Rising authoritarianism and the need to upend the failed Southern economic development model

For generations, Southern politicians backed by powerful business interests have promoted a Southern economic development model—characterized by low wages, regressive taxation, lax environmental regulations, a weak social safety net, and vicious opposition to unions—while claiming such policies will attract business and thereby generate regional economic gains. But data actually show a grim reality. The South lags all other regions on most indicators of economic health including job growth and wages, and Southern workers and their families experience significantly higher rates of poverty than in other parts of the country (Childers 2024a).

The truth is that this Southern economic development model was never designed to benefit most Southerners; rather, it is historically rooted in efforts of white plantation owners to retain their wealth following emancipation and ensure continued access to the labor of Black people for as little compensation as possible (Childers 2025). Foundational to these efforts was an authoritarian approach to state governance that suppressed popular democracy and worker organizing—an approach that also sanctioned prison labor, sharecropping, a century of Jim Crow laws, lynching, and other forms of state-sponsored terror and exploitation. Until partially challenged by federal legal and policy interventions won by post-WWII civil rights movements, many Southern states for decades held elections that served merely to provide a cover of legitimacy to one-party rule of white, wealthy elites—functionally excluding Black voters from the electorate and blocking working-class constituencies from any meaningful participation in governance (Mickey 2015; Perez 2024; Mast 2025).

Today, the Trump administration’s increasingly authoritarian actions echo this troubling Southern history. At their foundation, the administration’s approaches to bypassing constitutional checks and balances—while rolling back civil rights, worker rights, and environmental protections; terrorizing immigrant communities; deploying military troops in U.S. cities; and attempting to engineer election outcomes via gerrymandering and other forms of voter suppression—are rooted in authoritarian models developed and tested in the U.S. South, and that Black, brown, and immigrant communities across the country are no stranger to.

Recent attempts to terminate federal employee collective bargaining agreements, for example, are familiar to public employees in Southern states for whom collective bargaining has long been banned or severely restricted. The Trump administration’s use of military-style policing in communities across the country echoes Southern histories of weaponizing law enforcement (or National Guard troops) to suppress organizing and instill fear, while prioritizing the expansion of the carceral state over investments in housing, education, and public services. Trump’s efforts to override the authority of state officials mirror Southern state uses of abusive preemption laws to strip policymaking authority from local governments. And administration attempts to halt clean energy investments and environmental protections threaten to repeat harms familiar in Black and brown communities in the South, where corporations have insisted on lax environmental regulations that allow them to degrade air, water, and climate quality, while profiting from the exploitation of local natural resources and labor.

Seizing opportunities to reverse decades of anti-worker, anti-democratic policymaking in the South at a moment of rising authoritarianism in the U.S. is a daunting and unavoidably urgent challenge. It will require robust new forms of multiracial organizing and labor-community coalition building across a broad set of industries in the South. Labor-community coalitions can leverage community benefits agreements (CBAs) as a powerful tool to transform economic power relations in Southern workplaces and communities. Because CBAs are private agreements between labor-community coalitions and project owners, they do not rely on government action and can therefore shape economic outcomes of major projects even in otherwise hostile political environments. CBAs have traditionally been fought for and won by labor and community groups coming together and building necessary public pressure to hold developers, corporations, and elected leaders accountable for ensuring that public investments in major new developments truly benefit workers and communities.

In this report, we analyze the potential for labor-community coalitions to pursue strong CBAs that secure significant economic benefits for Southern manufacturing workers and communities, drawing on examples of existing agreements to model potential impacts. We examine the scale of recent public investments in Southern manufacturing and examine how strong CBAs on major publicly-subsidized private projects could improve the quality of newly created construction and production jobs; open up pathways to unionization; ensure equitable hiring and training opportunities for local residents; and address community needs such as child care, affordable housing, and natural resource protection.

We contend that upending the failed Southern economic development model and the authoritarian structures that underpin it will require building new forms of labor and community power to increase union density in the South. Well-known research shows that unions promote economic equality and help workers win improvements in pay, benefits, and working conditions (Economic Policy Institute 2021). But unions also powerfully affect people’s lives outside of work. They help foster solidarity, increase democratic participation, enable working-class communities to shape economic policies affecting their lives, and serve as a counterweight to corporate power in our economy and democracy (McNicholas et al. 2025). Historically, unions have been engines of resistance to entrenched and undemocratic power—mobilizing working people to challenge inequality, defend civil rights, and push back against authoritarianism in all its forms. For all these reasons, strengthening labor-community coalitions and pathways to unionization in growing Southern industrial sectors is not just good economic policy—it is also a democratic imperative amid national authoritarian backsliding.

Worker and community power can ensure new manufacturing investments yield good jobs and community benefits

The latest wave of manufacturing growth in the South presents both opportunities and pitfalls for workers and communities. Southern states continue to lure businesses—including large manufacturing facilities—with promises of low corporate tax rates, low wages, lax regulations, and massive public subsidies. The automotive manufacturing industry has been a key recipient of public subsidies, receiving billions of dollars from Southern states in recent decades (Childers 2024a; Todd 2021). This system of low taxation and corporate giveaways starves other essential public goods, like education and social safety net programs (Mast 2025b). Likewise, weak or nonexistent environmental regulations have contributed to toxic sites and resource degradation that disproportionately affect Black and brown families, reflecting often intentional decisions to site hazardous facilities in low-income communities of color (Bergman 2019).

