The failure of Trump’s trade and manufacturing policy

A shorter version of this post appeared in the Detroit News on 12/2/2018: GM Cutbacks a result of overvalued dollar.

Last month, General Motors announced plant closures in the U.S. that could lead to roughly 14,700 layoffs by the end of 2019. The shutdowns will have the biggest impact in industrial states like Ohio and Michigan, where key plants in Detroit-Hamtramck, Lordstown, and Warren are being closed. But the closures also have wider implications for American industry—and not just the machine shops and fabricators that produce rubber, steel, and glass components for auto assembly. America’s manufacturers are all struggling with the same issue—an overvalued dollar that puts them at risk from rising trade deficits. And it all derives from flawed Trump administration economic policies.

Trump’s tax cuts and increased government spending for defense and nondefense needs are widening the U.S. budget deficit, which will top $1 trillion in 2020 (5 percent of GDP). On top of that, Trump’s tariffs on China have backfired. China has reduced the value of the yuan 10 percent this year, and its trade surplus with the United States has increased 10 percent over the same period last year—even faster than the overall U.S. goods trade deficit, which is up 9.4 percent in the same period. The IMF projects that the overall U.S. current account deficit (the broadest measure of trade in goods, services and income) will nearly double over the next four years.

As a result of the rising dollar and increasing current account deficit, the U.S. goods trade deficit will increase to between $1.2 trillion and $2 trillion by 2020, an increase of $400 billion to $1.2 trillion above the $807 billion U.S. goods trade deficit in 2017, as shown below. This will directly eliminate between 2.5 and 7.5 million U.S. jobs, mostly in manufacturing (because 85 percent of U.S. goods trade consists of manufactured products). The collapse in output, especially in the capital intensive manufacturing sector, will decimate investment—and taken together, both will result in large additional job losses as income and spending collapse, resulting in a steep recession if nothing is done to reduce the over-valued dollar. The dollar must fall by at least 25 to 30 percent (on a real, trade-weighted basis) to rebalance U.S. trade and avert the coming trade tsunami that’s baked into the economy as a result of the rising trade deficit.

To see why the GM announcement is the canary in the coal mine, consider its position. Why is the company taking such a drastic step? CEO Mary Barra says the company is trying to make itself leaner, and shifting resources toward newer electric vehicles and self-driving cars.

But that’s not the entire issue. The U.S. dollar is now substantially overvalued—which keeps making imports cheaper and U.S. exports more expensive. GM is clearly trying to protect itself against a future economic downturn. It’s well known in the business community that the prospects for a recession in the next few years are quite high. This is the chickens coming home to roost on the broader Trump economic policies.

The dollar’s overvaluation stems from a rather grievous irony. The United States is the epicenter of the world’s financial markets, with overseas investors continually purchasing dollar-denominated assets and securities. That’s certainly good for Wall Street. But it invites a downside.

A continuing influx of foreign capital is driving up demand for the dollar. Trump appointees Jay Powell (Chair) and Randy Quarles (Vice Chair) at the Fed also bear substantial responsibility for recent increases in the dollar, due rapid interest rate increases within the past year, which have made U.S. investments more attractive to foreign investors.

And the resulting rise in the dollar is making America’s exports—including the cars built by General Motors—more expensive for overseas consumers. It also makes imported goods cheaper in the U.S. market. These low-cost imports deliver growing profits for multinational operations like Apple—and yield a triple-whammy for U.S. manufacturers competing against imports that keep getting cheaper.

The situation has gotten worse of late because President Trump’s economic policies have actually reinforced the dollar’s rise. Last year’s tax cuts and 2018’s spending increases are swelling a budget deficit projected to exceed $1 trillion by 2020. Just as textbooks predict, increased federal borrowing (along with Fed policy) is driving up short- and long-term interest rates, attracting even more foreign capital—and further strengthening the dollar.

The president’s policies are now backfiring on GM and domestic manufacturers because the dollar has increased 5.4 percent in value in the past year alone. And China has devalued its currency, the yuan by 10 percent this year—more than offsetting the impact of the president’s tariffs. Thus the irony that President Trump’s tax cuts and increased defense spending have short-changed working Americans even as they’ve swelled corporate coffers. The administration believes tax cuts will stimulate investment and job creation. But companies—including GM—have used the proceeds to increase dividend payments, buybacks, and CEO compensation—not worker wages.

