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	<title>Report | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<description>Research and Ideas for Shared Prosperity</description>
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		<title>Today’s working class is more diverse than ever:  A new picture emerges as demographic change and economic inequality challenge old perceptions</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/todays-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-a-new-picture-emerges-as-demographic-change-and-economic-inequality-challenge-old-perceptions/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 13:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle K. Moore, Stevie Marvin, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328439</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Learn about who is included in the working class, how economic conditions have changed for them, where they work and live, and much more.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 24px;"><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #0e5b8b;">Key takeaways</span></strong></span></p>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">An expanded view of the working class&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>The </b><b>working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight, but there is no universal definition of what it is.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>A commonly used definition of working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. </b><span style="font-size: 14px;">That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;"><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">Given these factors, a</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> broader </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">definition</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">of</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> the working class can be </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW110786087 BCX0">considered</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">people in the labor force who</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">se family income </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">is in</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">the bottom 75%</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">, regardless of education</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">al</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> level or job type.</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> This works out to a family income </span></span><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">below $150,000</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> per year.</span></span><span class="EOP Selected SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}'>&nbsp;</span></span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Under this broader definition, 31.5% of those in the working class have a bachelor&#8217;s degree or higher; a majority of working-class college graduates hold professional or managerial jobs.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Traditionally women-dominated jobs related to teaching, child care, or nursing make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">A racially diverse group&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>In 1979, the working class (defined by less than a bachelor&#8217;s degree) was 81.5% white.</b></li>
<li><b>Shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. Now, the working class is:&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>52% white&nbsp;</li>
<li>26.8% Hispanic&nbsp;</li>
<li>15.1% Black</li>
<li>4.7% Asian American</li>
<li>1.4% Native American</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>One-fifth of the working class was born outside the United States, and 11.6% are non-U.S. citizens.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><b>The working class is similarly diverse when defined by family income level.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">Differences by state (using family income to define working class)&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>There is considerable variation in the working-class composition of states, based on differences in costs of living and labor force participation.&nbsp;</b></li>
<li><b>The five states (including Washington, D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;
<ul>
<li>Massachusetts (42.9%)</li>
<li>Washington, D.C. (42.9%)</li>
<li>New Jersey (44.9%)</li>
<li>Maryland (47.8%)</li>
<li>Washington state (47.9%)&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>The five states with the highest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>
<ul>
<li>South Dakota (66.7%)</li>
<li>Iowa (64.9%)</li>
<li>Wyoming (64.7%)</li>
<li>Kansas (63.9%)</li>
<li>Nebraska (62.7%)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>What is the working class?</h2>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he working class remains an often-used rhetorical concept that carries tremendous political weight. Despite having no official definition, “working class voters” are a heavily courted constituency during election years. In the most general sense, the “working class” as a political economic category describes people who rely almost exclusively on wage labor through steady employment to support themselves and their families.</p>
<p>Historically, the term working class has been closely associated with nonmanagerial blue-collar workers and unions, often represented in the popular imagination by white tradesmen in hard hats. This popular image, however, has never represented a complete picture. Due to occupational segregation, Black workers have always made up a significant portion of nonmanagerial laborers commonly identified as working class. Additionally, since the 1970s, increases in women’s labor force participation and immigration have resulted in growing shares of women, Hispanic, and Asian workers in the U.S. labor force. Along with these demographic shifts, there have been changes in the composition of “working class” jobs over time. For example, as traditional blue-collar production and manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell sharply between 1998 and 2019, job opportunities for noncollege graduates were largely replaced by growth in service-sector employment (Scott et al. 2022).</p>
<h3>Who is working class?</h3>
<p>Contemporary views about who is included in the working class range from narrow to extremely broad: those earning very low wages, those without a bachelor’s degree, and anyone who works for a wage or salary, irrespective of their wage or education level. The latter definition, currently being pushed by the growing Democratic Socialist movement, has generated some debate around whether highly educated, relatively high-income wage and salary workers belong in a category with traditional blue-collar, noncollege-educated workers who often live vastly different material lives (Rotondaro 2026).</p>
<h3>What are some factors that complicate the traditional distinction between college-educated and other workers?</h3>
<p>For many, however, the line between the economic status of college- and noncollege-educated workers is not that clear and has been blurred by rising inequality and labor market discrimination. Over the last 10 years, the college wage premium has declined. In other words, the wage boost from a bachelor’s degree is lower than it used to be, and workers in many jobs that were once considered white collar now experience relatively modest pay and limited control over the pace and content of work (Fast and Gould 2026).</p>
<p>Research also shows that Black college graduates are more likely than white college graduates to work in jobs that don’t require a college degree, and even after controlling for college major, graduates of color, foreign-born graduates, and women of all races are much more likely to work alongside nongraduates (Williams and Wilson 2019; Attewell and Witteveen 2023). In addition to these forms of underemployment, racial and gender pay disparities among college graduates result in lower pay for women and Black and Hispanic men relative to white men (Quadlin, VanHuevelen, and Ahearn 2023; Wilson 2016a; Mora and Dávila 2018). Facing limited returns on their college education, debt-burdened bachelor’s degree holders may even find themselves in a more precarious position than nongraduate co-workers who are free of student debt.</p>
<h3>Which topics will this report cover?</h3>
<p>Taking these factors into consideration, this report updates prior EPI research on the changing demographics of the working class and presents a more expansive definition of this group that includes labor force participants in the bottom 75% of the family income distribution (Wilson 2016b). This report presents the working class as more racially diverse than ever before but also includes workers with and without college degrees employed in a range of blue-, pink<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>- and white-collar jobs that afford different standards of living across the United States. This analysis supports the idea that policies that strengthen labor standards and protect civil and workers’ rights will improve the lives of working people across traditional class lines defined by education or occupation.</p>
<h2>How are we defining the working class in this report?</h2>
<p>This report considers two definitions of the working class. Consistent with previous EPI research, the first definition is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Education captures much of what people typically associate with class, and in the labor market, a bachelor’s degree is commonly interpreted by employers as a signal of skill acquisition required for many white-collar occupations. Since educational categories have been more consistently coded in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) than other commonly used indicators of working-class status, like occupation or income, we use this definition in Part I of the report when comparing working-class demographic and economic outcomes over time.</p>
<p>The second definition, used in Part II of our analysis, is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with family income at or below the 75th percentile. In our sample, this corresponds to individuals with less than $150,000 in family income.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> The income-based definition captures people in similar economic circumstances, regardless of education or occupation. Implicit in this income-based definition of working class is the assumption that a job loss could result in significant economic hardship for most families below this threshold. We apply this more expansive definition to our more detailed analysis of the working class for disaggregated groups of workers by race, ethnicity, gender, nativity, geography, education, and occupation using pooled 2024–2025 CPS data (Part II).</p>
<p>Though slightly different, there is considerable overlap between these definitions: 82.9% of those who qualify as working class under the education-based definition are also defined as working class using the income-based definition.</p>
<h2>Part I: Changes in working-class demographic characteristics and economic conditions since 1979</h2>
<h3>Shifting demographic characteristics of the working class</h3>
<p>The demographic composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last five decades, as shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation among different groups have contributed to a more diverse workforce. For comparability over time, this part of our analysis relies on the education-based definition of working class: 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Since labor force participation fluctuates across different points in the business cycle, and to varying degrees for different groups of workers, we focus on demographic comparisons across peak years in the business cycle when employment and labor force participation are highest. Those years are 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, and 2019. The current time period covers 2024 and 2025, which combines the year with the highest rate of prime age employment since the 2019 business cycle peak (2024) and the most recent full year of data (2025) (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A </strong>clearly shows that the working class has grown more racially and ethnically diverse over the last 46 years. In 1979, the working class was over 80% white, but after 2000, the combined shares of Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN or Native American) workers increased rapidly. While white workers remain the largest single racial group, workers of color collectively accounted for nearly half of the working class in 2024–2025. Currently, the working class is 52% white, 26.8% Hispanic, 15.1% Black, 4.7% AAPI, and 1.4% Native American.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-325442 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325442" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325442-35936-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The changing race and gender composition of the working class are displayed separately for women and men in <strong>Figure B </strong>so that changes for each group are easier to see over time, but the combined percentages of men and women in each year sum to 100%. Overall, men have maintained a small majority over women in the working class (between 53% and 57%) since 1979. While there hasn’t been a huge shift in the overall gender demographics of the working class, an increase in the share of women between 1979 and 1989 reflects rising women’s labor force participation at a time when men were leaving the labor force (EPI 2026d). Women decline as a share of the working class after 2000 as the share of women with a bachelor’s degree or higher rose faster and surpassed the share of men with college degrees (Census 2022).</p>
<p>The intersection of race and gender in Figure B brings these joint demographic shifts in the working class into even sharper focus. For example, in 1979, white men alone accounted for nearly half (46.3%) of the working class. By 2024–2025, white men were less than a third (29.6%) of the working class. Over the same time, the share of working-class women of color more than doubled from 8.4% in 1979 to 21.2% in 2024–2025, with the largest increase occurring among Hispanic women (from 2.2% in 1979 to 11.1% in 2024–2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326126 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="326126" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326126-36098-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>An increase in immigration also contributed to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the working class since 1979 (Kramer and Passel 2025). While the immigrant population has grown increasingly diverse over the last 46 years, between 2010 and 2024, the 10 largest U.S. immigrant groups have come from Latin American or Asian countries. This has contributed to the growth in working-class Hispanic and Asian workers shown in Figures A and B (MPI 2025). <strong>Figure C</strong> further shows that the share of the working class that is foreign-born has grown from 13.8% in 2000 (the earliest year these data are available in the CPS) to 19.8% in 2024–2025 (a 43.5% increase). Currently, 11.6% of the working class are non-U.S. citizens.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325475 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325475" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325475-35938-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3>Changing economic conditions for the working class</h3>
<p>One of the most prominent narratives regarding the working class has been how people without a bachelor’s degree have been stripped of opportunities to earn a decent living and left behind in the modern economy. All too often, this narrative centers the white working class, and white men in particular, to the exclusion of all others. This section presents a more inclusive picture of changing economic conditions among the working class that depicts both shared class struggles and racial inequities within this group.</p>
<p><strong>Figure D</strong> shows that employment among prime-age (25–54-year-olds) adults without a bachelor’s degree peaked in 2000 but has since fallen for most groups. However, even at the high point in 2000, there were considerable gaps between racial and ethnic groups. As many as 80.9% of prime-age white adults with less than a bachelor’s degree were employed in 2000, compared with just 68.7% of similarly educated Native Americans in that age cohort. While employment among prime-age working-class white workers has fallen 4.0 percentage points since 2000, they have maintained the highest rates of employment among the working class, even as the gaps between white, Hispanic, and AAPI workers narrowed significantly after 2007. Over the decades, employment rates among prime-age working-class Black and Native American workers have been significantly lower than their white counterparts.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-326700 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326700" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326700-36012-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In addition to a shared peak in employment from the strong economy of the late-1990s–2000, the working class has also shared the experience of inconsistent, often tepid, wage growth since 1979 because of policy choices that suppressed wages for the vast majority of workers (Gould and Wething 2026). <strong>Figure E </strong>shows annualized rates of inflation-adjusted median hourly wage growth for each group between business cycle peaks. This chart notably shows that all racial and ethnic groups suffered real wage losses (adjusted for inflation) during the 1980s, as globalization and concerted efforts to weaken unions stripped many in the working class of good-paying union jobs and bargaining power.</p>
<p>After decades of slower wage growth, median hourly wages grew fastest for all groups between 2019 and 2025, with workers of color experiencing faster wage growth than white workers—from 1.2% a year for Black workers to 1.7% a year for Native Americans. This is consistent with research that shows between 2019 and 2023, the lowest-wage workers—a group that includes many working-class people of color—had the strongest wage growth (Gould and deCourcy 2024).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-326685 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326685" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326685-36010-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->




<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326689 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326689" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326689-36011-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Unfortunately, for most groups, the much-needed wage boost in recent years was not large enough to recover the prior four decades of lost ground, relative to state median wages. The wage boost failed to significantly reduce the share of working-class people whose hourly wage fell below their state median, as racial pay disparities within the working class persist. <strong>Figure F </strong>shows that between 1979 and 2019, the share of working-class Black and white workers whose wages were below the median hourly wage in their state increased by 11.1 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively. While wages among the Hispanic working class grew faster than other groups between 2000–2007 and 2007–2019, Figure F also shows they remained most likely to have wages below their state’s median in 2024–2025 (75.1%), followed closely by Black workers (74.9%). Even after receiving a stronger pandemic recovery wage boost, the median hourly wages of Black ($19.59) and Hispanic workers ($19.99) with less than a bachelor’s degree were significantly lower than those of similarly educated white workers ($22.65), as <strong>Table 1</strong> shows.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327450 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327450" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327450-36055-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Over the same time period that the hourly pay of more working-class wage earners dropped below the state median wage, a declining share of those workers were union members or covered by a union contract (see <strong>Figure G</strong>). The decline is especially stark among Black workers for whom union coverage in 2024–2025 (12.2%) was less than a third of what it was in 1979 (36.9%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326704 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326704" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326704-36013-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Part II: Current demographic and economic characteristics of the working class</h2>
<p>The remainder of this report is based on the more expansive definition of working class that includes all 18–64-year-old labor force participants in the bottom 75% of family income, regardless of educational level or occupation. This portion of the analysis takes a more detailed look at the current demographic and labor market characteristics of the working class in 2024–2025.</p>
<p><strong>Figure H</strong> shows the share of each group, by race, ethnicity, or nativity, that meets this more expansive definition of working class. As shown in Figure H, over 60% of Black and Hispanic adults between the ages of 18 and 64 meet this definition of working class, compared with more than half of Native American and white adults and 43.4% of AAPI adults.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Similarly, a larger share of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens is working class—62.1% compared with about 54% of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-325518 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325518" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325518-35943-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure I</strong> presents the educational distribution of the working class. Even under this broader definition that is unrestricted by educational level, the majority of those in the working class (68.5%) have less than a bachelor’s degree, with the largest group being those with only a high school diploma (32%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-325492 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325492" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325492-36095-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Defined in part by labor force participation, a large majority (69.2%) of those in the working class are between 25- and 54-years-old, or prime age. With large shares of younger people attending college and not working, the working class also includes more people ages 55–64 (17.1%) than under age 25 (13.7%) (see <strong>Figure J</strong>) (Gould et al. 2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-J"></a><div class="figure chart-325488 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325488" data-anchor="Figure-J"><div class="figLabel">Figure J</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325488-35939-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure J" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In addition to labor force participation, family income at or below the 75th percentile (less than $150,000 per year) is used to identify members of the working class under this more expansive definition. However, the relative precarity of families at the same income level can vary, based on family size and the number of household earners.</p>
<p><strong>Figure K</strong> summarizes basic family structures within the working class, based on marital status and the presence of minor children (under age 18). It shows that almost half of those in the working class are unmarried and childless (46.0%), while 30.8% have at least one child under age 18. The majority of working-class parents are married.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-K"></a><div class="figure chart-325495 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325495" data-anchor="Figure-K"><div class="figLabel">Figure K</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325495-35941-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure K" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class family income</h3>
<p>Although we are using a single-income threshold to define working class, <strong>Figure L</strong> reveals racial differences in family income among the working class that replicate differences in the overall population. For example, white and AAPI families are more likely to be at the upper end of the income distribution. One-third of each group has a family income of $100,000–$149,999 per year, compared with one-fourth of working-class AIAN families and one-fifth of working-class Black and Hispanic families. At the same time, all working-class families of color are more likely to be in the lower end of the income distribution than white families. More than a third of Hispanic (38.4%), Black (38.0%), and AIAN (35.8%) families have an income of less than $50,000 per year, compared with 25.2% of working-class AAPI families and 22.1% of white families. Most working-class Black and Hispanic families have income between $50,000 and $75,000 per year.</p>


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<a name="Figure-L"></a><div class="figure chart-325612 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325612" data-anchor="Figure-L"><div class="figLabel">Figure L</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325612-35953-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure L" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The number of workers contributing to family income also varies by race and ethnicity. The number of family earners is both a function of family structure and employment status. Consistent with the fact that over half of our working-class sample is not married (55%, as shown in Figure K), <strong>Figure M</strong> shows that most families include a single earner. However, lower rates of employment among Black and Native American families further contribute to their being most likely to be single-earner families (70.8% and 69.3%, respectively). White families (27.8%) are most likely to have two earners, while Hispanic (9.9%) and Asian (7.5%) families are more likely than other groups to include more than two earners.</p>


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<a name="Figure-M"></a><div class="figure chart-327433 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327433" data-anchor="Figure-M"><div class="figLabel">Figure M</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327433-36053-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure M" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class jobs</h3>
<p>Another consideration in defining what it means to be working class is the type of jobs people have. Separating professional or managerial roles from more traditionally working-class jobs closely aligned with the typical “blue-collar” definition sorts most of the occupations associated with a low degree of control and autonomy at work from those in which workers have more control over the pace and content of their work. As professionals, however, teachers and nurses would not be considered working class under a traditional blue-collar occupation definition of working class, despite teachers’ low pay relative to their years of education and nurses’ lack of control over the pace and content of their work (Allegretto 2026; Stimpfel et al. 2025).</p>
<p><strong>Figure</strong> <strong>N</strong> shows that overall, those employed in nonprofessional and nonmanagement occupations are much more likely to be working class. Between 70% and 87% of people employed in jobs other than professional or management occupations have a family income at or below the 75th percentile, compared with less than 60% of professionals and managers. This further supports the idea that even under our broader definition, working class is more often a label that applies to those in traditional blue-collar jobs.</p>


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<a name="Figure-N"></a><div class="figure chart-325530 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325530" data-anchor="Figure-N"><div class="figLabel">Figure N</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325530-35945-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure N" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Occupation also captures much of the variation associated with education, given that education is used as a credential for access to different kinds of employment. <strong>Figure O</strong> shows the distribution of major occupation groups within the working class by level of education. Again, even under this broader definition of working class, education is still a major determinant of the types of jobs available to those in the working class. More than two-thirds of the jobs held by members of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in two major categories—professional and related occupations (43.9%), and management, business, and financial occupations (23.3%)—but the income threshold largely excludes the more highly paid college graduates in these occupations.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> While the most common jobs among those with less than a bachelor’s degree are service occupations (24.4%), at that level of education, workers are more evenly split between office and administrative occupations (11.8%), transportation and material moving occupations (11.7%), professional and related occupations (10.2%), and management, business, and financial occupations (10.0%).</p>


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<a name="Figure-O"></a><div class="figure chart-325503 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325503" data-anchor="Figure-O"><div class="figLabel">Figure O</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325503-35942-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure O" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>One limitation of using a strictly occupational definition is that the professional and management categories also include jobs that have many of the qualities traditionally associated with membership in the working class: modest pay and limited workplace autonomy, among other things. There are over 220 detailed occupations within the major occupation categories for managers and professionals, but just 22 of those occupations, depicted in <strong>Figure P</strong>, account for half of all working-class managers or professionals. Among those 22 occupations, nine are traditionally women-dominated, or pink-collar, jobs related to teaching and child care (depicted in orange) or nursing (depicted in green) that account for 22.4% of working-class managers and professionals. Seven of the 22 occupations are management positions (depicted in blue) that account for 17.8% of working-class managers and professionals. Besides the generic “all other managers” category, the most common working-class management positions are food service, general and operations, construction, and financial managers. The remainder of the occupations represented in Figure P includes other types of professional occupations (depicted in purple) such as accountants and auditors, social and human resource workers, and technology-related occupations.<br />


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<a name="Figure-P"></a><div class="figure chart-326197 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326197" data-anchor="Figure-P"><div class="figLabel">Figure P</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326197-35987-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure P" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<br />
</p>
<p>The types of jobs held by members of the working class can also vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, following broader patterns of occupational segregation. <strong>Figure Q</strong> shows how the six most common occupations for working-class men and women are distributed by race, ethnicity, and gender. The distribution across all 10 major occupational categories can be found in <strong>Appendix Table 1. </strong>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Figure Q shows that working-class women’s employment is more concentrated than working-class men’s, with more than 80% of women of any race or ethnicity employed in just five job categories. More than half of all working-class women are employed in just two types of jobs: service, and professional and related occupations. As shown in Figure P, this is consistent with the fact that a large number of working-class professional jobs include female-dominated occupations like teachers, child care workers, and nurses. Service occupations are most common among Black (28.3%), Hispanic (32.7%), and Native American (27.6%) women, while professional occupations are most common among white and AAPI women. Across all racial and ethnic groups, similar shares of working-class women are employed in office and administrative occupations.</p>


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<a name="Figure-Q"></a><div class="figure chart-325567 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325567" data-anchor="Figure-Q"><div class="figLabel">Figure Q</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325567-35948-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure Q" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>By comparison, except for AAPI men, fewer than 80% of working-class men are employed across six job categories. Among men, however, there is more variation in the types of jobs by race or ethnicity. For example, the most common jobs held by Black working-class men are transportation (20.8%) and service (20.7%) occupations, while Hispanic working-class men are most concentrated in construction (21.7%) and service (18.8%) occupations. The most common occupations for working-class AAPI and white men are professional and related, and management, but like AAPI women, AAPI men are largely concentrated in professional and related occupations (31.5%).</p>
<h3>Job characteristics for working-class women and men by race and ethnicity</h3>
<p><strong>Table 2 </strong>further details how the employment characteristics of working-class men and women vary by race and ethnicity, underscoring differences in the work intensity required to sustain working-class family incomes. Among working-class women, Black women are most likely to work full time (83.4%) and to be represented by a union (11.6%). Although working-class Black women are more likely to have full-time jobs than their counterparts, they are still more likely to hold multiple jobs than most other groups of women. Native American women are most likely to hold multiple jobs (8.4%) and to be self-employed (5.7%) but are less likely than Black women to be employed in full-time jobs.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-325608 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325608" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325608-35952-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Working-class men are more likely than women to work full time and therefore, less likely to hold multiple jobs. Working-class men are also more likely to be self-employed than working-class women. Among working-class men, AAPI, Black, and Native American men are least likely to be employed full time; however, Black men hold an advantage over other groups of men in union representation (13.0%) and multiple job holdings (5.9%). Hispanic working-class men are most likely to be self-employed (8.1%).</p>
<p>The lower half of Table 2 provides estimated median hourly wages by race, ethnicity, and gender in 2024–2025 as well as the share of workers in each group whose wage falls below the median hourly wage in their state. These estimates differ from those presented in Part I because they are disaggregated by gender and are based on the more expansive income-based definition of working class, which includes some college graduates. Table 2 further shows significant race and gender pay gaps within the working class. For example, larger shares of women than men in each race or ethnic group earn wages lower than their state’s median, including as many as two-thirds of Hispanic (68.3%) and Native American (67.8%) women.</p>
<h3>Working class across the country</h3>
<p>Differences in local labor market conditions, costs of living, and structural inequities across and within state boundaries introduce many more factors to consider in understanding what it means to be working class in different parts of the country. While we don’t attempt to reconcile all those things in this report, we do explore what share of people in each state fits our family income-based definition of working class and how that applies to people with different types of occupations and educational backgrounds.&nbsp;</p>
<p>On average, a larger share of those in nonmetropolitan areas, or in the Midwestern or Southern regions of the country fall within this definition of working class (see <strong>Table 3</strong>), largely because incomes and the cost of living are lower. For example, according to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, a family of two adults and two children in Boston, Massachusetts (the state with the lowest working-class share), would require over $66,000 more for a modest but adequate lifestyle than they would in the Midwestern city of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, (the state with the highest working-class share) (EPI 2026c). In fact, 26 metropolitan areas require a family income greater than $150,000 for a two adult and two child household to achieve a moderate lifestyle, of which all but one are located in the Northeast and the West.</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-325559 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325559" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325559-35946-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The map in <strong>Figure R</strong> shows what share of each state’s 18–64-year-old population is working class, including by occupation and education. Since we are using a nationwide family income threshold to identify individuals in the working class, the map also reports the state median hourly wage, as well as working-class median hourly wages by broad occupation and educational category to help contextualize how the working-class family income limit translates to individual workers’ wages in each state.</p>
<p>The map shows that there is considerable variation in working-class shares across states and within regions. While the Midwest and South in aggregate have the highest working-class population shares, in the West, there is notable variance in state working-class population shares. For example, in Idaho and Wyoming, more than 62% of the population is working class compared with states like California and Washington where less than half of the population fit our working-class definition.</p>


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<a name="Figure-R"></a><div class="figure chart-326089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326089" data-anchor="Figure-R"><div class="figLabel">Figure R</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326089-35979-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure R" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In each of the five states with the highest working-class population shares—South Dakota (66.7%), Iowa (64.9%), Wyoming (64.7%), Kansas (63.9%), and Nebraska (62.7%)—the state median hourly wage is below $25.00. In the five states (including D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares—Massachusetts (42.9%); Washington, D.C. (42.9%); New Jersey (44.9%); Maryland (47.8%); and Washington state (47.9%)–the state median hourly wage is over $29.00. Across all 50 states and D.C., the median hourly wage for members of the working class with less than bachelor’s degree ranges from $18.61 in Louisiana to $23.78 in Alaska and New Hampshire.</p>
<p>Figure R also illuminates how filtering the working class by occupation or education can surface different realities faced by workers across the country. Several states register lower-than-expected overall working-class population shares, given their reputation for being low-wage, low-income states. Even after filtering the map by people without a bachelor’s degree, in four states—Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, in descending order—fewer than 60% are working class. Those four states also have some of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the country, eliminating larger shares of their population from our working-class count. Since the Great Recession, the South has had the lowest labor force participation rate compared with other regions of the country, and people with less than a bachelor’s degree have much lower labor force participation rates than those with a bachelor’s or advanced degree (Childers 2024a; EPI 2026d).</p>
<p>On the other hand, when we use nonprofessional and nonmanagerial (all other) occupations as the filter, it narrows the sample to a group of people who are in the labor force, and working-class shares rise to over 80% in those four states. Mississippi, the state with the lowest median hourly wage and a working-class population share of just 59.8%, has the nation’s highest share of working class among nonprofessional and nonmanagerial workers (89.7%).</p>
<p>This look into state working-class population shares sheds light on some of the conditions that produce unique labor dynamics across regions and states. The long-standing anti-worker policies of the Southern economic development model not only shape the configuration of the working class in the South, including characteristically low wages, but low labor force participation also creates a sub-working class (Childers 2023; Childers 2024b). It also demonstrates the need for strong and comprehensive labor standards and workers’ rights protections nationwide to reduce such large interstate disparities.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>While there is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of working class, this report proposes that based on similarities in family income and labor force participation, membership may reasonably extend to more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than previously considered. The decline in the college-wage premium, the teacher pay gap, and growing racial and gender pay gaps among college graduates have each contributed to this trend over the last 10–20 years. At the same time, more than 40 years of policy decisions that suppressed wages and led to a sharp decline in union density have undercut traditional opportunities for noncollege graduates to make a decent living, as increasing shares of those in the working class have an hourly wage that falls below their state’s median. In comparing what it means to be working class across different states, we find that the Southern economic development model not only contributes to lower working-class wages in some Southern states but also creates a sub-working class through low labor force participation (Childers 2023).</p>
<p>Finally, this analysis also shows that the working class has long outgrown the old image narrowly represented by white tradesmen in hard hats. Rather, shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. In the face of the growing diversity and interconnectedness of the working class, the racist and anti-immigrant policies being pushed by the current administration stand to alienate a larger share of this group. Elected leaders seeking to win support from today’s working class should prioritize issues and policies that improve the lives of workers across race, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and occupation. Previous EPI research demonstrates that some effective strategies for accomplishing this include tripling union density, ending mass deportations, curbing employer misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage (Bivens et al. 2026; EPI 2026e; Cid-Martinez et al. 2026; Zipperer 2026).</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-325563 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325563" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325563-35947-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The term pink-collar is commonly used to refer to jobs that are predominantly done by women and pay less than more male-dominated occupations. Examples include many clerical, administrative, and service jobs as well as teaching, nursing and care work.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Family income is reported in bands in the monthly CPS, with $150,000 as the lower limit for the highest income band, and 73.9% of the 18–64-year-old population have a family income below that level.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Though not depicted in the report, the shares of each group that met our education-based definition of working class were AIAN (79.1%), Hispanic (78.8%), Black (71.6%), white (57.8%), and AAPI (39.4%). Shares based on nativity were foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen (68.5%); native-born (63.0%); and foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen (54.6%).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> We estimate that 36.4% of working-class managers and professionals in our sample are early career or under age 35.</p>
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<p>Rotondaro, Vinnie. 2026. “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/213121/democratic-socialists-america-problem-middle-class-socialism">The Problem with Middle-Class Socialism</a>.” <em>New Republic,</em> July 23, 2026.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., Valerie Wilson, Jori Kandra, and Daniel Perez. 2022. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/"><em>Botched Policy Responses to Globalization Have Decimated Manufacturing Employment with Often Overlooked Costs for Black, Brown, and Other Workers of Color: Investing in Infrastructure and Rebalancing Trade Can Create Good Jobs for All</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2022.</p>
<p>Stimpfel, Amy Witkoski, Kathryn Leep-Lazar, Maile Mercer, and Kathleen DeMarco. 2025. “‘Scheduling Is Everything’: A Qualitative Descriptive Study of Job and Schedule Satisfaction of Staff Nurses and Nurse Managers.” <em>Western Journal of Nursing Research</em> 47, no. 10: 912–923. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280">https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>United States Census Bureau (Census). 2022. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/fig_6.png">Figure 6: Percent of Population 25 Years and Over, and 25 to 29 Years Old, with Bachelor&#8217;s Degree or Higher by Sex: 1947–2021</a>,” [chart image], <em>CPS Historical Time Series Visualizations. </em>Published February 24, 2022.</p>
<p>Williams, Jhacova, and Valerie Wilson. 2019. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-racial-disparities-in-employment/"><em>Black Workers Endure Persistent Racial Disparities in Employment Outcomes</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, August 2019.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016a. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-are-paid-less-than-whites-at-every-education-level/"><em>African Americans Are Paid Less Than Whites at Every Education Level</em></a> (economic snapshot). Economic Policy Institute, October 2016.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-changing-demographics-of-americas-working-class/"><em>People of Color Will Be a Majority of the American Working Class in 2032: What This Means for the Effort to Grow Wages and Reduce Inequality</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, June 2016.</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage: Raising the Wage to Two-Thirds of the National Median Wage Would Lift Pay for Nearly 40 Million Workers</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Misclassification: State solutions to the U.S. worker rights crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Mast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327039</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[What do federal laws say about employee status and worker Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>What do federal laws say about employee status and worker misclassification?</h2>
<p>Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor. This problem is pervasive and widespread: As many as <a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/">10–30% of employers</a> misclassify their workers.</p>
<p>The way a worker is classified has serious implications for their labor rights and economic security. Federal, state, and local labor laws provide extensive protections for employees that are not available to independent contractors. Workers misclassified as independent contractors:</p>
<ul>
<li>Are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which ensures workers are paid at least the federal minimum wage and receive overtime pay (150% of their regular pay rate for work in excess of 40 hours per week);</li>
<li>Are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which ensures workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively to improve their working conditions;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are not eligible for unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Do not qualify for paid sick or family leave, and are extremely unlikely to receive employer-provided health insurance or retirement benefits;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are <a href="https://www.abetterbalance.org/state-leadership-on-anti-discrimination-protections-for-independent-contractors/">not covered</a> by antidiscrimination and sexual harassment protections in most states.</li>
</ul>
<p>Workers misclassified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split these costs evenly with their employer.</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>How is employee status determined? Legal tests and their nuances</h3>
<p>There are various legal tests for determining employee status for the purpose of coverage under federal worker protection laws, such as the FLSA and NLRA, as well as tax laws. Likewise, states have adopted a range of their own definitions and tests for determining employee status under various state worker protection and tax policies.</p>
<p>At the federal level, interpretations of these tests have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">varied across different presidential administrations</a>. The Democratic Obama and Biden administrations defined “employee” more broadly under both the FLSA and NLRA, while Trump’s first-term Department of Labor (DOL) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appointees applied a more restrictive definition that denied more workers the protections afforded by employee status. The current Trump DOL recently issued a final rule that formally rescinds Biden-era guidance and makes it easier for employers to misclassify workers as independent contractors.</p>
<p>The three most common tests are (1) the “common law” test, (2) the “economic realities” test, and (3) the “ABC test,” though some jurisdictions combine elements of multiple tests.</p>
<p><strong>Common law test: </strong>Derived from court decisions over the years, the common law test uses a long list of factors for evaluating whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor. There are several versions of this test, including the <a href="https://udel.edu/~pollack/Acct351/handouts/definititions%20in%20restatement%202d%20law%20of%20agency.htm">“Restatement (Second) of Agency”</a> and the Internal Revenue Service’s <a href="https://www.valdosta.edu/administration/finance-admin/human-resources/documents/IRSFactorTest_000.pdf">20-factor test</a>. Typically, a test that includes a long list of factors is a version of common law. The common law test is primarily concerned with the &#8220;right to control&#8221; how the work is performed and has been <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2015/03/LegalLandscapeUS.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">criticized</a> for being insufficiently protective, overly subjective, and open to manipulation.&nbsp;However, it is the most prominently applied test at the state level, and it is also used by the NLRB to determine whether a worker is eligible for organizing and collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act.</p>
<p><strong>Economic realities test: </strong>A broader six-factor<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> test used to determine employee status, derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act definition of “employ,” which is “to suffer or permit to work.” Under this definition, most workers are considered employees. U.S. DOL has typically utilized this test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections.</p>
<p><strong>ABC test:</strong> The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining independent contractor status, offering more protections than either the Biden-era version of the economic realities test or the common law test. Unlike weaker standards, the ABC test establishes a presumption that an individual performing services for an employer is an employee—not an independent contractor—unless the employer can establish each of three factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>The work is done without the direction and control of the employer (“absence of control”);</li>
<li>The work is performed outside the usual course of the employer’s business (“outside usual course of business”); and</li>
<li>The work is done by someone who has their own independent business or trade doing that kind of work (“customarily engaged”).</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>What are the threats to existing protections against illegal worker misclassification?</strong></h2>
<p>Current federal threats include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>A weaker federal interpretation for determining employee status</strong>: The Trump administration is conducting its final review of an independent contractor rule that will expand misclassification and formally rescind&nbsp;the Biden administration’s 2024 <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/10/2024-00067/employee-or-independent-contractor-classification-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act">final rule</a>, which provided a strong interpretation of the legal test for determining independent contractor status. The proposed version of Trump’s rule was <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/">estimated to cost workers</a> over $3.7 billion annually and to rob federal and state social insurance funds of at least $357 million annually. Even before finalizing the rule, Trump’s DOL had instructed its staff to stop utilizing the 2024 rule.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Legislation to weaken the definition of “employee” under federal law: </strong>A <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1319/all-actions">bill before Congress</a> proposes changing the FLSA and NLRA definitions of “employee” to exclude more workers from protections under these laws by making it easier to classify them as independent contractors.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Attacks on immigrant workers: </strong>The Trump administration’s mass deportation agenda has terrorized communities, and past research suggests that anti-immigrant attacks sow fear in workplaces, leading to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/">increased labor abuses</a> in industries where immigrants tend to work and where misclassification is already rampant (e.g., construction, landscaping, and cleaning). Trump has also eliminated <a href="https://bettzedek.org/bloomberg-law-uscis-quietly-ends-program-to-shield-workers-reporting-abuse/">deferred action for workers who report labor abuses</a>, removing safeguards against retaliation that were intended to enable workers to come forward and report violations (including misclassification) without fear, regardless of their immigration status.</li>
<li><strong>Diminished resources for federal enforcement</strong>: Trump has <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-trump-has-dismantled-the-federal-workforce-in-his-first-100-days/">gutted</a> the federal workforce, including at DOL agencies that enforce workers’ rights, such as the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. And his budget bill proposed cutting <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/republican-budget-exacerbates-underfunding-of-worker-protection-agencies/">$72 million</a> from WHD and OSHA despite both agencies already being understaffed and underfunded. Trump’s budget bill also slashed <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/medicaid-and-snap-cuts-will-harm-students-and-local-economies/">federal</a> <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-has-cut-or-frozen-177-billion-in-grants-across-every-state-analysis-shows">funding</a> to states. New DOL <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pJlcv9vmjFjx88AqJ6tAEsCPBRNR1-mF/view">enforcement guidance</a> instructs agency staff to take a more permissive approach to enforcement and instead focus on &#8220;compliance assistance.” A <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-general-counsel-issues-case-handling-guidance">memo</a> issued earlier this year by the NLRB general counsel urges investigators not to pursue “enhanced remedies” against employers that commit unfair labor practices and to prioritize settlement over litigation of such cases. Trump’s recently confirmed secretary of labor has <a href="https://www.hrdive.com/news/sonderling-trump-DOL-EEOC-AI/824138/">voiced support</a> for more business-friendly regulations and employer self-audits.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ongoing industry attempts to erode labor standards:</strong> Industry groups representing employers that especially benefit from misclassifying workers as independent contractors—such as gig work and construction employers—have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">relentlessly attacked</a> state-level ABC tests<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> and sought to weaken the legal definition of “employment” to permanently exclude their workers from federal and state protections not available to independent contractors.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>
<ul>
<li>One of the latest manifestations of this agenda is the push by app-based companies—which classify their workers as independent contractors to avoid providing benefits—for “portable benefits” schemes (i.e., savings accounts that can be used for health care and other expenses). Portable benefits legislation has proliferated in at least 11 states in the past two years,<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> offering <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/why-workers-need-real-portable-benefits/">limited benefits to few workers</a> while allowing platform companies to keep avoiding providing workers legitimate employment benefits.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Federal legal frameworks for protecting against worker misclassification are limited in their applicability to begin with, and now even these limited protections are under threat. The FLSA and NLRA apply legal tests to determine employee status under these two laws, while many other protections and benefits workers may be eligible for are determined at the state level.</p>
<h2><strong>How can states maintain and strengthen labor standards and enforcement?</strong></h2>
<p>The erosion of employee classification standards has serious consequences for states. Misclassification not only hurts workers but also deprives federal and state social insurance funds of the revenue needed to support injured, unemployed, and older workers. At a time when states are facing budgetary shortfalls prompted by the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-radical-republican-budget-bill-steals-from-the-poor-to-give-tax-cuts-to-the-rich/">massive tax cuts</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/100-days-100-ways-trump-hurt-workers/">its gutting of the federal workforce</a> and federal programs, lost revenue from misclassification will constrain them even further. To safeguard workers’ right to proper classification under state wage and hour laws, states should, at a minimum: analyze the costs of misclassification, meaningfully enforce their existing standards, and—where possible—seek to enshrine in state law the interpretation of the six-factor economic realities test adopted by the Biden administration. Ideally, states should endeavor to go further and implement the even stronger ABC test for determining employee status. States should also pair a strong ABC test with additional protections against misclassification and robust enforcement.</p>
<p>Addressing misclassification will ensure that workers are paid at least the minimum wage for their work and made eligible for benefits to which they are legally entitled. It will also ensure that states receive the necessary revenue to support workers and state agencies charged with enforcing worker protections.&nbsp;</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>Getting started: Key questions to investigate how your state treats misclassification</h3>
<p>Legal standards on employee classification (and mechanisms for enforcing these standards) vary considerably across and even within states. For example, a state may have a strong legal standard for determining employee status for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits but not for protections under state wage and hour laws. Additionally, misclassification is typically addressed by amending state statutes through the legislative process, but some states have also used the administrative rulemaking process to clarify state agencies’ interpretation of existing legal standards, depending on the underlying statute and scope of state agencies’ authority.</p>
<p>Here are some key questions to investigate the legal landscape in your state:</p>
<ul>
<li>How is the term “employee” defined in relevant state laws, including the laws governing workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and wage and hour protections? Within your state’s wage and hour laws, are there any industry-specific provisions related to misclassification, such as in construction?</li>
<li>What are the legal tests used to determine whether a worker is an employee for the purposes of coverage under each law? Different interpretations may apply to different laws, and the test may not be spelled out in statute. You may need to search your state’s labor agency website.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, Wisconsin applies a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/wisconsin/chapter-108/section-108-02/">two-part test</a> to unemployment insurance but applies the economic realities test to wage and hour laws (the economic realities test is <a href="https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/worker-classification/er/laborstandards/employers.htm">not in statute</a> but is instead based on an interpretation of common law).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>In addition to statutory tests, does your state have administrative rules and regulations that provide guidance when interpreting legal tests?
