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	<title>Search results for “older americans and the great recession” | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Search results for “older americans and the great recession” | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>Today’s working class is more diverse than ever:  A new picture emerges as demographic change and economic inequality challenge old perceptions</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/todays-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-a-new-picture-emerges-as-demographic-change-and-economic-inequality-challenge-old-perceptions/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 13:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle K. Moore, Stevie Marvin, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328439</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Learn about who is included in the working class, how economic conditions have changed for them, where they work and live, and much more.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 24px;"><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #0e5b8b;">Key takeaways</span></strong></span></p>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">An expanded view of the working class&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>The </b><b>working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight, but there is no universal definition of what it is.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>A commonly used definition of working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. </b><span style="font-size: 14px;">That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;"><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">Given these factors, a</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> broader </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">definition</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">of</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> the working class can be </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW110786087 BCX0">considered</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">people in the labor force who</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">se family income </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">is in</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">the bottom 75%</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">, regardless of education</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">al</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> level or job type.</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> This works out to a family income </span></span><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">below $150,000</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> per year.</span></span><span class="EOP Selected SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}'>&nbsp;</span></span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Under this broader definition, 31.5% of those in the working class have a bachelor&#8217;s degree or higher; a majority of working-class college graduates hold professional or managerial jobs.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Traditionally women-dominated jobs related to teaching, child care, or nursing make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">A racially diverse group&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>In 1979, the working class (defined by less than a bachelor&#8217;s degree) was 81.5% white.</b></li>
<li><b>Shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. Now, the working class is:&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>52% white&nbsp;</li>
<li>26.8% Hispanic&nbsp;</li>
<li>15.1% Black</li>
<li>4.7% Asian American</li>
<li>1.4% Native American</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>One-fifth of the working class was born outside the United States, and 11.6% are non-U.S. citizens.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><b>The working class is similarly diverse when defined by family income level.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">Differences by state (using family income to define working class)&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>There is considerable variation in the working-class composition of states, based on differences in costs of living and labor force participation.&nbsp;</b></li>
<li><b>The five states (including Washington, D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;
<ul>
<li>Massachusetts (42.9%)</li>
<li>Washington, D.C. (42.9%)</li>
<li>New Jersey (44.9%)</li>
<li>Maryland (47.8%)</li>
<li>Washington state (47.9%)&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>The five states with the highest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>
<ul>
<li>South Dakota (66.7%)</li>
<li>Iowa (64.9%)</li>
<li>Wyoming (64.7%)</li>
<li>Kansas (63.9%)</li>
<li>Nebraska (62.7%)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>What is the working class?</h2>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he working class remains an often-used rhetorical concept that carries tremendous political weight. Despite having no official definition, “working class voters” are a heavily courted constituency during election years. In the most general sense, the “working class” as a political economic category describes people who rely almost exclusively on wage labor through steady employment to support themselves and their families.</p>
<p>Historically, the term working class has been closely associated with nonmanagerial blue-collar workers and unions, often represented in the popular imagination by white tradesmen in hard hats. This popular image, however, has never represented a complete picture. Due to occupational segregation, Black workers have always made up a significant portion of nonmanagerial laborers commonly identified as working class. Additionally, since the 1970s, increases in women’s labor force participation and immigration have resulted in growing shares of women, Hispanic, and Asian workers in the U.S. labor force. Along with these demographic shifts, there have been changes in the composition of “working class” jobs over time. For example, as traditional blue-collar production and manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell sharply between 1998 and 2019, job opportunities for noncollege graduates were largely replaced by growth in service-sector employment (Scott et al. 2022).</p>
<h3>Who is working class?</h3>
<p>Contemporary views about who is included in the working class range from narrow to extremely broad: those earning very low wages, those without a bachelor’s degree, and anyone who works for a wage or salary, irrespective of their wage or education level. The latter definition, currently being pushed by the growing Democratic Socialist movement, has generated some debate around whether highly educated, relatively high-income wage and salary workers belong in a category with traditional blue-collar, noncollege-educated workers who often live vastly different material lives (Rotondaro 2026).</p>
<h3>What are some factors that complicate the traditional distinction between college-educated and other workers?</h3>
<p>For many, however, the line between the economic status of college- and noncollege-educated workers is not that clear and has been blurred by rising inequality and labor market discrimination. Over the last 10 years, the college wage premium has declined. In other words, the wage boost from a bachelor’s degree is lower than it used to be, and workers in many jobs that were once considered white collar now experience relatively modest pay and limited control over the pace and content of work (Fast and Gould 2026).</p>
<p>Research also shows that Black college graduates are more likely than white college graduates to work in jobs that don’t require a college degree, and even after controlling for college major, graduates of color, foreign-born graduates, and women of all races are much more likely to work alongside nongraduates (Williams and Wilson 2019; Attewell and Witteveen 2023). In addition to these forms of underemployment, racial and gender pay disparities among college graduates result in lower pay for women and Black and Hispanic men relative to white men (Quadlin, VanHuevelen, and Ahearn 2023; Wilson 2016a; Mora and Dávila 2018). Facing limited returns on their college education, debt-burdened bachelor’s degree holders may even find themselves in a more precarious position than nongraduate co-workers who are free of student debt.</p>
<h3>Which topics will this report cover?</h3>
<p>Taking these factors into consideration, this report updates prior EPI research on the changing demographics of the working class and presents a more expansive definition of this group that includes labor force participants in the bottom 75% of the family income distribution (Wilson 2016b). This report presents the working class as more racially diverse than ever before but also includes workers with and without college degrees employed in a range of blue-, pink<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>- and white-collar jobs that afford different standards of living across the United States. This analysis supports the idea that policies that strengthen labor standards and protect civil and workers’ rights will improve the lives of working people across traditional class lines defined by education or occupation.</p>
<h2>How are we defining the working class in this report?</h2>
<p>This report considers two definitions of the working class. Consistent with previous EPI research, the first definition is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Education captures much of what people typically associate with class, and in the labor market, a bachelor’s degree is commonly interpreted by employers as a signal of skill acquisition required for many white-collar occupations. Since educational categories have been more consistently coded in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) than other commonly used indicators of working-class status, like occupation or income, we use this definition in Part I of the report when comparing working-class demographic and economic outcomes over time.</p>
<p>The second definition, used in Part II of our analysis, is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with family income at or below the 75th percentile. In our sample, this corresponds to individuals with less than $150,000 in family income.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> The income-based definition captures people in similar economic circumstances, regardless of education or occupation. Implicit in this income-based definition of working class is the assumption that a job loss could result in significant economic hardship for most families below this threshold. We apply this more expansive definition to our more detailed analysis of the working class for disaggregated groups of workers by race, ethnicity, gender, nativity, geography, education, and occupation using pooled 2024–2025 CPS data (Part II).</p>
<p>Though slightly different, there is considerable overlap between these definitions: 82.9% of those who qualify as working class under the education-based definition are also defined as working class using the income-based definition.</p>
<h2>Part I: Changes in working-class demographic characteristics and economic conditions since 1979</h2>
<h3>Shifting demographic characteristics of the working class</h3>
<p>The demographic composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last five decades, as shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation among different groups have contributed to a more diverse workforce. For comparability over time, this part of our analysis relies on the education-based definition of working class: 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Since labor force participation fluctuates across different points in the business cycle, and to varying degrees for different groups of workers, we focus on demographic comparisons across peak years in the business cycle when employment and labor force participation are highest. Those years are 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, and 2019. The current time period covers 2024 and 2025, which combines the year with the highest rate of prime age employment since the 2019 business cycle peak (2024) and the most recent full year of data (2025) (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A </strong>clearly shows that the working class has grown more racially and ethnically diverse over the last 46 years. In 1979, the working class was over 80% white, but after 2000, the combined shares of Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN or Native American) workers increased rapidly. While white workers remain the largest single racial group, workers of color collectively accounted for nearly half of the working class in 2024–2025. Currently, the working class is 52% white, 26.8% Hispanic, 15.1% Black, 4.7% AAPI, and 1.4% Native American.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-325442 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325442" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325442-35936-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The changing race and gender composition of the working class are displayed separately for women and men in <strong>Figure B </strong>so that changes for each group are easier to see over time, but the combined percentages of men and women in each year sum to 100%. Overall, men have maintained a small majority over women in the working class (between 53% and 57%) since 1979. While there hasn’t been a huge shift in the overall gender demographics of the working class, an increase in the share of women between 1979 and 1989 reflects rising women’s labor force participation at a time when men were leaving the labor force (EPI 2026d). Women decline as a share of the working class after 2000 as the share of women with a bachelor’s degree or higher rose faster and surpassed the share of men with college degrees (Census 2022).</p>
<p>The intersection of race and gender in Figure B brings these joint demographic shifts in the working class into even sharper focus. For example, in 1979, white men alone accounted for nearly half (46.3%) of the working class. By 2024–2025, white men were less than a third (29.6%) of the working class. Over the same time, the share of working-class women of color more than doubled from 8.4% in 1979 to 21.2% in 2024–2025, with the largest increase occurring among Hispanic women (from 2.2% in 1979 to 11.1% in 2024–2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326126 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="326126" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326126-36098-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>An increase in immigration also contributed to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the working class since 1979 (Kramer and Passel 2025). While the immigrant population has grown increasingly diverse over the last 46 years, between 2010 and 2024, the 10 largest U.S. immigrant groups have come from Latin American or Asian countries. This has contributed to the growth in working-class Hispanic and Asian workers shown in Figures A and B (MPI 2025). <strong>Figure C</strong> further shows that the share of the working class that is foreign-born has grown from 13.8% in 2000 (the earliest year these data are available in the CPS) to 19.8% in 2024–2025 (a 43.5% increase). Currently, 11.6% of the working class are non-U.S. citizens.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325475 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325475" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325475-35938-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3>Changing economic conditions for the working class</h3>
<p>One of the most prominent narratives regarding the working class has been how people without a bachelor’s degree have been stripped of opportunities to earn a decent living and left behind in the modern economy. All too often, this narrative centers the white working class, and white men in particular, to the exclusion of all others. This section presents a more inclusive picture of changing economic conditions among the working class that depicts both shared class struggles and racial inequities within this group.</p>
<p><strong>Figure D</strong> shows that employment among prime-age (25–54-year-olds) adults without a bachelor’s degree peaked in 2000 but has since fallen for most groups. However, even at the high point in 2000, there were considerable gaps between racial and ethnic groups. As many as 80.9% of prime-age white adults with less than a bachelor’s degree were employed in 2000, compared with just 68.7% of similarly educated Native Americans in that age cohort. While employment among prime-age working-class white workers has fallen 4.0 percentage points since 2000, they have maintained the highest rates of employment among the working class, even as the gaps between white, Hispanic, and AAPI workers narrowed significantly after 2007. Over the decades, employment rates among prime-age working-class Black and Native American workers have been significantly lower than their white counterparts.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-326700 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326700" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326700-36012-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In addition to a shared peak in employment from the strong economy of the late-1990s–2000, the working class has also shared the experience of inconsistent, often tepid, wage growth since 1979 because of policy choices that suppressed wages for the vast majority of workers (Gould and Wething 2026). <strong>Figure E </strong>shows annualized rates of inflation-adjusted median hourly wage growth for each group between business cycle peaks. This chart notably shows that all racial and ethnic groups suffered real wage losses (adjusted for inflation) during the 1980s, as globalization and concerted efforts to weaken unions stripped many in the working class of good-paying union jobs and bargaining power.</p>
<p>After decades of slower wage growth, median hourly wages grew fastest for all groups between 2019 and 2025, with workers of color experiencing faster wage growth than white workers—from 1.2% a year for Black workers to 1.7% a year for Native Americans. This is consistent with research that shows between 2019 and 2023, the lowest-wage workers—a group that includes many working-class people of color—had the strongest wage growth (Gould and deCourcy 2024).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-326685 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326685" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326685-36010-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->




<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326689 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326689" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326689-36011-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Unfortunately, for most groups, the much-needed wage boost in recent years was not large enough to recover the prior four decades of lost ground, relative to state median wages. The wage boost failed to significantly reduce the share of working-class people whose hourly wage fell below their state median, as racial pay disparities within the working class persist. <strong>Figure F </strong>shows that between 1979 and 2019, the share of working-class Black and white workers whose wages were below the median hourly wage in their state increased by 11.1 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively. While wages among the Hispanic working class grew faster than other groups between 2000–2007 and 2007–2019, Figure F also shows they remained most likely to have wages below their state’s median in 2024–2025 (75.1%), followed closely by Black workers (74.9%). Even after receiving a stronger pandemic recovery wage boost, the median hourly wages of Black ($19.59) and Hispanic workers ($19.99) with less than a bachelor’s degree were significantly lower than those of similarly educated white workers ($22.65), as <strong>Table 1</strong> shows.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327450 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327450" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327450-36055-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Over the same time period that the hourly pay of more working-class wage earners dropped below the state median wage, a declining share of those workers were union members or covered by a union contract (see <strong>Figure G</strong>). The decline is especially stark among Black workers for whom union coverage in 2024–2025 (12.2%) was less than a third of what it was in 1979 (36.9%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326704 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326704" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326704-36013-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Part II: Current demographic and economic characteristics of the working class</h2>
<p>The remainder of this report is based on the more expansive definition of working class that includes all 18–64-year-old labor force participants in the bottom 75% of family income, regardless of educational level or occupation. This portion of the analysis takes a more detailed look at the current demographic and labor market characteristics of the working class in 2024–2025.</p>
<p><strong>Figure H</strong> shows the share of each group, by race, ethnicity, or nativity, that meets this more expansive definition of working class. As shown in Figure H, over 60% of Black and Hispanic adults between the ages of 18 and 64 meet this definition of working class, compared with more than half of Native American and white adults and 43.4% of AAPI adults.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Similarly, a larger share of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens is working class—62.1% compared with about 54% of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-325518 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325518" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325518-35943-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure I</strong> presents the educational distribution of the working class. Even under this broader definition that is unrestricted by educational level, the majority of those in the working class (68.5%) have less than a bachelor’s degree, with the largest group being those with only a high school diploma (32%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-325492 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325492" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325492-36095-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Defined in part by labor force participation, a large majority (69.2%) of those in the working class are between 25- and 54-years-old, or prime age. With large shares of younger people attending college and not working, the working class also includes more people ages 55–64 (17.1%) than under age 25 (13.7%) (see <strong>Figure J</strong>) (Gould et al. 2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-J"></a><div class="figure chart-325488 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325488" data-anchor="Figure-J"><div class="figLabel">Figure J</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325488-35939-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure J" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In addition to labor force participation, family income at or below the 75th percentile (less than $150,000 per year) is used to identify members of the working class under this more expansive definition. However, the relative precarity of families at the same income level can vary, based on family size and the number of household earners.</p>
<p><strong>Figure K</strong> summarizes basic family structures within the working class, based on marital status and the presence of minor children (under age 18). It shows that almost half of those in the working class are unmarried and childless (46.0%), while 30.8% have at least one child under age 18. The majority of working-class parents are married.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-K"></a><div class="figure chart-325495 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325495" data-anchor="Figure-K"><div class="figLabel">Figure K</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325495-35941-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure K" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class family income</h3>
<p>Although we are using a single-income threshold to define working class, <strong>Figure L</strong> reveals racial differences in family income among the working class that replicate differences in the overall population. For example, white and AAPI families are more likely to be at the upper end of the income distribution. One-third of each group has a family income of $100,000–$149,999 per year, compared with one-fourth of working-class AIAN families and one-fifth of working-class Black and Hispanic families. At the same time, all working-class families of color are more likely to be in the lower end of the income distribution than white families. More than a third of Hispanic (38.4%), Black (38.0%), and AIAN (35.8%) families have an income of less than $50,000 per year, compared with 25.2% of working-class AAPI families and 22.1% of white families. Most working-class Black and Hispanic families have income between $50,000 and $75,000 per year.</p>


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<a name="Figure-L"></a><div class="figure chart-325612 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325612" data-anchor="Figure-L"><div class="figLabel">Figure L</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325612-35953-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure L" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The number of workers contributing to family income also varies by race and ethnicity. The number of family earners is both a function of family structure and employment status. Consistent with the fact that over half of our working-class sample is not married (55%, as shown in Figure K), <strong>Figure M</strong> shows that most families include a single earner. However, lower rates of employment among Black and Native American families further contribute to their being most likely to be single-earner families (70.8% and 69.3%, respectively). White families (27.8%) are most likely to have two earners, while Hispanic (9.9%) and Asian (7.5%) families are more likely than other groups to include more than two earners.</p>


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<a name="Figure-M"></a><div class="figure chart-327433 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327433" data-anchor="Figure-M"><div class="figLabel">Figure M</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327433-36053-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure M" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class jobs</h3>
<p>Another consideration in defining what it means to be working class is the type of jobs people have. Separating professional or managerial roles from more traditionally working-class jobs closely aligned with the typical “blue-collar” definition sorts most of the occupations associated with a low degree of control and autonomy at work from those in which workers have more control over the pace and content of their work. As professionals, however, teachers and nurses would not be considered working class under a traditional blue-collar occupation definition of working class, despite teachers’ low pay relative to their years of education and nurses’ lack of control over the pace and content of their work (Allegretto 2026; Stimpfel et al. 2025).</p>
<p><strong>Figure</strong> <strong>N</strong> shows that overall, those employed in nonprofessional and nonmanagement occupations are much more likely to be working class. Between 70% and 87% of people employed in jobs other than professional or management occupations have a family income at or below the 75th percentile, compared with less than 60% of professionals and managers. This further supports the idea that even under our broader definition, working class is more often a label that applies to those in traditional blue-collar jobs.</p>


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<a name="Figure-N"></a><div class="figure chart-325530 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325530" data-anchor="Figure-N"><div class="figLabel">Figure N</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325530-35945-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure N" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Occupation also captures much of the variation associated with education, given that education is used as a credential for access to different kinds of employment. <strong>Figure O</strong> shows the distribution of major occupation groups within the working class by level of education. Again, even under this broader definition of working class, education is still a major determinant of the types of jobs available to those in the working class. More than two-thirds of the jobs held by members of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in two major categories—professional and related occupations (43.9%), and management, business, and financial occupations (23.3%)—but the income threshold largely excludes the more highly paid college graduates in these occupations.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> While the most common jobs among those with less than a bachelor’s degree are service occupations (24.4%), at that level of education, workers are more evenly split between office and administrative occupations (11.8%), transportation and material moving occupations (11.7%), professional and related occupations (10.2%), and management, business, and financial occupations (10.0%).</p>


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<a name="Figure-O"></a><div class="figure chart-325503 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325503" data-anchor="Figure-O"><div class="figLabel">Figure O</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325503-35942-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure O" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>One limitation of using a strictly occupational definition is that the professional and management categories also include jobs that have many of the qualities traditionally associated with membership in the working class: modest pay and limited workplace autonomy, among other things. There are over 220 detailed occupations within the major occupation categories for managers and professionals, but just 22 of those occupations, depicted in <strong>Figure P</strong>, account for half of all working-class managers or professionals. Among those 22 occupations, nine are traditionally women-dominated, or pink-collar, jobs related to teaching and child care (depicted in orange) or nursing (depicted in green) that account for 22.4% of working-class managers and professionals. Seven of the 22 occupations are management positions (depicted in blue) that account for 17.8% of working-class managers and professionals. Besides the generic “all other managers” category, the most common working-class management positions are food service, general and operations, construction, and financial managers. The remainder of the occupations represented in Figure P includes other types of professional occupations (depicted in purple) such as accountants and auditors, social and human resource workers, and technology-related occupations.<br />


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<a name="Figure-P"></a><div class="figure chart-326197 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326197" data-anchor="Figure-P"><div class="figLabel">Figure P</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326197-35987-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure P" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<br />
</p>
<p>The types of jobs held by members of the working class can also vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, following broader patterns of occupational segregation. <strong>Figure Q</strong> shows how the six most common occupations for working-class men and women are distributed by race, ethnicity, and gender. The distribution across all 10 major occupational categories can be found in <strong>Appendix Table 1. </strong>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Figure Q shows that working-class women’s employment is more concentrated than working-class men’s, with more than 80% of women of any race or ethnicity employed in just five job categories. More than half of all working-class women are employed in just two types of jobs: service, and professional and related occupations. As shown in Figure P, this is consistent with the fact that a large number of working-class professional jobs include female-dominated occupations like teachers, child care workers, and nurses. Service occupations are most common among Black (28.3%), Hispanic (32.7%), and Native American (27.6%) women, while professional occupations are most common among white and AAPI women. Across all racial and ethnic groups, similar shares of working-class women are employed in office and administrative occupations.</p>


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<a name="Figure-Q"></a><div class="figure chart-325567 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325567" data-anchor="Figure-Q"><div class="figLabel">Figure Q</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325567-35948-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure Q" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>By comparison, except for AAPI men, fewer than 80% of working-class men are employed across six job categories. Among men, however, there is more variation in the types of jobs by race or ethnicity. For example, the most common jobs held by Black working-class men are transportation (20.8%) and service (20.7%) occupations, while Hispanic working-class men are most concentrated in construction (21.7%) and service (18.8%) occupations. The most common occupations for working-class AAPI and white men are professional and related, and management, but like AAPI women, AAPI men are largely concentrated in professional and related occupations (31.5%).</p>
<h3>Job characteristics for working-class women and men by race and ethnicity</h3>
<p><strong>Table 2 </strong>further details how the employment characteristics of working-class men and women vary by race and ethnicity, underscoring differences in the work intensity required to sustain working-class family incomes. Among working-class women, Black women are most likely to work full time (83.4%) and to be represented by a union (11.6%). Although working-class Black women are more likely to have full-time jobs than their counterparts, they are still more likely to hold multiple jobs than most other groups of women. Native American women are most likely to hold multiple jobs (8.4%) and to be self-employed (5.7%) but are less likely than Black women to be employed in full-time jobs.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-325608 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325608" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325608-35952-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Working-class men are more likely than women to work full time and therefore, less likely to hold multiple jobs. Working-class men are also more likely to be self-employed than working-class women. Among working-class men, AAPI, Black, and Native American men are least likely to be employed full time; however, Black men hold an advantage over other groups of men in union representation (13.0%) and multiple job holdings (5.9%). Hispanic working-class men are most likely to be self-employed (8.1%).</p>
<p>The lower half of Table 2 provides estimated median hourly wages by race, ethnicity, and gender in 2024–2025 as well as the share of workers in each group whose wage falls below the median hourly wage in their state. These estimates differ from those presented in Part I because they are disaggregated by gender and are based on the more expansive income-based definition of working class, which includes some college graduates. Table 2 further shows significant race and gender pay gaps within the working class. For example, larger shares of women than men in each race or ethnic group earn wages lower than their state’s median, including as many as two-thirds of Hispanic (68.3%) and Native American (67.8%) women.</p>
<h3>Working class across the country</h3>
<p>Differences in local labor market conditions, costs of living, and structural inequities across and within state boundaries introduce many more factors to consider in understanding what it means to be working class in different parts of the country. While we don’t attempt to reconcile all those things in this report, we do explore what share of people in each state fits our family income-based definition of working class and how that applies to people with different types of occupations and educational backgrounds.&nbsp;</p>
<p>On average, a larger share of those in nonmetropolitan areas, or in the Midwestern or Southern regions of the country fall within this definition of working class (see <strong>Table 3</strong>), largely because incomes and the cost of living are lower. For example, according to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, a family of two adults and two children in Boston, Massachusetts (the state with the lowest working-class share), would require over $66,000 more for a modest but adequate lifestyle than they would in the Midwestern city of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, (the state with the highest working-class share) (EPI 2026c). In fact, 26 metropolitan areas require a family income greater than $150,000 for a two adult and two child household to achieve a moderate lifestyle, of which all but one are located in the Northeast and the West.</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-325559 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325559" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325559-35946-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The map in <strong>Figure R</strong> shows what share of each state’s 18–64-year-old population is working class, including by occupation and education. Since we are using a nationwide family income threshold to identify individuals in the working class, the map also reports the state median hourly wage, as well as working-class median hourly wages by broad occupation and educational category to help contextualize how the working-class family income limit translates to individual workers’ wages in each state.</p>
<p>The map shows that there is considerable variation in working-class shares across states and within regions. While the Midwest and South in aggregate have the highest working-class population shares, in the West, there is notable variance in state working-class population shares. For example, in Idaho and Wyoming, more than 62% of the population is working class compared with states like California and Washington where less than half of the population fit our working-class definition.</p>


