Submitted via https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/07/23/2026-14937/removal-of-reporting-requirements
Raymond Windmiller, Executive Officer
Executive Secretariat
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, NE
Washington, DC 20507
Re: Proposed Rule for Removal of Reporting Requirements (RIN 3046-AB37)
Dear Commissioners,
I write to submit this comment on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), responding to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s proposed rule to rescind and remove the requirements for filing the EEO-1, EEO-2, EEO-3, EEO-4, EEO-5, and EEO-6 reports1, and the recordkeeping and record preservation requirements related to these reports, under 29 CFR part 1602.
EPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. For 18 years, EPI’s Program on Race, Ethnicity and the Economy (PREE) has been a nationally recognized source for expert analysis of the many ways that race, ethnicity, gender, class and policy decisions intersect to affect economic outcomes.
We strongly oppose the EEOC’s proposal to rescind the EEO reporting, recordkeeping and record preservation requirements. If implemented, this rule would undermine the Commission’s capacity to enforce federal laws against employment discrimination. Furthermore, this rule would deprive employers, researchers, policymakers and advocates of their ability to independently analyze and use this unique data source to develop and advocate for policies that support the EEOC’s mission of ending workplace discrimination.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is a cornerstone in upholding the civil rights of U.S. workers. Established under the same law that officially prohibited employment discrimination (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), the EEOC embodies the fact that effective federal laws against employment discrimination require consistent enforcement. For the last 60 years, EEO reports have been central to the agency’s capacity to enforce the law and to monitor and track the nation’s progress toward ending workplace discrimination.
That goal is still a work in progress, as documented in an extensive body of methodologically rigorous research by economists, sociologists and other social scientists. In what follows, we explain why the Commission’s proposal to rescind all EEO data collection would be counterproductive to reaching that goal and detrimental to the U.S. economy by:
- Summarizing the research on labor market discrimination that justifies the ongoing need for EEO reporting requirements;
- Describing how broad EEO reporting requirements help to rebalance power and information asymmetries between employers and employees; and
- Presenting estimates of how much discrimination costs the U.S. economy in economic output and average living standards.
Research and national data provide compelling evidence of persistent labor market discrimination against “minorities”
In their proposed rule, the Commission claims that EEO Reports “may encourage employers to discriminate against employees who are not considered ‘minorities,’ may promote racial stereotyping, and may encourage employers to engage in discrimination to avoid potential EEOC enforcement actions or to address perceived inequitable outcomes.” In addition to this being highly speculative, it is also inconsistent with what we know from research and national statistics. Large and persistent disparities in employment and pay of Black workers relative to white workers are among the most durable features of the U.S. labor market. Compelling empirical evidence points to discrimination as a significant factor in the persistence of those disparities.
EPI’s detailed expert analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data shows that the significant racial disparities in unemployment that are observed at each level of education, across age cohorts, and among both men and women strongly suggest that education or skills differentials alone can’t account for the near constant 2-to-1 Black-white unemployment gap2.
These findings are consistent with field experiments revealing that Black job applicants with equivalent, and sometimes superior, credentials to white applicants are less likely to receive job callbacks3. One of the starkest audit study findings in this regard concludes that employers treated white applicants with criminal records more favorably than Black applicants without criminal records4. Researchers also found that when résumés of Black and Asian job applicants were stripped of clues of their racial identity, they received callbacks at a much higher rate than those that clearly indicated an applicant’s racial identity5.
While audit and correspondence studies have been criticized for not adequately capturing unobserved characteristics that might influence hiring decisions, newer studies have shown how robust these findings can be to such considerations6. In fact, subsequent field experiments reveal a pattern of hiring discrimination experienced by Black and Hispanic job seekers that remained remarkably constant over time, with white applicants receiving 36% more callbacks than Black applicants and 24% more callbacks than Hispanic applicants7.
EPI’s analysis has also shown that since 1979, less than half of the observed black-white difference in average hourly wages can be explained by differences in education, experience, or region—the main factors presumed to determine pay – and discrimination has consistently played a major role8. However, changes in this racial wage gap track closely with changes in policy, including civil rights enforcement, and with structural factors that affect wage inequality. According to trend analysis research, the narrowing of the gap from the late 1960s through the 1970s can be attributed to the passage of important civil rights legislation9, combined with the 1960s economic boom, active enforcement of anti-discrimination10 and affirmative action policy11, and the narrowing of the educational attainment gap between Black and white workers12. On the other hand, retrenchment on anti-discrimination policy was found to be a significant factor in the widening of the gap during the 1980s13. Since 2000, research has shown a troubling trend of larger discriminatory differentials among the more highly educated14.
