Key takeaways
- For the past 45 years, policymakers have attempted to reduce income inequality by relying more on cutting federal taxes rather than boosting transfers like Medicaid.
- But the tax and transfer system has fallen short of this goal—narrowing the inequality gap from 32% to 20% between 1979 and 2022, only by about one-third of the total gap. At the same time, policies were passed that ripped away any bit of bargaining power or leverage typical workers had in labor markets.
- Since the data show that we can’t tax and transfer our way out of inequality, the final option remains to change policies that affect the distribution of market income so that inequality doesn’t get too large in the first place.
Tax cuts have become the single most namechecked policy in D.C. This has long been the priority of Republican policymaking. Post 1979 though, a nontrivial share of Democrats has also adopted the neoliberal view that markets should be allowed to generate more inequality in the pursuit of economic prosperity. They reasoned that policy could limit the downsides by compensating those on the losing end of higher market-driven inequality by making taxes, social insurance, such as Social Security, and public transfers, such as Medicaid, more equalizing. This strategy is often shorthanded as “compensating the losers”—those who have been left worse off.
For the past 45 years, to the degree policymakers have aimed to compensate for rising market-based inequality, they have relied more on cutting federal taxes rather than boosting transfers. They cut federal taxes for middle-income families significantly— by about a third. Yet, even with these cuts, middle-class economic security has not substantially improved over time, and much of market-driven inequality has gone uncompensated. Even as support for more universal public benefits has grown in recent years among some Democrats, too many in Washington still have an ingrained reflex of “maybe a tax cut will do it”?
In this post we probe why “compensating the losers” through redistribution failed to reduce economic inequality on its own. While policymakers increased transfers and cut middle-class taxes, the transfers programs were targeted mostly for elderly and low-income households, and the policies that were passed ripped away any bit of bargaining power or leverage typical workers had in labor markets. These policies ultimately supported employers putting a lot less into typical workers’ paychecks, even as the federal government took a bit less out.
The Democratic Party’s shift from predistribution and toward redistribution
There was once a time when income growth was broadly shared because the federal government supported predistribution—institutions and policies that intervened in labor markets much earlier than at tax withholding time. These institutions and policies include unions, the federal minimum wage, full employment, and high marginal tax rates, which all influenced pretax outcomes. Growth was broadly shared because typical workers’ paychecks kept pace with economywide growth.
But the shift beginning in the 1970s saw a segment of the Democratic Party becoming less supportive of predistribution measures. Today, middle-class families have a $30,676—or 31.8%—gap between what they earned from the market and what their income would have been if it had grown at the same rate as average market income did.
To be clear, Republicans have always been fine to roll back policies that intervened in instances of unequal income trajectories. What changed during this time was a growing number of Democrats who accepted the neoliberal logic that removing predistribution policies to equalize markets was fine, so long as policy sought to “compensate the losers” by making taxes and public transfers more equalizing. In this view, Democrats advocated for tax cuts to the middle class and stopped introducing predistribution bills to strengthen worker labor standards and pay.
The resulting tax cuts and higher transfer incomes accruing to middle-fifth families blunted only about a third of the income penalty imposed by rising inequality. When the definition of income includes tax and transfer policies, such as social insurance, cash assistance, and tax payments, the gap between what middle-class families earned and what they could have earned if their income grew at the rate of average income is narrower but still remains large at $19,320—or 20.2 % in 2022. In effect, the strategy of “compensating the losers” in the neoliberal game still left middle-class families with a loss of about two-thirds of the income they might have had otherwise.
Figure A shows how the various components of the tax and transfer system closed the inequality gap from 32% to 20%. We can view this graph as a report card for how policymakers fared in their approach to prioritizing tax and transfer policies as opposed to predistribution policies. Of the nearly 12 percentage point total reduction in inequality for middle-class families, nearly half of the reduction came from social insurance programs (primarily Social Security and Medicare). While this outsize role of social insurance might be a bit counterintuitive given that our measures of inequality focus on the nonelderly population, there has been a growing preponderance of multigenerational families that is likely being picked up here.
Means-tested programs narrowed the 12 percentage point gap by only 2.2 percentage points. These programs are only a small contribution because their design narrowly targets low-income adults. While low-income adults may reside in households with middle-class income, most middle-class households have income too high to qualify for benefits like Medicaid or SNAP/food assistance. This relatively small contribution could grow if policymakers pushed for fiscal resources to allow for universal access to these programs, such as single-payer health care or expanded nutrition and rental assistance programs.
Taxes and transfer income close the gap in income inequality generated by markets by one-third: Gap between actual middle-class income for nonelderly households and income, if middle-class income had grown at the same rate as average income during the 1979–2022 period
| Inequality gap | SS/WC/UI | Medicare | Means-tested transfers | Taxes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market income | 31.8% | ||||
| Post-tax, post-transfer income | 19.9% | 3.4% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 4.1% |

Note: The gap measures the percent difference between what middle-fifth nonelderly households earned in 2022 and what they would have earned if their income had grown at the same rate as average income from 1979–2022. The bar on the left is the total gap when market income alone is used. The bar on the right shows the contribution of taxes and transfers to closing the gap and the remainder. SS/WC/UI stands for Social Security, workers‘ compensation, and unemployment insurance.
Source: Author’s analysis of Congressional Budget Office, “Distribution of Household Income, 1979–2022,” https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61911.
The rest of the reduction in inequality came from a reduction in taxes for the middle class. The overall federal tax rate for middle-class families dropped from 19.1% of income in 1979 to 13.1% in 2022. This decline in taxes owed closed about one-third of the reduction of the market-income inequality gap, or 3.9 of the 12 percentage points. Cutting taxes, especially individual income taxes, rivals the reduction in inequality attributed to social insurance programs.
However, tax cutting is a lever that comes with sharp costs, namely the degradation of the public sector’s capacity to do useful things, like ensuring the water system provides potable water or monitoring contagious diseases. Federal tax cuts, and the ensuing degradation of the public sector’s capacity, aligns with the decline in Americans’ trust in the federal government, suggesting that tax cuts are not likely to be a useful lever in the future. Moreover, projections of spending needs over the next 10 years suggest that the U.S. will need more revenue, not less.
We need predistribution policies that rebalance the labor market
In total, the scale of fiscal support given to the middle class was nowhere near as large as the scale of what they lost in a labor market that is now rigged against them. The “compensate the losers” strategy of redistribution policies failed to fully close the income gap middle-class families experience from an unbalanced labor market, and the levers in the redistribution toolbox, short of universal programs, are mostly played out. You can see this policy failure not just in the income numbers, but in people’s perceptions of their economic security. The Gallup Economic Confidence Index, which summarizes Americans’ assessments of current economic conditions, is 40% below its level in 1996, and the percentage of Americans who report being satisfied with their personal life has effectively remained stagnant since 1979.
In passing policies that ripped away any bit of bargaining power or leverage typical workers had in labor markets, policymakers failed to come close to compensating the losers with fiscal measures. Ultimately, policymakers failed to meaningfully reduce inequality and instead created decades of wage suppression. This wage suppression led to employers putting a lot less into typical workers’ paychecks, even as the federal government took out a bit less.
Since the data show that we can’t tax and transfer our way out of the inequality tax, the final option remains to change policies that affect predistribution income so that inequality doesn’t get too large in the first place.