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<a name="Figure-R"></a><div class="figure chart-326089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326089" data-anchor="Figure-R"><div class="figLabel">Figure R</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326089-35979-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure R" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In each of the five states with the highest working-class population shares—South Dakota (66.7%), Iowa (64.9%), Wyoming (64.7%), Kansas (63.9%), and Nebraska (62.7%)—the state median hourly wage is below $25.00. In the five states (including D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares—Massachusetts (42.9%); Washington, D.C. (42.9%); New Jersey (44.9%); Maryland (47.8%); and Washington state (47.9%)–the state median hourly wage is over $29.00. Across all 50 states and D.C., the median hourly wage for members of the working class with less than bachelor’s degree ranges from $18.61 in Louisiana to $23.78 in Alaska and New Hampshire.</p>
<p>Figure R also illuminates how filtering the working class by occupation or education can surface different realities faced by workers across the country. Several states register lower-than-expected overall working-class population shares, given their reputation for being low-wage, low-income states. Even after filtering the map by people without a bachelor’s degree, in four states—Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, in descending order—fewer than 60% are working class. Those four states also have some of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the country, eliminating larger shares of their population from our working-class count. Since the Great Recession, the South has had the lowest labor force participation rate compared with other regions of the country, and people with less than a bachelor’s degree have much lower labor force participation rates than those with a bachelor’s or advanced degree (Childers 2024a; EPI 2026d).</p>
<p>On the other hand, when we use nonprofessional and nonmanagerial (all other) occupations as the filter, it narrows the sample to a group of people who are in the labor force, and working-class shares rise to over 80% in those four states. Mississippi, the state with the lowest median hourly wage and a working-class population share of just 59.8%, has the nation’s highest share of working class among nonprofessional and nonmanagerial workers (89.7%).</p>
<p>This look into state working-class population shares sheds light on some of the conditions that produce unique labor dynamics across regions and states. The long-standing anti-worker policies of the Southern economic development model not only shape the configuration of the working class in the South, including characteristically low wages, but low labor force participation also creates a sub-working class (Childers 2023; Childers 2024b). It also demonstrates the need for strong and comprehensive labor standards and workers’ rights protections nationwide to reduce such large interstate disparities.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>While there is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of working class, this report proposes that based on similarities in family income and labor force participation, membership may reasonably extend to more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than previously considered. The decline in the college-wage premium, the teacher pay gap, and growing racial and gender pay gaps among college graduates have each contributed to this trend over the last 10–20 years. At the same time, more than 40 years of policy decisions that suppressed wages and led to a sharp decline in union density have undercut traditional opportunities for noncollege graduates to make a decent living, as increasing shares of those in the working class have an hourly wage that falls below their state’s median. In comparing what it means to be working class across different states, we find that the Southern economic development model not only contributes to lower working-class wages in some Southern states but also creates a sub-working class through low labor force participation (Childers 2023).</p>
<p>Finally, this analysis also shows that the working class has long outgrown the old image narrowly represented by white tradesmen in hard hats. Rather, shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. In the face of the growing diversity and interconnectedness of the working class, the racist and anti-immigrant policies being pushed by the current administration stand to alienate a larger share of this group. Elected leaders seeking to win support from today’s working class should prioritize issues and policies that improve the lives of workers across race, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and occupation. Previous EPI research demonstrates that some effective strategies for accomplishing this include tripling union density, ending mass deportations, curbing employer misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage (Bivens et al. 2026; EPI 2026e; Cid-Martinez et al. 2026; Zipperer 2026).</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-325563 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325563" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325563-35947-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The term pink-collar is commonly used to refer to jobs that are predominantly done by women and pay less than more male-dominated occupations. Examples include many clerical, administrative, and service jobs as well as teaching, nursing and care work.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Family income is reported in bands in the monthly CPS, with $150,000 as the lower limit for the highest income band, and 73.9% of the 18–64-year-old population have a family income below that level.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Though not depicted in the report, the shares of each group that met our education-based definition of working class were AIAN (79.1%), Hispanic (78.8%), Black (71.6%), white (57.8%), and AAPI (39.4%). Shares based on nativity were foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen (68.5%); native-born (63.0%); and foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen (54.6%).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> We estimate that 36.4% of working-class managers and professionals in our sample are early career or under age 35.</p>
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<p>Rotondaro, Vinnie. 2026. “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/213121/democratic-socialists-america-problem-middle-class-socialism">The Problem with Middle-Class Socialism</a>.” <em>New Republic,</em> July 23, 2026.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., Valerie Wilson, Jori Kandra, and Daniel Perez. 2022. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/"><em>Botched Policy Responses to Globalization Have Decimated Manufacturing Employment with Often Overlooked Costs for Black, Brown, and Other Workers of Color: Investing in Infrastructure and Rebalancing Trade Can Create Good Jobs for All</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2022.</p>
<p>Stimpfel, Amy Witkoski, Kathryn Leep-Lazar, Maile Mercer, and Kathleen DeMarco. 2025. “‘Scheduling Is Everything’: A Qualitative Descriptive Study of Job and Schedule Satisfaction of Staff Nurses and Nurse Managers.” <em>Western Journal of Nursing Research</em> 47, no. 10: 912–923. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280">https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>United States Census Bureau (Census). 2022. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/fig_6.png">Figure 6: Percent of Population 25 Years and Over, and 25 to 29 Years Old, with Bachelor&#8217;s Degree or Higher by Sex: 1947–2021</a>,” [chart image], <em>CPS Historical Time Series Visualizations. </em>Published February 24, 2022.</p>
<p>Williams, Jhacova, and Valerie Wilson. 2019. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-racial-disparities-in-employment/"><em>Black Workers Endure Persistent Racial Disparities in Employment Outcomes</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, August 2019.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016a. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-are-paid-less-than-whites-at-every-education-level/"><em>African Americans Are Paid Less Than Whites at Every Education Level</em></a> (economic snapshot). Economic Policy Institute, October 2016.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-changing-demographics-of-americas-working-class/"><em>People of Color Will Be a Majority of the American Working Class in 2032: What This Means for the Effort to Grow Wages and Reduce Inequality</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, June 2016.</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage: Raising the Wage to Two-Thirds of the National Median Wage Would Lift Pay for Nearly 40 Million Workers</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on the Census Bureau&#8217;s proposed changes to the residence criteria and demographic items for the 2030 Census</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-the-census-bureaus-proposed-changes-to-the-residence-criteria-and-demographic-items-for-the-2030-census/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 14:08:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327926</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Daniel Deputy General Counsel for Economic, Statistical, and Regulatory Office of the General U.S. Department of Washington, DC Re: Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions (FR Doc.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/10/2026-18481/decennial-census-of-the-population-of-americans-proposed-residence-criteria-and-proposed-regulations">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/10/2026-18481/decennial-census-of-the-population-of-americans-proposed-residence-criteria-and-proposed-regulations</a></em></p>
<p>Daniel Sweeney<br />
Deputy General Counsel for Economic, Statistical, and Regulatory Affairs<br />
Office of the General Counsel<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, DC 20230</p>
<p>Re: Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions (FR Doc. 2026-18481, RIN 0607-AA75)</p>
<p>Dear Mr. Sweeney:</p>
<p>On behalf of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), I am writing to comment on the proposed rule “Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions” (FDMS Docket Number USBC-2026-0628, published September 10, 2026). We strongly oppose the proposed rule’s changes to the residence criteria and demographic items for the 2030 Census.</p>
<p>EPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. Federal and state policymakers trust and rely on research conducted by experts at EPI and other institutions to make informed, effective, evidence-based policy decisions that will address the real challenges low- and middle-income workers face in the labor market. That is only possible through accurate, comprehensive census data.</p>
<p>The initial 33-day comment period for this proposed rule, ending on October 13, 2026, was wholly inadequate. While we support the recent extension of the public comment period until November 2, 2026<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>, 53 days is still not sufficient for the public to review and provide input on this rule given the scope of the proposed changes and the devastating effect they would have on census data.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Moreover, given the Secretary of Commerce’s termination of the Census Bureau’s advisory committees<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>, ensuring ample opportunity for the public to respond to the proposed changes is essential for promoting public trust in the census. To allow the public, including researchers and policy advocates, sufficient time to evaluate and comment on these changes, the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau immediately publish a <em>Federal Register</em> notice further extending the comment period until at least December 10, 2026.</p>
<p>We are extremely concerned that the proposed residence criteria and changes to demographic questions would undermine the accuracy, integrity, and usefulness of census data. We are particularly concerned about the following issues:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Eliminating census race and ethnicity data collection is unprecedented, violates statutes, and severely undermines the utility of census data for a range of critical purposes.</strong> Since the first census in 1790, every single decennial census has collected race and ethnicity data in some form. Census race and ethnicity data underpin many other critical federal datasets and serve as an irreplaceable benchmark for nearly every population-based survey and study in the U.S., ensuring that our research is reliable and leads to better outcomes for all of us. Race and ethnicity data are necessary to enforce civil rights laws and ensure equal opportunity for all Americans, helping to ensure fairness and strengthen the U.S. economy. Race and ethnicity data also help local governments and nonprofits target services more efficiently.
<p>EPI relies on census race and ethnicity data to provide timely and reliable analysis of the economic conditions facing low- and middle-income workers – a disproportionate share of whom are people of color – and to evaluate how those conditions are shaped by economic policies. Accurate, comprehensive census data is foundational to the population weights applied to the Current Population Survey (CPS); the data set most used in our research. Those weights make it possible to convert survey responses from a sample of just over 100,000 individuals into results that more closely represent the actual composition of the entire U.S. population. Since economic outcomes can vary significantly by race and ethnicity, even among individuals who share other characteristics in common, accurate and comprehensive Census counts by race and ethnicity are essential to the precision of aggregate economic indicators and the policy decisions those indicators help to inform. For example, EPI research demonstrating the persistence of large racial disparities<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> in unemployment and how tight, high pressure labor markets<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> narrow those gaps and deliver faster wage growth to all low- and middle-income workers helped to make an important point about there being more room for flexibility in the Federal Reserve Board’s policymaking targets and goals<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a>. The Fed’s willingness to consider more data-dependent macroeconomic policymaking over fixed targets and predictions after the Great Recession resulted in one of the longest economic recoveries in U.S. history without triggering a corresponding spike in inflation. Such critical decisions about maximum employment for the whole of the U.S. economy were informed by a more complete understanding of economic outcomes for different demographic groups, as supported by a comprehensive and accurate census count.</li>
<li><strong>Excluding noncitizens without lawful permanent residence from census apportionment data is unconstitutional and would deprive our communities of their fair share of resources and representation.</strong> The Constitution, statutes, and settled law clearly provide that all persons residing in the United States must be counted for the apportionment of Congressional seats. Research has also shown that adding a question on citizenship to the decennial census form would have a chilling effect on census participation. If the census does not count <em>all</em> residents, communities all over the United States will lose resources to support their schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, emergency services, and more. In addition to EPI’s focus on national economic policy, we also work in partnership with a nationwide network of 56 research, policy and advocacy organizations representing 43 states and the District of Columbia to fight for an economy that works for everyone. Significant undercounting would harm some of the most vulnerable communities in those states because schools that urgently need funding to meet all students’ needs would no longer get the appropriate funding under Title I and IDEA.
<p>Like the concerns raised in point #1 above, excluding select groups of noncitizens from the census count would also undermine the accuracy of population weights used in the CPS. Since 1994, the CPS has collected data on the nativity of respondents, including foreign-born noncitizens, but without disclosure of their specific immigration status. The ability to estimate labor force growth by nativity is critical to accurate economic projections because the pace of overall GDP growth rises and falls almost one-for-one with the pace of labor force growth<a href='#_note7' class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a>. As the pace of U.S.-born labor force growth continues to slow with an aging population, developing reliable national and state projections of economic growth will require a complete and accurate accounting of everyone who participates in the U.S. labor force and contributes to the U.S. economy.</li>
</ol>
<p>Accurate and reliable data is foundational to a strong democracy, good economic decision-making, and to the enforcement of everyone’s civil and workers’ rights. For these reasons, we strongly oppose the changes proposed in this rule. We call on the Census Bureau and Department of Commerce to:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Continue collecting race and ethnicity data and implement the 2024 OMB SPD 15 standards. </strong>Census race and ethnicity data are essential for important research across many sectors, for upholding civil rights, and for growing the economy. Extensive Census Bureau research and engagement with expert stakeholders shows that implementing the modernized 2024 OMB SPD 15 standards for race and ethnicity data collection will yield data that more accurately represent the nation’s increasingly diverse population.&nbsp;</li>
</ol>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong>Count all people residing in the United States in the 2030 Census, without regard to immigration status.</strong> Excluding noncitizens from census apportionment data violates the constitution and established legal precedent. It would suppress the count of many communities, effectively erasing them from critical datasets and depriving them of resources and Congressional representation.</li>
</ol>
<p>We appreciate your consideration of these comments.</p>
<p>Sincerely,</p>
<p>Valerie Wilson, PhD<br />
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity and the Economy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> U.S. Census Bureau. (2026, October 5). <em>Decennial Census of the population of Americans; Proposed residence criteria and proposed regulations for demographic questions; Extension of comment period </em>[Proposed rule].<em> Federal Register</em>. https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-20328.pdf</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See <a href="https://civilrights.org/resource/request-for-extension/">Request for Extension of Comment Period for Proposed Rule: “Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions”</a> for an in-depth discussion about the insufficient comment period and the need for an extension.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. (2025, May 7). <em>Letter regarding the termination of the 2030 Census Advisory Committee, Census Scientific Advisory Committee, and National Advisory Committee on Racial, Ethnic, and Other Populations</em> [Letter]. <u>https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Updated-Final-LCCHR-Census-Advisory-Committee-Letter-.pdf</u></p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/labor-markets-racial-disparities/">Tight labor markets are essential to reducing racial disparities and within the purview of the Fed’s dual mandate</a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Josh Bivens and Ben Zipperer, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-importance-of-locking-in-full-employment-for-the-long-haul/">The importance of locking in full employment for the long haul</a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2018.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-reserve-fact-sheet/">How the Federal Reserve Can Help or Hurt the Economy</a>, July 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-u-s-born-labor-force-will-shrink-over-the-next-decade-achieving-historically-normal-gdp-growth-rates-will-be-impossible-unless-immigration-flows-are-sustained/#epi-toc-6">The U.S.-born labor force will shrink over the next decade</a>, October 2025.</p>
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		<title>Wages, inequality, and the roots of America’s affordability crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/wages-inequality-and-the-roots-of-americas-affordability-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 25 Sep 2026 15:32:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heidi Shierholz, Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=326306</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This piece was originally published in American Educator, the professional journal of the American Federation of Teachers. Read it Outside of a crisis or recession, Americans’ perceptions of how the country and economy are being managed have never been so negative.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This piece was originally published in American Educator, the professional journal of the American Federation of Teachers. <a href="https://www.aft.org/ae/fall2026/shierholz_bivens">Read it here</a>.&nbsp;</em></p>
<p>Outside of a crisis or recession, Americans’ perceptions of how the country and economy are being managed have never been so negative. Many have attributed this voter unhappiness to a crisis of “affordability.”</p>
<p>It is objectively true that it is too hard for most American families to afford a secure and dignified life. But the word “affordability” leads too many people—including policymakers—to fixate on&nbsp;<em>prices</em>. Affordability is not just about prices; instead, it’s the outcome of a race between incomes and prices.</p>
<p>This is not just economists quibbling. Focusing on prices will lead policymakers to ignore far too much of the useful playing field when thinking about what changes could make life better for working families.</p>
<p>In this article, we make the following arguments:</p>
<ul>
<li data-list-item-id='e783f63b937463f9d4d2c0bc1fa28b260'>Far too many families are unable to afford a decent economic life.</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e2de2c36fb5f06858eef4e08293606191'>The primary cause is a large increase in income and wage inequality, with incomes and wages for the vast majority of families lagging far behind what they could and should be.</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e7ed5313d4ece5dcc9ac75df1e978fdc2'>This rise in inequality was caused by increasingly unequal “market” incomes (e.g., wages and salaries, returns on investments), while changes in taxes or transfers (e.g., Social Security, Medicare, unemployment insurance) slightly&nbsp;<em>dampened</em> the rise of income inequality.</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e5011f173c5e3c9a8cbed80f2d20022bd'>The large rise in income inequality was driven by&nbsp;<em>intentional</em> policy changes that affected typical workers’ leverage and bargaining power in the labor market—and that means they can be reversed.</li>
<li data-list-item-id='eb0b20dbde7976f16c0a1f6fded7c221c'>In capitalist economies (like ours), labor markets are inherently tilted toward employers—but historically and globally, broadly shared prosperity has only been achieved when policies that intentionally support workers (like strong unions, adequate minimum wages, and full employment mandates) have provided a countervailing force against employers’ power in labor markets.&nbsp;</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e6b94651848809d1a591df13393199b4d'>Much of the post-1979 period in the United States saw an assault on worker-friendly policies, and this led directly to the rise in inequality and to weak income growth for working families.</li>
</ul>
<p><span id="more-326306"></span></p>
<h4>Americans’ economic dissatisfaction has real roots</h4>
<p>The U.S. economy is the richest in the world, yet the gap between what it could deliver to working families versus what it actually delivers is maddening. This gap can be measured with some precision. Figure A shows inflation-adjusted household income for the middle-fifth of U.S. families between 1979 and 2022, as well as what this growth could have been had it simply grown as fast as average incomes did in this period.&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-326307" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-650x328.png" alt="" width="650" height="328" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-650x328.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-950x480.png 950w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-768x388.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-1536x776.png 1536w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM-320x162.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.10.50-PM.png 1710w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /></p>
<p>This gap is driven by inequality. Average incomes can only rise faster than incomes at the middle if some groups—the ultra-rich in this case—see strongly above-average growth. This gap between average growth and growth experienced by the middle reached staggering levels by 2022 (the most recent data from the Congressional Budget Office). In that year, inequality’s rise since 1979 deprived middle-income families of an average of $28,100. Life for these families would be far more affordable today if they had this money coming in each year. And that’s well within our grasp. Average income growth is by definition attainable. All that’s needed are policies that ensure income growth is broadly shared, instead of policies that cause staggeringly fast income growth among the top 1% and much slower income growth for working people.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Figure B shows this inequality another way—charting average annual growth rates for the 1979–2022 period for a number of groups ranked by their position in the income distribution. The strikingly bad news from this figure is that only household groups above the 90th percentile saw income growth that matched or exceeded average income growth. How can more than 90% of households be below average when it comes to income growth? This is possible because the top 5%—and especially the top 1%—saw astoundingly fast growth over this period.&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-326309 size-small aligncenter" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.13.18-PM-320x264.png" alt="" width="320" height="264" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.13.18-PM-320x264.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.13.18-PM-650x536.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.13.18-PM-768x633.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.13.18-PM.png 832w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px" /></p>
<p>For any given average growth rate, faster growth at the top of the scale must be matched by slower growth at the middle and/or bottom. It is this zero-sum dynamic of inequality, not anything to do with prices, that has been the crushing drag on regular Americans trying to afford a better life over time.</p>
<h4>Staggering inequality is a choice</h4>
<p>This growth in inequality has been driven by the rules governing markets—rules our elected leaders determine—not by taxes or transfers. Figure A showed the staggering $28,100 gap in market (pre-tax and transfer) income between what families in the middle-fifth actually made in 2022 versus what they could have made had inequality not risen. Figure C shows how large this gap is after the federal government gets involved on the tax and transfer side of the equation.&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-326310" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-650x346.png" alt="" width="650" height="346" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-650x346.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-950x505.png 950w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-768x408.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-1536x817.png 1536w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM-320x170.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.15.11-PM.png 1704w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /></p>
<p>Taxes obviously reduce incomes, but transfers (social insurance like Social Security and income support payments like unemployment insurance) raise incomes. For the middle-fifth of US households, this effect is largely a wash—their current income levels in Figures A and C are very similar. But because the United States still has a progressive federal tax system (though not as progressive as we would like), the rise of inequality in this post-tax and transfer data is slightly muted—i.e., federal taxes and transfers shrink the gap somewhat. By 2022, the annual gap after accounting for federal taxes and transfers is $17,698—still a sum of money that would be transformative for American families.</p>
<p>Essentially, federal taxes and transfers undid roughly one-third of the rise in income inequality, allowing rich households to pocket roughly two-thirds of their gains.*</p>
<p>This rise in inequality was overwhelmingly driven by an intentional, multipronged policy campaign to suppress wages that was undertaken by shareholders, other capital owners, and corporate executives, with policymakers greasing the skids along the way.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> The primacy of wage suppression can be seen in Figure D, which compares the economy’s <em>potential</em> to pay higher wages and incomes with the actual hourly pay of typical workers in the United States.&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-326311" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-650x347.png" alt="" width="650" height="347" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-650x347.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-950x508.png 950w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-768x410.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-1536x821.png 1536w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM-320x171.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.19.08-PM.png 1710w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /></p>
<p>We measure the economy’s potential to pay higher wages by&nbsp;<em>productivity</em>, which is the output and income generated in the economy in an hour of work on average. And we define&nbsp;<em>typical workers’ pay</em> as the wages and benefits of workers in production and nonsupervisory positions, a group that constitutes over 80% of the economy’s private-sector workforce, excluding higher-wage managers and executives. As you see in the figure, in the three decades after World War II, productivity and pay mostly moved roughly in tandem, with typical workers’ pay rising 83% as fast as productivity. After 1979, these lines diverge sharply, with workers’ pay rising only about 43% as fast as productivity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>If typical workers’ pay had risen in line with productivity growth in the years since 1979, their hourly pay would be 43% higher today. For a full-time, full-year worker making the median wage, this would constitute annual wages that are almost $23,000 higher.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Where did that $23,000 go? Instead of paying workers more as their productivity rose, corporate executives, other already highly paid professionals, and shareholders captured those gains for themselves.</p>
<p>This growing gap between what shows up in typical workers’ paychecks and benefits versus the overall income being generated in the economy is the root story of American inequality and of today’s affordability crisis.</p>
<p>This pay-productivity gap can be decomposed into two parts: the portion driven by rising inequality in “labor” income (income earned from work), and the portion driven by a shift from labor income to “capital” income (income from investments, like when a stock increases in value). Growing inequality within labor incomes—earnings growing much faster among high-paying jobs than among middle- and low-paying jobs—accounts for almost 80% of the gap. The remaining 20% is accounted for by a shift from labor income to capital income.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Below we say a bit more about each of these.</p>
<h4>Rising inequality of labor incomes</h4>
<p>The larger factor in the rise of overall income inequality is the growing inequality within labor incomes. This often surprises people, who assume the story of rising inequality is mostly one of the&nbsp;<em>profits</em> of rich corporations rising while most of their workers are left behind. It’s true that most workers in these corporations do not benefit, but the powerful employees who do prosper—CEOs and other executives—receive astronomical salaries that are classified as labor income in economic data, and these inflated executive salaries do cut into corporate profits.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In addition, below the stratospheric level of corporate managers at large companies, there is a stratum of workers in medicine, legal services, and finance who command huge salaries. It’s not a large group of people, but the rise in their pay has been extreme. Figure E highlights this radical inequality within labor incomes, showing annual earnings of various wage groupings. (To keep the figure legible, pre-1979 data are not shown.) Prior to 1979, wage growth among very high wage workers—those in the top 10%, the top 1%, and the top 0.1%—was roughly in line with wage growth for the vast majority (i.e., for the bottom 90%). But between 1979 and 2023, cumulative growth in average annual earnings for the bottom 90% of workers was 44%, compared with 133% for the top 1%. For the top 0.1%, this growth was 354%—so high it doesn’t fit in the figure.</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone size-medium wp-image-326312" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-650x348.png" alt="" width="650" height="348" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-650x348.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-950x509.png 950w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-768x411.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-1536x823.png 1536w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM-320x171.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.23.12-PM.png 1710w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px" /></p>
<p>Given that labor income remains the large majority of all income generated in the economy, this huge rise in inequality within labor incomes is a key driver of the economy-wide march to greater inequality. Workers at the top of the wage scale were largely able to insulate themselves from the campaign of wage suppression launched by corporate owners. Of course, some of them were active participants in this campaign and got a significant cut of its benefits (think CEOs and lawyers for union-busting law firms). But the vast majority of workers (roughly 90%, as we see in Figure B) were on the losing side of this wage suppression campaign and found their wages falling far behind the economy’s potential to deliver strong and sustained wage growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In some ways, the influence of rising inequality within labor incomes might be underestimated. For decades, U.S. tax policy has levied lower tax rates on capital income than labor income, and a great deal of capital gains escapes taxation entirely due to loopholes.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Many of the same people who have been privileged enough to insulate themselves from wage suppression are also privileged enough to have excellent accountants who can make their incomes appear in whatever form results in the lowest taxes.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> For example, CEOs are overwhelmingly paid with “performance-based” measures, which means measures tied to the value of their companies’ stock prices. Twenty years ago, the large majority of this stock-based pay for CEOs came in the form of stock options, which are contracts that give the CEO the right (but not the obligation) to buy shares of stock at a set price. If the market price went above this set price, CEOs could exercise these options and pocket the difference as pay. The gains from exercised stock options are recognized by the IRS as labor income, taxed accordingly, and classified in data as labor income. But over the past two decades, there has been a pronounced shift in the stock-based pay of CEOs away from stock options and toward the outright granting of stock. In this case, CEOs are not given a right to buy shares at a preferential price; they are simply given shares.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> What’s important for the split between capital and labor incomes is that these non-option forms of stock-based compensation are far less likely to be captured in measures of wage incomes. So this tax evasion strategy artificially depresses estimates of labor income in the economy.</p>
<h4>The shift from labor to capital incomes</h4>
<p>While most of the pay-productivity gap stemmed from the rising inequality within labor earnings discussed above, a nontrivial portion of this gap stemmed from a shift in overall income from labor to capital. This goes far beyond the tax avoidance trick described above for CEO compensation—including paying regular working people less so that shareholders get more. If, for example, a corporation were able to suppress its workers’ pay while raising customers’ prices and/or cutting what it paid suppliers (which generally means those suppliers paying their workers less), it would earn higher profits. By successfully suppressing wages to boost profits, American corporations have made their stock more valuable. Imagine an investor buys $100 in company stock with the expectation of an annual return of $5. If the company undertakes a successful campaign of wage suppression that boosts annual returns to $10, many other investors will buy company stock—bidding up share prices.</p>
<p>So even though this labor-to-capital shift in overall income is the smaller player in generating overall income inequality, it still had profound effects on American economic life. Estimates indicate that anywhere from 40% to nearly 100% of the entire nominal gains in the U.S. stock market since 1989 can be attributed to this shift of income from workers to capital owners.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>The rise in US stock prices in recent decades is a key driver of another kind of economic inequality: inequality of wealth.<sup>†</sup> One of the primary sources of wealth, the ownership of corporate equities (e.g., shares of stocks), is incredibly concentrated; the top 10% of households own about 85% of all corporate equities, and the top 1% own nearly 40%.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a></p>
<p>The concentration of corporate equities combined with the role of wage suppression in making these equities far more valuable leads to a clear implication: The wage suppression of recent decades is not just by far the biggest driver of the rise in&nbsp;<em>income</em> inequality; it is also by far the biggest driver of the rise in&nbsp;<em>wealth</em> inequality. Most of the rise in wealth inequality in recent decades has been the outcome of an intentional transfer away from workers to the top.&nbsp;</p>
<h4>Labor markets are not fair</h4>
<p>This rise in inequality in recent decades has attracted much attention from researchers—along with everybody else struggling to pay for groceries and keep the lights on. For a long time, economists’ role in the debate over inequality was to look for reasons why well-functioning, competitive markets could generate lots of inequality. This often led to explanations that essentially blamed workers for the outcomes. The argument was that the fair and competitive labor market had spoken and that these workers were falling behind because their skills and efforts had been found wanting. The precise failure identified was often workers’ alleged inability to adapt to the quickening pace of technological change in the economy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>But the evidence supporting this view of inequality driven by apolitical forces working through fair and competitive markets was incredibly thin.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> That led many researchers to examine whether labor markets are by their very nature tilted against workers, making it very difficult to secure regular raises that match overall economic growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>There is ample evidence for this view—that excess employer-side power makes labor markets generally unfair and inefficient, and that truly fair, competitive labor markets are the exception, not the rule. For example, many employers, and particularly those of low- and moderate-wage workers, rarely if ever negotiate pay; instead, they post take-it-or-leave-it wage offers.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> And when a given employer lets its wages lag behind those of potential competitors, workers’ exit from the lower-wage firm is far less common than would be predicted under truly competitive labor markets (where employers robustly compete for workers).<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<p>This employer-side power is rooted in many obvious factors in real-world labor markets that make it hard for workers to effectively search for better jobs and, therefore, force employers to compete over them. These include things like lack of information about wages and benefits offered by other employers, transportation restrictions that require workers to look for jobs only in places near their homes or public transit nodes, and child care considerations that require a job’s location be compatible with picking up kids at a regular time, along with many other factors.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Another barrier to competition is the obvious fact that in the short run, most employers need the income a new worker would generate for their business far less than most workers need the income from a job. In a jobsite of 100 workers, having a month go by understaffed by a single worker reduces business income by roughly 1%. In a household with a single worker, having a month go by without a job reduces income by essentially 100%.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Employers exploit these barriers to employees finding better options by “marking down” wages below what would be necessary for employers to attract and retain workers in competitive labor markets. These markdowns can be large enough to push workers’ pay well below the value they produce for the employer (i.e., below the “market clearing” wage). This makes them not just unfair, but inefficient—a drag on economic growth.&nbsp;</p>
<h4>Key policy choices that led to rising inequality&nbsp;</h4>
<p>Having realized the role of employers’ power in determining labor market outcomes, the importance of specific policies is magnified. For example, before the 1990s, many economists were extremely skeptical that minimum wages could do much good in raising wages without steep downsides like job loss. Why? Because they erroneously used models of&nbsp;<em>competitive</em> labor markets.&nbsp;</p>
<p>But more accurate models that include employers’ power reveal significant room to raise minimum wages without generating job losses. The evidence over the past 30 years has been highly persuasive that minimum wages could be much higher than they were in the 1980s and 1990s without causing job losses and that the benefits for low-wage workers would be large.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<p>The period of rising inequality since 1979 was one of profound institutional change in labor markets. The federal minimum wage, for example, lost 35% of its value between 1979 and 2025 as legislative inaction (i.e., not raising it) allowed it to be battered into irrelevance by inflation.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> This was also a period that saw a pronounced acceleration in the decline of unionization rates of American workers.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> It was a time when high levels of unemployment were tolerated by policymakers for extended periods in the name of fighting inflation.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> And it was a time when increasing integration between the rich United States and a poorer global economy was done on terms that were written by and for corporate interests.<sup>‡</sup></p>
<p>Several years ago, researchers at our organization, the Economic Policy Institute, reviewed the research on how much specific policy choices likely contributed to growing inequality. Adding together the impacts of the changes like those listed above could easily explain the lion’s share of the rise in inequality since 1979.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>For example, one key policy change was the practical abandonment of the Federal Reserve’s full employment mandate. By law, the Fed is supposed to pursue both stable inflation and full employment (which means trying to keep unemployment as low as is consistent with stable inflation). But between 1979 and 2007 (right before the Great Recession), the Fed largely acted as if it did have a mandate to pursue stable inflation but did not have one to pursue full employment.&nbsp;</p>
<p>After the Great Recession, the Fed admirably reversed course and tried to push the economy back to full employment, but its tools proved too weak given the magnitude of the shock. In such situations, fiscal policy—taxes and spending—should be used aggressively to restore full employment. But in the 2010s, political gridlock and excess caution kept policymakers from doing this, and much of that decade was plagued by excess unemployment.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Excess unemployment does not just leave willing workers locked out of jobs. It also saps the ability of still-employed workers to demand raises. For nonunion workers, their chief leverage for getting wage increases is threatening to quit. This threat is only credible when unemployment is low. Consequently, the too-high unemployment rates for most of the period from 1979 to 2019 were a drag on wage growth. In our estimates, too-high unemployment may well have explained nearly a third of the entire pay-productivity gap over that period<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a>—not to mention the devastation it wrought for millions of families.</p>
<p>Another key policy change was the failure to keep the playing field level between workers looking to organize and join unions and the employers who wanted to stop them. The National Labor Relations Board is supposed to safeguard this right, but its tools have proved too weak in the face of fierce employer opposition to unions, and policy changes to strengthen these tools have consistently been blocked. The results of throttling the growth of new unions have been profound; our estimates are that declining unionization likely explains a quarter of the pay-productivity gap since 1979.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> Crucially, the decline in unionization did not just hurt workers who otherwise would have been unionized. By far the biggest of the wage-suppressing effects of deunionization has been on the broad pool of nonunion workers. As unions lose strength, they stop being able to set industry-wide pay standards that even nonunion employers feel like they have to meet to avoid hemorrhaging employees.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The wage-depressing effect of trade flows from poorer nations—flows encouraged by the corporate-led trade agreements the United States has signed in recent decades—can likely explain another 10 to 15% of the pay-productivity divergence since 1979.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a></p>
<h4>The wrong incentives</h4>
<p>Tolerating excess unemployment, throttling workers’ ability to join unions, failing to update the minimum wage as costs rise, and signing corporate-friendly trade agreements were some of the many instruments of wage suppression undertaken and abetted by policymakers in recent decades. At the same time, choices legislators made on tax policy boosted the incentive for capital owners and corporate managers to aggressively use these instruments to increase their wealth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>When ultra-high incomes and corporate profits are taxed at high (i.e., appropriate) rates, the incentives for powerful individuals to rig the rules of markets to suppress regular workers’ wages are much smaller. Key research shows that this incentive effect is real and powerful. For example, across countries, the larger the tax cuts on the rich enacted in recent decades, the greater the increase in&nbsp;<em>pre-tax&nbsp;</em>inequality.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> And, the lower the top tax rates for individuals, the higher the levels of <em>pre-tax</em> CEO pay.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> High taxes reduce the benefits of rule-rigging, so cutting taxes increases rule-rigging. This means that raising taxes on the richest households and corporations results in new revenue <em>and</em> more equal pre-tax incomes. But from the mid-1970s, tax rates for high-income households and corporations have been cut steadily and deeply in the United States, reducing both tax revenues and wages for working people.</p>
<h4>Income inequality, not high prices, is behind the affordability crisis</h4>
<p>We opened this article with a claim that affordability is the outcome of a race between income and prices. Our long walk through the economics and history of recent American inequality highlights that intentional policy choices have deprived typical households of income they could have otherwise claimed. Without this inequality, a middle-income household today would have tens of thousands of dollars more per year—and this would obviously make affording a decent life much easier.&nbsp;</p>
<p>But some might wonder if we have still given prices short shrift in how much they contribute to affordability challenges. We don’t think so, for a number of reasons. We sketch three of them here.</p>
<p>First, all of the income, wage, and productivity statistics we have included in this article have been&nbsp;<em>real</em> (i.e., they have been adjusted for the impact of inflation). And it is unambiguously true that real (inflation-adjusted) incomes are the proper way to measure living standards and economic possibilities for households.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Getting distracted by price growth while missing what’s happening with income will lead to wrong conclusions about economic performance over even relatively recent periods of time. Figure F compares two periods, both starting one year before a deep recession struck and then running five years: 2007–2012 and 2019–2024. In the first period, inflation averaged 1.8%, while in the second it ran more than twice as fast at 4.2%. Yet real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth for low- and middle-wage workers was far faster in the second period. For the lowest-wage workers, real wages fell by 2.1% in the first period but rose by 15.3% in the second. For workers in the middle of the wage scale, real wages fell by 1.5% in the first period but rose by 5.8% in the second.&nbsp;</p>
<p><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="wp-image-326313 size-small aligncenter" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM-320x481.png" alt="" width="320" height="481" srcset="https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM-320x481.png 320w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM-650x977.png 650w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM-768x1155.png 768w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM-180x270.png 180w, https://files.epi.org/uploads/Screenshot-2026-09-24-at-4.37.39-PM.png 842w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 320px) 100vw, 320px" /></p>
<p>Over very short periods of time (one to two years), it is true that a rapid spike in prices tends to drive down real incomes and wages. But over any longer period (even as short as three to five years), assessing how the economy is doing for typical families rarely bears much relationship to price growth.</p>
<p>Second, even when researchers adjust for inflation differently at different parts of the wage and income distribution, the impact is modest. Such measures account for things like lower-income families spending a higher share of their income on rent and groceries and a lower share on vacations. But there are surprisingly small differences in overall price growth faced by families at different income levels. For example, from 2019 to 2025, when the price of housing and groceries was on peoples’ minds for good reasons, the inflation rate faced by the bottom 40% of households was just 0.2% higher than for the top 20% of households.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> In short, the growth in prices faced by different groups varies far less than the growth of their incomes and wages.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Third, a key insight in assessing affordability debates is that one person’s cost is another person’s income. If the cost of a pound of coffee doubles from $10 to $20, this constitutes $10 of additional income that somebody is getting. Perhaps the coffee grower or the shipper or the grocery store shareholders or the CEO or the cashiers or some other link in the supply chain is getting an extra $10 (or several of them are getting some slice of it). This means that rapidly rising prices cannot result in less income overall, so they are highly unlikely to actually make an entire economy poorer. Instead, the groups that face only the price increase lose out while groups receiving the extra income win.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This fact that every price is an amalgamation of various income streams also means policymakers can more usefully target wage and income policies rather than price policies. Again, my bill at the grocery store pays for the wages of cashiers, the pay of the company CEO, the dividends to shareholders, the payments to suppliers, and more. Even if we’re unhappy about this grocery bill, we likely don’t want all of those price components to get squeezed. We probably want the wages of cashiers to rise while hoping to rein in CEO pay and shareholder dividends. Policies that only look to restrain prices—price controls, for example—make no such distinction, so we don’t know who in the grocery supply chain will bear their burden (though we can guess it’s more likely to be the cashiers than the CEO). But if we raise minimum wages, change labor law to allow more widespread unionization, and raise taxes on the ultra-rich and on corporate profits, we have a very good idea of which incomes will be boosted and which will get squeezed.</p>
<h3>Creating a fairer economy</h3>
<p>It is deeply depressing that intentional policy acts led to the enormous rise in inequality that is making life so much harder for so many people. If tens of millions of American households had tens of thousands of extra dollars in their bank accounts each year while billionaires had significantly less money, the country would be a much better and happier place.</p>
<p>What brings us hope is the knowledge that because the rise in inequality was not the inevitable outcome of a modern economy, it can be halted and reversed. Today’s workers have the skills and abilities needed to support much higher incomes with no loss in efficiency or employment—if we change policy to give them these higher wages. This is excellent news. Of course, many of today’s elected leaders—and their donors—have little interest in reducing inequality, so the road ahead is long. But the foundational ingredients for a fairer and more efficient economy are clear:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li data-list-item-id='e376ae8b533c6c2acbb2399a579691cea'>Keep unemployment rates low for long periods of time and fight recessions fiercely when they inevitably occur.&nbsp;</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e875622e2a1fbe80f6432473aea5bf5e8'>Restore the right to organize new unions and bargain collectively.&nbsp;</li>
<li data-list-item-id='e1ff851e281657fda6afbb73a7a000b1d'>Raise minimum wages, including the federal minimum wage.&nbsp;</li>
<li data-list-item-id='ed16e0c876e773248fd072f85be889e86'>Enact rules for the global economy that support healthy wage growth, not just healthy corporate profits.&nbsp;</li>
<li data-list-item-id='ed1167e2cea8e451280adf725a943e833'>Crush the incentive to rig the rules of the economy by raising taxes significantly on ultra-rich households and corporations.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<p>The details on how we create a fairer economy are more complex—and they do matter! But understanding that the affordability crisis facing American families is overwhelmingly an inequality crisis is a necessary and useful place to start.</p>
<hr>
<p>*Since this analysis goes through 2022, it does not include the tax or benefits cuts (including to Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act that President Trump signed into law in July 2025. These will further increase inequality.</p>
<p><sup>†</sup>Wealth is the value of a person’s assets (e.g., the equity in their home, stocks and bonds in their retirement accounts, or their baseball card collections) minus the value of their debts.</p>
<p><sup>‡</sup>For details, see <a href="https://www.aft.org/ae/fall2026/wallach">“A Trade Policy That Puts Working Families First.”</a>&nbsp;</p>
<h4>Footnotes</h4>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Congressional Budget Office, <em>The Distribution of Household Income, 2022</em> (January 2026), <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61911">cbo.gov/publication/61911</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Congressional Budget Office, <em>The Distribution</em>.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Congressional Budget Office, <em>The Distribution</em>.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> For a much deeper dive into the specifics of this policy campaign of wage suppression, along with empirical assessments of how much it cost American families, see L. Mishel and J. Bivens, “Identifying the Policy Levers Generating Wage Suppression and Wage Inequality,” Economic Policy Institute, May 13, 2021, <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> The median wage for U.S. workers in 2025 was $25.67. This (and a lot more) can be found at data.epi.org. Multiplying this median wage by 0.43 and then by 2,080 (hours worked by a full-time/full-year worker) yields the $23,000 figure.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Earlier estimates of how much inequality within wages contributed to the pay-productivity gap can be found here: L. Mishel, “Growing Inequalities, Reflecting Growing Employer Power, Have Generated a Productivity–Pay Gap Since 1979,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em>, September 2, 2021, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/growing-inequalities-reflecting-growing-employer-power-have-generated-a-productivity-pay-gap-since-1979-productivity-has-grown-3-5-times-as-much-as-pay-for-the-typical-worker/">epi.org/blog/growing-inequalities-reflecting-growing-employer-power-have-generated-a-productivity-pay-gap-since-1979-productivity-has-grown-3-5-times-as-much-as-pay-for-the-typical-worker</a>. The easy way to update this (which we did for this report) is to compare productivity with growth in overall average compensation of American workers since 1979. This overall average compensation rose by roughly 76% since 1979. Given typical workers’ pay growth of just under 30%, this means that 46% (76% minus 30%) of the divergence between typical workers’ pay and productivity is a difference between typical workers’ pay and average pay.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See here for an estimate of how much of today’s reported capital incomes would be more properly classified as the returns to work (i.e., labor incomes): A. Eisfeldt, A. Falato, and M. Xiaolan, “Human Capitalists,” NBER Working Paper no. 28815, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2022, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w28815">nber.org/papers/w28815</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> For more on CEO pay levels and their composition, see J. Bivens, E. Gould, and J. Kandra, “CEO Pay Has Skyrocketed Since 1978,” Economic Policy Institute, September 25, 2025, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay/">epi.org/publication/ceo-pay</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> For this estimate, see D. Greenwald, M. Lettau, and S. Ludvigson, “How the Wealth Was Won: Factor Shares as Market Fundamentals,” <em>Journal of Political Economy</em> 133, no. 4 (April 2025): 1083–1132; and A. Atkeson, J. Heathcote, and F. Perri, <em>A Macroeconomic Perspective on Stock Market Valuation Ratios</em> (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Research Division, January 2026), <a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr682.pdf">minneapolisfed.org/research/sr/sr682.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See Table 10 in: E. Wolff, “Household Wealth Trends in the United States, 1962 to 2019: Median Wealth Rebounds… but Not Enough,” NBER Working Paper no. 28383, National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2021, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28383/w28383.pdf">nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28383/w28383.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> For a much deeper dive into the weakness of claims that inequality was driven by technology rewarding skilled workers and penalizing less-skilled workers, see J. Schmitt, H. Shierholz, and L. Mishel, <em>Don’t Blame the Robots: Assessing the Job Polarization Explanation of Growing Wage Inequality&nbsp;</em>(Economic Policy Institute, November 19, 2013), <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots/">epi.org/publication/technology-inequality-dont-blame-the-robots</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> One study found that roughly 75% of low-wage jobs were ones where employers made take-it-or-leave-it posted offers: R. Hall and A. Krueger, “Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search,” <em>American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics</em> 4, no. 4 (October 2012): 56–67; and R. Hall and A. Krueger, “Evidence on the Determinants of the Choice Between Wage Posting and Wage Bargaining,” NBER Working Paper no. 16033, National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2010, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w16033/w16033.pdf">nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w16033/w16033.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> For evidence on how nonresponsive worker quits are to wage cuts relative to predictions of competitive markets, see A. Dube, L. Giuliano, and J. Leonard, “Fairness and Frictions: The Impact of Unequal Raises on Quit Behavior,” <em>American Economic Review</em> 109, no. 2 (February 2019): 620–63.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> For a comprehensive review of this evidence, see D. Cengiz et al., “The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage Jobs,” <em>Quarterly Journal of Economics</em> 134, no. 3 (August 2019): 1405–54.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Economic Policy Institute, “Minimum Wages: Real Minimum Wage (2025$),” 2026, <a href="https://data.epi.org/minimum_wage/minimum_wage_levels/line/year/national/real_minimum_wage_2025/overall?timeStart=1938-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2025-01-01&amp;dateString=1979-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=overall">data.epi.org/minimum_wage/minimum_wage_levels/line/year/national/real_minimum_wage_2025/overall?timeStart=1938-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2025-01-01&amp;dateString=1979-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=overall</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> P. Romero and J. Whittaker, <em>A Brief Examination of Union Membership Data</em> (Library of Congress, June 16, 2023), <a href="https://congress.gov/crs-product/R47596">congress.gov/crs-product/R47596</a>; and H. Meyerson, “Economic Inequality Is Undermining America: Worker Solidarity Will Build a Better Future,” <em>AFT Health Care</em> 3, no. 2 (Fall 2022): 33–36.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> S. Galan, “Monthly Federal Funds Effective Rate, Unemployment Rate and Inflation Rate in the U.S. During Paul Volcker’s Terms as Federal Reserve Chairperson from 1979 to 1987,” <em>Statista</em>, October 2022, <a href="https://www.statista.com/statistics/1338105/volcker-shock-interest-rates-unemployment-inflation/?srsltid=AfmBOoqoXQ4yTpqiSJMevwNFbnNGEETrwhlltEeVrJuA1rThyYCBBkFl">statista.com/statistics/1338105/volcker-shock-interest-rates-unemployment-inflation/?srsltid=AfmBOoqoXQ4yTpqiSJMevwNFbnNGEETrwhlltEeVrJuA1rThyYCBBkFl</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Mishel and Bivens, “Identifying the Policy Levers.”</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> J. Bivens, “Focus on the Boom, Not the Slump—the Fed’s New Policy Framework Needs to Stop Cutting Recoveries Short,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em>, Economic Policy Institute, June 18, 2019, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Mishel and Bivens, “Identifying the Policy Levers.”</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> Mishel and Bivens, “Identifying the Policy Levers.”</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> A. Fieldhouse, <em>Rising Income Inequality and the Role of Shifting Market-Income Distribution, Tax Burdens, and Tax Rates</em> (Economic Policy Institute, June 14, 2013), <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rising-income-inequality-role-shifting-market/">epi.org/publication/rising-income-inequality-role-shifting-market</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> J. Bivens, “Using Tax Policy to Restrain CEO Pay: Best Practices and Smart Alternatives,” Economic Policy Institute, December 13, 2023, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/using-tax-policy-to-restrain-ceo-pay-best-practices-and-smart-alternatives/">epi.org/publication/using-tax-policy-to-restrain-ceo-pay-best-practices-and-smart-alternatives</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Authors’ analysis of data obtained from: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, “Economic Heterogeneity Indicators (EHIs),” 2026, <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/economic-heterogeneity-indicators">newyorkfed.org/research/economic-heterogeneity-indicators</a>.</p>
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		<title>Consequences of austerity: How reductions in BLS funding threaten the credibility of our statistics</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/consequences-of-austerity-how-reductions-in-bls-funding-threaten-the-credibility-of-our-statistics/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hilary Wething, Joe Fast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=326266</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Government funding cuts are undermining the Bureau of Labor Statistics' ability to provide the reliable information that businesses and policymakers need to make sound decisions about the economy.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;"><strong>Key takeaways</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">Years of government funding cuts are undermining the U.S.’s position as a global leader in providing the reliable statistical information that businesses and policymakers need for sound decision-making.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The Trump administration has accelerated the funding cuts and worked to degrade the effectiveness and independence of data-collecting agencies.</span></li>
<li><span style='font-size: 16px;'>The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is a prime example of an agency whose data collection in areas like employment and wages is integral to our understanding of the economy’s health and whether it is heading into a recession.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">A decline in response rates to one of the BLS’s key surveys was already underway but, absent funding increases and survey modifications, it will be harder for economists and policymakers to make timely sense of changes in the labor market.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Historically, the U.S. has been a leader in providing reliable and timely statistical information to support business strategy and policymaking. The value of information provided publicly and free of charge to businesses, households, and governments <a href="https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/27934/chapter/4">is immense.</a> Yet underinvestment over the past 15 years is a key reason why the U.S. lost its position on the cutting-edge of public statistical services worldwide.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the second Trump administration, this underinvestment has accelerated, and the administration has made intentional efforts to degrade the effectiveness and independence of the federal statistical agencies (FSAs). This accumulation of threats to the effectiveness of the FSAs will rapidly degrade the value of the key public good they provide, unless policy changes course sharply.</p>
<p>This blog post provides just one example of how cumulative underinvestment has blocked the ability of a key FSA to respond to developments, making its data less reliable over time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects a range of necessary data tracking the performance of the U.S. labor market. This BLS data are a key input into high-stakes decisions across the U.S. economy—including for both public and private actors. For example, the Federal Reserve relies on BLS data about unemployment rates, payroll job growth, wage growth, and price indexes to set monetary policy. The more volatile the BLS data are from month to month, the worse the information that guides Federal Reserve decisions.</p>
<p><span id="more-326266"></span></p>
<p>Private industry also relies heavily on these statistics. A <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.1.131">2018 survey</a> conducted by the National Association for Business Economists found that 95% of businesses responded “yes” to the question: “Are government data important for analyses and forecasting that drive business decisions?” Employment and unemployment data produced by the BLS were rated as the most important data source for <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.1.131">informing business decisions</a>.</p>
<p>Yet over the past 15 years, the BLS has gradually lost personnel and funding, which has been undermining their mandate of producing timely, accurate statistics on wages, prices, and the labor market. More recently, the Trump administration’s choices to freeze BLS hiring has further strained Census field staff charged with collecting household survey data. Worst of all, the Trump administration took the unprecedented step of firing the commissioner of the BLS simply because the agency accurately reported data that the administration happened to find politically inconvenient.</p>
<p>Even without further blatant political pressure on the BLS’s independence, the agency will encounter growing difficulty in doing its job effectively in coming years. One of their most important efforts is the fielding of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a survey of thousands of households across the U.S. taken every month, which provides detailed employment and wage information. The CPS is the source data for the monthly estimate of the nation’s unemployment rate, for example. This is in turn a key criterion for assessing whether the economy is heading into recession. In recent years—after the COVID-19 pandemic—the response rates for the CPS have sharply declined. These declines, if not countered with greater investment in response rates, may make it harder for economists and policymakers to make timely sense of changes in labor market, particularly for populations that already have small sample sizes, such as rural areas or detailed demographic groups.</p>
<p>The rest of this blog post highlights the problem of falling response rates, demonstrates that they have made some labor market measures more volatile month to month, and shows that these falling response rates have occurred over the same period as the retrenchment in resources for the BLS.</p>
<h4><strong>Nonresponse reduces sample size in the Current Population Survey</strong></h4>
<p>The Current Population Survey asks questions about employment and other labor market characteristics to 60,0000 households or about <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cex/cecomparison/cps_profile.htm">110,000</a>&nbsp;individuals every month. Between 2005–2016, the Current Population Survey household survey was able to steadily receive responses from around 107,000 people, ages 16 and older. However, as noted by <a href="https://www.briefingbook.info/p/cps-sample-size-cut-may-save-some">others</a> and shown in <strong>Figure A</strong>, the number of households responding to the survey has declined since the mid-2010s and then fell precipitously after the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first few months of 2026, just over 75,000 individuals, ages 16 and older, had responded to the monthly CPS.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322962 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322962" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322962-35835-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The decline in response rate has likely occurred for a few reasons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics notes <a href="https://www.bls.gov/osmr/research-papers/2014/pdf/st140220.pdf">that the rate of refusals had been increasing as early as the 1990s</a>, likely as the world became more connected with computers and the internet, leading to less reliance on in-person interactions to conduct business. Social trust has also gone down over the past few decades, and the share of adults who agree that “most people can be trusted” <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/05/08/americans-trust-in-one-another/">has decreased by more than 15% since 1984</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with concerns for privacy and distrust in the government, may be the reason that the rate of decline grew in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic forced many workers to transition to remote work, and concerns about contagion limited overall social interactions, making response collection increasingly difficult. Additionally, concerns about privacy or retribution from the state felt by groups like immigrants may make some people more reluctant to answer questions for fear of deportation.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, distrust in the federal government, fueled by recent overtly political activity, could be behind some of the reduction in response rates. For example, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics published two consecutive months of large negative revisions to the number of payroll jobs in mid-2025, the Trump administration leveled charges—which were baseless and never backed up by any evidence—that the BLS had manipulated the data for political purposes and fired then Commissioner Erika McEntarfer. People are less likely to trust government if they think publicized information and facts are politically motivated.&nbsp;</p>
<h4><strong>Smaller sample sizes are linked to less precision in key labor-market estimates </strong></h4>
<p>If the size of sampled households is large enough, declining participation does not have to significantly affect the reliability of statistics produced from the survey. However, if declines in participation reduce usable sample sizes too much, this can lead to estimates with less precision, which can reduce researchers’ ability to parse a signal from statistical noise in a timely manner, especially for economically vulnerable groups.</p>
<p>For example, because the unemployment rate for Black workers is volatile, it can be difficult to accurately diagnose labor market softness for this group. If the sample size is too small to generate statistical precision in each month, researchers will require increasingly more months of data to be able to diagnose labor market softness, which could jeopardize the timeliness of proper policy responses to support the labor market.</p>
<p>Every month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes statistical significance summary tables, identifying whether changes in labor force indicators are statistically significant at the 90% level. BLS publishes these statistical significance tests for dozens of indicators across several demographic groups, including for Black workers. We collected these tables over time and documented the margin of error needed in order to claim a 1-month change in unemployment was statistically significant, shown in <strong>Figure </strong><strong>B</strong>.</p>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-1IxI7" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Figure B: The CPS Black unemployment rate estimate has become less precise" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1IxI7/12/" height="602" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>While the margin of error that is needed to claim a change is statistically significant varies with the level of unemployment rate, the reduction in precision from lower response rates is evident when we hold the unemployment rate constant. The two red lines in Figure B identify the effect size needed to claim statistical significance for a change from a starting unemployment rate of 7.3%. In November 2017, when the sample size of the labor force was 63,346, a 0.66 percentage point change in unemployment would have been considered a statistically significant change. In April 2026, when sample size of the labor force decreased to 45,416 respondents, a 0.84 percentage point change in unemployment is required to claim statistical significance.</p>
<p>If the declines in survey participation are not random across the U.S. population, estimates may also be biased, which runs the risk of conveying inaccurate information about the state of the economy. For example, if nonresponse is more likely <a href="https://cepr.net/documents/undercounting_cps_2006_01.pdf?utm_source=Macro+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=e736b411d7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_04_26_09_12_COPY_01&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_c7f77b552d-e736b411d7-&amp;mc_cid=e736b411d7&amp;mc_eid=%5b1e8229297d%5d">to occur among unemployed respondents</a> compared with employed respondents, <a href="https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_150-Cai-Baker.pdf">the statistics derived from these samples may suggest labor market softness when there is none</a>. These concerns are already materializing: The Census reported that nonresponse had biased income statistics from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement upward by <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/research-matters/2025/09/administrative-data-nonresponse-bias-cps-asec.html">2%–3% since 2020.</a></p>
<p>Researchers and field staff at Census and the BLS are aware of potential concerns of bias in their estimates and do their best to weight estimates using population counts from administrative data and other sources so that these issues don’t happen. However, if sample size declines continue on this trajectory, the BLS will need to create new methodologies and sampling strategies, all of which will require funding.</p>
<h4><strong>Steady throttling of BLS funding makes all decision-makers—public and private—less well informed</strong></h4>
<p>The declining precision of estimates in the Black unemployment rate is just one of the key indicators affected by a BLS that lacks resources to respond effectively to growing data collection challenges. Achieving a larger sample size for key surveys requires a well-functioning and well-funded BLS with personnel who can take on the challenges of administering surveys in the 21st century. Yet this is the exact opposite of what is happening. <strong>Figure C</strong> shows that from 2005 to the present, the staffing at the BLS went from roughly 2,500 employees to just over 2,150, a drop of about 15%.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322945 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322945" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322945-35833-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Funding has followed a similar trajectory. Since its high-water mark in 2010, the BLS budget has declined from $810 million to $636 million in inflation-adjusted terms, a decrease of 20%. These cuts don’t hurt just the estimates generated by the Current Population Survey. In the past couple of years, the BLS has been forced to reduce data collection for the Consumer Price Index and to discontinue certain <a href="https://www.bls.gov/ppi/notices/2025/bls-to-discontinue-selected-ppis.htm">Producer Price Indexes</a> in an effort to cut costs. At a time when affordability and price changes are top of mind for U.S households and businesses, depriving public and private decision-makers of accurate and timely information about prices makes little sense.</p>
<p>Increased funding would allow the BLS to maintain all their current functions and implement new procedures to address declining sample sizes. In 2023, BLS began to modernize the collection process of the CPS to improve response rates by allowing online <a href="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/about/modernization.html">self-completion of the survey</a> and other collection process improvements for certain data products. This BLS initiative is happening in parallel to similar initiatives in several other countries undertaking modernization efforts. The <a href="https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/publication/state-of-the-uk-statistical-system-2025/pages/6/">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3233/SJI-140803">the Netherlands</a>, <a href="https://www.isi-next.org/abstracts/submission/3084/view/">Australia</a>, and Canada have all received funding to launch similar modernization efforts for their own household surveys to address declining response rates. However, the BLS <a href="https://www.friendsofbls.org/updates/2025/5/7/fy-2026-appropriations-request-for-bls">requests for increased funding for the modernization efforts</a> have not been fully granted.</p>
<p>The decision to steadily defund the BLS is especially striking when weighed against the large economic benefits provided by the agency and other federal statistical agencies. The BLS provides up-to-date precise estimates of economic indicators that policymakers and business leaders alike rely on. Previous research finds that increased <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202520300454?ref=pdf_download&amp;fr=RR-9&amp;rr=a402ba36be37b712">economic uncertainty can have negative effects on the economy</a>, proving the important role that the BLS plays. Moreover, some economists have estimated in 2025 that the BLS generates economics benefits of about <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w35135">$25 for every $1 spent on the agency’s budgets</a>. The 2025 FY BLS budget was approximately $636 million, meaning the BLS currently generates about $15.9 billion in economic benefit. Across all agencies, in FY 2022, the combined budget request for statistical agencies was <a href="https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/27934/chapter/4#25">$7.1 billion or 0.3% GDP, yet the benefits have been measured to be around $770 billion</a>.</p>
<h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<p>At a time when more information on the economic and social well-being of people and communities is needed, not less, <a href="https://www.friendsofbls.org/updates/2025/5/7/fy-2026-appropriations-request-for-bls">funding the BLS should be a top priority.</a> Addressing nonresponse will require substantial effort and creativity to counteract declining levels of social trust and anti-government sentiment. It will, for example, require public campaigns to convey that information provided to the BLS is confidential and safe, and changes in methodology to render the correct statistical adjustments, such that the statistics generated are unbiased.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Rather than tackle these challenges head on however, the Trump administration put forward a proposal that would reduce the number of statistics about rural and less populous substate areas that could be published without running the risk of disclosing personally identifiable information. These proposals are a lazy solution to the real but solvable problem of making public data widely available and fully confidential. They would provide less information on the economic and social well-being of citizens, likely leading to delays in accurately diagnosing economic and social problems.</p>
<p>When agencies like the BLS are underfunded and understaffed, they aren’t able to conduct the critical functions of their agency or serve the public to the degree their mission entails. Funding for these organizations shouldn’t be up for debate, given how strong of an economic benefit they deliver.</p>
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		<title>The case for tripling union membership: How rebuilding union power would strengthen workers, the economy, and our democracy</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Jul 2026 14:00:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Zipperer, Celine McNicholas, Heidi Shierholz, Jennifer Sherer, Josh Bivens, Margaret Poydock]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=323255</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Imagine union membership tripling in the United States. It may sound radical—if you’ve forgotten history. In fact, more than 1 in 3 private-sector workers belonged to a union in the 1950s.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Foreword</h2>
<p>Imagine union membership tripling in the United States. It may sound radical—if you’ve forgotten history. In fact, more than 1 in 3 private-sector workers belonged to a union in the 1950s. The results? Wages grew in tandem with the economy. The middle class thrived. Black-white wage gaps shrank. Broadly shared economic growth was a reality, not an aspiration. That’s because when workers have bargaining power, they win better wages, benefits, and working conditions. This report shines a light on what we stand to win if we rebuild union power.</p>
<p>Over the last four decades, big corporations and the billionaires who run them have waged a relentless campaign against unions. And they have largely succeeded in reshaping the U.S. economy. By making it harder and harder for workers to organize and bargain collectively, the rich seized more and more income and wealth, destroying the U.S. middle class. Now the wealth of the richest Americans has exploded: The richest 0.1% own more than five times the combined wealth of the entire bottom half of the country.</p>
<p>And yet, workers haven&#8217;t given up. In 2025, unionization ticked upward. Public approval of unions has reached some of its highest levels in decades, and more than 50 million nonunion workers say they&#8217;d join a union tomorrow if they could. That&#8217;s because they know what unions deliver. In an economy that has been rigged against working people for decades, unions serve as a counterweight to corporate power—reducing inequality and building the kind of middle class that underpins a strong and inclusive economy.</p>
<p>It will take serious policy change to reverse nearly 50 years of deliberate attacks on working people and their institutions. It will require that politicians stand up to the superrich and corporate interests. It will require that workers continue to build power. But, as this report shows, we have much to gain from stronger unions. An organized and empowered workforce has powerful and far-reaching economic benefits.</p>
<p>Nearly four decades ago, I helped found the Economic Policy Institute because working people needed a voice in the economic debates that shape their lives. This report is exactly the work we envisioned: rigorous research that puts workers at the center of economic policy, and that arms all of us with the facts to fight for them. At a time when our economy is held in relatively few hands, we need this work—and we need unions—more than ever.&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Robert Reich<br />
</strong><em>Professor, writer, and former Secretary of Labor</em></p>
<h2>Executive summary</h2>
<p>Union membership in the U.S. ticked up in 2025, breaking a decades-long trend of declining unionization. But today&#8217;s unionization rate doesn&#8217;t reflect the tens of millions of workers who want a union but can&#8217;t get one. This report examines what we stand to gain if we triple current union membership to 30%—restoring it to 1950s levels, when union strength delivered rising wages, narrowing racial wage gaps, and a thriving middle class.</p>
<h3>Tripling union membership would:</h3>
<ul>
<li><strong>Deliver a 14.5% raise for the median worker—amounting to more than $7,700 annually, or nearly $270,000 over a 35-year career. </strong>These life-changing increases would benefit union and nonunion workers alike.</li>
<li><strong>Shift $1.2 trillion to workers annually. </strong>This would reverse a third of the increase in inequality experienced since 1979.</li>
<li><strong>Significantly narrow racial wage gaps. </strong>Because unions tend to boost wages more for Black and Hispanic workers than for white workers, tripling union membership would close racial wage gaps by more than one-third.</li>
<li><strong>Boost the number of people with health insurance</strong>. Since unions increase other forms of compensation, like health insurance benefits, the number of nonelderly people without health insurance would fall by about 25%. Unions further reduce uninsured rates by advocating for increased public benefits like Medicaid.</li>
<li><strong>Strengthen communities. </strong>States with high union density invest more in public education, have higher unemployment insurance recipiency rates, and have all adopted Medicaid expansion.</li>
<li><strong>Protect democracy. </strong>Unions boost voter turnout, equip workers with civic skills, and actively defend voting rights. States with high union density have passed far fewer voter restriction bills than low-density states.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><a class="epi-button" href="https://files.epi.org/uploads/2026-Union-Density-Fact-Sheet-v2.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><strong>Download the factsheet</strong></a></p>
<h3>Roadmap for tripling union density</h3>
<p>Reversing decades of political neglect that has stealthily undermined workers’ rights to unions and collective bargaining will require comprehensive reform that weaves together tested approaches with bold new ideas, at both federal and state levels.</p>
<h4>Two bills with bipartisan support could help restore collective bargaining</h4>
<ul>
<li>The <strong>Protecting the Right to Organize Act </strong>would restore private-sector workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively. It would streamline the union formation process, establish penalties for labor law violations, override so-called “right-to-work” laws, and ban “captive audience” meetings.</li>
<li>The <strong>Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act </strong>would be the first federal law that guarantees all public-sector workers at the federal, state, and local levels the right to organize and collectively bargain.</li>
</ul>
<h4>Two bold new proposals could expand the benefits of collective bargaining and help tackle the affordability crisis</h4>
<ul>
<li><b data-olk-copy-source='MessageBody'>Guaranteed annual raises for newly unionized workers.</b>&nbsp;Legislation providing that newly unionized workers can use arbitration to achieve a first contract (if an employer fails to negotiate in good faith) should set a minimum standard that such contracts include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). For the typical worker, a 3% COLA means roughly $2,000 extra a year.</li>
<li><strong>Default collective bargaining when CEO-to-worker pay ratios exceed 100:1. </strong>Declining unionization and the stratospheric rise in CEO pay are deeply connected. Strengthening the bargaining power of workers in severely imbalanced companies would enable them to capture a larger share of the wealth their work creates.</li>
</ul>
<h4>States can remove anti-union laws and protect collective bargaining</h4>
<p><strong>Removing so-called “right-to-work” laws and restrictions on public-sector bargaining alone would increase union density nationally from 9.9% to 14.4%.</strong> Beyond removing those unionization barriers, states can also:</p>
<ul>
<li>Extend collective bargaining rights to workers currently excluded from federal law (in-home child care, home health care, agricultural, and gig workers);</li>
<li>Protect workers&#8217; right to refuse mandatory, anti-union “captive audience” meetings; and</li>
<li>Extend unemployment insurance eligibility to workers on strike.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>In 2025, 14.7 million workers—10% of all wage and salary workers—were union members, an increase from 9.9% in 2024.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> Though small, the increase marks a departure from prior years’ downward trend in union density and coincides with record high public favorability of unions.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a></p>
<p>This report examines what the U.S. might look like if union membership were to triple to 30%, restoring it to roughly its 1950s peak. We analyze the economic, social, and democratic impacts of this increase; examine the potential impact on state union density rates if all states were to remove anti-union policies; and offer policy recommendations to expand union membership.</p>
<p>While tripling union membership is an ambitious goal, it is fully consistent with workers’ own demand for unions. Recent survey data show that 43% of nonunion workers would vote to unionize if given the opportunity—the equivalent of about 56 million wage and salary workers (Ahlquist, Grumbach, and Kochan 2024; McNicholas, Poydock, and Shierholz 2026). If all these workers unionized, union density would rise from 10% to 48.7%—well above the 30% goal we examine in this paper.</p>
<h3>Union decline, wage suppression, and affordability</h3>
<p>As union membership has declined, workers’ wages have been suppressed and inequality has skyrocketed. The gap between typical workers’ pay and economy-wide productivity is at a historic high.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Since 1979, productivity has grown 2.7 times as much as pay for typical workers (<strong>Figure A</strong>). This divergence reflects both rising wage inequality—high earners experiencing much stronger wage growth than typical workers—and a shrinking share of the economy’s income going to workers overall. Between 1979 and 2023, real (inflation-adjusted) earnings for the top 0.1% grew 354% (from $618,000 to $2.8 million), while earnings for the bottom 90% of households grew just 44% (from $30,000 to $43,000) (EPI 2026a). And workers are now taking home a historically low share of corporate-sector income—meaning shareholders and other capital owners are capturing more than ever before (EPI 2026b).</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322664 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322664" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322664-35860-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Inequality has grown since 1979 because of intentional policy choices that suppressed wages for typical workers to accelerate income growth at the top. If pay for typical workers had kept pace with productivity over the past nearly five decades, their paychecks today would be more than 40% larger (EPI 2026c). Though affordability pressures are often framed as a problem of high prices, the real problem is this wage shortfall—and reversing that shortfall must be central to any serious affordability agenda. Collective bargaining is the most effective mechanism workers have to raise their wages and secure their fair share of economic growth. Expanding union membership and collective bargaining is central to addressing the affordability squeeze.</p>
<h3>Unions raise wages for all workers</h3>
<p>One of the most well-studied benefits of unions is the ability of collective bargaining to raise pay—resulting in a “union wage premium.”<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Historically, that premium has fluctuated around 15–20% (EPI 2026d). Unions also reduce inequality by compressing the wage distribution within firms, with the largest benefits going to workers at the bottom and middle. This is one reason the union wage premium is typically larger for those with less education, and for Black and Hispanic workers relative to white workers (Bivens et al. 2023).</p>
<p>Less appreciated is that unions also boost wages for nonunion workers. Higher wages at unionized firms make those jobs more attractive to nonunion workers, indirectly pressuring nonunion firms to raise wages to keep their workers. Nonunion firms may also raise wages to avoid unionization, especially when union density is already high in the relevant sectors and occupations.</p>
<p>Finally, unions also advocate for progressive changes in the tax and benefit system—indirectly raising <em>pre-tax</em> pay for low- and middle-wage workers. This happens in two main ways: First, when taxes on top incomes are higher, corporate executives have less incentive to maximize their own income at the expense of workers’ wages.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Second, more generous social benefits like SNAP and Medicaid increase the bargaining power of lower-paid workers by making them less economically vulnerable and better able to reject low-quality jobs (Bivens 2026).<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>These “spillover” effects of unions on the nonunion sector are significant and increase when union density is high. Rosenfeld, Denice, and Laird (2016) and Farber et al. (2021) find strong evidence that unions raise the wages of nonunion workers. Consistent with this, Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (2021) estimate that between 1979 and 2017, declining unionization was responsible for 37% of the increase in inequality between the 90th and 50th percentiles of male workers—and <em>more than half</em> of that impact occurred because, as unions weakened, nonunion employers faced less pressure to offer higher wages.</p>
<h2>Tripling union density would shift $1.2 trillion a year to working people</h2>
<p>Our analysis of the relationship between union density and state median wages finds that for every 10 percentage point difference in union density, real median wages are about 7.2% higher.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> If we tripled union density from 10% to 30%, the real median wage for all workers (including both union and nonunion workers<em>) </em>would rise from $25.67 in 2025 to $29.39 per hour—a 14.5% increase.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> A full-time, full-year worker earning that wage would see annual pay rise by more than $7,700.</p>
<p>To put this into perspective, consider the substantial growth in the gap between pay and productivity between 1979 and 2025. A full-time, full-year worker at the 2025 median wage was paid about $53,400 per year—but would have earned about $76,400 had their pay kept pace with productivity growth (EPI 2026e). Through direct wage increases for union members and unionization’s spillover effects on nonunion workers, tripling union density would close roughly one-third of the productivity-pay gap, increasing annual pay to $61,100.</p>
<p>To contextualize the gain in another way, consider that the median annual cost of a mortgage in the U.S. is $18,252. An additional $7,700 per year would cover more than 40% of that cost.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>Perhaps more strikingly, consider that an extra $7,700 a year adds up to nearly $270,000 (in today&#8217;s dollars) over the course of a 35-year&nbsp;career—a life-changing increase for a working family. Adjusting the USDA&#8217;s latest estimate of the cost of raising a child to 2025 dollars yields a current cost of roughly $317,000 to raise a child from birth through age 17, including food, housing, transportation, health care, clothing, child care, education, and other expenses (USDA 2017). The additional $270,000 in career earnings that a typical worker would receive if union density were tripled would cover 85% of that cost.</p>
<p>Or, according to the College Board, the average annual cost of attending a four-year in-state public college, including room and board, is about $31,000 (Ma, Pender, and Hu 2025). Over four years, that comes to $124,000 per student—so the additional $270,000 in career earnings would more than cover the cost of sending two children to college.</p>
<p>Yet another way to show how transformational these effects would be for the U.S. economy and the economic security of typical families: Assuming the 14.5% wage&nbsp;boost&nbsp;we estimate&nbsp;from a tripling of union density applies to&nbsp;the&nbsp;bottom 80% of the&nbsp;U.S.&nbsp;workforce, this&nbsp;would&nbsp;raise these&nbsp;workers’&nbsp;combined&nbsp;pay&nbsp;each year&nbsp;by&nbsp;$1.2&nbsp;trillion.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Several useful reference points help illustrate the scale of this $1.2 trillion increase in workers&#8217; annual pay. First, the increase would be nearly three times as large as the $430 billion U.S. families received in “COVID checks”—and unlike those one-time checks, these gains would be permanent and recurring.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> Second, the $1.2 trillion that tripling union density would shift to workers slightly exceeds the Pentagon’s 2025 budget—a redistribution of income on a scale comparable to the entirety of the U.S. military-industrial complex.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Third and most revealingly, this increase would claw back a full third of the increase in income inequality since 1979. Between 1979 and 2022,&nbsp;the share of market income going to the richest 20% of households rose by 12.0 percentage points (with&nbsp;nearly all&nbsp;of that increase—10.1 percentage points—accruing to the richest 1%). A&nbsp;$1.2 trillion&nbsp;increase in the incomes of the bottom 80% of households would reverse a third of that shift, 4.0 of the 12.0 percentage points.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<h3>Our estimates likely underestimate future gains</h3>
<p>It’s worth noting that while our estimates show large wage gains to workers from tripling union density, they are likely being significantly held down by the fact that union density in the U.S. is starting from such a low level (10%). Our estimates therefore likely understate the wage gains workers will experience once the labor market reaches a higher level of union density. Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (2021) find that the wage payoff to union density is much larger where density is already high, and this shows up clearly in our analysis as well: Below 15% union density, a one percentage point increase in density is associated with just a 0.2% increase in the median wage; above 15%, the median wage increases by 0.9%—a wage response more than four times as large (see <strong>Figure B</strong>).<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
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<p>The economic intuition behind this 15% threshold is that a minimum scale of unionization is needed for collectively bargained wages to exert a strong influence on pay scales—both union and nonunion—throughout the broader economy. While every additional percentage point of unionization gives another 1% of workers the union pay premium, it has a more limited effect on wage-setting throughout the broader labor market until overall union density reaches around 15%.</p>
<p>Today&#8217;s typical state has a union density of about 10%, which means the wage gains from each additional percentage point of unionization—while still significant—are muted relative to the gains that occur once union density exceeds 15%. In essence, the policy assault on unions in recent decades has pushed density so low that we need a 50% increase—from 10% to 15% union density—just to start realizing the “normal” gains unions can bring to a high-road economy. Raising density from 10% to 30% would carry the labor market across that 15% threshold and well into the higher-density regime, where each additional percentage point increase in unionization delivers substantially larger gains for the median worker. This is why a transformational policy effort is needed: We must rebuild union density from the depressed levels created by decades of political neglect to the point where the full wage benefits of widespread collective bargaining can be realized.</p>
<h3>Unions reduce racial wage gaps</h3>
<p>Because unions increase wages for Black and Hispanic workers more than for white workers, unions reduce racial wage gaps. And this dynamic is not new—research shows that the union premium was already higher for Black workers than for white workers by the mid-20th century, meaning that the spread of unionization in that era was one of the country’s greatest forces for racial justice (Farber et al. 2021; Bivens et al. 2023). But with the decline in unionization over the past 45 years, racial wage gaps have widened and are now substantially worse than they were in 1979—damage that restoring union power would more than reverse. In 2025, the median Black or Hispanic worker earned 76.5% of the median white worker wage—a wage gap of 23.5%. Tripling union density would close more than one-third of that gap, reducing it to 14.6%.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<h3>Unions boost benefits, not just pay</h3>
<p>Unions also increase other forms of compensation, like health insurance benefits. In 2025, 95% of union workers had employer-sponsored health insurance, relative to 71% of nonunion workers. In addition, as discussed later, unions further reduce uninsured rates by advocating for increased public benefits like Medicaid. <strong>Figure C </strong>shows that nonelderly uninsurance rates are substantially lower in states with higher union density. To do this analysis, we divided the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia into three equally sized groups based on their current (2023–2025) level of union density.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Most low-union-density states have double-digit uninsured rates, but these rates typically fall to the single digits in medium- and high-union-density states. If union density tripled and all states were high-density states, the national nonelderly uninsured rate would fall by about a quarter, from 9.8% to 7.3%.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322994 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322994" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322994-35848-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Unions benefit communities</h2>
<p>Unions don’t just improve workers’ pay and benefits—they give workers a voice in shaping the social fabric of their communities, lifting standards for union and nonunion workers alike. The data reveal a strong correlation between higher levels of unionization and a range of economic and personal well-being measures. When more workers are in unions, states have more equitable economic and social structures (McNicholas et al. 2025). Meanwhile, states with anti-union policies have lower union density and consistently worse outcomes across these measures.</p>
<h3>Economic well-being</h3>
<p>We first examine economic well-being—broadly defined as working people having the means to support themselves—using two indicators: the gap between productivity and pay, and unemployment insurance recipiency rates.</p>
<p>As discussed earlier, there has been a growing gap since 1979 between productivity—the value of the output generated by a worker in the U.S. economy in an hour of work, on average—and typical workers’ hourly compensation. Far from accidental, this divergence stems from deliberate policy choices in the U.S. beginning around 1980 that allowed the gains from economic growth to be increasingly captured by the highest earners, shareholders, and other capital owners—rather than being broadly shared across low-, middle-, and high-income households (Shierholz 2024).</p>
<p>The degree to which productivity gains have translated into higher pay for typical workers varies widely across states.&nbsp;<strong>Figure </strong><strong>D</strong> shows that in states with smaller declines in unionization since 1979, a larger share of productivity gains translated into higher pay for typical workers. In other words, in places where unions remained stronger, it wasn’t just those with high incomes and wealth who benefited from economic growth—working people, both unionized and nonunionized, saw a bigger share of the gains.</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-322732 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322732" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322732-35849-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Unemployment insurance (UI) recipiency rates also offer insight into economic well-being. When a worker is laid off and their household income falls, unemployment insurance supports them and their family until they find another job. UI is a joint federal-state program that relies on state UI systems to effectively deliver benefits to unemployed workers. States differ in their rules and approaches under the federal UI framework, leading to wide variation in the share of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits (the UI recipiency rate).</p>
<p>Studies show a strong correlation between higher UI recipiency rates and high union density (Clegg et al. 2022);&nbsp;<strong>Figure E</strong> illustrates this strong positive relationship. In recent years, the average UI recipiency rate in high-union-density states was 36%, double the 18% rate in low-union-density states.</p>
<p>Unions fight to increase UI eligibility, ease of access, benefit levels, and benefit duration—to the benefit of all workers, union and nonunion (Hertel-Fernandez and Gould-Werth 2020). The strong correlation between union density and state UI recipiency rates suggests that expanding unionization by removing anti-union policies would result in higher UI recipiency rates.</p>