Some announced manufacturing projects have been cancelled or reduced in size after the Trump administration’s slashing of federal supports for strategic industries, but many projects launched during the Biden administration continue to move forward. These manufacturing investments, both in traditional industries and nascent ones such as electric vehicle (EV) and EV battery manufacturing, are spurring significant job growth in some Southern communities. Yet past experience shows that new investments and resulting jobs are unlikely to generate economic benefits for most Southerners unless local residents are able to ensure that developers and corporations respect workers’ rights, protect local natural resources, and contribute a fair share toward addressing priority community needs.

Community benefits agreements can be powerful vehicles for communities to secure lasting local economic benefits from major industrial development, at both new and existing facilities. A CBA is a legally enforceable contract between a private developer or company and a local coalition—typically made up of labor, community, faith, environmental, and other grassroots organizations—that details how a project will benefit workers and the community, and in turn how the community will support the project (including via potential public investment). Benefits spelled out in a CBA can include commitments to strong labor standards; respect for workers’ rights to organize; equitable workforce recruitment, training, and hiring practices; affordable housing; environmental protections; or a broad range of other community-identified priorities. CBAs are a well-developed model for responsible community development—so far mostly, but not entirely, in regions outside the South—and have been used for many different types of major projects including sports stadiums, events centers, manufacturing plants, airports, transit projects, and more (WRI n.d.).

CBAs can likewise mitigate risks for project developers by ensuring local project support and addressing important concerns early on, whereas failure to engage local communities in major development decisions can otherwise lead to strong community opposition, interruption of development, obstacles to obtaining necessary siting permits or rezoning approvals, or significant legal costs. In an example from June 2024, developers shelved plans for a $1.3 billion data center in Indiana after facing significant local opposition over environmental concerns (Fazili et al. 2025).

Because a CBA is a private, legally binding agreement, it does not require government action and can be used to shape outcomes of major projects even in contexts (as in most of the South) where state legislators have preempted local governments from establishing their own job quality or environmental standards (EPI 2025a). That being said, state and local governments can still have a role in facilitating, negotiating, or enforcing community benefits. Cities like Detroit and Cleveland have ordinances requiring developers of projects using public resources to engage in a community benefits plan process (City of Detroit n.d.; City of Cleveland n.d.). In 2005, Atlanta passed an ordinance specifying worker and community benefits for the Beltline redevelopment (WRI 2025). However, government involvement in community benefits plans does not guarantee strong agreements on its own. A strong labor-community coalition remains essential for securing meaningful community benefits.

Another key strength of a CBA is that it can set standards across all stages of a project’s development to ensure long-term benefits for the community at large. Private developers or public entities sometimes negotiate Project Labor Agreements (PLAs) or Community Workforce Agreements (CWAs) with building trades unions and community partners to set wages, working conditions, and timelines for the construction phase of a complex development project. A CBA can be negotiated alongside a PLA to also ensure pathways to quality jobs for local residents during the operational phases of a project, including any future expansions of the facility or additions to its workforce. A CBA can also secure commitments to build affordable housing, strengthen environmental standards, and provide other benefits to the community such as child care, public parks, or other community spaces.

To be successful, a CBA must also include defined enforcement mechanisms that hold all parties to the agreement accountable. It must clearly establish the obligations of each party, metrics for measuring progress, and ongoing monitoring of compliance with the agreement’s provisions (Last 2025; PWF and CBLC 2016). If the company or the coalition fails to make good-faith efforts on the agreement’s commitments, an arbitration process is initiated. While monitoring of the agreement is an ongoing responsibility of all members of the coalition, providing a pathway for workers to organize in the operational phase of a project is of particular importance. A newly established union at the project site is well-positioned to monitor the commitments of the CBA and hold the company accountable over the long term.

Organizers and advocates should be clear-eyed that while strong CBAs can yield powerful economic outcomes, such agreements are by no means easy to win. There are generally no legal requirements for a particular company or developer to recognize or engage with a labor-community coalition, much less to agree to negotiate and implement a CBA. Building the broad-based, durable coalitions and leverage necessary to compel private interests to engage in CBA negotiations (and then to implement and enforce the terms of a CBA) is unavoidably a challenging, long-term, resource-intensive organizing project. And like any worthwhile organizing, the formation of strong, durable labor-community coalitions is itself a key outcome of successful CBA campaigns. Vastly expanding the capacity of broad-based coalitions and labor, faith, environmental, and other grassroots organizations to gradually build community and worker power in Southern communities is the most essential ingredient for transforming existing power imbalances and, ultimately, upending the failed Southern economic development model.

Indeed, recent initiatives to win CBAs in Southern states have proven so threatening to some corporate interests that they have sought to undermine them. In 2025, Tennessee Republicans passed legislation prohibiting any company that enters into a CBA from receiving state economic development funds—aiming to create obstacles to replication of a highly successful CBA covering Nashville’s soccer stadium, and to discourage a coalition of West Tennessee residents and allied groups calling on Ford and SK Innovation to negotiate a CBA covering its massive BlueOval electric vehicle and battery manufacturing complex (Abrams 2025). In Tennessee and elsewhere, however, labor-community coalitions are nonetheless continuing to organize to ensure that massive, publicly subsidized new facilities yield good jobs and community benefits.