Figure A

U.S. real, trade-weighted, dollar has gained 20% since 2013, including 5.4% since January 2018

Date Index
Jan-2013 83.0072
Feb-2013 83.8660
Mar-2013 84.2735
Apr-2013 83.6784
May-2013 83.9714
Jun-2013 84.5956
Jul-2013 85.0344
Aug-2013 84.9739
Sep-2013 84.5745
Oct-2013 83.6290
Nov-2013 84.3156
Dec-2013 84.5068
Jan-2014 85.3151
Feb-2014 85.4637
Mar-2014 85.3800
Apr-2014 84.9779
May-2014 84.6391
Jun-2014 84.7046
Jul-2014 84.4719
Aug-2014 85.1031
Sep-2014 86.2371
Oct-2014 87.2109
Nov-2014 88.4908
Dec-2014 90.2616
Jan-2015 91.8290
Feb-2015 92.9646
Mar-2015 94.6199
Apr-2015 93.6767
May-2015 93.0333
Jun-2015 93.7821
Jul-2015 95.3466
Aug-2015 96.9659
Sep-2015 97.4868
Oct-2015 96.5737
Nov-2015 98.0522
Dec-2015 98.8458
Jan-2016 101.0772
Feb-2016 99.7273
Mar-2016 97.6935
Apr-2016 96.3411
May-2016 97.4197
Jun-2016 97.8018
Jul-2016 98.2944
Aug-2016 97.5140
Sep-2016 98.2575
Oct-2016  99.1800
Nov-2016 101.5569
Dec-2016 103.2522
Jan-2017 103.1325
Feb-2017 101.7496
Mar-2017 100.9806
Apr-2017 100.0883
May-2017 99.5038
Jun-2017 98.1389
Jul-2017 96.6850
Aug-2017 95.7392
Sep-2017 95.1008
Oct-2017 96.6714
Nov-2017 96.8921
Dec-2017 96.6153
Jan-2018 94.6413
Feb-2018 94.9467
Mar-2018 95.1990
Apr-2018 95.3401
May-2018 97.9133
Jun-2018 99.3953
Jul-2018 99.7208
Aug-2018 100.7764
Sep-2018 99.1850
Oct-2018 99.7789
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve of the Federal Reserve System, Foreign Exchange Rates -- H.10. Price adjusted Broad dollar index -- monthly index.

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Figure B

Chinese yuan has fallen 10 percent against the U.S. dollar since early April, 2018