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<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-322554 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322554" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322554-35850-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Personal health and well-being</h3>
<p>Next we examine personal health and well-being—which we define as an individual’s physical and mental health—using one indicator, Medicaid expansion.</p>
<p>As we noted earlier, almost all union workers (95%) have access to health insurance, and uninsured rates are lower in high-union-density states. To show how unions influence health care coverage beyond explicitly bargained workplace plans, we examine whether a state has expanded Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act to broaden eligibility. The Medicaid public insurance program provides critical health coverage to families and individuals with low incomes. Research has found that Medicaid expansion has expanded access to health care; improved health outcomes, including fewer premature deaths; lowered uncompensated costs; bolstered financial security; and boosted economic mobility (CBPP 2020). While the Medicaid program has broad federal guidelines, it is administered by states—and a 2012 Supreme Court decision gave them the power to decide on eligibility and expansion. Since 2014, 40 states plus the District of Columbia have adopted Medicaid expansion; 10 states have not (Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).</p>
<p><strong>Figure </strong><strong>F </strong>shows a stark divide between high- and low-union-density states in terms of Medicaid expansion. All 17 high-union-density states have expanded Medicaid. Out of 17 medium-union-density states, 14 have adopted Medicaid expansion (Alabama, Kansas, and Wisconsin are the only medium-union-density states that have not adopted expansion). Just 10 out of 17 low-union-density states have adopted Medicaid expansion (Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming are the low-union-density states that have not adopted expansion).</p>
<p>There is a strong correlation between union density and Medicaid expansion. If states removed anti-union policies and became high-union-density states, they would be joining a group of states in which Medicaid expansion is currently universal, potentially helping to close the Medicaid coverage gap that currently leaves 1.5 million adults uninsured (Zhang 2026).</p>


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<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-322548 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322548" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322548-35859-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Spending on public education</h3>
<p>Union density also intersects with public education investment. Investment in public education helped make the U.S. the richest country in the world in the 20th&nbsp;century. The benefits of universal education&nbsp;are many—including a more productive workforce,&nbsp;and a more informed and engaged democratic society equipped to think critically. Unions play a key role in negotiating public spending on education. At the school district and state level, education unions advocate for increased funds for schools.&nbsp;</p>
<p>We&nbsp;can&nbsp;measure&nbsp;the relationship between union density and&nbsp;public education investment by&nbsp;looking at states’ level of per-pupil spending.&nbsp;Adequate levels of per-pupil spending are&nbsp;crucial to maintaining&nbsp;quality education; low per-pupil spending limits the support students receive toward achieving their learning goals and makes it harder for districts to&nbsp;retain&nbsp;teachers and staff&nbsp;by&nbsp;offering competitive salaries or benefits. Increased per-pupil funding pays off for students.&nbsp;Research has consistently&nbsp;shown&nbsp;that increased funding for schools improves&nbsp;educational attainment, student&nbsp;achievement,&nbsp;and&nbsp;economic outcomes in adulthood&nbsp;(Jackson and&nbsp;Mackevicius&nbsp;2023). In one study, researchers&nbsp;examined the impact of school finance reforms between 1972 and 2010 and found that a 10% increase in school spending for 12 years leads to increased high school graduation rates, 7% higher wages, and 10% higher family incomes in adulthood for children from districts that saw the spending increase (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016).</p>
<p><strong>Figure</strong>&nbsp;<strong>G </strong>shows that states with higher rates of unionization spend&nbsp;substantially more&nbsp;per pupil on education—demonstrating the impact of union advocacy on education investment and building a more educated society.</p>


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<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-322861 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322861" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322861-35852-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Voting rights and democratic participation</h2>
<p>Many states disproportionately disenfranchise people of color (Johnson and Feldman 2020), and the number of voter suppression laws enacted across the country is high and rising. These restrictions threaten democratic participation and the stability of our democracy.</p>
<p>Unions strengthen democracy by encouraging civic engagement and helping workers become informed voters. Unions communicate with their members about issues and candidates to make sure workers have the information they need when they go to the polls. And as democratic institutions where members elect leaders and ratify contracts, unions serve as “schools of democracy,” equipping workers with civic skills that carry over to public life (Andrias and Hertel-Fernandez 2026). More broadly, because many organizations that shape policy represent elite or corporate interests, unions are a countervailing force, bringing working people’s voices into legislative debates and building coalitions that can win against well-resourced opposition.</p>
<p>Research shows that these effects translate into greater political participation. Union members are more likely to vote than the general public, and voter turnout is higher in states with greater unionization (EPI 2021). Conversely, turnout is lower in states with “right-to-work” (RTW) laws, which weaken unions and in turn the civic engagement they foster. Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson (2018) found that RTW laws reduced presidential election turnout by 2%, a substantial effect given the narrow margins that often decide presidential elections.</p>
<p>We build on this evidence by examining the relationship between union strength and laws that restrict voting. <strong>Figure H</strong> shows that there is a strong correlation between union density and voter suppression legislation. A large majority of low- and medium-union-density states passed at least one voter restriction bill between 2023 and 2025, while a large majority of high-union-density states passed none. Among high-union-density states, 14 out of 17 did not pass any voter restrictions during this period, while only eight of the medium-union-density states and three of the low-union-density states can claim this distinction.</p>
<p>These results are consistent with evidence that unions actively defend voting rights. Unions have long mobilized members to oppose voter suppression laws, educated communities about their rights, and turned out to vote despite increasing barriers (Bondy 2025). Unions have also expanded access to voting: Dean, McCallum, and Grumbach (2023) found that county-level union density was associated with greater access to ballot drop boxes—a highly secure way to increase access to voting—during the 2022 midterm elections. Together, these findings suggest that stronger unions not only increase voter participation but also help preserve and expand access to the ballot.</p>


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<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-322559 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322559" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322559-35853-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<div class="quick-card">
<h3>How unions protect workers in the age of AI</h3>
<p>Employers’ increasing use of AI systems has the potential to affect the lives and livelihoods of workers across the country. Without appropriate guardrails, employers’ integration of these technologies can erode workers’ rights, expose them to discrimination and surveillance, violate their privacy rights, and undermine their economic security. Where policymakers have been slow to act, unions have stepped up to help workers protect themselves against employers’ potentially exploitative use of AI.</p>
<p>Through collective bargaining, unions not only negotiate protections to mitigate the harms of AI but also ensure workers have a say in how the technology is deployed in their workplace. Across industries, union contracts are securing enforceable protections for workers, including (AFL-CIO Tech Institute 2026):</p>
<ul>
<li>Protections against job displacement and guaranteed training programs to help workers transition to new jobs if their role is impacted by AI;</li>
<li>Requirements that employers notify workers before introducing technologies and provide them a meaningful opportunity to raise concerns and shape implementation;</li>
<li>Restrictions on employer surveillance and clear limits on how worker data are collected, shared, and used;</li>
<li>Provisions ensuring that employment-related decisions like hiring and performance reviews are made with meaningful human oversight and not just left to AI.</li>
</ul>
<p>Unions also serve as a line of defense for the public because they equip workers to push back against unsafe or untested uses of AI in their communities. This underscores a broader lesson: The most effective AI policies are often not technology-specific policies at all, but policies that strengthen workers’ power to unionize and collectively bargain. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to AI protections and, while federal guardrails are necessary to protect all workers, unions are uniquely positioned to ensure that workers can protect themselves and their communities against exploitative uses of AI.</p>
</div>
<h2>State policy and union density</h2>
<p>Increasing union density across all states—including those where anti-union policies have historically suppressed unionization—is essential to strengthening both the economy and democracy, improving all workers’ wages, and expanding access to public goods like health care, retirement, and education.</p>
<p>As the previous section made clear, residents of high- and low-union-density states face starkly different economic and social realities. These wide variations in union density across states—and highly variable economic outcomes—are strongly correlated with variations in state labor policies. For example, the union rights of millions of public-sector, agricultural, and domestic workers (including home health care and in-home child care providers) vary by state because workers in these occupations are excluded from coverage under federal law. And even for private-sector workers whose union rights <em>are</em> covered under federal law, collective bargaining rights are limited by anti-union “right-to-work” laws in many states. Research shows that anti-union state policies result in lower union density. Union density averages 6.2% in states with anti-union RTW laws compared with 15.8% in non-RTW states, and states that limit or prohibit public-sector collective bargaining have lower overall union density than other states (Sherer and Gould 2024; Sherer and Morrissey 2026).</p>
<p>Here, we consider what union density would be if states with certain anti-union laws adopted the policies of states that better protect workers’ rights to unionize and collectively bargain. We consider two policy changes: 1) requiring state and local governments to bargain with public-sector workers who choose to unionize; and 2) repealing so-called “right-to-work” laws that limit collective bargaining rights of private-sector workers. These are two of many policies that states can adopt to remove barriers to unionization, but we focus on them because of their clearly documented, large-scale impact on large numbers of workers across much of the country. At present, roughly half of U.S. states have RTW laws in effect and do not require public employers to bargain with unionized public employees. Modeling changes to these two policies lets us estimate what would happen to union density if we removed large state-by-state labor policy disparities and created a stable “floor” for collective bargaining for workers across all states. This provides an important starting point for considering how additional, stronger state labor policies might affect union density, worker wages, and democracy.</p>
<h3>Public-sector workers face wide disparities in bargaining rights across states</h3>
<p>Variations in collective bargaining rights for public-sector workers are rooted in history, notably in Southern states where systemic racism drove the enactment of anti-union policies (Childers 2023; Dixon 2007; Kaufman 2018; Stelzner, Hoyt, and Ramchurn 2019). By the 1980s, most states had enacted public-sector collective bargaining policies, though these statutes varied in strength and coverage (Freeman and Ichniowski 1988). In more recent decades, many states have repealed or harshly limited formerly robust public-sector collective bargaining statutes, while a few states have expanded them. A key distinction is whether state and local government employers have a legal duty to bargain with unionized employees over pay and working conditions, rather than being merely permitted to bargain—or outright banned from doing so.</p>
<p>Sherer and Morrissey (2026) classify state public-sector bargaining rules across five categories of workers: teachers, police officers, firefighters, other local government employees, and other state government employees. States vary widely in which categories they cover and how strongly, and that variation maps closely onto union density. In states with strong, uniform duty-to-bargain rules across all five categories, public-sector union density can be close to 50% or higher, while in states that ban bargaining across most categories, state and local density can fall as low as the single digits. Pay consequences track these differences. Across the country, public-sector employees earn less than their private-sector counterparts with similar experience and education. This public-sector pay gap is smaller when bargaining rights are strong: Sherer and Morrissey (2026) estimate that in states with robust duty-to-bargain rights, public-sector workers earn 14.3% less than private-sector workers; the gap widens to 19.6% in states where bargaining is only permitted, and to 22.5% in states where it is banned.</p>
<h3>“Right-to-work” laws weaken union density and suppress wages for all workers</h3>
<p>“Right-to-work” laws prohibit unions and employers from negotiating over union security—the contract terms under which workers covered by a union contract either join the union or pay an agency fee covering their share of representation costs. State RTW laws first emerged as part of anti-union industry campaigns to suppress multiracial worker organizing and maintain Jim Crow labor relations in Southern states following the passage of the National Labor Relations Act (Pierce 2017). By making union finances more unpredictable and leaving unions more vulnerable to ongoing employer interference, these laws weaken unions&#8217; stability, suppress union density, and limit workers’ bargaining power. As a result, RTW laws generate negative outcomes for all workers—with or without a union. States with RTW laws have lower unionization rates and higher income inequality, and workers in RTW states on average have lower wages and benefits (Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd 2022). Sherer and Gould (2024) document that workers in RTW states earn 3.2% less than otherwise comparable workers in non-RTW states—about $1,670 per year for a full-time worker.</p>
<p>There are currently 27 states with RTW laws in place—including Colorado, which is not a traditional RTW state, but whose law has, since 1943, effectively imposed RTW conditions. By barring unionized workers from negotiating over union security unless they first win a second, state-administered election by a 75% supermajority of those voting or 50% plus one of all eligible workers—whichever is higher—Colorado’s anti-union policy has produced RTW-like outcomes, so we group it with RTW states.</p>
<h3>Removing state anti-union policies would raise national union density from 9.9% to 14.4%</h3>
<p>We estimate that these two policy changes—1) requiring state and local governments to bargain with public-sector workers who choose to unionize, and 2) repealing RTW—would substantially increase unionization in states that currently have more anti-union policies in place, as shown in <strong>Table 1</strong>.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> In the 24 states without a duty to bargain with public-sector employees, establishing that duty would raise public-sector union density from 16.7% to 46.7%. In the 27 RTW states, repealing RTW would increase private-sector density from 3.4% to 8.8%. Overall, removing these anti-union policies would increase union density in 27 states from 5.4% to 14.3%. Nationally, union density would rise from 9.9% to 14.4%.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> This is a conservative national estimate reflecting changes in union density only for the 27 states undergoing hypothetical policy changes and not including likely impacts on the 23 states and D.C. where stronger union policies are already in place. These states would likely also see some level of increased union density under this scenario, given that removal of anti-union state policies across the country would strengthen worker bargaining power and union organizing resources in all states.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-323055 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323055" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323055-35854-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Removing state-level anti-union policies would increase median wages by up to $4,900 a year</h3>
<p>Were the 27 RTW states to increase unionization to estimated levels, overall annualized median wages would rise by $1,600 to $4,900 for full-time, full-year workers, depending on the state. <strong>Table 1</strong> shows that if Virginia’s density rose from 4.9% to 15.5% because of the removal of state-level anti-union policies, annual pay for full-time, full-year workers at the state median wage would increase by about $4,500. Removing these anti-union policies in Texas could cause a similar increase in density, raising annual pay by $3,400.</p>
<p>Of course, were workers in all states able to achieve 30% union density, the effects on median pay would be even larger. These impacts are shown in <strong>Figure I</strong>. The 23 percentage point increase in density in Alabama, for example, would increase annualized median pay there for full-time, full-year workers by about $8,500.</p>