Contrary to the Commission’s proposed justification for ending EEO reporting requirements, the research literature cited above offers no evidence of systemic discrimination “against employees who are not considered minorities”. The research, however, underscores the need for ongoing monitoring of employment and pay discrimination through the collection of EEO data.
Elimination of EEO data would worsen power and information asymmetries that undermine worker protections
In an essay published under EPI’s Unequal Power project, former EEOC Chair Jenny Yang explains that “in a system that places the primary responsibility for enforcing anti-discrimination laws on individual workers, who must file complaints with their employer or a government agency, the government plays a fundamental role in rebalancing the power disparities between workers and employers.”15 She further concludes that “policies that encourage employer transparency and require data collection to support prevention and accountability are essential to addressing the inherent information asymmetry workers face.”16
EEO data helps to provide the necessary transparency and accountability across major segments of the U.S. labor market, including private employers with 100 or more employees and federal contractors with 50 or more employees (EEO-1), apprenticeship programs (EEO-2), labor unions (EEO-3), state and local governments (EEO-4), elementary and secondary schools (EEO-5) and institutions of higher education (EEO-6)17.
While the Commission now argues that reporting requirements are too broad because they include non-discriminating employers along with those accused of discrimination, that feature is actually a strength of EEO data. As the nation’s only federally collected source of firm-level information on employment by race, ethnicity, sex, and job category, the EEO-1 provides EEOC investigators with the information they need to assess each individual claim within the context of a larger group of employers.
In addition to being used in this important first step of the charge intake process, these data can also identify potential patterns of systemic discrimination within an industry, occupation, or worksite location. This information helps to direct EEOC systemic enforcement and commissioner’s charges, enabling the EEOC to investigate and address discriminatory practices in cases where workers either lack information or fear retaliation for filing an individual charge of discrimination. Many state and local government Fair Employment Practices Agencies (FEPAs) also have data sharing agreements with EEOC, allowing them to utilize EEO data for local enforcement activities. Similar data collections are too costly for most FEPAs to undertake on their own. As such, EEO data address information and power asymmetries that make it difficult and costly for workers to identify and prove discrimination.
Elimination of EEO data would limit EEOC’s ability to support economic growth through reduced discrimination
Finally, the Commission claims that elimination of the EEO surveys is consistent with the policy underlying E.O. 14192, “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” requiring agencies to be “prudent and financially responsible in the expenditure of funds . . . to alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens placed on the American people.” However, the Commission is overlooking the cost discrimination imposes on the economy and the long-term consequences ending EEO data collection would have on the EEOC’s ability to reduce discrimination through the enforcement mechanisms described above.
Research shows that since the 1960s, the decline in workplace discrimination has contributed to a stronger economy and more inclusive labor force. A widely cited 2019 report concludes that reduced discrimination alone accounted for almost 8% of GDP per capita growth between 1960 and 201018. Extrapolating this estimate through 2024 and applying it to published national estimates of real GDP per capita, we estimate that reduced discrimination boosted average living standards by $4,932 per person since 196019. While it is difficult to precisely measure the EEOC’s impact apart from other forces, assuming the Commission’s role in reducing discrimination accounts for 10–25% of that growth, we estimate that EEOC enforcement, aided by EEO data, helped to boost average living standards by $493 to $1,233 per person since 1960. This estimated increase in average living standards applies to all people, not just those with proven claims of discrimination. Elimination of EEO data would compromise many of the EEOC’s tools for enforcing laws against employment discrimination, and as a result, undermine economic growth.
Conclusion
For years, the EEOC has been vastly under-resourced relative to the magnitude of its enforcement responsibilities, and EEO data is essential to directing those limited resources. Changes to the categories and definitions used in EEO forms over time represent the ways in which Commissioners have grappled with how to accurately capture individual markers of identity useful in detecting unfair influence over employment opportunities for members of legally protected classes.
Under prior administrations, EEOC has convened expert panels to evaluate EEO data collections. These panels were comprised of statisticians, economists, sociologists, legal scholars, and other practitioners with decades of expertise in statistical analysis, labor and civil rights law and the study of labor market discrimination. I have had the privilege of serving on two of these panels. In both instances, panel members expressed differing opinions with respect to data quality, what conclusions could be reliably drawn from the data, and how to best improve the data collection process. Undoubtedly, there were also likely differences in panel members’ political views, but I don’t ever recall any assertion that the problem discrimination had been sufficiently reduced to justify removal of EEO reporting requirements.
In conclusion, EPI strongly urges the Commission to withdraw its proposal to eliminate all six of the EEO surveys. Failure to do so would renege on the promise of our nation’s anti-discrimination laws for workers, their families and the economy.
Sincerely,
Valerie Wilson, PhD
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity and the Economy
Economic Policy Institute
1. The EEO-2 remains authorized under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 but has not been collected since 1981. In this case, our recommendation to continue the surveys is a recommendation to reinstate it.