$US/yuan
2018-01-02 0.154059
2018-01-03 0.153822
2018-01-04 0.154048
2018-01-05 0.154143
2018-01-08 0.153917
2018-01-09 0.153226
2018-01-10 0.153716
2018-01-11 0.15395
2018-01-12 0.154782
2018-01-16 0.155292
2018-01-17 0.155448
2018-01-18 0.155824
2018-01-19 0.156274
2018-01-22 0.156165
2018-01-23 0.15625
2018-01-24 0.157109
2018-01-25 0.158255
2018-01-26 0.15823
2018-01-29 0.157908
2018-01-30 0.15823
2018-01-31 0.159132
2018-02-01 0.158808
2018-02-02 0.15877
2018-02-05 0.159109
2018-02-06 0.15916
2018-02-07 0.159619
2018-02-08 0.158173
2018-02-09 0.158816
2018-02-12 0.158103
2018-02-13 0.157778
2018-02-14 0.157634
2018-02-15 0.157634
2018-02-16 0.157634
2018-02-20 0.157851
2018-02-21 0.157851
2018-02-22 0.157552
2018-02-23 0.157906
2018-02-26 0.158441
2018-02-27 0.158305
2018-02-28 0.158028
2018-03-01 0.157319
2018-03-02 0.157659
2018-03-05 0.157503
2018-03-06 0.158496
2018-03-07 0.158165
2018-03-08 0.157756
2018-03-09 0.158015
2018-03-12 0.158053
2018-03-13 0.158278
2018-03-14 0.158378
2018-03-15 0.158223
2018-03-16 0.157978
2018-03-19 0.158
2018-03-20 0.157908
2018-03-21 0.158228
2018-03-22 0.157953
2018-03-23 0.158453
2018-03-26 0.159528
2018-03-27 0.159284
2018-03-28 0.158866
2018-03-29 0.159043
2018-03-30 0.159424
2018-04-02 0.159274
2018-04-03 0.159031
2018-04-04 0.158617
2018-04-05 0.158617
2018-04-06 0.158617
2018-04-09 0.158642
2018-04-10 0.159241
2018-04-11 0.159604
2018-04-12 0.159043
2018-04-13 0.159426
2018-04-16 0.159357
2018-04-17 0.159226
2018-04-18 0.159434
2018-04-19 0.159324
2018-04-20 0.158869
2018-04-23 0.158333
2018-04-24 0.158642
2018-04-25 0.158138
2018-04-26 0.157878
2018-04-27 0.157916
2018-04-30 0.157916
2018-05-01 0.157916
2018-05-02 0.157208
2018-05-03 0.157431
2018-05-04 0.15726
2018-05-07 0.157134
2018-05-08 0.157011
2018-05-09 0.15727
2018-05-10 0.157629
2018-05-11 0.157896
2018-05-14 0.157828
2018-05-15 0.156838
2018-05-16 0.156971
2018-05-17 0.157122
2018-05-18 0.156818
2018-05-21 0.156703
2018-05-22 0.157085
2018-05-23 0.156556
2018-05-24 0.156846
2018-05-25 0.156487
2018-05-29 0.155855
2018-05-30 0.155824
2018-05-31 0.156016
2018-06-01 0.155812
2018-06-04 0.156128
2018-06-05 0.156148
2018-06-06 0.156617
2018-06-07 0.156519
2018-06-08 0.156174
2018-06-11 0.15625
2018-06-12 0.15627
2018-06-13 0.156387
2018-06-14 0.156299
2018-06-15 0.15533
2018-06-18 0.15533
2018-06-19 0.154316
2018-06-20 0.154528
2018-06-21 0.154083
2018-06-22 0.153782
2018-06-25 0.152999
2018-06-26 0.15207
2018-06-27 0.151534
2018-06-28 0.150978
2018-06-29 0.151124
2018-07-02 0.150078
2018-07-03 0.150675
2018-07-05 0.150736
2018-07-06 0.150611
2018-07-09 0.151233
2018-07-10 0.150839
2018-07-11 0.149781
2018-07-12 0.150083
2018-07-13 0.149477
2018-07-16 0.149553
2018-07-17 0.149214
2018-07-18 0.148896
2018-07-19 0.147708
2018-07-20 0.1478
2018-07-23 0.147217
2018-07-24 0.147249
2018-07-25 0.147802
2018-07-26 0.147351
2018-07-27 0.146849
2018-07-30 0.146839
2018-07-31 0.146977
2018-08-01 0.146727
2018-08-02 0.146242
2018-08-03 0.146394
2018-08-06 0.145985
2018-08-07 0.146456
2018-08-08 0.146319
2018-08-09 0.14663
2018-08-10 0.146075
2018-08-13 0.14518
2018-08-14 0.14533
2018-08-15 0.144238
2018-08-16 0.145366
2018-08-17 0.145476
2018-08-20 0.145887
2018-08-21 0.146105
2018-08-22 0.146199
2018-08-23 0.145459
2018-08-24 0.146994
2018-08-27 0.146746
2018-08-28 0.14702
2018-08-29 0.146649
2018-08-30 0.146167
2018-08-31 0.146413
2018-09-04 0.146141
2018-09-05 0.146477
2018-09-06 0.146366
2018-09-07 0.146158
2018-09-10 0.14589
2018-09-11 0.145552
2018-09-12 0.145828
2018-09-13 0.146184
2018-09-14 0.145618
2018-09-17 0.1459
2018-09-18 0.145792
2018-09-19 0.146058
2018-09-20 0.146081
2018-09-21 0.14586
2018-09-24 0.14586
2018-09-25 0.145705
2018-09-26 0.145427
2018-09-27 0.14518
2018-09-28 0.145603
2018-10-01 0.145603
2018-10-02 0.145603
2018-10-03 0.145603
2018-10-04 0.145603
2018-10-05 0.145603
2018-10-09 0.144473
2018-10-10 0.144459
2018-10-11 0.14518
2018-10-12 0.144546
2018-10-15 0.144653
2018-10-16 0.144714
2018-10-17 0.144377
2018-10-18 0.144161
2018-10-19 0.144319
2018-10-22 0.143997
2018-10-23 0.144148
2018-10-24 0.144051
2018-10-25 0.143933
2018-10-26 0.14404
2018-10-29 0.143668
2018-10-30 0.143548
2018-10-31 0.143396
2018-11-01 0.144498
2018-11-02 0.145151
2018-11-05 0.144406
2018-11-06 0.144567
2018-11-07 0.144563
2018-11-08 0.144263
2018-11-09 0.143775
2018-11-13 0.14379
2018-11-14 0.143885
2018-11-15 0.144134
2018-11-16 0.144161
2018-11-19 0.144096
2018-11-20 0.143993
2018-11-21 0.144409
2018-11-23 0.143933 
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Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Foreign Exchange Rates – H.10: Historical Rates for the Chinese Yuan Renminbi