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, New Jersey has a statutory ABC test covering six state statutes—including unemployment compensation, wage and hour, and earned sick leave—and <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">recently adopted new regulations</a> to codify the state’s longstanding interpretation of the test and provide more detailed regulatory guidance on how the ABC test applies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What remedies are available to illegally misclassified workers under state law? These remedies may be covered in a standalone section of a state’s employment statute.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, in Minnesota, remedies available to misclassified workers are not covered under “Payment of Wages” but under a separate “Misclassification of Employees” section.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Has your state already conducted research regarding the cost of misclassification to workers and the state? If so, that analysis may provide useful statistics for advocating for better enforcement or a stronger legal test.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h3>Step I: Enforce existing standards, assess costs, and ensure legal test is at least as strong as 2024 Biden rule</h3>
<h4><strong>Vigorously enforce existing standards and take note of their weaknesses</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>While state laws defining employee status vary considerably, a legal test is only as strong as its enforcement. Regardless of a state’s particular test, strong enforcement of the law is essential. (Specific recommendations for robust enforcement are covered in Step II.) For example, though Minnesota does not have an ABC test, <a href="https://www.littler.com/news-analysis/asap/effective-july-1-minnesota-employers-face-increased-scrutiny-and-possible">lawmakers</a>, the <a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/business/employment-practices/intergovernmental-misclassification-enforcement-and-education">labor agency</a>, and the <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/">attorney general</a> have taken significant steps to address misclassification and expand remedies for workers subject to illegal misclassification. In <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/minnesota/chapters-175-187/chapter-181/section-181-722/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Minnesota</a>, employers who misclassify workers can be penalized for the violation and required to pay back wages, overtime, and other compensation workers lost as a result. Workers can also <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">sue their employer directly</a> to enforce their right to proper classification.</p>
<h4><strong>Investigate the costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds</strong></h4>
<p>If their state has not already done so, lawmakers can propose legislation creating a task force to study the impact of illegal misclassification and then make policy recommendations to the legislature. Given the high costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds, these studies can help create a sense of urgency and build support for further action on misclassification protections among lawmakers who may not otherwise see it as a priority.</p>
<p>These task forces can be created by legislation, executive order, or existing agency authority. For example, in 2020, Louisiana lawmakers passed a <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://dam.ldr.la.gov/miscellaneous/SR%2022.pdf">resolution</a> requesting that the Department of Revenue establish a Misclassification of Employees Task Force to study the costs of misclassification and recommend ways for the legislature to address them. In 2008, Iowa Governor Chet Culver initiated a misclassification task force to study the issue and report its findings to him. And in 2023, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison formed an Advisory Task Force on Worker Misclassification; its <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/Meetings/20241220/AdoptedRecommendations.pdf">policy recommendations</a> formed the basis of <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">2024 legislation</a> that made it easier for workers to report misclassification, established a private right of action to recoup denied wages, increased penalties for violations, and improved government coordination on misclassification investigations.</p>
<p>Task forces to study the impact of misclassification can also lead to more cross-agency coordination to crack down on misclassification and other violations that often occur alongside it (see Step III for more on interagency coordination). By vigorously enforcing their existing standards and investigating the costs of misclassification, states can still address harm and deter violations, regardless of how strong those standards are.</p>
<h4><strong>Adopt the economic realities test in common law states</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>States can ensure that their employment laws include a test for determining independent contractor status that is at least as strong as the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20240109-1">six-factor economic realities rule issued to apply to the FLSA</a> during the Biden administration. The six-factor economic realities test is stronger than the common law test and overly simplistic “right to control” tests used by many states because it determines independent contractor status by asking whether the worker is in fact in business for themselves. For example, while one 2026 proposed bill in Kentucky (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) would enshrine an ABC test in the state&#8217;s wage and hour code, a narrower and less ambitious but perhaps more feasible bill (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/sb117.html">SB 117</a>) would prohibit misclassification on publicly funded construction projects—excluding workers in all other industries—and would use the six-factor economic realities test instead of an ABC test to determine whether a worker was misclassified. The economic realities test may be an option for lawmakers to consider in states where adopting an ABC test is not immediately feasible.</p>
<h3>Step II: Establish a strong ABC test and pair it with robust enforcement</h3>
<p>A strong legal test for determining employee status is fundamental to asserting workers’ right to proper classification and provides a strong basis for enforcement. The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining employee status. It differs from <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">other tests of employee status</a> (such as the common law test used under the NLRA and by the IRS, and the economic realities test used under the FLSA) because the ABC test presumes that workers are employees, places the burden on the employer to prove otherwise, and provides a clear, narrow definition of independent contractor status. The test seeks to determine whether an individual is truly in business for themselves, which reduces the likelihood that workers are misclassified and lose protections they should be guaranteed under the law as employees. States should adopt the ABC test in as many of their labor protection statutes as possible.</p>
<p>The ABC test has not yet been adopted at the federal level, though legislation has been proposed. For example, the federal Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act would enshrine the ABC test in at least one federal law (the National Labor Relations Act) for purposes of determining workers’ organizing and bargaining rights but has not yet passed both chambers of Congress. Even if the ABC test were someday widely adopted at the federal level, state ABC tests would still be needed to address exclusions from federal protections and ensure adequate enforcement.</p>
<p>Eighteen states and the District of Columbia currently use the ABC test for determining employee status for certain workplace laws, but the strength of states’ classification standards varies widely (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). Even within states with ABC tests, some apply the test only to workers in certain industries, and most of these states have adopted the test only for the purpose of determining unemployment insurance eligibility—and not for wage and hour protections or workers’ compensation. Most states do not have ABC tests and apply weaker tests to determine employee status or have implemented components of an ABC test that fall short of the full test (see Figure A), and almost no state has made progress on advancing ABC tests in the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">past three years</a>.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327198 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327198" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327198-36051-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Some states have recently taken action to implement an ABC test or strengthen their existing one. For example, in addition to pursuing strong, innovative <a href="https://www.nelp.org/new-jerseys-worker-classification-crackdown-could-have-broad-impact/">enforcement strategies</a> to combat misclassification, New Jersey’s labor department proposed a <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">new administrative rule</a> in 2025 to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-new-jerseys-proposed-regulation-codifying-its-interpretation-of-the-states-statutory-abc-test/">codify into state law</a> the agency’s existing interpretation of the state&#8217;s ABC test for preventing independent contractor misclassification. And in 2026, lawmakers in <a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">Kentucky</a> proposed establishing a new ABC test in state wage and hour law.</p>
<p>States should seek to apply ABC tests to as many worker protection statutes as possible and limit carveouts that exclude certain workers based on their industry or occupation—the goal is to protect all workers with the simplest, most effective standard possible. However, focusing on a particular problem industry may be more politically feasible and can ensure some of the most vulnerable workers are protected while advocates build pressure to expand the test’s coverage. For example, several states have implemented an ABC test for the construction industry—long known for its <a href="https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2022/11/erlich_ilrr_final_article_11.28.20.pdf">reliance on illegal misclassification</a>—covering all relevant standards, including wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and income tax.</p>
<p>Lawmakers and advocates should also beware of legislation intended to weaken existing ABC tests or undermine the ABC test’s presumption that a worker is an employee <em>unless the employer can prove otherwise</em>. For example, a <a href="https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2026/A1184">2026 bill</a> introduced on the heels of New Jersey’s new misclassification rule proposes eliminating the B and C factors in the state’s ABC test, effectively replacing the ABC test with a much weaker, single-factor “right to control” test. Additionally, a 2026 West Virginia bill (<a href="https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4571%20intr.htm&amp;yr=2026&amp;sesstype=RS&amp;i=4571">HB 4571</a>) proposes establishing an ABC test designed to prevent the state from being deprived of income tax revenue, but the test presumes a worker is an independent contractor <em>unless</em> the employer demonstrates that the worker is in fact an employee (a true ABC test requires employers to prove a worker is an independent contractor, not an employee).</p>
<p>For states with no existing ABC test, lawmakers can propose legislation to establish a standard and provide remedies for misclassified workers within a single proposal. For example, the 2026 Kentucky bill mentioned above (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) proposed enshrining an ABC test in state wage and hour code and proposed new remedies for misclassified workers, including back wages, liquidated damages, and the right to pursue legal action against their employer.</p>
<p>A strong legal standard must be paired with action to enforce the law, and there are numerous policy options to strengthen workers’ rights and improve the enforcement of the state’s misclassification standards. Lawmakers can:</p>
<ul>
<li>Establish specific penalties for misclassification and make them sufficiently high to deter violations. Under the FLSA, the act of misclassification carries no penalty. Instead, aggrieved workers are limited to remedies for minimum wage and overtime violations uncovered during an investigation. States can address this gap in federal law by making misclassification a standalone violation and establishing penalties for misclassification, as Minnesota does. Lawmakers can also amend their statutes to direct penalties toward enforcement, as <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/generalmisclassification.shtml">New Jersey</a> does.</li>
<li>Increase the remedies for workers, including by making aggrieved workers eligible for compensatory damages in addition to back wages, and establishing a private right of action for workers to pursue legal action against offending employers, as Minnesota does.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Encourage workers to report labor abuses by extending the timeframe for filing wage and misclassification claims and by establishing anti-retaliation protections that include a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Rather than putting the onus on workers to prove they faced retaliation, a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation assumes adverse action taken shortly after protected activity was retaliatory unless the employer can prove otherwise (see Pennsylvania’s <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/pa/title-43-ps-labor/pa-st-sect-43-933-10.html">Construction Workplace Misclassification Act</a>).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Where state law authorizes these approaches, use “stop work” orders and “hot goods” provisions to prohibit employers from continuing work or profiting from the shipment of goods produced using illegally misclassified workers.
<ul>
<li>New Jersey&#8217;s <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/conindindependentcontractoract.shtml">Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act</a> was recently used to <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260807_Stop_Work.shtml">stop work</a> by four subcontractors after investigators found wage theft and multiple labor law violations affecting 15 workers. In 2026, the New York Senate <a href="https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S1514">passed a bill</a> that would permit “stop work” orders to be implemented for willful misclassification in any industry.</li>
<li>In the spirit of a “hot goods” provision, California’s labor code pertaining to the <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/california/code-lab/division-2/part-11/chapter-2/section-2680/">garment industry</a> requires manufacturers to be registered with the state; if apparel is manufactured without registration, state labor enforcers may confiscate the garments and destroy or dispose of them.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Require employers to provide workers with transparent statements of their employment status and a justification for their classification, as was <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3178">proposed</a> in the 2011 Employee Misclassification Prevention Act.</li>
</ul>
<p>In the past two years, at least 15 states have proposed legislation or administrative rules to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification and state agencies’ enforcement of misclassification laws (see<strong> Appendix Table 1</strong>).</p>
<h3>Step III: Implement innovative strategies to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification</h3>
<p>Beyond the remedies described in Step II, which focus on holding employers accountable and expanding worker protections, state lawmakers and agencies can implement the below actions to more effectively combat misclassification and prevent misclassification from happening in the first place:</p>
<h4><strong>Establish interagency coordination and enforce protections against misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>Misclassification is pervasive across many industries, but often states and cities lack the resources to address the issue comprehensively. States across the country have created <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/public-task-forces-take-on-employee-misclassification-best-practices/">interagency task forces</a> with dedicated resources, staff, and <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/Toolbox_Tool12_Intro_to_Co-enforcement_final.pdf">partnerships with worker organizations</a>, enabling them to more effectively crack down on misclassification in targeted industries. These task forces allow the state to pool efforts and expertise and use its limited resources more efficiently to address misclassification as well as other labor violations that frequently occur alongside misclassification. For example, last year, Washington’s attorney general <a href="https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-nick-brown-launches-worker-rights-unit-enforce-protections-fight-exploitation">established a worker rights unit</a> to combat wage theft and misclassification through strategic litigation, increased collaboration with state agencies, and partnerships with legislators to advance new worker protections. Interagency misclassification enforcement task forces have delivered significant results for workers and the state. For example, in 2018, in a one-year period Tennessee’s Employee Misclassification Education and Enforcement Fund and Uninsured Employers Fund unit found <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/workforce/documents/injuries/2019ComplianceAnnualReport.pdf">over 250 workers’ compensation and misclassification violations</a> and assessed nearly $6 million in penalties for the violations. The programs also helped over 1,250 employees gain workers’ compensation coverage for work-related illnesses and injuries. The same year, audits conducted by Oregon’s interagency task force on misclassification discovered over <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_engagement/Reports/2019-ICN-Interagency-Compliance-Network-Report.pdf">$73 million</a> in unreported payroll and resulted in the reclassification of nearly 7,000 workers.</p>
<h4><strong>Create a presumption of employee status for workers</strong></h4>
<p>One simple and effective way to deter misclassification in states without an ABC test is to create a presumption of employee status, meaning that workers are presumed to be employees unless proven otherwise. For example, New Mexico does not apply an ABC test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections, but the state does apply a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/chapter-60/article-13/section-60-13-3-1/">presumption of employee status</a> to workers in the construction industry. Construction contractors that improperly report employees as independent contractors are subject to criminal penalties.</p>
<h2>Additional recommended resources</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</a> [full report] and <a href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet/">state fact sheets</a> (Economic Policy Institute)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Policy-Brief-Public-Task-Forces-Take-on-Employee-Misclassification-Updated-August-2020.pdf">Public Task Forces Take on Employee Misclassification: Best Practices</a> (National Employment Law Project)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347871314_Misclassification_in_Construction_The_Original_Gig_Economy">Misclassification in Construction: The Original Gig Economy</a> (Cornell University Industrial &amp; Labor Relations Review)</li>
</ul>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The author is grateful to EPI Senior Fellow Lynn Rhinehart for her expertise and guidance.</p>
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<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The six factors are: (1) opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill; (2) investments by the worker and the potential employer; (3) degree of permanence of the work relationship; (4) nature and degree of control; (5) extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the potential employer’s business; and (6) skill and initiative.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See, for example, New Jersey A1184 (failed in 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> See, for example, Nebraska LB 229 (enacted in 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> See Alabama SB 86 (2025), Georgia HB 987 (2026), Idaho H 645 (2026), Kentucky HB 732 (2026), Louisiana HB 301 (2026), Massachusetts HB 1108 (2026), Nebraska LR 414 (2026), Rhode Island H 7365 (2026), West Virginia SB 269 (2025) and HB 4009 (2026), Wisconsin SB 269 (2025), and Wyoming SF 41 (2026).</p>
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		<title>AI and the economy: Your questions, answered</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/ai-and-the-economy-your-questions-answered/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327528</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span class="dropped">T</span></strong>his FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise. But we&nbsp;do&nbsp;have considerable expertise regarding AI’s potential effect on labor markets and the broader impacts of technological change on the economy.</p>
<p>Further, many of AI’s potential effects on the economy are largely distinct from its consequences in these other areas, making the economic effects amenable to separate, granular analysis. For example, if poorly regulated and recklessly deployed AI systems lead to disruptive cybersecurity incidents, this could obviously have some economic effects (imagine a large bank suffering a cyberattack and depositors’ funds being frozen or inaccessible for a time). But regulatory failures and irresponsible management of AI systems that lead to cyberattacks do not really signal anything about the economic potential for AI tools to replace human labor at large scale or about how a rapid evaporation of AI investment or stock market gains would ripple through the economy. Nor does the right policy to mitigate possible cybersecurity or disinformation problems exacerbated by AI have much at all to do with the optimal policy to ensure working families’ prosperity and economic security in an age of AI.</p>
<p>Across all realms of AI policy, much attention has been paid to regulations that are specifically tailored to AI. This might be appropriate in some fields. However, we suggest that not enough attention has been paid to simply applying protections, norms, and institutions that predate AI to its uses. For example, tort law already makes it possible to hold companies liable for harms their products create. While the application of these existing legal remedies to AI hacking incidents could potentially be clarified, it doesn’t seem to require a huge new field of law or legislation to make this possible. Further, we should significantly <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/">strengthen</a> the application and enforcement of existing protections for workers. For example, employers should be held liable when they discriminate against workers, rather than being able to evade accountability because the discriminatory impact stemmed from their use of an algorithm or other automated system.</p>
<p>This notion that existing best practices, policies, and ideas are likely to be the best solutions to the problems AI may cause holds particularly true when it comes to its economic effects. The single largest concern expressed in this realm is AI’s potential to permanently displace very large amounts of human labor in a short period of time, causing economy-wide joblessness and wage declines. This FAQ will examine the economic evidence surrounding many of these concerns, but one key conclusion to state here is that even if such a scenario seemed plausible, it is highly unlikely that policies tailored specifically to AI tools’ potential uses in workplaces could ever keep up with, let alone proactively block, the ways that millions of private-sector firms are adopting these tools. What would reduce the most harm in such scenarios is implementing ideas already firmly on the policy agenda for many: keep the macroeconomy well managed and unemployment rates very low; provide effective protection for workers’ rights to form unions and bargain in the workplace over issues like how technology is implemented; offer a more protective social safety net that makes spells of joblessness less devastating for workers experiencing them; and implement progressive taxes—particularly higher tax rates on income derived from capital.</p>
<p>It is understandable that people are anxious about what AI could do to workers’ jobs and wages in coming years; the U.S. labor market has been rigged by policy for decades to make most workers insecure and keep their wages suppressed. AI deployed into this rigged labor market, as is happening currently, is unlikely to provide much benefit to most workers and could inject more churn and uncertainty. But making the policy changes noted above and deploying AI in a high-road economy where policy forces labor markets to perform better could allay many of these worries. In fact, if power were rebalanced in our economy to ensure workers are protected and empowered, AI might deliver real tangible benefits to most workers in the form of faster wage growth.</p>
<p>To be clear, arguing that broad, pre-existing ideas for how to unrig labor markets and generate shared prosperity are the best response to the economic concerns of AI does not mean we’re not taking AI “seriously” or recognizing its potential harms across many other realms. Instead, our recommendation stems from granular analysis of how AI might affect the economy and labor markets.</p>
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<h2>How should we think about AI&#8217;s likely effects on jobs and wages?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>The effect of AI on the wages and employment of typical U.S. workers will, like most technological advances, hinge almost entirely on the broader economic, social, and political context. Crucially, the U.S. labor market has been largely rigged by policy to suppress wages and opportunities for most workers. In this context, there is little upside for U.S. workers from widespread deployment of AI tools. There are also widespread fears that AI might threaten jobs and wages on a large scale. But were the labor market substantially unrigged, AI tools could well raise the living standards of working people. Nothing inherent to AI lets us forecast its potential effects on U.S. workers, for good or bad. This will be determined by policy.</p>
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<p>Being relatively agnostic about the direct effect of technology and AI on labor markets does not imply that we think labor markets have been working well for U.S. workers. On the contrary, unemployment has been too high and wage growth too low for <em>most</em> years in recent decades. But the roots of labor market dysfunction—both past and future—have very little to do with technological changes. Instead, this dysfunction is driven by the concerted policy push to exacerbate the extreme imbalance of power between typical workers and the corporate managers and capital owners who hire and supervise them.</p>
<p>It is important to get the facts and analysis right on the questions of why labor markets have not delivered enough jobs or acceptable wage growth, and what the real threats are to decent jobs in the future. The current fixation on AI—and the resulting pressures to respond with policies that wrap tightly around AI-specific parameters—distracts from the more fundamental problem of imbalanced power in labor markets, pulling policy in less useful directions.</p>
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<h2>What’s AI’s most immediate threat to the U.S. economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>AI-related spending accounts for roughly half of U.S. growth in recent quarters—a narrow and fragile base for economic growth. That spending comes from two sources: (1) tangible investment in data centers, hardware, and research, and (2) consumption financed by the AI-driven stock bubble. Both spending flows could reverse quickly if expectations change about the future profitability of AI tools. If this reversal happens, the economy may well enter recession unless policymakers react nimbly and smartly.</p>
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<p>There are two main spending flows associated with the race to develop and sell AI tools for mass-market use. The first is tangible business investment—what we’ll call capital expenditures, or <em>capex</em>. Many firms are hoping to be in the first wave of companies whose AI products are adopted, so they are currently investing heavily in data centers, servers, racks, and research. This wave of AI-related spending is driving demand for land, hardware and software components, construction materials, and the labor needed to build data centers, develop the models, and market them.</p>
<p>The other spending flow comes from the sharp rise in the market valuation of AI-related companies, which has driven a stock market boom—or, likely, bubble—in recent years. Part of households’ annual consumption spending comes from wealth (not just income). According to <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/jep.14.2.99.pdf">general estimates</a>, $1 in increased stock market wealth leads to around 3 cents in additional consumption spending. To the degree AI is driving above-normal valuations of the stock market relative to current fundamentals, the extra consumption spending out of this “excess” wealth can be attributed to AI.</p>
<p>To measure the AI effect on capex, macroeconomic observers have looked at the categories of business investment where the AI build-out is concentrated—data centers, information processing equipment, software, and R&amp;D—and calculated how much these categories are contributing to GDP growth over and above historical norms. This excess contribution has recently reached roughly 0.7% of GDP. In an economy where growth runs at roughly 2%, this would constitute roughly a third of all <em>increases</em> in GDP. That said, some portion of this capex spending—likely a third to a half—probably stems from increased imports, which are then subtracted out of the contribution to domestic growth. Very roughly, we estimate that the AI capex build-out has likely contributed 0.5% to GDP growth in the past year.</p>
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<p>For the consumption effect associated with AI, we look at today’s ratio of price to earnings (P/E ratio) in the overall stock market (the S&amp;P 500 specifically). This measures how expensive it is to buy a dollar’s worth of earnings. Today, it is more expensive than in any period in history except the very late 1990s–2000, an unambiguous bubble that was also driven by wild enthusiasm about tech and saw a very large correction. Today’s P/E ratio is close to 40. A more normal ratio—though still high in historical terms—would be 30. If the stock market fell from a P/E ratio of 40 to one of 30 in a relatively short period of time, that would constitute a 25% decline in household wealth in corporate equities. That decline in wealth would imply a consumption reduction of about $200 billion, or roughly 0.7% of GDP.</p>
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<p>Combined, the contributions of these two AI-related spending flows to GDP growth likely exceed 1% of GDP. Since the first quarter of 2025, growth <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1XYEd">has averaged roughly 2%</a>, which implies that over half of all growth in the past year was being propelled by AI-related spending.</p>
<p>But this AI-related spending is a narrow and fragile base for overall growth. A genuinely healthy economy should be able to generate enough demand to keep unemployment low and stable without a stock market bubble. And both the stock market valuations and the determination to keep spending heavily on data centers and other capex hinge on the belief among companies and investors that AI companies’ eventual profits will justify them.</p>
<p>If the potential profitability of this investment in AI ever appears lower than expected, this could lead to a sharp deflation of the current stock market bubble. A drop in the market value of AI companies would almost surely also convince at least a few of the big capex spenders that their investments will not pay off, and they will likely cut back. All this means that the AI contribution to GDP growth could evaporate quickly if just one or two dominoes fall.</p>
<p>This would leave a large hole in aggregate demand (spending by households, businesses, and governments) that would cause a recession unless policymakers reacted nimbly to fill it. This could largely be accomplished with <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">standard recession-fighting monetary and fiscal policy</a>. But there would still be pain. And if political obstacles prevented the quick deployment of standard recession-fighting policy, the recession could linger and cause lasting damage.</p>
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<h2>Is the current fixation on AI the first time a technology-driven stock market bubble has threatened the broader economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Today’s AI boom bears striking parallels to the internet build-out and stock market bubble of the late 1990s. That episode clearly led to a stock market bubble, and the resulting deflation of that bubble led to a very stubborn recession. But the late 1990s boom also gave the U.S. labor market four to five very strong years before the bubble burst—something the current AI frenzy has largely failed to do.</p>
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<p>The parallels between today’s AI frenzy and the late 1990s build-out of the internet are striking. The late 1990s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">boost to GDP from tech-related capex</a> was even larger than today’s, and by a significant amount. The late 1990s stock market bubble (measured by P/E ratios) was the only one in history larger than today’s AI bubble, and it was even more <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/unpacking-us-tech-valuations-agnostic-assessment">concentrated</a> in tech-related stocks than today’s is.</p>
<p>Taken together, the productivity boost delivered by the internet boom from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s was very large—roughly in line with the more optimistic projections of how much AI could boost productivity growth in the decades ahead. By 2005, the economy was <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c11074/c11074.pdf">about 15% larger</a> than projecting forward from the early 1990s would have suggested.</p>
<p>In short, the introduction of the internet was a huge economic story. We don’t think of it that way for the same reason that fish don’t notice water: It’s now so fundamental to daily life that it no longer registers. But it was a mammoth change with measurable, obvious economic effects.</p>
<p>One important difference, however, is that the internet boom lifted the labor market broadly. The late 1990s saw large reductions in unemployment relative to the previous five (or 10) years, and inflation-adjusted wages grew strongly up and down the wage distribution <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">for the first time in a generation</a>.</p>
<p>The AI boom has not benefited the broader labor market in the same way. Since late 2022, when ChatGPT was first introduced, the U.S. labor market <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">has clearly softened</a>, and wage growth has decelerated, most sharply for the bottom half of the wage distribution. The AI boom began with lower unemployment and tighter labor markets than the internet boom did, so it is striking that it has not been associated with a stronger—or even an equally strong—labor market.</p>
<p>Part of the reason is policy—not AI-specific policy but broader policy decisions. Many <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">policy choices over this year slowed growth</a> in the large parts of the economy outside the AI boom. For example, in normal times, much of the Trump administration’s agenda in 2025 would have been seen as very bad for business investment. Its tariff policy was extreme and chaotic; its mass deportation policy threatened to weigh heavily on both the labor supply and the customer base of very specific industries; the large deficit increases locked in by the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill (even with the large spending cuts) seemed likely to keep upward pressure on interest rates; and the administration’s historically unprecedented meddling with the Fed’s policy independence also put upward pressure on rates and increased uncertainty.</p>
<p>AI-related investment has been strong in recent years even in the face of these poor broader policy choices simply because this happened to be the historical moment when the technology matured enough for firms to race to deploy it.</p>
<p>But non-AI-related investment—over half of all business investment—has clearly been hurt by the policy trajectory of the past year and a half. This non-AI investment decelerated through 2025 and then turned firmly negative by year-end. In short, the policy headwinds for investment really do seem to be binding on all areas of the economy not being swept along by the AI build-out.</p>
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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325965 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325965" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325965-36062-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Is AI inevitably bad for the jobs and wages of typical workers over the longer run?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>There’s no obvious reason to think so. Economists’ best summary measure of how rapidly technological change is moving forward is the pace of <em>productivity growth</em>—growth in the average output and income created in an hour of work. Throughout history, periods of fast productivity growth (that is, periods of rapid technological advance) have been <em>good</em>, not bad, for the wages and jobs of typical workers. What has overwhelmingly determined how workers fare is <em>policy</em>, not the pace or nature of technological change, and there is no sign yet that AI will break that pattern. Current policy is notably bad for workers’ jobs and wages and should be fixed, but that poor policy environment predates AI by decades.</p>
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<p>U.S. labor markets have performed poorly for most workers for decades. But the root of this poor performance has largely <em>not</em> been technological change that displaced workers or made their skills obsolete. Instead, the main drivers of dysfunctional labor market performance for most U.S. workers have been intentional policy changes meant to tilt the balance of bargaining power in labor markets away from typical workers and toward the owners and managers of corporate business. These policy changes tore down institutions (like the minimum wage and unions) that had supported workers’ leverage and bargaining power in earlier decades and introduced new institutions (like <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/">noncompete agreements</a>) that further eroded workers’ ability to win pay increases that matched overall economic growth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/">Too slow wage growth for the bottom 80% of workers</a>—and the rise in inequality that came with it—began in the late 1970s and accelerated through the 1980s and 1990s. The early conventional wisdom about this inequality, especially among economists, was that labor markets are generally competitive and efficient, so inequality must stem from deep market forces shifting the relative demand and supply for different types of workers—things like technology and the pace of educational attainment. According to this view, policy institutions like the minimum wage and unions could affect only the small sliver of workers they touched directly, and any such effect introduced its own costly distortions. If one believed this, then the 30-year period of equal and fast wage growth after World War II could not have been driven by distortionary institutions like unions and a robust minimum wage, and the attack on unions and minimum wages could not be a convincing explanation of why inequality increased after 1979.</p>
<p>A tide of <a href="https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/57/s/s1">cutting-edge labor market research</a> has overturned most of this conventional wisdom and shown that while technology—including AI—is a prime determinant of how fast the overall economy grows, how that growth is <em>distributed</em> as jobs and wages is mostly a function of <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/home/">policies and institutions</a>. Like any technology, AI will help set the pace of growth, but whether typical workers share in it or whether today’s inequality widens even further will be decided by the policies and institutions that govern workers’ wages and labor market power.</p>
<p>The political and economic implications of this shift in understanding can hardly be overstated. If inequality were simply the product of rapid technological changes interacting with competitive and efficient markets, then it would be regrettable but essentially nobody’s fault, and little could be done about it. That is a very convenient story for the powerful. But it does not fit the historical record or economic evidence. Instead, across history, rapid technological progress has generally been <em>good</em> for workers, not bad: Periods of fast productivity growth have been periods of lower unemployment and slower growing inequality.</p>
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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-325933 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325933" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325933-36063-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Whether U.S. workers thrive in an era of AI remains mostly a policy question. The decisions that will determine it have to do with the level of labor market power available to typical workers through policies like the level of minimum wages, the determination of macroeconomic policymakers to sustain full employment, the effectiveness of labor law in allowing workers to unionize and bargain collectively, and how robust the U.S. welfare state is.</p>
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<h2>Won’t AI automate many jobs away?</h2>
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<p>AI will likely destroy some <em>specific jobs</em> through automation—but it is also highly likely to create jobs more broadly over time by boosting incomes for those in the non-automated sectors. How much any particular group of workers suffers when displaced from their jobs will be determined by policy decisions. Throughout U.S. history, we have generally been terrible at managing these transitions in worker-friendly ways. It would obviously be better if we changed that and put in place the policy supports workers need to get through them.</p>
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<p>Rapid technological change concentrated in any one sector can reduce employment <em>in that sector</em>. So perhaps AI really will, say, reduce the number of software coding jobs.</p>
<p>But if this technological change allows the same output to be produced with fewer hours of work, it raises incomes across the economy. Sticking with software coders, if the price of software design stays the same as its productivity rises, incomes within the sector will rise, and the workers and capital owners within the sector will have higher incomes they can use to buy <em>other</em> sectors’ goods and services. More likely, competition pushes the price of software design down, and those who purchase software design services (including purchasing indirectly as consumers buying goods and services from other businesses) will see their real (inflation-adjusted) incomes rise.</p>
<p>This increased demand stemming from these productivity gains means that job losses within the AI-using sector can be counterbalanced (or more than counterbalanced) by expanding employment in other sectors <em>as long as aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) is maintained.</em></p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-automation-labor-displacing-productivity-growth-employment-and-the-labor-share/">Autor and Salomons (2018)</a> analyzed these cross-cutting effects of technological changes within particular economic sectors. They found that the <em>own-effect</em> of a positive productivity shock—its effect on jobs within the sector where it happens—is indeed negative: Fewer hours of work are needed to produce the sector’s output, and rising demand for that now less expensive output doesn’t fully make up the difference. However, the <em>cross-effect</em>—the boost that sector’s productivity growth gives to employment <em>in other sectors</em>—is strongly positive and generally large enough to outweigh the negative own-effect for total employment.</p>