A new wave of Southern manufacturing is an opportunity to transform working conditions in growing industries—and across the South

Growth in Southern manufacturing industries presents a significant opportunity for labor-community coalitions to shape labor standards and community benefits in new plants and facilities—and to shape economic outcomes for generations of Southern workers to come. In recent years, the South has seen a wave of manufacturing investments. Between 2017 and 2023, manufacturing construction doubled in the East South Central Census division (Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi) (O’Brien 2023). The West South Central division (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) has the highest amount of manufacturing construction spending of any division in the U.S. These investments are part of a long-term trend of manufacturing industries locating in the South, which in recent years was accelerated by large federal investments through the Inflation Reduction Act, Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and CHIPS and Science Act. These federal investments included both direct public subsidies and tax credits to businesses that invested in key clean energy manufacturing industries such as the production of batteries, electric vehicles, solar panels, and wind energy products.

In contrast to the typical economic development approach of many Southern states, some recent federal investments have included incentives meant to encourage strong labor standards on projects receiving public funds. While the future of many of these investments (and accompanying incentives) is now uncertain, the U.S. has in the past two years experienced its largest investment in clean energy manufacturing ever, and much of that has occurred in Southern states.{{1}} Since the third quarter of 2023, more than $125 billion worth of clean energy manufacturing investments were announced across Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas (CET 2025). Advancing even a portion of these projects would result in thousands of jobs for Southern workers.

Independent of the future of federal support for clean energy manufacturing, the South will likely continue to be the largest manufacturing employer of all U.S. regions. Figure A shows manufacturing employment by region in the United States since 1990. While manufacturing employment overall has fallen during the last three decades, the South has retained the largest share of manufacturing employment of any region. In 2024, 35% of U.S. manufacturing employment was in the South. Furthermore, since 2010, manufacturing employment in the South has grown by 17%, the quickest growth of any region.

Figure A

Manufacturing jobs are often considered to be well-paid, benefit-providing “middle-class” jobs, but there is nothing inherent to the sector that determines their quality. Manufacturing jobs in some industries became “good jobs” thanks to relatively high levels of unionization during the mid-20th century, which improved wages, benefits, and working conditions (Bayard et al. 2024; Rhinehart and McNicholas 2020). As Figure B shows, unionization in manufacturing has fallen in all regions since 1983, but the South has almost without exception had the lowest unionization rate of any region.

Conservative Southern policymakers have long been hostile to union organizing. For example, every Southern state except Maryland and Delaware has passed anti-union so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws, which make it harder for workers to form, join, and sustain unions. Southern states like Florida and Arkansas were among the first to pass such laws in the 1940s, amid a wave of big business backlash against new federal labor laws and white supremacist campaigns to maintain racial hierarchies and suppress multiracial worker organizing. RTW laws suppress unionization rates and, as a result, have driven down wages for both union and nonunion workers alike across the South (Sherer and Gould 2025; Childers 2023).

Figure B

In 2025, Southern manufacturing had a 6.7% unionization rate—slightly below the national unionization rate for private-sector workers (6.8%). Unionization in Southern manufacturing grew by more than a percentage point between 2024 and 2025, a notable one-year reversal of the industry’s long-standing unionization decline, consistent with overall union gains in the South (McNicholas, Poydock, and Shierholz 2026). Nevertheless, Southern manufacturing’s unionization rate remains well below the Midwest’s (11.2%), the region where manufacturing is the most heavily unionized. Unions have a strong impact on job quality because they leverage worker power collectively to raise wages, win benefits like health care and retirement, and enact other meaningful workplace improvements, such as improved health and safety standards. These benefits can extend beyond unionized workers themselves, helping set standards across a workplace, and with enough density, across an industry.

As unionization declines in an industry or region, so does job quality. For instance, as unionization rates have fallen in auto manufacturing, the pay advantage for auto workers compared with the median worker has declined significantly (Barrett and Bivens 2021). Figure C demonstrates how this relationship holds across regions in 2025. Manufacturing jobs in the South have a pay advantage of 7%, the lowest of any region. Southern manufacturing workers also experience the lowest median hourly pay of any region ($24.41).{{2}}

Figure C

The Southern economic development model clearly hurts the region’s workers by denying them their right to organize and suppressing their wages, but there are harmful spillover effects for their communities as well. Corporate tax breaks with no strings attached provide billions of dollars to corporations that could otherwise be used to invest in schools and other essential government services. These types of tax breaks might be worthy of consideration if manufacturing employers were required to create high-quality jobs for local workers and make long-term investments in local community development needs (i.e., housing, infrastructure, education, etc.). Without such protections, they are simply taxpayer-funded giveaways that often drain the very resources needed to develop the local workforce recruited by large new facilities.

Southern states enact little to no regulation of workplace safety or environmental pollution. This results in unsafe workplaces with greater levels of injury and death (Childers 2024a). Environmental pollution from manufacturing sites can negatively affect public health by contaminating water, air, and soil. New manufacturing investments also can mean significant changes to the demand for housing in a community. A new plant or factory can drive up the cost of living for nearby residents without yielding any economic benefits to a local community. Labor, community, and environmental groups need to collaborate on shared solutions to effectively address these intertwined challenges.