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Because the dollar keeps rising, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) foresees a perfect storm. Rising imports will drive America’s current account deficit up from $449 billion in 2017 to more than $800 billion in 2022. Concurrently, the U.S. goods trade deficit could double in the next four years, rising from $807 billion in 2017 to between $1.2 and $2.0 trillion. Such a massive increase could potentially tip the nation into a new recession.

Figure C

The Trump bump in the U.S. trade deficit, 2012–2022

U.S. current account deficit ($billion) U.S. current account, share of GDP
2012 $426.83 2.6%
2013 $348.80 2.1%
2014 $365.20 2.1%
2015 $407.77 2.2%
2016 $432.87 2.3%
2017 $449.14 2.3%
2018 $515.75 2.5%
2019 $652.13 3.0%
2020 $709.42 3.2%
2021 $769.36 3.3%
2022 $809.93 3.4%
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Source: EPI analysis of International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Data by Countries. October 2018. Data after 2016 are IMF estimates.

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Growing gap between current account and goods trade deficits bodes ill for U.S. manufacturing

Historically, and especially between 2000 and 2006, the U.S. current account and goods trade balances tended to track one-another nearly dollar for dollar. However, since 2007, there has been a growing gap between these two measures, with the goods trade deficit rapidly increasing relative to the current account deficit, as shown below. There are three reasons for this. First, since the mid-2000s, the United States has begun to run a sizeable surplus in “services” trade (not shown), which reached $243 billion (1.3 percent of U.S. GDP) in 2017. To some, this sounds like the desirable symbol of a “modern” economy. But in fact, over half of the U.S. services surplus is in three categories: financial services (banks, brokers, and credit card companies, 23 percent); professional and management consulting (15 percent); and charges for intellectual property (13 percent). These “services” are simply rents, or profits accruing to investors, and high-wage industries in finance and business consulting. They generate few good jobs for non-college educated workers, of the type supported by manufacturing, in the domestic economy. Of the rest, “travel” is the largest single category, which is dominated by education (another high-wage sector, 13 percent) and other personal travel (18 percent), but the later primarily supports low wage jobs in industries such as accommodations and food services.

The second major, growing component of trade is growth of “primary” income, including investment income and payments to employees (such as foreign executives), which generated $217 billion of net income (1.3 percent of GDP) in 2017. The dangerous irony of the modern global economy is that outsourcing, which has shifted production to foreign countries, has generated rapidly growing flows of foreign profits and rents (royalties, profits, and wages paid in banking and consulting services) to U.S. and foreign multinationals. These flows of capital income have directly offset the growing U.S. deficits in goods trade, which have displaced millions of manufacturing jobs. In total the United States has lost 5 million manufacturing jobs since 1998, most due to growing trade deficits with China and other large exporters. The troubling irony is that outsourcing is generating a flow of profits and services income that is offsetting growing goods trade deficits in the broadest trade measure (the current account deficit), effectively disguising the negative impacts of globalization on the domestic economy.

The third major component shift in U.S. trade patterns has occurred in petroleum products. A decade ago, in the mid-2000s, the United States ran a trade deficit in crude and refined petroleum which reached 2.1 percent of GDP in 2006 (peaking at 2.8 percent of GDP in 2008). However, the rise of fracking in the United States, combined with a decline in world oil prices and rising U.S. exports of refined petroleum products, has reduced the U.S. trade deficit in crude and refined petroleum to only 0.3 percent of GDP. The U.S. trade deficit in non-oil goods (which is dominated by trade in manufactured products) reached near-peak levels of $732 billion in 2017 (3.8 percent of GDP). This is much larger than the previous peak of $520 billion in 2006, which was also 3.8 percent of GDP. Thus, the rise in U.S. oil production has also tended to obscure the impacts of the rapid growth in the U.S. non-oil goods trade deficit, over the past decade. The non-oil goods trade deficit is poised to explode as a direct result of the failure of Trump’s trade and economic policies.