<p>This offset is not always automatic. Market mechanisms could fail, at least in part, to channel higher incomes driven by technological advance into higher demand elsewhere in the economy. If the initial large income gains in the AI-using sector flow to already wealthy households, for example, these households are unlikely to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/inequalitys-drag-on-aggregate-demand/">spend rather than save all of these gains</a>. That is why policymakers should keep aggregate demand high enough to keep unemployment low. They have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">ample tools to do it</a>, from lower interest rates set by the Federal Reserve to redistributive fiscal policy that funds more generous public benefits out of progressive taxes.</p>
<p>In reality, however, market mechanisms likely will do much of the work in terms of maintaining aggregate demand in the face of productivity increases. Recessions and damagingly high increases in unemployment rates are overwhelmingly <em>not</em> caused by bursts of productivity growth. Instead, as the economy’s productivity potential grows year after year, those gains tend to translate relatively smoothly into growth in demand. When demand does falter, it is usually because of an outside shock, like an asset bubble popping or central bankers deliberately slowing the economy to forestall inflation.</p>
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<h2>If AI can both create and destroy jobs, does this mean policymakers can totally ignore its effects?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>No. If anything, the opposite is true: Policymakers should be doing far more to protect working families from the hardship and uncertainty of earning a living in labor markets that are volatile and offer little protection. If AI-induced technological change turns out to be large and causes significant job displacement, it will hit a U.S. labor market with few worker protections and create real pockets of concentrated harm—as every other economic change of the past several decades has. But the main driver of this harm is the weakness of U.S. labor market protections, not the specifics of the technology.</p>
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<p>To understand the scale, start with how much churn the labor market already absorbs. About 1.5 million workers involuntarily <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">lose their jobs <em>every single month</em></a> in the U.S. economy—about 18 million jobs lost involuntarily each year. If AI raised the growth of productivity by 0.5 percentage points over the next decade <em>and</em> there were no countervailing job creation from increased incomes, this would very roughly translate into another 700,000 jobs each year being shed, with workers in those jobs needing to find alternative employment. Compared with the 18 million separations the economy already churns through, that is a real but manageable increase.</p>
<p>Even so, many individual workers may suffer from sector-specific job displacements due to AI, even in years when overall unemployment is low. The harm these displacements cause is real and significant: The labor market is not frictionless, and it can be a painful stretch of time before a displaced worker finds comparable work elsewhere. Some workers (particularly older workers) may never find a specific job as good as the one they lost.</p>
<p>But, again, most of this suffering is <em>not an AI-specific problem</em>. The <em>vast majority</em> of painful, forced job separations are not about AI currently and likely won’t be in the future. <em>Workers displaced for reasons not due to AI deserve protection too.</em> The solution is not a search for novel AI-specific policies but the broad, labor market-wide policies that help in every case: stronger social insurance, more widespread collective bargaining, and sustained high-pressure labor markets. These policies are all highly desirable regardless of the pace of technological change.</p>
<p>It is the absence of these broad-based labor market and social insurance policies that makes losing a <em>specific job</em> so damaging for some U.S. workers. Because the guaranteed baseline of job quality and social protection is so low for U.S. workers, a job that does provide some of those things is rare, and workers know it will be hard to replace. This imparts a strong sense of <em>rational</em> loss aversion for workers who happen to hold a high-quality job.</p>
<p>One reason specific jobs are occasionally highly valued in the U.S. labor market is that they come bundled with nonwage compensation—like health and retirement benefits, which are not universally available. Making those benefits universal through more protective social insurance would make losing any particular job far less damaging. Another key social insurance system—unemployment insurance (UI)—is too stingy in the U.S., imposing large income losses while workers search for alternative employment after a layoff. Making UI more generous would directly reduce the pain of a layoff.</p>
<p>Another reason some specific jobs can be highly valued in the U.S. economy is that they are unionized. Union jobs should be much more common than they currently are, but decades of employer hostility and policy indifference have made large-scale organizing in newly created jobs incredibly challenging. The sectors that remain unionized do so largely because of a historical legacy that saw their unions formed decades ago, so a worker separated from one today has little chance of finding another union job elsewhere. <em>Anything</em> that destroys today’s union jobs, technological progress included, will leave their former holders worse off. If policy changed to make it more likely for newly created jobs to be unionized, much of the damage from loss of union jobs spurred by technological churn could be ameliorated.</p>
<p>Additionally, the U.S. economy has spent much of the past four decades <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">with excessively high unemployment</a>, which radically increases the cost of losing a job. When unemployment is low and vacancies are high, a laid-off worker can find a new job quickly, putting employers under constant pressure to keep job quality high enough to retain and attract new employees.</p>
<p>If U.S. policymakers built a more protective social insurance system, restored the effective right to organize unions, and maintained high-pressure labor markets with low unemployment, then a large part of the damage done by <em>any</em> job displacements—including any driven by AI—would disappear.</p>
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<h2>Will AI lead to mass unemployment across the U.S. economy?</h2>
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<p>Almost surely not. The historical evidence is clear that business cycles with faster productivity growth see <em>lower</em> unemployment, not higher. And the ease with which AI or any capital investment can substitute for human labor at scale is often overstated.</p>
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<p>Throughout modern history in advanced economies, mass unemployment has never been caused by technological advances that accelerate productivity growth. Unemployment crises are instead caused by a shortfall in aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments). Within a given business cycle, faster productivity growth is accompanied by lower, not higher, unemployment.</p>
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<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-325935 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325935" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325935-36069-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>It is worth stepping back from this historical evidence to think through <em>why</em> technological advance has never led to mass unemployment. The rest of this answer walks through some of that logic. We offer these illustrations to take the current fears of mass unemployment seriously, not to suggest that any of these scenarios are likely or have characterized the real economic history of the U.S.</p>
<p>One important economic reason why AI or any technological change is unlikely to cause mass unemployment is simply that technology is not free. Firms will replace labor with capital (including AI tools) only when the costs of doing so are less than the savings. But while shedding labor saves firms money, investing in new capital <em>costs</em> money.</p>
<p>And if the demand for AI tools rises rapidly as businesses across the economy try to replace large swathes of their workforce, the price of these tools will rise, and eventually (or even quickly) the price of investing in AI tools will exceed the benefits to firms.</p>
<p>Because so much of what is called “technological change” in recent years has occurred in online spaces that seem unconstrained by capital costs, it is easy to underestimate how costly AI tools will likely be if a broad swathe of U.S. employers try to buy them at scale to economize on labor costs. But AI tools require vast amounts of capital, labor, and energy to build and maintain (see <strong>Figure A</strong> about the scale of investments being made to build up AI capacity and enter the race to try to sell AI tools across the U.S. economy).</p>
<p>Further, if AI opened up historically large-scale possibilities for the replacement of human labor in the future, this would radically raise economy-wide productivity <em>and</em> reduce the <em>relative</em> cost of labor, as unemployment reduced workers’ leverage to demand wage growth that keeps pace with productivity. This reduction in the relative cost of labor would provide some businesses a large incentive to figure out how to profitably employ some of the now-jobless workers—who, again, are now quite a bit cheaper relative to other inputs into production (i.e., AI tools).</p>
<p>In short, mass unemployment due to technological change is highly unlikely to be an <em>equilibrium</em> in the economy—a place the economy remains at for long periods—unless policymakers completely fail at keeping aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) stable. Have policymakers failed in the past at this fundamental part of their jobs, allowing excess unemployment to linger far longer than necessary? Definitely. But that had nothing to do with AI, and the toleration of mass unemployment that might occur due to an AI-driven acceleration of productivity would be a failure of these policymakers, not an inevitability of the technology.</p>
<p>Also, this scenario—where AI generates extremely rapid productivity growth and the <em>relative</em> price of labor must fall to keep unemployment in check in the face of this AI-biased technological change—does not imply <em>absolute</em> reductions in wages. Instead, it only implies wages fall further behind productivity growth. But if productivity growth is supercharged by AI (and that’s the entire root of this scenario), workers’ wages and living standards could still grow in absolute terms, even more rapidly than they have in the recent past. Only wages <em>relative</em> to capital costs have to fall. To be clear, this isn’t a particularly happy scenario: Rising inequality is objectively bad, even if all incomes see some absolute gains. But it’s not a purely pessimistic scenario either.</p>
<p>Finally, much of the discourse that seems to assume a very easy replacement of human labor with AI tools underappreciates the complexity of most jobs in the economy. <em>Jobs</em> are a bundle of specific <em>tasks</em> that are often hard to clearly describe (let alone fully replace). AI will replace many tasks, but this will often just allow workers to focus more time and attention on the other tasks their jobs entail. Many of the tasks of modern jobs are extremely hard to define in binary terms that would allow easy automation. This difficulty in crisply describing many job tasks often leads to sneering about the alleged worthlessness of “<a href="https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/ai-isnt-management-try-explaining">middle managers</a>” or “<a href="https://substack.jurgenappelo.com/p/how-ai-will-achieve-peak-bullshit-work">bullshit jobs</a>” (to borrow anthropologist David Graeber’s term), but it stems from the fact that we have an amazingly complex economy built on ever-finer divisions of labor and information across workers and functions. Just because any single person has <a href="https://messyjobs.ai/">almost no idea what the key tasks</a> are for most of the workforce <em>doesn’t mean these tasks are unimportant or easy to replace</em>. It just means the economy is complex.</p>
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<h2>How much might AI boost productivity growth—and has the U.S. labor market ever absorbed that fast a productivity acceleration before?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Most credible estimates project that AI could boost productivity growth over the next decade by an average of 0.5–1.5 percentage points per year. Even at the high end of 1.5 percentage points per year, that implies an acceleration of productivity growth that the U.S. economy has easily absorbed in the past with no labor market distress. In fact, periods of productivity acceleration have been good for U.S. workers; it is productivity slowdowns that have coincided with bad outcomes.</p>
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<p>The effect AI will have in boosting productivity growth is still genuinely unclear. There are clear reasons to think it could run faster for a stretch as AI is incorporated into firms’ workflow, but as with all technological innovations, the pace and the ultimate depth of that penetration remain highly uncertain.</p>
<p>As of the first quarter of 2026, there is very little reason to think AI has contributed anything measurable to U.S. productivity growth. Since the last business cycle peak (the last quarter of 2019), productivity growth has averaged 1.96%. Looking only at the period since the third quarter of 2022 (when ChatGPT was introduced to the public), productivity growth has averaged 2.08%—a small acceleration in a very noisy data series. The pre-2022 numbers also include the large productivity declines stemming from the supply chain bottlenecks caused by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early 2020s. <strong>Figure F</strong> shows the simple level of productivity over time, along with an extrapolated trend for recent years that shows what the level of productivity would be today if the 2017–2019 productivity trend held after the rollout of ChatGPT. Two things stand out: the large drop in the level of productivity as the early 2020s supply chain snarls formed, and the fact that as of the first quarter of 2026, the level of productivity is only about 0.2% higher than what would have been extrapolated from it following its immediate pre-Covid trend.</p>
<p>Further, even this small edge over projection is entirely driven by the first quarters of 2023—the gap between actual productivity and trend productivity has actually declined in the past two years. None of this looks like evidence of a large technological innovation that is diffusing rapidly across ever-larger shares of the U.S. economy.</p>
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<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326014 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326014" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326014-36070-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Finally, even the quite optimistic projections of how much AI might add to U.S. productivity growth in the coming decade do not imply a pace of productivity growth the U.S. labor market has never successfully absorbed before. <strong>Figure G</strong> shows a range of projections of how much AI could raise productivity growth over the next decade and compares the implied acceleration with past episodes of rising and falling productivity growth in the U.S. economy. We intentionally choose historical periods that have seen sharp changes in productivity growth to compare with projections of AI-driven productivity growth.</p>
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<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326010 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326010" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326010-36071-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>U.S. history has clearly seen sharp changes in productivity growth roughly as large as the more optimistic projections of AI’s effect on productivity. Importantly, the historical period that saw a rapid acceleration of productivity growth—the late 1990s and early 2000s—was an unusually strong period in the U.S. labor market, with lower unemployment and faster, broader wage growth than had been seen in a generation. The beginning of wage suppression, in contrast, followed the sharp productivity slowdown of 1973–1979. The other sharp productivity slowdown, from 2007 to 2019, was also a long period of extreme dysfunction in U.S. labor markets, with extended periods of excess unemployment and many years of near-stagnant wage growth.</p>
<p>In short, the actual history of the U.S. economy and credible projections of AI’s effect on productivity do not warrant extreme concern about AI-caused labor displacement.</p>
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		<title>Using FY 2027 appropriations to build a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline: House Republican appropriations legislation would expand H-2A and H-2B visa programs and cut farmworker pay</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/fy-2027-house-republican-appropriations-deportation-to-guestworker-pipeline/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 13:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328101</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of For H-2A, the bill Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key findings:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of agriculture.</li>
<li>For H-2A, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S. farmworkers. Current regulations limit H-2A to temporary and seasonal work.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Allow employers to pay year-round H-2A farmworkers drastically lower wages, cutting pay by roughly $17,000 to $40,000 per year in key industries and states in 2027 and incentivizing farm operators to replace U.S. farmworker employees with much lower-paid H-2A workers.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>For H-2B, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Raise the annual cap to at least 270,000 visas in FY 2027 (more than doubling the current cap that includes supplemental H-2B visas) and 300,000 total workers.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Reward employers for applying for as many H-2B jobs as possible each year, since doing so increases their cap exemption for the following year, likely driving exponential growth in the program.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Move 10,000 amusement park, carnival, fair, and circus workers from H-2B to a newly created P-4 visa, which has no numerical cap and questionable worker protections—further expanding the pool of exploitable workers in H-2B industries.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>These changes would drastically lower pay for all farmworkers and degrade labor standards for U.S. workers on farms and in industries like landscaping, construction, and hospitality. Employers would gain an exploitable workforce they can control, made up of workers with no realistic path to a green card or U.S. citizenship.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>Introduction and summary</h2>
<p>In June 2026, Republican legislators in the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security—the subcommittee tasked with funding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—proposed legislation to fund DHS for FY 2027, which was then considered by the full House Appropriations Committee. The bill includes several legislative riders that, if enacted into law, would make major changes to two temporary work visa programs, H-2A and H-2B. Those provisions would accelerate hiring and substantially expand the size and scope of the programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> The full House Appropriations Committee approved the bill on a party-line vote with 34 Republican members voting in favor of reporting the bill to the full House of Representatives.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Nearly identical riders were passed in the House FY 2026 DHS appropriations bill, but were not included in the final FY 2026 omnibus bill that funded the federal government.</p>
<p>H-2A allows farm employers to hire migrant workers for seasonal and temporary agricultural jobs, while H-2B allows employers to hire migrant workers for temporary jobs in low-wage occupations outside of agriculture (including in landscaping, construction, hospitality, food service, seafood processing, and traveling fairs and carnivals). Both programs represent a flawed employment model that restricts workers’ rights by giving employers control over their workers’ immigration status.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Both undercut U.S. wage standards, lack adequate regulations and enforcement to protect workplace rights, and fail to provide workers with a pathway to becoming lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens. If the House legislative provisions on H-2A and H-2B become law, they would greatly increase the number of workers in these programs and lower wages for hundreds of thousands of farmworkers by tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s unrestrained and indiscriminate immigration enforcement efforts and bureaucratic slowdowns have caused net immigration levels in the United States to turn negative for the first time in half a century.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Given demographic projections and the fact that nearly all prime-age workforce growth in the past 30 years has come from immigration,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> it is becoming clearer that sustaining future economic and workforce growth will be difficult without policies that would expand pathways for immigrants. But those pathways must give workers full and equal rights in the workplace through immediate or eventual lawful permanent residence and a path to citizenship. Temporary work visa programs like H-2A and H-2B, often called “guestworker” programs, do not do that, and strong evidence shows they are degrading wages and working conditions for both migrant and U.S. workers.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>Efforts in Congress to expand H-2A and H-2B build on the Trump administration’s own use of executive authority to expand both programs. Meanwhile, DHS’s immigration enforcement agencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—now have $270 billion at their disposal to detain, deport, and terrorize immigrants across the country,<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> and temporary protections that provide lawful work authorization, like parole and Temporary Protected Status, are being terminated en masse. ICE and CBP have gone far beyond what their mandates and statutes allow, acting as gestapo-like forces that racially profile people and disregard whether a person has a green card, a temporary protective status like DACA, or, in many cases, a U.S. passport.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> The result is a shrinking workforce. Are measures to expand H-2A and H-2B an attempt to replace some of the foreign-born workers the economy is losing?</p>
<p>This report examines the provisions in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation, which passed and was reported out of the House Appropriations Committee in June 2026, that would expand and modify the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, and estimates their impact. While the House Appropriations bill has not been voted on yet by the full House, with government funding set to expire on December 11, 2026, the bill is likely to be the starting point for negotiations on an omnibus bill to fund the government for the remaining 10 months of fiscal year 2027.</p>
<h2>Both the Trump administration and Congress are working to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline</h2>
<p>While this report focuses on congressional efforts to expand the H-2A and H-2B programs through the appropriations process, it is important to note that the Trump administration has already used its executive authority to expand the H-2A and H-2B visa programs: The Department of Labor (DOL) issued a regulation drastically cutting farmworker wages in October 2025 that the agency estimates will increase the size of the program from 383,000 to 515,000 jobs due to expanded hiring driven by lower labor costs for farm operators.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> One of the administration’s stated reasons for the DOL regulation is its own immigration enforcement. It expects to deport so many farmworkers that farm operators will lack sufficient employees to produce enough food, leading to higher prices for consumers, unless the deported workers are replaced with farmworkers hired from abroad through the H-2A program.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Then, in January 2026, after a lobbying push by H-2B employers, the Trump administration doubled the size of the H-2B program using discretionary authority Congress granted it in FY 2026 appropriations legislation.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>While the Trump administration and Republicans in Congress have embraced anti-immigrant rhetoric and adopted inhumane immigration policies, their efforts to expand work visa programs reveal that they recognize immigrant workers are an essential part of the U.S. labor market. The Trump administration is acknowledging that, without these workers, there will be negative consequences for the U.S. economy—many of which have already become evident, including a slowdown in employment and increased unemployment for U.S.-born workers.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> The administration and Congress are effectively creating a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline. Migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permits are left with only one viable way to work in the United States: as guestworkers. And as guestworkers, they have few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their status and ability to reside and work in the country.</p>
<h2>The H-2A program had 350,000 workers in 2025 and would be expanded to include 409,000 additional year-round jobs like dairy and livestock farming</h2>
<p>The H-2A program is a visa program that allows employers to hire farmworkers from abroad for seasonal and temporary farm jobs, ostensibly when they can show that a U.S. worker is unavailable. The H-2A program accounts for a significant share of the total farm workforce, between 11% and 16% of total farm employment, and is a lobbying priority for the agricultural industry. The estimated size of the H-2A program in 2025 was nearly 350,000 workers (see <strong>Figure A</strong>).</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327466 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327466" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327466-36100-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The language adopted in Section 410 of the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill would allow H-2A workers to be employed in year-round jobs—which is currently prohibited—expanding the scope of the program and allowing employers to hire H-2A workers for jobs on dairy, livestock, and poultry and egg farms, as well as in nurseries and greenhouses and other nonseasonal agricultural jobs. This would be a major change to H-2A and has long been a priority of agribusiness. In fact, a nearly identical legislative rider was first proposed by the same House committee almost a decade ago.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> The Trump administration recently used sub-regulatory means to make a down payment on this change to H-2A, issuing a policy memorandum, which arguably stretches the bounds of the law: It instructs U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to begin approving petitions for H-2A workers who would be employed on dairies.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> The memorandum still requires employers to prove the dairy-related H-2A position is of a temporary or seasonal nature, however. The USCIS memo is susceptible to legal challenges, whereas a statutory change would be more durable, as some industry representatives have pointed out.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<p>Data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages show that there are approximately 409,000 year-round (full-time equivalent) jobs in agriculture. <strong>Table 1</strong> lists four of the major agricultural industries employing farmworkers year-round. The largest are greenhouse production and cattle ranching, which includes dairy jobs.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> However, the true scope of jobs that could become eligible for H-2A under the vague language of Section 410 is unknown and potentially larger. Representatives of the agricultural industry could argue, for instance, that if Section 410 becomes law, eligible job categories should now include meat and poultry packing and processing, logging, equine, and aquaculture jobs, as well as various nonfarming jobs “performed by workers on agricultural operations.” DOL and USCIS would ultimately decide how to implement their interpretation of the provision.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-323089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323089" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323089-36101-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Expanding H-2A to include year-round occupations will dramatically lower wages for farmworkers</h2>
<p>As noted above, the Trump administration’s Interim Final Rule (IFR) from October 2025 set the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) methodology at dramatically lower rates than the previous one.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> Based on DOL’s own estimates, the 2026 H-2A AEWR will result in a $24 billion pay cut for H-2A farmworkers over 10 years and, by reducing H-2A labor costs, encourage employers to expand the H-2A program to 515,000 jobs a year.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> EPI has estimated that U.S. farmworkers will lose $2.7 to $3.3 billion in wages per year as a result of the Trump AEWR rule. In total, all farmworkers (U.S. farmworkers and H-2A farmworkers) will lose roughly $5 billion per year in wages thanks to this regulation from the Trump DOL.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<p>Under current regulations, H-2A farmworkers cannot be hired for year-round agricultural jobs.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> Because farmworkers in these jobs work year-round, rather than seasonally, they generally earn higher wages that can sometimes approach a living wage. But if the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill becomes law and allows employers to additionally use H-2A visas for year-round jobs instead of just seasonal and temporary ones, the required minimum wage employers would have to pay H-2A workers would be set by the same H-2A methodology used for seasonal crop farming jobs. As a result, farmworkers in year-round jobs would see significant pay cuts, to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2</strong> shows a sample of some of the main year-round agricultural industries in major agricultural states, along with average annual employment in each (which together account for about 15% of the total year-round, full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture). Table 2 shows how much farmworkers earned annually on average in 2025 in those industries and states, and compares the annual earnings of farmworkers in 2025 with what H-2A workers would earn in 2026 or 2027 if they worked in the same jobs and were paid the corresponding 2026–2027 AEWR at Skill Level 1 for the entire year (40 hours per week for 52 weeks), minus the annualized amount that will be deducted from hourly wages for housing as permitted in the current AEWR methodology.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a></p>
<p>The final column in Table 2 shows a few examples that illustrate the difference between what U.S. farmworkers working year-round in the selected industries earned in 2025 and what H-2A workers at Skill Level 1 would earn if they were paid the annualized AEWR in 2026 or 2027. Table 2 shows that the reduction in wages for H-2A farmworkers in year-round jobs could range from an annual pay cut of $17,500 for mushroom farming in California to over $43,000 per year for employment on poultry and egg farms in Texas.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-323087 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323087" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323087-36102-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Outcomes such as these—in which farmworkers paid the 2026–2027 AEWR would earn tens of thousands of dollars less than what U.S. farmworkers earned in major year-round jobs in 2025—are in violation of the spirit and letter of the AEWR and the H-2A statute. Yet they would become legal if the year-round H-2A provision in the House appropriations bill becomes law. This would hurt some of the most vulnerable and lowest-paid workers in the U.S. labor market and give farm operators a strong incentive to replace their U.S. farmworkers with H-2A workers because the latter cannot easily change employers and have their rights restricted and wages restrained via H-2A program rules—which also have the effect of insulating employers from free market forces that would lead them to improve wages and working conditions in order to attract U.S. farmworkers.</p>
<h2>The size of the H-2B program would be set by a new methodology that will start at 270,000 in 2027 and grow exponentially</h2>
<p>The H-2B program currently has an annual numerical limit (or “cap”) of 66,000. Since FY 2016, Congress has passed amendments to annual appropriations bills that allow DHS to increase the number of visas available.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> In the past four fiscal years, both the Biden and Trump administrations have used the full authority granted to the executive branch in the legislative riders, raising the total H-2B annual limit to 130,716 during FY 2023–2026.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a></p>
<p>The FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill includes language in Section 409 that would establish a new methodology for setting the H-2B visa program’s annual numerical limit to further increase the cap beyond the 130,716 during FY 2023–2026. The language of the bill states that for every employer who has had any H-2B positions certified in the past five fiscal years (2022–2026), the highest number that they had certified in those years will be the number of H-2B workers they may hire who will not count against the annual cap of 66,000. In other words, if an employer had 10 jobs certified in 2022, 15 in 2023, 20 in 2024, 100 in 2025, and 50 in 2026, they would be allowed to hire 100 H-2B workers in 2027 without them counting against the 66,000 cap. As the analysis below explains, the provision would result in a cap of nearly 270,000 visas in FY 2027.</p>
<p><strong>Table 3</strong> shows an estimate using 2021–2025 H-2B data that serves as a proxy for the estimated number of new H-2B workers who would be exempted from the cap in 2027, and the number of new H-2B workers permitted under the regular annual cap of 66,000. Altogether, the regular cap plus the supplemental cap for H-2B in 2027 would permit at least 269,617 new H-2B workers if the House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law. That’s more than double the size of the total cap in 2023–2026, and a 309% increase relative to the original H-2B cap of 66,000.</p>
<p>The annual caps and total number of workers will grow rapidly if Congress reauthorizes the same language in the rider year after year, as it has done with past H-2B riders. The rider in Section 409 incentivizes employers to apply to DOL for labor certification for as many H-2B jobs as possible every year because that will increase the size of their exemption from the cap for the following year. The resulting growth is likely to be exponential.</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-326744 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326744" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326744-36105-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Total number of H-2B workers could reach 300,000 in 2027 if House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law</h2>
<p>Despite the size of the H-2B annual cap, the total number of H-2B workers is always larger because some workers extend their status and some change jobs, but those workers are not counted against the annual cap. In FY 2025, when 64,716 supplemental H-2B visas were added to the statutory cap of 66,000 for the fiscal year, for a total cap of 130,716, there were a total of 166,823 H-2B workers (see <strong>Figure B</strong>).</p>
<p>This was up from 75,122 total H-2B workers just a decade earlier. The nearly 167,000 H-2B total in 2025 included 139,736 H-2B workers with newly issued visas from the State Department, and 4,137 H-2B workers who had their employment extended with the same employer. An additional 22,950 were H-2B workers who changed employers. (The final totals in FY 2026 are likely to be similar to those in FY 2025 given the same cap methodology was in place.)</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326751 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326751" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326751-36104-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>To get a better sense of the total number of H-2B workers who would be employed in 2027 if Section 409 of the House Homeland appropriations legislation is enacted into law, I estimated that the same number of workers who extended their status or changed jobs in 2025 would also do so in 2027, and added that total to the FY 2027 total cap of 269,617 that would result from the new methodology in the legislation. This is also illustrated in Figure B, which shows the total number of H-2B workers from 2015 to 2025, and projections for 2026 and 2027. The annual cap plus the supplemental cap, together with H-2B extensions and job changes, would result in nearly 300,000 H-2B workers being employed in 2027—‎or 296,704&nbsp;to be exact—which is a 78% increase relative to the number of H-2B workers who were employed in 2025 or estimated to be employed in 2026.</p>
<h2>Close to 10,000 H-2B jobs would be moved to the P visa, a program with no worker protections and administered by DHS</h2>
<p>The other notable change to the H-2B program in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation is in Section 411, which would move H-2B fair and carnival workers, such as those employed at amusement parks, carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses, to the P visa program. Section 411 would move those covered by the current P-4 visa—designated for spouses and minor children of P-1, P-2, and P-3 visa holders—to a new P-5 category and reassign the P-4 visa category to fair and carnival workers. The language in Section 411 appears to be a permanent statutory change, unlike Sections 409 and 410, which would only be in place during FY 2027 unless they are renewed in subsequent legislation for FY 2028 (and beyond). According to DOL, in FY 2025 there were 9,622 H-2B jobs certified in the “Amusement and Recreation Attendants” occupation, which is the most relevant occupation that would be moved to the P-4 visa. Unlike the H-2B program, there is no annual cap in the P visa program and the bill language does not apply the annual H-2B cap to the number of fair and carnival workers who could be employed with P-4 visas.</p>
<p>At present, the P visa is a little-known program intended for use by professional athletes and coaches, members of an internationally recognized entertainment group, or persons performing under a reciprocal exchange program or as part of a culturally unique program.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> The P visa program has no wage rules or worker protections and is administered exclusively by DHS, which has no dedicated staff or expertise on worker rights.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> This is extremely troubling, given that H-2B workers employed at fairs, amusement parks, and carnivals work grueling hours and in terrible conditions, making them some of the most exploited H-2B workers—as advocacy groups have pointed out.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> These workers are often paid below the minimum wage and are not paid for overtime hours. Yet it is unclear if DOL would have any formal oversight role to ensure they are protected as P-4 workers.</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 states that employers hiring H-2B fair and carnival workers through the P visa “shall be subject to the same program requirements that govern the admission” of H-2B workers, but it does not give clear authority to DOL to administer the P-4 visa program, nor explicitly state that post-entry H-2B worker protections will apply to P-4 workers. (The current H-2B program and rules are administered and enforced by DOL.) The legislation further directs DHS and DOL to each separately publish regulations to implement H-2B fair and carnival workers being moved to the P-4 visa program within 180 days and to finalize them within one year. But there is little direction from Congress in the legislation on how the H-2B program requirements will be implemented and enforced. Will DHS publish identical regulations to DOL’s H-2B rules and enforce them? Will DOL enforce the DHS regulations? Or will each play a role in enforcing the wage and worker protection regulations in the H-2B program? And will employers be allowed to begin hiring fair and carnival workers with P-4 visas before any regulations that include wage and worker protections are finalized?</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 reflects previously introduced legislation in the House and Senate during the 119th Congress: H.R. 2729, Carnivals are Real Entertainment Act (also known as the CARE Act), and a similar companion bill, S. 1281, <em>Restoring </em>Industry Development in Entertainment (RIDE) Act. However, the legislators on the House Appropriations Committee who support this amendment have provided no explanation or rationale for why it makes sense to create an entirely new process and set of regulations to move one of the biggest H-2B occupations from DOL into DHS—an agency that will be given primary responsibility over the P-4 visa and protecting fair and carnival workers, but that has no mandate or expertise on labor standards and employment laws. The most obvious explanation is that this legislative maneuver is simply a new way to expand the H-2B cap even beyond 270,000, in a way that gives fair and carnival employers an unlimited supply of workers who can be exploited and underpaid. It also generally seems absurd to put a low-paid traveling carnival worker into the same visa category—where there’s no labor oversight—as a professional baseball player coming from abroad to sign a multimillion-dollar contract with a major league team, or a world-famous singer, dancer, or painter.</p>
<h2>Republicans in Congress are using the appropriations process to avoid scrutiny and expand H-2A and H-2B, while the administration seeks to deport millions</h2>
<p>Finally, for over a decade at least, Congress has repeatedly changed policy on temporary work visa programs through an opaque process: riders attached to annual appropriations legislation, like the ones examined in this report.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Riders that make policy changes are much more likely to pass without much public notice, debate, or pushback relative to dedicated legislation, since they are smaller parts of larger, must-pass legislation to fund the entire U.S. government. The significant changes proposed or passed for H-2A and H-2B visas in riders over the past decade have all pushed the programs toward the same direction: expansion, deregulation, and the watering down of worker protections, which benefits employers at the expense of U.S. workers and hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who will continue to see reduced wages and poorer working conditions.</p>
<p>Employers have a particular urgency to see riders that expand and deregulate the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, as the Trump administration arrests and deports workers at a breakneck pace and cancels temporary immigration protections that provided work authorization to millions.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> Employers are making the case that H-2 visas are “a workforce issue, not immigration,” as well as an essential service that must continue to function even during a government shutdown.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> Given the FY 2026 and FY 2027 riders in the House Homeland appropriations bills, it’s clear that a number of lawmakers and the Trump administration agree.</p>