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<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-322787 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322787" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322787-35855-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Recent state policy changes show that anti-union laws lower union density</h3>
<p>Recent “natural experiments” in states that have changed one or both of these labor policies also show the impact on union density. For example, in states that adopted new RTW laws since 2010, union density fell 3.8 percentage points between 2010 and 2023. By comparison, union density declined only 2 percentage points during this same period in non-RTW states (Sherer and Gould 2024).</p>
<p>Wisconsin is an example of a state that both repealed a previous duty to bargain with public employees (in 2011) and enacted a new RTW law (in 2015). Since adopting these anti-union policies, between 2011 and 2024, Wisconsin’s union density has fallen by half, from 14% to 7%. Over this same period, national union density declined just 2 percentage points, from 13% to 11%. With both a RTW law in place and no public-sector duty to bargain, Wisconsin’s union density is plummeting in comparison with national and regional trends (Dresser, Rogers, and Vasquez 2025). Other studies show that Wisconsin’s adoption of anti-labor policies and declining union density have generated a wide array of harmful outcomes for the state’s economy and democracy, including sharp decreases in public education spending, declining worker wages, widening public-sector pay gaps (including stark increases in gender pay gaps for teachers), and declining voter participation (Nack et al. 2019; García and Han 2021; Biasi and Sarsons 2022; Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018).</p>
<h3>States have other policy options to enable workers to increase union density</h3>
<p>Beyond these two policy changes, states have numerous other opportunities to increase union density by removing obstacles to unionization and ensuring more workers have full rights to collectively bargain (Sherer 2026). A few examples that have not yet been adopted in most states include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Creating pathways to collective bargaining for all workers in occupations not currently covered by federal labor law, including in-home child care and home health care workers, agricultural workers, and rideshare or delivery drivers treated as “independent contractors” by digital platform companies;</li>
<li>Protecting workers’ freedom to refuse mandatory “captive audience” meetings on political or religious topics not related to work duties, including mandatory anti-union meetings employers typically hold when attempting to block workers from unionizing;</li>
<li>Ensuring workers whose paychecks stop due to a strike or lockout are eligible to apply for unemployment insurance; and</li>
<li>Establishing or expanding state agency capacities and public labor education programs that ensure workers can easily learn about their union rights.</li>
</ul>
<p>We do not model the specific impacts of all possible state policy changes in this report. But our conservative, baseline estimate of increases in union density likely to result from removing two of the largest state obstacles to workers’ union rights—RTW laws in 27 states and the lack of a duty to bargain for public employees in 24 states—suggests that combining these changes with additional policy changes would likely lead to additional increases in union density across the country.</p>
<h2>Federal policy and union density</h2>
<p>Given the clear benefits of tripling union membership, it is critical that policymakers prioritize reforms that enable workers to organize and collectively bargain. It is tempting to search for a policy “silver bullet” to restore the promise of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), our primary labor law. But the reality is that policymakers must adopt comprehensive labor law reforms to eradicate the effects of decades of political neglect that has steadily undermined the effectiveness of U.S. labor law. As discussed above, these reforms must at a minimum reverse state anti-union policies, via state or ideally federal labor law reforms that end Jim Crow-era occupational exclusions, ensure equal union rights and pathways to collective bargaining for all workers in all states, and eliminate RTW laws.</p>
<h3>Labor law reform has passed the House three times with bipartisan support</h3>
<p>A consistent narrative maintains that such policy change is impossible, but that narrative relies on the mistaken notions that real reforms require more political power than the labor movement has and that our legislative process prevents labor law reform. It is true that winning policy fights takes significant political capital. But labor law reform must not be seen as solely a labor movement priority. It is central to any attempt to address affordability pressures and economic inequality. And in this moment, such reform is imperative to our democracy. While the Senate filibuster rules do prevent much legislative progress, they are not inevitable dictates but rather agreed-upon rules that, as history shows, can change. It is deeply destructive to our political system to convince working people that the system simply cannot be expected to serve their interests, which is what this flawed narrative around labor law reform reinforces. To be clear, policies favored by elites benefiting from the unequal status quo are far more likely to become law than even broadly popular ones. But these reforms have the potential to help rebalance this inequality.</p>
<p>In fact, in the last two decades, legislation to significantly reform labor law has passed the U.S. House of Representatives three times—with bipartisan support each time. Even in the current Congress, legislation aimed at restoring collective bargaining rights has managed to bypass Republican House leadership opposition via parliamentary procedure (discharge petition) and pass with bipartisan support.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a> Of the on average 12,000 bills introduced in a given Congress, labor law reform measures have had more success than roughly 95% of bills—passing a chamber with bipartisan support. Of course, Senate rules around the filibuster requiring 60 votes to proceed on consideration of various measures have been a significant impediment to the Senate passing these reforms. However, since 2013, the Senate has used the “constitutional option” to change its own rules for procedures and has eliminated the 60-vote requirement to proceed on specific debates three times. That could be done here, too.</p>
<h3>Record high union approval strengthens the case for labor law reform</h3>
<p>Labor unions today have significantly higher public approval ratings than when major labor law reform was last considered, polling more than 20 points higher.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> Since 2021, approval for unions has remained high, with over 68% of people in the U.S. viewing unions favorably (Brenan 2025). This positive view of unions is shared across generations, with majorities of Boomers (59%), Gen X (58%), Millennials (61%), and Gen Z (63%) viewing unions favorably. Young adults (ages 18–35) have the highest favorability rate at 72% (Glass 2025).</p>
<p>Unions are viewed positively across party lines, with both Democrats (90%) and independents (69%) having high favorability rates for unions, and over 40% of Republicans approving of labor unions (Brenan 2025). Some conservative organizations recognize that unions are popular among workers: Research by American Compass (2025) finds that at least 46% of Republicans view unions somewhat favorably, with favorability increasing among young Republicans (60%).</p>
<p>Data from the American National Election Studies show that people in the U.S. favor unions over big business now more than ever—with the average rating for labor unions hitting a new high (60%), while big business hit a low (44%) (Sojourner and Reich 2025). Further, most people in the U.S. say the decline in union density is bad for the country (60%) and bad for working people (62%). Most young adults (69%), including young Republicans (52%) and young Democrats (82%), view the decline in union density as negative for working people (Van Green 2025).</p>
<h3><strong>Three bipartisan bills would pave the way toward restoring collective bargaining rights </strong></h3>
<p>As with many popular policies, high public opinion of unions has not translated into the enactment of labor law reform. Even though several bills that would reform aspects of our current labor law are being introduced and even passing with bipartisan support in the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate has failed to act on the legislation. There are three main bills with bipartisan support that would help reform our current labor law system and each should be passed.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>The </strong><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/20"><strong>Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO)</strong></a><strong> Act would restore private-sector workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively. </strong>It would streamline the process of forming a union, create a roadmap to reaching a first collective bargaining agreement, establish civil monetary penalties for employers who violate labor law, among other reforms—such as expanding coverage to more workers, overriding state “right-to-work” laws, and banning “captive audience” meetings (McNicholas, Poydock, and Rhinehart 2021). Since its first introduction in 2019, the PRO Act has passed the House of Representatives twice with bipartisan support.</li>
<li><strong>The </strong><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2736"><strong>Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act</strong></a><strong> (PSFNA) would establish public-sector workers’ right to organize and bargain collectively. </strong>This would fill an important gap—there is currently no federal law that guarantees all public-sector workers at the federal, state, and local levels the right to organize and collectively bargain. As a result, more than half of U.S. states today lack comprehensive collective bargaining laws for state and local public-sector workers (Sherer 2026).</li>
<li><strong>The </strong><a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2550"><strong>Protecting America’s Workforce Act</strong></a><strong> (PAWA) would reverse President Trump’s executive order that revokes collective bargaining rights for federal workers. </strong>The bill would reestablish collective bargaining rights for more than 1 million federal workers. In December 2025, PAWA passed the House of Representatives by a 231-195 vote.</li>
</ul>
<p>Beyond passing these important bills, policymakers should also consider additional policies to help workers access collective bargaining and union membership. We propose two concrete policies that complement the labor reforms above. While these two proposals alone will not result in tripling union membership, they could help more workers receive the benefits of collective bargaining, which serves as a corrective to the affordability crunch and the economic inequality that characterizes our economy.</p>
<h3>Guaranteed annual raises for workers in first contract arbitration</h3>
<p>When workers win a union and begin to collectively bargain with their employer, both parties have an obligation to bargain in “good faith.” However, given that the NLRA lacks meaningful penalties for violations, employers often engage in bad faith bargaining tactics with few consequences. In fact, it is well documented that many union-busting consultants view bargaining as a new phase of union-busting and advise employers to drag out bargaining for as long as possible. The goal is to avoid reaching a contract for a year or more, hoping that workers will then give up their union through decertification, which is permitted one year after the election. It is no coincidence that workers who have successfully formed a new union spend an average of 465 days bargaining for a first contract before reaching an agreement.</p>
<p>The Faster Labor Contracts Act, which overwhelmingly passed the U.S. House of Representatives last month, would discourage delay and promote good faith bargaining by establishing a mediation and binding arbitration process when employers refuse to bargain in good faith. Beyond guaranteeing workers first contract arbitration, we suggest the adoption of a mandatory cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for workers whose first contract bargaining ends up in arbitration. This would establish an important guardrail for workers in the arbitration process, given that an arbitrator will ultimately impose a final contract on both parties. This provision would ensure that workers receive at least a COLA each year of their first contract. In other words, by voting for a union, workers would be voting for a guaranteed raise.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a></p>
<p>For the average production, nonsupervisory worker, a 3% COLA would result in almost a $2,000 increase in annual earnings for a full-time, full-year worker. <a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> <strong>Table 2</strong> shows that, while these increases would vary widely by industry because pay varies widely by industry, workers in some of the lowest-paid industries would still see annual pay increases above $1,000.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-322720 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322720" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322720-35856-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Default collective bargaining when CEO-to-worker pay ratios exceed 100:1</h3>
<p>The outsized and ballooning gap in recent decades between CEO pay and the pay of typical workers is among the clearest signs that the economy’s rules have been rigged to allow the most powerful to claim oversized shares of income growth. This CEO-to-worker pay ratio rose nearly tenfold from 1978 to 2024, as the pay of CEOs rose over 1,000% while the pay of typical workers rose just 26%. The explosion of CEO pay was driven not by CEO’s rising productivity or skills, but by policy changes that boosted both the incentives and the ability of CEOs to raise their own pay.</p>
<p>When a firm’s CEO makes more than 100 times what the typical worker in their industry makes, effective corporate governance has clearly broken down—which threatens the ability of those outside the C-suite to receive their fair share of the firm’s income. The two main parties competing with executives to claim a share of a firm’s income are the shareholders and the firm’s workers. The best mechanism for ensuring that workers are able to bargain against CEOs and shareholders for their fair share of the income generated by the firm is collective bargaining.</p>
<p>We propose instituting default collective bargaining in any firm that meets or exceeds this 100:1 ratio. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting already requires the annual disclosure of CEO pay (SEC 2007). We propose that these disclosures be reported not only to the SEC but also to the National Labor Relations Board. Comparing those disclosures with Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the pay of a typical worker economy-wide in various industries, the NLRB would determine which corporations meet the default collective bargaining ratio of 100:1.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> The NLRB would then publish a public notice and notify specific corporations and their workers that the default collective bargaining ratio had been met, triggering default collective bargaining at the firm. The NLRB would then direct an election for a bargaining representative to be held within 45 days of the notification.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a></p>
<p>Nonsupervisory workers at these firms would then have the opportunity to select a bargaining representative of their choosing—whether a labor organization or other representative. The NLRB would conduct the election for and certify a bargaining representative, after which bargaining would start. For purposes of default collective bargaining, the presumption for the bargaining unit would be a wall-to-wall unit—a model where all nonsupervisory employees join a single bargaining unit—ensuring comprehensive coverage under the collective bargaining process and resulting contract. This standard would apply absent an employer or employee representative demonstrating extraordinary circumstances.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> The NLRB would then determine the appropriate bargaining unit, the same way the agency already accepts or rejects bargaining unit proposals. We propose that all such questions be resolved within 10 days of the NLRB’s notice of election for bargaining representative. This proposal would not apply to existing bargaining units, but in firms where unions are present, it would apply to any nonunionized nonsupervisory employees, as described below.</p>
<p>A threshold of 100:1 for the CEO-to-typical-worker pay ratio is reasonable and fair. A ratio this high clearly signals a fatal breakdown in the ability of the firm’s workers and shareholders to protect their income claims against executives looking to maximize their own incomes. A ratio this high will not affect <em>most</em> publicly traded companies but <em>will</em> be relevant to a large share of the U.S. workforce.</p>
<p>Comprehensive data on CEO pay are available only for a subset of firms: The Compustat Execucomp database tracks CEO pay for half of publicly owned companies (and most U.S. firms are not publicly owned). For the firms in the Compustat database, under half (41.7%) had a CEO-to-typical-worker pay ratio exceeding 100:1 in 2024. This proposal would provide the 30 million workers employed in firms that have higher ratios—representing about a fifth of total private-sector employment in the United States—with collective bargaining.</p>
<p>It is not a coincidence that the stratospheric rise in CEO pay was accompanied by an acceleration in the downward trend of unionization in the United States. The broader correlation between declining unionization and the rise of inequality is well established, and the&nbsp;highest-quality research documents&nbsp;that this relationship is clearly&nbsp;<em>causal</em>, with the decline of unions leading to a higher share of income claimed by households at the top of the income distribution (Farber et al. 2021).</p>
<p>To be clear, using a threshold CEO-to-worker pay ratio as a trigger for default collective bargaining will not alone solve the problem of excess CEO pay. We focus on this threshold as a policy trigger because it is a readily available and <em>measurable</em> indicator of the outsized control of executives over the distribution of the firm’s income. In the total absence of collective bargaining or any other strong corporate governance institutions, firm executives will shift income in a zero-sum fashion away from both the workers and the shareholders of a firm. If shareholders manage to assert some influence over CEO pay—e.g., through public pressure campaigns or say-on-pay mandates—one likely outcome will be CEOs looking to suppress the firm’s wages even further to make room for both their own outsized salaries and a return to shareholders that placates them. Only collective bargaining can protect the interests and earnings <em>of workers</em> in firms where executives pocket an outsized share of firms’ incomes.</p>
<p>If collective bargaining became widespread enough throughout the corporate sector, it would likely not only boost workers’ wages but also rein in excess executive pay broadly—actually helping shareholders at the same time. The research on this question is encouraging: Unions and collective bargaining have been found to significantly restrain excess CEO pay (Huang et al. 2017; Nanda,&nbsp;Nishikawa, and Prevost 2025; DiNardo, Hallock, and Pischke 2000). But even if expanded collective bargaining does not tamp down the CEO-to-worker pay ratio beneath our 100:1 threshold, it will at a minimum protect workers’ interests from excess executive power—without foreclosing any policy route shareholders take to restrain excess CEO pay.</p>
<p>Currently, a number of firms with at least some degree of unionization among their workforces have CEO-to-worker pay ratios that exceed 100:1. But this is not an argument against using this threshold as an indicator of dysfunctional corporate governance requiring a strong policy solution. For many of these firms, union coverage among their rank-and-file workforce is far from complete, so this proposal would help fill in glaring gaps. Most of these firms clearly do pay wages that are among the highest in their industries, which signals that the policy of default collective bargaining to protect workers’ interests in the face of dysfunctional corporate governance would largely work. Finally, one key empirical driver of high CEO pay is the simple size of the firm: The CEO-to- worker pay ratio rises steeply with the size of the firm, all else equal.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> The firms with CEO-to-worker pay ratios above 100:1 and some degree of unionization among their workforces are large firms; it would take a very strong effect of collective bargaining on CEO pay specifically to have kept pay ratios at these large firms well below average.</p>
<p>In our world with only 10% union density (and less than this in the private sector), it should hardly be a shock that collective bargaining <em>by itself</em> has not been able to stem what has been an irresistible tide toward high CEO pay. Even large increases in executive pay are not enormous when compared with overall returns to shareholders. Given the strong policy and economic barriers to shareholder activism in restraining CEO pay, it takes truly outrageous pay scales to mobilize enough organized opposition from shareholders. In those firms where it is relatively strong, collective bargaining <em>has</em> protected workers’ interests, and that is the primary goal we are looking to achieve with this policy. The fact that in these firms the CEOs have felt free to shift income to themselves at the expense of other stakeholders (like the shareholders of the firm) is not a sign that default collective bargaining is a bad solution for protecting workers’ interests—it is only a sign that the problem of excess CEO pay needs to be addressed from other angles as well.</p>
<h2><strong>Tripling union density is what workers want—and it is entirely achievable </strong></h2>
<p>Restoring union density to 1950s levels is not a nostalgic pipe dream. Federal and state policymakers have a clear roadmap for tripling union density. While no single reform discussed in this report is a silver bullet for the problems facing the country, taken together they would address one of the worst: the erosion of workers’ right to bargain for their fair share of the wealth they produce. These reforms are meaningful steps toward tripling union density, and toward an economy where productivity gains are shared broadly, not captured by corporate elites and the superrich.</p>
<p>The evidence in this report shows what is at stake. Tripling union density would deliver nearly $270,000 in extra earnings over the median worker’s career and shift $1.2 trillion annually to working people—reversing a third of the rise in inequality since 1979. Rebuilding union power would narrow racial wage gaps by more than a third, and removing state anti-union policies would help dismantle the legacy of Jim Crow-era campaigns aiming to suppress multiracial organizing. States with higher union density deliver better economic and personal well-being outcomes to their residents, and they have healthier democracies with fewer voting restrictions. At a time when the voting rights of all citizens are under attack, rebuilding union power is a democratic imperative.</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgments</strong></h2>
<p>The authors thank Hilary Wething for her contribution to this report&#8217;s section on public education spending. We also thank Matthew Wich, Summer Labor Fellow from the Institute for Social Concerns at the University of Notre Dame, for his support of the project.</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>
<h3>Methodology</h3>
<h4>How we measure union density</h4>
<p>The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data on both union&nbsp;membership—workers who are full-fledged union members—and union&nbsp;representation, which includes both union members and workers who are not members but are covered by a collective bargaining agreement. As a result, the share of workers represented by a union is higher than the share of union members. For example, in 2025, 11.2% of workers were represented by a union, but 10% were union members.</p>
<p>In this report, we measure union density as the share of workers who are members of a union. Throughout this report, the terms “union density” and “unionization” refer to those who are members of a union. When measuring union density by state, data are averaged over three years (2023 to 2025) to give a more accurate estimate of state unionization rates and avoid temporary single-year changes due to small sample sizes in some states.</p>
<h4>Estimating wage effects of tripling union density</h4>
<p>To assess how much higher wages would be after tripling union density, we use state-level annual data on wages and unionization from 1979 to 2019 and compare median wages with unionization rates across states and over time. Specifically, we regress the state median wage on the state union membership rate, controlling for permanent differences in state characteristics, national annual shocks (like recessions), and annual state characteristics like state unemployment rate, minimum wage level, and education, race, age, gender, broad industry, and managerial shares.</p>
<p>Using state-level data from the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group for 1979–2019, we regress the log median wage on union density with state and year fixed effects and additional covariates: the log minimum wage, unemployment rate, and shares of those with less than a high school degree and just a high school degree, age group shares, and shares of those who are white, Black, Hispanic, married, and shares of those in the public sector, manufacturing, construction, services, and a managerial occupation. Regressions are weighted by state employment levels averaged over 1979–2019. The coefficient on union membership is 0.724 with a standard error, accounting for clustering at the state level, of 0.191.</p>
<p>To calculate effects of increasing union density on racial wage gaps, we use the same wage regression as before, except where the dependent variable is the state annual racial wage gap.</p>
<p>The calculation yielding the $1.2 trillion estimate of the annual increase in workers&#8217; pay from tripling union density is as follows. First, the share of total labor income claimed by the bottom 80% is calculated from data provided by the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO 2026) Distribution of Household Income data (we focus on the bottom 80% because research has&nbsp;generally identified&nbsp;the positive effect of unions on boosting pay&nbsp;as applying&nbsp;mostly to union and nonunion workers&nbsp;in&nbsp;the bottom 80% of the U.S. workforce). In&nbsp;1979 this share was 60.5%, but by 2019 it had fallen to 50.1%. We use 50% for our calculations.&nbsp;Then we multiply the 14.5% boost to pay stemming from a tripling of union density by this 50%&nbsp;of labor income&nbsp;to get an estimate (7.25%) of how much&nbsp;total&nbsp;labor compensation would rise&nbsp;in the event of&nbsp;a tripling of union density. In the first quarter of 2026, the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) Table 2.1 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2026a) reports that total labor compensation was&nbsp;$16.1 trillion. Multiplying this by the 7.25% pay boost from tripling union density yields&nbsp;$1.16 trillion&nbsp;in higher pay&nbsp;for the bottom 80%. We believe this is the appropriate estimate for approximating how much higher wages would be for most workers if union density tripled. While potential caveats merit consideration, none, in our view, hold much force. For example, the regressions used earlier in the paper use median&nbsp;wages, not median&nbsp;total labor compensation, as the dependent variable. However,&nbsp;a long&nbsp;research literature has highlighted that benefit premiums stemming from unionization are&nbsp;likely even&nbsp;larger than wage premiums (Knepper 2020). To the degree that tripling union density works by giving all workers more leverage and bargaining power in labor markets, it seems clear that some of this leverage will be used to obtain broader and more generous coverage of benefits, not just higher wages. Another objection could be that union effects (both direct and indirect effects) are higher in the middle of the wage distribution than in either the lower or upper parts of the distribution, and&nbsp;hence&nbsp;the full 14.5%&nbsp;wage boost&nbsp;would only apply to (say) the&nbsp;second and&nbsp;middle fifths&nbsp;of workers while workers in the lowest and fourth fifth would see smaller wage boosts. However,&nbsp;in work that has estimated both the overall average effect of unionization on nonunion wages and the effect by wage percentile, the overall average effect is roughly one-half the effect at the median, a result that would be consistent with applying the 14.5% premium to half of all labor income, as we do (Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd 2021). Other research has similarly found that union effects at the median are&nbsp;very close&nbsp;to overall average effects (Baker et al. 2026).</p>
<p>For our analysis of how wage effects differ across union density levels, we use the same regression of log median wages on union density described above, modified to let the slope differ below and above 15% density using a piecewise-linear specification interacting union density with an indicator for density of at least 15%, while retaining the same controls and state and year fixed effects, weighted by state employment. The difference in slopes is statistically significant at the 1% level.</p>
<p>The scatterplot in <strong>Figure B </strong>uses 50 state-year bins to show this nonlinearity directly. The binned scatterplot groups the state-year observations into 50 employment-weighted bins by union density and plots each bin&#8217;s average real log median wage against its average union density, after partialing out the same controls and state and year fixed effects used in the regression.</p>
<h4>State union density groupings</h4>
<p>We divided the 50 U.S. states plus the District of Columbia into three equally sized groups based on their current (2023–2025) level of union density.</p>
<p>These groupings are shown in <strong>Appendix</strong> <strong>Table 1. </strong>We refer to the 17 states with the highest union density as “high-union-density states” (with 11.9%–25.1% union membership rates); the next 17 states (including D.C.) are “medium-union-density states” (6.8%–11.6%); and the remaining 17 are “low-union-density states” (2.5%–6.1%).</p>


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<h4>Estimating union density effects of establishing a public-sector duty to bargain and repealing “right-to-work” laws</h4>
<p>To estimate the effect of these two policy changes—1) requiring state and local governments to bargain with public-sector workers who choose to unionize, and 2) repealing RTW—we use the CPS Outgoing Rotation Groups for 2023–2025 to compute union density rates in states with stronger union policies (i.e., states with public sector collective bargaining and/or without RTW). We do this separately by industry and major occupation group for the private sector and by level of government (federal, state, and local) for the public sector. We then apply those rates to the workforce of each state that lacks the corresponding policy, holding each state&#8217;s industry, occupation, and government-employment mix fixed. Nevada is an exception on the private-sector side: Although Nevada is a RTW state, its private-sector union density is already comparatively high, so we hold its private-sector density at its current level.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> “Union membership” refers to workers who are full-fledged union members, while “union representation” includes both union members and workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement but not members. The share of workers represented by a union is thus higher than the share of union members. In 2025, for example, 11.2% were represented by a union and 10% were union members.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> In 2025, for the fifth consecutive year in a row, approval of unions reached record high levels last seen in the late 1950s, when union membership was roughly triple what it is now.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> The productivity-pay gap is a measure of how much income is generated in an average hour of work.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> “Union wage premium” refers to the additional wages paid to union members compared with nonunion workers with similar characteristics.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> For example, when the top marginal tax rate was 91%, as it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, executives kept far less of each additional dollar of pay than they do under today’s 37% top rate, which reduced the payoff to pursuing ever-larger compensation packages.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Relatedly, expanded unemployment benefits during the pandemic boosted workers’ bargaining power and compelled employers to make higher wage offers (Bivens and Banerjee 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See appendix for details about our methodology.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> The real median wage is the wage of the person in the middle of the overall wage distribution, including both union and nonunion workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> The median monthly cost of a mortgage in the U.S. is $1,521 according to Census (2025). Over the course of a year, that is $18,252.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See appendix for details about the calculation of this figure.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> In 2020 and 2021, Congress authorized Economic Impact Payments—better known as the &#8220;COVID checks.&#8221; Those three rounds of payments added roughly $430 billion to U.S. families’ personal income in those years and were widely viewed as an&nbsp;historically ambitious economic intervention. Data on how much these checks added to personal income can be found at Bureau of Economic Analysis (2026c).</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Data on federal defense spending in 2025 is from Bureau of Economic Analysis (2026b).</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Data on the income shares by percentile come from CBO (2026), which contains data through 2022. The calculation of how much the $1.2 trillion gain to wages would reverse the rise in income shares of the top quintile uses data from BEA (2026a).</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> See appendix for details on how we estimated these wage effects.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> See appendix for details on how we calculated the effects of increasing union density on racial wage gaps.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> See Appendix Table 1, which shows how we grouped states into low-, medium-, and high-union-density categories.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> For details on the data and methodology used to produce these estimates, see appendix.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> For this state-level analysis, we use 2023–2025 averages of union density across states, which is 9.9%, rather than the 10% for 2025 cited earlier in this report.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> See passage of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2550">Protecting America&#8217;s Workforce Act</a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/5408">Faster Labor Contracts Act</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> The last time a major labor law reform was considered was in 2009 with the Employee Free Choice Act.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/20/cosponsors?hl=protecting+the+right+to+organize&amp;s=7&amp;r=5&amp;overview=closed&amp;pageSort=alphaByParty">The Protecting the Right to Organize Act</a>&nbsp;has two Republican co-sponsors, the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2736/cosponsors?pageSort=alphaByParty">Public Service Freedom to Negotiate Act</a>&nbsp;has&nbsp;six Republican co-sponsors, and the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2550/cosponsors?pageSort=alphaByParty">Protecting America’s Workforce Act</a>&nbsp;has nine Republican co-sponsors.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> One way to determine the exact COLA amount is to use nonseasonally adjusted values of the national Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. These price index values are easily available, less subject to revision, and widely covered in the media. The simplest COLA adjustment would be to use the annual rate of inflation measured as the percent change between the two most recent annual averages of nonseasonally adjusted CPI-U values. See BLS (2023) for other considerations.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> CBO estimated CPI in 2026 at 2.8%, 2027 at 2.4%, and then 2.3% after—however those estimates were done before the U.S. war in Iran that increased energy prices, so we estimate COLA at 3% for purposes of the proposal. To calculate full-time, full-year worker wages, we used 2025 average production, nonsupervisory wage rates (EPI 2026f).</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> We specifically would recommend calculating the CEO-to-typical-worker pay ratio using the methodology detailed in&nbsp;EPI (2025).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> In order to appear on the ballot, an individual or organization would have to demonstrate a record of collective bargaining over the preceding three years or obtain 100 signatures or 10% of the workforce, whichever is less.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> The showing of extraordinary circumstances is referenced in the acute care hospital rule: 29 CFR § 103.30 (1989).</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> This correlation between simple firm size and CEO pay is yet another piece of evidence that CEO pay is not about the skills or acumen of individual CEOs, but is driven by noncompetitive market structures and labor markets for executives.</p>
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<p>García, Emma, and Eunice Han. 2021.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-impact-of-changes-in-public-sector-bargaining-laws-on-districts-spending-on-teacher-compensation/"><em>The Impact of Changes in Public-Sector Bargaining Laws on Districts’ Spending on Teacher Compensation</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, April 2021.</p>
<p>Glass, Aurelia. 2025. “<a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/everybody-likes-unions/">Everybody Likes Unions</a>.” Center for American Progress, November 4, 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, and Alix Gould-Werth. 2020. <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/labor-organizations-and-unemployment-insurance-a-virtuous-circle-supporting-u-s-workers-voices-and-reducing-disparities-in-benefits/"><em>Labor Organizations and Unemployment Insurance: A Virtuous Circle Supporting U.S. Workers’ Voices and Reducing Disparities in Benefits</em></a>. Washington Center for Equitable Growth, October 2020.</p>
<p>Huang, Qianqian, Feng Jiang, Erik Lie, and Tingting Que. 2017. “<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/effect-of-labor-unions-on-ceo-compensation/394B191FBA84A754F2DF5123DDEB31A0">The Effect of Labor Unions on CEO Compensation</a>.” <em>Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52</em>, no. 2: 553–582. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000072">https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109017000072</a>.</p>
<p>Jackson, C. Kirabo,&nbsp;Rucker&nbsp;C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico. 2016. “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms</a>.”&nbsp;<em>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</em>&nbsp;131, no. 1: 157–218.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Jackson, C. Kirabo, and Claire L. Mackevicius. 2023. “<a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/app.20220279">What Impacts Can We Expect from School Spending Policy? Evidence from Evaluations in the United States</a>.”&nbsp;<em>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics&nbsp;</em>16, no. 1: 412–446. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220279">https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20220279</a>.</p>
<p>Johnson, Theodore R., and Max Feldman. 2020.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/new-voter-suppression"><em>The New Voter Suppression</em></a><em>.</em>&nbsp;Brennan Center for Justice, January 2020.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Kaufman, Dan. 2018. “<a href="https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/a-labor-day-reflection-on-race-and-unions">A Labor Day Reflection on Unions, Race, and Division</a>.” <em>The New Yorker</em>, September 3, 2018.</p>
<p>KFF. 2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.kff.org/state-health-policy-data/state-indicator/health-insurance-coverage-population-0-64/?currentTimeframe=0&amp;sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D#notes"><em>Health Insurance Coverage of Population Ages 0-64: 2024</em></a>.&nbsp;Accessed May 4, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Knepper, Matthew. 2020. “<a href="https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article-abstract/102/1/98/58540/From-the-Fringe-to-the-Fore-Labor-Unions-and?redirectedFrom=fulltext">From the Fringe to the Fore: Labor Unions and Employee Compensation</a>.” <em>The Review of Economics and Statistics</em> 102, no. 1: 98–112.</p>
<p>Ma, Jennifer, Matea Pender, and Xiaowen Hu. 2025. <a href="https://research.collegeboard.org/media/pdf/Trends-in-College-Pricing-and-Student-Aid-2025-final.pdf"><em>Trends in College Pricing and Student Aid 2025</em></a>, College Board.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Lynn Rhinehart. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/why-workers-need-the-pro-act-fact-sheet/">Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act</a>” (fact sheet). Economic Policy Institute, February 9, 2021.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Heidi Shierholz. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/workers-resolve-drives-increase-in-unionization-in-2025/"><em>Workers’ Resolve Drives Increase in Unionization in 2025</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2026.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, Heidi Shierholz, and Hilary Wething. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-arent-just-good-for-workers-they-also-benefit-communities-and-democracy/"><em>Unions Aren’t Just Good for Workers—They Also Benefit Communities and Democracy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2025.</p>
<p>Nack, David, Michael Childers, Alexia Kulwiec, and Armando Ibarra. 2019. “<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0160449X19860585">The Recent Evolution of Wisconsin Public Worker Unionism Since Act 10</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Labor Studies Journal</em>&nbsp;45, no. 2: 147–165.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19860585">https://doi.org/10.1177/0160449X19860585</a>.</p>
<p>Nanda, Vikram, Takeshi Nishikawa, Andrew Prevost. 2025. “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/fima.12472">The Impact of Unions on Compensation Consultants and CEO Pay</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Financial Management</em> 54, 89–122.&nbsp;<br />
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12472">https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12472</a>.</p>
<p>Pierce, Michael. 2017. <a href="https://lawcha.org/2017/01/12/origins-right-work-vance-muse-anti-semitism-maintenance-jim-crow-labor-relations/"><em>The Origins of Right-to-Work: Vance Muse, Anti-Semitism, and the Maintenance of Jim Crow Labor Relations</em></a>. The Labor and Working-Class History Association, January 12, 2017.</p>
<p>Rosenfeld, Jake, Patrick Denice, and Jennifer Laird. 2016.&nbsp;<em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/union-decline-lowers-wages-of-nonunion-workers-the-overlooked-reason-why-wages-are-stuck-and-inequality-is-growing/">Union Decline Lowers Wages of Nonunion Workers</a></em>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2016.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Securities and Exchange Commission. 2007. “<a href="https://www.sec.gov/answers/execcomp.htm">Executive Compensation</a>” (web page). Last modified January 4, 2007.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rights-to-unionize-and-collectively-bargain-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/"><em>Holding the Line: Rights to Unionize and Collectively Bargain</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2026.</p>
<p>Sherer,&nbsp;Jennifer,&nbsp;and Elise Gould. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/data-show-anti-union-right-to-work-laws-damage-state-economies-as-michigans-repeal-takes-effect-new-hampshire-should-continue-to-reject-right-to-work-legislation/">Data Show Anti-Union ‘Right-to-Work’ Laws Damage State Economies</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Working Economics Blog</em>&nbsp;(Economic Policy Institute), February 13, 2024.</p>
<p>Sherer,&nbsp;Jennifer,&nbsp;and Monique Morrissey. 2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/stronger-collective-bargaining-laws-will-benefit-all-virginians/"><em>Stronger Collective Bargaining Laws Will Benefit All Virginians</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2026.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/middle-out-economics-is-good-for-workers-their-families-and-the-broader-economy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Middle-Out Economics Is Good for Workers, Their Families, and the Broader Economy</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), March 19, 2024.</p>
<p>Sojourner, Aaron, and Adam Reich. 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/americans-favor-labor-unions-over-big-business-now-more-than-ever/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Americans Favor Labor Unions Over Big Business Now More Than Ever</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), May 20, 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Stelzner, Mark, Eric Hoyt, and Toushita Ramchurn. 2019. <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/structured-conflict-changes-in-federal-and-state-labor-laws-and-strike-activity-1950-to-2017/"><em>Structured Conflict: Changes in Federal and State Labor Laws and Strike Activity, 1950 to 2017</em></a>. Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst, May 2019.</p>
<p>United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 2017. “2<a href="https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/cnpp/2015-expenditures-children-families">015 Expenditures on Children By Families</a>” (web page). Accessed June 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Van Green, Ted. 2025. “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/27/majorities-of-adults-see-decline-of-union-membership-as-bad-for-the-us-and-working-people/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Majorities of Adults See Decline of Union Membership as Bad for the U.S. and Working People</a>.” Pew Research Center, August 27, 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Zhang, Elizabeth. 2026. <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/nearly-3-million-uninsured-adults-would-gain-a-path-to-medicaid-coverage-if-their"><em>Nearly 3 Million Uninsured Adults Would Gain a Path to Medicaid Coverage if Their States Adopted ACA Medicaid Expansion</em></a>. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, March 19, 2026.</p>
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		<title>Taking affordability seriously: Even with recent oil shocks, affordability remains mostly an issue of incomes, not prices </title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/taking-affordability-seriously-even-with-recent-oil-shocks-affordability-remains-mostly-an-issue-of-incomes-not-prices/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 18:34:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=321572</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Affordability has been the policy buzzword of recent years. Much of the affordability discourse—both among policymakers and the public—has focused near-exclusively on prices as the big affordability problem.]]></description>
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<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>Affordability is not just about prices; it’s the outcome of a race between income growth and price inflation. When income growth is slower than price inflation, affordability worsens. When income growth is faster, affordability improves.</li>
<li>Focusing just on prices is bad for understanding how the economy works and how it has performed in the recent past, and it leads to an overly restrictive policy menu for improving families’ affordability.</li>
<li>Policy can more reliably address income growth for typical families. This growth has been stunted for decades by the rise of inequality. Closing this gap by ensuring more equitable distribution of future growth is the strongest tool we have for improving affordability.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Affordability has been <em>the</em> policy buzzword of recent years. Much of the affordability discourse—both among policymakers and the public—has focused near-exclusively on <em>prices</em> as the big affordability problem. But affordability is not a problem of high prices, instead it’s the outcome of a race between incomes and prices. And the reason typical families have faced an affordability crunch in recent decades is not because prices have grown exceptionally fast, it’s because incomes for the vast majority have grown too slowly. This income growth has been suppressed mostly by rising inequality that has put a growing wedge between overall economic growth and the income growth of typical families.</p>
<p>Getting the drivers of affordability right is important—it’s not just quibbling. If you only examine price growth and try to infer what has happened to affordability over periods of economic history, you’ll usually get the story wrong. And if policymakers only look at how to change the trajectory of prices while ignoring what they can do to change the trajectory of incomes, they will be far less effective in providing useful relief to U.S. families. There are far more ways to use policy to raise incomes in a targeted and effective way than there are to suppress price growth.</p>
<p>Below, we provide some more background on why analyses of affordability need to include incomes, why policymakers have much more scope to raise incomes in a useful way as opposed to pushing down prices, and why focusing just on prices can obscure whether affordability has improved or worsened.</p>
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<h4><strong>Why do prices dominate today’s affordability debates? </strong></h4>
<p>In modern capitalist economies, prices rise essentially every year (though at quite different rates), but so do incomes. Determining what has happened to families’ ability to afford a decent and secure life requires looking at measures that take into account both sides of the affordability equation, such as real (inflation-adjusted) income growth. Nobody really disputes this. After all, Americans could <a href="https://libraryguides.missouri.edu/pricesandwages/1930-1939">buy a new car for $600</a> in the 1930s, but nobody thinks society was generally richer back then.</p>
<p>The narrow focus on prices in assessing one’s own economic struggles likely stems from several factors.</p>
<p>First, inflation was very fast in the early 2020s. Americans hadn’t experienced inflation rates that high in decades, and they didn’t like them, so prices remain front of mind for many.</p>
<p>Second, it is true that price changes can dominate what happens to real incomes over <em>very</em> short time periods (say a year or less). This recognition is why we can be so sure that the oil price shock inflicted by the U.S. bombing of Iran is going to be so damaging to U.S. families. The rise in oil prices so far this year has likely baked in at least a 1.5% increase in inflation over the next 6–12 months. In 2025, real wage growth for <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">the large majority of workers</a> was slower than 1.5% (which was the outcome of roughly 4% nominal wage growth minus 2.5% inflation). Given this, a sharp and unexpected 1.5% jump in prices will likely erase any prospective real wage gains for workers in 2026.</p>
<p>Finally, it <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/policy-choices-did-not-cause-recent-years-inflation-but-did-deliver-strong-wage-growth/">has been noted</a> that many Americans see wage gains as something they accomplished themselves through hard work, while prices are out of their immediate control. Inflation is hence seen as damage done <em>to</em> them and something they need relief from. But <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/policy-choices-did-not-cause-recent-years-inflation-but-did-deliver-strong-wage-growth/">this is mostly wrong</a>—policy choices impact wage growth at least as much as inflation, and the most effective policy relief for living standards will come through measures that raise wages, not restrain prices.</p>
<h4><strong>Policy can target incomes more effectively and precisely than prices</strong></h4>
<p>One person’s income is another person’s cost, which means prices are a bundle of different stakeholders’ incomes. The bill you pay at the grocery store must cover payments the store makes to its shareholders, the salary of the CEO and managers, the wages of cashiers, and the cost of buying food from producers. We don’t want <em>all</em> these incomes to be forced down. Given extreme levels of inequality in the U.S., we would likely be fine with lower CEO pay and payments to shareholders, but we would want wages of cashiers and many in the food production supply chain to rise. Efforts to simply clamp down on this price will have uncertain effects on incomes.</p>
<p>In the jargon of economists, focusing on prices is <em>sector-based</em> policy but to genuinely improve affordability we need <em>factor-based</em> policies, where factors of production like capital, rank-and-file workers, and corporate management can be specifically targeted by policies that aim to raise or restrain their incomes.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are many good policy options for targeted affordability policy specifically toward low- and middle-income families. Incomes for these families—and for anybody without dynastic wealth—are dominated by wages and public benefits. We talk about each of these in turn below.</p>
<p><strong><em>Boosting public benefits is affordability policy</em></strong></p>
<p>Public benefits are entirely under policymakers’ control. If policymakers really cared about the affordability of groceries or health care or energy, they could boost benefits for food stamps, Medicaid, and the low-income heating energy assistance program. These programs currently deliver needed assistance to tens of millions of families to make life more affordable—and they do this with vanishingly small administrative costs, meaning they are highly efficient. Yet all <a href="https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/community-and-social-services/2025/2025-october-focus-on-lower-income-households.pdf">of these programs</a> are slated for steep cuts in the coming decade due to the Republican tax and spending megabill passed in 2025. This bill will inflict large damage to the most vulnerable families’ ability to afford decent and secure lives.</p>
<p>Further, Congress and the Trump administration chose to not extend the Biden administration’s more-generous subsidies for people to buy health insurance through the marketplace exchanges of the Affordable Care Act. The failure to extend these subsidies—even after a full federal government shutdown engineered by congressional Democrats aimed at prioritizing this issue—means that average out-of-pocket costs <a href="https://www.kff.org/quick-take/aca-insurers-are-raising-premiums-by-an-estimated-26-but-most-enrollees-could-see-sharper-increases-in-what-they-pay/">will double</a> for those buying insurance in the exchanges.</p>
<p>Besides just reversing these cuts, making the U.S. welfare state more robust could also greatly boost the affordability of a decent life. Things like making <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/medicare-for-all-would-help-the-labor-market/">health coverage more universal</a> with lower out-of-pocket costs, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/">reforming unemployment insurance</a> to make it more protective, and providing all families with children a generous <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/presenting-epis-budget-for-shared-prosperity/">universal child allowance</a> could dramatically improve affordability.</p>
<p><strong><em>Policy can boost affordability through higher wages as well</em></strong></p>
<p>The link between policy changes and wage growth is slightly less direct than for public benefits, but <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">it remains very strong</a>. Capitalist labor markets are <em>inherently</em> tilted toward employers and against workers. The only periods of history that have seen strong and equal rates of wage growth across the workforce have been periods where policy supported institutions that boosted workers’ leverage with employers.</p>
<p>The 30 years after World War II saw the creation of policies and institutions that successfully spread the gains from rising productivity equitably among workers up and down the wage distribution, with low- and middle-wage workers seeing growth rates as fast as high-wage workers. This equitable distribution of wage growth was a crucial way that income growth more broadly was kept equitable in this period.</p>
<p>Since 1979, however, these institutions have been steadily attacked and weakened with no new institutions being stood up to take their place in ensuring an equitable distribution of economic growth. The result has been that wages and incomes of typical families have lagged far behind <em>average</em> income and wage growth (or productivity). The wedge between income growth experienced by the vast majority of families and average growth is simply income being generated in the economy that is not helping typical families’ affordability struggles. Instead, it is income being funneled reliably away to the top.</p>
<p>There’s no reason that the institutions that equalized wage growth cannot be built back up and modernized.</p>
<p>The federal minimum wage is the most obvious policy institution for raising wages at the low end of the labor market. Raising the federal minimum wage from its current shamefully low $7.25 would directly boost affordability for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rtwa-2025-impact-fact-sheet/">tens of millions of workers</a>. In the middle of the wage distribution, unions have proven to be the institution that has historically counteracted employer power and given typical workers increased leverage. However, unions are in a far weaker position today relative to their high points because of intentional policy choices—specifically because policymakers failed to act to curb <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/">employers’ growing hostility</a> (and often their illegal activities) toward union organizing. If stronger policy boosted union density, unions would <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/union-decline-lowers-wages-of-nonunion-workers-the-overlooked-reason-why-wages-are-stuck-and-inequality-is-growing/">raise wages for both members and non-members</a> alike.</p>
<p>Low- and middle-wage workers also benefit enormously from a determined effort to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-importance-of-locking-in-full-employment-for-the-long-haul/">keep unemployment low for extended periods of time</a>. In recent decades, policymakers have tolerated excess unemployment to keep inflation in check, but this is far too costly a strategy to keep potential inflation in check. Besides locking out millions of willing workers from job opportunities, long periods of excess unemployment <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-should-we-assess-and-characterize-workers-wage-growth-in-recent-decades/">were periods when real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth became literally stagnant</a>.</p>
<p>Policymakers often seem skeptical of the effectiveness of these wage-boosting policies, arguing that the effects are too indirect and will take too long to provide benefits to workers. It’s true that efforts to boost unionization and sustain full employment will take some time to push up wages. <em>But they will do this reliably. </em>Further, many policies advanced in the name of reducing prices would also take a long time to come to fruition. For example, calls to tighten antitrust restrictions against corporate mergers and to break up established monopolies often have lots of merit. However, they are not policies that happen instantly and have purely predictable effects.</p>
<h4><strong>Focusing too hard on prices can obscure when affordability is actually improving</strong></h4>
<p>Finally, one key reason to broaden the affordability debate beyond prices is simply to make sure the public and policymakers can correctly identify periods of improvement or degradation of affordability. As an example of how focusing only on prices can lead to an incorrect diagnosis of affordability trends, take the example of two five-year stretches in recent economic history, both measured from a business cycle peak and going five years forward from there: In the years between 2007 and 2012, annual inflation averaged 1.8% and peaked at 5.5%, while between 2019 and 2024, inflation averaged 4.2% and peaked at 9%. Based on price growth alone, one would expect affordability to have eroded more rapidly in that second period, and indeed the popular narrative is that the early 2020s inflation was particularly destructive for affordability.</p>
<p>But between 2007 and 2012, the nation’s unemployment rate averaged 8.3%, while it averaged less than 5% between 2019 and 2024. After 2007, it took 93 months to re-attain the pre-recession unemployment rate, while it took just 29 months after the 2019 business cycle peak. In short, the labor market was far stronger in the second period.</p>
<p>And when it comes to real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth, the second period—largely because of its lower unemployment—saw far better outcomes than the first. In the 2019–2024 period, inflation-adjusted wages for low-wage workers (those at the 10th percentile) and the median worker rose by a cumulative 15.3% and 5.8%, respectively. In short, contrary to most conventional wisdom, affordability <em>improved</em> in this time. Between 2007 and 2012, real wages outright fell for both low-wage and median workers. Even with very slow inflation, affordability was demonstrably worse in that earlier period.</p>