Labor-community coalitions can obtain commitments that ensure “economic development” means shared prosperity for all

Labor-community coalitions organizing around manufacturing projects can secure commitments that offer direct economic benefits to workers and communities, while also establishing groundwork for the growth of worker and community power in the area. While a campaign to win a CBA can be the impetus for forming a local labor-community coalition, the alignment and relationships built through this shared work can lead to longer-term, sustainable coalitions capable of transforming local and state power relationships.

The following section analyzes a set of commitments that can be included in a CBA for a manufacturing project. The CBA framework is flexible and allows for the inclusion of many different types of commitments prioritized by particular groups of workers, community members, and environmental groups. This report focuses on key types of commitments including union neutrality agreements, living wage floors, equitable workforce development practices (such as local or targeted hire policies and programs to expand pathways to apprenticeship training), affordable housing provisions, child care benefits, and environmental protections. Each type of commitment is analyzed in terms of its economic impacts and effectiveness in reshaping local economic development to ensure that public investments generate broadly shared community benefits.

The construction phase and Project Labor Agreements (PLA)

This report mostly focuses on community benefits for workers during the operational phase of a manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, it is just as vital to set high labor standards during the construction phase. Strong community benefits agreements are ideally developed in tandem with strong project construction labor standards set via project labor agreements (PLAs). A PLA is a multiparty agreement between a project owner and a coalition of labor unions that sets out labor standards and dispute resolution procedures to promote stability and efficiency on complex infrastructure projects while also ensuring the project will generate good jobs. PLAs ensure that construction projects run smoothly, are safer, and pay workers fairly (Mangundayao, McNicholas, and Poydock 2022). By setting negotiated wage and benefit levels for each type of work on a project, PLAs level the playing field in highly competitive construction bidding processes; they ensure that contractors base bids on their ability to deliver on quality and efficiency, rather than low-ball cost estimates that reflect intent to pay substandard wages or cut corners on safety. By standardizing wage and benefit levels and taking them out of the competition in the bidding process, PLAs incentivize the use of skilled union labor, which is 14% more productive than nonunionized construction work (McFadden, Santosh, and Shetty 2022). PLAs typically set wages, fringe benefits, and working conditions but can also include requirements to utilize certain numbers of apprentices, hire locally or from certain target worker populations, and/or provide child care or other benefits that open up pathways to good union construction jobs for members of underrepresented groups.

Several of the types of standards for construction workers typically included in a PLA have analogous labor standards in the operational phase. For instance, a CBA can secure commitments for local or targeted hiring and the development of registered apprenticeship programs in a manufacturing facility, extending equitable recruitment and high-quality training requirements that a PLA typically sets for construction into the operational phase of a project.

Removing obstacles to unionization: Neutrality and labor peace agreements

Protecting workers’ freedom to unionize has historically been key to turning manufacturing jobs into good jobs. This remains just as true today. However, like workers across the country, Southern manufacturing workers continue to face formidable obstacles—including weak labor laws, powerful anti-union corporations, and hostile politicians—to exercising their legally protected rights to form or join a union. Employers are charged with violating federal labor law in more than 40% of union elections and spend more than $400 million a year on “union avoidance” consultants (McNicholas et al. 2019; McNicholas et al. 2023). Because existing weak labor laws do not effectively deter employers from union busting, these tactics are treated by many employers as a normal cost of doing business—stacking the deck unfairly against workers seeking to exercise their rights to organize and collectively bargain.

Union neutrality agreements can help safeguard workers’ right to form unions free of the types of interference employers often deploy. Under a neutrality agreement, an employer agrees to remain “neutral” and not interfere with workers’ decisions on whether to unionize. Such agreements typically include joint commitments to a “card check” process for verifying whether a majority of employees have indicated interest in forming a union. Unions and employers sometimes also enter into a labor peace agreement, where unions agree not to engage in certain types of picketing, work stoppages, or other economic disruptions during the organizing process in exchange for employer neutrality.

Employers can also choose to commit to union neutrality as a matter of principle or company policy. Union neutrality—providing workers a more free and fair choice to decide whether to unionize—has been a key component of successful unionization drives in Southern manufacturing. To take two recent examples:

• In 2024, workers at the Volkswagen (VW) Chattanooga plant voted to join the United Auto Workers. Like many European corporations, the German-based VW has an established policy of maintaining neutrality in union election processes, although workers still voiced concerns that in its U.S. facilities, VW management tried to intimidate and dissuade workers from forming a union (Bomey 2024).
• In tandem with community benefits agreement negotiations with New Flyer in Anniston, Alabama, the United Steel Workers and Communications Workers of America negotiated three neutrality agreements with New Flyer and its subsidiaries in 2022. Over the two years that followed, these union neutrality agreements enabled workers to pursue five successful union drives, including at the New Flyer facility in Alabama (Last 2025; Sasha 2024).

Successful recent instances of union organizing in Southern manufacturing facilities have been powerful enough to generate their own backlash. Because of the threat that union neutrality agreements represent to the reigning Southern economic development model, several conservative state legislatures in the South have used model legislation developed by the American Legislative Exchange Council to pass laws intended to interfere with these agreements (Sachs 2024). While the legality of such measures remains in question and has not yet been tested, Alabama, Tennessee, and Georgia now all have legislation in place stating that employers who agree to a union neutrality agreement will be barred from receiving state economic development funds, disincentivizing companies from participating in these agreements (Stephenson 2024).