<p>In effect, these legislators aim to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline, one where migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permit are left with only one viable option to work in the United States: as temporary migrant workers with few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their ability to live and work in the country. Perhaps the legislator who is the most emblematic of the push to combine mass deportations with expanded guestworker programs is Rep. Andy Harris of Maryland, a Republican member on the House Appropriations Committee. <em>Politico</em> recently profiled him for leading the charge on the H-2A and H-2B riders in recent appropriations bills, highlighting also his strong support for President Trump’s mass deportation efforts.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> Apparently, for Rep. Harris, there is no irony in supporting Trump’s removal of millions of employees who support the U.S. economy while simultaneously purporting to represent the interests of employers who say they don’t have enough workers, and tirelessly working to expand low-wage guestworker programs. It’s reasonable to ask whether the Harris strategy is to ensure that the only people from abroad who can work in the United States are those willing to be quasi-indentured to the employers that recruit them—and who accept that they will never become citizens able to fully participate in U.S. economic and political life.</p>
<h2><strong>The H-2A and H-2B programs need reform to improve labor protections and provide workers with a pathway to citizenship</strong></h2>
<p>The appropriations committees in the House and Senate should not use parliamentary tactics like provisions in appropriations bills to make changes to the H-2A and H-2B programs that would likely not pass in Congress through regular order. Instead, policymakers and the public must reject the harmful and unjustified proposals coming from Trump and Congress to expand programs that allow employers to underpay migrant workers and keep those workers indentured and controlled by employers.</p>
<p>Instead of pursuing a strategy that combines deportations with expanded guestworker programs, Congress should work with the executive branch to reform both the H-2A and H-2B visa programs in the following ways:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Provide green cards to undocumented farmworkers and a path to a green card for farmworkers recruited from abroad through the H-2A program</li>
<li>Rescind the October 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate and reinstitute the Farm Labor Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was previously used to set H-2A wages</li>
<li>Prohibit H-2A visas, which are for temporary and seasonal jobs, from being used for year-round agricultural jobs like those on dairy and poultry farms and in greenhouses; workers from abroad who are recruited to fill year-round, permanent jobs must be granted a permanent status instead</li>
<li>Provide H-2A and H-2B workers with new protections from retaliation and allow them to more easily change jobs</li>
<li>Craft updated wage rules that protect U.S. wage standards for all workers in H-2B industries</li>
<li>Provide H-2B workers with a quick path to a green card after being in H-2B status for 18 months</li>
<li>Ensure U.S. workers seeking employment in H-2B occupations are adequately considered for open temporary and seasonal jobs by requiring employers to hire available U.S. workers and offer them housing and transportation</li>
<li>Prohibit lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-2A or H-2B programs by creating a screening and registration system</li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, the Trump administration has tacitly admitted and shown through policy actions described in this report that migrant workers are making important contributions to the U.S. economy in key industries. Rather than continue to harm the economy through immigration enforcement, it should end its mass deportation efforts and reinstate humanitarian protections like Temporary Protected Status and parole for persons who have been stripped of them and lost their work permits.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> For more background, see these two blog posts discussing the provisions on H-2A and H-2B that were passed in the FY 2026 House Homeland appropriations legislation: Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">Congressional Budget Amendment and New DOL Wage Rule Together Would Greatly Expand Work Visas for Farmworkers and Drastically Lower Their Wages</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 5, 2025; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/rider-in-the-house-homeland-security-appropriations-bill-would-increase-the-number-of-workers-in-the-h-2b-visa-program-by-113000/">Rider in the House Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Would Increase the Number of Workers in the H-2B Visa Program by 113,000</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 11, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> For the legislative text, see <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/9310/text">H.R.9310 &#8211; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027</a>, 119th Congress (2025-2026), placed on the Union Calendar on June 12, 2026. See also House Appropriations Chairman Tom Cole, “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-releases-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-bill">Committee Releases FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill</a>,” Press Release, June 4, 2026; “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-act">Committee Approves FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Act</a>,” Press Release, June 11, 2026; and for the roll call vote on the bill, see House of Representatives, Roll Call 15 in “<a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP00/20260609/119380/HMKP-119-AP00-20260609-SD008.pdf">Full Committee Votes</a>,” June 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> For more background on temporary work visas, their flaws, and proposed reforms, see Daniel Costa, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/">Temporary Work Visa Programs and the Need for Reform: A Briefing on Program Frameworks, Policy Issues and Fixes, and the Impact of COVID-19</a></em>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Laura Romero, “<a href="https://abcnews.com/US/us-1st-time-50-years-experienced-negative-net/story?id=129175522">US, for 1st Time in 50 Years, Experienced Negative Net Migration in 2025: Report</a>,” ABC News, January 13, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> William Frey, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-immigration-may-shape-america-after-250/">America Is Turning 250. Here’s How Immigration May Shape Its Future</a>,” Brookings Institution, June 25, 2026; see question 6 in Daniel Costa et al., “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/immigrants-and-the-economy/">Immigrants and the Economy</a>,” in <em>Immigration FAQ</em>, Economic Policy Institute, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See, for example, Economic Policy Institute, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/deportation-calculator/">The Cost of Deportations Calculator</a></em> (interactive tool), accessed October 25, 2026; AFL-CIO and ACLU, <a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/citizenship-and-affordability-agenda"><em>Citizenship and the Affordability Agenda: A Path to Better Jobs, Higher Wages, and Prosperity for All</em></a>, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See, for example, Nicole Foy et al., “<a href="https://projects.propublica.org/american-citizens-detained-dhs-civil-rights/">506 U.S. Citizens Detained</a>,” <em>ProPublica</em>, October 6, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/11/immigration-crackdown-food-prices/">Trump Administration Says Immigration Enforcement Threatens Higher Food Prices</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, October 11, 2025; David Dayen, “<a href="https://prospect.org/2025/10/08/trump-labor-department-says-his-immigration-raids-are-causing-a-food-crisis/">Trump Labor Department Says His Immigration Raids Are Causing a Food Crisis</a>,” <em>American Prospect</em>, October 8, 2025; Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Chris Cameron, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/us/politics/h2b-visas.html">Trump Officials Move to Double Number of H-2B Guest Visas This Year</a>,” <em>New York Times</em>, January 30, 2026. For more background on H-2B appropriations riders giving the executive branch authority to expand the program, see Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/">Unemployment Has Increased for U.S.-Born Workers in the Face of Mass Deportations: Trump’s Draconian Immigration Enforcement Is Harming All Workers</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), April 3, 2026; Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/benzipperer.org/post/3muoyodo4wk26">Trump&#8217;s mass deportations were sold as a major jobs program, but they&#8217;re still failing to help U.S.-born workers</a>,” Bluesky, @benzipperer.org, September 4, 2026, 5:46 a.m.; Marcela Escobari, Ian Seyal, and Paul Beach, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ice-enforcement-employment-effects-us-cities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Shock, Awe, and Economic Fallout: The Employment Effects of ICE Enforcement in U.S. Cities</em></a>, Brookings Institution, May 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> For more background, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026; see also discussion in Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026. However, a statutory change made with an appropriations rider would presumably have to be renewed yearly. The H-2B riders that allow the executive branch to double the program with supplementary visas have been renewed every year since FY 2016, suggesting that once these riders make it into the bill, they are likely to be renewed as part of the yearly underlying bills.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> The industries listed do not include the many year-round (or nearly year-round) jobs that can be found on crop farms, including equipment operators and supervisors. It’s possible that up to one-third of the total 1.6 million full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture could be year-round.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> The AEWR IFR has been challenged in federal court and vacated on procedural grounds, but the court left the current AEWR in place for the time being, with an order issued to DOL to issue a new AEWR methodology by December 30, 2026. What will result from a new methodology is an open question, but the possibility remains that the new rule could be similar to the current rule, if DOL fulfills the procedural requirements. For more background, see, for example, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://flag.dol.gov/announcement/2026-09-02">OFLC Announces Updates to Implementation of the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Non-Range Occupations Interim Final Rule; Compliance with District Court Order</a>” (announcement), September 2, 2026, U.S. Department of Labor; Envoy Global, “<a href="https://www.envoyglobal.com/news-alert/federal-court-orders-dol-to-replace-h-2a-wage-methodology/">Federal Court Orders DOL to Replace H-2A Wage Methodology</a>,” updated October 5, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Except, arguably, for some positions in dairy as a result of the June 2026 USCIS memo; however, even employers hiring through that route must demonstrate that the need for the H-2A dairy worker is seasonal or temporary. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> The amounts have not been adjusted for inflation. The 2026 AEWR provides two “skill levels” for farmworkers, which are set at specific percentiles along the distribution of Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics wages surveyed. Skill Level 1 is the 17th percentile while Skill Level 2 is the median (50th percentile) of wages surveyed. For this calculation, I am only estimating the wage differentials for H-2A workers in year-round jobs who are classified by employers at Skill Level 1, which DOL estimates will account for 92% of all H-2A workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> For a discussion of the first instance of H-2B riders in the FY 2016 appropriations legislation, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> For more background, see discussion in Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services information pages for P visa subcategories: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1a-athlete">P-1A Athlete</a>, last updated March 26, 2026; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1b-a-member-of-an-internationally-recognized-entertainment-group">P-1B A Member of an Internationally Recognized Entertainment Group</a>, last updated January 24, 2025; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-2-individual-performer-or-part-of-a-group-entering-to-perform-under-a-reciprocal-exchange-program">P-2 Individual Performer or Part of a Group Entering to Perform Under a Reciprocal Exchange Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-3-artist-or-entertainer-coming-to-be-part-of-a-culturally-unique-program">P-3 Artist or Entertainer Coming to Be Part of a Culturally Unique Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; U.S. Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> While there is a requirement from USCIS that an appropriate labor organization be consulted and provide a written letter for a P visa petition, it is unlikely, but ultimately unclear, that this requirement will apply to the new P-4 category. Further, there is no DOL labor certification, no prevailing wage requirement, and no DOL enforcement of P visa program rules to protect workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> See, for example, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante and American University Washington College of Law Immigrant Justice Clinic, <a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Taken_Ride.pdf"><em>Taken for a Ride: Migrant Workers in the U.S. Fair and Carnival Industry</em></a>, February 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/"><em>The H-2B Temporary Foreign Worker Program: For Labor Shortages or Cheap, Temporary Labor?</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, January 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017; Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-2b-industries-and-wage-theft/"><em>As the H-2B Visa Program Grows, the Need for Reforms That Protect Workers Is Greater Than Ever: Employers Stole $1.8 Billion from Workers in the Industries That Employed Most H-2B Workers Over the Past Two Decades</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2022; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trump-attacks-on-temporary-immigration-protections-like-tps-hurt-the-economy-and-strip-millions-of-their-workplace-rights/">Trump Attacks on Temporary Immigration Protections Like TPS Hurt the Economy and Strip Millions of Their Workplace Rights</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), May 12, 2025; Carolyne Im and Mia Hennen, “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/08/12/second-trump-administration-has-ended-temporary-protected-status-for-most-immigrants-who-had-it/">Second Trump Administration Has Ended Temporary Protected Status for Most Immigrants Who Had It</a>,” <em>Short Reads</em> (Pew Research Center), August 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Andrew Kreighbaum, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/stalled-release-of-seasonal-h-2b-visas-puts-strain-on-employers">Stalled Release of Seasonal H-2B Visas Puts Strain on Employers</a>,” <em>Bloomberg Law</em>, March 26, 2025; Nick Niedzwiadek, “<a href="https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/10/dol-brings-back-immigration-staff-as-shutdown-drags-on-00631426">DOL Brings Back Visa-Processing Staff as Shutdown Drags On</a>,” <em>Politico Pro</em>, October 31, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Jennifer Scholtes, “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/10/andy-harris-immigration-foreign-workers-00867621">The Trump Ally Cracking Down on Immigration in Washington — and Bringing in Foreign Workers Back Home</a>,” <em>Politico</em>, April 12, 2026.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>Nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/nearly-1-billion-in-stolen-wages-was-recovered-for-workers-in-2025/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 13:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Matthew Wich, Samantha Sanders]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327812</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for Affordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every year.</li>
<li>Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in 2025.</li>
<li>These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion annually.</li>
<li>Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for perpetrators.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p><span class="dropped">A</span>ffordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S. Much of the affordability debate has focused narrowly on prices. But the true underlying driver of today’s affordability squeeze is suppressed pay—the result of decades of policy decisions that have weakened workers’ bargaining power. Weakened bargaining power not only suppresses workers’ wages but also makes workers more vulnerable to exploitation. Among the most pervasive forms is wage theft, which robs millions of workers of billions of dollars each year (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Poydock and Zhang 2024). Wage theft occurs anytime an employer fails to pay a worker the amount they are legally owed for their labor. This can take many forms, including not paying overtime to eligible workers, not providing meal breaks as required by law, or paying workers less than the minimum wage. Existing laws enable workers to recoup these stolen wages through government enforcement, individual wage claims, and class action lawsuits.</p>
<p>Our survey of all states and review of federal data find that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025. This figure significantly understates the scale of wage theft, as it only accounts for recovered wages. Further, the Trump administration has pursued policies that make it easier for employers to minimize their liability for wage and hour violations and harder for workers to recoup money they are owed. The report highlights wage theft recovery efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), by state agencies, and via class action litigation. Finally, the report provides policy recommendations at both the federal and state levels to combat the pervasive practice of wage theft across the United States.</p>
<div class="box">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>What is wage theft?</strong></span></p>
<p>Wage theft is the failure to pay workers the full wages to which they are legally entitled. It can take many forms, including but not limited to:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Paying workers less than the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Overtime violations:&nbsp;</strong>Failing to pay nonexempt employees time and a half for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week</li>
<li><strong>Off-the-clock violations:&nbsp;</strong>Requiring employees to work off the clock before or after their shifts</li>
<li><strong>Meal break violations:&nbsp;</strong>Denying workers their legal meal breaks</li>
<li><strong>Illegal deductions:&nbsp;</strong>Taking illegal deductions from wages for business expenses such as uniforms or use of equipment</li>
<li><strong>Tipped minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Confiscating tips from workers, or failing to pay tipped workers the difference between their tips and the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Employee misclassification violations:&nbsp;</strong>Misclassifying employees as independent contractors to pay a wage lower than the legal minimum or avoid paying overtime&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>The scale and cost of wage theft</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a costly and widespread problem that affects millions of workers each year. Research by Cooper and Kroeger (2017) estimates that workers lose $15 billion annually in minimum wage violations alone. This does not account for other forms of wage theft, such as overtime pay violations, off-the-clock violations, or the denial of legal meal breaks. To put that into perspective, Cooper and Kroeger’s (2017) estimate of minimum wage violations alone exceeds the value of any form of property crime reported in Federal Bureau of Investigation data in the last year, including stolen value from all currency ($10.96 billion) and locally stolen motor vehicles ($8.22 billion).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>Wage theft occurs in all industries and impacts all workers, but workers in low-wage industries are significantly more likely to experience wage theft. A 2008 survey of workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City found that two-thirds (68%) of these workers experienced at least one pay-related violation in any given week, robbing these workers of nearly $3 billion in wages each year (Bernhardt et al. 2009). Applying these rates to the national workforce, EPI estimates that low-wage workers in the U.S. lost $52.5 billion to all forms of wage theft in 2025 (Shierholz and Sanders 2026). According to DOL, low-wage workers in construction, food service, health care, and retail experience high rates of wage theft (WHD 2026a).</p>
<p>Wage theft is costly not only to the workers whose wages are stolen but also to taxpayers and the communities those workers live in. Failing to pay workers, particularly low-wage workers, the wages they are owed can cause them to fall into poverty. This increases reliance on public assistance, effectively shifting the costs of paying workers away from employers and onto taxpayers. When employers do not pay wages owed, they also suppress consumer demand in local economies because workers have less money to spend, which can hurt small businesses.</p>
<p>In this report, we present findings about the amount of <em>recovered</em> wages, which is only a small percentage of the total stolen from workers every year. Previous EPI reports found that between 2017 and 2020, $3.24 billion was recovered, and between 2021 and 2023, $1.5 billion was recovered (Mangundayao et al. 2021; Poydock and Zhang 2024).</p>
<h2><strong>Findings and analysis</strong></h2>
<p>In this report, we aggregated available data on stolen wages that were recovered across the United States. To be as comprehensive as possible, we reviewed current U.S. DOL wage enforcement data, surveyed state labor departments and attorneys general, and analyzed data on the largest class action wage and hour settlements.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025 through the U.S. Department of Labor, state agencies, and class action lawsuits. Importantly, as stated above, this figure does not account for all wage theft in the United States. Our analysis focused only on wages recovered, not total wages stolen, which we expect to be much greater. Whether it be out of fear of retaliation or a lack of knowledge about their rights, many workers never file a claim to recover stolen wages.</p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery by the U.S. Department of Labor</strong></h3>
<p>According to Wage and Hour Division (WHD) enforcement data, U.S. DOL recovered $259 million in fiscal year 2025, as shown in <strong>Table 1</strong>. These wages were recovered on behalf of 176,957 workers, which equates to $1,465.30 per worker on average.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-322767 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322767" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322767-36078-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Breaking down those aggregate numbers by specific violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find that overtime violations accounted for the largest share (79%) of total back wages recovered in 2025, as shown in <strong>Figure A</strong>. Minimum wage violations had the second-largest share at 15%, followed by tip-related violations (5%) and retaliation violations (under 1%).</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322810 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322810" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322810-36079-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3><strong>Wage recovery by state departments of labor and attorneys general</strong></h3>
<p>During the summer of 2026, EPI contacted state departments of labor and attorneys general via phone and email to compile data on their wage recovery efforts. We collected data, summarized in <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>, from 39 states and the District of Columbia. The remaining 11 states either did not recover wages for workers, did not respond to our request, did not track the requested data, or were unable to provide the requested data.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a></p>
<p>According to our analysis, state departments of labor and attorneys general in 39 states and the District of Columbia recovered $267 million in 2025.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery through class action settlements</strong></h3>
<p>Class action lawsuits, brought by workers themselves, can be an effective way for workers to recoup stolen wages. In <strong>Figure B</strong>, we present data collected by two law firms, Seyfarth Shaw LLP and Duane Morris LLP, that totals the value of the 10 largest class action lawsuits over the last decade. According to Duane Morris LLP, the value of large class action lawsuits totaled $434 million in 2025.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-322760 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322760" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322760-36080-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>One of the largest class action wage settlements in recent years was settled in 2025, with Disney agreeing to pay out more than $233 million to over 50,000 current and former employees of the Disneyland Park (Palm 2025). In 2018, voters in Anaheim, California, passed Measure L—legislation that required resorts in the area to raise the minimum wage to $15 per hour if they receive tax rebates from the city. Disney argued for several years that it was not covered by the new law. Though the trial court ruled in favor of Disney, the appellate court and California Supreme Court disagreed, and Disney ultimately settled—a massive win for Disneyland employees which demonstrates the power of workers joining together to hold employers accountable.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
As illustrated above, class action lawsuits are an effective strategy for recovering wages. However, many workers are barred from joining class action cases because they are subject to forced arbitration agreements. According to Colvin (2018), 56.2% of private-sector, nonunion workers are subject to forced arbitration agreements, which typically recover much lower awards for workers than class action lawsuits. For example, Stone and Colvin (2015) find the typical award per worker in forced arbitration ($36,500) is only 21% of the median award in a class action lawsuit in the federal courts ($176,426).</p>
<h2><strong>Case studies</strong></h2>
<p>The case studies presented below highlight the important work of federal, state, and local enforcement agencies and the power of workers who stand up against their employers to fight for the wages owed to them.</p>
<h3>U.S. Department of Labor</h3>
<p>In July 2026, the U.S. Department of Labor recovered over $500,000 in back wages and damages for six deli workers in San Diego, California (DOL 2026). Chau Deli was found to have failed to pay workers minimum wage for regular hours and overtime pay for hours worked over 40 per workweek. DOL determined that the employer was paying workers a flat rate of $100 per day, despite the workers averaging 11-hour days. The investigation resulted in each worker being paid approximately $83,000 in back wages.&nbsp;</p>
<h3>New York: NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection</h3>
<p>In January 2026, New York City secured a $5.2 million settlement with three delivery app companies—Uber Eats, Fantuan, and HungryPanda—to pay approximately 50,000 workers who were denied pay for deliveries that customers canceled (NYC 2026). The city’s minimum wage law requires companies to pay delivery workers for the time they spent on the delivery regardless of whether the customer cancels the order.</p>
<h3>Minnesota: Department of Labor and Industry</h3>
<p>In 2019, Minnesota labor officials began investigating two construction companies, Advantage Construction and Property Maintenance &amp; Construction, for committing wage violations at several construction sites. In 2026, the companies settled and agreed to pay $1.28 million to 26 workers on 19 different projects (Minnesota DLI 2026). This settlement is particularly noteworthy because when construction companies compete for contracts, companies that break the law by underpaying their employees have a competitive advantage. Holding employers accountable for wage theft is pivotal to ensure competition for contracts is based on quality and not exploitation.</p>
<h2><strong>Policy recommendations</strong></h2>
<h3>Federal solutions</h3>
<p>As illustrated in this report, wage theft is a costly and pervasive problem for workers in the United States. The Trump administration has only exacerbated this issue by reinstating the “Payroll Audit Independent Determination” (PAID) program, which permits employers who have stolen workers’ wages to confess their violations up front in order to avoid applicable penalties, essentially allowing employers to steal their workers’ wages without facing the full legal consequence (FPW 2025). Further, the Trump administration has proposed policies that would allow large corporations to minimize their liability for FLSA violations. In 2026, the Department of Labor proposed changes to independent contractor status and the joint employer standard under the FLSA. According to EPI analysis, the Trump administration’s proposed joint employer rule would cost workers more than $225.6 million each year in additional stolen wages (Shierholz and Sanders 2026).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Policymakers should enact policies that protect workers against wage theft and, more generally, build worker power. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>One of the best ways to combat wage theft is to strengthen the right to form unions and bargain collectively. Wage theft is exceedingly rare in unionized workplaces because union contracts typically provide covered workers with full transparency and legally binding employer commitments regarding work hours, pay periods, and pay rates (including rules on overtime and premium pay). Union contracts typically have grievance procedures that can quickly resolve any pay-related violations of the contract, ensuring that workers are paid what they are owed in a timely manner and without fear of retaliation.</p>
<p>It is also imperative that Congress increase funding for the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division. Beginning in 2020, the WHD has seen a decline in inflation-adjusted allocation each year (<strong>Figure C</strong>). The number of full-time employees at the WHD has also decreased consistently over time. Increased funding and investigators will help the WHD recover more stolen wages, investigate additional instances of wage theft, and better enforce the FLSA.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322773 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322773" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322773-36081-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Finally, providing workers with greater transparency in their terms and conditions of employment is another key tool for protecting them against wage theft. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would require employers to provide disclosures, regular pay stubs, and final payments, which would help workers identify when they have not been paid what they are owed. Increasing the penalties to make wage theft more costly for employers would also help curb the practice. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would increase such penalties significantly. The Don’t Stand for Taking Employed Americans’ Livings (Don’t STEAL) Act would do the same by increasing penalties and fines and elevating the most severe violations to possible felony charges.</p>
<h3><strong>State and local efforts</strong></h3>
<p>As we demonstrate in this report, state and local agencies play an important role in enforcing wage theft laws and recovering stolen wages for workers (Sherer 2025).</p>
<p>While federal legislation combating wage theft has made little progress, many states have taken important action to fill gaps in federal law, such as 1) requiring written pay stubs, 2) ensuring timely pay on scheduled paydays, 3) regulating forms of pay and employer uses of third-party payroll vendors or electronic pay cards, 4) preventing unauthorized paycheck deductions, and 5) mandating prompt payment of final paychecks when a worker’s employment ends.</p>
<p>At a minimum, states can ensure workers greater transparency about their terms and conditions of employment. For example, 44 states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring pay stubs from employers (ADP 2026). This empowers workers to verify if they are being compensated correctly. States can also adopt explicit codes that prohibit payroll deductions without worker authorization, as New York has.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Additionally, states like Minnesota require employers to provide a written notice with terms of employment at the time of hire (Sherer 2025). Both the initial notice and pay stub documentation can deter unauthorized deductions from paychecks.</p>
<p>Timeliness of payment is another concern that states have the capability to address. States should more widely adopt codes that set consistent, predictable payday intervals. Nevada and others have also taken steps to address prompt payment of a final paycheck.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> To address forms of wage theft related to the growing employer use of third-party payroll services or electronic bank cards to deposit workers’ pay, many states like Arkansas have laws to require their employers to provide the option of receiving wages via check and set standards for the use of pay cards in order to ensure workers receive their full, entitled pay (ADP 2020).</p>
<p>Finally, many states have passed legislation strengthening enforcement of wage theft violations by increasing fines and allowing for enforcement against certain wage payment violations under criminal statutes. Colorado and Connecticut, among several other states, classify wage theft as a felony if certain circumstances are met, which can result in jail time.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In March 2026, Washington state passed a law which strengthens penalties for repeat offenders and creates a Wage Recovery Account to help unpaid workers receive some of the wages they are owed while cases are ongoing.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<h2><strong>The work of ending wage theft continues</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a pervasive epidemic that cheats many workers, families, and communities out of billions of dollars each year. Federal, state, and local enforcement efforts win back some of the stolen wages, but those efforts only recover a small fraction of the total wages stolen. Our report finds that through efforts conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, by state agencies, and through class action lawsuits, <span style="background-color: #9bd8c9;">nearly $1 billion</span> was recovered for workers. Although strong examples of recovery efforts exist, much more is necessary to ensure workers are paid what they are rightfully owed, including greater wage transparency for workers, bolstered enforcement capacities by agencies, and meaningful penalties for perpetrators.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The authors would like to thank Mallory Miller, Christina Ayon, and Salma Abdi for their research assistance in this report.</p>
<h2><strong>Appendix</strong></h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-326588 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326588" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326588-36082-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Authors’ analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Data Explorer data (FBI-CDE 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Seven states defer to the federal government for recovery efforts: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Note that 2025 total includes some data from 2024 or 2026, as some states tracked wage recovery efforts by fiscal year instead of calendar year.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> EPI conservatively estimates workers will lose roughly one billion dollars ($997.6 million) annually as a result of this rule if it is finalized: more than $772.0 million lost by workers as a result of the rule due to an increase in workplace fissuring and more than $225.6 million in losses by workers as a result of wage theft.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> NY Lab L § 193 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> NV Rev Stat § 608.040 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> CO Rev Stat § 8-4-114 (2025) and CT Gen Stat § 31-71g (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> HB 2479 &#8211; 2025-26</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>ADP. 2020. <a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/employer_paycard_wp.pdf?rev=731797839037413386e2aaad33dcff78&amp;hash=871BCF8EC1C49EBAC5BD9992BF99E5F2"><em>Employer Pay Cards: Staying on the Right Side of Compliance: A Guide to Federal and State Employer Pay Card Compliance Requirements</em></a>.</p>
<p>ADP. 2026. “<a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/pay_statement_requirements_chart.pdf">Pay Statement Requirements</a>” (web page). Last updated October 6, 2026.</p>
<p>Bernhardt, Annette, Ruth Milkman, Nik Theodore, Douglas Heckathorn, Mirabai Auer, James DeFilippis, Ana Luz González, Victor Narro, Jason Perelshteyn, Diana Polson, and Michael Spiller. 2009. <a href="http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1"><em>Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 2009</em></a>. Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment.</p>
<p>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2026. “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.t01.htm">Table 1. Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State, Seasonally Adjusted</a>.” Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Last modified September 18, 2026.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>
<p>Cooper, David, and Teresa Kroeger. 2017. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year/"><em>Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ Paychecks Each Year</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 2017.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20260717">U.S. Department of Labor Recovers More Than $500K in Back Wages from San Diego Deli for 6 Workers</a>” (news release). July 17, 2026.</p>
<p>Duane Morris LLP. 2026. <a href="https://www.duanemorris.com/pressreleases/duane_morris_publishes_wage_hour_class_collective_review_0126.html"><em>Wage &amp; Hour Class and Collective Review</em></a>. January 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (FBI-CDE). 2026. “<a href="https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/explorer/crime/property-crime">Expanded Property Reported in United States</a>” (web page). Last updated September 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Policy Watch (FPW). 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/department-of-labor-restarts-employer-friendly-self-audit-compliance-program-on-wage-and-hour-laws/">Department of Labor Restarts Employer-Friendly &#8216;Self-Audit&#8217; Compliance Program on Wage and Hour Laws</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, July 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Iowa Department of Inspections, Appeals, and Licensing (Iowa DIAL). 2025. <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/DF/1544407.pdf"><em>SFY25 DIAL Annual Report</em></a>.</p>
<p>Mangundayao, Ihna, Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Ali Sait. 2021. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021/"><em>More Than $3 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2017 and 2020</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2021.</p>
<p>Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Minnesota DLI). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/news/dli-recovers-128-million-back-wages-and-liquidated-damages-construction-workers">DLI Recovers $1.28 Million in Back Wages and Liquidated Damages for Construction Workers</a>” (news release). April 27, 2026.</p>
<p>New York City, Office of the Mayor (NYC). 2026. “<a href="https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces--5-million-settlement--reinstatement-of-">Mayor Mamdani Announces $5 Million Settlement, Reinstatement of as Many as 10,000 Wrongfully Deactivated Food Delivery Workers</a>” (news release). January 30, 2026.</p>
<p>New York Department of Labor (NY DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://dol.ny.gov/wage-theft-dashboard">Wage Theft Investigation Dashboard</a>” (web page). Accessed&nbsp; October 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Palm, Iman. 2025. “<a href="https://ktla.com/news/theme-parks/disneyland/unionized-disneyland-workers-say-233m-settlement-validates-years-of-organizing/?link_id=4&amp;can_id=ab0184786856562d7c97b3a362f2fb49&amp;source=email-daily-brief-sept-xx-2025-21&amp;email_referrer=email_2908984&amp;email_subject=daily-brief-sept-29-2025&amp;&amp;">Unionized Disneyland Workers Say $233M Settlement Validates Years of Organizing</a>.” KTLA, September 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Poydock, Margaret, and Jiayi (Sonia) Zhang. 2024. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021-23"><em>More Than $1.5 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2021 and 2023</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2024.</p>
<p>Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 2022. <a href="https://www.content.seyfarth.com/publications/Workplace-Class-Action-Report-2022/i/"><em>18th Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report</em></a>. January 2022.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-payment-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/"><em>Wage Payment: State Solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 30, 2025.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi, and Samantha Sanders. 2026. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-joint-employer-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act/">EPI Comment on DOL’s Proposed Rule on &#8216;Joint Employer Status&#8217; Under the Fair Labor Standards Act</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, June 22, 2026.</p>
<p>Utah Labor Commission. 2025. <a href="https://laborcommission.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Annual.Report25-copy-6-1.pdf"><em>Utah Labor Commission Annual Report: For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025</em></a>.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026a. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/low-wage-high-violation-industries">Low Wage, High Violation Industries</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026b. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/all-acts">All Acts</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026c. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/fair-labor-standards-act">Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026d. <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-2027-V2-09.pdf"><em>FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour Division</em></a>. Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>West Virginia Division of Labor (WV DOL). 2025. <a href="https://labor.wv.gov/index.php/media/261/download?inline"><em>FY 2025</em></a>.</p>
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		<title>A pro-worker AI policy playbook: Strengthening unemployment insurance and building a better safety net</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/a-pro-worker-ai-policy-playbook-strengthening-unemployment-insurance-and-building-a-better-safety-net/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mary Beech]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=326852</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Policymakers can act now to reduce the harm to workers of losing a job for any reason, by strengthening the safety net to support them until they find another.