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<p>More recently, inflation averaged slightly lower in 2025 (2.5%) than 2024 (2.9%). Yet for many workers—and particularly low-wage workers—2025 <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">saw <em>weaker</em> (or even negative) real wage growth</a>. This is largely due to some slight cooling in the labor market as unemployment rose from 4.0% to 4.4% over the course of 2025. Hence, even as inflation decelerated, the cooling labor market led to an even faster deceleration in nominal wages, which meant that affordability worsened for many workers.</p>


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<h4><strong>Reducing inequality is the key to improving affordability </strong></h4>
<p>Because many policymakers believe that affordability concerns are a new problem caused by inflation of recent years, they are now on a frenzied search for new and creative solutions to this price problem. But because the real affordability problem for U.S. families did <em>not</em> emerge in the past few years (remember, affordability was improving in the five years before 2025) and because the genuine long-run problem of affordability was about the inequality of income and wage growth, not excess inflation, most of these new and creative solutions just won’t hit the mark.</p>
<p>It’s understandable why many policymakers seem frustrated with being reminded of the long-diagnosed problem of inequality and the proven remedies—such as sustained full employment, higher wage standards like minimum wages, protecting workers’ fundamental rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, and a more robust welfare state.</p>
<p>Some, of course, just don’t believe in some of these solutions, while many who do would argue that these proven remedies are politically unrealistic in the current moment. But because the real affordability problem is an inequality problem that requires those at the top of the income and wealth scales having to accept less growth going forward (less than the stratospheric gains they’ve gotten used to, it should be said), <em>any</em> genuine solution is going to seem impossible in today’s political system that is dominated by the wealthiest families and corporations. <em>Any</em> policy—whether old and well-tested or new and creative—that actually aims to redistribute income, wealth, and power away from where it sits today will face a wall of opposition that must be politically overcome one way or the other. There’s no “one weird trick” where you can develop a policy creative and neat enough that it will somehow fool the rich and powerful about what its end result will be. And if the end result of the new and creative policy does not threaten the prerogatives of the rich, it’s not a real solution.</p>
<p>Today’s affordability concerns are indeed rooted in objective facts about the material circumstances of middle- and working-class families in the United States. Precisely because of this, they deserve more serious analysis and policy responses than they have been getting. This means focusing more on incomes than prices, and it means being clear-eyed that it has been the upward redistribution of income to the top—abetted by policy decisions—that is the drag on typical families’ affordability. Until solutions address that, they’re mostly just noise.</p>
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		<title>Racial and ethnic disparities in the United States: An interactive chartbook</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 04:00:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=270707</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This interactive chartbook provides a statistical snapshot of race and ethnicity in the United States, depicting racial/ethnic disparities observed through population demographics; civic participation; labor market outcomes; income, poverty, and wealth; and health. The chartbook also highlights some notable intersections of gender with race and ethnicity, including educational attainment, labor force participation, life expectancy, and maternal mortality. The findings are bracing, as they show how much more work we need to do to address longstanding and persistent racial inequities.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Originally published June 15, 2022</em></p>
<p>This interactive chartbook provides a statistical snapshot of race and ethnicity in the United States, depicting racial/ethnic disparities observed through</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="#demographics">Population demographics</a></li>
<li><a href="#civiccharts">Civic engagement</a></li>
<li><a href="#laborcharts">Labor market outcomes</a></li>
<li><a href="#incomecharts">Income, poverty, and wealth</a></li>
<li><a href="#healthcharts">Health</a></li>
</ul>
<p>The chartbook also highlights some notable intersections of gender with race and ethnicity, including educational attainment, labor force participation, life expectancy, and maternal mortality. The findings are bracing, as they show how much more work we need to do to address longstanding and persistent racial inequities.</p>
<p>Most charts include data for five racial/ethnic groups in each of the charts—white, Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN). In the charts and text, “Americans” refers to all U.S. residents, regardless of citizenship status.</p>
<div class="box">
<p>Data for AAPI and AIAN populations have not always been available from the federal government sources used. Starting in November 2024 this data is included in selected charts identified with a yellow box.</p>
</div>
<p>Researchers seeking disaggregated data and statistics for AAPI and AIAN groups are encouraged to look at sources cited in the companion essays in the Anti-Racist Economic Research and Policy Guide: <a href="https://aapidata.com/">AAPI Data</a> and the <a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/indiancountry">Center for Indian Country Development</a> at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.</p>
<p>As our efforts illustrate, collecting and maintaining data sources that are representative of the entire U.S. population is an essential first step toward overcoming the invisibility, neglect, and lack of understanding experienced by many communities of color. Future work on this project will involve identifying comparable data from alternative sources that fill in as much of the missing information in the chartbook as possible.</p>

</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;"><em>In this interactive chartbook, additional notes and source information can be accessed by clicking on the ellipses ( &#8230; ) in the notes and sources lines under the charts.</em></span></p>
<p>
<a name='demographics'></a>
<h2>Population demographics</h2>


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<a name="1"></a><div class="figure chart-244632 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard shrink-table" data-chartid="244632" data-anchor="1"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">The U.S. has become more racially and ethnically diverse over the last two decades</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of U.S. population by race and ethnicity, 2000, 2010, and 2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">1</div><div class="figLabel">1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244632-33962-email.png" width="608" alt="1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Each decennial Census since 2000 has revealed a more racially and ethnically diverse U.S. population. While the share of people who identify as Black (about 12%) or American Indian and Alaskan Native (0.7%) has remained constant, the non-Hispanic white share of the population has declined from 69.1% in 2000 to 57.8% in 2020. On the other hand, a growing share of U.S. residents identify as Hispanic (increasing from 12.5% in 2000 to 18.7% in 2020) or Asian American and Pacific Islander (increasing from 3.7% in 2000 to 6.1% in 2020). These changing population demographics reflect different trends in birth, mortality, and immigration rates across groups. Since 2000, there have also been significant changes in how people identify racially. Notably, a growing share of people identify as being of two or more races (this would include people who, for example, identify as Black and AAPI, but would not include people who identify as Black and Hispanic, as they are identifying Black alone as their race and Hispanic as their ethnicity). Also, a growing but still small share of people identify as being of a race other than those explicitly defined by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">As Trevon Logan notes in his essay, it is the OMB that issues regulations regarding the classifications of race and ethnicity by federal agencies, including the U.S. Census Bureau, which conducts the major household and business surveys used by researchers. There are six permitted race categories and two ethnicity classifications, Hispanic and non-Hispanic. As such, everyone is a member of both a race and ethnicity. For more on the current classifications, see <a href="https://www.epi.org/anti-racist-policy-research/race-and-ethnicity-in-empirical-analysis">Logan’s essay</a>.</span></p>
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<a name="2"></a><div class="figure chart-244645 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244645" data-anchor="2"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">While U.S. residents are overwhelmingly citizens, Asian American/Pacific Islander and Hispanic citizens are more likely to be first-generation immigrants</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of U.S. population by race/ethnicity and nativity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">2</div><div class="figLabel">2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244645-30222-email.png" width="608" alt="2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Across all racial and ethnic groups, an overwhelming majority of people in the United States are U.S. citizens, according to data from the Current Population Survey. However, nativity shares vary across racial groups. White persons (95.9%), American Indian and Alaskan Native (AIAN) persons (81.3%), and Black persons (88.6%) are most likely to have been born citizens (born in the United States or to United States citizens abroad), compared with over half of the Hispanic population (66.7%) and more than one-third (37.8%) of the Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) population.</p>
<p>Immigration status also varies widely. AAPI residents are most likely to be immigrants: more than one-third (38.3%) were not born U.S. citizens but became U.S. citizens (i.e., are naturalized U.S. citizens), while another 23.9% are not citizens. Hispanic residents are next most likely to be immigrants: 12.6% are naturalized citizens and 20.7% are not citizens. These statistics highlight only a fraction of the diversity represented within and across different racial and ethnic groups. As several essays in the <a href="https://www.epi.org/anti-racist-policy-research/"><em>Advancing Anti-Racist Economic Research and Policy</em></a> guide explain, analyses that use categories or group descriptions that are too broadly defined can lead to inaccurate conclusions.</p>
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<a name="3"></a><div class="figure chart-247107 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="247107" data-anchor="3"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">The uneven geographic distribution of racial and ethnic populations highlights the influence of state and local policy on racial inequality</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of state population by race and ethnicity, 2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">3</div><div class="figLabel">3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/247107-30223-email.png" width="608" alt="3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The U.S. Census Bureau projects that Black, Hispanic, AAPI, and other people who do not identify as white will collectively account for over half of the population of the United States by 2044. In California, Hawaii, Maryland, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and the District of Columbia, the white population is already in the minority, and in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, New Jersey, and New York, white persons make up just over half of the population. This interactive map shows areas of population density for each race or ethnic group (click on a race or ethnic group) along with the racial and ethnic distribution of each state’s population (click on a state). It shows that Southern states and the District of Columbia have the largest shares of residents who are Black, with the highest shares in the District of Columbia (40.9%), Mississippi (36.4%), and Louisiana (31.2%). Southwestern and Western states are home to a large percentage of Latinos, with the highest shares in New Mexico (47.7%), Texas (39.3%), and California (39.4%). AAPI residents, including Native Hawaiians, predictably account for nearly half (46.8%) of the population of Hawaii but are also a significant share of the population in California (15.5%) as well as New Jersey and Washington state (10.2% each). Also, as the group’s name would indicate, American Indian and Alaska Native residents account for the highest share of the population in Alaska (14.8%), followed by New Mexico (8.9%), South Dakota (8.4%), and Oklahoma (7.9%). White Americans account for the largest majority of the population in several Northeastern states (90.2% in Maine, 89.1% in Vermont, and 87.2% in New Hampshire) and West Virginia (89.1%).</p>
<p>The patterns illustrated in the map trace each group’s unique history of settlement, immigration, and migration in this country. But they also help to make a point about the important role that state and local policies play in either improving or worsening racial disparities in the United States. As just one example, EPI research shows that Southern states, which have a high density of Black residents, are more likely than states in other regions to use preemption laws to stop local governments from setting strong labor standards, such as raising the minimum wage and guaranteeing paid sick leave.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on preemption laws in the South, see Hunter Blair et al., <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/preemption-in-the-south/">Preempting Progress: State Interference in Local Policymaking Prevents People of Color, Women, and Low-Income Workers from Making Ends Meet in the South</a></em>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2020.</span></p>
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<a name="4"></a><div class="figure chart-244665 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244665" data-anchor="4"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Current population demographics by race/ethnicity and age support projections that people of color will become the collective majority by 2050</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of U.S. population within given age ranges, by race and ethnicity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">4</div><div class="figLabel">4</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244665-30224-email.png" width="608" alt="4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The changing racial and ethnic makeup of the U.S. population is foretold in the age distribution of different racial and ethnic groups. In 2024, over a quarter (28.9%) of people who identified as Hispanic were under the age of 18, as were about a quarter of those who identified as Black (24.5%), American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) (27.9%) and a fifth within those who identified as Asian American and Pacific Islander (19.9%). A smaller share of the white population (17.8%) belonged to this younger age cohort while over a third (36.9%) of white residents were near or at retirement age (age 55 or older)—a much larger share than for other racial and ethnic groups. As the current population ages, the older population will remain predominantly non-Hispanic white while Black, Hispanic, AAPI, and AIAN persons will be a growing share of the younger population. This racial and ethnic generation gap will require balancing the interests of a younger, less wealthy, more racially and ethnically diverse population with those of an older, wealthier, predominantly white population. However, these generations are linked in important ways. Older workers and retirees have a stake in worker, economic, and racial justice for those younger workers who in the years ahead will be a growing share of workers driving the national economy and providing many of the services the aging population relies on. Census population projections from 2022 (the latest available) indicate that in 2050, non-Hispanic white persons will account for less than half (48.4%) of the U.S. population (see U.S. Census Bureau, <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2023/demo/popproj/2023-summary-tables.html">2023 National Population Projections Tables</a>, Table 4).</p>
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<a name="5"></a><div class="figure chart-244676 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244676" data-anchor="5"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Men’s educational attainment is highly stratified by race and ethnicity, with American Indian and Alaska Native, Hispanic, and Black men most likely to be “working class”</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of men aged 25 and older within given level of educational attainment, by race and ethnicity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">5</div><div class="figLabel">5</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244676-30225-email.png" width="608" alt="5" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The term <em>working class</em> has been used to describe working-age adults who have less than a bachelor’s degree. Based on their high shares without a bachelor’s degree or more education, American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) (85.3%), Hispanic (80.9%), and Black (76.5%) men are more likely to be considered working class (under this definition) than are white (60.3%) or Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) (40.7%) men. Even among the groups of men most likely to be considered working class, there is still a wide range of educational attainment that includes everything from less than a high school diploma to some college. The some college category includes attendance at a four-year or two-year institution, but no degree; it also includes completion of a two-year associate or technical degree. The groups with the highest shares of people with less than a high school education are Hispanic men (27.6%) and AIAN men (23.5%) and 57.7% of Hispanic men and over half of AIAN men (58.2%) have no education beyond high school. While about half (47.0%) of Black men also have no education beyond high school, Black men are more likely than either Hispanic or AIAN men to have a bachelor’s or advanced degree, but still much less likely to have that level of education than either white or AAPI men. AAPI men lead all other racial groups in the share (59.2%) who have a bachelor’s or advanced degree. These patterns of educational attainment are shaped by multiple factors, including differences in immigration policies applied to Asian versus Latin American countries, as well as the legacy of racial discrimination and oppression that severely limited educational opportunities for generations of Black and Native Americans.</p>
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<a name="6"></a><div class="figure chart-244682 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244682" data-anchor="6"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Most women have more than a high school education, but Latinas and AIAN women lag behind other groups in attaining higher education</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of women aged 25 and older within given level of educational attainment, by race and ethnicity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">6</div><div class="figLabel">6</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244682-30226-email.png" width="608" alt="6" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>In 2024, across most racial and ethnic groups, at least half of women aged 25 or older had some education beyond a high school diploma. Latinas were the exception—only 49.1% had some level of education beyond high school and 24.2% had less than a high school education, a much higher percentage than any other group of women (1.2 to nearly 5 times as much). Those women least likely to have a bachelor’s or advanced degree were American Indian and Alaskan Native (AIAN) women (19.7%) and Latinas (23.9%). Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) and white women had the highest levels of educational attainment with 56.9% of AAPI women and 41.8% of white women having at least a bachelor’s degree, followed by 29.9% of Black women. As with men, these patterns of educational attainment are shaped by multiple factors, including differences in immigration policies applied to Asian versus Latin American countries, as well as the legacy of racial discrimination and oppression that severely limited educational opportunities for generations of Black and Native Americans. But compared with male educational attainment by race and ethnicity women tend to have higher levels of educational attainment (see <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#Chart5">Chart 5</a>).</p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN and AAPI data</h6>
</div>
<p><br />


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<a name="7"></a><div class="figure chart-244034 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244034" data-anchor="7"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">While the Black and AIAN imprisonment rate has decreased, Black and AIAN people are still five times as likely as white people to be imprisoned</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Imprisonment rates per 100,000 U.S. residents by race and ethnicity, 2012–2022</span></h4><div class="figLabel">7</div><div class="figLabel">7</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244034-30227-email.png" width="608" alt="7" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info"><br />
<span class="TextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW58338199 BCX0">In response to the demand for criminal justice reform and a shift away from the “tough on crime” politics of the 1980s and 1990s</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW58338199 BCX0">, imprisonment rates for Black</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN)</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, Hispanic</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">people have fallen over the last decade. But Black</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">AIAN</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, and Hispanic</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">people are still much more likely to be incarcerated than white people, whose imprisonment rate has stagnated over the past decade. Over 1,000 out of every 100,000 U.S. residents who are Black</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> or A</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">merican Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN)</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> were imprisoned in </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">2023</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, followed by </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">603</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">out of 100,000 Latino U.S. residents</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">229</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> out of 100,000 white U.S. residents</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">, and 88 out of 100,000</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> Asian American and Pacific Islander </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">U.S. residents</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">. Thus, the approximately</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart SCXW58338199 BCX0">1.</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">8</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> million people</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> held in U.S. prisons at the e</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">nd of 2022</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">—an often-forgotten segment of the U.S. population—are disproportionately Black, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">AIAN, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW58338199 BCX0">Hispanic, and other people of color.</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW58338199 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{}'>&nbsp;</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;"><span class="TextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0">Data on the size of the overall incarcerated population come from the “</span></span><a class="Hyperlink SCXW228773342 BCX0" href="https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/cpus22st.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span class="TextRun Underlined SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>Correctional Populations in the United States, 20</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>22</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>—Statistical Tables</span></span></a><span class="TextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0">” published by the U.S. Department of Justice in </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0">May 2024</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW228773342 BCX0">.</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW228773342 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{}'>&nbsp;</span></span></p>
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</p>

<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN and AAPI data</h6>
</div>
<p><br />


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<a name="8"></a><div class="figure chart-244045 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244045" data-anchor="8"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black and AIAN men have an exceptionally high imprisonment rate</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Imprisonment rates per 100,000 U.S residents, by race/ethnicity and gender, 2022</span></h4><div class="figLabel">8</div><div class="figLabel">8</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244045-30228-email.png" width="608" alt="8" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">This chart makes two facts </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">very clear</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">: That imprisonment in the United States is not only a gendered issue—with men being much more likely to be imprisoned—but also an issue of racialized gender, with Black</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) men being </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">far and away</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> the most highly imprisoned group.</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> Among women, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">AIAN residents ha</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">d</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">the highest</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> imprisonment rate (173 per 100,000), followed by </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">Black residents </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">who </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">had an imprisonment rate (</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">64</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> per 100,000) in 20</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">22</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">.</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> AIAN women were almost three times as likely to be imprisoned as Black women</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">around four times as likely to be imprisoned as White and Hispanic women</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">, and 34 times as likely to be imprisoned as AAPI women</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">. </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">Among men, Black residents had the highest imprisonment rate (</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">1,826</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> per 100,000), followed by </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">AIAN</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">men (</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">1,443</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> per 100,000).</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> Black men were more than twice as likely to be imprisoned as Hispanic men, more than five times as likely to be imprisoned as white men, and almost 13 times as likely to be imprisoned as AAPI men. AIAN men were </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">almost twice</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0"> as likely to be imprisoned as Hispanic men, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW113811211 BCX0">more than four times as likely to be imprisoned as white men, and more than ten times as likely to be imprisoned as AAPI men.</span></p>
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<a name='civiccharts'></a>
<h2>Civic engagement</h2>


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<a name="9"></a><div class="figure chart-244050 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244050" data-anchor="9"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Consistently higher turnout among white voters was challenged by historic Black voter turnout in 2012 and, to a lesser extent by historic Hispanic and Asian voter turnout in 2020</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Voter turnout in presidential election years by race and ethnicity, select years 1992 to 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">9</div><div class="figLabel">9</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244050-30229-email.png" width="608" alt="9" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The right to vote is the most powerful right of U.S. citizenship—and widespread voter participation is essential to a functional democracy. Yet many U.S. citizens ages 18 and older do not vote. Data on voter participation during presidential election years since 1992 reveal that turnout varies significantly by race and ethnicity and changes over time. Since 1992, voter turnout has typically been highest among white voters—ranging from 60.7% to 70.9%—although Black voter turnout saw a huge increase in 2008 and 2012 during the election and reelection of the nation’s first Black president, Barack Obama. In fact, 2012 was the only election in which Black voter turnout (66.2%) exceeded white voter turnout (64.1%). Hispanic and Asian voter turnout was less than 50% in all presidential election years between 1996 and 2016, until both groups had the largest turnout in decades in 2020 (53.7% and 59.7% respectively). In the 2024 presidential election, voter participation declined among Black, Hispanic and AAPI adults. While one’s personal decision to participate in an election can be influenced by any number of factors—including enthusiasm about a particular candidate or confidence in the democratic process—rampant forms of voter suppression in some states undoubtedly contribute to these disparities as well.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the impact of state laws that limit access to voter registration, revoke the right to vote for returning (formerly incarcerated) citizens, or otherwise make it more difficult for certain populations to cast a ballot, see “<a href="https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-every-american-can-vote/voting-reform/state-voting-laws">State Voting Laws</a>,” Brennan Center for Justice, accessed May 5, 2022; &nbsp;“<a href="https://tracker.votingrightslab.org/states">State Voting Rights Tracker</a>,” Voting Rights Lab, accessed May 5, 2022.</span></p>
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<a name="10"></a><div class="figure chart-244061 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244061" data-anchor="10"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Amid dramatic decline in union membership since the 1970s, Black workers have held onto the highest rate of union membership for decades</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Union membership rates, by race and ethnicity, 1973–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">10</div><div class="figLabel">10</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244061-30233-email.png" width="608" alt="10" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Like the constitutional right to vote in civil society, union membership gives workers a voice—in this case, a voice at work. But as the chart shows, since 1973, union membership has declined for all racial and ethnic groups. Union membership is an important metric of the state of the American worker given the role that labor unions play in giving workers a stronger, collective voice to advocate for higher pay, better benefits, and training and promotional opportunities, as well as protections against discrimination and harassment. In a unionized workforce, for example, collective bargaining results in labor contracts that help to create greater transparency through clearly defined policies and pay structures. These contracts help reduce the potential for pay discrimination by limiting an employer’s discretion in paying different wages to comparably qualified individuals doing the same job and by providing workers with critical protections and direct recourse against other forms of exploitation or mistreatment. The benefits of union membership are a likely contributor to the higher union membership rate of Black workers, given their long history of unequal treatment relative to other groups of workers. Between 1973 and 1980, Hispanic workers also had higher rates of union membership than white workers. While the subsequent across the board decrease in union membership has brought union membership rates by race and ethnicity closer together, in 2024, Black workers were still more likely to be union members (11.7%) compared with white workers (10.0%), Asian American and Pacific Islander workers (8.9%), and Hispanic workers (8.5%).</p>
<p>Still, the labor movement, like any other U.S. institution, is not immune to racism. Unions must continue to become more diverse, inclusive, and dynamic as they serve the vital role of leveling the playing field for all workers.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the benefits and protections conferred by union membership, see Celine McNicholas et al., <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/why-unions-are-good-for-workers-especially-in-a-crisis-like-covid-19-12-policies-that-would-boost-worker-rights-safety-and-wages/"><em>Why Unions Are Good for Workers—Especially in a Crisis Like COVID-19</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2020 and Valerie Wilson, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wilson-testimony-costs-of-racial-and-ethnic-labor-market-discrimination/">The Costs of Racial and Ethnic Labor Market Discrimination and Solutions That Can Contribute to Closing Employment and Wage Gaps</a>,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee on Economic Disparity and Fairness in Growth, January 20, 2022.</span></p>
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<a name='laborcharts'></a>
<h2>Labor market</h2>

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<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="11"></a><div class="figure chart-244065 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244065" data-anchor="11"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black women have maintained the highest labor force participation rate amid post-1970 rise in women’s labor force participation overall</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Labor force participation rate for women by race and ethnicity, 1973–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">11</div><div class="figLabel">11</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244065-30234-email.png" width="608" alt="11" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The labor force participation rate is an important indicator of economic well-being. It shows the number of people in the labor force—people who are employed or unemployed but looking for work—as a share of the number of civilian, noninstitutionalized people ages 16 and older. Across racial and ethnic groups, women’s labor force participation rose significantly from the 1970s through the 1990s for a number a reasons: increased access to higher education, and the introduction and widespread availability of the birth control pill, to name a few. After leveling off during most of the first decade of the 2000s, labor force participation by women declined during or after the Great Recession of 2007–2009. And it declined again during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic and recession as the burden of job losses and care responsibilities disproportionately impacted women. In 2024, Black women had the highest labor force participation rate at 60.5%, followed by Hispanic (58.9%), Asian (58.6%), white (56.7%), and American Indian and Alaska Native women (55.1%). While Latinas have historically had the lowest rates of labor force participation among women, their labor force participation rate had been climbing steadily in the four years leading up to the COVID-19 pandemic. Historically, Black women have had stronger labor force attachments than other groups of women. This is part of the legacy of being forced to work as enslaved people, but the necessity of work has continued for Black women who are often co-breadwinners if not sole earners for their households.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">For more on the </span></span><span class="TrackedChange SCXW79776492 BCX0"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">rise of women’s labor force participation from the 197</span></span></span><span class="TrackedChange SCXW79776492 BCX0"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">0s see </span></span></span><span class="TrackedChange SCXW79776492 BCX0"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">Elisabeth Jacobs and </span></span></span><span class="TrackedChange SCXW79776492 BCX0"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">Kate Bahn “<a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/womens-history-month-u-s-womens-labor-force-participation/">Women’s History Month: U.S. women’s labor force participation</a>”</span></span></span><span class="TrackedChange SCXW79776492 BCX0"><span class="TextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0">, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 22, 2019.&nbsp;</span></span></span><span class="TextRun EmptyTextRun SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-contrast='none'></span><span class="EOP SCXW79776492 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{}'>&nbsp;</span></span></p>
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</p>

<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="12"></a><div class="figure chart-244693 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244693" data-anchor="12"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Hispanic men have maintained the highest labor force participation rate even as labor force participation of all men has declined since the 1970s</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Men’s labor force participation rate by race and ethnicity, 1973–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">12</div><div class="figLabel">12</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244693-30235-email.png" width="608" alt="12" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Across all racial and ethnic groups, men’s labor force participation rates have declined significantly since the 1970s, with the sharpest decline occurring during and since the Great Recession of 2007–2009. While this trend in part reflects an aging population with a growing share of retirees, researchers have suggested that labor force participation has fallen among prime-age men (ages 25–54) due to a rise in serious health conditions that are a barrier to work, the emerging opioid crisis, or technological changes that encourage younger men&nbsp; (under age 30) to allocate less time to work and more time to leisure activities like playing video games. Unlike with Black women, who have the highest labor force participation rate among women, Black men in 2024 had the lower labor force participation rates than white and Asian men (65.9%). And unlike with Hispanic women, who have historically had the lowest labor force participation rates among women, Hispanic men have had the highest labor force participation rate, which reached 75.5% in 2024. The ranking of men’s labor force participation rates by race and ethnicity has remained constant over the last three decades.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the likely reasons for declining male labor force participation see Alan Krueger, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/1_krueger.pdf"><em>Where Have All the Workers Gone? An Inquiry into the Decline of the U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate</em></a>, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, September 2017; and Mark Aguiar et al., <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w23552">“Leisure Luxuries and the Labor Supply of Young Men,”</a> National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 23552, June 2017.</span></p>
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</p>

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<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="13"></a><div class="figure chart-244850 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244850" data-anchor="13"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black and AIAN unemployment is consistently higher than unemployment of all other racial and ethnic groups</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Annual unemployment rate by race and ethnicity, 1979–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">13</div><div class="figLabel">13</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244850-30236-email.png" width="608" alt="13" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Relative rates of unemployment by race and ethnicity have been remarkably consistent over time. Typically, the annual unemployment rates of American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN), Black, and Hispanic workers are significantly higher than those of white workers. The difference between Asian and white unemployment rates is smaller, and the size of the gap fluctuates, as does which group has the lower unemployment rate. In 2024, this pattern held, with an unemployment rate of 6.5% for AIAN workers, 6.0% for Black workers, followed by 5.1% for Hispanic workers, 3.6% for white workers, and 3.5% for Asian workers. While 2023 saw historical low rates for Black unemployment, one of the most enduring features of the U.S. labor market is the roughly 2-to-1 ratio of the Black and white unemployment rates.</p>
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<a name="14"></a><div class="figure chart-244841 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244841" data-anchor="14"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Higher education typically lowers a worker’s chances of being unemployed but does not eliminate racial and ethnic disparities in unemployment rates</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Unemployment rate by race/ethnicity and educational attainment, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">14</div><div class="figLabel">14</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244841-30237-email.png" width="608" alt="14" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>A breakdown of unemployment rates by race, ethnicity, and education level shows the limits of educational attainment as a factor in addressing inequitable economic outcomes. As the chart shows, racial and ethnic disparities in unemployment rates exist at every level of educational attainment. And Black workers have the highest rates of unemployment among all groups without a college degree. In fact, even at historically low rates of unemployment in 2024, only the most highly educated Black workers approached anything near unemployment rate parity with their white counterparts. The figure also shows that while education can contribute to better outcomes—unemployment rates are lower for all groups at higher levels of education—education alone does not necessarily create equal outcomes. Reading this chart alongside <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart13">Chart 13</a> suggests that differences in the average unemployment rates of racial and ethnic groups can only be partially explained by relative differences in education, skill, experience or local labor market conditions—discrimination remains an undeniable factor.</p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="15"></a><div class="figure chart-244189 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244189" data-anchor="15"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black, Hispanic, and AIAN workers earn lower wages and have smaller gender wage disparities than their white and AAPI counterparts</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Median wages by race/ethnicity and gender, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">15</div><div class="figLabel">15</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244189-30238-email.png" width="608" alt="15" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>There are sharp differences in the wages earned by typical workers of different racial groups in the United States. Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) and white workers are paid the highest wages at the median, while Black, Hispanic, and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) workers are paid significantly less. The gender differences are also greater among AAPI and white workers than among Black, Hispanic and AIAN workers. While AAPI and white men far out-earn AAPI and white women, Black and Hispanic men and women have much more similar median wages.</p>
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<a name="16"></a><div class="figure chart-244819 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244819" data-anchor="16"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Even after controlling for education and other factors known to affect earnings, women—particularly Black and Hispanic women—are paid far less than white men</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Regression-adjusted hourly wage gaps for women relative to non-Hispanic white men, by race and ethnicity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">16</div><div class="figLabel">16</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244819-30239-email.png" width="608" alt="16" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Women of all racial and ethnic groups in the U.S. have a significant pay penalty by virtue of their gender, even when we account for several factors that could reasonably influence a worker’s productivity or wage rate, including education, marital status, age (a measure of potential experience) and geographic area (a measure of local labor market conditions). Black and Hispanic women face an additional pay penalty by virtue of their race or ethnicity. The chart depicts these wage gaps, presented as how much less women make than non-Hispanic white men. The fact that Black and Hispanic women earn about a quarter less than white men on average when calculating regression-adjusted wage gaps mean, then, that the pay penalty is not a result of differences in formal education between those groups of women and white men. One partial explanation for these wage disparities is occupational segregation, by which women of color are more highly concentrated in occupations with low pay, even relative to their education level. However, women of all races and ethnicities also often earn less than men in the same occupation (not shown in the chart), an indication of potential pay discrimination.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on occupational segregation and on gender pay gaps by occupation, see Jessica Schieder and Elise Gould, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/womens-work-and-the-gender-pay-gap-how-discrimination-societal-norms-and-other-forces-affect-womens-occupational-choices-and-their-pay/"><em>Women’s Work” and the Gender Pay Gap: How Discrimination, Societal Norms, and Other Forces Affect Women’s Occupational Choices</em><em>—and Their Pay</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, July 2016; Emily Carew and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/latina-equal-pay-day-latina-workers-remain-greatly-underpaid-including-in-front-line-occupations/">“Latina Equal Pay Day: Latina Workers Remain Greatly Underpaid, Including in Front-Line Occupations</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em>, Economic Policy Institute, October 20, 2021; Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/black-women-face-a-persistent-pay-gap-including-in-essential-occupations-during-the-pandemic/">“Black Women Face a Persistent Pay Gap, Including in Essential Occupations During the Pandemic</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2, 2021.</span></p>
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<a name='incomecharts'></a>
<h2>Income, poverty, and wealth</h2>

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<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="17"></a><div class="figure chart-244109 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244109" data-anchor="17"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Racial and ethnic disparities in median household income have been largely persistent across time</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Inflation-adjusted median household income (2024 dollars), by race and ethnicity, 1972–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">17</div><div class="figLabel">17</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244109-30240-email.png" width="608" alt="17" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>In the United States, households of different racial and ethnic backgrounds bring in significantly different amounts of income and have done so for decades. At the median, Black, Hispanic, and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) households earn the least on an annual basis, while Asian and white households earn the most. It is notable, though, that in 2023, Black households had the highest household income on record and experienced the largest increase in income between 2020 and 2023. Significant gaps in employment opportunities (shown in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart13">Chart 13</a>) and lower wage levels (shown in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart15">Chart 15</a>) translate into lower incomes among Black, Latino, and AIAN households. Household income is also a function of the number of earners in a household. Though not shown here, past EPI research found that in the pre-pandemic economy, about a third of Black nonelderly households (where the head of household is age 18–64) had two or more earners, compared with nearly half of white and Hispanic nonelderly households. This racial disparity in the number of household earners is not just a function of how many working-age adults live in the household, or family structure, but is another measurable consequence of the persistent 2-to-1 ratio between the Black and white unemployment rates (shown in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart13">Chart 13</a>). As income inequality in the United States has increased in general over the past 50 years, disparities between the least and most well-off groups have continued to persist and, in some cases, have grown. &nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on earners per household by race, see Elise Gould and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/black-workers-covid/"><em>Black Workers Face Two of the Most Lethal Preexisting Conditions for Coronavirus—Racism and Economic Inequality</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, June 2020. For more on increasing income inequality, see Elise Gould, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/decades-of-rising-economic-inequality-in-the-u-s-testimony-before-the-u-s-house-of-representatives-ways-and-means-committee/">Decades of Rising Economic Inequality in the U.S.</a>,” testimony before the House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2019.</span></p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<a name="18"></a><div class="figure chart-245322 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="245322" data-anchor="18"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black and AIAN households are more likely to have the lowest annual incomes—under $25,000 per year in 2024</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of households within given income range by race and ethnicity, 2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">18</div><div class="figLabel">18</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/245322-30241-email.png" width="608" alt="18" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>This chart extends beyond the data on median or midpoint of household income shown in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart17">Chart 17</a> to provide a more detailed look at where different groups fall across the entire household income distribution. In 2024, 22.9% of Black households, 23.3% of American Indian and Alaska Native households, 15.1% of Hispanic households had annual incomes under $25,000, compared with just 11.4% of white households and 9.3% of Asian households. This $25,000 figure is well below the 2024 official poverty threshold for a family of two adults and two children ($31,812). Conversely, 29.3% of Asian households and 17.8% of white households had annual incomes at or above $200,000—the highest income category—compared with only about 6%-10% of Black, AIAN, and Hispanic households. &nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;"><span class="TextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0">Poverty threshold data can be found in the U.S. Census Bureau’s </span></span><a class="Hyperlink SCXW91668985 BCX0" href="https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2025/demo/p60-287.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span class="TextRun Underlined SCXW91668985 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>Poverty in the United States: 2024</span></span></a><span class="TextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0"> data tables, </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW91668985 BCX0">published September 09, 2025</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW91668985 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;335557856&quot;:16777215,&quot;335559738&quot;:242,&quot;335559739&quot;:242}'>&nbsp;</span></span></p>
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</p>

<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
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<p><br />