The EEO-6 remains authorized under Title VII but has not been collected since 1993. In this case, our recommendation to continue the surveys is a recommendation to retain this authorization and reinstate the survey to the extent that it is not superseded by the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Staff Survey of the U.S. Department of Education.
2. Valerie Wilson and William Darity Jr., Understanding black-white disparities in labor market outcomes requires models that account for persistent discrimination and unequal bargaining power, Economic Policy Institute, March 2022.
3. Examples include: Michael Fix, George C. Galster, and Raymond J. Struyk, “An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination.” in Michael Fix and Raymond Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America, Urban Institute Press, 1993; Marc Bendick, Jr., Charles W. Jackson, and Victor Reinoso, “Measuring Employment Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments” in James B. Stewart, ed., African-Americans and Post-Industrial Labor Markets, Transaction Publishers, 1994; Michael Fix, George C. Galster, and Raymond J. Struyk, “An Overview of Auditing for Discrimination” in Michael Fix and Raymond Struyk, eds., Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America. Urban Institute Press, 1993; and Margery Turner, Michael Fix, and Raymond Struyk, Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished: Racial Discrimination in Hiring, Urban Institute Press, 1991.
4. Devah Pager, “The Mark of a Criminal Record,” American Journal of Sociology 108 (March 2003): 937–75.
5. Sonia Kang, Katy DeCellesa, András Tilcsika, and Sora Jun, “Whitened Résumés: Race and Self-Presentation in the Labor Market,” Administrative Science Quarterly 61, no. 3 (March 17, 2016): 469-502.
6. David Neumark, “Detecting Discrimination in Audit and Correspondence Studies,” Journal of Human Resources 47 (Fall 2012): 1128–57.
7. Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel, and Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, “Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring Over Time,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 41 (October 10, 2017): 10870-875.
8. Valerie Wilson and William Darity Jr., Understanding black-white disparities in labor market outcomes requires models that account for persistent discrimination and unequal bargaining power, Economic Policy Institute, March 2022.
9. Examples include: John Bound and Richard Freeman, “Black Economic Progress: Erosion of the Post-1965 Gains in the 1980s?” in Steven Shulman and William Darity, Jr., eds., Question of Discrimination: Racial Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market, Wesleyan University Press, 1989; David Card and Alan Krueger, “School Quality and Black-White Relative Earnings: A Direct Assessment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (February 1992): 151–200; and John Donohue and James Heckman, “Continuous vs. Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,” Journal of Economic Literature 29 (December 1991): 1603–43.
10. Examples include: Augustin K. Fosu, “Occupational Mobility of Black Women, 1958–1981: The Impact of Post-1964 Antidiscrimination Measures,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 45, no. 2 (1992): 281–94; and James J. Heckman and Brook Payner, “Determining the Impact of Federal Antidiscrimination Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks: A Study of South Carolina,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 2854, 1989.
11. Examples include: Charles Betsey, “Litigation of Employment Discrimination Under Title VII: The Case of African American Women,” American Economic Review 84, no. 2 (1994): 98–102; and Jonathan S. Leonard, “The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 4 (1990): 47–63.
12. Examples include: Leonard Carlson and Caroline Swartz, “The Earnings of Women and Ethnic Minorities, 1959–1979,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 41, no. 4 (1988): 530–46; James S. Cunningham and Nadja Zalokar, “The Economic Progress of Black Women, 1940–1980: Occupational Distribution and Relative Wages,” Industrial & Labor Relations Review 45, no. 3 (1992): 540–55; and Nadja Zalokar, The Economic Status of Black Women: An Exploratory Investigation. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 1990.
13. Jonathan S. Leonard, “The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black Employment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 4 (1990): 47–63.
14. Examples include: Donald Tomaskovic-Devy, Melvin Thomas, and Kecia Johnson, “Race and the Accumulation of Human Capital Across the Career: A Theoretical Model and Fixed-Effects Application,” American Journal of Sociology 111, no. 1 (2005): 58–89; and Valerie Wilson and William M. Rodgers III, Black-White Wage Gaps Expand with Rising Wage Inequality, Economic Policy Institute, September 2016.
15. Jenny R. Yang and Jane Liu, Strengthening Accountability for Discrimination: Confronting Fundamental Power Imbalances in the Employment Relationship, Economic Policy Institute, January 2021.
16. Ibid.
17. See endnote 1.
18. Chang-Tai Hsieh, Erik Hurst, Charles I. Jones and Peter J. Klenow. “The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth”, Econometrica, Vol. 87, No. 5 (September 2019), 1439-1474.
19. Adewale A. Maye and Valerie Wilson, Trump is Making it Easier for Employers to Discriminate. This Stifles Equity and Hurts Economic Growth. Economic Policy Institute, May 2025.