&#160;]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/EPI-Workshop_WeBuild-Cobrand-2.png" width="430"></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #1372ae;">Key takeaways</span></strong></h4>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Policy choices will determine whether AI helps or harms workers.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Given that, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers to meet any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">To strengthen the unemployment insurance system that provides funds to workers who have lost their jobs, we should do the following:&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">increase the amounts and duration of unemployment benefits&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
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<li style="list-style-type: none;">
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<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
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<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
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<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">center delivery on worker needs and power</li>
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<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">build stronger data infrastructure to support workers while they are searching for new jobs</li>
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<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Establishing a stand-alone unemployment program solely focused on AI raises important considerations. These include program design, stakeholder roles, eligibility criteria challenges, the resources needed to be effective, and vulnerability to reauthorization hurdles in Congress.</span></li>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i>This is the first brief in a series exploring comprehensive federal policy recommendations around AI and workers.</i></p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid the seemingly endless predictions about AI, one point is essential to remember: How this plays out is not predetermined. Policy choices determine whether workers are helped or harmed by technological change. Even without AI, many workers already face harmful disruptions. Every year, 20 million workers are laid off in the U.S. economy<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>—due to employer mismanagement, once-profitable products becoming less so, offshoring, automation, and other factors. For individual workers, losing a job fo<em>r any reason</em> and for <em>any period of time</em> is traumatic and damaging in large part because we lack adequate social insurance programs to smooth those transitions.</p>
<p>As lawmakers debate how to best regulate AI deployment in our workplaces, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers in any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods. Decades of underinvestment, coupled with attacks on unions and other labor supports, have left workers without an adequate safety net.</p>
<p>We can improve our current systems to better provide livable benefits for workers who lose their jobs because of large-scale economic shocks that are not their fault and outside their control. We can also learn from other periods of workforce disruption—the COVID-19 pandemic, trade-related shocks, and the 2008 recession—about which policy choices were effective and which fell short.</p>
<p>When workers lose their jobs due to factors outside their control, they are considered “displaced” or “dislocated.” If they meet certain requirements, these workers are eligible for unemployment insurance (UI). To strengthen outcomes for workers, this brief will provide recommendations to:</p>
<ul>
<li>increase UI benefit amount and duration</li>
<li>expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
<li>align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
<li>center worker needs and power</li>
<li>strengthen data infrastructure to support workers</li>
</ul>
<p>These recommendations should be considered amid conversations focused on creating a stand-alone unemployment program geared toward AI-driven job loss. These discussions should weigh considerations and potential pitfalls, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>a blank slate for program design</li>
<li>relevant roles for key stakeholders</li>
<li>eligibility criteria challenges</li>
<li>the allocation of resources, time, and awareness to be effective</li>
<li>reauthorization vulnerability</li>
</ul>
<p>If policymakers are serious about easing the impact of AI-related job transitions for workers, the priority solution should be strengthening already existing social insurance programs to reduce the economic consequences of losing any job and to provide adequate support to workers while they seek other employment.</p>
<p>Changes to the current system or establishing a new program will require robust resources, including time, money, and expertise. This investment can help all workers, regardless of their risk of AI-based displacement. With a strong safety net, workers who lose their jobs can get the assistance they need, including the opportunity to find work that is well suited to their skills and experiences, and businesses are more inclined to improve their practices because they know workers aren&#8217;t trapped in their current jobs by economic necessity.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This moment presents an opportunity to strengthen the labor market for everyone and to ensure workers have the safety net they deserve.</p>
<h2>How to strengthen our current system</h2>
<p>Any effective approach to fixing the UI system must be comprehensive and should apply regardless of whether a worker is displaced due to AI. Numerous experts have weighed in on the best approach—including the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) Unemployment Insurance Taskforce,<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> the National Employment Law Project (NELP),<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a>,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> and The Century Foundation,<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> among others. This brief draws from those recommendations to strengthen outcomes for workers. Other important issues, such as modernizing UI system technology and infrastructure, fraud detection and prevention, and the use of AI in benefit determinations and delivery, also shape worker outcomes but fall outside this brief&#8217;s scope.</p>
<h3>Increase benefit amount and duration</h3>
<p>First and foremost, UI should be designed to ensure that workers can afford housing, food, and other essentials during their period of joblessness. The percentage of wages that UI replaces for workers has declined over time and has not kept pace with inflation.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In 2025, national average UI benefits replaced well under half of national average wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> This gap leaves workers across the income spectrum unable to maintain their standard of living and can push those whose earnings were close to the minimum wage into poverty.</p>
<h4>Ensure benefit amounts are consistent across states</h4>
<p>Benefit amounts vary across states. In Arizona and Florida, UI benefits replace less than 15% of average weekly wages.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> In some states, the weekly benefit amount is just $222 per week.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> While state variation in benefit amounts hurts all workers in stingy states, it weighs especially heavily on Black and Hispanic workers.</p>
<p>One recent study finds that differences in state rules cause the wage replacement rate for Black workers to be meaningfully lower than the rate for white workers, and that the discrepancies harm overall well-being.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> These disparities compound. Even among those likely eligible, Black workers are less likely than white workers to receive UI benefits—a gap explained primarily by structural factors, not a difference in eligibility, that has held steady for three decades.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>Wage replacement rates should be consistent across states. A recent federal bill has proposed changes to increase the replacement rate to 75% and provide additional weekly funding for dependents.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> Given growing wage inequality, the rate also should vary by income level. In one proposal, the lowest earners would receive benefits that represent 85% of their wages.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<h4>Extend the duration of benefits across states</h4>
<p>The duration of benefits also varies greatly from state to state. Until 15 years ago, eligible workers across the country had access to 26 weeks of benefits, a generally agreed-upon standard.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> After the Great Recession however, federal law barred states from cutting benefit amounts, so many states instead cut the duration of unemployment benefits to stabilize their trust funds and lower tax rates for employers.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Some states now only provide 12 weeks of benefits, a short bridge to find a new job well-matched to workers’ skills and experiences.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> A minimum of at least 26 weeks of benefits should be a uniform requirement across states.</p>
<p>Workers cannot currently depend on the Extended Benefits program, which was intended to provide support during economic downturns by providing additional weeks of benefits during periods of high and rising unemployment. The triggers for Extended Benefits have not been effective, leaving workers to wonder if they are available. In their absence, workers must rely on temporary programs funded by Congress, which depend on political priorities.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> More reliable triggers, higher wage replacement levels, and a longer duration of benefits would make the Extended Benefits program more effective.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<h3>Expand and standardize eligibility for benefits</h3>
<p>Only certain workers are eligible for UI, leaving others stranded without benefits if they lose their jobs. Eligibility criteria and the base period used to calculate benefits are set by state law, rather than federal statute. This state-by-state variation can make it difficult for workers to know whether they qualify for assistance and plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Generally, the group of workers ineligible for benefits includes independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and those who have exhausted their benefits. Some employers have incorrectly classified many workers as independent contractors, and this misclassification prevents those workers from requesting access to the UI benefits to which they would otherwise be legally entitled.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></p>
<p>UI should cover a broader range of workers, including part-time workers, independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and seasonal and temporary workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress tasked states with implementing new UI programs for gig and platform workers who fell outside of the usual verification system, creating significant challenges.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> Barring changes to account for the unique situation of these workers, these same issues will arise again.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> By incorporating these workers into the UI system now, instead of waiting for a crisis, future challenges can be mitigated.</p>
<p>Policymakers should also consider stronger presumptive eligibility standards, under which workers are presumed eligible for benefits and paid promptly, with the burden placed on employers or the state to prove otherwise. Lowering the barriers for workers to receive benefits could meaningfully increase uptake among workers who currently go without benefits.</p>
<h3>Align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</h3>
<p>All eligible workers should be able to access UI benefits if they want them. State UI programs are generally financed through employer experience rating: Employers pay more taxes when they lay off more workers who are eligible for UI.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Therefore, the system’s setup incentivizes employers to limit their tax liability by restricting eligibility for the program in different ways. This can include not hiring certain workers as employees, not proactively informing workers about their eligibility, attempting to reclassify workers as independent contractors, and other forms of suppressing UI program access.</p>
<p>A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that only about a quarter of workers who were unemployed in 2022 applied for benefits.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> Further, a recent survey found that 19% of recently unemployed workers encountered actions from an employer that were meant to deter them from applying, in addition to a quarter of all UI filers who said that their employer contested their benefits.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> Low-income workers more frequently reported employer contestations , and workers who reported contestations of their claims by employers were less likely to receive benefits and to experience greater material and psychological burdens during the filing process.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> There is a real opportunity to better align employer incentives to support workers in accessing UI benefits.</p>
<p>Presumptive eligibility, discussed above, would address some of these access barriers by shifting the burden of proof away from workers, but it would not resolve the underlying incentive employers have to minimize their tax liability. There have been many proposals for how to address this issue: broadening the tax base, payroll contributions from employees to UI, or increasing state taxes to fund programs.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Most basically, employers could pay taxes based on the total number of workers they lay off, not just those eligible for UI.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> These questions are tied to broader considerations about how to finance a more effective program.</p>
<h3>Center on worker needs and power</h3>
<p>The UI system should be structured around ensuring that workers have the support they need as they seek reemployment. This requires a real investment in active labor market policy, including communicating with workers and unions about their needs in order to align training and placement. Congress should allocate funds to revitalize the Employment Service in the U.S. Department of Labor, which once played a key role in supporting reemployment.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> For example, in a 1986 New Jersey pilot program, job search assistance measurably helped dislocated workers return to work sooner and increased their earnings.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> A well-resourced and staffed U.S. Employment Service can leverage state labor market information—frequently used by employers—to help job seekers find opportunities aligned with their skill sets.<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a></p>
<p>Worker organizations can also play an important role in the delivery of benefits, including facilitating training and connections to job search assistance.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> In 2022, unemployed people who were members of a union were twice as likely to apply for UI benefits, and among applicants, 30 percentage points more likely to receive those benefits.<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> This sizable gap suggests that when workers have organizational support navigating the UI system, they are far more likely to receive the benefits they are entitled to, reinforcing the case for involving worker organizations directly in UI outreach, filing assistance, and perhaps even delivery. Furthermore, unions routinely negotiate with employers, both in collective bargaining agreements and when bargaining before layoffs, to secure agreements that employers will not contest workers’ applications for UI benefits.</p>
<p>In some Northern European countries, unions are responsible for administering unemployment benefits, and scholars have found that this system leads to stronger unions and worker voice in the economy.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Policymakers in the United States should consider how unions and other worker organizations could deliver unemployment benefits to workers.</p>
<h3>Strengthen data infrastructure to improve outcomes</h3>
<p>State workforce agencies collect quarterly wage records from employers to facilitate UI administration to gauge eligibility for benefits as well as benefit levels. States share wage records with the federal Census Bureau, and these data are included in longitudinal data sets that can follow workers over time. These data are used for both research and the administration of other policies (such as facilitating child support payments or tracking the performance of job training programs). Wage records provide an important but limited set of information that varies by state. A growing number of states have expanded their wage records to include additional information such as job titles, total hours worked, and job location.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>State-level data are a valuable source of information about what is happening to workers, but the lack of standardization across states makes it difficult to gain a clearer picture of employment. To remedy this, lawmakers should create standardized requirements for enhanced wage records to analyze who is losing their job and where workers are finding new opportunities.</p>
<p>The enhanced information coming from states would be especially useful with the advent of AI since no single federal data source can reliably track how AI adoption is reshaping demand for specific occupations in real time or identify when firms are reducing jobs through attrition. Further, workers would benefit from better information about opportunities that align with their skill set.<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> Better integration with job posting data—including the National Labor Exchange—and reemployment systems would help workers navigate the job-search process.</p>
<h2>Considerations for a stand-alone program</h2>
<p>The UI system should be improved regardless of how AI affects employment and job opportunities. Additionally, some policymakers have suggested creating a stand-alone program geared toward AI-driven job loss. There is precedent for this approach. Congress has acted nine times since 1958 to create temporary, additional UI benefits, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> There is much to be learned from successes and challenges of these previous programs.</p>
<p>Some of these programs also included benefits or services beyond unemployment insurance for workers. For example, Trade Adjustment Assistance has, at various points, included relocation assistance, training programs, a health coverage tax credit, and wage insurance for older workers who took a lower-paying job.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> A new stand-alone program could similarly go beyond cash benefits, offering workers support to develop new skills, cover the costs of a transition, or find new opportunities.</p>
<h3>Blank slate for program design</h3>
<p>A new program can address the key structural issues with the current system discussed in the previous section. Any new program should be uniform across states so that benefit levels, duration, and eligibility are consistent for every worker regardless of where they live. A new program also presents the opportunity to build in the other improvements outlined above, including benefit levels set to a livable amount, expanded eligibility, and stronger data infrastructure. A new program could also adopt more fundamental changes to the claims process, such as the presumptive eligibility standards that Michigan moved toward during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a></p>
<p>As discussed in the worker power section, a new program should be explicitly structured around building worker power, for example, by involving worker organizations in program administration or benefit delivery. Further, a new program can focus on effective job placement by leveraging relationships between employers, unions, and other worker organizations.</p>
<p>Finally, a new program should also be designed to avoid UI&#8217;s employer-financing structure, which—as discussed—in most states, disincentivizes employers from making sure workers get the benefits they are due. Left unaddressed, that same structure would allow employers to game or underreport AI-related job loss in a new program.</p>
<h3>Relevant roles for key stakeholders</h3>
<p>A successful program requires effective coordination among stakeholders. As with UI and previous stand-alone programs, states would likely retain a central role in delivering benefits and services, given their existing infrastructure and more direct knowledge of local labor market conditions. Local agencies can provide labor market information to workers, worker organizations, and employers to facilitate job placement. Any program should carefully consider how to balance flexibility for states to tailor the program to meet local needs, while maintaining strong, uniform standards across states.</p>
<p>As discussed, worker organizations and unions can play a central role in program administration. Worker organizations can support workers in accessing relevant benefits and training opportunities, ensuring that worker needs and outcomes are central to programmatic strategy and implementation.</p>
<p>Employers bear significant responsibility for the program&#8217;s success. They are often the first to know a layoff is coming and should proactively connect workers to available services, for example, by supporting on-site services when requested by state or local Rapid Response teams. Employers can proactively share specific information about their talent and skills needs with labor agencies and worker organizations, and hire workers during or after relevant training.</p>
<h3>Eligibility criteria challenges</h3>
<p>Creating clear and consistent eligibility criteria will be a significant challenge in establishing a stand-alone program for workers affected by AI-related job displacement. For instance, a program to compensate Department of Energy workers harmed by nuclear materials has faced significant challenges determining eligibility, including the complexity of reconstructing historical exposure to nuclear materials to establish causation.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> Challenges in establishing causation have also been an enormous barrier to worker relief through the Trade Adjustment Assistance program.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>In another example, some pandemic unemployment assistance benefits are still hung up over eligibility disputes years later.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a> And from the start of the pandemic, there have been hotly contested debates about who should receive benefits.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> Moreover, concerns about fraud can also complicate eligibility determinations. In the wake of fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic, many states adopted stricter verification requirements to confirm eligibility.<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> A new program focused on AI-driven job loss would need to balance similar integrity concerns against the risk of preventing eligible workers from receiving the benefits they are due.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a></p>
<p>It is virtually impossible to systematically link job loss with AI adoption. In many instances, AI’s effects on a worker or industry may be indirect. For example, workers may lose their jobs in part due to AI adoption months or years earlier or because of broader economic disruption caused by AI’s impact on different industries. Even setting aside these implementation challenges, restricting eligibility to AI-driven job loss raises a separate concern: fairness. AI is not the only source of economic disruption. Global trade (including offshoring and outsourcing) and the green energy transition continue to displace workers across industries.</p>
<p>Other workers should be entitled to the same benefits as those directly displaced by AI. Drawing arbitrary boundaries around a single cause of job loss will create inequities, a risk compounded if states must independently interpret what counts as AI-driven job loss, therefore creating inconsistent standards nationwide.</p>
<h3>Resources, time, and awareness to be effective</h3>
<p>Standing up a new program will take significant time and resources. In addition to providing benefits, this includes making meaningful investment in technological systems and program administration, a particular challenge in light of years of underinvestment in modernizing UI systems.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Federal and state governments need adequate resources for user experience testing, efficient application determinations, coordination with relevant partners, data collection and analysis, and programmatic evaluation. The challenges of implementing relief programs during COVID-19 are instructive. Slow initial payments, overwhelming caseloads that strained public servants, technological breakdowns, and significant confusion about eligibility requirements demonstrated the need to proactively develop systems that can respond more nimbly in times of crisis.<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>Starting a new program also requires sustained public outreach, as new and stand-alone programs have historically struggled because of a lack of public familiarity. For example, over half of workers did not know they had access to emergency sick leave during COVID-19.<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> In another example, when the Reagan administration made changes to the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, applications plummeted, perhaps because many workers believed the program had been abolished.<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> Further, most workers did not know that other services including training, job counseling, and relocation assistance were available through the program.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a></p>
<p>A stand-alone program could also come at the expense of the existing UI system, which the vast majority of states say is underfunded.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a> From 1999 to 2019, federal funding for UI administration declined by 30% on an inflation-adjusted basis.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a> If policymakers decide to divert resources that would otherwise go to the existing UI system, the system’s further deterioration could harm workers served by that system in both the short and long term.</p>
<h3>Reauthorization vulnerability in Congress</h3>
<p>If an AI-specific UI program requires congressional reauthorization, it will be vulnerable to the difficulty of coordinating bipartisan action in Congress. Several previous programs have been subject to a sunset date, requiring periodic reauthorization to continue accepting new claims. Sunsets and other reauthorization requirements leave workers vulnerable to congressional inaction, especially if the impacts of AI on the workforce play out over an extended time period.</p>
<p>For an example of a program caught up in this type of reauthorization limbo, Trade Adjustment Assistance lapsed multiple times, including most recently in 2022, leaving additional workers without access to the program. Another example is The Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, which was created in 2008 and lapsed five times between 2010 and 2013, before expiring for good at the end of that year.<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a> This immediately cut off benefits for 1.3 million workers and for more than 3.6 million workers by the following September.<a href="#_note54" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='54' id="_ref54">54</a></p>
<h2>Financing and the path forward</h2>
<p>The current worker safety net has failed to expand enough to cover the basic realities of today&#8217;s labor market, and inadequate benefit levels, incomplete coverage, and diminished worker representation are persistent problems. Deployment of AI and related technologies in the workplace adds urgency to addressing these issues.</p>
<p>Implementing the recommendations in this issue brief requires a significant investment that should be considered, along with program parameters and design. As AI drives up stock prices and generates wealth for a select few, policymakers are considering how the public should share in these gains. Ideas include increasing taxes for wealthy individuals, closing the gap between labor and capital tax rates, taxing AI use, and taxing data center development, with the proceeds from these new taxes financing programs that redistribute income more broadly across the economy. Considerations for potential taxation approaches will be discussed in a forthcoming brief.</p>
<p>This moment requires big thinking and corresponding action. While AI drives changes to the economy, improvements to the worker safety net are long overdue. We can learn from the past to improve the labor market for everyone.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>Angela Hanks, Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Ben Zipperer, Gillian Gutierrez, Jacob Leibenluft, Janelle Jones, Josh Bivens, Michele Evermore, Patrick Oakford, Raj Nayak, and Stephen Nuñez.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Layoffs and Discharges: Total Nonfarm” [JTSLDL]. Accessed from <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>, October 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Patrick Oakford, Josh Bivens, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/"><em>Federal AI Legislation: An Evaluation of Existing Proposals and a Road Map Forward</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>Unemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Amy Traub, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/boosting-economic-resilience-seven-ways-states-can-support-more-workers-with-unemployment-insurance/"><em>Boosting Economic Resilience: Seven Ways States Can Support More Workers with Unemployment Insurance</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, July 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2023/11/Policy-Advocacy-Brief-Benefit-Amounts-11-2023.pdf."><em>Policy Advocacy Brief: Benefit Amounts</em></a>, November 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp">UI Replacement Rates Report</a>,” Benefit Accuracy Measurement data. Public data prepared by the OUI Division of Performance Management, Accessed August 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Megan Rivera, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/why-unemployment-insurance-alone-is-not-enough-in-the-ai-era/"><em>Why Unemployment Insurance Alone Is Not Enough in the AI Era</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Daphné Skandalis, Ioana Marinescu, and Maxim Massenkoff, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/racial-inequality-in-the-u-s-unemployment-insurance-system/"><em>Racial Inequality in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance System</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper, July 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Elira Kuka and Bryan A. Stuart, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29595"><em>Racial Inequality in Unemployment Insurance Receipt and Take-Up</em></a>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 29595, December 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Office of U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, “<a href="https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2025/07/16/bennet-wyden-beyer-reintroduce-bicameral-bill-to-overhaul-unemployment-insurance/">Bennet, Wyden, Beyer Reintroduce Bicameral Bill to Overhaul Unemployment Insurance</a>” (press release), July 16, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>U</em><em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf">U<em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez, Nina Mast, Margaret Poydock, and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Costly for Workers and Social Insurance Systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a>&nbsp;The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> Adam Grundy and Lucie Alleyne, “<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2025/07/nes-gig-economy.html">Nonemployer Businesses Are Key Contributors to Gig Activities and Economic Growth Nationally</a>” (blog post), U.S. Census Bureau website, July 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2023/most-unemployed-people-in-2022-did-not-apply-for-unemployment-insurance-benefits.htm">Most Unemployed People in 2022 Did Not Apply for Unemployment Insurance Benefits</a>” (blog post), <em>The Economics Daily (TED)</em>, April 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> Amy Traub, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Sanjay Pinto, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/the-unemployed-worker-study/"><em>The Unemployed Worker Study</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Alix Gould-Werth, &#8220;<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739410">Employer Contestations and Access to Unemployment Insurance: Implications for Benefit Receipt, Material Hardship, and Administrative Burden</a>,&#8221; <em>Social Service Review</em> 100, no. 1 (March 2026): 38–68.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Stephen A. Wandner, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17848/9781441680389"><em>Solving the Reemployment Puzzle: From Research to Policy</em></a>, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 2010.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “<a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/solidarity-insurance-reimagining-unemployment-insurance-as-a-platform-for-worker-power/">Solidarity Insurance: Reimagining Unemployment Insurance as a Platform for Worker Power.</a>” (policy brief), Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/uisup_03292023.htm">Characteristics of Unemployment Insurance Applicants and Benefit Recipients—2022</a>” (economic news release), March 29, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> Bruce Western, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691010335/between-class-and-market"><em>Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies</em></a> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Michele Evermore and Will Raderman, <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>T</em></a><a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>he Case for Enhanced Wage Records: Lessons from States</em></a>, National Academy of Social Insurance and The Niskanen Center, January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10336">The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation</a>,” Congressional Research Service, IF10336, updated January 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/05/NELP-Michele-Evermore-Testimony-Michigan-UI-Processing-5-21-2020.pdf">Michigan Unemployment Claims Processing</a>,” testimony on behalf of National Employment Law Project to a hearing before the Michigan Legislature, Joint Select Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 21, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> U.S. Government Accountability Office, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-74"><em>Energy Employees Compensation: DOL Generally Followed Its Procedures to Process Claims but Could Strengthen Some Internal Controls</em></a>, GAO-16-74, March 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Julie Kay, “<a href="https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/north-carolina-unemployment-benefits-still-delayed-five-years-after-pandemic/275-5b6093e8-1e0f-46bc-811a-d446166114a3">‘No Accountability’: Pandemic-Era Unemployment Benefit Delays Persist, 5 Years Later</a>,” <em>WCNC Charlotte</em>, April 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> Annelies Goger, Tracy Hadden Loh, and Nicole Bateman, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debunking-myths-about-covid-19-reliefs-unemployment-insurance-on-steroids/"><em>Debunking Myths About COVID-19 Relief&#8217;s ‘Unemployment Insurance on Steroids,’</em></a> The Brookings Institution, May 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/id-verification/"><em>ID Verification</em></a>, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, “<a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Testimony of Michele Evermore, Senior Fellow, National Academy of </a><a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Social Insurance</a>,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Work and Welfare Subcommittee, March 5, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Emma Jelliffe, Paul Pangburn, Stefan Pichler, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth, “<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2107670118">Awareness and Use of (Emergency) Sick Leave: US Employees&#8217; Unaddressed Sick Leave Needs in a Global Pandemic</a>,” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 118, no. 29 (July 20, 2021): e2107670118.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42444"><em>Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration</em></a>, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Product Number R42444, August 11, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='54'><a href="#_ref54" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note54">54. </a> U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee Democrats, <a href="https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/hot-topics/unemployment-insurance"><em>Unemployment Insurance</em></a> (fact sheet), 2014.</p>
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		<title>Wage suppression in 10 charts</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-suppression-in-10-charts/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Sep 2026 12:00:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Hilary Wething]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=325386</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Wages for typical workers lag far behind productivity growth. It hasn't always been this way and does not have to be this way. These 10 charts outline the historical context of workers’ wage trajectories, and what can be done to fix the gaping disparities.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>		<a href="#charts" class="epi-button   button-medium"><i class="icon fa fa-bar-chart  "></i> Jump to the charts</a>
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Wages for typical workers have been largely suppressed since the 1970s. The 10 charts below tell that story.</p>
<p>In the following 10 charts, we outline the historical context of workers’ wage trajectories since the 1970s. For most of those years, wages for the majority of workers were essentially stagnant. Two periods, the late 1990s and the last decade, saw decent wage growth, which kept cumulative wage growth since 1979 well above zero. But those years were the exception, not the norm. More importantly, even with those two periods, wages for typical workers lagged far behind productivity growth—meaning there was the potential for wages to rise far faster than they did. Had workers’ wages kept up with productivity, their annual earnings would have been roughly $30,000 higher.<br />
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container togglable-plain "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="close" data-open-text="List of charts">List of charts</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<h4><a href="#income">Income</a></h4>
<p><strong>1.</strong> <a href="#1">The cost of inequality to middle-class households</a><br />
<strong>2.</strong> <a href="#2">Income inequality is driven by unbalanced power in labor markets</a></p>
<hr>
<h4><a href="#wages">Wages</a></h4>
<p><strong>3.</strong> <a href="#3">Wage suppression boosted profits</a><br />
<strong>4.</strong> <a href="#4">Highly paid corporate managers and professionals benefited the most from wage suppression</a><br />
<strong>5.</strong> <a href="#5">Since 1979, middle-wage workers only saw short-lived real wage growth during tightening labor markets</a><br />
<strong>6.</strong> <a href="#6">Wage suppression was not driven by increased benefits</a></p>
<hr>
<h4><a href="#policy">Policy</a></h4>
<p><strong>7.</strong> <a href="#7">CEO pay grabs a larger share of wages</a><br />
<strong>8.</strong> <a href="#8">Tolerating excess unemployment has been deeply damaging for wage growth</a><br />
<strong>9.</strong> <a href="#9">The federal minimum wage no longer lifts wages</a><br />
<strong>10.</strong> <a href="#10">The assault on collective bargaining hurts all workers</a></p>
</div></div>
<p>The cost of this wage suppression is real. Because wages make up a large share of income for most U.S. working families, lost wage growth meant sluggish income growth. However, there was one group where wage growth, and corresponding income growth, was substantial: the top 1%, whose wages skyrocketed by 182% since 1979. This uneven growth implies that today’s labor market, and the income derived from it, is deeply unbalanced. Rather than workers reaping the rewards of their rising productivity, a growing share of their labor has gone to the top 1%, leading to rising wage and income inequality. &nbsp;</p>
<p>Decades of sluggish wage growth for typical workers—paired with the message that it was workers’ own fault for not obtaining the necessary skills for today’s economy—have left many pessimistic about whether policy changes can help them earn more. But if we want to achieve broad-based economic security in the U.S. economy, there is no alternative to raising pay for workers up and down the wage distribution. The U.S. economy generates enough income in aggregate to provide decent rates of pay growth for all workers—the challenge is a political one.</p>
<div class="epi-togglable-container togglable-plain "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="close" data-open-text="Read more…">Read more…</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>We close by detailing the ways in which policy choices, not the workings of competitive markets, are behind unbalanced power and growing economic inequality. We look to periods when there was decent wage growth (the late 1990s and the last 10 years) for insight. In both periods, unemployment was low and sustained, suggesting that high-pressure labor markets are key to wage growth. We further show that the deterioration of labor standards happened concurrently with a period of largely sluggish wage growth, suggesting that the key to rebalancing labor markets lies in policies that center worker power. We find, for example, that if union density in 2025 had been the same as the level in 1973, median wages would be 10% higher today.</p>
<p>While 45 years of suppressed wage growth may give the impression that this is inevitable, it is not. Our analysis reveals that equitable wage growth is not only possible, but that it has happened for significant periods in U.S. history and can happen again. This leaves us optimistic: There is nothing inevitable about our unbalanced labor market, and poor wage growth for the vast majority of workers is not driven by genuine economic scarcity. Policy choices like raising the minimum wage, ensuring every worker who wants a union has access to one, and prioritizing full employment are the keys to rebalancing the labor market in favor of workers. Wage suppression might have defined the last 45 years.</p>
<p>But, as our research on the factors affecting wage growth and worker power show, it doesn’t have to be the story of the future.</p>
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<p><a name='income'></a><br />
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<h2>The cost of inequality to middle-class households</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-XYRVZ" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="The inequality tax cost the middle class $30,676 in 2022" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XYRVZ/2/" height="445" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>The stakes of rising inequality for middle-income households in the United States are enormous. By 2022, steadily rising inequality was costing these households roughly $30,000 <em>per year</em>.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 1</strong> compares actual income growth of the middle fifth of nonelderly households since 1979 with what this income growth could have been had inequality not increased. The graph highlights market-based incomes because rising inequality was driven entirely by this income category—earnings from the labor market and business income like dividends and interest payments. We focus on incomes of nonelderly households because inequality largely stemmed from unbalanced labor market power, and nonelderly income is dominated by labor earnings.</p>
<p>In 2022, the average market income of the middle fifth of households was $96,335. But their income would have been $127,011—roughly 32% (over $30,000) higher—had inequality not increased after 1979. Put another way, if the middle fifth of households had seen market income grow at the overall average rate—an overall average pulled up by stratospheric growth at the very top—their income could have been roughly $30,000 higher by 2022.<br />
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<a name="2"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="2"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">2</div><div class="figLabel">2</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>Income inequality is driven by unbalanced power in labor markets</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Faqrr" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="The gap between productivity and a typical worker’s compensation has increased dramatically since 1979" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Faqrr/4/" height="586" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>The inequality in market-based incomes highlighted in Figure 1 was overwhelmingly driven by unbalanced power in labor markets that prevented typical workers from seeing their paychecks keep up with overall economic growth. <strong>Figure 2</strong> shows hourly pay (including benefits) for the roughly 80% of the private-sector workforce who are not managers or supervisors and a measure of economy-wide <em>productivity</em>—defined as the income generated in an average hour of work in the U.S. economy. The rising gap between these lines is how we define wage <em>suppression</em>—keeping typical workers’ wage growth slower than growth in incomes in the rest of the economy.</p>
<p>In the three decades following World War II, hourly compensation for the vast majority of workers rose 2.1% on an annualized basis, roughly in line with productivity growth of 2.5%. But for most of the last five decades (except for a brief period in the late 1990s), pay for the vast majority lagged further behind overall productivity. Over the entire 1979 to 2025 period, hourly pay for a typical worker rose just 0.6% while productivity increased 1.4% on an annualized basis. This means that workers have been producing far more than they receive in their paychecks and benefit packages from their employers, and this wedge has grown substantially over time. Some of those gains in productivity went to greater profits for corporations but an even larger portion went to highly paid managers and professionals, resulting in a vast increase in wage inequality over the last five decades.</p>