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<a name="19"></a><div class="figure chart-244115 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244115" data-anchor="19"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Persistently elevated AIAN, Black, and Hispanic child poverty rates have thwarted progress reducing overall child poverty in the U.S.</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Child poverty rates, by race and ethnicity, 1974–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">19</div><div class="figLabel">19</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244115-30242-email.png" width="608" alt="19" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>A cruel and unfortunate reality of structural racism in the U.S. economy is that even in the “best” of economic times, Black, American Indian, and Alaska Native (AIAN), and Hispanic children experience much higher rates of poverty than white children. In 2024, 30.5% of AIAN children, 25.4% of Black children and 20.2% of Hispanic children lived below the official poverty threshold, compared with just 8.2% of non-Hispanic white children 6.4% of Asian children. While child poverty has fallen significantly for Black, Hispanic, and Asian American children over the past 40 years, Black and Hispanic child poverty rates remained over 20% in 2024. Additionally, in 2024, AIAN children had the highest rates of child poverty at over 30 percent (30.5%). This large and persistent disparity in child poverty combined with the fact that Black and Hispanic children have become an increasing share of the underage 18 population over time (see <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart1">Chart 1</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart4">Chart 4</a>) has resulted in very little change in the overall child poverty rate since 1974. Given the long-term effects of exposure to poverty in childhood, addressing these persistent disparities must play a role in our approach toward building equity and moving the needle on child poverty.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the long-term effects of exposure to poverty in childhood, see Kerris Cooper and Kitty Stewart, “<a href="https://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/case/cp/casepaper203.pdf">Does Money Affect Children’s Outcomes? An Update</a>,” <em>CASEpapers (203)</em>, The London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2017; Randall Akee et al., “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2891175/">Parents’ Incomes and Children’s Outcomes: A Quasi-Experiment</a>,” <em>American Economic Journal: Applied Economics</em>, January 2010.</span></p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
</div>
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<a name="20"></a><div class="figure chart-244119 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244119" data-anchor="20"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Poverty rates are higher among AIAN, Black and Hispanic working-age adults</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Poverty rates for age 18–64, by race and ethnicity, 1974–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">20</div><div class="figLabel">20</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244119-30243-email.png" width="608" alt="20" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>While poverty across the working-age population (ages 18 to 64) is lower than that for children (see <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart19">Chart 19</a>), disparities by race and ethnicity follow a similar trend, with American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN), Black, and Hispanic adults more likely to be impoverished than white and Asian adults. Poverty is a measure of economic deprivation, and among working-age adults in particular, reflects disparities in unemployment, wages, and income. Life circumstances, such as severe disability and major illness—which can also limit earned income or quickly deplete any available savings—also contribute to poverty for this age group. The racially coded misrepresentation of poverty as some kind of moral or cultural pathology has hindered the political will needed to sustain and strengthen vital income supports that have proven effective in fighting poverty. &nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the misrepresentation of poverty as a cultural pathology see William “Sandy” Darity Jr., <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/259414596_REVISITING_THE_DEBATE_ON_RACE_AND_CULTURE">“Revisiting the Debate on Race and Culture: The New (Incorrect) Harvard/Washington Consensus</a>.” <em>Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 8</em>, no. 2, 467–476. For more on the vital income supports that would lessen poverty see Asha Banerjee and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/social-insurance-programs-cushioned-the-blow-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-in-2020/">Social Insurance Programs Cushioned the Blow of the COVID-19 Pandemic in 2020</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em>, Economic Policy Institute, September 14, 2021.</span></p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN data</h6>
</div>
<p><br />


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<a name="21"></a><div class="figure chart-245301 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="245301" data-anchor="21"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">There are large racial disparities in poverty at older ages (65 and older)—likely reflecting differences in retirement preparedness and/or lifetime income disparities</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Poverty rates for people ages 65 and older, by race and ethnicity, 1974–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">21</div><div class="figLabel">21</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/245301-30244-email.png" width="608" alt="21" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The poverty seen among older Americans in the chart is most likely the result of a lifetime of low earnings and a lack of retirement preparedness. While research shows that Social Security plays a critical role in keeping poverty rates among older Americans lower than they otherwise would have been (not depicted in the chart), older Black, Hispanic, and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN) adults still have relatively high poverty rates. Older Asian Americans are also more likely to live in poverty than older white Americans. Additionally, older Asian Americans have higher poverty rates than younger Asian Americans (see <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart19">Chart 19</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/#chart20">Chart 20</a>). This is likely due to a larger share of older Asian Americans having worked comparatively few years in the United States, or in jobs where they were unable to accumulate the necessary years for Social Security eligibility, leaving them less able to take advantage of work-based social safety net programs like Social Security.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the causes of poverty among older Americans and the capacity of Social Security to lift older Americans—particularly women and people of color—out of poverty, see Kathleen Romig, <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-lifts-more-people-above-the-poverty-line-than-any-other"><em>Social Security Lifts More People Above the Poverty Line Than Any Other Program</em></a>, Center on Budget and Policy priorities, April 2022. For more on the economic condition of the older Asian American population, see Victoria Tran, “<a href="https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/asian-american-seniors-are-often-left-out-national-conversation-poverty">Asian American Seniors Are Often Left Out of the National Conversation on Poverty</a>,” <em>Urban Wire</em> (Urban Institute blog), May 31, 2017.</span></p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes Asian data</h6>
</div>
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<a name="22"></a><div class="figure chart-244126 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244126" data-anchor="22"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Racial wealth disparities are stark and persistent, reflecting a history of exploitation and exclusion</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Median family net worth by race and ethnicity, selected years from 1989 to 2022</span></h4><div class="figLabel">22</div><div class="figLabel">22</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244126-30247-email.png" width="608" alt="22" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The chart shows sharp racial and ethnic disparities in net worth observed across time in the United States. Though not shown in the chart, these disparities reflect the differences in lived economic experiences between white, Black, Hispanic, and Asian families. Wealth can be accumulated both within and across generations, such that a high net worth can result from the benefit of prime earning years with 1) relatively few employment disruptions, 2) access to wealth-building savings and investment vehicles, 3) relatively few serious negative health shocks, and 4) well-timed wealth transfers from parents and grandparents.&nbsp; The typical white household has many times the wealth of the typical Black or Hispanic household due to 1) their privileged position in the American labor market, which grants them access to more consistent and higher-quality employment opportunities, 2) their more limited exposure to the health risks brought on by poorer living conditions and discrimination, and 3) their history of access to wealth-building opportunities from which other groups have been excluded.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In 2022, the Survey of Consumer Finances reported household wealth data for the Asian American population for the first time. Asian household wealth far outstrips that of other households in 2022, though this statistic should be couched with appropriate context: Asian Americans are an incredibly diverse group with varying economic circumstances related to, among other things, immigration history and country of origin; moreover, the SCF oversamples households that are likely to be wealthy. Further disaggregation of wealth data by immigration history could be useful in illuminating wealth disparities within the Asian American population. &nbsp;</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the systemic barriers to Black wealth building see Natasha Hicks, Fenaba Addo, Anne Price, and William Darity Jr., <a href="https://socialequity.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/INSIGHT_Still-Running-Up-Down-Escalators_vF.pdf"><em>Still Running Up the Down Escalator: How Narratives Shape Our Understanding of Racial Wealth Inequality</em></a>, The Samuel Dubois Cook Center on Social Equity, 2021. For more on the barriers to Hispanic wealth building see Dedrick Asante-Muhammad, Alexandra Perez, and Jamie Buell, “<a href="https://ncrc.org/racial-wealth-snapshot-latino-americans/">Racial Wealth Snapshot: Latino Americans</a>.” National Community Reinvestment Coalition, September 17, 2021.</span></p>
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<h2>Health</h2>

<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes AIAN and Asian data</h6>
</div>
<p><br />


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<a name="23"></a><div class="figure chart-245832 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="245832" data-anchor="23"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Racial disparities in life expectancy reflect the cumulative disadvantage of living as a minority in the United States</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Women’s and men’s life expectancy at birth, by race and ethnicity, 2022</span></h4><div class="figLabel">23</div><div class="figLabel">23</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/245832-30248-email.png" width="608" alt="23" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Racial disparities in life expectancy have been documented as far back as statistics on life expectancy have been recorded in the U.S, with clear and persistent distinctions between privileged groups and disadvantaged groups. That is, rather than groups shifting in their ranking of life expectancy randomly across time, there are distinct patterns in which groups live longer lives than others. In general, Black and AIAN women and men live much shorter lives than white and Asian women and men.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In 2022, Asian American women and men had the longest life expectancies, at 86.3 years and 82.3 years respectively. AIAN women and men had the lowest life expectancies, at 64.5 years and 71.3 years respectively. This massive gap in life expectancy approaching two decades can be attributed to several factors, many of which are structural and rooted in economic disparity. In recent years, life expectancy gains have disproportionately gone to those in the highest income categories, who are disproportionately white and Asian (see Chart 18). Alongside the history of white supremacy and anti-Black racism in the United States, these economic roots of also help to explain persistent the persistent Black-white gap in life expectancy. That Black-white gap has fluctuated somewhat over the past decade, shrinking due to the impact of opioid-related “deaths of despair” on lowering white life expectancy, and reopening as COVID-19 related mortality disproportionately impacted Black and brown communities.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Hispanic women and men tend to live longer than white women and men, though that life expectancy advantage has been shown to diminish with subsequent generations of U.S.-born Latinos. This suggests that there may be something uniquely deleterious about living as a minority in the United States.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on gaps in life expectancy, effects of the opioid crisis, and Hispanic life expectancy see Congressional Research Service, <a href="https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44846.pdf"><em>The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Recent Evidence and Implications for the Social Security Retirement Age</em></a>, CRS Report R44846, July 6, 2021; Helena Hansen and Julie Netherland, “<a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5105018/">Is the Prescription Opioid Epidemic a White Problem?</a>” <em>American Journal of Public Health 106</em>, no. 12 (December 2016), 2127–2129 (doi: 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303483); Osea Giuntella, “<a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352827316000203?via%3Dihub">The Hispanic Health Paradox: New Evidence from Longitudinal Data on Second and Third-Generation Birth Outcomes</a>,” <em>SSM – Population Health</em>, vol. 2 (December 2016), 84–89 (doi.org/10.1016/j.ssmph.2016.02.013).</span></p>
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<a name="24"></a><div class="figure chart-244153 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244153" data-anchor="24"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">The Affordable Care Act significantly reduced uninsured rates across racial and ethnic groups, but disparities remain</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Uninsured rates by race and ethnicity, 2008–2024</span></h4><div class="figLabel">24</div><div class="figLabel">24</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244153-30249-email.png" width="608" alt="24" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The Affordable Care Act (the ACA or “Obamacare”) expanded health insurance coverage to middle- and low-income Americans, which disproportionately benefited those groups with the least access—Hispanic Americans and American Indians and Alaska Natives (AIAN), and to a lesser extent Black Americans. Despite the marked improvement in health insurance coverage rates since the implementation of ACA, disparities between groups remain stark, with Hispanic and AIAN uninsured rates double Black rates, and approaching four times as high as the uninsured rates of white and Asian American and Pacific Islanders (AAPI). Early diagnosis and treatment are essential to minimizing the severity of chronic illnesses, and regular health care is important for promoting better overall health. The lack of health insurance often results in a choice to delay receiving health care until one’s condition is critical, contributing to racial disparities in health outcomes and life expectancy.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on how the ACA expanded health coverage, particularly to certain groups, see Samantha Artiga, Latoya Hill, Kendal Orgera, and Anthony Damico. “<a href="https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/health-coverage-by-race-and-ethnicity/">Health Coverage by Race and Ethnicity, 2010–2019</a>,” Kaiser Family Foundation, July 16, 2021; Jesse Cross-Call, <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/health/medicaid-expansion-has-helped-narrow-racial-disparities-in-health-coverage-and"><em>Medicaid Expansion Has Helped Narrow Racial Disparities in Health Coverage and Access to Care</em></a>, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2020.</span></p>
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<div class="headline-chart">
<h6>This chart now includes Asian data</h6>
</div>
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<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="25"></a><div class="figure chart-244154 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="244154" data-anchor="25"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black mothers are far more likely to die from pregnancy-related causes than are white and Hispanic mothers</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Pregnancy-related deaths per 100,000 live births by race and ethnicity, 2023</span></h4><div class="figLabel">25</div><div class="figLabel">25</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/244154-30250-email.png" width="608" alt="25" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Maternal mortality rates are a stark indicator of racial disparities in public health in the United States. Black women are over twice as likely to die from a pregnancy-related cause as white women, almost three times as likely as Hispanic women, and almost four times as likely as Asian women. Although not shown in the chart, these racial disparities persist regardless of a woman’s social or economic status. Health status and differential access to quality prenatal care play a major role in maintaining these disparities, as does structural racism more generally. To adequately address these disparities in maternal health outcomes, we must confront racism and bias in the U.S. health care system and the implications for how health care providers and personnel communicate with and treat patients.</p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">For more on the causes and solutions to Black maternal mortality, see “<a href="https://www.cdc.gov/healthequity/features/maternal-mortality/index.html">Working Together to Reduce Black Maternal Mortality</a>,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, April 6, 2022.</span></p>
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<a name="Appendix"></a><div class="figure chart-290680 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="290680" data-anchor="Appendix"><div class="figInner"><h4>AIAN population 1-year estimates and 3-year rolling averages, select charts</h4><div class="figLabel">Appendix</div><div class="figLabel">Appendix</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/290680-33960-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info"></div><div class="chart-share-label donotprint">Share this chart:</div></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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]]></content:encoded>
											
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		<title>Good news and bad news about U.S. labor force participation: Many headwinds from the 2010s are gone, but we&#8217;re not investing enough in the future</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/good-news-and-bad-news-about-u-s-labor-force-participation-many-headwinds-from-the-2010s-are-gone-but-were-not-investing-enough-in-the-future/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 25 Sep 2025 09:00:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Hilary Wething, Josh Bivens, Sarah Jane Glynn]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=311594</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The last decade marks a shift in the prime-age labor force participation rate (LFPR). It moved away from a long-term decline toward rebounded participation in the wake of strong labor markets.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card border-right web-only">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;"><strong><em>Key takeaways</em></strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>The last decade marks a shift in the prime-age labor force participation rate (LFPR). It moved away from a long-term decline toward rebounded participation in the wake of strong labor markets. Current prime-age LFPR is now back to its 2001 level, erasing much of those losses. Key conclusions from this: Full-employment labor markets are needed to keep LFPRs strong, and long-term structural determinants of LFPR growth cannot be accurately diagnosed during times of cyclical labor market weakness.</li>
<li>Since 1979, key drivers of the decline in men’s labor force participation included the following:
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>extended periods of excess unemployment rates</li>
<li>the labor market scarring effect of mass incarceration</li>
<li>the decline of historical sources of employment for noncollege men like the manufacturing and military sectors</li>
<li>increased opioid usage</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>During the strong labor market in the late 2010s and following the tremendous recovery from the pandemic recession, noncollege men and Black men have seen substantial increases in&nbsp; &nbsp; labor force participation.</li>
<li>Women, by contrast, experienced historical gains in labor force participation throughout the 1980s and 1990s but then their participation stalled out in the early 2000s —and began falling behind relative to peers in OECD countries. In the U.S., insufficient support for balancing paid work and family responsibilities has been a limiting factor in further increases in women’s labor force participation. However, increases in workplace flexibility, with the rise of hybrid or remote work following the pandemic, may have boosted labor force participation, particularly for women with caregiving responsibilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-size: 16px; font-family: proxima-nova, 'Proxima Nova', sans-serif;"><strong>Policy recommendations for maintaining and improving gains in labor force participation:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>In addition to policies that prioritize tight labor markets, policies should target the following for adults:
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>reductions in opioid use</li>
<li>reductions in incarceration rates</li>
<li>improvements in policies that support parents and caregivers</li>
<li>&nbsp;substantial improvements in the pay and working conditions of jobs of the future (like caregiving jobs) to attract and retain workers</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Investments in today’s children are crucial for boosting the labor force participation of future generations, such as safety net policies that promote long-term health and educational investments. The future labor market benefits of investing in children are so strong in the long run that they may even be fiscally self-financing.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<p><span style="font-size: 18px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>The last decade marks a shift in the prime-age labor force participation rate (LFPR). It moved away from a long-term decline toward rebounded participation in the wake of strong labor markets. Current prime-age LFPR is now back to its 2001 level, erasing much of those losses. Key conclusions from this: Full-employment labor markets are needed to keep LFPRs strong, and long-term structural determinants of LFPR growth cannot be accurately diagnosed during times of cyclical labor market weakness.</li>
<li>Since 1979, key drivers of the decline in men’s labor force participation included the following:
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>extended periods of excess unemployment rates</li>
<li>the labor market scarring effect of mass incarceration</li>
<li>the decline of historical sources of employment for noncollege men like the manufacturing and military sectors</li>
<li>increased opioid usage</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>During the strong labor market in the late 2010s and following the tremendous recovery from the pandemic recession, noncollege men and Black men have seen substantial increases in labor force participation.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Women, by contrast, experienced historical gains in labor force participation throughout the 1980s and 1990s but then their participation stalled out in the early 2000s —and began falling behind relative to peers in OECD countries. In the U.S., insufficient support for balancing paid work and family responsibilities has been a limiting factor in further increases in women’s labor force participation. However, increases in workplace flexibility, with the rise of hybrid or remote work following the pandemic, may have boosted labor force participation, particularly for women with caregiving responsibilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><span style="font-size: 18px;"><strong>Policy recommendations for maintaining and improving gains in labor force participation: </strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>In addition to policies that prioritize tight labor markets, policies should target the following for adults:
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>reductions in opioid use</li>
<li>reductions in incarceration rates</li>
<li>improvements in policies that support parents and caregivers</li>
<li>&nbsp;substantial improvements in the pay and working conditions of jobs of the future (like caregiving jobs) to attract and retain workers</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Investments in today’s children are crucial for boosting the labor force participation of future generations, such as safety net policies that promote long-term health and educational investments. The future labor market benefits of investing in children are so strong in the long run that they may even be fiscally self-financing.</li>
</ul>
<hr>
</div>
<h2>Executive summary</h2>
<p>Labor force participation is both a key input and a consequence of strong economic growth. While there are many reasons some do not participate in the formal labor market—school, family caregiving responsibilities, retirement, work-limiting disabilities—a strong labor market with high employer demand for workers is a necessity to give as many willing workers as possible a chance for employment.</p>
<p>In an aging population in which college attendance is far more common than it used to be, demographic trends have a strong influence on the overall labor force participation rate. Few people think that it’s a problem that many older Americans choose to enjoy retirement or that many younger adults are enrolled in school rather than searching for work. What is, however, a potential problem is many prime-age workers—those between 25 and 54—are dropping out of the job search and work. To assess the extent of this problem, this report focuses primarily on prime-age labor force participation, the share of the population between 25 and 54 that is working or looking for work. This measure rose sharply from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. After that, it was flat for a period, then fell during the mid-2010s, most notably following the Great Recession. Over the last 10 years, participation has rebounded strongly and is now back to its 2001 level, erasing much of those post-2000 losses.</p>
<p>The rise in participation before 2000 was primarily driven by women as they increased their education, delayed family formation, and chose to participate in the paid labor market, driven in part by greater opportunities to access higher-paying previously male-dominated professions. The rise in participation over the last decade improved outcomes for both men and women, as strong employer demand led to workers entering or returning to the labor market. By 2024, women’s participation hit an all-time high, and men’s participation rate is back to its 2010 level.</p>
<p>Changes in labor force participation over the last nearly five decades varied by gender, but also across various demographic groups. While changes <em>within</em> demographic groups were the most important drivers of overall trends, there were notable differences between groups. For instance, those without a college degree—particularly men—experienced steeper declines in participation. And education upgrading (increasing the share of the population with a college degree) over the long term did little to offset that weakness. Loss of jobs in areas that traditionally were large-scale employers of noncollege men, such as manufacturing and the military, is undoubtedly related to reduced opportunity and participation in the labor force for those without a four-year college degree.</p>
<p>Black men, in particular, experienced notable declines in participation before the strong labor market over the last 10 years returned their participation to its 2000 level. The quadrupling of incarceration rates through the 1980s and 1990s disproportionately impacted Black men, making it harder for them to secure employment because of both the labor market scarring effects of incarceration as well as labor market discrimination.</p>
<p>Across peer countries in the OECD, prime-age labor force participation didn’t fall off to the same extent for men as it did in the U.S. and continued to rise for women over time. Insufficient support for balancing paid work and family responsibilities in the U.S. has been a limiting factor, particularly for women’s labor force participation. A body of international evidence indicates that larger investments in those areas—such as child care and paid leave—have the potential to help boost participation. Recent increases in work flexibility following the pandemic, such as hybrid or remote work, may have aided the entry or reentry of workers with caregiving responsibilities.</p>
<p>Policy choices–both of commission and omission—can affect the future growth of labor force participation, but outside of immigration, the effects will be comparatively modest relative to historical swings in labor force participation. Strengthened public care can increase labor supply, particularly for women. Poor health, pain, and opioid use have been linked to lower participation, so improving population health and the provision of health care could increase labor force participation. Further, investments in today’s children, through programs that provide health care, early education, and food security, can also pay dividends in terms of future labor force participation.</p>
<p>A strong economy and high-quality jobs are strongly related to labor force participation. When the labor market is tight, workers come back in search of better opportunities. Even with the pandemic job losses, the tight labor market over the last decade has all but erased the declines in the 2000s when excess unemployment and slow job growth kept would-be workers on the sidelines.<br />
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<h4>Other briefs, reports, and analysis from this series</h4>
<p><a title="It is often underrecognized how much population aging is currently reducing the growth rate of the U.S. labor force and will continue to pull it down in coming decades. The share of the population that is over the age of 65 (when labor force participation tends to take a steep fall on average) is rising rapidly. " href="https://www.epi.org/312225/pre/b4eb59dd0154dc8ee9fdf2a25179027a86a869e7b6509828348941526b333e54/">The U.S.-Born labor force will shrink over the next decade</a> Achieving historically &#8216;normal&#8217; GDP growth rates will be impossible, unless immigration flows are sustained</p>
<p><a title="A recent EPI report surveyed trends in labor force participation in the United States in recent decades. Besides presenting basic facts, the report also reviewed the research literature on the determinants of these trends, and the effects of policy changes. This policy brief focuses on one theme from the report: the need for patience when crafting a response to labor force participation trends." href="https://www.epi.org/311701/pre/6e7bc9d96493dd399ac1a4e481a80607a0ea80ba45b5022b8f9f2c357c7addde/">Better things come to those who wait</a> The importance of patience in diagnosing labor force participation rates and prescribing policy solutions</p>
<p><a title="Although there have been tremendous strides toward gender equity over the last few generations, it remains the fact that women and men tend to work in different types of jobs. " href="https://www.epi.org/blog/job-quality-is-a-policy-decision-better-jobs-can-spur-higher-labor-force-participation-for-both-men-and-women/">Job quality is a policy decision</a> Better jobs can spur higher labor force participation for both men and women</p>
<p><a title="It might be tempting to think that this preliminary downward revision means that the U.S. economy was much weaker than originally reported. But most of the slower job growth in 2024 was the result of smaller working-age population growth due to reduced immigration and the aging of the workforce—it was not due to degraded labor force participation or opportunities for prime-age workers in the U.S. labor market. " href="https://www.epi.org/blog/assessing-the-strength-of-the-labor-market-preliminary-downward-revisions-do-not-necessarily-signal-a-weaker-2024-labor-market-but-there-are-warning-signs-for-2025/">Assessing the strength of the labor market</a> Preliminary downward revisions do not necessarily signal a weaker 2024 labor market, but there are warning signs for 2025<br />
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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>The rate at which people participate in the U.S. labor force—which includes people who are working, as well as those who are unemployed but actively looking for work—has enormous implications for the economy and can serve as a barometer for its overall health.</p>
<p>There is no ideal labor force participation rate, and a society in which 100% of the population is in the labor force is not only unrealistic, but also undesirable. For example, high labor force participation could reflect a strong economy, or it could reflect a lack of access to social safety nets that force the very old and people with work-limiting disabilities into the workforce in order to survive. Falling labor force participation rates could be the result of a recession or other negative event like a global pandemic or could be caused by an aging population with many retired people or increased educational opportunities that delay entry into the labor force among younger cohorts.</p>
<p>Because there is no obvious ideal labor force participation rate, policymakers should think less about particular targets to hit for this rate and should instead aim at removing barriers that stand in the way of willing workers and their ability to search for and secure a decent job. While there are good reasons to not participate, such as gaining education or skills, harmful barriers could include macroeconomic slack in labor markets or more structural barriers like discrimination or insufficient societal investment in workers’ health and skills or insufficient support for balancing paid work and family responsibilities.</p>
<p>Labor force participation that is high due to few barriers between willing workers and the ability to find decent jobs is a key ingredient to a healthy, stable economy. This relationship moves in both directions: A healthy economy is one that sees few barriers to willing workers finding jobs, and growing labor force participation is also a key component of economic growth. When the number of people in the labor force increases, it boosts production and leads to higher consumption.</p>
<p>The overall labor force participation rate in the United States is lower now than at its peak in 2000, largely because the population is aging and members of the baby-boom generation have retired. Participation among younger people has declined over time, raising concerns among some economists and policymakers. But the direction of these trends has not been consistently negative, and there is evidence from the last decade that earlier patterns were less durable than predicted.</p>
<p>This report provides an overview of prime-age labor force participation over the last 45 years, summarizes prior research on possible drivers behind the changes over time, and highlights when and how patterns have shifted over the last decade, concluding with policy recommendations that the data suggest could be most helpful to support a continued upward trajectory.</p>
<h2>Overall trends in labor force participation</h2>
<p>The prime-age labor force participation rate is the share of the civilian noninstitutional population between ages 25 and 54 that is working or looking for work. We focus on this measure to remove those who may be more likely to be in school or retired. As educational attainment has increased over time, a larger share of the population may be out of the labor force for longer (primarily affecting the population younger than 25). At the same time, the population has aged, and a growing share of the population has moved into retirement. Removing those under 25 and over 54 from our analysis removes those mostly demographic changes in labor force participation. Unless otherwise stated, all analysis in this report will include only the U.S. population 25 to 54 years old and will, therefore, be referred to as the labor force or the labor force participation rate (LFPR).</p>
<p>In this report, our primary data set is the basic monthly Current Population Survey. For most analysis, we have a consistent series from 1976 to 2024 and use that entire period, when possible, to display trends. For consistency when decomposing changes over periods of time, we start with 1979 because it is the first business cycle peak in our data, and we don’t want to capture any cyclical trends that may have impacted the data from 1976. Using endpoints for analyses that are at different points of the business cycles can cloud conclusions on structural changes in the labor market. This is what happened with much of the research on labor force participation rates from the mid-2010s when the economy was still suffering employment losses in the aftermath of the Great Recession.</p>
<p>Prime-age labor force participation increased year over year throughout most of the post-World War II era for which we have data. Between 1976 and 2024, the prime-age labor force participation rate rose 8.8 percentage points from 74.8% to 83.6%. As <strong>Figure A</strong> demonstrates, there was a sharp rise in labor force participation from 1976 to the mid-1990s when it stabilized somewhat, then fell until the mid-2010s. With the notable exception of the pandemic recession, labor force participation has been on the rise for the last 10 years.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-307087 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307087" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307087-35056-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Labor force participation rates by gender</h2>
<p>The overall trends in prime-age labor force participation are valuable in understanding the overall story of the labor market, but they mask some stark differences between participation rates for men and women. <strong>Figure B</strong> shows that men’s labor force participation is consistently higher than women’s throughout the entire period. What’s most striking is the rise in participation overall through the 1990s was entirely driven by women. There are a number of cultural and socioeconomic factors behind that rise in women’s participation as women increased their college attendance and graduation rates while narrowing the gender gap in college majors, delayed marriage and childbirth, and acquired more market-relevant skills. Combined, these shifts led to greater opportunities for women to enter previously highly male-dominated occupations and earn higher wages (Goldin 2006). Both men and women experienced declines in participation from around 2000 to the mid-2010s, and then both groups experienced a rise since then, though stronger for women.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-307094 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307094" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307094-35058-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Labor force participation rates move with overall labor market strength</h2>
<p>Labor force participation rates tend to decline under weak economic conditions, like recessionary periods. But when the 2008 recession began, prime-age participation had still not fully recovered losses from the early 2000s, and LFP continued to fall for both men and women after the recession ended and the economy started expanding again. The majority of the decline in prime-age labor force participation occurred in the years after the 2008 recession, when prime-age LFP fell by 2.2 percentage points over the course of six years.</p>
<p>A significant body of research was released in the mid-2010s that highlighted the long-term fall in labor force participation, particularly among men, but the last 10 years have shown us a notable reversal in trend as participation for both men and women have been on the rise. While prime-age women are now experiencing their highest labor force participation rates on record, men’s have stopped their downward movement and risen 1.1 percentage points since their low point in 2014 (except in the pandemic recession).</p>
<p>The strength of the labor market over the last 10 years has meant more and better opportunities for potential labor market entrants. There have been two distinct periods over the last 45 years in which a growing economy has led to more broadly shared prosperity: the late 1990s and the last 10 years. <strong>Table 1</strong> maps changes in labor force participation in those particular time periods against unemployment rates. Then, we summarize those two periods of time into two categories. The stronger labor market is defined by 1995–2000 and 2014–2024, while the weaker labor market is defined by the remaining 30 years since 1979.</p>
<p>In the good times, the unemployment rate averaged 4.7%, and labor force participation increased 0.3 and 0.1 percentage points per year, on average for women and men, respectively. In the bad times, women’s labor force participation continued to rise, but was largely driven by the structural increases in opportunities in education and reduced barriers to entry for higher-paying professions that characterized the 1979–1995 period. Men’s participation fell 0.2 percentage points in these times of weaker opportunities and lower wage growth when the overall unemployment rate averaged 6.7% (Gould 2020). Since 2000, periods of high unemployment have been associated with declines in both male and female labor force participation.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-307257 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307257" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307257-35073-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Periods of higher unemployment for much of the last 45 years appear to be related to lower participation rates, particularly among men. But, as the women’s labor force participation rate stabilized in 2000, the trends have been similar for both men and women. The weaker labor market between 2000 and 2014 meant losses in participation, as workers saw fewer opportunities for themselves in the labor market. Though delayed, the labor market expansion in the lead-up to the business cycle peak in 2019, and in the strong bounceback of the last four years, has coincided with greater labor market participation for new or returning workers.</p>
<p>Mechanically, when workers see fewer opportunities and leave the labor force, the unemployment rate will fall as people who may have been classified as unemployed are now out of the labor force and, therefore, not counted. To the extent this is happening, even the higher unemployment rates in the bad times may be overstating labor market strength or undercounting weakness.</p>
<p>Since men’s and women’s labor force participation rates differ greatly in terms of their absolute levels across the entire period in question, we will conduct separate analyses for women and men. We caution readers to note the change in scale between figures for women and men when comparing trends. Women’s low participation in the 1970s requires a wider range; when men’s are narrowed to the range of interest, it can appear to amplify changes. While there were large losses over the entire period for men, they may appear larger than they are when compared with women’s wider labor force experiences.</p>
<h2>Labor force participation rose for all racial/ethnic groups among women, while white and Black men experienced the largest declines</h2>
<p><strong>Figure C </strong>illustrates prime-age labor force participation rates for women (on the left) and men (on the right) for four groups: Hispanic of any race, white non-Hispanic (white), Black non-Hispanic (Black), and other (non-Hispanic). Other (non-Hispanic) is mostly Asian and Pacific Islander women and men; however, a series for this group doesn’t date as far back as 1976. Among women, Hispanic women have the lowest participation rates, while white and Black women have the highest. White women experienced the sharpest rise in participation through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, and all groups experienced a lack of progress or a softening in participation in the early 2000s. Except for the dip in the pandemic recession, all groups experienced a resurgence in participation over much of the last decade.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-311354 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="311354" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311354-35243-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Over the entire period, Black men had the lowest labor force participation rates, and their declines were the sharpest for much of the last 45 years, never recovering fully in each recovery until the most recent period. With the exception of losses in the pandemic recession, Black men experienced a significant increase in participation over the last decade. Now, their labor force participation rate is the highest it has been in nearly 25 years. White men also experienced declines until the mid-2010s, but their participation rate stabilized and remains just shy of their pre-pandemic levels. Hispanic men experienced milder declines over the entire period and an uptick since the pandemic recession.</p>
<p>Though we do not show a figure for labor force participation rates by nativity (and the data only go back to 1994), it’s worth noting that among women, the participation rate of noncitizens is much lower than that of native or naturalized women (See <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>). Among men, the largest fall in participation occurred among the native-born though 2014 but then rose over much of the last 10 years, except during the deep pandemic recession. Non-native men, either naturalized or noncitizens, did not experience large declines in participation, but their presence in the U.S. is often tied to the availability of work so their denominator—the population of each of these groups—also ebbs and flows with the strength of the labor market.</p>
<p>Over the last nearly five decades, the prime-age population has shifted from over 80% to about 55% white non-Hispanic, a drop of about 28 percentage points (EPI 2025a). While the Black share of the prime-age population rose about 4 percentage points, the largest gains were among the Hispanic share, increasing about 16 percentage points between 1979 and 2024 (EPI 2025a).</p>
<p>Given differences in labor force levels by race and ethnicity and the changing composition of the population by race and ethnicity over time, it is useful to decompose the overall change in the labor force into its component parts: the change in population share (or the between effect) and the change in labor force participation within groups (the within effect).<strong> Figure D </strong>shows these two effects, on the left for women and on the right for men.</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-307511 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307511" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307511-35097-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Compared with the changes due to the changing composition of the workforce, the changes within groups loom much larger. For women, the changing composition pulls down participation in part because Hispanic women were a growing share of the population with lower participation rates, compared with the falling share and higher participation rates of white non-Hispanic women. The rise is due to within-group increases in participation over the entire period.</p>
<p>Among men, the changing composition of the workforce played a small role, though likely driven by a falling population share of white men with higher participation rates in general. The drop in participation rates within each race/ethnic group played a much larger role over the 45-year period.</p>
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<h2>Labor force participation rate fell sharply for men with less than a four-year college degree, while participation for women with a college degree is at its highest ever</h2>
<p>Labor force participation rates for different groups by educational attainment vary but follow the same general pattern for men and women, respectively. Both men and women with lower levels of educational attainment, shown in <strong>Figure E </strong>as noncollege—less than a four-year bachelor’s degree—exhibit lower levels of labor force participation throughout the last 45 years. For women, the noncollege participation tracked college participation, though their rates notably continued rising into 2000, while college participation peaked in 1997 (before the current period). Then, noncollege women’s participation dropped off in the 2000s and rose only mildly over the last 10 years. After softening for several years, labor force participation for women with a college degree is now at an all-time high.</p>


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<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-311552 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="311552" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311552-35276-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The labor force participation rate for men with and without college degrees has declined over time, but unevenly. Men <em>without</em> a four-year college degree experienced large declines between 1979 and 2014, a fall of 8.2 percentage points. They experienced some gains in the expansion of the late 2010s but were harmed more in the pandemic recession. While their participation rate is now back to their 2019 level, the increase hasn’t put a huge dent in the losses they suffered in the 35 years following 1979.</p>
<p>The reduction in labor force participation for noncollege men over time has been considerably greater than for men with a four-year degree. Technology has reduced employment for some types of workers, especially in manufacturing and jobs made up of routine tasks, while boosting employment for other kinds of work, and there is evidence that middle-skilled or middle-wage occupations have declined and have been replaced with a combination of low- and high-skilled jobs (CEA 2016).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>The decline in jobs that are available to workers with lower levels of formal education—or perhaps more accurately, the decline in the types of jobs these men have traditionally had access to, such as those in manufacturing—may make men more likely to leave the labor force. The decline in routine manual-labor jobs—skilled and semi-skilled jobs in production, maintenance, and material moving occupations, which are concentrated in manufacturing but are common in many other industries as well—has been significant and was accelerated by the 2008 recession.</p>
<p>From 2000 to 2017, routine manual-labor jobs as a share of all nonfarm employment fell by nearly 5 percentage points (Valletta and Barlow 2018). There is a correlation between routine manual-labor jobs and prime-age labor force participation, and in states where the drop was larger, there tended to be corresponding larger declines in participation. Controlling for other state-level economic conditions does not alter the relationship, indicating that the share of routine manual-labor jobs is not a proxy for other broad changes such as changes to the unemployment rate. The reduction in the routine manual employment share from 2000 to 2017 is estimated to have reduced the prime-age participation rate by approximately 1.3 percentage points, slightly more than half of the actual 2.3 percentage point decline in prime-age LFP (Valletta and Barlow 2018).</p>
<p>More specifically, the share of men’s employment in the manufacturing sector has fallen to less than half of what it was in 1979. As shown in <strong>Appendix Table 3</strong>, men’s share of employment in combined durable and nondurable goods manufacturing was 28.5% in 1979, but by 2024, these shares were reduced to 12.8%. To be clear, women’s participation in manufacturing jobs also declined substantially over the period, dropping from 17.9% to 6.3% of women’s employment; however, given that these jobs made up a smaller share of women’s overall employment composition, the loss was felt less by women than by men.</p>
<p>Additionally, the debate over falling male labor force participation often does not mention an important and heavily male economic sector that has shrunk enormously in terms of the opportunities it provided for those who might otherwise have lower-than-average participation rates: the military.</p>
<p><strong>Figure F </strong>shows the overall decline in men’s labor force participation alongside the decline in total military employment scaled to the male noninstitutional prime-age population. To be clear, these are not true shares because our measure of the prime-age population is limited to the noninstitutional population, which excludes those in military service. However, the decline in military employment has meant that millions of noncollege men who might have lower-than-average opportunities in the civilian economy can no longer find work in the military. Throughout the mid-1960s through the 1990s, the share of prime-age men in the military dramatically decreased, from a high of 14% in 1967 leveling out at just under 4% of the prime-age male population in the 2000s.</p>


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<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-307515 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307515" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307515-35098-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Educational upgrading played a small role compared with within-group changes in labor force participation</h2>
<p>As with the composition of the population by race and ethnicity, there were large shifts in the educational attainment of men and particularly women between 1979 and 2024. As shown in Appendix Table 2, the share of women with a college degree rose 30.3 percentage points, while the share of men with a college degree rose 14.3 percentage points. Even though women started out with a smaller share of college graduates, today they are more likely to have a four-year degree relative to men. Given that overall labor force participation is far higher for college degree holders, all else equal, we would expect participation rates to have climbed over the 45-year period. While not the same as the labor force participation rate, prime-age women’s increased educational attainment is estimated to have contributed 2.7 percentage points to their employment rate between 2000 and 2023 (Arnon et al. 2023).</p>
<p>There is evidence that pursuing postsecondary education may be delaying labor force entry, at least for some populations. While most college students are younger than prime age, about one-third of students enrolled at Title IV institutions in the fall of 2023 were age 25 or older, and one-quarter were ages 25 to 39 (NCES 2024). Research comparing prime-age men between millennial and baby-boomer generational cohorts found that school attendance explains a roughly a third of millennial men under 30s&#8217; lower labor force participation, but that this effect has virtually no impact by age 40 (Bengali, Duzhak, and Zhao 2023). And when millennial men are separated by education, labor force participation for those with a high school diploma or less is relatively flat from age 25 to 40, while it increases with age for those with a college degree or more, suggesting that additional educational attainment may play a role in delaying eventual entry into the labor market.</p>
<p>In <strong>Figure G</strong>, we examine the role that changing education composition played in the changes in labor force participation. As the shift in educational attainment was twice as large among women, it’s not surprising that it played a large role in lifting women’s participation rates overall. But the increases in participation within education groups were even more important since 1979. For men, the declines in participation within each group played an outsized role in explaining declines in labor force participation. As we saw in Figure E, these losses were more acute among noncollege men.</p>


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<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-307448 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307448" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307448-35094-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Labor force participation among married women rose quickly, as unmarried women saw little change</h2>
<p>Participation rates for men and women by marital status display a strikingly different pattern, as shown in <strong>Figure H</strong>. Married men are more likely to work than unmarried men, while unmarried women are more likely to work than married women. Unmarried women always exhibit relatively high levels of labor force participation, and that has changed little over much of the last few decades, except for mild rising and falling in business cycles. Married women, however, experienced a sharp rise in participation from just over a half (52.3%) to three-quarters (75.8%), currently at their highest level of participation on record.</p>
<p>On average, married men are about 9 percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force than unmarried men. That gap has been relatively consistent over the last 45 years, though unmarried men are more subject to swings in the labor market.</p>