Importance of unionization to improve manufacturing jobs and wages

Securing unionization in Southern manufacturing can have significant wage benefits for workers. Unionized manufacturing jobs are more likely to provide family-sustaining wages. Unionization in manufacturing is associated with a 17.9% wage premium for workers (Scott et al. 2022). This means that compared with similar workers in terms of education, occupation, experience, race, and ethnicity, unionized manufacturing workers are paid almost a fifth more per hour than their nonunionized counterparts.

Table 1 translates this union premium into how much more unionized workers in the South could make on an hourly, annual, and plant-wide basis. The average nonunionized manufacturing worker in the South earns $34.50 an hour, so with the typical union premium, that worker would be earning an additional $6.18 an hour. If that worker works full time, year-round, the hourly premium translates to $12,846 more a year. To illustrate the potential impact of unionization in an entire plant, we take the example of the BlueOval auto manufacturing investment in Tennessee, which is projected to create 6,000 jobs (TN Office of Governor 2023). For a plant of that size, unionization could mean more than $77 million in additional wages for workers.

Table 1

Wage gains from successful unionization are not hypothetical for manufacturing workers in the South. For example, in 2024, workers at New Flyer in Anniston, Alabama, ratified a union contract with significant pay raises, with some workers gaining raises of up to 38% through 2026 (CWA 2024). Establishing a union contract with transparent pay ladders will also help New Flyer workers combat persistent pay gaps between white and Black workers in Anniston’s manufacturing industry (Erickson 2021).

The benefits of unionization go far beyond hourly wage increases. The workers at New Flyer also achieved significant gains in terms of vacation time and retirement contributions. Unionized workers secure critical benefits like health care and sick days at greater rates than their nonunion peers. Adjusting for differences in industry, sector, and region, union workers are 18.3% more likely to have employer-covered health insurance than their nonunion counterparts (EPI 2021). Almost 9 in 10 private-sector union workers have paid sick days, compared with less than three-fourths of nonunion private-sector workers (EPI 2021).

Unions also contribute to safer and healthier working conditions across a wide range of industries (Dean, McCallum, and Venkataramani 2022). By strengthening workers’ voice on the job, unions empower workers to report safety issues and demand better protocols. One example of this is that unionized construction sites experience significantly lower rates of Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) violations than nonunionized sites (Manzo IV, Jekot, and Bruno 2021). This is despite the fact that unionized workplaces actually experience greater rates of OSHA inspections than other workplaces, likely because many unions maintain active health and safety committees and because unionized workers have greater access to education on how to recognize safety hazards and are less afraid of reprisals from their employer for reporting them (Leigh and Chakalov 2021).

As the New Flyer agreement demonstrates, a strong CBA includes (or is negotiated in tandem with) union neutrality commitments ensuring that workers have a free and fair choice to unionize, without employer interference or retaliation. Securing a pathway to unionization can provide direct benefits to workers at a particular facility, while also increasing local organizing capacity and coalition strength for future negotiations over new projects and local development decisions. Not only is a new union a legally recognized institution that can monitor and hold the company accountable for commitments in the CBA, but it can also play a critical role in amplifying demands of workers and communities outside of the workplace and building power for working people more broadly.

Living wage floor

CBAs can also include commitments to minimum wage floors for the workers who will operate a new facility. For example, the 2018 Nashville Soccer CBA in Tennessee included a commitment to an hourly wage of at least $15.50 for stadium workers (SUN 2018). This provision set the stadium’s wage floor well above the minimum wage in Nashville, where workers—like all Tennessee workers and many across the South—are otherwise subject to the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour.

If a wage floor set by a CBA is high enough, it can help workers achieve a living wage in the place that they live. What constitutes a living wage must be determined by labor and community partners (Gould, Mokhiber, and DeCourcy 2024). For example, a living wage could be defined narrowly as covering the necessities for a single adult, or more broadly as including the needs of a working parent and their children. A living wage target must also make assumptions about nonwage income such as health care benefits and government transfers. Manufacturing workers in the South can also rightfully seek wages that not only cover bare necessities but provide the family-sustaining resources needed to be healthy and thrive.

Figure D shows the share of manufacturing workers in the South earning less than $30 an hour, or $62,400 a year in wages for a full-time worker. More than 3 in 5 (60.8%) manufacturing workers in the region earn less than $30 an hour. Around 80% of Southern Black and Hispanic manufacturing workers earn below the $30 threshold. Women in manufacturing are also more likely to earn below $30 an hour (71.8%) than men (59.1%).

Figure D

A $30 wage floor exceeds the minimum costs for a single adult in most jurisdictions in the U.S., but still barely covers needs for many families with children in manufacturing-dense counties nationwide. EPI’s Family Budget Calculator estimates living wage standards by county that cover modest but necessary costs families face like food, rent, and transportation in the United States. Table 2 shows three Southern counties with significant clean energy manufacturing investments in recent years (CET 2025). Each county has significant manufacturing employment, exceeding the U.S. average for manufacturing employment density. For each county, living wage standards from the Family Budget Calculator are listed for different family types. In Morgan County, Georgia, and Maury County, Tennessee, a single adult with a child must earn at least $30 an hour to cover basic needs. For a single economic provider to cover the costs of a four-person family, they must earn over $35 an hour in all the counties listed. These living wage standards indicate that a $30 wage floor would provide significant economic security for workers with smaller families or multiple wage-earners.