<p>Had we pursued policies to support broad-based wage growth—instead of wage suppression—typical workers would have much higher pay today. In fact, if annual pay for production and nonsupervisory workers had instead tracked productivity growth since 1979, their pay would be 45% higher, or $30,000 more than it is today.</p>
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<a name='wages'></a><br />
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<h2>Wage suppression boosted profits</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-HW2uJ" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Workers' share of corporate income hasn't recovered" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/HW2uJ/5/" height="433" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>The declining labor share of corporate-sector income—the share of corporate income received by workers in the form of wages and benefits—explains a portion of the wedge between productivity and pay. The labor share of corporate-sector income has not recovered to its pre-pandemic level, and remains well below its 1979 to 2008 average. <strong>Figure 3</strong> illustrates the labor share of corporate-sector income since 1979. Typically, the labor share rises during recessions because profits fall much faster than wages during downturns. Then, in the early stages of recovery, the labor share falls significantly as profits increase much more rapidly than wages. Usually, the labor share then rises again late in an expansion as labor markets tighten and workers regain the bargaining power necessary to secure wage increases. Since 2000, no business cycle expansion has gone on long enough with unemployment low enough to put serious upward pressure on the labor share of income. Small upticks were seen sporadically over the last 15 years, but this progress, but this progress has stalled out.</p>
<p>Two things about the shift from labor compensation to profits in recent decades deserve some context. First, even as measured in official data, this shift explains well under half of the overall wedge between productivity and pay—the biggest piece of this gap remains inequality <em>within</em> labor compensation (we return to this point further below). Second, some of the changes in the official data might be more the outcome of accounting decisions than of fundamental changes in the economy.</p>
<p>Since the early 2000s, capital income (dividends, capital gains, and business income) has been taxed at lower rates than labor income. Highly privileged economic actors who have the ability to engage in tax evasion by reclassifying their income have likely done so in this time—relabeling income once classified as wages and salaries as capital income instead to pay lower tax rates. <a href="https://everywheremillionaire.substack.com/p/why-the-labor-share-keeps-falling" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Recent research</a> has estimated that roughly a third of the decline in the labor share of income might be driven by this kind of tax evasion rather than by a genuine change in which factors of production are seeing income gains.</p>
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<a name="4"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="4"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">4</div><div class="figLabel">4</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>Highly paid corporate managers and professionals benefited the most from wage suppression</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-gu3VW" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Cumulative percent change in real annual wages, by wage group, 1979–2023" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/gu3VW/3/" height="501" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>The largest portion of the growing wedge between productivity and pay can be explained by the astronomical wage growth for those at the highest end of the wage distribution. The ability of those at the very top to claim an ever-larger share of overall wages is evident in <strong>Figure 4</strong>. Annual earnings for the top 1% have grown 182% since 1979, while wages of the bottom 90% have grown just 44%. If the wages of the bottom 90% had grown at the average pace over this period—meaning that wages grew equally across the board—then wages for the bottom 90% would have grown by 65%, far higher and roughly 50% faster than the actual growth experienced. Earnings are so concentrated at the top that average growth is well above the 90th percentile of the earnings distribution. That means workers need to be among the highest 10% of wage earners to even experience average earnings growth. And everyone else—more than 90% of the workforce—saw less than average growth over the last four and a half decades.</p>
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<a name='5'></a><br />


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<a name="5"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="5"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">5</div><div class="figLabel">5</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="5" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>Since 1979, middle-wage workers only saw short-lived real wage growth during tightening labor markets</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-u3y0b" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Real median wages grew 30% since 1979 but only in tighter labor markets" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/u3y0b/3/" height="491" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>Between 1979 and 2025, the hourly wages of middle-wage workers (workers earning the median wage) cumulatively grew just 30%—about 0.6% per year. Yet even this disappointing cumulative wage growth occurred only because wages grew in the late 1990s and the late 2010s–2020s. Apart from these two periods, the wages of middle-wage workers were totally flat or in decline since 1979. <strong>Figure 5</strong> shows real median wages since 1979. The red portions of the line highlight periods when median wage growth was genuinely stagnant, while the green portions highlight when growth occurred.</p>
<p>In the absence of strong institutions and labor standards like robust unions and high minimum wages, strong wage growth occurs only when labor markets are tight. In tight labor markets, the relative scarcity of workers gives them more power in the workplace to effectively demand decent hourly wage growth across the board.</p>
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<a name="6"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="6"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">6</div><div class="figLabel">6</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="6" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>Wage suppression was not driven by increased benefits</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-fdJy0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Employer-provided health and retirement benefits dropped over the last five decades" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/fdJy0/2/" height="349" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Grouped Bars" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>The suppressed “pay” portion of the pay–productivity chart includes wages and benefits, suggesting that benefits have not offset slow wage growth. In fact, by many measures benefit generosity and availability have deteriorated alongside wage suppression. We explore trends in two key employment benefits in <strong>Figure 6</strong>: employer-sponsored health insurance and retirement coverage. We define employer-provided health insurance as insurance for which the employer pays some or all of the premium. We define retiree coverage as coverage a worker receives at their firm that offers it. We isolate workers who are strongly attached to their job, working at least 20 hours per week and 26 weeks per year.</p>
<p>For workers, sluggish pay has been compounded by the fact that health insurance and retirement coverage have declined significantly over time. Health insurance fell from 69.0% to 52.2% between 1979 and 2024. At the same time, retiree coverage nearly fell by half from 50.6% down to 29.0%. Furthermore, plan generosity has suffered with the <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12007" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trend away from defined benefit to defined contribution</a> retirement benefits, as well as the <a href="https://www.kff.org/health-costs/health-policy-101-employer-sponsored-health-insurance/?entry=table-of-contents-what-types-of-employer-sponsored-health-insurance-plans-do-workers-have" target="_blank" rel="noopener">shift to high deductible health plans</a>.</p>
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<h2>CEO pay grabs a larger share of wages</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-qzWT2" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="CEOs paid 324 times as much as typical workers" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/qzWT2/7/" height="601" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>In a nation of increasing inequality, the most extreme disparities are between the heads of large American corporations and typical workers. <strong>Figure 7</strong> tracks the ratio of pay of CEOs at the 350 largest public U.S. firms to the pay of typical workers. In 1965, these CEOs made 21 times what typical workers made. As of 2025, they make <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay/">325 times typical workers’ pay</a>. This higher pay for CEOs does not reflect any increased contribution to corporate output or growth in the skills or productivity of CEOs. CEO pay gains help explain the growing divergence between pay and productivity. Further, the pay of CEOs and other highly placed corporate managers sets norms and market benchmarks across a range of elite occupations. The pay of specialty physicians, lawyers, consultants, and even sectors like university and nonprofit administration is likely pulled upward by rising pay for corporate executives.</p>
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<a name="8"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="8"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">8</div><div class="figLabel">8</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="8" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>Tolerating excess unemployment has been deeply damaging for wage growth</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-9z0HH" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Real wages fall when unemployment exceeds 5%" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9z0HH/2/" height="455" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Scatter Plot" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>As a rough rule of thumb, real wages for middle-wage workers outright <em>fall</em> when unemployment is greater than 5%.</p>
<p>Prioritizing high-pressure labor markets—those identified by extended periods of low unemployment—is key to providing lower- and middle-wage workers the leverage to bid up their wages. <strong>Figure 8</strong> shows that the threshold for achieving any real wage growth at all is around 5% unemployment. In general, real wages grow when unemployment is lower than 5%, but they fall when unemployment is higher. Extended periods of low unemployment can also <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-importance-of-locking-in-full-employment-for-the-long-haul/">reduce wage inequality and racial disparities</a>.</p>
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<a name="9"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="9"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">9</div><div class="figLabel">9</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="9" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>The federal minimum wage no longer lifts wages</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-U3lrK" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="The federal minimum wage is at its lowest value in 77 years" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/U3lrK/2/" height="539" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p><strong>Figure 9</strong> shows the decline in the real (inflation-adjusted) value of the federal minimum wage since its high in 1968. The last increase to the minimum wage was enacted in 2009, 17 years ago, which is the longest period without a minimum wage increase since its inception in 1938.</p>
<p>The minimum wage is essential for establishing the wage levels for the bottom fifth of wage earners. Today’s low-wage workers are far <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bold-increases-in-the-minimum-wage-should-be-evaluated-for-the-benefits-of-raising-low-wage-workers-total-earnings-critics-who-cite-claims-of-job-loss-are-using-a-distorted-frame/">more educated, older, and experienced</a> than low-wage workers in 1968. Yet, despite being more skilled and productive, their wages are <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/">43% lower than wages earned in 1968, and 32% lower than the most recent increase in the minimum wage 17 years ago</a>. The failure to raise the federal minimum wage has especially adverse effects on women and Black and Hispanic workers.</p>
<p>Luckily, many states have refused to follow the federal government’s inaction and have passed higher minimum wages at an increasing rate over the past two decades. <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/over-8-3-million-workers-will-benefit-from-minimum-wage-increases-on-january-1-nineteen-states-will-raise-their-minimum-wages-heres-where/">Seventeen states and the District of Columbia now have minimum wages of at least $15 per hour</a>, and more workers live in states with minimum wages over $15 than in states only bound by the too low federal minimum wage.</p>
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<a name='10'></a><br />


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<a name="10"></a><div class="figure chart-no-id figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="" data-anchor="10"><div class="figInner"><h4></h4><div class="figLabel">10</div><div class="figLabel">10</div><img decoding="async" src="" width="608" alt="10" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<h2>The assault on collective bargaining hurts all workers</h2>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Mwb0h" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Median hourly wage if union density held at its 1973 level" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Mwb0h/5/" height="544" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>One of the main causes of wage suppression and rising wage inequality is the decline of collective bargaining, which lowers the wages of both union and nonunion workers. Collective bargaining not only raises wages for organized workers but also leads other employers to raise the wages and benefits of nonunion workers to come closer to union wage standards.</p>
<p>The erosion of collective bargaining can explain from <a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0003122411414817" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one-fifth to one-third</a> of the growth of wage inequality between 1973 and 2007; it had a greater impact on men than women. This erosion of unionization occurred despite <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-are-extremely-popular-56-million-workers-would-join-a-union-if-they-could/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">large numbers of workers </a>indicating they would prefer collective bargaining if they had a choice. But the political power of those with the most income, wealth, and power has prevented the adoption of laws to modernize our labor–management system and enable workers to pursue collective bargaining.</p>
<p><strong>Figure 10</strong> shows how wages could have grown <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">if unionization hadn’t declined since 1973</a>. If union density in 2025 had been the same level as union density levels of 1973 (14 percentage points higher than it is today), median wages would rise by 10.1%.</p>
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</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/archive-wage-stagnation-in-nine-charts/">Click here</a> for the 2015 archive of this page.</p>
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		<title>Wages are lower in &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; states: These states have lower unionization rates and more anti-worker policies</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/wages-are-lower-in-right-to-work-states-these-states-have-lower-unionization-rates-and-more-anti-worker-policies/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 12:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Emma Cohn]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=324607</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Workers in “right-to-work” (RTW) states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—double the 3.2% wage penalty in 2015. RTW laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies. &nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies. &nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<hr>
</div>
<p><span class="dropped">I</span>n the United States, so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws are anti-union state policies promoted by big business interests to weaken unions and limit workers’ bargaining power. Despite the name, RTW laws do not provide any sort of job protection or right to a job. Rather, the deceptively named policy starves unions of resources, making it harder for them to negotiate collectively for better wages, benefits, and working conditions.</p>
<p>RTW laws emerged in the 1940s as part of anti-union campaigns to suppress worker organizing and maintain Jim Crow labor relations in Southern states; these campaigns worsened economic inequality and racial disparities (Childers 2024). Today, 26 states have active &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; statutes.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>As intended, RTW laws reduce union density (the share of workers who are either members of a union or covered by a union contract). These policies prohibit unions and employers from negotiating over union security—the contract terms under which workers covered by a union contract either join the union or pay an agency fee covering their share of representation costs. This deprives unions of critical resources and suppresses union membership (Sherer et al. 2026). RTW states—specifically those with RTW laws for at least 25 years—have an average union density rate of 6.2%, far less than half the union density rate in non-RTW states (16.0%) (see <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>).</p>
<p>RTW laws not only reduce the number of workers with collective bargaining agreements but also limit unions’ political power to advocate for stronger labor standards for workers more broadly. This is, in part, why states without anti-union restrictions are more likely to pass protections such as prevailing wage mandates, restrictions on noncompete agreements, higher minimum wages, and pay transparency laws.</p>
<p>To assess the effects of RTW laws on outcomes for workers, we analyze whether wages are lower in RTW states after controlling for key demographic-, job-, and state-level characteristics (see Appendix Table 1 for full demographic controls as well as median and average wages by RTW status). We find that wages in &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; states are, on average, 6.7% lower than in non-RTW states. This penalty is worse for Black and Hispanic workers, as well as young workers and those without college degrees. Notably, the penalty is also larger for nonunion workers. This is because strong unions benefit workers across the state, not just those in unionized workplaces (Shierholz et al. 2026). In RTW states with weaker unions, nonunionized workers do not experience these positive “spillover” effects.</p>
<h2>Pro-worker policies are more common in states without RTW laws</h2>
<p>The strong correlation between wages and states’ RTW status is not surprising. Not only do RTW states have lower unionization rates, leaving workers with less leverage to bid up wages, but they often maintain other anti-worker policies. Combined, these anti-worker policies tilt bargaining power toward employers, weakening workers’ ability to garner higher wages. States without RTW laws are more likely to have a wide array of stronger labor standards in place that raise pay, protect workers&#8217; ability to switch jobs, and support those who lose one. These same states—where unionization rates have not been suppressed by RTW laws—have a better safety net and stronger labor standards in part because stronger unions give workers more political power and the ability to better lobby for pro-worker policies writ large (Shierholz et al. 2026).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong> displays the incidence of these labor standards for states with and without anti-union RTW laws.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This is far from a complete list of relevant policies that may correlate with RTW status and wage levels, but they are illustrative.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-324406 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324406" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324406-35912-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Prevailing wage</h3>
<p>Prevailing wage laws apply to certain contracts for public works and require that contractors and subcontractors pay the employees performing such work a prevailing wage rate. The prevailing wage rate is defined as the average wage paid to similarly employed workers in a specific occupation in the area of intended employment. Federal law requires this of federal contracts while state and local laws may apply to state and local contracts.</p>
<p>Prevailing wage laws are more common in non-RTW states. Figure A shows that nearly all (96.0%) of non-RTW states have prevailing wage laws, while only 23.1% of RTW states have these protections for workers on state contracts.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Without prevailing wage requirements, contractors may reduce their workers’ wages to win bids on government contracts—putting contractors who pay their workers fair wages at a disadvantage.</p>
<h3><strong>Restrictions on noncompetes</strong></h3>
<p>Noncompete agreements are employment provisions that ban workers at a company from joining a competing business or starting their own for a set period after leaving a job. Noncompetes undermine economic dynamism and innovation; they depress business formation and labor mobility, hurt productivity and growth, raise prices, shrink workers’ wages, and restrict workers’ freedom (Shierholz 2024).</p>
<p>One of the most effective ways workers achieve higher wages is by securing another offer, and then either renegotiating their current salary or leaving for the new higher-paying job. It is not surprising then that workers in states that enforce noncompetes are paid less than similar workers in states that do not enforce noncompetes (Starr 2019). States without anti-worker RTW laws are nearly four times as likely to restrict noncompetes as RTW states (44.0% vs. 11.5%).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> In this analysis, we include only full bans on noncompetes and states with income-based restrictions. States with <em>only</em> small carve-outs for certain occupations provide a much weaker standard and are, by definition, less broad, so those aren’t included.</p>
<h3><strong>Minimum wage</strong></h3>
<p>Raising the minimum wage is particularly important for lower-wage workers. While the federal minimum wage has sat at $7.25 an hour since 2009, losing over 30% of its purchasing power, workers in 31 states enjoy a higher wage floor (Zipperer 2026). Non-RTW states are three times as likely to have minimum wages higher than the federal minimum compared with RTW states (92.0% vs. 30.8%). This is not a small difference. As of 2026, the average value of the minimum wage in non-RTW states is 60% higher—$5.36 more per hour—than in RTW states.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a></p>
<h3><strong>Pay transparency</strong></h3>
<p>Pay transparency laws prevent employers from lowballing wage offers by requiring them to include wage information in job postings. While they vary, all laws include some requirement that employers provide salary information in job postings or if directly requested by applicants. Lack of knowledge about wages and benefits keeps potential workers in the dark and limits their ability to learn about and apply for better paid opportunities. A study on Colorado’s newly passed wage transparency law found that wages increased 4.2% faster than those in neighboring states without such laws (Shedge 2025). Further, wage transparency has the potential to reduce gender- and race-based discrimination by arming jobseekers with more information and limiting employers’ ability to pay different amounts to similarly qualified candidates. Only two RTW states have a pay transparency law, compared with 64% of non-RTW states.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<h3><strong>Unemployment insurance</strong></h3>
<p>Access to unemployment insurance (UI) also shapes workers’ ability to seek better wages. When a worker is laid off and their household income falls, unemployment insurance supports them and their family until they find another job. UI is a joint federal-state program that relies on state UI systems to effectively deliver benefits to unemployed workers. States differ in their rules and approaches under the federal UI framework, leading to wide variation in the share of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits (the UI recipiency rate).</p>
<p>Better UI not only cushions workers and their families but also provides workers with additional leverage in the labor market. When UI access and generosity fall, job seekers are forced to settle for lower wages and employers leverage this by offering less (Dahl and Knepper 2026). On the flip side, research shows a positive relationship between more UI generosity and wages (Rinz and Wasser 2026). The UI recipiency rate is significantly higher in non-RTW states compared with RTW states (32.8% vs. 18.7%).<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> This is not surprising because non-RTW states have stronger unions, which fight to increase UI eligibility, ease of access, benefit levels, and benefit duration—to the benefit of all workers, union and nonunion (Hertel-Fernandez and Gould-Werth 2020). As with other pro-worker policies, better UI access can contribute to higher wages in non-RTW states.</p>
<h3><strong>Other policy levers</strong></h3>
<p>Not only do workers in non-RTW states enjoy higher wages, but they also benefit from increased economic security thanks to higher health insurance rates, higher public education spending, paid family and medical leave access, and no preemptions against higher labor standards. Every non-RTW state expanded Medicaid compared with fewer than two-thirds of RTW states (61.5%).<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> Unsurprisingly, the uninsured rate is higher in RTW states than in non-RTW states (8.9% vs. 6.2%).<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>Investments in public education deliver a more productive workforce and more informed and engaged society. Increased funding for schools not only improves educational attainment, but also increases wages and family incomes (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). Non-RTW states spend 45% more on public education than RTW states ($24,084 vs. $16,620).<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Paid family and medical leave provides essential benefits that help workers maintain their livelihoods while taking care of themselves and their families. These laws are also shown to increase labor force participation, job retention, and earnings (Glynn 2020). Only one RTW state has comprehensive paid family and medical leave provisions for private-sector workers, compared with 56% of non-RTW states.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>Finally, some cities, counties, and other local governments enact policies that raise standards for working people, but some state legislatures force those standards back down with preemption—the use of state law to void local ordinances. Preemptions apply to policies such as minimum wage, prevailing wages, paid leave, and fair scheduling (EPI 2025). Preemption laws interfere with local governments’ ability to set job quality standards. They suppress wages, exacerbate racial inequities, and reduce worker power (Sherer, Cohn, and Ahdoot 2025). These preemptions are more common in RTW states.</p>
<h2><strong>Workers in RTW states are paid less</strong></h2>
<p>Our analysis of the relationship between wages and RTW status puts states into three categories: long-term RTW states, always non-RTW states, and “switcher” states that have changed their RTW status since 2011.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these three groups of states, and<strong> Appendix Figure A</strong> provides a map of states by RTW status. Our estimates focus on comparisons between long-term RTW states and always non-RTW states.</p>
<p>A simple comparison of hourly wages, the primary variable of interest, reveals that average wages are 22.9% higher in non-RTW states ($40.28 in non-RTW states vs. $32.78 in RTW states). Median wages are 19.2% higher in non-RTW states ($28.79 vs. $24.16). Because there are differences between worker-, job-, and state-level characteristics in RTW and non-RTW states, and since some of these characteristics will directly impact workers’ wages, it is important to control for these factors in a multivariate regression model. This allows us to more accurately identify the relationship between RTW status and wages.</p>
<p>We estimate log wage equations using Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) data for 2023–2025. We pool three years of data to minimize any spurious year-specific economic relationships, thereby helping us achieve more precise estimates. The total sample consists of 234,155 workers, ages 16+, who earn wages and salaries. About 42% of the sample lives in states with RTW laws (see Appendix Table 1 for the sample’s full demographic breakdown).<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<p>In <strong>Table 1</strong>, we construct a regression model, starting with an unadjusted framework and building up to a model that controls for the full range of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages.</p>
<p>The variable of interest is an indicator variable when the worker lives in a long-term RTW state. We also include an indicator in the regression for a switcher state, though that is not our focus of interest (see <strong>Appendix Table 2</strong> for a complete set of regression results, including the coefficient for switcher states). There are currently 26 states with RTW laws on the books and 25 without them including Washington, D.C. (see Appendix Figure A). There are five switcher states that have adopted RTW in recent years: Indiana (2012), Michigan (2013), Wisconsin (2015), West Virginia (2016), and Kentucky (2017). In 2023, Michigan became the first state to repeal its RTW statute. We separate the five switcher states from the analysis to better isolate the relationship between wages and the long-run effects of RTW.</p>
<p>The naïve model, without any controls, suggests that workers in RTW states are paid 17.8% less than workers in non-RTW states (Model I in Table 1).<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> But many factors contribute to wage differences: demographic characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, and level of education are relevant as well as job-related factors such as work hours, occupation, and industry. Since these vary across states, they reduce the measured relationship between RTW status and wages. Model II shows that when the analysis compares more similar workers with each other, the RTW penalty drops to 14.0%.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<p>There are other factors that are different in RTW states, aside from these individual and job-related characteristics. Most importantly, the cost of living. The cost of living in non-RTW states is higher than in RTW states, as shown in Appendix Table 1. In prior research, Gould and Kimball (2015) showed that choice of price indicator makes no material difference on the measured relationship between RTW and wages. Here we include the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Price Parity index: The regional price parity index is higher in non-RTW states.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Not surprisingly, this correlates with wage levels and therefore is important to include in the model. As with earlier studies, we also include state unemployment rates to control for differences in economic conditions.</p>
<p>After including the full set of demographic, individual-, and state-level labor market and cost of living controls (Model III), our analysis finds that workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less than similar workers in non-RTW states. For the average worker, this is a difference of $2.70 per hour, or more than $5,600 for full-time workers at 2,080 hours over the year. However, because the average is skewed upward due to wage inequality, an assessment at the middle of the wage distribution provides a more conservative but perhaps more robust estimate of the RTW wage penalty. Acknowledging that this is a likely understatement of the full relationship, the RTW wage penalty for the median worker at full-time hours is over $4,000 for the year.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-324357 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324357" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324357-35913-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>This does not mean that RTW laws are a <em>causal</em> explanation for this 6.7% wage penalty. As demonstrated earlier in this report, RTW status correlates strongly with a number of other anti-worker policies. Other research has attempted to calculate the causal effects of RTW laws on wages. Using the switcher states in the most recent period, Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (2022) found smaller wage penalties, which is to be expected given the shorter time frame for measurement post-adoption. Our wage penalty for switcher states—shown in the final column of Appendix Table 2—is much smaller (closer to zero) than the coefficient for long-term RTW states, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. Dasgupta and Merchant (2023) also examine states recently adopting RTW laws and find a statistically significant decline in annual wages by almost $1,900. Again, these states are more recent RTW <a name="_Int_YjhAwYo8"></a>adopters, so the full effects we find may take time to materialize.</p>
<p>We find that this relationship between long-term RTW status and wages remains economically and statistically significant under alternative specifications of our econometric model. For instance, removing major industries and occupations changes the coefficient to -0.071. Restricting the model to RTW status as of 2026—removing the separate indicator for states that switched since 2011—yields a coefficient estimate of -0.060. Doing the same but dropping Michigan (since its status changed in the measurement period) results in a coefficient of -0.064. In our final model, we do not include an indicator for unionization, unlike Gould and Kimball (2015). If we reintroduce that variable, the coefficient is -0.063.</p>
<p>In each of our regressions discussed above, we include a three-year average as it improves data reliability and allows us to run smaller groups of the data (see next section). When we run our analysis using just 2025, our results do not change. In fact, when we run our three-year final model for the periods 2021–2023, 2022–2024, and 2023–2025, our coefficients remain in the -0.070 to -0.068 range.</p>
<h2><strong>Wage penalties are steeper for women, Black, Hispanic, and nonunion workers in RTW states</strong></h2>
<p>The RTW penalty is not uniform across demographic groups and other labor market characteristics. <strong>Table 2</strong> below shows the results of a series of final-model regressions (comparable to Model III in Table 1) for a set of demographic groups.</p>
<p>We find that women’s wages in RTW states are penalized at a higher rate (7.3%) than men’s (6.3%). The wage penalty also persists across all racial and ethnic groups, but it is almost twice as large for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic (10.0%) workers as for similar white workers (5.4%) and more than twice as large as for Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers (4.6%). Young workers between the ages of 16 and 24 face a greater penalty (8.4%) than older workers. And workers without a college degree experience a much higher penalty (7.8%) than workers with a college degree (4.7%).</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-324418 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324418" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324418-35914-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>It is particularly important to note that RTW laws have a statistically significant negative effect on the wages of nonunion workers, as shown in the last row of Table 2. Our analysis indicates that nonunion workers in RTW states have wages that are 6.3% lower, on average, than their counterparts in non-RTW states. Union members likely experience a smaller penalty (3.6%) because their wages tend to be higher than those in nonunionized workplaces, regardless of the state’s RTW status (McNicholas et al. 2025). However, the wage impact of unions extends beyond those directly covered by a union contract. Unions lift wage standards across entire industries, meaning that nonunion workers in states with higher union density are more likely to receive better pay.</p>
<h2><strong>As the gap in wages and labor standards between RTW and non-RTW states has grown, so has the wage penalty</strong></h2>
<p>Using our final model (Model III in Table 1) with pooled 2023–2025 data, we find a 6.7% RTW wage penalty—a larger penalty than we found in earlier examinations. For example, we found a 3.2% wage penalty using data for 2009 (Gould and Shierholz 2011) and pooled 2010–2012 data (Gould and Kimball 2015). Some of the increase in the current estimate of the RTW wage penalty reflects small changes (likely improvements) in our methods. But part of the higher estimate persists even when we apply our current methods to earlier data: Applying these methods to the 2010–2012 data yields an RTW wage penalty of 4.7%.</p>
<p>One method change concerns “switchers”—states that changed from non-RTW to RTW status (or back) since 2019. In the 2010–2012 period, there were no switchers to affect the data.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> In our analysis, we isolate switchers from the long-term RTW group, but the RTW penalty remains negative and significant no matter how one deals with the issue of switcher states. For example, recategorizing the five switchers to match their 2012 status (all non-RTW) lowers the measured RTW wage penalty in the 2010–2012 period to 4.1%, but it remains significant.</p>
<p>Other changes relative to our earlier research include controlling for public-sector status; removing union as an independent variable from the regression; using the full working age range of 16 and up (as opposed to 18–64); and correcting an issue with nonrandom missing values to the metropolitan variable. We’ve further clustered standard errors at the state level as suggested by Douglas (2024), which does not affect the size of the coefficients, only the size of their standard errors and resulting statistical significance.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>Setting those minor model differences aside, a consistent comparison over time sees the RTW wage penalty rising from 4.7% in 2010–2012 to 6.7% in 2023–2025. One possible reason why this RTW wage penalty grew could be the increasingly divergent policy trajectories of RTW and non-RTW states over this period.</p>
<p>For example, the gap between minimum wages in RTW states and non-RTW states has grown since 2010, largely because policymakers in most RTW states have refused to increase their minimum wage despite the fact that the federal minimum wage has been stagnant in nominal terms since 2009. In that year, the average minimum wage in RTW states was $7.25 while the average minimum wage in non-RTW states was $7.54. That gap has grown enormously, from just $0.29 per hour in 2009 to $5.36 per hour by 2026 ($14.24 in non-RTW states vs. $8.89 in RTW states).</p>
<p>There were other potentially relevant policy changes between 2012 and 2025. The first state-level pay transparency law was passed in Maryland in 2020. Seventeen states followed suit in subsequent years, 15 of which were non-RTW states. On the flip side, six states have repealed their prevailing wage laws since 2012—all of which were RTW. Only one state, Michigan, reinstated its prevailing wage law. It did so in 2023, the same year it repealed RTW. While this is far from an exhaustive list, it’s not surprising that the measured RTW wage penalty has grown over time.</p>
<h2><strong>Repealing anti-union “right-to-work” laws and strengthening labor law is key to raising wages </strong></h2>
<p>The wage penalty for workers in RTW states has grown since the last time we conducted this research a decade ago. Long-standing and more recently enacted anti-union RTW laws in 26 states, in tandem with other anti-worker policies, have further eroded workers’ collective bargaining power, suppressed wages, and lowered labor standards. These outcomes are linked to clear policy choices, and lawmakers at every level of government have the tools they need to restore workers’ union rights, strengthen labor standards, and lift wages. Across the U.S., 56 million workers say they want a union in their workplace, yet only 10% of all workers have one (Shierholz et al. 2026). Current federal and state labor laws—including anti-union RTW laws—place too many obstacles in workers’ path to unionizing and give employers too much power to interfere with workers’ free choice.</p>
<p>First and foremost, states with RTW laws should follow Michigan’s recent lead and repeal them. Repealing state RTW laws will enable workers to unionize and raise wages across the country. Indeed, recent EPI research finds that equalizing collective bargaining rights across all states by repealing RTW laws that affect private employees and ensuring collective bargaining rights for public employees would increase national union density by almost 50% (from 9.9 to 14.4%) (Shierholz et al. 2026). States should also consider passing constitutional amendments that affirm collective bargaining rights and explicitly bar RTW-style restrictions, such as the 2022 Workers’ Rights Amendment in Illinois (Sherer 2026).</p>
<p>At the federal level, lawmakers should pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act. The PRO Act is designed to address major weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which has been severely eroded by amendments and court decisions. Among many other reforms, the PRO Act would eliminate the option for states to maintain anti-union RTW laws—restoring full bargaining rights to workers in all states as intended when the NLRA was originally passed in 1935 (McNicholas, Poydock, and Rhinehart 2021). Since its first introduction in 2019, the PRO Act has passed the House of Representatives twice with bipartisan support (Shierholz et al. 2026).</p>
<p><span class="TextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">In addition to</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> proposed PRO Act reforms</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">that</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> would enable</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">newly unionized workers </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">to</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">pursue</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> arbitration to achieve a first contract (if an employer fails to negotiate in good faith)</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">, federal labor law</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> should set a minimum standard that </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">such</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> contracts include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">To f</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">urther</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> expand</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> the benefits of collective </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW49082779 BCX0">bargaining</span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW49082779 BCX0">,</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">Congress should amend the NLRA to require </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">d</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">efault collective bargaining</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> at</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> any</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> firm </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">where</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> CEO-to-worker pay ratios exceed 100</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">times what a typical worker makes in their industry</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> (</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">as this ratio would be one proxy for </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">whether</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0"> conditions at an employer are particularly unequal</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">)</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">(Shierholz et al. 2026)</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">.</span></span><span class="EOP CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW49082779 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;134233117&quot;:false,&quot;134233118&quot;:false,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:1,&quot;335551620&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:0,&quot;335559737&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:278}'>&nbsp;</span></p>
<p>Legislators at both the state and federal level should also look to the list of anti-worker laws that are typically found in RTW states for more opportunities to rebalance unequal power in the labor market and improve wages and working conditions. These policies include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Raising the minimum wage;</li>
<li>Banning noncompete agreements;</li>
<li>Strengthening federal unemployment insurance guidelines and state UI systems;</li>
<li>Removing state restrictions that preempt local governments from raising wages and strengthening labor standards.</li>
</ul>
<p>These are among just a few of the policy levers states can use to raise wages and standards (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that repealing anti-union RTW laws and enabling workers to increase unionization levels are key to raising wages, both because RTW laws directly suppress unionization rates (and unions raise wages), and because weakening unions limits workers’ collective ability to shape other public policies.</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The authors are grateful to Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Hilary Wething, and Ben Zipperer for their helpful comments and expertise.</p>