On the other hand, The U.S. current account deficit—the broadest measure of our trade in goods, services and income—was widely viewed as relatively stable in 2017 at only 2.4 percent of GDP (versus an all-time peak of 5.8 percent of GDP in 2006). Thus, today’s current account trade deficit is viewed as manageable by most economists. However, in manufacturing and other traded goods sectors (such as farming), the goods trade deficit (and especially in non-oil goods) is reaching crisis levels. This explains why it is so important to focus on future trends in goods trade, as shown in the bottom two lines of Figure D, below.

Figure D

U.S. current account and goods trade balance, actual and forecast, 2010–2023

Alternate goods trade balance Estimate* IMF WEO goods trade balance IMF WEO current account balance
2010 -631.158 -648.677 -431.266
2011 -684.672 -740.646 -445.663
2012 -686.817 -741.171 -426.833
2013 -586.648 -702.245 -348.801
2014 -640.815 -751.494 -365.199
2015 -745.191 -761.855 -407.765
2016 -822.59 -752.507 -432.874
2017 -886.2 -811.212 -449.141
2018 -1055.17 -851.471 -515.75
2019 -1381.66 -989.17 -652.127
2020 -1554.69 -1042.79 -709.418
2021 -1742.07 -1102.8 -769.364
2022 -1892.88 -1162.9 -809.928
2023 -1950.97  -1178.9  -809.563
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*Based on IMF CA forecast and trend of the ratio of the actual trade balance to current account forecast.

Note: Data labels are rounded to the nearest hundred.

Source: EPI analysis of IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2018

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The U.S. goods trade balance forecasts (for the 2018 through 2023) shown in Figure D are based on two alternative projections. The first projection (shown in red) is based on IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) projections of trends in the volume of goods exports and imports. However, these are overly conservative because they fail to reflect changes in import and export prices. The second “alternate goods trade balance estimate” is based on the trend growth in the ration of the goods trade to the current account balance (this ratio increased 3.4 percent per year in the 2018-2023 period).

Both scenarios lead to goods trade deficits well of at least $1.2 trillion by 2023, and possibly as much as $2.0 trillion. Given the rapid decline in U.S. trade deficits in petroleum projects, these deficits will be devastating for the U.S. manufacturing sector, likely giving rise to massive job loss on the scale experience in the 2000-2007 period, when 3.5 million U.S. manufacturing jobs were lost.

There’s still time to sort through the mess, however. Washington can take coordinated action to lower the value of the dollar by at least 25 to 30 percent. The last time the United States intentionally engineered a major currency realignment was with the Reagan administration in 1985. Treasury Secretary James Baker negotiated the Plaza Accord with Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—achieving a 30 percent depreciation in the U.S. dollar. The U.S. goods and service trade deficit subsequently fell from $122 billion in 1985, and a peak of $152 billion in 1987, to $31 billion in 1991(the trade deficit usually worsens for two years after the dollar depreciates, and then improves rapidly, in what is known as the j-curve effect).

Notably, House Democrats played a key role in the Plaza Accord. The threat of Rostenkowski-Gephardt trade legislation—which would have imposed a 25 percent surcharge on imports from Japan, Brazil, Korea, Taiwan, and others—motivated finance ministers to work with Baker on a currency deal. The threat of high, permanent tariffs lead foreign officials to seek out alternatives that would rebalance trade without introducing new trade barriers.

With GM and other manufacturers now struggling, Democrats should see an opportunity to focus on middle class jobs—starting with a revaluation of the U.S. dollar. They can force the president’s hand by threatening to impose broad, across the board tariffs on all countries with large, persistent, global trade surpluses, including China, Japan, Korea and Germany and other big surplus countries in Europe (Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) or the entire E.U. There are also other tools to rebalance the dollar, such as taxing foreign capital inflows. But it is perhaps best to confront a man such as Trump in a language the he understands: with the threat of higher, across-the-board tariffs. The \president campaigned on rebuilding American manufacturing, and delivering more jobs and higher wages. Instead, it could be the newly Democratic House that actually achieves this—by pressing 1980s-style trade legislation as the impetus to revalue the dollar in the same way the Reagan administration wisely did, 30 years ago.