Table 2

A CBA that secures a strong living wage standard in a manufacturing facility can create a virtuous cycle that brings about greater prosperity in the area. Higher wages for low- and middle-income workers boost spending in the local economy because these workers spend a greater share of their paycheck than high-income workers (Anderson 2014). Other employers in the area might have to raise their wages to compete for workers with the CBA-bound employer. The establishment of a living wage also demonstrates to other workers in the area that higher wages are a feasible goal through collective action.

Local and/or targeted hire policies

Local and targeted hiring refers to policies that prioritize recruitment of individuals from the local community, or workers from specific groups who are otherwise underrepresented in a given workforce relative to local population demographics, such as women, people of color, veterans, low-income workers, formerly incarcerated workers, or workers with disabilities (Lawliss, Finfer, and Sherer 2022). A local hire policy can require that a certain percentage of hours worked on a project be completed by local workers. These policies can also require giving local workers the first option to apply for jobs on a project. For the prosperity created through manufacturing investments in the South to be shared equitably, it is important that local community members have access to the jobs that are created during both the construction and operation phases of a development. Workforce policies also should be designed to remove barriers to employment for groups of workers—especially workers of color and women—who have historically been excluded from many construction and manufacturing career opportunities. Increasing access to these well-paying jobs can increase economic mobility for workers with more limited opportunities.

Despite these benefits, some state policymakers have been hostile to local hire as a public policy. In 2015, Nashville voters passed a ballot initiative that required city-funded construction projects to dedicate 40% of construction hours to Nashville residents, with 25% of those hours going to low-income Nashville residents (Blair et al. 2020). The Tennessee state legislature then quickly passed a bill that preempted the city from creating its own local hire policy.

As Figure E shows, the harm of Tennessee’s preemption of local hire falls disproportionately on workers of color. The construction workforce in the Nashville metro area has a higher share of workers of color and immigrant workers compared with the state construction workforce overall. Black workers are 8.2% of the construction workforce in Davidson County, but 5.5% of the overall state workforce. More than half (51.5%) of construction workers in Davidson County are Hispanic, compared with less than a quarter (20.1%) of the state overall. Davidson County construction workers are also more than twice as likely to be immigrants (40.2%) than in all of Tennessee (14.8%). State preemption of local hire prevented Nashville from ensuring that public spending would benefit local workers. However, private agreements like CBAs offer an opportunity to incorporate local hire and/or targeted hire requirements into publicly subsidized developments, even in heavily preempted jurisdictions.

Figure E

In 2018, three years after the preemption of Nashville’s local hire policy, the labor-community coalition Stand Up Nashville was able to leverage $275 million in public subsidies for a new professional soccer stadium into a successful CBA (SUN 2018). The Nashville Soccer CBA included commitments to local hire for stadium workers, particularly workers from “Promise Zones,” i.e., high-poverty areas with fewer economic opportunities (SUN 2020). Through the CBA, Nashville Soccer Holding, LLC agreed to consider qualified Promise Zone resident referrals for jobs at the stadium. So far, the program has succeeded in hiring Promise Zone residents. In 2023, Nashville Soccer Club had hired 180 employees, 80 of whom were residents of Promise Zones (SUN 2023).

CBAs in the South and throughout the country are securing similar commitments to local and targeted hiring in clean energy and manufacturing investments. In Alabama, the New Flyer CBA commits the company to ensuring that at least 45% of new hires and 20% of promotions are members of “Historically Disadvantaged Groups” (Sabin 2022).{{4}} In Massachusetts, a new offshore wind terminal entered into a CBA with the City of Salem—setting targets for hiring of local workers, workers of color, and women workers (Sabin 2024). The CBA for Maine Aqua Ventis, an offshore wind facility, includes local hiring opportunities for residents of Monhegan, Maine (Sabin 2017). 

These types of agreements help ensure that local residents benefit from large investments in their communities, particularly when policymakers have invested public dollars in the form of tax breaks or corporate subsidies to support a new facility. Ensuring local workers are prioritized in training programs and hiring processes for newly created jobs also helps community members stay in the area when housing costs are driven up by a large new manufacturing investment. And in the longer term, providing pathways for local workers to benefit directly from these investments strengthens the labor and community alliances needed to hold developers and corporations accountable over time.

Equitable workforce development through apprenticeships and pre-apprenticeships

In addition to local hire policies, which help create equitable pathways for local workers to secure good jobs at a manufacturing site, construction and manufacturing projects require a skilled workforce to operate safely and productively. A robust ecosystem of registered apprenticeship and pre-apprenticeship programs can help ensure both that employers find the skilled workers they need in a large new manufacturing facility, and that local workers can access pathways to newly created jobs.

Registered apprenticeship programs are training programs vetted by federal or state agencies to ensure use of high-quality, best-practice training standards and approved curriculum aligned with skills needed to succeed in a particular occupation. Registered apprenticeships combine paid on-the-job and classroom training and result in a recognized, portable credential certifying that a worker has the skills and experience necessary for a specific occupation. Pre-apprenticeship programs (also known as apprenticeship readiness programs) recruit and prepare participants for registered apprenticeships—often partnering with community organizations—to open pathways to apprenticeship for women, Black and brown youth, immigrants, workers with disabilities, or others historically excluded from skilled trades occupations. The best practice is for these apprenticeships and pre-apprenticeships to be joint programs between unions and employers, providing high-quality instruction tailored to industry needs and training that leads to placement in a high-quality job with wages, conditions, and benefits negotiated into a union contract. Often, a vital building block for successful manufacturing apprenticeship programs is the establishment of a unionized workforce at a facility.