<h2><strong>Appendix</strong></h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-324432 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324432" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324432-35916-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-324246 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324246" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324246-35917-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See Appendix Figure A for RTW status. As of 2026, these states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> States are categorized as “RTW” or “non-RTW” based on their status as of 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Authors’ analysis of prevailing wage laws from DOL (2023) and state legislative websites.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Authors’ analysis of noncompete restriction policies from EIG (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Authors’ analysis of minimum wage data from EPI (2026c).</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Authors’ analysis of pay transparency laws from GovDocs (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Authors’ analysis of UI recipiency rate data from DOL-ETA.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Authors’ analysis of Medicaid expansion policies from KFF (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Authors’ analysis of uninsurance rates by state, 2023 through 2025, from Carter (2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Authors’ analysis of per-pupil education spending data from NCES-NPEFS (2024).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Authors’ analysis of paid family and medical leave policies from Wielk (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Prior to 2012, the last state to change its status was Oklahoma in 2001.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> This analysis builds on earlier work by Gould and Kimball (2015); see the report for a full description of the methodology and list of controls.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Interpreting the results from these semilogarithmic functions requires utilizing the exponential function on the coefficient. Specific to the binary variable coefficient (β1) for RTW, the percent change in workers’ wages resulting from a state being RTW can be calculated by the formula: 100*[exp(β1)-1]. Typically, the result of this equation will be very close to the coefficient itself but will differ more as the coefficient becomes larger. We show the coefficient in the first row of Table 1 and the exponentiated result as a percent in the third row.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Full regression results for covariates in all three models can be found in Appendix Table 2.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> Because the 2025 BEA RPP data were not yet available at the time of publication, we assign an average of 2022–2024 data to all years in our sample (2023–2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Gould and Kimball (2015) classify Indiana as non-RTW as its RTW law had just taken effect.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> We do not control for state-level fixed effects, as Douglas (2024) suggested, because state-level fixed effects perfectly correlate with RTW status and would deem our results uninterpretable.</p>
<h2><strong>References</strong></h2>
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<p>Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (DOL-ETA). Various years. Unemployment Insurance Chartbook. Public data series accessed via&nbsp;<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/chartbook.asp" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the interactive tool</a>. Accessed August 6, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Douglas, Christopher C. 2024.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.mackinac.org/s2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Right-to-Work States Do Not Have Lower Wages</em></a>.&nbsp;Mackinac Center, December 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Innovation Group (EIG). 2026. “<a href="https://eig.org/state-noncompete-map/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">State Noncompete Law Tracker</a>.” Last modified March 24, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/preemption-map/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Workers’ Rights Preemption in the U.S.</a>”&nbsp;Last modified February 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8, <a href="https://www.mackinac.org/s2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://microdata.epi.org</a>.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">Holding the Line: State solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis</a></em>.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026c.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Minimum Wage Tracker</a>.”&nbsp;Last Modified July 1, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Neil Lloyd. 2022. “<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and Wage Setting</a>.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no.&nbsp;30098,&nbsp;June&nbsp;2022.&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098" target="_blank" rel="noopener">http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Glynn,&nbsp;Sarah Jane. 2020.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rising-cost-inaction-work-family-policies/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Rising Cost of Inaction on Work-Family Policies</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Center for American Progress</em>,&nbsp;January 21, 2020.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Will&nbsp;Kimball.&nbsp;2015.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/right-to-work-states-have-lower-wages" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>“Right-to-Work” States Still Have Lower Wages</em></a><em>.</em>&nbsp;Economic Policy Institute, April 2015.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Heidi&nbsp;Shierholz.&nbsp;2011.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp299/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2011.&nbsp;</p>
<p>GovDocs. 2026. “<a href="https://www.govdocs.com/pay-transparency-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Pay Transparency Laws by State and Province</a>.” Last modified July 2026.</p>
<p>Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, and Alix Gould-Werth. 2020. <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/labor-organizations-and-unemployment-insurance-a-virtuous-circle-supporting-u-s-workers-voices-and-reducing-disparities-in-benefits/"><em>Labor Organizations and Unemployment Insurance: A Virtuous Circle Supporting U.S. Workers’ Voices and Reducing Disparities in Benefits</em></a>. Washington Center for Equitable Growth, October 2020.</p>
<p>Jackson, C. Kirabo, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico. 2016.&nbsp;“<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms</a>.” <em>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</em> 131, no. 1: 157–218. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036</a>.</p>
<p>KFF. 2026. “<a href="https://www.kff.org/medicaid/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions</a>.” Last modified May 21, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Lynn Rhinehart. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/pro-act-problem-solution-chart/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How the PRO Act restores workers’ right to unionize</a>” (fact sheet).&nbsp;<em>Economic Policy Institute</em>, February 4, 2021.&nbsp;</p>
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<p>National Center for Education Statistics, National Public Education Financial Survey (NCES-NPEFS). 2024. Public data series accessed via the&nbsp;<a href="https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/files.asp#Fiscal:1,LevelId:2,Page:1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Common Core of Data database</a>. Accessed July 1, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Rinz,&nbsp;Kevin, and&nbsp;David&nbsp;Wasser.&nbsp;2026. “<a href="https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Wage Determination</a>.”&nbsp;Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland&nbsp;Working Paper no.&nbsp;26-11,&nbsp;May&nbsp;2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611</a>.</p>
<p>Shedge, Nirav.&nbsp;2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5649250" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Pay Transparency Laws and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Colorado</em></a><em>.&nbsp;</em>Social Science Research Network, November 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rights-to-unionize-and-collectively-bargain-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Rights to Unionize and Collectively Bargain: State Solutions to the U.S. Workers Rights Crisis</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2026.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer, Emma Cohn, and Ruby Ahdoot. 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/updated-epi-preemption-tracker/">Updated EPI Tracker Shows More States Obstructing Progress on Workers’ Rights: Harmful Preemption Laws are Increasing Inequality and Repressing Democracy.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), March 6, 2025.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer, Nina Mast, Elise Gould, and Emma Cohn. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/everything-you-need-to-know-about-anti-union-right-to-work-laws"><em>Everything You Need to Know About Anti-Union “Right-to-Work&#8221; Laws</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, forthcoming 2026.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi.&nbsp;2024.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-prepared-for-the-u-s-senate-subcommittee-on-economic-policy-for-a-hearing-titled-banning-noncompete-agreements/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Banning Noncompete Agreements</a>.” Testimony&nbsp;before&nbsp;the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy, July 30, 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Shierholz,&nbsp;Heidi,&nbsp;Celine McNicholas, Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Ben Zipperer, and Margaret Poydock.&nbsp;2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Case for Tripling Union Membership: How Rebuilding Union Power Would Strengthen Workers, the Economy, and Our Democracy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Starr,&nbsp;Evan.&nbsp;2019.&nbsp;“<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0019793919826060" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete</a>.” <em>ILR Review</em>&nbsp;72, no. 4 (August): 783–817.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919826060" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919826060</a>.</p>
<p>Wielk,&nbsp;Emily. 2026. “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/state-paid-family-leave-laws-across-the-u-s/">State Paid Family Leave Laws Across the U.S.</a>” Bipartisan Policy Center. Last updated April 23, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Everything you need to know about anti-union &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; laws</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/everything-you-need-to-know-about-anti-union-right-to-work-laws/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 12:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Emma Cohn, Jennifer Sherer, Nina Mast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=324732</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Worker interest in unions is at historic highs, and nearly 70% of the public approves of unions. Yet most of the 56 million workers who say they want a union contract can’t get one because of weak federal labor law and the spread of state anti-union “right-to-work” (RTW) laws.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="dropped">W</span>orker interest in unions is at historic highs, and nearly 70% of the public approves of unions. Yet most of the 56 million workers who say they want a union contract can’t get one because of weak federal labor law and the spread of state anti-union “right-to-work” (RTW) laws. Suppression of union membership has in turn lowered workers’ wages and benefits while inequality has skyrocketed. This FAQ examines the meaning, origins, and impact of anti-union RTW laws, and the importance of restoring workers’ collective bargaining power by removing RTW laws and other obstacles to unionization.</p>
<h4>Key takeaways</h4>
<ul>
<li>The label “right to work” is intentionally misleading. RTW laws provide no job protections. What they do is make it harder for workers to form and sustain strong unions.</li>
<li>RTW laws are intended to weaken unions. They are linked to lower unionization rates, lower wages and benefits, and worse safety outcomes for all workers.</li>
<li>RTW laws have racist, anti-union origins dating to the 1940s. For decades, big business and white supremacist groups promoted RTW laws to diminish workers’ collective bargaining rights and block multiracial organizing.</li>
<li>RTW laws don’t boost job growth but do erode job quality and increase inequality.</li>
<li>Trends on RTW are reversing. No state has adopted a new RTW law since 2017, and multiple states have repealed or rejected RTW.</li>
</ul>
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<h2>What is a “right-to-work” law?</h2>
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<p>In the U.S., so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws are anti-union state policies designed to weaken unions and limit workers’ bargaining power. Despite the misleading name, RTW laws do not provide any sort of job protection. Instead, state RTW laws prohibit any requirement that workers covered by a union contract either join the union or contribute toward the cost of union representation. Because RTW laws make it more difficult to form and sustain unions, RTW states have lower unionization rates, which translate to lower wages, fewer benefits, and greater inequality for all workers.</p>
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<p>So-called right-to-work laws have an intentionally misleading name: They do not provide any sort of job protection or job rights. Rather, they allow state policymakers to interfere with private-sector workers’ federally protected rights to form unions and collectively bargain with their employers. RTW laws are designed to suppress unionization, and data show they result in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wages-are-lower-in-right-to-work-states-these-states-have-lower-unionization-rates-and-more-anti-worker-policies">lower wages</a> and benefits for all workers.</p>
<p>RTW laws have for decades allowed state governments to suppress unions without outright prohibiting private-sector workers from unionizing (which would be illegal under federal law). RTW laws do not outlaw unions, but they make it harder for workers to establish and maintain them. In states with RTW laws, employers and unions are barred from negotiating what’s called a “union security” agreement.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;">
<h4>What is “union security,” and why does it matter?</h4>
<p>A union security clause is language included in a collective bargaining agreement—negotiated and jointly agreed to by labor and management—that sets terms under which employees covered by a union contract in a given workplace will either join the union or (for workers who choose not to join the union) contribute a fee to cover their share of costs of contract and workplace representation benefits. In the U.S., the ability to bargain over union security has proven critical in establishing the stability and longevity of unions in the context of highly unequal workplace power.</p>
<p>Without a union security agreement, any union’s future remains by definition “insecure” and precarious—both because future financial resources are unpredictable and because of significant risk that anti-union employers (who <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-employers-spend-more-than-1-5-billion-annually-on-union-avoidance/">spend millions each year</a> on efforts to bust unions) could at any time attempt to discourage union membership in order to hinder the bargaining process; dissolve a newly formed union; or even encourage decertification of a longstanding union. Overt employer interference with workers’ freedom to join or form unions via tactics like pressuring employees to drop union membership or selecting new hires based on their willingness to oppose a union is of course illegal. However, such labor law <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/">violations remain commonplace</a> and generally result in few or no consequences for employers under existing weak labor laws.</p>
</div>
<p>Constraints on bargaining rights imposed by RTW laws can <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/261454">deter workers from organizing</a> new unions in RTW states. RTW laws especially disincentivize organizing in sectors where low wages and difficult working conditions have led to high worker turnover. While workers can and do still form unions in RTW states, RTW states have far fewer unionized workers overall—leaving workers in RTW states with less bargaining power and less political power than workers in other states.<br />
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<h2>How do “right-to-work” laws affect workers’ wages and benefits?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>On average, workers in “right-to-work” states experience lower wages and less access to health care, retirement, and other benefits. Even after controlling for other factors, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states.</p>
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<p>New EPI research finds that workers in RTW states are paid on average <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wages-are-lower-in-right-to-work-states-these-states-have-lower-unionization-rates-and-more-anti-worker-policies">6.7% less than workers in non-RTW states</a>. For a median full-time worker, this translates to over $4,000 less per year. RTW laws result in lower worker wages and benefits both by limiting access to unions and because states with such laws are far more likely to adopt additional anti-worker policies that further suppress wages.</p>
<p>When more workers have unions and are able to collectively bargain, their wages, benefits, and working conditions improve. On average, a worker covered by a union contract is paid <a href="https://data.epi.org/unions/union_wage_gaps/line/year/national/percent_union_premium/overall?timeStart=2003-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2025-01-01&amp;dateString=2025-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=overall">14.2% more</a> than a nonunionized peer (after controlling for gender, race and ethnicity, citizenship, education, marital status, age, industry, occupation, class of worker, and state). <strong>Figure A</strong> shows unionized workers are 32% more likely to have employment-provided health insurance and 30% more likely to have employment-provided retirement benefits than their non-union counterparts. Three-quarters to four-fifths of union workers enjoy at least one of these workplace benefits, compared with only about half of non-union workers.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-eZd80" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure A: Union workers are far more likely to have employer-provided health and retirement benefits" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/eZd80/4/" height="287" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Grouped Bars" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>Unionized workers are more likely to have access to paid sick leave, paid vacation, and paid holidays than nonunionized workers. <strong>Figure B</strong> displays paid leave by union status and shows that union workers are significantly more likely to have access to paid leave than nonunion workers.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-m1gYK" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure B: Union workers are more likely to have paid leave" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/m1gYK/3/" height="309" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Grouped Bars" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>Because RTW laws suppress unionization rates, fewer workers in RTW states have direct access to a union contract that includes these benefits, and in aggregate, wages and benefits are lower for all workers in RTW states—union and nonunion alike. This is because unions also boost wages and benefits for nonunion workers. The <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">“spillover” effects of unions</a> on the nonunion sector are significant and increase when union density is high. The lower unionization rates of RTW states are also highly <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">correlated with other anti-worker state policies</a>, such as lower minimum wages, less generous unemployment insurance, and less access to paid leave. It’s not surprising that as a result, workers in RTW states have lower wages and fewer benefits.<br />
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<h2>Do “right-to-work” laws protect workers from being fired or help workers get jobs?</h2>
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<p>No. Despite the misleading name, “right-to-work” laws do not provide any sort of job protection or right to a job. In fact, RTW laws make it less likely that workers will have a union contract that includes protections from unjust termination.</p>
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<p>As Martin Luther King, Jr. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/martin_luther_king_on_right_to_work/">pointed out in 1961</a>, “right to work” is a “false slogan” since RTW laws provide neither rights nor work and are in fact designed “to rob us of our civil rights and job rights [and] to destroy labor unions and the freedom of collective bargaining by which unions have improved wages and working conditions of everyone.”</p>
<p>Without a union contract, most workers in the U.S. have no protection from unjust discipline or firing. Under federal law (and in every state except Montana), <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/the-legal-understanding-and-treatment-of-an-employment-relationship-versus-a-contract/">employment is presumed to be “at will,”</a> meaning that an employer can choose to hire or fire an employee at any time for any reason or no reason at all (with a few exceptions, i.e., employers cannot legally discriminate based on a worker’s race, sex, gender, disability, or other protected characteristics).</p>
<p>Union contracts typically include <a href="https://www.ueunion.org/stwd_jstcause.html">“just cause” provisions</a>, which require employers to follow a fair process before disciplining employees and to have a good reason to justify a termination. Under a union contract with “just cause” language and a grievance procedure, unions can appeal unfair terminations and, if necessary, have cases decided by a neutral arbitrator. The arbitrator’s decision has the force of law and may require an employer to reinstate a worker to their job and/or provide backpay and other remedies if someone was unfairly fired. Nonunion workers do not have access to this important form of job security. By weakening unions, RTW laws effectively reduce the share of workers with “just cause” protections, leaving most workers’ livelihoods subject to the whims of management, including unfair treatment due to nepotism or favoritism in some workplaces.</p>
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<h2>Does “right to work” protect individual workers from being forced to join a union or support causes they don’t agree with?</h2>
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<p>No. So-called right-to-work laws do not grant workers any rights or protections they do not already have. Existing federal laws already prohibit requiring any worker to join a union or donate to union political funds.</p>
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<p>Supporters of “right-to-work” laws often claim they are interested in protecting individual workers’ “freedom” or “choice.” In reality, all workers already have the ability to freely choose whether to work at a unionized firm, and workers who take a union job then get to decide <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/about-nlrb/rights-we-protect/your-rights/employer-union-rights-and-obligations">whether to become a union member</a>.</p>
<p>Workers who accept employment at any unionized firm will be agreeing to work under terms negotiated by the employer and the union in a collective bargaining agreement (which typically spells out wages, hours of work, “just cause” and seniority protections, paid time off, health insurance and retirement benefits, and much more). In non-RTW states, the contract may also include “union security” language specifying that those covered by it either join the union as a dues-paying member or contribute an agency fee toward the cost of union representation (this fee is calculated based on the percentage of overall union expenditures that are devoted to representation and bargaining, while excluding expenditures on other activities including member political education).</p>
<p>Contrary to common claims of anti-union groups that promote RTW laws, the primary goal of RTW laws is not to protect workers, but to weaken unions and limit workers’ collective power. The real threat to workers’ rights today is that labor laws have become too weak to protect against <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/">aggressive employer union busting</a>; as a result, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">over 50 million workers</a> who say they wish they had a union haven’t been able to get one.</p>
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<h2>Where did “right-to-work” laws come from? Is RTW a racist policy?</h2>
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<p>So-called right to work laws first emerged in the 1940s as part of anti-union industry campaigns to suppress worker organizing and maintain Jim Crow labor relations in Southern states, during a period when unions had begun to grow rapidly following the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935.</p>
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<p>RTW laws are rooted in racism and are designed to maintain unequal power between workers and employers. In the late 1930s, unions grew quickly following passage of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), including in some industries where multiracial unions began to challenge the exploitation of Black, brown, and immigrant workers. In response, big business interests waged anti-union, explicitly <a href="https://www.lawcha.org/2017/01/12/origins-right-work-vance-muse-anti-semitism-maintenance-jim-crow-labor-relations/">white supremacist campaigns to limit worker power</a> and undermine the new federal labor law.</p>
<p>After losing court challenges to the NLRA, business groups increasingly turned to state legislation in their attempts to stop the growth of unions. While many state legislative attempts to restrict workers’ federally protected union rights were struck down by courts, business lobbyists succeeded in codifying an exception for so-called right-to-work laws as part of major amendments to federal labor law included in the <a href="https://cepr.net/publications/six-ways-a-78-year-old-law-is-still-screwing-workers/">1947 Taft-Hartley Act</a>. Under Section 14b of the 1947 law, Congress granted states authority to restrict (but not expand) private-sector workers’ collective bargaining rights by enacting RTW laws. State RTW laws proliferated after Taft-Hartley went into effect, especially in Southern and Western states where RTW laws soon became the preferred tactic of state governments interested in blocking multiracial worker organizing.</p>
<p>Historians have traced the origins of state RTW proposals directly to Southern conservatives like <a href="https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/vance-muse-and-the-racist-origins-of-right-to-work/">Texas antisemite Vance Muse</a>. Muse’s white nationalist “Christian American Organization” focused on opposing unions associated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations which had begun organizing Black and white sharecroppers, factory workers, and miners into expansive industrial unions. Muse spent his career promoting RTW policies to Southern state lawmakers as key to maintaining the color line and stopping union organizing that threatened the racial hierarchies underpinning labor exploitation.</p>
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<h2>Who is pushing for RTW laws today?</h2>
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<p>In the U.S. today, support for RTW laws is coordinated by a well-established network of corporate or billionaire-funded think tanks and political organizations; lobby groups representing employers and business interests; and lawmakers with ties to these entities.</p>
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<p>Because collective worker power poses a threat to unilateral employer control, employers have long spent <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-employers-spend-more-than-1-5-billion-annually-on-union-avoidance/">considerable resources</a> on a diverse array of tactics to block workers from organizing unions. This includes funding efforts to preserve or expand anti-union policies like RTW laws.</p>
<p>RTW is among the policy priorities supported by a <a href="https://www.exposedbycmd.org/2025/04/15/know-your-enemy-the-organizations-attacking-unions-in-the-states/">large network of anti-union organizations</a> seeking to maintain the outsized power of the wealthy and corporations—while minimizing the collective voice and influence of working people. Many of these groups are funded by the same set of billionaire-backed foundations, and they often <a href="https://www.exposedbycmd.org/2025/04/15/know-your-enemy-the-organizations-attacking-unions-in-the-states/">work in coordination</a> on campaigns to maintain and expand anti-union laws.</p>
<p>These groups use interlocking strategies that combine public relations and lobbying operations with targeted campaign donations and litigation to influence state legislation. Some of these groups also use more aggressive tactics that draw from the playbooks of <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-employers-spend-more-than-1-5-billion-annually-on-union-avoidance/">anti-union consultants</a> who specialize in blocking or busting new unions, such as directly targeting union members with propaganda campaigns urging them to quit their unions, or creating “alternative employee organizations” that function as anti-union front groups claiming to speak on behalf of workers.</p>
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<h4>Quick guide to a few of the organizations promoting anti-union state legislation</h4>
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<li><strong>The National Right to Work Committee</strong> specializes in <a href="https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/group-turned-right-work-crusade-crush-labor/">lobbying and public relations campaigns</a> in support of anti-union “right-to-work” laws with the goal of destroying labor unions. Its partner organization, the <strong>National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation</strong>, <a href="https://thealexpress.substack.com/p/how-to-sue-a-union?r=5n16&amp;utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&amp;utm_medium=web">uses the courts</a> to attack labor unions and recruits clients to dissolve or sue unions.</li>
<li>Anti-union groups heavily funded by billionaires like <strong>Charles and David Koch</strong> have become extremely <a href="https://www.prwatch.org/news/2021/02/13694/koch-funded-groups-back-anti-union-bills-states-oppose-pro-union-legislation">influential in state legislatures</a> in the past two decades. These include <strong>Americans for Prosperity (AFP)</strong>, a <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/sep/26/koch-brothers-americans-for-prosperity-rightwing-political-group">right-wing dark money group</a> that maintains lobbyists and field staff in states across the country, and the <strong>American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)</strong>, which <a href="https://www.prwatch.org/content/index-prwatch-articles-about-alec">drafts and promotes model legislation</a> reflecting the priorities of corporate donors in state legislatures. RTW laws are among the many <a href="https://inthesetimes.com/article/alec-american-legislative-exchange-council-labor-unions-politics">anti-union state policies</a> that AFP and ALEC promote.</li>
<li>The Michigan-based <strong>Mackinac Center</strong> has long <a href="https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Mackinac_Center_for_Public_Policy">promoted RTW and other anti-union policies</a> in Michigan’s legislature, and in recent years has expanded its anti-union operations to other states. For example, the Center coordinated work on a 2018 <a href="https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/conservative-group-expands-push-to-get-teachers-to-leave-their-unions/2018/10?">national campaign</a> urging teachers to leave their unions, and in 2025 was identified as the source of anti-union legislation <a href="https://www.orlandoweekly.com/news/labor/florida-bill-to-deter-voluntary-union-recognition-came-from-a-midwest-think-tank-records-show/">introduced in Florida</a>.</li>
<li>The <strong>Freedom Foundation</strong>, based in Washington state, uses aggressive strategies to <a href="https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Freedom_Foundation#cite_note-3">spread anti-union state laws and attempt to dismantle existing unions</a> (including running operations that <a href="https://seiu73.org/resources/dont-be-fooled-by-freedom-foundation/">contact individual union members</a> and urge them to leave their unions). In recent years, Freedom Foundation has especially focused on attacking teachers’ unions, and in 2025 launched a new anti-union group called <strong>Teacher Freedom Alliance</strong>.</li>
<li>The <strong>Center for Union Facts</strong> is a <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AsPKpNyAFcU">dark money group</a> founded by corporate lobbyist Richard Berman that spreads anti-union propaganda, <a href="https://janemcalevey.com/writing/smithfield-foods/">helps employers block</a> union organizing efforts, and lobbies in opposition to worker rights legislation.</li>
<li>Established national employer lobbying organizations like the <strong>U.S. Chamber of Commerce</strong>, the <strong>National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)</strong>, and the <strong>National Restaurant Association (NRA)</strong> are often heavily involved in coordinating campaigns to spread RTW and other anti-union state legislation via their state chapters. Other large right-wing think tanks like the <strong>Heritage Foundation</strong> (the group behind Project 2025), also remain influential in supporting anti-union legislation and opposing legislation that expands workers’ rights.</li>
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<h2>Which states have “right-to-work” laws?</h2>
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<p>As of 2026, 26 states have anti-union “right-to-work” laws. Additionally, Colorado has a unique anti-union state law that effectively imposes RTW conditions, bringing the total of states with RTW conditions in place to 27.</p>
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<p>Twenty-six states have anti-union “right-to-work&#8221; laws in place. <strong>Figure C</strong> shows each state’s RTW status as of 2026. States with RTW laws are red, and non-RTW states are blue. Additionally, Colorado state law effectively imposes RTW conditions by barring unions and employers from negotiating over union security unless workers pursue a state-administered “second election” that must be won by a supermajority.</p>
<p>States with RTW laws are concentrated primarily in the South, Midwest, and <a href="https://www2.census.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf">Mountain West</a>. Southern states were the first to establish RTW laws—as early as 1944 in Arkansas and Florida. All Southern states with the exception of Delaware and Maryland—14 out of 16 Southern states—have such laws. More than half of states in the Midwest—seven out of 12—are currently RTW states. The remaining RTW states are in the Mountain West; five out of eight Mountain states are RTW. No states in the Northeast or Pacific regions have RTW laws.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Z5Oiv" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure C: States with RTW laws limiting worker power" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Z5Oiv/7/" height="531" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Choropleth map" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>Most RTW laws were passed in the mid-20th century, starting in Southern and Western states. Eighteen states adopted RTW laws in the 1940s and 1950s amid a national wave of big business and white supremacist campaigns to limit the growth of unions. Only four states adopted RTW laws between 1960 and 1999. One state (Oklahoma) adopted RTW in 2001. Then amid a new wave of nationally coordinated <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/attack-on-american-labor-standards/">anti-union state legislative campaigns in the 2010s</a>, five more states adopted RTW (including Michigan, which then repealed its RTW law in 2023).</p>
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<h2>Have any states changed “right-to-work” laws in recent years?</h2>
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<p>Most RTW laws were passed in the mid-20th century. Between 2000 and 2017, six additional states passed new RTW laws. Since 2017, no state has adopted a new RTW law, and a growing list of states have rejected or repealed them.</p>
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<p>Between 2000 and 2017, six states passed new RTW laws: Oklahoma (2001), Indiana and Michigan (2012), Wisconsin (2015), West Virginia (2016), and Kentucky (2017). Since 2017, no state has adopted a new RTW law, and states are increasingly rejecting or repealing them.</p>
<p>In 2018, Missouri voters overwhelmingly <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Daily_Brew:_Missouri_voters_say_no_to_Right_to_Work">rejected RTW via a ballot measure</a>, repealing a RTW law passed by the legislature in 2017. In 2019, New Mexico passed <a href="https://www.nmlegis.gov/Sessions/19 Regular/final/HB0085.pdf">state legislation</a> affirming federal rights of unions and employers to negotiate over union security and eliminating local RTW ordinances that some counties had previously adopted. In 2023, Michigan repealed its 2012 RTW law. In 2025, proposed RTW legislation in Montana <a href="https://nwlaborpress.org/2025/03/montana-right-to-work-bill-defeated/">failed for the third time</a> in five years. In New Hampshire, RTW legislation has been rejected dozens of times, most recently in 2025.</p>
<p>In 2022, a supermajority of Illinois voters <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/illinois-workers-rights-amendment-sets-new-bar-for-state-worker-power-policy-other-state-legislatures-should-seize-the-moment-to-advance-worker-racial-and-gender-justice-in-2023/">approved a constitutional amendment</a> affirming workers’ right to unionize and prohibiting any future restrictions on collective bargaining (including RTW proposals), and Vermont voters will consider a similar amendment this November.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-40RI4" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure D: Four states have limited worker power since 2012" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/40RI4/4/" height="576" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Choropleth map" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<h2>What does it mean if &#8220;right to work&#8221; is added to a state’s constitution?</h2>
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<p>States with so-called right-to-work laws in place vary in whether they have adopted RTW through a legislative process or a constitutional amendment (or both). Legislation requires only the support of lawmakers and can be reversed in future legislative sessions, while constitutional amendments generally require both legislative and voter approval and are harder to reverse.</p>
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<p>In every state except Delaware, the state legislature is required to seek voter approval to amend the state constitution. Constitutional amendments must be approved first by the state legislature and then by the state’s voters—though the specific steps, rules, and procedures governing this process vary by state. Because constitutional amendments involve a multistep approval process, they are harder to reverse than legislation.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.ncsl.org/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-resources">A total of 10 states</a> have RTW embedded in their constitutions. Starting in the 1940s amid big business backlash against the growth of unions, six states adopted RTW constitutional amendments in the mid-20th century. More recently, amid another wave of nationally coordinated anti-worker state legislation starting in the 2010s, anti-union organizations have renewed efforts to pass RTW constitutional amendments in states that already have RTW laws. Alabama (a RTW state since 1953) approved a RTW constitutional amendment in 2016, the same year that voters in Virginia (a RTW state since 1947) rejected a proposed RTW amendment. Tennessee (a RTW state since 1947) approved a RTW amendment in 2022. A proposal for a RTW constitutional amendment in North Carolina (a RTW state since 1947) passed one chamber of the state legislature in 2026.</p>
<p>Other states have used constitutional amendments to protect—instead of to restrict—workers’ collective bargaining rights. A handful of states have long had <a href="https://clje.law.harvard.edu/publication/building-worker-power-in-cities-states/state-constitutions-and-public-sector-collective-bargaining-rights/">constitutional language</a> in place affirming collective bargaining rights, and other states have been motivated to amend their constitutions to affirm the collective bargaining rights of all employees and explicitly prohibit RTW-style legislation that limits workers’ bargaining rights. In 2022, a supermajority of Illinois voters <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/illinois-workers-rights-amendment-sets-new-bar-for-state-worker-power-policy-other-state-legislatures-should-seize-the-moment-to-advance-worker-racial-and-gender-justice-in-2023/">approved a constitutional amendment</a> affirming workers’ rights to unionize and prohibiting any future restrictions on collective bargaining (including RTW proposals), and Vermont voters will consider a similar amendment in November 2026.</p>
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<h2>Do “right-to-work” laws affect jobs and job growth? Are anti-union “right-to-work” states better for businesses?</h2>
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<p>RTW laws erode job quality without creating job growth. There are no measurable differences between employment rates in RTW states and non-RTW states.</p>
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<p>Despite persistent claims from business lobbyists that using so-called right-to-work laws to weaken unions will lead to job growth, comparisons of RTW and non-RTW states over decades show no relationship between employment rates and RTW status. <strong>Figure E</strong> illustrates the prime-age employment-to-population ratio—the share of the population ages 25–54 with a job—in two groups of states, determined by contemporaneous RTW status. For instance, Oklahoma will show up as non-RTW in the chart from 1979 to 2000 and then as RTW from 2001 to 2025. The figure shows no clear difference in prime-age employment-to-population ratio between states with or without RTW laws. Employment trends across both sets of states reflect fluctuations within business cycles; recessions are shaded in grey.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-RW8fe" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure E: Right-to-work does not buy any advantage in creating jobs for state residents" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/RW8fe/7/" height="524" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>Prior studies have likewise shown no causal link between a state’s RTW status and job growth. For example, studies of Oklahoma after the state enacted RTW in 2001 found a significant reduction in private-sector unionization, but <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/pam.21861">no measurable effect</a> on employment growth. When studies have claimed to find such effects, it is often because they <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/right-to-work-michigan-economy/">fail to control for other critical factors</a>, such as education levels of the workforce, proximity to transportation hubs, technological advances, or natural resources. Other studies examining state economic performance across Southern U.S. states from 1964 to 2004 have found that RTW status has <a href="https://uknowledge.uky.edu/cber_researchreports/14/">no relationship</a> to state economic outcomes. Instead, RTW laws erode job quality by suppressing unionization and limiting workers’ bargaining power. As a result, workers in RTW states have lower wages and fewer benefits than workers in other states, whether they are members of unions or not.</p>
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<h2>How do anti-union state laws like “right-to-work” affect union membership rates?</h2>
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<p>“Right-to-work” laws are designed to suppress union membership, and states with RTW laws have lower unionization rates. Workers in states without RTW restrictions are more than twice as likely to be in a union or covered by a union contract than workers in RTW states.</p>
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<p>States with RTW laws restricting workers’ collective bargaining rights have lower unionization rates than states without such restrictions. RTW laws suppress union membership and reduce workers’ bargaining power. <strong>Figure F </strong>displays states by current unionization rate using a blue color scale, with lighter shades denoting lower unionization rates and darker shades denoting higher ones. Current RTW status is displayed with a cross hatch.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-ux78E" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure F: States with anti-union laws restricting collective bargaining rights have lower unionization rates" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ux78E/6/" height="631" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Choropleth map" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>Unionization rates vary by state, ranging from 3% in North Carolina to 25.9% in Hawaii. Figure F shows unionization rates for each state as of 2025, showing that states with lower unionization rates are more likely to be states with RTW laws.</p>
<p><strong>Figure G</strong> displays trends in unionization rates between 2010 and 2025, and groups states into three categories by RTW status. These data further illustrate the overall pattern from Figure F: RTW states have lower unionization rates.</p>