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<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-311543 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="311543" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311543-35272-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Over the last nearly five decades, marriage rates have declined for both men and women, falling by about a quarter overall (see <strong>Appendix Table 2</strong>). All else equal, the decrease in marriage rates for women would pull up overall labor force participation for women. <strong>Figure I </strong>illustrates this decomposition. The shift toward unmarried status pulled up women’s participation but depressed men’s, as unmarried women are more likely to work than unmarried men, but unmarried men are less likely to work than married men. Rising participation, especially among married women, was a major factor in the rise of participation among women. Men’s falling labor force participation over the 1979–2024 period is explained by both falling participation among married and unmarried men and falling married rates.</p>


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<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-307460 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="307460" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/307460-35096-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Labor force participation among women with young children rose, while men’s labor force remained tied to aggregate labor market conditions</h2>
<p>While a small percentage of prime-age workers overall report they are not in the labor force due to family and care responsibilities, family structure and caregiving have strikingly disparate impacts on men&#8217;s and women’s participation. Care for children is a significant driver of this difference, as mothers are more likely than fathers to be primary caregivers. Mothers have lower participation rates than similarly aged women without children, even after controlling for demographics and education (Kahn, García-Manglano, and Bianchi 2014).</p>
<p>Participation rates for women with young children tend to lag participation rates for women overall and have not grown at the same rate (see Appendix Table 1). Women with children under age 3 have lower participation rates than women with children under 5, although the gap between these two groups has closed slightly since the early 2000s. Women experience a significant and sharp decline in labor force participation after having their first child. Compared with one year prior to having their first child, mothers are 18 percentage points less likely to be in the labor force in the quarter they give birth, and it takes an estimated two years after the birth of their last child for LFP to recover to roughly the same rate as pre-motherhood (Sandler and Szembrot 2019).</p>
<p>Some of this is likely due to personal preferences and cultural norms around caregiving, but there is also evidence that suggests high prices for child care contribute significantly to lower maternal labor force participation. Previous studies have found a positive relationship between access to child care and the mother’s LFP, although the size of the effect varies across studies (Morrissey 2017). More recent data suggest a close to a 1-to-1 relationship between the price of care and employment; as child care prices increase by 1 percentage point, a mother’s probability of employment declines by 0.9 percentage points, and the relationship is even stronger in states with traditional gender norms (Collins et al. 2021).</p>
<h2>Factors thought to have influenced prime-age labor force participation between 2000 and the mid-2010s</h2>
<p>The majority of the decline in prime-age labor force participation occurred in the years immediately after the 2008 recession, when the participation rate fell by 2.2 percentage points over the course of six years. This prompted a wave of research and subsequent news coverage aimed at understanding the drivers behind this shift. Labor force participation rates tend to decline under weak economic conditions like recessionary periods. But when the recession began, the prime-age LFP had still not fully recovered losses from the early 2000s, and it continued to fall for several years for both men and women after the recession ended and the economy started expanding again.</p>
<p>The longer-term trends indicated that there were factors exerting downward pressure on prime-age participation beyond the business cycle. Estimates on how much of the change in LFP was caused by cyclical factors vary, ranging from one-sixth to about two-thirds (Shierholz 2012; CEA 2016). But while point estimates varied, there was widespread agreement that structural factors contributed significantly to falling labor force participation after 2007.</p>
<p>Many of the factors identified, such as declining opportunities for men without four-year college degrees and stalled parental and child care policies, have already been discussed. A wide range of other potential causes has also been hypothesized to be behind the reduction in prime-age participation, with an overall focus on the experience of men, given their steeper declines.</p>
<h3>Poor health, pain, and the opioid epidemic</h3>
<p>The number of prime-age adults who report they are not in the labor force due to poor health or disability has increased over time and is the primary reason for nonparticipation reported by men (Tüzeman and Tran 2019). Prime-age women overall report their health as better and their well-being as higher compared with men, and women’s self-reported health does not vary significantly by labor force status. In contrast, prime-age men who are not in the labor force report worse health indicators compared with working men (Graham and Pinto 2021).</p>
<p>Racial and ethnic disparities in health are well documented (NASEM 2017), but in contrast to decades of findings that people of color experience disproportionate health challenges, white men, among prime-age men not in the labor force from 2010 to 2016, reported worse health, lower well-being, and more pain than men of other racial groups. Among these white men, overall low scores were driven by those with lower educational attainment and those at the older end of the prime-age range, especially those ages 45 to 54. Because their health was so much worse than similar men who are working, this suggests that poor health may be the cause of their nonparticipation rather than its effect (Graham and Pinto 2021).</p>
<p>The opioid epidemic has also been linked to declining labor force participation, although it is difficult to assign causation or separate cause from effect due to a lack of reliable data. Opioid prescriptions increased significantly beginning in the late 1990s and peaked in 2012 (Chai et al. 2018) with 17.8 billion opioid analgesic pills dispensed that year alone (Woods et al. 2021). While the overall decline in prime-age labor force participation predates the opioid epidemic, there is evidence opioid use may have contributed to the trend.</p>
<p>A number of studies show that increases in the use of opioids are associated with negative labor market outcomes, including lower labor force participation, although effect sizes vary (Maclean et al. 2020). One widely cited report found that labor force participation fell more in counties with higher opioid prescription rates. After controlling for race, marital status, age, education, manufacturing jobs, and census region, increased opioid prescriptions are estimated to account for as much as 0.6 percentage points of the decline in prime-age male LFP and 0.8 percentage points of the decline for women—or roughly 20% of the total decline from 1999 to 2015 (Krueger 2017). Subsequent research found an opposite pattern by gender, estimating that a 10% increase in the local opioid prescription rate is associated with a 0.53 percentage point decline in prime-age participation for men and a 0.10 percentage point decline for prime-age women (Aliprantis, Fee, and Schweitzer 2023).</p>
<h3>Social Security Disability Insurance</h3>
<p>Along with increased self-reported poor health, pain, and opioid use, growing incidence of disability benefits has also been proposed as a cause of falling prime-age labor force participation in the 2000s and 2010s. Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) has been an important component of the social safety net since benefits began in 1957. Reforms were made to the disability screening process in the 1980s, and researchers have posited that, coupled with an increase in the real value of benefits, this led to the subsequent large increase in enrollment, with the number of workers receiving SSDI benefits tripling from 1980 to 2013. Some went so far as to suggest that many of the applicants may be making fraudulent claims (Autor and Duggan 2006). Although SSDI benefits replace only a fraction of a disabled worker’s prior earnings and disabled beneficiaries are more than twice as likely to live below the poverty line (CBPP 2025), some researchers hypothesized that SSDI benefits would reduce the incentive for people with some remaining work capacity to stay in the labor force.</p>
<p>Estimates on how much increased SSDI receipt has contributed to declining labor force participation for prime-age men vary but generally account for very little of the total change (CEA 2016). SSDI is suggested to have a particularly chilling effect on LFP for men with lower levels of education since benefit receipt has grown more for prime-age adults without a college degree, a group that has also seen larger declines in participation (Burk and Montes 2018). But research comparing data on SSDI and participation rates between 1975–1984 and 2008–2017 found that increases in disability benefits explain almost none of the decline in LFP for men with less than a high school education and only very small shares of the drop in LFP for prime-age men with only a high school diploma—0.01 percentage points of the decline for men ages 25–34 and 35–44, and 0.3 percentage points for those ages 45–54 (Binder and Bound 2019).</p>
<h3>Incarceration rates</h3>
<p>The number of people incarcerated in the U.S. quadrupled from 1978 to 1998 (BJS n.d.), and young Black men are disproportionately likely to be impacted. The rise in incarceration has cross-cutting effects on measured labor force participation. Because the surveys that estimate participation do not include the incarcerated population, if those currently incarcerated would be likely to have lower-than-average labor force participation rates in the noninstitutional labor market, a rise in incarceration can actually boost measured participation by removing this population from the denominator.</p>
<p>However, if a spell of incarceration causally reduces the probability of labor force participation because it makes an individual’s connections to the labor force more tenuous (being in an institution categorically means one is not in the labor force) or because skills and work experience can depreciate over time, then a growing stock of people in the market with a spell of incarceration in their history could lower overall participation through these scarring effects. Further, people with a history of incarceration are more likely to experience labor market discrimination (Burk and Montes 2018).</p>
<p>Spells of incarceration are estimated to have accounted for at least a quarter of the decline in LFP among all Black men between 1979 and 2000, and over one-half of the decline in participation rates among Black men ages 25–34 without a high school diploma (Holzer, Offner, and Sorenson 2005). More recently published research found that having received a criminal charge in their youth significantly increased the number of weeks prime-age men spent out of the labor force up to 26 years later. However, the data used in this research may be overestimating effects since it cannot account for reasons why someone is not in the labor force, including school attendance or because of later incarceration (Ellsworth 2017).</p>
<p>While not specifically measuring effects on prime-age labor force participation, additional research quantifies the way prior convictions—which may or may not result in incarceration—impact future employment. Having been convicted of a felony is estimated to have reduced the employment rate for all men in 2008 by 1.5 to 1.7 percentage points, and by 6.1 to 6.9 percentage points for men without a high school diploma (Schmitt and Warner 2011). Later research using state-level modeling estimated that every 1 percentage point increase in the share of the adult population with a felony conviction is associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in the rate of nonemployment—including unemployment and being out of the labor force—for adults aged 18 to 54 (Larson et al. 2022).</p>
<h3>Leisure activities</h3>
<p>As previously discussed, prime age women are much more likely to leave the labor force to undertake family responsibilities, and men rarely report this as the reason for their nonparticipation. But regardless of the reason for their nonparticipation, there is also no evidence that men ultimately use the time they may have otherwise used for labor market activities on household work. Time-use data show that prime-age men not in the labor force spend twice as much time on leisure activities compared with other men, but only slightly more time on housework and caring for children (Krause and Sawhill 2017).</p>
<p>From 2000 to 2015, total market hours worked fell more for younger men ages 21 to 30 than for men ages 31 to 55, and younger men’s detachment from the labor market increased. Computer and video game technology advanced over this same period, which increased the appeal of this leisure time, and younger men significantly increased their time spent gaming. While recognizing other factors such as declining demand for younger men’s labor, researchers have hypothesized that video and computer games are a potential factor that contributed to the reduction in the labor supply of younger men, estimating that increased gaming technology was responsible for up 38% to 79% of the differential in work hours reduction between younger and middle-aged men (Aguiar et al. 2017).</p>
<p>Subsequent research confirms that time spent playing video games increased among men in the 2000s (Krueger 2017; Gray 2019). The increase in time spent gaming was concentrated among men under 30, and nonworking young adult men spent more time playing computer and video games than their working peers did. However, total electronics leisure time was flat over this period because time spent on gaming was generally offset by decreased time watching television or movies, not by reduced job search or labor market activity. And while young men who had recently exited the labor force spent more time gaming than employed men did, they spent less time compared with men who had been out of the labor force longer, undercutting the hypothesis that gaming was the reason for their exit (rather than a consequence of it). Overall, the data suggest that shifting cultural norms have made it more socially acceptable for slightly older and non-employed men to spend time playing video games, not that young men were leaving the labor force in order to devote more time to gaming (Gray 2019).</p>
<h3>Real and relative wages</h3>
<p>Real hourly wages (adjusted for inflation) for prime-age men without a college degree were meaningfully lower in 2015 compared with the early 1970s, while real wages for men with degrees increased over the same time—although the decline is not consistent throughout the entire period, and real wages for all educational groups did increase in the late 1990s (Binder and Bound 2019).</p>
<p>While an individual’s personal level of pay is important to labor market decisions, there is also evidence that men’s relationship to other men’s wages may have a meaningful impact on their beliefs about the financial returns on the time and effort invested in work and subsequent labor supply. Data from 1980 to 2019 show that noncollege prime-age men are more likely to leave the labor force when their earnings decline relative to other prime-age men. Increases in real earnings may not be enough to offset the effect of inequality; it’s the comparison to what other similar-ages men are paid that seems to matter most. The relationship with women’s wages is weaker, and white non-Hispanic men are driving the relationship, indicating that the LFP of historically privileged groups may be more sensitive to changes in relative economic standing. This decline in relative earnings for noncollege prime-age men is estimated to have contributed to 44% of the decline in labor force participation over this period (Wu 2022).</p>
<p>Additional recent research comparing wages in men’s birth states found a positive relationship between the wages paid to other men starting in an individual’s boyhood and their eventual labor force participation when they reach prime age, even after controlling for labor market conditions and demographic variation. The study found that a $0.33 increase in the average experienced aggregate lifetime hourly wage of men raised the probability of prime-age labor force participation by 10 percentage points. The effects persisted even when men moved states, and were stronger within racial categories with an effect twice as strong for Black men compared with white men. Racial decompositions found that white men were most influenced by the wages of other white men, while Black men were influenced by both Black and white wage trajectories (Levin and Vidart 2025). The data suggest that lifetime wage experiences, and what men see other similar men being paid throughout the life course, may shape beliefs about the returns on work, which in turn, influence labor force participation. This may help explain why men’s LFP continued to decline in the 1990s when real wages rose.</p>
<h2>More recent changes to the economy&nbsp;</h2>
<p>The research outlined above was largely conducted using data from the years immediately after the 2008 recession, often with endpoints before prime-age labor force participation started recovering in the late 2010s. Labor force participation declined dramatically in 2020 but rebounded faster than predicted, continuing the upward trend in place before the pandemic. Between 2020 and 2024, the prime-age labor force grew about two-and-a-half times faster than the prime-age population (EPI 2025b). And as of 2024, prime-age men’s participation had regained its 2010 level, while women’s hit a historic high.</p>
<p>Research on the drivers of the rapid recovery and longer-term prime-age LFP increases is ongoing, but there are indicators that the single most important factor might simply be the state of macroeconomic slack. The 2010s saw prolonged and large output gaps that persisted for almost a decade after the business cycle peak in 2007. The more recent post-pandemic recovery was far faster, with output gaps essentially erased 18 months after the previous peak.</p>
<p>Since 2015, when prime-age participation started to recover, researchers have found a consistent procyclical relationship between changes in state unemployment rates and prime-age LFP, a relationship that is not present for business cycles between 1990 and 2014. The wage gains experienced by low-wage workers have been larger during the recent economic expansions compared with earlier periods, and since this groups tends to be more responsive to changes in labor market conditions, it is possible that higher wages for workers at the lower end of the wage spectrum drove labor force participation rates up (Prabhakar and Valletta 2024). However, as wage growth has slowed, this procyclical rise has likely cooled for now.</p>
<p>Prime-age women’s labor force participation fell more than men’s in the early months of the pandemic, declining by 3.4 percentage points compared with men’s decline of 2.8 percentage points, although women’s LFP recovered earlier and more consistently than men’s in 2023 (EPI n.d.). Maternal employment and labor force participation were also deeply impacted by the closure of in-person schooling and child care, more so than for fathers and women without children (Landivar et al. 2023). As a result, in contrast to studies done in the 2010s, much of the post-pandemic research has focused on the labor market experiences of women and mothers.</p>
<p>Labor force participation for mothers whose youngest child was under age 5 hit a record high of 71% in September 2023 (Aron-Dine, Bauer, and Powell 2025). There are a number of factors that could have influenced this outcome, including increased access to telework, as mothers with preschool-aged children are the most likely group of prime-age workers to telework, or this could be the result of the procyclical factors previously discussed.</p>
<p>Earlier analysis found that prime-age women contributed the most to the rebound of the overall labor force participation rate post-pandemic, and among all prime-age women, it was mothers with children under 5 who increased their participation the most from 2019 to 2023. However, this seems to be largely because their participation rate, which was already lower than the rate for all prime-age women and mothers of older children, declined the least among mothers in the labor market collapse period (April–May 2019 to April–May 2020). During the recovery period (April–May 2020 to April–May 2023) prime-age women without minor children had a larger impact on the net change in the labor force participation rate, holding population constant. (Bauer and Wang 2023).</p>
<p>Analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers on the impact of the Biden-Harris administration’s $24 billion in child care stabilization funds, which were issued as subsidies to child care providers, estimates a 2–3 percentage point increase in the labor force participation rate for mothers of children under 6 as a result of the funds (CEA 2023). Labor force participation rates stabilized around the time the funds expired, and after that point, growth in LFP for mothers of young children followed the same patterns as those of other women, lending support to the hypothesis that increased child care funding was driving earlier increases. However, these estimates only control for the expanded child tax credit and state unemployment rates, with no control for increases in telework. Telework increases have also been hypothesized to affect all groups of women similarly, but that finding differs by data source. Analysis using Current Population Survey data shows prime-age parents are more likely to telework than workers without children (Aron-Dine, Bauer, and Powell 2025), while others using Census Pulse Survey data found non-mothers were more likely to telework in the first half of 2023 (Bauer and Wang 2023).</p>
<h2>Prospects for labor force participation going forward and how policy can affect them</h2>
<p>There are many reasons for comparative optimism about prime-age labor force participation going forward, driven by a partial reversal of a number of pressing social challenges. For one, the low points of the 2010s seem to have been significantly driven simply by excess macroeconomic slack. To the degree such prolonged periods of slack can be avoided going forward, labor force participation rates should avoid similar large slumps. For another, the incarcerated population in the United States has fallen significantly in the past 2 decades. To the degree that the future will see fewer workers scarred by a spell of incarceration, this should boost labor force participation. Further, the high point of the opioid epidemic seems to have passed, and rates of addiction are falling, removing another key headwind to labor force participation.</p>
<p>All of these potential tailwinds to labor force participation are obviously contingent on policy decisions—both economic and social. Further, a number of other margins that will affect labor force participation also will be largely driven by policy. Below, we highlight a number of determinants of labor force participation in coming years and assess how policy can increase or reduce their effect.</p>
<h3>Efforts to reduce opioid use further may increase labor force participation</h3>
<p>Although the exact effects are challenging to measure due to a lack of comprehensive data, there is some evidence suggesting that the increased use of opioids contributed to declining labor force participation in the late 2000s through mid-2010s (Aliprantis, Fee, and Scheitzer 2023). Since that time, a number of laws at the state and national levels have been enacted in response to the opioid crisis. Federally, the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016, the 21st&nbsp;Century Cures Act, and the Substance Use Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act are intended to lessen the demand and supply of opioids while reducing the harms of opioid use disorder (CBO 2022). These efforts are multifaceted but include strategies such as providing funding to states to invest in prescription drug monitoring programs, increasing budgets for public health services to prevent and treat substance use disorders, and developing treatment alternatives to incarceration.</p>
<p>Tracing the impact of these laws is difficult, in part due to the effects of the pandemic, which contributed to increased opioid use, misuse, and deaths in 2020 (CBO 2022). However, post-2020 some measures have markedly improved. The overall rate of opioid dispensing has declined by roughly 20% since 2019, and opioid deaths involving prescription drugs have declined since their peak in 2017 (CDC 2024; NIDA 2024b). Emergency room visits for suspected nonfatal overdoses related to all opioids also declined over this time period (CDC 2024). At the same time, overdose deaths from any drug and those involving any opioid (not just prescription drugs) continued to increase through 2022 before declining in 2023, although they remain elevated by historical standards (NIDA 2024a).</p>
<p>It is too early to know if these measures will continue to trend downward, but there does not seem to be a simple, straightforward, ongoing connection between opioid misuse and labor force participation. Overdose rates are not a perfect proxy for misuse, but deaths from synthetic opioids increased dramatically after 2014 and remain very high, largely caused by illicitly manufactured fentanyl (NIDA 2024c). This occurred at the same time that prime-age labor force participation has also been increasing. It is possible that there are more complex relationships developing between opioid misuse and LFP, particularly as the opioid crisis changes over time.</p>
<h3>Reducing the labor market scarring of incarceration</h3>
<p>For Black men in particular, incarceration presents a uniquely challenging obstacle to gaining employment and rejoining the labor force (Pager 2003; Williams, Wilson, and Bergeson 2019; Holzer, Offner, and Sorenson 2005; Ellsworth 2017). At least 1 in 5 Black men will experience incarceration at some point in their lives (Robey, Massoglia, and Light 2023). These results suggest that any successful policy effort to reduce incarceration and recidivism rates would be highly supportive of labor force participation. While recent ban-the-box policies (such as those that do not require job applicants to disclose their criminal history for most jobs) have had mixed results in their ability to promote overall employment (Rose 2021), Bailey et al. (2024) found that children in households that received food stamps had a reduced likelihood of being incarcerated as adults later in life by 0.5 percentage points, suggesting that meeting families’ basic needs can do more than just improve health.</p>
<p>More promising than the ban-the-box policies is California’s 2011 policy to redistribute the costs of sending an adult to prison to the governing locality that makes the decision to incarcerate. This policy is associated with a reduction in the prison population of 50,000 between 2009 and 2019, suggesting that public financing policy can play a surprisingly effective role in supporting labor force participation (Pfaff 2024). The law, AB 109 or colloquially referred to as realignment,” mandated that nonviolent, nonsexual, and nonserious offenders were required to serve sentences under county supervision. Prior to the law, prosecutors, who are paid by the county, were incentivized to prosecute offenses to their highest conviction to get offenders sent to prison, which was paid for exclusively by the state. This redistribution of costs significantly curtailed prosecutors’ incentives to seek higher sentences for less serious offenses and as a result, reduced incarceration rates in California substantially.</p>
<h3>Job quality matters to attract workers into the labor market, particularly into some of the fastest-growing occupations</h3>
<p>A key headwind for men’s labor force participation in the past few decades has been a slowdown in job growth in sectors like manufacturing and mining that traditionally provided relatively high wages for workers without a college degree. Much of the change in the composition of employment is largely outside the purview of policymakers—but policy can have some effect on the margins of this employment composition. More importantly, how changing <em>employment composition</em> translates into changes in wages or perceived opportunities for different population groups is highly contingent on policy.</p>
<p>Occupational segregation is the tendency for one gender to more likely work in certain occupations than another. For instance, men are more likely to work in manufacturing and construction, while women are more likely to work in education and health care (industrial sectors are provided in Appendix Table 3, but the same phenomenon exists in occupations). Gender stereotypes, such as the idea that women are better suited to caregiving or that men are naturally better at physically demanding tasks, can constrain people’s options and make them more or less likely to pursue traditionally gendered jobs (Palffy, Lehnert, and Backes-Gellner 2023).</p>
<p>Occupational segregation is driven by social and cultural forces that compel women into caring professions (Schieder and Gould 2016). While many people do have choices about which jobs to apply for, accept, or reject, these decisions are made within the context of larger social and cultural influences. Occupational choices are shaped by a lifetime of experiences, including the expectations children are raised with, educational experiences, hiring practices, and norms and beliefs about family roles and the division of household labor held by employers, co-workers, and society. These norms and expectations impact women’s as well as men’s occupational “choice.” As we’ve shown above, the loss of both manufacturing and military jobs in the U.S. came at a cost to men in particular. On the flip side, the growth in jobs in health care will disproportionately benefit those more likely to work in health care, in this case, women.</p>
<p><strong>Figure J </strong>illustrates the occupations expected to gain the most jobs, in percent terms, between 2024 and 2034 (BLS 2025a), as well as the share of women in those four occupations in 2024. The industries shown are expected to grow at least twice as fast as the average rate of 4%.</p>
<p>Three of the four fastest-growing occupation groups are dominated by women. The fastest-growing occupation group over the next 10 years—health care support occupations—is expected to grow by 12.4% and is comprised of jobs that pay lower-than-average wages. The median wage in health care support occupations is about three-fourths the median wage overall ($37,000 versus $49,000). Currently women make up about 84% of workers in health care support occupations. Low pay is both a cause and effect of occupational segregation. Jobs in which women are overrepresented tend to provide lower pay and fewer benefits than male-dominated occupations do, and wages tend to fall in occupations as the share of women increases (Levanon, England, and Allison 2009).</p>


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<a name="Figure-J"></a><div class="figure chart-308156 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="308156" data-anchor="Figure-J"><div class="figLabel">Figure J</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/308156-35125-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure J" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>For workers of any gender to enter those faster-growing occupations, those jobs need to be better. That means better pay, better working conditions, and better benefits. Stronger labor standards, such as a higher minimum wage and overtime protections, can improve those jobs and make them more appealing to a broader range of workers. Increased unionization can also improve pay in those jobs. On average, workers in unionized jobs are paid about 12.8% more than workers in nonunion jobs (EPI 2025c) A key reason jobs in manufacturing could support a middle-class lifestyle was the high unionization rates. There’s no reason currently low-paid health care support occupations couldn’t enjoy such conditions. The number and share of unionized workers in health care support jobs has recently increased, and their wages are higher than those of their nonunion counterparts (BLS 2025b; BLS 2025c).</p>
<h2>Labor force participation is more resilient in peer countries</h2>
<p><strong>Figure K </strong>compares the United States with the OECD average prime-age labor force participation, 1976–2024, women on the left and men on the right. While they display similar overall trends at the endpoints—upward for women and downward for men—there are some notable differences. In the OECD countries, men’s participation also fell between 1976 to the early 2000s, but the losses tapered off quickly, and today, participation remains around its 2000 level. In the United States, men’s participation continued to drop, most notably during the Great Recession and prolonged recovery before starting its upward climb as the economy expanded.</p>
<p>While it is the case that many of our peer countries in the OECD also experienced downturns, particularly in the Great Recession, their labor force participation rates did not fall as far, largely due to different policy responses. Policies such as work sharing and time banking that provide support for workers to stay on the payroll helped blunt the impact of the Great Recession in places like Germany, which saw its unemployment rate tick down at the same time the rate in the U.S. more than doubled (Baker 2018).</p>