Unlike lower-quality workforce development programs, registered apprenticeships pay workers fairly for their labor during their training—and in joint apprenticeship programs, the wages and benefits of apprentices are negotiated into a union contract and typically include scheduled increases as apprentices progress through the training program. Registered apprentices (across joint and non-joint programs) typically see their earnings increase 49% between the year before they enter the program and the year after completing it (Walton, Gardiner, and Barnow 2022). These increases in earnings are greater than for similar workers who do not enter the apprenticeship during the same time period (Katz et al. 2022). Apprenticeships can also be particularly attractive to workers because they are debt-free. Most apprentices (60%) consider debt avoidance the most important reason for choosing to enroll in an apprenticeship (Walton, Gardiner, and Barnow 2022).

Apprenticeships can be a powerful tool for increasing the diversity of construction and other industry workforces. While participation of women and workers of color in apprenticeships has grown in recent years, this growth has been painfully slow for decades (CEA 2024). Research finds that union-based (joint) apprenticeship programs have been more successful than other types of apprenticeships at increasing diversity in the construction industry (Ormiston and Bilginsoy 2024). Joint apprenticeships enroll a higher share of women, Black workers, and Hispanic workers than non-joint programs, and have higher program completion rates for all workers, including for women and workers of color. Community benefits agreements can secure commitments and partnerships that equitably grow this pipeline of workers and set enforceable local and targeted hiring goals which in turn spur diversification of construction and manufacturing apprenticeship programs.

For instance, the New Flyer CBA creates a partnership between the company and coalition partners to develop pre-apprenticeship and technical training programs that expand access to manufacturing jobs for workers with low incomes and from disadvantaged groups (Sabin 2022). For these programs to succeed, community groups and educational institutions must have an active role in shaping the programs and connecting workers to these opportunities. The development of a growing skilled workforce and a robust, high-quality workforce development ecosystem can in turn be a strong incentive for bringing more facilities to an area over time. In 2015, Polaris stated that a significant factor in its decision to choose Huntsville, Alabama, for a new production facility was the area’s skilled workforce (Polaris 2015). As more workers participate in high-quality training programs that lead to union jobs, the organized workforce of the region will grow, strengthening labor-community coalitions the next time there is an opportunity to shape new development in the region.

Child care

Child care is an essential but extremely costly expense for many working families across the South. Average annual infant care costs in the South range from $6,868 in Mississippi to $14,277 in Virginia.{{5}} The Department of Health and Human Services recommends that 7% or less of family income go toward infant child care costs, but typical Southern families spend significantly more. In Alabama, infant care costs are 9.8% of median family income, while in Oklahoma the share is 15.4% (EPI 2025b).

Increasing access to high-quality, affordable child care not only makes work more accessible to parents (and especially to women, who on average continue to assume disproportionate care responsibilities), but is a powerful investment in children’s development that can help narrow class and racial inequalities (Morrisey 2020). In addition, child care workers tend to work for very low wages and experience poverty at greater rates than the typical worker.

A large manufacturing investment in a locality might produce a significant number of jobs, and in turn increase the demand of workers and their families to live nearby. This is likely to increase the need for child care services in the region. However, data show that child care employment has not kept up with manufacturing growth in Southern counties. Table 3 compares counties with high manufacturing density, where manufacturing employment makes up more than the national average (9% in 2009), with those with lower manufacturing employment density (EPI 2025c).

Table 3

Between 2009 and 2024, manufacturing employment in high-manufacturing-density counties in the South grew 15.9%, achieving faster growth than similar counties in the U.S. overall (12.1%). However, over the same period, child care employment only grew 4.5% in Southern high-manufacturing-density counties, far below the national rate of 14.2%. Child care employment growth in the South for low-manufacturing-density counties (22.3%) is also below the national level (28.5%). The South systematically underinvests in child care, despite its importance to a healthy economy in the region.

CBAs and PLAs have been used to secure both the construction of physical child care spaces and financial support for actual services. The Nashville Soccer CBA reserved 4,000 square feet for the development of a child care center (SUN 2020). In 2001, the CBA for the North Hollywood Commons mixed-use development project in Southern California secured a commitment to an on-site child care center. Fifty child care spaces at the center were reserved for low- and moderate-income families (Sabin 2001). In the Boston area, unions have secured Project Labor Agreements that seek to address the unique child care needs of the construction industry. The PLA for the Winthrop Center in Boston established a child care access fund to research, develop, and implement alternative child care models within the construction industry, with a particular focus on assisting single mothers with child care while supporting their career (NEREJ 2019).

These types of investments are vital supports for working families, particularly mothers, seeking to balance professional and care work. Combined with union neutrality for the child care workers at these facilities, commitments to providing child care can further elevate worker power in the region and help large new facilities recruit and retain the skilled, experienced workforces they need to succeed.

