s strategy-free tariff policy and its mass deportation program likely contribute to some of this—both by pinching on key parts of the economy’s supply side. Some of the rise in inflation is also accounted for by the AI build-out (again—electricity and hardware prices are up noticeably due to this).
The combination of a sharp deceleration in wage growth and acceleration in inflation has led to falling real (inflation-adjusted) wages. Real wages in October are lower than they were for most of 2025 and 2026.
The extent of wage deceleration is large enough to be puzzling. Unemployment is not at historic lows, but it is substantially lower than post-1979 averages. One speculative reason why wage growth might be particularly tame even in the face of relatively low unemployment is workers’ anxiety about the wave of news regarding AI’s ability to replace jobs. There are plenty of good reasons to think that this ability is radically overstated, and the effect of AI in displacing jobs will be far more modest and “normal” than what many scenarios (particularly those aggressively marketed by AI companies themselves) might indicate. But if people think mass displacement is a possibility and imagine their own job is on a knife’s edge of being replaced by AI, they might preemptively moderate their wage demands. Again—it’s a very speculative idea, but hardly one that seems impossible. And it again would fit a story in which what some people see as welcome heat in the economy is not helping typical workers.
Finally, overall employment growth has slowed significantly during the Trump administration. Employment grew by 166,000 jobs per month on average in 2023 and 2024, but in 2025 and 2026, this has slowed to 44,000. Lots of this is a large decline in net immigration, spurred both by deportations but also by reduced inflows of immigrants. Crucially, this decline spurred by lower immigration flows has not helped U.S.-born workers: Their unemployment rates are clearly higher in 2026 than in previous years. Further, cities where ICE activity has been pronounced have suffered notable economic damage, both from lower labor supply of immigrant workers but also from lower demand caused by a reduction in mobility.
Downright cold: Anybody needing help from the safety net
Even worse than the labor market is income support coming from the U.S. public sector. Large cuts to Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and subsidies to those receiving health insurance through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges were all part of the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill.
The Medicaid and SNAP cuts officially went into effect in October 2026, but states had preemptively adopted many of the required policy changes before this, and enrollment in both programs has already begun to crater. Analyst Charles Gaba estimates that from January 2025 to May 2026, Medicaid enrollment dropped by 5.9 million, and enrollments in ACA exchanges dropped by somewhere between 4.5–6 million. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimates that 5.5 million people lost SNAP benefits between July 2025 and July 2026.
These are literally the largest cuts to income support programs in the nation’s history. Tens of millions of families rely on these programs to afford the necessities of life. It is far from a surprise that these families aren’t feeling much welcome heat from the economy.
Conclusion
So, is the U.S. economy hot or not? If you’re a billionaire with a big stake in AI companies, it’s very hot. Or if you’re a seller of computer chips to these companies, also very hot. For the vast majority of U.S. families, though, this economy feels pretty cool, at best. Their wage growth has slowed, and prices are up. Anybody needing help from the safety net is facing a much uglier path than a year ago. All of this struggle coexisting with decent headline economic numbers is purely the result of policy decisions.
If the Trump administration had not cut Medicaid, SNAP, and ACA subsidies, the safety net would be providing more help to tens of millions of families. If this administration had not instituted chaotic and strategy-free tariff and immigration policies, Main Street businesses would be investing more, labor markets would be healthier, and prices wouldn’t be as high. And if the administration had not chosen to bomb Iran for no compelling reason, gas prices would be lower.
The divergence between headline numbers and people’s perceptions just isn’t that puzzling today, unlike earlier this decade.