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<a name="Figure-K"></a><div class="figure chart-311531 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="311531" data-anchor="Figure-K"><div class="figLabel">Figure K</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311531-35268-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure K" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Women’s labor force participation never stopped its upward rise in the OECD average, even while it softened in the United States following 2000. The steep gains in participation in the U.S. tapered off significantly, while it continued to rise in the OECD until today. The policy environment around work for women is quite different, particularly in Western European countries, which have stronger family leave and child care supports.</p>
<p>There is meaningful evidence that the lack of work-family policies and relatively sparse care infrastructure in the U.S. depresses women’s labor force participation. In 1990, out of 22 OECD countries, the U.S. ranked 6th for women’s prime-age labor force participation, but by 2010 had fallen to 17th place. The lack of family-supportive policies in the U.S., such as paid parental leave and publicly provided child care, can explain 29% of the decline in the U.S.’s ranking of female LFP relative to other OECD countries (Blau and Kahn 2013).</p>
<p>In the subsequent 15 years, the gaps between policies in other OECD countries and the U.S. have typically widened. Compared with other high-income OECD countries, the U.S. is now even more of an outlier on nearly every workplace policy that could help boost labor force participation among workers with family responsibilities.</p>
<p>Since 2010 the total amount of paid parental leave available to two parents in OECD countries has increased from an average of 58.1 weeks to 64.6 weeks (OECD 2024). Yet the United States remains an extreme outlier and is one of the only countries in the world that does not guarantee workers the right to any form of paid parental leave. Across the other 37 OECD countries, mothers are eligible for an average of more than one year (53.5 weeks), and fathers are eligible for more than three months (13 weeks) of paid leave.</p>
<p>Families in the United States also pay more on average for child care than families in other OECD countries. In the U.S., a single parent paid the average wage would need to spend 40% of their wages to pay for center-based care for two toddlers—about 5 times the cost burden (8%) for the OECD, on average (OECD n.d.). And while net costs increased for U.S. families, they declined in most other OECD countries, with the overall OECD average dropping from 15% to 8% between 2004 and 2023.</p>
<p>The cost burden is much greater in the U.S. compared with other countries where child care fees are similarly high or higher because the U.S. does not provide meaningful benefits like child care allowances or fee rebates to help families reduce their financial costs. While there are tax credits that allow some working parents to write off child care expenses, not all families qualify, and the overall impact on net costs is minimal.</p>
<p>The share of GDP the United States spends on early childhood education and care has declined since 2010, while the OECD average has increased (OECD Social Expenditure Database n.d.). In 2021, the last year with complete data on all 38 OECD countries, U.S. spending (0.3% of GDP) was less than half the OECD average (0.7%).</p>
<p>Policies related to remote work and workplace flexibility—such as the ability of workers to alter their start and stop times—were not part of the original analysis conducted by Blau and Kahn (2013). However, flexibility and remote or telework options have been identified as important policies to support labor force participation, particularly among mothers post-2020. As of April 2024, 25 of the 38 OECD countries had laws in place allowing workers to request flexible schedules, remote work, or both (World Bank 2024).</p>
<p>The 2019 Work-Life Balance Directive<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> created a right for workers in the European Union to request flexible work arrangements, including remote work, to better coordinate work with family caregiving responsibilities. The law does not guarantee that employers will grant approval to every request, but they are required to seriously consider requests for flexibility and must provide reasons for refusing requests. In the United Kingdom, workers’ rights to request flexible work arrangements were expanded through the Employment Relations (Flexible Working) Act 2023<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>. Workers in the U.K. now have a legal right to request flexibility starting from their first day of employment rather than having to wait 26 weeks before making the request as they did previously.</p>
<p>In the United States, workers do not have an explicit legal right to request remote work or workplace flexibility, and employers are not required to consider such requests when they are made. Although the data are not conclusive, there are indications that increased access to telework during and after the pandemic enabled greater labor force participation, including among mothers of young children. Broadening access to flexibility and remote work would likely further increase entry or reentry into the labor force among workers with caregiving responsibilities, as well as supporting continued participation for current workers.</p>
<h2>Investing in children is a long-run strategy to increase labor force participation in the future</h2>
<p>Previous sections noted the sharp increase in college attainment among the U.S. population in recent decades and also noted that college graduates saw much slower rates of declines in labor force participation than noncollege workers did. The public sector has supplied the majority of financing for higher education in the United States for the entire post-World War II period. In short, the boost to labor force participation (and economic growth generally) supplied by higher education was a policy choice.</p>
<p>Policy choices about how prepared future generations will be to participate in the labor force are not just confined to education spending (though that is obviously important as well). Investing in children by supporting their basic needs such as food, medical care and child care has been shown to have demonstrable long-term effects on health and economic sufficiency. These, in turn, support attachment to the labor market. Early childhood is a sensitive period, and investments in children tend to have large benefits as they age (Cunha and Heckman 2007; Heckman 2008). Additionally, a stronger welfare state raises the income and resources of a child’s family (Ruhm and Waldfogel 2012). Importantly, these benefits tend to outweigh the costs of the program or any potential impacts on the parents (Aizer, Hoynes, and Lleras-Muney 2022).</p>
<p>Long-term studies have tracked children in households with access to food stamps (SNAP), early childhood education, and Medicaid to assess the impact of these programs on these children as adults. With respect to food stamps, Hoynes, Schanzenbach, and Almond (2016) found that access to food stamps for households with children led to statistically significant improvements in measures of metabolic health when they were adults. Moreover, researchers found positive impacts of receiving food stamps on economic sufficiency (high school completion, use of food stamps, and earnings), with statistically significant increases among adult women who receive food stamps. Bailey et al. (2024) linked the 2000 Census and 2001–2013 American Community Survey to information from Social Security to examine how SNAP program rollouts from 1961–1975 impacted children as adults. They found that children with access to food stamps before age 5 have better outcomes as adults in the form of increased economic self-sufficiency (3% standard deviation increase), human capital (6% SD increase), quality of neighborhood residence (8% SD increase), and a 1.2-year increase in life expectancy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Several studies have also documented the long-run impact of Medicaid with implications for labor market participation. Miller and Wherry (2019) studied infants who gained access to Medicaid <em>in utero</em> via their mother’s prenatal coverage. They find that infants with prenatal coverage had lower rates of chronic health conditions as adults, fewer hospitalizations, and increased high school graduation rates. Thompson (2017) examined the long-term impact of Medicaid access and found that each additional year of Medicaid eligibility during childhood improved overall adult health (self-score evaluations) and reduced chronic conditions and asthma prevalence as adults. Given that disability and chronic health conditions are some of the main reasons that individuals stay out of the labor force, these studies show that access to Medicaid as a child can promote the conditions that would lead to labor force attachment.</p>
<p>Finally, Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie (2020) use tax data to estimate the long-term impact of Medicaid eligibility in childhood on a variety of outcomes measured at ages in early adult life. They find that eligibility for Medicaid during childhood increased college enrollment rates, delayed fertility, reduced mortality, and reduced dependence on EITC benefits, and led to higher tax payments among adults, suggesting that access to Medicaid has the long-term benefit of improved economic self-sufficiency and employment.</p>
<p>While the U.S. doesn’t have a national pre-K early-childhood program, studies of individual programs show promising results. Chicago’s Child-Parent Center Education Program preschool was linked to higher educational attainment and socioeconomic status, a higher likelihood of health insurance coverage, and lower rates of justice-system involvement and substance abuse (Reynolds et al. 2011). Michigan’s HighScope Perry Preschool program was linked to fewer arrests, higher earnings, and higher educational achievement and attainment (Schweinhart 2005), and careful cost- benefit analysis estimated that every dollar invested at age 4 yields a return of $60–$300 by age 65 (Heckman et al. 2010). Additionally, studies of state-introduced universal kindergarten programs in the 1960s and 1970s found that this additional early childhood education increased both educational attainment for some groups of students (Cascio 2009, 2010; Dhuey 2011); and labor market outcomes in the form of weeks worked and wages (Dhuey, 2011), suggesting that early childhood education interventions can support labor market attachment.</p>
<p>Studies in Europe have documented the impact of pre-K and early childhood care on long-term outcomes. In Denmark, researchers found that early increased preschool density was positively associated with completed schooling, particularly for daughters of less educated mothers, and later adult earnings (Bingley and Westergaard-Nielsen, forthcoming). In France, researchers found that the large-scale universal preschool program increased test scores, high school graduation rates, and adult wages, with larger effects for children from disadvantaged backgrounds (Dumas and LeFranc 2010). In Norway, an expansion of subsidized child care led to increased educational attainment (more years of schooling, higher rates of college attendance) and labor market participation<strong> (</strong>Havnes and Mogstad 2011).</p>
<h2>The role labor force participation rates play in the economic future of the U.S.</h2>
<p>Labor force growth is a key element of economic growth more generally. At the most basic level, growth in overall gross domestic product (GDP) over brief periods of time can be proxied as the sum of the growth rates of the labor force and of labor productivity—with productivity defined as the amount of output generated in an average hour of work in the economy. Given this, every percentage point rise or fall in the growth rate of the labor force translates one for one into a corresponding change in overall GDP growth.</p>
<p>In coming decades, the question that matters more than any other for projecting labor force growth for the U.S. economy is the pace of net immigration. For example, the Congressional Budget Office projects that the U.S. labor force will grow by just under 7% from 2025 to 2035 (CBO 2025a). But if the influence of immigration flows is removed, this growth will fall to just 0.5% over the entire next 10 years.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a></p>
<p>There is no realistic scope at all for changes within U.S.-born labor force participation rates to fundamentally change this and lead to significant increases in the labor force over the next decade. Most importantly, the U.S.-born population is aging fast. Over the next 10 years the share of the U.S. adult population over the age of 65 will rise by another 4 percentage points (to over 27%). Given the gap in labor force participation rates for workers aged 65–74 and those under the age of 65, this translates into a reduction in the overall labor force participation by roughly a full percentage point over the decade—a powerful headwind to growth.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a></p>
<p>In theory, the CBO has taken some account of the fact that major headwinds to growth in prime-age participation rates over the past decade or so should likely reverse (or at least, dial down) in the next 10 years. These headwinds include excess labor market slack, the stock of prime-age adults with some spell of incarceration in their past, the prevalence of opioid addiction, and the steady shrinkage of military employment scaled against the civilian workforce. If none of these past headwinds to labor force participation were taken into account in CBO projections, their reversal could conceivably add 1–2 percentage points to prime-age labor force participation rates over the next 10 years. But, again, this doesn’t come close to rivalling the potential effects of changes in net immigration, and CBO has likely accounted for a number of these influences in their projections, at least in part.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>If one of the more ambitious long-run strategies for boosting future labor force participation highlighted in the previous section was undertaken (large investments in child health, nutrition, and education for example), these effects could conceivably add another percentage point to labor force participation rates, but only at a quite long time horizon (well over 10 years).<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a></p>
<p>One upshot of the dominance of immigration flows in conditioning future labor force growth and the continued downward pressure on labor force growth imposed by the aging of the U.S.-born population is that anybody promising large increases in GDP growth in coming years without calling for higher rates of immigration will have a very hard time fulfilling this. Again, every percentage point decline in the growth rate of the labor force subtracts a percentage point from GDP growth, and changes in labor force growth in the coming decade will be driven near entirely by immigration inflows.</p>
<p>Of course, GDP growth is (roughly) the sum of growth in the labor force <em>plus</em> the growth of productivity. In theory, a slower growth rate of the labor force could be overcome by a surge in productivity growth, and overall GDP growth could still rise. However, productivity growth over the past century in the U.S. economy has fluctuated with a relatively narrow band—essentially between 1% and 2% annually. Since the 1960s, spells of productivity growth over 2% have been rare—just the late 1990s and early 2000s. It is theoretically possible that we are in a stage currently where technological change will accelerate and productivity growth will surge to the higher bands of its historical experience, but this is very hard to bank on. Promises of future growth surges from other technological changes (like robotization in the 2010s) yielded real, but quite modest, productivity growth.</p>
<p>But while productivity growth is unlikely to generate historically fast GDP growth in coming decades, it is the most relevant part of the growth equation to focus on. A higher GDP driven by a larger labor force does not necessarily raise living standards. It is productivity growth alone that makes a country richer over time in the most relevant sense—providing the potential for higher living standards <em>per person</em>.</p>
<p>By far the most substantive way that differing rates of labor force growth can affect Americans’ economic future is through the tax and transfer system. The federal government in the U.S. has historically taken on the role of ensuring adequate income in retirement for all citizens by running social insurance programs—Social Security and Medicare—through the nation’s fiscal system. Very roughly speaking, current workers are taxed to provide benefits to current retirees. As the share of the population that is retired rises relative to the stock of current workers, this means a higher share of workers’ output needs to be devoted to providing income for retirees.</p>
<p>This need not imply any pronounced economic pressure. Productivity growth means that even if a rising <em>share</em> of workers’ incomes is devoted to social insurance for current retirees that workers’ net-of-tax income <em>levels</em> can still rise steadily over time. But this demographic angle of the large social insurance programs run by the federal government does pose potential political challenges. These political challenges could well be lessened by policy decisions that keep the ratio of current workers to current retirees higher than it otherwise would have been—and here is where issues of labor force participation could matter.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Labor force participation is both an input and a consequence of a healthy economy. While there is no ideal labor force participation rate that policymakers should target, they should target any barriers that are keeping willing workers from being able to actively search for work. These barriers include too-slack labor markets stemming from macroeconomic policy failures; labor market discrimination; insufficient investment in workers’ health, skills, and credentials; and a failure to make investments needed to enable parents with young children to also participate meaningfully in the labor market.</p>
<p>Outside of immigration, however, the changes to labor force participation that can be leveraged by even quite ambitious policy changes will be relatively small and will not meaningfully change the trajectory of the U.S. macroeconomy over a decade or so. This does not mean they are not worth doing, instead it means that policymakers should be realistic when claiming that future economic growth can be boosted by increasing growth in the U.S. labor force.</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>The authors thank Katie deCourcy&nbsp;and Stevie Marvin for research assistance and Grace Park for editing. This project was made possible by financial support from the Peter G. Peterson Foundation.</p>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> We should note that this change in employment shares by skill- or credential-grouping does not predict at all accurately any related change in wages. In short, one can believe that changing employment shares by occupation—even those driven by technological changes—fail to move relative wages or inequality in any significant way, and that non-relationship between employment and wage changes by occupation is validated in the data (see Mishel, Schmitt, and Shierholz 2013).</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Council Directive 2019/1158, 2019 O.J. (L 188), 79–93.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> The Employment Relations (Flexible Working) Act 2023, c. 24 (UK), <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/438/made">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2024/438/made</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Authors’ analysis is based on information in CBO 2025a, b. The size of the over-19 labor force over the next decade is provided directly in CBO 2025b. This data also provide the share of growth in the over-19 population that is accounted for by immigration. To obtain the counterfactual growth, we just removed the portion of growth associated with immigration each year and recalculated the level of the labor force for each year in the next decade.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Numbers in this paragraph are based on authors’ analysis of data in CBO 2025a, b. CBO 2025b reports that the share of the over-64 population will rise as a share of the total adult population by almost exactly 3 percentage points between 2025 and 2035. Currently, the LFPR for workers between the ages of 65 to 69 is almost exactly 30 percentage points lower than for workers between the ages of 55 to 64. Multiplying these together (which gives 0.9%) should give a very rough sense of the downward pressure on labor supply stemming from aging.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Schmitt and Warner (2011) estimated that the scarring effect of incarceration could reduce the employment-to-population ratio of men by between 0.6 to 2.6 percentage points by 2008. Given that the stock of incarcerated men has fallen by roughly 20% since its highest point (and a bit more than this as a share of the population), this penalty going forward could have been reduced by 0.15 to 0.6 percentage points. In regard to opioids, given estimates that rising opioid use throughout the 2000s could have reduced labor force participation rates by as much as 1 percentage point, any leveling off of this could remove a powerful headwind to labor force growth, and any affirmative reduction in the incidence of opioid addiction should, in theory, potentially boost labor force growth.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Most estimates of the effect of early childhood investments—whether it be early education, health, or nutritional investments—report the effect on earnings of exposed children when they become adults. Assuming a package of investments in today’s children were able to boost their earnings by 5% when they became adults (which seems plausible given that early childhood educational investments alone have been estimated to increase annual earnings of exposed children by over 20%, and the share of today’s children not currently receiving high-quality early childhood education is estimated to be over half of all children (see Lynch and Vaughul 2015)). If increased labor force participation accounted for a fifth of this total earnings effect (as opposed to lower unemployment rates, higher hours worked during a year, and higher hourly wages), then a range of estimates would indicate that these investments could boost the adult labor force participation rates of today’s children by roughly a percentage point. It seems plausible that increased labor force participation could, by itself, explain a fifth of projected future earnings. For example, annual earnings of workers with a college degree are roughly 60% higher than with only a high school degree. This 60% difference can be very roughly expressed as the sum of differences in labor force participation, unemployment rates, hours worked per year, and average hourly earnings. Labor force participation rates for workers with a bachelor’s degree or greater are roughly 12% higher than for workers with only a high school diploma , which is roughly a fifth of the total difference in annual earnings.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Next week’s 2024 Census data will give us the final snapshot of the economy’s health before Trump</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/next-weeks-2024-census-data-will-give-us-the-final-snapshot-of-the-economys-health-before-trump/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Sep 2025 17:16:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adewale A. Maye, Ben Zipperer, Elise Gould, Hilary Wething, Ismael Cid-Martinez, Joe Fast, Kyle K. Moore]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=309996</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[The U.S. labor market continued to expand in 2024, but at a slower pace than the prior two years. Job growth remained fast enough to largely keep pace with population growth and wages rose faster than inflation.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. labor market continued to expand in 2024, but at a slower pace than the prior two years. Job growth remained fast enough to largely keep pace with population growth and wages rose faster than inflation. Upcoming <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2025/2024-iphi-webinar-announcement.html">Census Bureau data for 2024</a>—set to be released on Tuesday—will reflect how these factors and others impacted annual earnings, income, poverty, and health insurance for workers, families, and children across the country.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>It&#8217;s worth emphasizing that the upcoming Census data <i>do not</i> reflect any economic developments in 2025. Some policymakers will attempt to claim any good news from the data as validation of the current U.S. policy path, but this would be completely misleading given the radical policy shifts in 2025 under the Trump administration. In this piece, we argue:</p>
<ul>
<li>Data for 2024 will likely reflect continued labor market strength. Inflation decelerated rapidly in 2024, which should boost last year’s income growth.&nbsp;</li>
<li>Even the likely strong 2024 income and poverty data will still show an economy that has left many workers, families, and children in an economically precarious position. Racial disparities in income, for example, leave people of color much more vulnerable to economic insecurity and poverty.</li>
<li>Trump administration policies—including chaotic and historically high tariffs, mass deportations, and attacks on the federal workforce—have already led to a softening labor market and more inflationary pressures in the economy. Given this, income and poverty measures are likely to worsen when these data are released next year for 2025.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
<li>In 2026 and beyond, cuts to food assistance and Medicaid that were part of the Republican-passed spending bill will increase food insecurity and the number of people without health insurance, particularly for families of color.</li>
<li>The Census data are incredibly valuable and provide transparent and non-politicized data that allow Americans to make informed decisions about what policies are delivering economic security for working people. The Trump administration has begun attempting to politicize and erode trust in federal statistical agencies and to manipulate the reporting of anything that seems like bad news for the economy. This is deeply undemocratic.</li>
</ul>
<p><span id="more-309996"></span></p>
<h4><b>The labor market mostly held strong in 2024</b>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>Between 2021 and 2023, the labor market rebounded dramatically from the pandemic recession as large-scale policy interventions—like expanded unemployment insurance—helped families stay afloat and drove a recovery several times faster than the Great Recession. In 2024, the labor market remained relatively strong, growing by <a href="https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/">2 million jobs</a> over the year. The unemployment rate rose slightly but maintained a 4.0% average over the year.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The prime-age employment-to-population ratio—the share of workers between the ages of 25 and 54 with a job—held steady at a high level of<a href="https://data.epi.org/labor_force/labor_force_emp/line/year/national/percent_emp/overall?timeStart=1976-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2024-01-01&amp;dateString=2024-01-01&amp;focuses=age_25_54&amp;highlightedLines=age_25_54"> 80.7%</a> in 2024. Prime-age Hispanic workers saw their employment rise, as prime-age Hispanic men <a href="https://data.epi.org/labor_force/labor_force_emp/line/year/national/percent_emp/gender?timeStart=2023-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2024-01-01&amp;dateString=2024-01-01&amp;focuses=age_25_54&amp;focuses=race_hispanic&amp;highlightedLines=gender_male&amp;highlightedLines=gender_female&amp;fitScale">increased their employment rates</a> by 0.7 percentage points. <a href="https://data.epi.org/labor_force/labor_force_emp/line/year/national/percent_emp/race?timeStart=2023-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2024-01-01&amp;dateString=2024-01-01&amp;focuses=age_25_54&amp;focuses=gender_female&amp;highlightedLines=race_hispanic&amp;highlightedLines=race_white&amp;highlightedLines=race_black&amp;fitScale">Employment also rose slightly</a> for prime-age Black and white women by 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. At the same time, Black and white men experienced mild declines in their employment rates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Real (inflation-adjusted) wages continued to increase in 2024. <b>Figure A</b> shows that inflation fell sharply from 3.9% to 2.6% over the course of the year. At the same time, the strong labor market allowed workers to maintain a solid pace of nominal wage growth: nominal hourly wages and weekly earnings growth decelerated by much smaller amounts than price growth for goods and services. This combination of inflation falling faster than nominal wage growth is exactly the macroeconomic “soft landing” from the COVID-19 inflation shock that so many thought would be impossible to achieve. Together, this translated into a 1.4% increase in average real hourly wages over the year. Average real <i>weekly</i> earnings—perhaps a better signal for the annual income data out next week—rose by 0.9%.&nbsp;</p>
<p><span class="TextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">While these are meaningful averages, we also know that real wage growth </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">was </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">particularly strong for </span></span><a class="Hyperlink SCXW43125339 BCX0" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/strong-wage-growth-for-low-wage-workers-bucks-the-historic-trend/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span class="TextRun Underlined SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>lower</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>&#8211;</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>wage workers</span></span></a><span class="TextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">a</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">nd workers with lower levels of </span></span><a class="Hyperlink SCXW43125339 BCX0" href="https://data.epi.org/wages/hourly_wage_mean/line/year/national/real_wage_mean_2024/education?timeStart=2023-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2024-01-01&amp;dateString=2023-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=education_some_college&amp;highlightedLines=education_college&amp;highlightedLines=education_hs" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><span class="TextRun Underlined SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-contrast='none'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-ccp-charstyle='Hyperlink'>educational attainment</span></span></a><span class="TextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">. A</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">long</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0"> with steady employment</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW43125339 BCX0">, these advances bode well for improvements to income and poverty rates in next week’s report.</span></span></p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-309499 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="309499" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/309499-35154-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><b>Persistent economic disparities leave families of color disproportionately vulnerable</b></h4>
<p>The upcoming Census release will continue to show persistent racial inequities that can only be corrected through years of sustained progress. In 2023, typical Black and Hispanic households were paid just <a href="https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/p60-282.html">63 cents and 74 cents</a>, respectively, for every dollar paid to the median non-Hispanic white household. These disparities are especially harmful to low-income families of color who live in a constant state of economic insecurity. In a <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-last-two-recessions-have-hit-low-income-families-of-color-hard-trumps-economic-agenda-will-expose-millions-to-even-more-pain-when-the-next-recession-strikes/">new report</a>, we find that Black and Hispanic families with children make up more than half (61.1%) of economically vulnerable families, defined as those with incomes below 200% of the federal poverty line. Even within the group of economically vulnerable families, Black and Hispanic workers are also more likely to have incomes below the poverty line (see <b>Figure B </b>below). Narrowing these racial disparities will demand stronger and more persistent income gains for these families in the years to come.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-304770 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="304770" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/304770-34947-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><b>Policy changes are weakening the economy in 2025</b></h4>
<p>There are several reasons to suspect that 2025 will be a worse year for incomes and poverty. For one, labor market indicators have weakened: unemployment inched up to <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm">4.2% by July 2025,</a> and job growth slowed to <a href="https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CES0000000001">85,000 per month compared with 168,000 in 2024.</a> The last three months saw average job growth of just 35,000 per month. While layoffs have not yet surged, <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/elisegould.bsky.social/post/3lv4e5ke53c2l">both employers and workers appear to be sitting tight in anticipation of a weaker economy going forward.</a> Federal employment has fallen by <a href="https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment/">84,000 since January</a>, which doesn’t include the many workers who will leave federal payrolls on September 30 at the end of the fiscal year. According to Trump official Scott Kupor, 2025 will end with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/22/us/politics/trump-federal-workers.html">300,000 fewer federal workers</a>.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s damaging and chaotic tariff policy also threatens economic security, with nearly universal tariffs set at the highest level in a century or more. This is causing severe business uncertainty and already leading<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/tariffs-everything-you-need-to-know-but-were-afraid-to-ask/"> to higher prices for households</a> because tariffs are taxes on both imported and domestically produced goods. Since lower-income families spend a higher share of their income on goods consumption, these tariffs will disproportionately harm their real incomes.</p>
<p>In addition, the administration’s mass deportation agenda will substantially harm the labor market. The damage will not just be felt by immigrant workers and their families—they will spill over and hurt U.S.-born workers as well. If the Trump administration successfully follows through on its goals of deporting 1 million people each year during their term, there will be <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/">3.3 million fewer employed immigrants and 2.6 million fewer employed U.S.-born workers</a> by 2029.</p>
<h4><strong>Health insurance coverage and access to food assistance will fall over the next several years</strong></h4>
<p>Health insurance, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) coverage, and Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) rates in 2024 will likely represent high-water marks over the next few years. That’s because the <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-radical-republican-budget-bill-steals-from-the-poor-to-give-tax-cuts-to-the-rich/">Republican spending bill</a> passed in July cuts Medicaid spending by <a href="https://www.kff.org/medicaid/allocating-cbos-estimates-of-federal-medicaid-spending-reductions-and-enrollment-loss-across-the-states/">$793 billion</a> and SNAP benefits by <a href="https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbo.gov%2Fsystem%2Ffiles%2F2025-06%2F61533-hr0001-Sen-2025Recon-BEB.xlsx&amp;wdOrigin=BROWSELINK">$186 billion</a> over the next decade—all to pay for tax cuts for the richest Americans.</p>
<p>The share of the population without health insurance was <a href="https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2024/demo/p60-284.pdf">8.0% in 2023</a>, or about 26.5 million people. This ranked near historic lows in the United States—driven by a strong labor market, enhanced Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies, and pandemic-era coverage protections (particularly in Medicaid). 2024 saw a slight rollback in some of the pandemic-era coverage protections, but the strong labor market and ACA subsidies likely kept uninsurance rates relatively low. However, we can expect uninsurance rates to climb in 2025 and beyond because the Republican spending bill both <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-08/61367-Uninsured-Data.xlsx">cut Medicaid</a> and <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-06/Wyden-Pallone-Neal_Letter_6-4-25.pdf">allowed the enhanced ACA subsides to lapse</a>. This will lead to more than 14 million people losing health insurance coverage by 2035, increasing the number of uninsured people by more than 40%.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>The Republican budget will also lower incomes and increase food insecurity by cutting SNAP. Benefit reductions and more stringent eligibility requirements will reduce SNAP participation by an average of <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-08/61367-SNAP.pdf">2.4 million</a> in the next decade. A weakening labor market will exacerbate this problem by making it more difficult to satisfy new SNAP work requirements as people work fewer hours due to shrinking job opportunities.</p>
<p>Black and Hispanic households will likely represent a <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/medicaid-cuts-will-disproportionately-hurt-people-of-color-and-children/">disproportionate share</a> of those losing health insurance coverage and access to SNAP benefits. <strong>Figure C</strong> below shows that people of color are more likely to rely on Medicaid and SNAP benefits. In 2023, SNAP lifted more than 3 million people <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/cuts-to-snap-benefits-will-disproportionately-harm-families-of-color-and-children/">out of poverty</a>—over half of those were Black or Hispanic, and nearly 40% were children. Cuts to Medicaid, SNAP, and other government support programs mean that the 2024 rate of poverty as measured by the Supplemental Poverty Measure will also likely be the lowest for many years to come.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-309586 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="309586" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/309586-35155-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong>Timely and accurate data are essential but under threat</strong></h4>
<p>Next week’s release will also mark the last year in which data from federal statistical agencies could be reliably assumed to be completely free of politicization or manipulation. Staffing cuts and <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/trumps-firing-of-bls-commissioner-is-undemocratic-and-economically-dangerous/">politically motivated firings</a> at government agencies threaten the credibility of future data releases. On August 1,<sup>, </sup>Trump fired the Bureau of Labor Statistics Commissioner because he did not like the jobs <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/trumps-firing-of-bls-commissioner-is-undemocratic-and-economically-dangerous/">numbers they released.</a> High-quality public data inform how well the economy is delivering for the majority of working people—whether job opportunities exist, how families make ends meet, and whether families have access to vital services such as nutrition and health care. There is simply no substitute for the government data infrastructure, and pressure from the executive branch to alter data to fit political aims will damage a <a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.33.1.131">valuable public good</a> that is critical for business decisions, policymaking, and planning by all stakeholders in the economy.</p>
<p>It is possible that the extreme competence and professionalism of federal workers who staff the statistical agencies will shield most of the data they release from manipulation or quality-erosion. But this will take near-heroic measures and is too much to ask of our civil service—they work hard enough collecting and analyzing this data in professional and non-politicized ways, they should not also have to be activists safeguarding its integrity.</p>
<p><strong>Note</strong></p>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> CBO <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-06/51298-2024-06-healthinsurance.xlsx">projected</a> that 32.4 out of 363.3 million people would be uninsured in 2034. Adding <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-08/61367-Uninsured-Data.xlsx">10 million uninsured</a> due to Medicaid cuts brings the uninsurance rate to 11.7%, compared with the actual 2023 uninsurance rate of 8.0%.</p>
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		<title>Unions raise wages. Tariffs don&#8217;t: Why Trump&#8217;s trade policy won&#8217;t help U.S. workers</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-raise-wages-tariffs-dont-why-trumps-trade-policy-wont-help-u-s-workers/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 09:00:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam Dean]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=309485</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Tariffs do not automatically raise wages or create good jobs. While strong tariff policies can help preserve jobs in industries facing unfair competition, strong unions are a prerequisite for tariffs to translate into widespread job and wage gains.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="pdf-only">
<p><span style="font-size: 16px;"><strong>Summary</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">Tariffs do not automatically raise wages or create good jobs. While strong tariff policies can help preserve jobs in industries facing unfair competition, strong unions are a prerequisite for tariffs to translate into widespread job and wage gains. Without unions, corporate executives have no incentive to pass on the profits they’re gaining to their workers. Only unionized workers can secure a fair share of tariff-driven profits, while most nonunion workers will be left behind.</span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">At the same time, the Trump administration is pursuing unprecedented union busting that will drive unionization rates even lower than they are today. Today only 16% of autoworkers and 18% of steelworkers are in unions compared with 62% of autoworkers and 50% of steelworkers in 1983. Without strong unions, tariffs simply funnel higher profits to corporate executives and shareholders. The potential benefits of tariffs will only be shared with workers if they are combined with improved labor rights and stronger labor unions.</span></p>
<p><span style="color: #000000; font-family: proxima-nova, 'Proxima Nova', sans-serif; font-size: 16px;"><strong>How to fix it</strong></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size: 14px;">Union leaders need to communicate this message to members and nonunion workers: Trump’s tariffs will benefit businesses, not workers. Tariffs must be combined with pro-labor reforms and support for unionization so that workers can have a voice in the workplace and in policymaking.&nbsp;</span></p>
<hr>
</div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p><span class="dropped">I</span>n 2024, Donald Trump campaigned on the benefits of tariffs for U.S. workers. He claimed that tariffs would boost wages and create good manufacturing jobs by protecting domestic industries from unfair foreign competition. On the face of it, it might seem like tariffs would automatically protect entire industries, increasing profits for employers and wages for workers. But whether employers share the benefits of tariff protection with workers depends on their bargaining power—something very few workers have without a union.</p>
<p>Without unions, tariffs will mostly just lead to higher corporate profits in protected industries. And with the Trump administration waging the worst union busting in recent American history (McNicholas et al. 2025), high tariffs will mean corporate executives and Wall Street shareholders will see the big payday, not workers. Tariffs alone do not increase wages or create good jobs, unless the industries being protected by tariffs have strong unions.</p>
<p>Since returning to office, President Donald Trump has aggressively increased U.S. tariffs on friend and foe alike. While some of these tariffs have been paused<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> and others ruled unlawful by U.S. courts (Lynch and Zakrzewski 2025), Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has promised that the Trump administration’s overall approach to broad tariffs is “not going away” (Bacon 2025).</p>
<h3>The case against tariffs</h3>
<p>By now, there have been many critiques leveled against Trump’s tariffs. They will increase inflation and consumer prices (Peller 2025). They will decrease economic growth and trigger a recession (Burga 2025; Bianco 2025). They open the door to official corruption (Hersh and Bivens 2025). The chaos of tariff increases and reversals roiled the stock market and made it impossible for businesses to plan for the future (Rosen 2025). Tariffs alienate allies needed to strengthen U.S. supply chains (Mui 2025).</p>
<p>These academic arguments may all be correct, but they are unlikely to sway most working-class voters. Trump’s 2018 tariffs were attacked for all the same reasons, yet counties protected by those tariffs still swung toward Trump and GOP candidates in the next election (Autor et al. 2024). It is difficult to counter Trump’s populist promises that tariffs will increase wages and create new manufacturing jobs with elite concerns about the stock market and aggregate economic growth (White House 2025).</p>
<p>What’s tragic about this situation is that Trump’s new tariffs will likely not deliver for most workers, not even those in tariff-protected industries. One could understand working-class voters supporting a tariff policy that prioritized long-term investment and higher pay for workers at the expense of short-term returns for shareholders. But Trump’s tariffs threaten to do just the opposite—increasing profits for bosses while leaving workers far behind.</p>
<p>While it is true that higher tariffs may reduce new layoffs in U.S. manufacturing—a significant goal after decades of free trade caused de-industrialization and millions of job losses—maintaining the status quo is a far cry from Trump’s promise that tariffs will spur re-industrialization with higher wages and new jobs (Kimball and Scott 2014; Hersh and Scott 2021). Though tariffs can offer some job security to workers in trade-affected industries, tariffs will translate into job and wage gains only when companies work collaboratively with their employees.</p>
<p>To be clear, this report assumes that tariffs will boost profits in protected industries, but even that may be overly optimistic. The fact that automakers have posted billion-dollar losses is a reminder that tariffs alone are not a coherent industrial policy (Ewing 2025; Tucker 2025). Domestic industries need strong demand signals for their products. Instead, the Trump administration’s unpredictability has created deep uncertainty for businesses, discouraging investment and undermining long-term planning. Trump’s policy incoherence will likely yield a lose-lose scenario of lower profits <em>and</em> lower wages, while threatening job growth across the manufacturing sector. In other words, even the best-case scenario for Trump’s tariffs will fail to deliver higher wages or good jobs for the vast majority of U.S. workers who lack strong unions.</p>
<h2>Tariffs don’t automatically benefit workers</h2>
<p>To understand why, we need to revisit the conventional argument about tariffs and workers’ wages in protected industries. Tariffs shield U.S. producers from unfair trade practices and cheaper imports, enabling them to increase market share—and sometimes prices. But how do those higher prices lead to more jobs and higher wages? Here’s how the logic works in the theoretical (and unrealistic) models of an economic textbook.</p>
<p>Higher tariffs for a specific U.S. industry—for example, automobiles—increase the price of imported cars, which allows domestic car producers to raise prices without fear of losing market share. For industries facing chronic competition from unfair trade practices, tariffs help level the playing field by limiting unfairly valued competition. Absent that context, tariffs are a blunt instrument benefitting domestic producers without any accountability for worker pay. The tariff does not make it more expensive to produce cars in the United States but means that car makers can charge a higher price and earn higher profits for each car they produce. In turn, higher profits may induce increased investment and employment in making cars. Since these models assume full employment throughout the economy, no one is out looking for a job, and firms need to raise their wages to attract new workers.</p>
<p>But in the real world, there is little reason to expect that employers will pass on the higher profits they receive in the form of higher wages for their workers. There are two problems that get in the way of workers sharing in the benefits of high tariffs: unemployment and market power.&nbsp;</p>
<h3>Precarious employment breaks the connection between tariffs and wages</h3>
<p>First, unemployment can break the connection between tariffs and wages. Although higher prices may lead firms to increase production, they often find a surplus of unemployed workers willing to work at the going wage. This is especially true when government policies like those in the Republican-led budget bill that Trump recently signed into law are sharply cutting social safety nets, pushing unemployed workers to accept jobs at even lower wages. This means that firms facing a slack labor market can turn higher tariffs into higher prices and profits without the need to increase workers’ wages.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Part of the problem is that many U.S. counties with manufacturing-based economies still have higher unemployment rates from years of neoliberal globalization and cheap imports, even as the national unemployment rate remains relatively low (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2021). Given such unemployment in labor markets near manufacturing plants, we should not expect Trump’s new tariffs to increase workers’ wages. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what recent studies find regarding Trump’s 2018 tariffs: They increased prices and profits, but nominal wages in the tradable sector of the U.S. economy increased by only 0.1%, or about $1.20 a week (Fajgelbaum et al. 2019).</p>
<h3>Market power breaks the connection between tariffs and employment</h3>
<p>Second, market power can break the connection between tariffs and employment. In competitive markets, higher prices lead firms to expand production and hire more workers. But when an industry is dominated by a small number of firms—as is the case in much of today’s U.S. economy—producers often behave like monopolists. Instead of increasing output to meet higher demand, they restrict production to keep prices—and profits—high, as we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic. Tariffs that raise prices in such markets can simply boost profits without leading to more jobs. Since the 1980s, the rise of corporate consolidation has given firms greater pricing power across the economy, including in key manufacturing sectors like autos and steel (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020).</p>
<p>Consider Stellantis, which chose to spend $3.3 billion on stock buybacks in 2024 after new car prices—but not manufacturing costs—spiked during the COVID-19 pandemic, rather than making investments that would increase production and employment (Stellantis 2024; BLS 2025). And in response to more recent tariff developments in April 2025, Stellantis went ahead with a $2.26 billion dividend payout to shareholders, rather than hiring workers or investing in expanded capacity (Lawrence 2025). For these firms, expanding production in response to higher tariffs would lower prices and erode profitability. Considering the uncertainty caused by Trump’s volatile tariff policy, it’s no surprise that most companies are delaying investments rather than hiring new workers (CBT News 2025). The outcome mirrors what happened in 2018: Tariffs raised prices and profits but failed to increase employment in newly protected industries (Autor et al. 2024)—though they likely helped preserve jobs in industries that might otherwise have lost further ground to unfair foreign competition.</p>
<p>In other words, when companies are given protection from competition that lets them charge more for each unit of output they produce, they do not automatically pass the benefits of this protection onto their workers in the form of higher compensation or expanded employment. So, how can workers make sure that higher tariffs lead to higher wages and more good jobs? One way is by joining a labor union, which increases workers’ bargaining power and helps them capture a share of their companies’ booming profits. Sadly, intentional policy decisions have made this option far too rare for most U.S. workers (McNicholas et al. 2019).</p>
<h2>Unions boost profit sharing for workers</h2>
<h3>The UAW’s ‘Stand Up’ strikes support profit sharing for workers</h3>
<p>Now consider the United Auto Workers (UAW), whose 2023 “Stand Up” strike won contracts that once again include profit sharing for workers (UAW 2023). The UAW’s current contracts with the Big-Three auto companies provide workers with profit-sharing bonuses of roughly $250 for every $250 million in company revenue (Martinez 2025). If Trump’s tariffs increase car prices and revenue for the Big Three, unionized autoworkers are guaranteed to see higher incomes. Even before the new auto tariffs, the UAW’s contract with GM led to a $14,500 profit-sharing bonus for union members in 2024. If the Big Three expand production, that would mean more jobs with union wages and benefits. The UAW’s new contracts also protect workers’ right to strike over future plant closures, giving the union some countervailing power against monopolistic companies placing profits over jobs (Bustamante 2023). And those gains for unionized workers also pressured some nonunion employers to raise wages too. But there is no inherent guarantee of good jobs if tariffs result in nonunion automakers increasing U.S. production at the expense of unionized facilities.</p>
<p>Or consider GM’s recent announcement that it would invest $4 billion to create new jobs in the U.S. auto industry. Although the <em>Wall Street Journal</em> (Otts 2025) reported this as a business decision based on Trump’s new tariffs, the reality is that the majority of these investments were negotiated with the UAW back in 2023 to end the “Stand Up” strike. The UAW plays a crucial role in making sure that profits for a company like GM translate into new investment and new jobs for workers. The UAW continues to push the Big Three to respond to tariff increases by reshoring production jobs to the U.S.—where these companies have unused capacity—rather than issuing stock buybacks and special dividends (UAW 2025).</p>
<p>This all means that auto tariffs are good news for UAW members, and it shouldn’t be a surprise that the UAW has offered tentative support for targeted tariff protection for the auto industry. But only 16% of the 1.4 million autoworkers in the U.S. are unionized, so the vast majority of autoworkers should not be surprised when Hyundai, Tesla, and other nonunion auto companies and auto parts suppliers refuse to share tariff-generated profits with their workers (Unionstats.com 2025). As Shawn Fain, president of the United Auto Workers, recently explained, “tariffs increase profits—but only unions increase wages” (Fain 2025).</p>
<h3>The United Steelworkers win improvements in profit sharing for U.S. Steel and ArcelorMittal workers</h3>
<p>Another example is the steel industry in which the United Steelworkers had to fight U.S. Steel and ArcelorMittal for a share of the profits generated by Trump’s 2018 tariffs. Back then, tariffs increased U.S. steel prices by 30%, and companies like U.S. Steel announced $2 billion in profits (Keller 2018). But when it came time to negotiate a contract with its workers, U.S. Steel offered a small wage increase that would be wiped out by deep cuts to workers’ health care benefits (Lindstrom 2018). It was only after USW members overwhelmingly voted to authorize a strike that the companies agreed to new contracts that increased wages, maintained health care benefits, and improved the companies’ profit-sharing arrangement (USW 2018).</p>
<p>The profit-sharing provision in the current USW contract with U.S. Steel requires the company to share roughly 6% of earnings with steelworkers every quarter (Dolph-Smith 2024). That means that Trump’s new 50% steel tariffs are good news for USW members, but the union only represents 18% of the 295,000 workers in the U.S. steel industry (Unionstats.com 2025). When union density is high, these gains help raise wages for nonunion workers as well. But when unions are against the ropes, as is the case for a vast majority of workers, Trump’s tariffs will likely mean higher prices and corporate profits, but not higher pay.</p>
<h3>Workers’ wages haven’t kept pace with increases in their productivity</h3>
<p>The inability of most workers to share in their company’s profits is not unique to trade policy. It is just another example of workers’ wages lagging behind increases in worker productivity when they lack strong unions. From 1948 through 1979, when labor unions represented between 20% and 30% of all U.S. workers, wages grew along with increased productivity (Romero and Whittaker 2023). But since 1980, precipitous declines in union density—now at 6% in the private sector—have left wages lagging far behind productivity gains (Durbin 2024). From 1979 to 2019, worker productivity grew by roughly 60%, while workers’ total compensation grew by less than 16% (Mishel 2021).</p>
<p>Nor is the inability of many workers to share in their company’s profits specific to the United States. I examined the relationship between wage growth and productivity growth in 28 manufacturing industries, across 117 countries, from 1986 to 2002. The analysis relies on labor rights data that measure the degree to which a country respects their workers’ rights to act collectively (Dean 2015a). The results demonstrate that when labor rights are weakly protected, the conventional textbook model discussed above systematically exaggerates how much workers gain from tariffs that benefit their industry. Wages rise along with productivity growth when labor rights are well protected, but wages don’t go up at all if labor rights are regularly violated (Dean 2016; Bivens, Hersh, and Weller 2005).</p>
<p>There was a time when labor unions like the UAW and USW were powerful enough to secure higher wages and profit sharing for the majority of U.S. auto and steel workers. In 1983, the UAW represented 62% of all U.S. autoworkers, and the USW represented 50% of all U.S. steel workers. With unionization now down to 16% and 18% of these industries respectively, unions have less power to translate gains to the wider economy.</p>
<h2>Trump combines high tariffs with union busting</h2>
<p>The already narrow benefits of Trump’s new tariffs shrink even further when we look holistically at the administration’s trade and labor policies together. Since workers need strong unions to share in the benefits of high tariffs, it is crucial to understand that the Trump administration is systematically weakening American unions. Trump has quickly taken a hatchet to workers’ rights, illegally firing government employees, illegally terminating the collective bargaining agreement with Transportation Security Administration workers, and illegally revoking the collective bargaining rights for roughly 1 million federal workers (McNicholas et al. 2025; Berger and Leibenluft 2025; AFGE 2025; EPI 2025). Labor historian Joseph McCartin (Glass 2025) characterized the Trump administration’s activity as “by far the largest single action of union-busting in American history.”</p>
<h3>Trump kneecaps the National Labor Relations Board</h3>
<p>Perhaps most troubling for unions like the UAW and USW, which mostly represent workers in the private sector, are Trump’s efforts to paralyze the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the federal agency that adjudicates disputes about union elections and unfair labor practices (Wiessner 2025). In January 2025, Trump illegally fired Gwynne Wilcox, a member of the National Labor Relations Board, before the end of her term (Kaye and Davis O’Brien 2025). This unprecedented action left the board without a quorum, effectively halting its operations (Cohen 2025). Now, when employers break the law by firing union organizers or intimidating workers to vote against joining a union, workers will literally be denied their day in court.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Even with a functioning NLRB, such illegal union busting was extremely common; in union elections in workplaces with more than 60 employees, employers were charged with violating federal labor law 54% of the time (McNicholas et al. 2019). Union-busting employers will only be emboldened in their illegal activity now that the NLRB lacks the quorum needed to make final decisions and levy penalties for unfair labor practices.</p>
<h3>Weak enforcement of labor law has a chilling effect on unions</h3>
<p>Trump’s effective termination of federal labor law enforcement is the exact opposite of what U.S. workers need. In fact, many scholars believe that the already weak enforcement of labor law before Trump’s new term was a main cause of union decline. At the heart of this debate is the growing gap between increasingly high public support for unions and declining union density. Recent surveys find that 71% of Americans have a favorable view of unions, and roughly half of workers say that they would vote to join a union if they had the opportunity (AFL-CIO 2023; Poydock et al. 2025). According to law professor Kate Andrias (2016), the problem is that American labor law is failing to protect workers’ right to join a union: “weak enforcement mechanisms, slight penalties, and lengthy delays—all of which are routinely exploited by employers resisting unionization—fail to protect workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively with their employers.” Americans want unions, but Trump is making sure they can’t have them.</p>
<p>Trump’s anti-union reforms, especially his paralyzing of the NLRB, pose an existential threat to the country’s remaining powerful unions like the UAW. The growing presence of nonunion auto plants run by multinational companies in the American South has gradually eroded the UAW’s bargaining power with the Big-Three auto companies in the Midwest. These companies point to lower wages and benefits in Southern plants to justify offering lower wages and benefits (Butzel Long 2013). As Bob King, ex-president of the UAW, explained more than 10 years ago, “if we don’t organize these transnationals, I don’t think there’s a long-term future for the UAW” (Krisher 2023). Since the early 1980s, union density in the U.S. auto industry has dropped by 74%. With Trump’s anti-union reforms, high auto tariffs will only mean higher profits for increasingly nonunion auto companies.</p>
<h3>How U.S. economic policies compare with those in other countries</h3>
<p>Trump’s combination of high tariffs and weak labor rights is moving the U.S. toward a development strategy that will funnel the benefits of re-industrialization to capital instead of labor. If we zoom out and compare Trump’s economic policies with those in other countries, there are striking similarities with Italy in the 1930s, and Brazil and South Korea in the 1960s and 1970s. These are all countries in which authoritarian governments used high tariffs to protect manufacturing industries alongside labor repression to break unions and ensure that wages lagged behind productivity (Zamagni 1993; Seidman 1994; Deyo 1989).&nbsp;</p>
<p>Of course, there are other examples that the U.S. could follow. There are countries whose governments have combined tariff protection with pro-union policies that made sure workers shared in the benefits of industrialization. In the 1930s, Norway used a combination of high tariffs and pro-labor reforms to build an industrial economy that led to shared economic growth (Grytten 2002). In the middle of the 20th century, Argentina and India both used high tariffs and pro-union policies to spur rapid industrial growth as well as stronger unions, higher wages, and lower income inequality (James 1988; Kohli 2012). Argentina’s and India’s overall development strategies faltered in the late 20th century, but for decades, they produced gains that were broadly shared with workers.</p>
<p>Proposals to expand investment in sustainable new energy industries similarly envision an industrial policy that combines tariffs and subsidies for green industries like wind turbines and electrical vehicles with pro-labor reforms that will make it easier for workers in these industries to join a union and secure a share of the benefits (Tucker et al. 2024). Something similar is playing out now in the European Union, where the trade protection and strong unions of the Green Deal Industrial Plan jointly support good jobs in green industries (European Commission 2023).</p>
<h2>History shows that worker support for tariffs isn’t set in stone</h2>
<p>When discussing how tariffs will make America great again, Trump often praises President McKinley’s high tariffs in the 1890s (Cabral 2025). Ironically, there is no better example to illustrate that workers will only share in the benefits of high tariffs if they have a strong union. Even better, it shows that the spell can be broken— that workers will understand that high tariffs and weak unions promise nothing more than wealth extraction.</p>
<p>The crucial historical precedent is the infamous Homestead steel strike, which culminated in the election of Grover Cleveland, a Democrat, in 1892 (Dean 2015b). The Republican Party of the late 19th century promised that high tariffs would deliver higher wages for U.S. workers. When a Republican Congress passed the protectionist McKinley tariff of 1890, steel prices and profits started to soar.</p>
<p>Just months before the 1892 general election, the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers (the precursor of today’s United Steelworkers) was locked in contract negotiations with the Carnegie Steel Company (the precursor of today’s U.S. Steel). The union argued that “with the metal tariff as it is… there is no reason why the labor of the mills should not have part of the plum of profits that the ownership has been enjoying” (National Labor Tribune 1890). In response, the company locked out the workers and proclaimed that “hereafter, the Homestead steel works will be operated as a non-union mill” (Brody 1960).</p>
<p>The ensuing conflict ultimately ended with four striking workers killed, the town of Homestead occupied by the Pennsylvania National Guard, and the union decimated (Burgoyne 1893).</p>
<p>Although the steelworkers lost the strike, the conflict became a major focal point in the 1892 presidential election. Workers throughout the country began to question whether the GOP’s high tariffs actually delivered benefits to U.S. workers.</p>
<p>While the steelworkers had loyally voted for Republicans for decades, their new views on tariffs led many of them to throw their support to the Democratic Party (Arizona Republican 1892). The industrial states of Illinois, Indiana, New York, and Wisconsin all voted for Grover Cleveland, the victorious Democratic candidate for president.</p>
<h2>What does all this mean for today’s politics?&nbsp;</h2>
<p>Trump’s 2018 tariffs, which increased average U.S. tariffs from 2% to 4%, helped him win voters in 2020 (Tradingeconomics.com 2025; Autor at al. 2024). Will Trump’s more aggressive 2025 tariffs, which are set to increase average tariffs to 16% or more, do the same (The Budget Lab 2025)? Given the recent memory of high inflation, many Democrats hope that linking Trump’s new tariffs to rising consumer prices will help win back working-class voters (DNC 2025).</p>
<p>There is some evidence that this time might be different, with overall public support for tariffs decreasing dramatically since Trump began increasing tariffs at the start of his second term. In early June, a survey found that 64% of independent voters opposed Trump’s tariff plans (Keene 2025).</p>
<p>And yet, Trump’s tariffs still resonate with many Americans. According to a recent Gallup poll, half of Americans expect tariffs to create more manufacturing jobs, and 69% are willing to accept at least some economic disruption to realize such gains (Brenan 2025). Or consider a recent focus group with Pennsylvania voters who voted for Biden in 2020 but Trump in 2024 (Talev 2025). Most of these swing voters expressed continued support for Trump and his tariffs because &#8220;things have been so screwed up for so long and he&#8217;s finally doing something about it.&#8221;</p>
<p>When the next elections arrive, will voters in swing states like Pennsylvania and Michigan reward Trump for following through on one of his main campaign promises, or will they reward Democrats for attacking tariffs in ways that sound a lot like defending free trade (Stiglitz 2024)?</p>
<h3>How to construct a progressive message on tariffs</h3>
<p>Thankfully, there is an alternative. Progressives can explain that Trump’s economic policies are meant to benefit businesses and not workers. As long as working-class voters believe that they benefit from tariffs, they will only be further alienated by politicians who critique tariffs for roiling the stock market and creating business uncertainty. Progressives will defeat Trumpism by embracing a progressive version of economic populism that combines tariffs and pro-labor reform to deliver shared prosperity (Reston 2025).</p>
<p>Union leaders need to communicate this message to rank-and-file members, as well as nonunion workers. Trump’s tariffs will only benefit the small minority of workers that have the bargaining power to win improvements in the workplace. And with Trump’s anti-labor policies simultaneously crushing unions, those benefits will be enjoyed by fewer and fewer workers. In the short term, workers who want to share in the potential benefits of high tariffs need to join a union. In the long term, workers who want to share in the prosperity of re-industrialization need to fight for policies that strengthen workers’ unions as well as their industries.</p>
<h2>About the author</h2>
<p>Adam Dean is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at George Washington University. He is the author of two books on international trade and labor politics<em>: <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/from-conflict-to-coalition/BF6BB72852F3E0A6D3BBD82100BCA955#fndtn-metrics">From Conflict to Coalition</a></em> (2016) and <a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/opening-up-by-cracking-down/0986F8FA66EC6A2FEB76C5DB1CDCBFCD#fndtn-metrics"><em>Opening Up by Cracking Down</em></a> (2022), both of which were published by Cambridge University Press.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/15/2025-06462/modifying-reciprocal-tariff-rates-to-reflect-trading-partner-retaliation-and-alignment">Proclamation No. 14266</a>, 90 Fed. Reg. 15625 (April 9, 2025).</p>
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