<p>Unionization rates among states with RTW laws in place for at least the last 20 years average 6.1%, while non-RTW states as of 2025 had average unionization rates 2.5 times as high at 15.7%. The unionization rate in states that adopted RTW laws more recently—those that became RTW since 2010—is now 9.1%. Michigan is excluded from this analysis because it became RTW and then returned to its original non-RTW status over the last 15 years.</p>
<p>What’s also clear in Figure G is that unionization rates fell for all groups of states, as unionization has continued its <a href="https://www.epi.org/research/unions-and-labor-standards/">decline for the last several decades</a>. It’s particularly striking that unionization rates fell far faster in states that became RTW since 2010. While RTW and non-RTW states experienced 1.0 and 1.8 percentage point declines respectively, states that recently adopted RTW experienced a drop in unionization of 4.0 percentage points since 2010. While other anti-worker laws correlate strongly with RTW restrictions, this sharper decline illustrates that suppressing unionization is both the intent and result of states adopting RTW laws. Although a <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">growing number of workers want a union</a>, workers are facing more obstacles to unionization, and RTW is one of those obstacles.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-9m0aO" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure G: Unionization rates fell most in states that became RTW since 2010" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9m0aO/5/" height="578" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p>The spread of RTW laws is one of many factors that have contributed to decades of declining unionization rates in the U.S., and in turn lowered all workers’ wages. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">Recent EPI research</a> shows that repealing anti-union state RTW laws and ensuring full collective bargaining rights for public-sector workers in all states would alone increase unionization rates by around 50% (from 9.9% to 14.4%) and raise median annual wages of workers in 27 affected states by up to $4,900.<br />
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<h2>How do “right-to-work” laws affect workplace safety?</h2>
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<p>“Right-to-work” laws are associated with less safe working conditions and higher rates of workplace injury and fatality. Studies show that after controlling for other factors, RTW laws are associated with a 14.2% increase in occupational fatalities.</p>
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<p>States with so-called right-to-work laws have much higher workplace fatality rates than non-RTW states. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) job fatality data show that overall, workers in states with RTW laws (and lower average unionization rates) had a <a href="https://aflcio.org/sites/default/files/2026-04/485 DOTJ_2026 FIN-NBUG rev.pdf">59% greater risk of dying on the job</a> than workers in states without RTW laws (where unionization rates tend to be higher). Research has found that a 1% decline in unionization attributable to RTW laws is associated with a roughly 5% increase in the rate of occupational fatalities, and that after controlling for other factors (like state differences in industry mix and demographics), RTW laws are associated with a <a href="https://oem.bmj.com/content/75/10/736">14.2% increase</a> in occupational fatalities.</p>
<p>By weakening unions, RTW laws limit the ability of workers to enforce safety standards in their own workplaces or to advocate for public policies that improve workplace safety for all workers. Union contracts often secure <a href="https://oem.bmj.com/content/75/10/736">important workplace hazard protections</a> and improve the ability of workers to report unsafe conditions or accidents <a href="https://www.ovid.com/jnls/joem/fulltext/10.1097/jom.0000000000000562~protecting-construction-worker-health-and-safety-in-ontario">without fear of retaliation</a>. Inspections by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) are <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/">more likely to be triggered by worker complaints</a> in unionized workplaces, since workers covered by a union contract typically feel more empowered to voice concerns to employers and enforcement agencies. Unionized workplaces see more frequent and lengthier OSHA inspections, increasing the likelihood that hazards are identified and addressed. For example, data on OSHA inspections in the construction industry show that union worksites are <a href="https://illinoisupdate.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/ilepi-pmcr-unions-and-construction-health-and-safety-final.pdf">19% less likely to have an OSHA violation</a> and have 34% fewer violations per inspection.</p>
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<h2>How do “right-to-work” laws affect democracy?</h2>
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<p>“Right-to-work” laws are associated with declines in voter turnout and the weakening of democratic institutions. States with lower unionization rates—due in part to RTW laws—have passed more voter restrictions than states with higher unionization rates.</p>
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<p>RTW laws are associated with decreased voter participation and weaker democratic institutions due to their suppression of unions. By suppressing unionization, RTW laws decrease unions’ <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">positive effects on democracy</a>. States with higher unionization rates have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">fewer voter restrictions</a> and more systems in place to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-and-ballot-drop-boxes/">facilitate voting</a>. Union members are more likely to vote than the general public, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">voter turnout is higher in states with higher unionization rates</a>. Conversely, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w24259">voter turnout is lower in states with RTW laws</a>, which weaken unions and in turn suppress the civic engagement that unions foster. A 2018 study found that RTW laws reduced presidential election turnout by 2%, a substantial effect given the narrow margins that often decide elections. The same study found that RTW states had lower labor campaign contributions, less voter mobilization, fewer working-class candidates serving in state legislatures and Congress, and fewer pro-worker state policies.</p>
<p>Unions tend to strengthen democracy by encouraging civic engagement and helping workers become informed voters; many unions communicate with their members about candidate positions on relevant workplace and economic issues to make sure workers are informed when they go to the polls. Research shows that these effects translate into greater political participation. As democratic institutions where members elect leaders and ratify contracts, unions <a href="https://rooseveltinstitute.org/publications/democratic-abundance/">serve as “schools of democracy,”</a> equipping workers with civic skills that carry over to public life. Because many organizations that shape policy represent elite or corporate interests, unions serve as an important countervailing force, bringing working people’s voices and interests into legislative debates and building coalitions that can exert influence against well-resourced opposition.</p>
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<h2>How do “right-to-work” laws affect inequality?</h2>
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<p>So-called right-to-work laws weaken unions, which play a key role in raising wages, improving job quality, reducing income inequality, narrowing racial and gender wage gaps, and improving health and well-being for workers nationwide. RTW laws that limit workers’ bargaining rights contribute to overall declines in unionization rates and worker power, increasing income inequality for all workers and especially increasing labor market disparities affecting women and workers of color.</p>
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<p>The primary goal of RTW laws is to weaken unions, which have historically been one of the most important forces for raising wages, improving job quality, and decreasing income inequality and forms of labor market discrimination in the United States. RTW laws suppress wages and erode job quality for all workers (whether they are members of unions or not) and contribute to growing economic inequality.</p>
<p>All workers experience a wage disadvantage in states where RTW laws are in place, and data show these disparities are especially pronounced for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/right-to-work-is-wrong-for-missouri-a-breadth-of-national-evidence-shows-why-missouri-voters-should-reject-rtw-law/">women and workers of color</a>. When unions are strong, they improve wages and benefits for all workers (not just those in unions) and reduce racial and gender wage gaps, helping to counteract disparate outcomes resulting from occupational segregation and discrimination in the labor market. When unions are weak, women and workers of color are less likely to work under a union contract, where equal pay for equal work and non-discrimination protections are enforceable guarantees.</p>
<p>RTW laws weaken unions, especially benefiting the rich and fueling income inequality. Five decades of <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/">declining unionization rates</a> have ushered in sharp increases in the share of incomes going to the top 10% (<strong>Figure H</strong>) and staggering <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-pay/">increases in CEO pay</a>.</p>
<div class="box" style="background-color: #ffffff;"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-8zlLK" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none; background-color: #ffffff;" title="Figure H: As union membership declines, income inequality increases" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/8zlLK/2/" height="558" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
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<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/why-right-to-work-was-always-wrong-for-michigan-restoring-workers-rights-is-key-to-reversing-growing-income-inequality-in-michigan/ ?">Michigan provides one clear example</a> of the effects of anti-union RTW laws. For decades before passing a RTW law in 2012, Michigan boasted the highest unionization rate in the country, and the state’s median wage was 6% higher than the national median. After lawmakers passed RTW and other anti-union state laws in 2012, Michigan’s unionization rates declined faster than the national rate, the state’s relative median wage fell below the U.S. median, and income inequality increased dramatically: By 2023, half of all income in Michigan was going to the richest 10%.</p>
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<h2>Can workers in “right-to-work” states form unions? Are unions illegal in “right-to-work” states?</h2>
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<p>Workers in all 50 states have the right to form and join unions under the National Labor Relations Act. However, so-called right-to-work laws make it more difficult for workers to organize unions and weaken the ability of unions to represent workers.</p>
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<p>Under federal law, most private-sector workers in all states have a legally protected right to form and join unions. Anti-union RTW laws do not outlaw unions (which would be illegal under federal law), but they do constrain workers’ bargaining rights by prohibiting unions and employers from negotiating over union security (the terms under which those covered by a union contract will either join the union or contribute an agency fee toward the costs of union representation and benefits).</p>
<p>In states with RTW laws, workers still have legally protected rights to unionize, but they must overcome extra obstacles. Workers can and do form strong unions in RTW states, but doing so requires expending significant time and resources on ongoing worker outreach to maintain union membership, in addition to carrying out required bargaining and representation duties. In workplaces with especially high turnover, the challenge of maintaining a union over time can be particularly daunting under RTW conditions. For this reason, RTW laws tend to disincentivize union organizing especially in occupations where high turnover due to low wages and difficult conditions might otherwise increase workers’ interest in forming a union.</p>
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<h2>What would it take to get rid of anti-union “right-to-work” laws?</h2>
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<p>States with “right-to-work” laws in place should repeal them. Nationally, Congress should pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act to eliminate RTW laws and restore full bargaining rights to workers in all states.</p>
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<p>In states with RTW laws in place, state legislatures can repeal the statutes. Where RTW is enshrined in a state’s constitution, legislators and voters would need to take additional action according to their particular state’s procedures for amending the state constitution.</p>
<p>A more direct pathway to eliminating anti-union RTW laws would be for Congress to reform federal labor law and reverse prior amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) that have allowed states to use RTW laws to erode collective bargaining rights. Among other important reforms to federal labor law, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/pro-act-problem-solution-chart/">the PRO Act</a> would eliminate the option for states to maintain anti-union RTW laws, restoring full bargaining rights to workers in all states as intended when NLRA was originally passed in 1935.</p>
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		<title>The teacher pay penalty remained high in 2025: Teachers and students nationwide are still paying the price of decades of neglect</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/the-teacher-pay-penalty-remained-high-in-2025-teachers-and-students-nationwide-are-still-paying-the-price-of-decades-of-neglect/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Aug 2026 09:00:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sylvia Allegretto]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=324563</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key In 2025, the teacher pay penalty stood at an estimated 25.2%—meaning teachers earned about a quarter less than comparable college graduates in other professions.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/CEPR-EPI-Joint-Logo-02.jpg" alt="EPI-CEPR logos" width="300"></p>
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<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>In 2025, the teacher pay penalty stood at an estimated 25.2%—meaning teachers earned about a quarter less than comparable college graduates in other professions. That&#8217;s a slight improvement from 2024&#8217;s record high of 26.9%, but still more than four times the 6.1% penalty recorded in 1996.</li>
<li>Inflation-adjusted weekly wages for public school teachers fell 6.2% over the last three decades, while wages for other college graduates rose 28.8% over the same period.</li>
<li>Teachers typically receive better benefits packages than other professionals, but after accounting for the difference in benefits, teachers&#8217; total compensation penalty was 14.5% in 2025.</li>
<li>Across states, the teacher pay penalty ranged from 10.4% in Rhode Island to 40.7% in Colorado. It was at least 25% in 25 states.</li>
<li>Reversing these trends requires targeted, sustained investment in public education—funded through coordinated efforts at the local, state, and federal levels. It also requires stronger support for public-sector collective bargaining, which has long been a driver of better pay and job quality for teachers.</li>
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<p><span class="dropped">T</span>his report updates a two-decade body of research tracking the teacher pay penalty—the growing pay gap between public school teachers and their college-educated peers.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> Because public school teachers must attain at least a bachelor’s degree to teach in the U.S., this research compares weekly earnings of public school teachers (elementary, middle, and secondary)<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> with those of college graduates who chose other careers. Documenting the widening divergence between the wages of teachers and their college-educated counterparts over time allows for a historical analysis of an issue that is critical to the future of the United States: the quality of our education. If teachers’ compensation doesn&#8217;t catch up with that of similarly educated and experienced professionals, schools will struggle to retain and attract qualified workers into the profession.</p>
<h2>Data and relevant information</h2>
<p>In analyzing differences in pay between public school teachers and other college graduates, I use two sources of data, both from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> First, I use Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-ORG) data for the weekly wage analyses (BLS 2025a). I focus on weekly wages, rather than weekly hours worked or the length of the work year, to account for the “summers off” issue that affects teachers but not other college graduates.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> The sample is restricted to full-time workers (working at least 35 hours per week) aged between 18 and 64, with at least a bachelor’s degree, since teachers today need at least a bachelor’s degree to teach. Note that the 2025 annual data do not include October due to the U.S. federal government shutdown.</p>
<p>The sample is further limited to those who reported their wage information directly (those who didn’t respond and whose wages were estimated by BLS are excluded).<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> To preserve data confidentiality, the BLS records weekly wages only up to a defined threshold, so the wage amounts above this threshold aren’t specifically identifiable in the data. This is called top-coding. Historically, the threshold was rarely updated. As a result, a growing share of workers are assigned top-coded wages that are below their actual wages, which has generated a growing understatement of college graduate wages relative to those of teachers. EPI replaces original top-coded values with Pareto-distribution implied means above the original CPS top-code separately for men and women.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> CPS demographic variables (e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, state of residence, marital status, age) are also used for the regression analyses.</p>
<p>The BLS’s National Compensation Survey’s Employer Costs for Employee Compensation program (BLS 2025b) is the second data source. Specifically, I pull data on employer costs per hour worked for detailed categories of compensation for “primary, secondary, and special education school teachers” in the public sector, and the same data for “civilian professionals,” which is the broadest category available that largely corresponds to college graduates. “Benefits,” in this analysis, refer to employer costs for health and life insurance, retirement plans, and payroll taxes (covering Social Security, unemployment insurance, and workers’ compensation).</p>
<p>The remaining components of compensation are “W-2 wages,” a measure that corresponds to the wages captured in the CPS data used above. W-2 wages are the wages reported to employees and to the Internal Revenue Service. They include “direct wages,” defined by the BLS as “regular payments from the employer to the employee as compensation for straight-time hourly work, or for any salaried work performed,” and other wage items, including “supplemental pay.” Supplemental pay includes premium pay for overtime, bonus pay, profit-sharing, and paid leave.</p>
<h2>Findings</h2>
<p>I present the results of this research in four sections. First, I examine trends in the simple (i.e., not regression-adjusted, but adjusted for inflation) average weekly wages for public school teachers and other college graduates from 1979 through 2025. Second, I report annual estimates of the relative national teacher weekly wage gap. The relative gap is estimated using standard regression techniques to control for systematic differences in age, education, state of residence, and other factors known to affect wage rates. Third, I analyze the regression-adjusted estimates of the teacher wage gap for each state and the District of Columbia. Lastly, I factor in nonwage benefits to estimate a total compensation penalty that accounts for the estimated teacher wage penalty, along with the teacher “benefits advantage”—teachers’ relatively larger share of compensation coming from benefits, like health insurance or retirement plans. I use these figures to estimate a total compensation differential at the national level (which is not possible to calculate for each state).</p>
<h3>Simple level differences: Weekly wage trends</h3>
<p>The average weekly wages of public school teachers and other college graduates are shown in <strong>Figure A.</strong> These data are national annual averages adjusted only for inflation (i.e., not regression-adjusted). It is important to keep in mind that real improvements in living standards require wages to outpace inflation, which has not been the case for teachers—but has for other college graduates.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-324448 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324448" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324448-35918-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure A</strong> shows that the inflation-adjusted average weekly wages for teachers were relatively flat from 1996 through 2021, indicating that teacher wages, on average, were just keeping up with the rate of inflation. By 2025, teacher wages were 6.2% less than they were on average in 1996. The average weekly wages of other college graduates also experienced a stretch of stagnation, but for a shorter time span (2002–2014), after which real increases ensued. Since 1996, the wages of other college graduates increased by 28.8%.</p>
<p>Illustrated in <strong>Figure A</strong> is a noteworthy fall in teacher wages that occurred in 2022 due to high rates of inflation. A similar decline did not occur in the wages of other college graduates as private-sector wages can be more responsive to economic conditions, whereas that is not possible with public-sector teacher pay. At the time, I posited that a new, lower trend in teacher wages would likely occur post-2022. History has shown that teacher pay has barely kept up with moderate rates of inflation—as indicated by the flat trend in Figure A—and pay increases following 2022 seemed unlikely to be large enough to recoup that significant decline. Thus far, they have not.</p>
<p>Addressing the long-term stagnation of teacher wages requires that future increases in pay <em>meet and</em> <em>exceed rates of inflation in the future </em>to recover the decline in wages since 2021, and to drive an increasing trend in teacher wages to close the gap relative to other college graduates.</p>
<h3>Relative differences: Regression-adjusted trends</h3>
<p>The discussion of weekly wages shown in Figure A is centered around simple averages—meaning, they are not adjusted for fundamental differences that may exist between the samples of teachers and other college graduates. In this section, I move to regression adjusted estimation, which helps to account for ways the two groups may differ fundamentally on factors that typically affect pay—such as age, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and state of residence. For instance, all else being equal, one would expect experienced workers to earn more than younger workers who are just starting out in their careers. Controlling for age within a regression model accounts for such differences across the two samples. Thus, I employ standard regression techniques to estimate weekly wages of public school teachers <em>relative</em> to other&nbsp;similarly situated college graduates working in other professions, which can provide a more apples-to-apples comparison of earnings.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a></p>
<p><strong>Figure B</strong> reports regression-based results that show how much less (or more) teachers earn in weekly wages <em>relative</em> to other college graduates. A weekly wage “penalty” for teachers is reported when the regression estimates suggest that teachers, all else equal, are paid less than other college graduates. Teachers’ weekly wage penalties are reported as negative numbers in&nbsp;Figure B. When teachers are paid <em>relatively</em> more, the reported gap is positive and is referred to as a “premium.” The regression analysis provides estimates for all teachers (which includes a gender control), as well as separately for women and men.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-324506 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324506" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324506-35919-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The historical trends in relative teacher pay are depicted in Figure B. The overall trend represents three decades of teacher wages faring ever more poorly compared with other similarly qualified professionals. In the pre-1994 period, the teacher wage gap averaged 8.7%, but the relative gap worsened considerably starting in the mid-1990s. The teaching penalty hit a record of 26.9% in 2024, before slightly improving to an estimated 25.2% in 2025. However, this slight improvement is unlikely to be sustained, given that similar improvements throughout this long series have historically proven temporary.</p>
<p>In sum, teachers earned on average 74.8 cents on the dollar in 2025 compared with what similar college graduates earned working in other professions—much less than the relative 93.9&nbsp;cents on the dollar that teachers earned in 1996.</p>
<p>Separating the analysis by gender shows that in the period from 1979 through 1993, the relative female teacher weekly wage (i.e., comparing female teachers with other female college graduates) was at a <em>premium</em> that averaged 3.3%. But starting in 1996, the female teacher wage gap quickly went from a small premium to an ever-increasing penalty—landing at a 20.0% penalty in 2025.</p>
<p>My previous research (using decennial Census data) confirmed that, over a longer timeframe, the relative wage estimates for female teachers moved from significant premiums to large penalties. For example, I documented that relative female teacher earnings were at a 14.7% <em>premium</em> in 1960, which lessened to 10.4% in 1970 and to near parity in 1980 (pre-1979 years not shown in Figure B). Using the estimates from 2025, the cumulative change has been a 34.7&nbsp;percentage-point deterioration in the relative wage of female teachers since 1960.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<p>There is an important story behind the declining relative wages experienced by female teachers. Historically, the teaching profession relied on a somewhat captive labor pool of educated women who had few employment opportunities. This is thankfully no longer the case, but increased opportunity costs are a part of the story, and they are reflected in these results. Expanding opportunities for women enabled them to earn more as they entered occupations and professions from which they were once barred.</p>
<p>The wages of male teachers have long been outpaced by those garnered by male college graduates who chose other professions. My previously documented estimates going back to 1960 have never been even close to parity. But similar to their female counterparts, the relative male teacher penalty grew considerably over time—from 20.5% in 1960 to 34.5% in 2025.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>The historically large and worsening male teacher penalty partly explains why about 3 in 4 teachers today are women—a ratio that has not changed much since 1960. The pay penalty experienced by male teachers is unfortunate given the recent statistics and reporting of boys struggling in school. Performing poorly in school is associated with problems encountered later in life—including addiction, mental and physical health issues, and involvement with the criminal justice system.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Further, Thomas Dee (2010) found that a teacher’s gender has large effects on student test performance, teacher perceptions of students, and students’ engagement with academic material.</p>
<p>It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that today a much smaller share of college-educated women choose the teaching profession over expanding opportunities with better pay—even as three-quarters of teachers are women. Moreover, the very large, persisting male teaching penalty goes a long way in explaining why men who may want to teach are compelled to choose other career paths, which are on average much more lucrative.</p>
<h3>Relative teacher weekly wage penalties by state</h3>
<p>To this point, I have reported the relative teacher wage gaps for the country as a whole, but there is a lot of state-by-state variation. To produce regression estimates by state, I pool&nbsp;six years (2020–2025) of CPS data to assure ample sample sizes for each state. Again, I compare public school teachers with nonteacher college graduates <em>within</em> each state and estimate regression-adjusted weekly wage gaps for each state and the District of Columbia.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-324480 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324480" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324480-35920-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>As in previous reports, <strong>Figure C</strong> shows that in no state does the relative (i.e., regression-adjusted) weekly wage for teachers equal or surpass that of their nonteaching college graduate counterparts. The results in Figure C are sorted from the largest (40.7%) to the smallest (10.4%) penalties across the U.S.</p>
<p>The teaching penalty was at least 25% in 25 states, and at least 30% in 11 states. Colorado’s 40.7% teacher penalty is the first time in this research series that a penalty was estimated at or above 40%; on average, teachers in Colorado earned 59.3 cents on the dollar compared with&nbsp;similar college graduates in 2025.</p>
<p>The map in<strong> Figure D</strong> illustrates the state penalties reported in Figure C.</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-324526 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324526" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324526-35921-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Adding benefits to the analysis</h3>
<p>This section adds a nationwide analysis of benefits to see how they affect total compensation between teachers and other college graduates. Teachers are thought to have a “benefits advantage,” which refers to the understanding that, on average in the U.S., teachers generally receive a larger share of their total compensation in benefits—such as health insurance, other insurance, and retirement plans—compared with employment benefits received by other professionals.</p>
<p>Keep in mind that a larger share of total compensation via benefits means a smaller wage share, given that total compensation is made up of these two components. Here, I calculate how the relatively more generous benefits package for teachers partially offsets the large teacher wage penalty.</p>
<p>The BLS Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) series measures the average employer cost per employee hour worked for total compensation, wages and salaries, benefits, and costs as a share of total compensation. I compare benefits packages of primary, secondary, and special education public school teachers with those of comparable workers (specifically, workers in professional occupations).<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> <strong>Table 1</strong> shows a summary of my calculations.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-324528 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324528" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324528-35922-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The first two columns in Table 1 under “W-2 wage share of compensation” report the share of W-2 wages that make up total compensation for professionals in all occupations and for state and local K–12 public school teachers. The shares of compensation for W-2 wages and benefits add up to 100. The W-2 shares allow for an examination of how important wages are relative to benefits in the total compensation package.</p>
<p>In 2025, W-2 wages made up 69.4% of teachers’ total compensation, while the share was 79.3% for nonteaching professionals. That means that for every dollar of teachers’ total compensation, 69.4 cents went to wages, and 30.6 cents went to benefits. For professionals, 79.3 cents went to wages, and 20.7 cents went to benefits. Therefore, for every dollar of total compensation, public school teachers receive more in benefits than other professionals, but less in wages. I refer to this as the “benefits advantage.”<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>The right-side columns in Table 1 provide the information needed to assess total compensation on average for the United States from the “public school teachers” vantage point. The “wage penalty” column reports the teacher wage penalty estimates from Figure B, followed by the benefits advantage calculation for teachers. Combining the two gives us a measure of how teachers compare with other professionals on total compensation, which is reported in the last column. Per usual, the benefits advantage for teachers partially offsets their estimated relative wage disadvantage, but teachers are still left with a significant total compensation gap of 14.5% in 2025—down somewhat from 16.7% in 2024. This slight change was due to a 0.5 percentage point relative increase in the teacher benefits advantage, and a 1.7 percentage point decrease in the relative teacher wage penalty.</p>
<p>As reported in Table 1, the teacher total compensation gap over the last decade has varied in a rather narrow range from 10.2% in 2019 to a high of 17.0% in 2022. Generally, over the long run, the teacher wage penalty has been worsening as the teacher benefits advantage has grown larger—albeit at a slower rate than the wage penalty. Of course, even if the teacher benefits advantage exceeded the large teacher wage penalty, the standard of living for teachers would likely fall as they would have little in the way of earnings to make ends meet.</p>
<h2>How much further can teacher pay fall behind?</h2>
<p>Teaching is one of the most consequential professions—not just for kids and their families, but for the country as a whole. Educating each and every child, regardless of means, is among our highest ideals as a country, and the future of the U.S. economy depends on it. The highest standard is still worth fighting for, even as we have always fallen short of the ideal.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<p>Given the critical role that teachers have on student outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2014), I have been updating this series on teacher pay for over 20 years. After Larry Mishel, Sean Corcoran, and I wrote two books on the subject in 2004 and 2008, it was not obvious that the trends we depicted would continue to get worse—but overall, they have.</p>
<p>The nearly 50-year trends documented in this paper have no doubt already taken a serious toll on the teaching profession. That toll shows up in teacher retention, recruitment, and staffing (Fortin and Fawcett 2023; NCES 2023); college students forgoing teaching careers citing pay as a main barrier (Croft, Guffy, and Vitale 2018); parents actively steering their children into professions that pay better than teaching (PDK 2019); fast-tracking credentials in response to permanent teacher shortages (Povich 2023); the heavy use of unqualified teachers (Tamez-Robledo 2023; Lopez and Van Overschelde 2024); and the reliance on unqualified substitute teachers (Franco and Kemper Patrick 2023).</p>
<p>I have long asserted that providing teachers a standard of living commensurate with that of similar nonteacher professionals is not simply a matter of fairness—teacher pay is a central issue in public education, and thus a matter of national consequence. The quality of a public education hinges on our willingness to fairly and sufficiently invest in both schools and teachers, including the full public school workforce, its infrastructure, and essential wrap-around services (Wething and Bivens 2025).</p>
<p>It would be willful blindness to ignore the toll that the decades-long teacher pay penalty has had on the quality of public education. Regrettably, policymakers have failed to deliver sustained and effective interventions capable of mitigating—let alone substantially improving—the trends outlined in this long-running series. This is an unfortunate reality, especially in a country as wealthy as the United States, with more than enough resources for its public schools to be the envy of the world.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See&nbsp;Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2004, 2008;&nbsp;Allegretto and Tojerow 2014; Allegretto and Mishel 2016, 2018, 2019; and Allegretto 2023 and 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> The teacher sample does not include kindergarten or pre-kindergarten; if included, the teacher pay penalties would be even larger.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Allegretto and Mishel 2019, Appendix A provides a comprehensive discussion of the data and methodologies that were used to produce our teacher weekly wage and total compensation estimates.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> In Allegretto and Mishel 2019, we provide evidence that teachers work weekly hours similar to those of other professionals.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Our earlier work documents that BLS’s imputation method overstates teacher earnings, which is not the case for the other college graduate sample (Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2008, 9).</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> For more about top-code adjustments, see Economic Policy Institute 2026b.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> The wage model includes controls for both public and private school teachers. The weekly wage penalty estimates are based on the coefficient on the public school teacher indicator. Regression for all teachers includes a gender control. The percentage gap is calculated as (e<em>b</em> -1) x 100. See Allegretto and Mishel 2019, Appendix A, for specification details.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2008 for 1960, 1970, and 1980 estimates using decennial censuses.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> The 1960 results are not shown in Figure B. They can be found in Allegretto, Corcoran, and Mishel 2008, 7.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See Abrams 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> The ECEC provides compensation data for a narrower category of “primary, secondary, and special education school teachers” and for a broader category of “teachers.” I analyze the narrower category, which closely matches the definition of teachers in the CPS-ORG data, using data limited to state and local public-sector workers. The inclusion of kindergarten and special education teachers in the benefits analysis does not produce any more substantial differences than if they were excluded (as they are in the CPS sample used to estimate the wage penalty). Greater methodological detail is provided in Appendix A of&nbsp;Allegretto and Mishel 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> My analysis accounts for differences in annual weeks worked, as it is based on the usual weekly wages of teachers and other college graduates, not hourly wages or annual earnings. One reason health and pension costs are higher for teachers is that teacher health benefits are provided for a full year, while teacher salaries are for less than a full year.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> See Allegretto, Garcia, and Weiss 2022. This paper describes inequities in public education funding. We also argue that the federal government should play a larger role in funding public education.</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Abrams, Zara. 2023. <a href="https://www.apa.org/monitor/2023/04/boys-school-challenges-recommendations"><em>Boys Are Facing Key Challenges in School. Inside the Effort to Support Their Success</em></a>.&nbsp;<em>American Psychological Association</em>, April 2023.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia A., Sean P. Corcoran, and Lawrence Mishel. 2004.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/books_teacher_pay/"><em>How Does Teacher Pay Compare? Methodological Challenges and Answers</em></a>. Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia A., Sean P. Corcoran, and Lawrence Mishel. 2008.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/book_teaching_penalty/"><em>The Teaching Penalty: Teacher Pay Losing Ground</em></a>. Washington, D.C.: Economic Policy Institute.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia A., Emma García, and Elaine Weiss. 2022.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/public-education-funding-in-the-us-needs-an-overhaul/"><em>Public Education Funding in the U.S. Needs an Overhaul: How a Larger Federal Role Would Boost Equity and Shield Children from Disinvestment During Downturns</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 2022.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia A., and Lawrence Mishel. 2019.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-teacher-weekly-wage-penalty-hit-21-4-percent-in-2018-a-record-high-trends-in-the-teacher-wage-and-compensation-penalties-through-2018/"><em>The Teacher Weekly Wage Penalty Hit 21.4 Percent in 2018, a Record High</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, April 2019.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia A., and Ilan Tojerow. 2014. <a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2014/article/teacher-staffing-and-pay-differences.htm"><em>Teacher Staffing and Pay Differences: Public and Private Schools</em></a><em>.</em>&nbsp;<em>Monthly Labor Review</em>. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, September 2014.</p>
<p>Blad, Evie. 2024. <a href="https://www.edweek.org/teaching-learning/teachers-report-lower-pay-more-stress-than-workers-in-other-fields/2024/06"><em>Teachers Report Lower Pay, More Stress Than Workers in Other Fields</em></a>.&nbsp;<em>Education Week</em>, June 19, 2024, sec. Teaching &amp; Learning, Teaching Profession.</p>
<p>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2025a. <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_over.htm">Current Population Survey</a>.</p>
<p>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2025b. Employer Costs for Employee Compensation Historical Listing: National Compensation Survey, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/web/ecec.supp.toc.htm"><em>data tables</em></a>. Accessed July 12, 2026.</p>
<p>Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, and Jonah E. Rockoff. 2014. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.9.2633"><em>Measuring the Impacts of Teachers II: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood</em></a><em>. American Economic Review</em>&nbsp;104, no. 9 (September 2014): 2633–2679.</p>
<p>Croft, Michelle, Gretchen Guffy, and Dan Vitale. 2018.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.act.org/content/dam/act/unsecured/documents/pdfs/Encouraging-More-HS-Students-to-Consider-Teaching.pdf"><em>Encouraging More High School Students to Consider Teaching</em></a>. ACT Research &amp; Policy, June 2018.</p>
<p>Dee, Thomas S. 2010 <a href="https://www.educationnext.org/the-why-chromosome/"><em>The Why Chromosome</em></a><em>.</em> <em>Education Next</em>, January 26, 2010.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8,&nbsp;<a href="https://microdata.epi.org/">https://microdata.epi.org</a>. Accessed July 6, 2026.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. “<a href="https://microdata.epi.org/">Methodology: Wage Variables</a>.”&nbsp;<em>EPI Microdata Extracts</em>&nbsp;documentation.</p>
<p>Fortin, Jacey, and Eliza Fawcett. 2023. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/29/us/schools-teacher-shortages.html"><em>How Bad Is the Teacher Shortage? Depends Where You Live</em></a><em>.</em> <em>New York Times</em>, August 29, 2023.</p>
<p>Franco, Marguerite, and Susan Kemper Patrick. 2023. <a href="https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/state-teacher-shortages-vacancy-resource-tool"><em>State Teacher Shortages: Teaching Positions Left Vacant or Filled by Teachers Without Full Certification</em></a>. Learning Policy Institute, July 2023.</p>
<p>Lopez, Minda, and James P. Van Overschelde. 2024. <a href="https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/unlicensed-teachers-dominate-new-teacher-hires-in-rural-texas-schools-19418069"><em>Unlicensed Teachers Now Dominate New Teacher Hires in Rural Texas Schools.</em></a> <em>The Dallas Observer</em>, June 20, 2024.</p>
<p>Merod, Anna. 2023. <a href="https://www.k12dive.com/news/low-pay-teacher-shortages-rand-survey/693346/"><em>Low Pay, Long Hours Top Reasons Teachers Consider Leaving</em></a>.&nbsp;<em>K-12 Dive</em>, September 12, 2023.</p>
<p>National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). 2023. <a href="https://nces.ed.gov/whatsnew/press_releases/10_17_2023.asp"><em>Most Public Schools Face Challenges in Hiring Teachers and Other Personnel Entering the 2023-24 Academic Year</em></a>. October 2023.</p>
<p>Phi Delta Kappan (PDK). 2018.<em> <a href="https://pdkpoll.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/pdkpoll50_2018.pdf">Teaching: Respect but Dwindling Appeal. The 50th Annual PDK Poll of the Public’s Attitudes Toward the Public Schools</a></em>. Supplement to <em>Kappan</em> magazine.</p>
<p>Povich, Elaine S. 2023. <a href="https://stateline.org/2023/07/24/plagued-by-teacher-shortages-some-states-turn-to-fast-track-credentialing/"><em>Plagued By Teacher Shortages, Some States Turn to Fast-Track Credentialing</em></a>. Stateline, July 24, 2023.</p>
<p>Steiner, Elizabeth D., Ashley Woo, and Sy Doan. 2023. <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA1108-9.html"><em>All Work and No Pay — Teachers’ Perceptions of Their Pay and Hours Worked: Findings from the 2023 State of the American Teacher Survey</em></a><em>.</em> RAND Corporation, September 12, 2023.</p>
<p>Tamez-Robledo, Nadia. 2023. <a href="https://www.edsurge.com/news/2023-04-04-these-states-have-the-most-underqualified-teachers-stepping-in-to-fill-open-positions"><em>These States Have the Most &#8216;Underqualified&#8217; Teachers Stepping in to Fill Open Positions</em></a>. <em>EdSurge</em>, April 4, 2023.</p>
<p>Wething, Hilary and Josh Bivens. 2025. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-investment-in-public-education-is-at-risk-vouchers-state-budget-austerity-and-federal-attacks-on-the-department-of-education-threaten-childrens-futures/">U.S. Investment in Public Education is at Risk: Vouchers, State Budget Austerity, and Federal Attacks on the Department of Education Threaten Children’s Futures</a>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, August 2025.&nbsp;</p>
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