Affordable housing

Without strategies to address the housing needs of a community impacted by a new manufacturing investment, local residents can experience increased economic precarity or forced displacement. The local housing impacts of a large industrial investment can be complex. A significant manufacturing investment can make a local community more attractive as workers move into the area to be close to their place of work. Manufacturing investments are also likely to be paired with prospective real estate investments in anticipation of future development around the original project. State and local governments might use eminent domain and other purchasing mechanisms to secure land for roads and other new infrastructure. These dynamics can increase housing costs for residents, particularly renters who are most vulnerable to the impacts of housing speculation and prospective rent increases. For instance, the BlueOval development in West Tennessee is already reported to have increased property prices and housing rents (TCG 2023). Homeowners, particularly those with fixed incomes, can also be more burdened with housing costs as higher demand in the area increases property tax valuations (Payne 2019).

On the other hand, extreme proximity to an industrial site can expose residents to environmental hazards and noise pollution, and may be considered unsightly, which decreases property values (Currie et al. 2016; Upton and Talpur 2024). The exact distribution of these changes in demand for housing across a community will depend on the type of industry and any other types of development included in the project.

Industrial investments like manufacturing facilities tend to take place in rural and semirural areas, in part because land is relatively inexpensive (Wiley 2015). While the counties with a higher share of manufacturing employment tend to have lower housing costs than urban areas, housing affordability remains a significant issue for workers. On average, across high-manufacturing-density counties in the South, a two-adult, two-child household must cover more than $14,000 a year in housing costs.{{6}} A large share of renters in high-manufacturing-density counties in the South still are cost-burdened by housing, meaning they spend more than 30% of their income on rent, utilities, and other housing costs. As shown in Figure F, across the Southern states, the share of cost-burdened households in high-manufacturing-density counties ranges from 28% in Arkansas to 47% in Florida. More than 2 in 5 (42%) of Texas renters in these counties are also housing cost-burdened.

Figure F

A strong CBA will secure commitments to build a certain number of affordable housing units or dedicate a share of housing at the site as affordable. The Nashville Stadium CBA created agreements that at least 12% of residential units in the development would be affordable and that 20% of those units would be three-bedroom units to accommodate families (SUN 2020). The Staples Center CBA in Los Angeles, California, was another successful example of strong affordable housing benefits. The 2001 agreement for the development of an expanded convention center, theater, and surrounding housing, hotel, and retail space secured commitments that 20% of housing units would be affordable. The developer also agreed to provide $650,000 in interest-free loans to nonprofit affordable housing developers in the local community (WRI 2001).

Even in situations where a labor-community coalition is unable to reach a final CBA with a company, coalition organizing around community demands can still deliver meaningful affordable housing victories. Between 2002 and 2006, a labor-community coalition in Denver pressured Cherokee Investment Partners to provide community benefits as part of their redevelopment of the site of the Gates Rubber Company. The coalition leveraged zoning changes necessary for the project and a potential subsidy package from the city to extract benefits including an affordable housing plan for hundreds of rental and for-sale affordable housing units (Ingram and Hong 2011; PowerSwitch Action 2025).

In 2005, the labor-community coalition organized by Georgia STAND-UP was able to attach community benefits to an Atlanta city ordinance allocating $2 billion in public funding for the Atlanta Beltline transit-oriented development project. The city resolution shaped by the coalition established an affordable housing trust fund and a goal of developing 5,600 affordable housing units (PowerSwitch Action 2025). As of 2024, more than 4,100 affordable units have been created as part of the project (Atlanta Beltline, Inc. 2024).

Labor-community coalitions can also pursue other land-use commitments beyond the development of affordable housing. The BlueOval Good Neighbors coalition in West Tennessee has demanded commitments to protect land for farmers in the area. The development of the Ford factory has pushed Tennessee’s Department of Transportation to pursue land for new roadways through purchase and eminent domain. The area targeted for new roadways is a majority Black farming community, and several farmers are engaged in lawsuits with the state over the state’s meager compensation offers for their land (Wadhwani 2023). The coalition has demanded that farmers be offered replacement land in exchange for their sold land, as well as the creation of a 10,000-acre community land trust (BlueOval Good Neighbors n.d.).

Creating or protecting affordable housing is essential for protecting the communities that are necessary for any effective labor-community coalition. Large developments can cause instability within the community as new residents arrive, and existing residents are buffeted by rising housing costs. Because of historic and ongoing racial discrimination in housing policy, labor policy, and real estate practices, the costs of these changes are most likely to impact Black and Hispanic workers. Black families and other workers of color are the most likely to be cost-burdened by housing (JCHS 2024). Creating housing for workers and families to remain in the area is vital for continued collective action to secure benefits from developers and hold those developers accountable for their promises.

Environmental standards, funding, and monitoring

Large-scale manufacturing projects often have significant environmental impacts, both during construction and once they are in operation. Air, noise, and groundwater pollution; harm to wildlife habitats; and residents’ exposure to toxic byproducts are just a few examples of common concerns, and these consequences can be severe when projects are approved without sufficient environmental consideration. The consequences of large manufacturing projects often disproportionately harm communities of color and low-wealth areas throughout the South (Brouk 2024). For decades, poor and Black residents in the region have been exposed to toxic chemicals, pollution, and other environmental dangers at alarming rates (Bergman 2019).

In 2021, the Tennessee governor approved the construction of a General Motors lithium battery supplier in the city of Spring Hill, on the banks of the Duck River. Though the project was seen as an economic success, the plant’s operation has taken a toll on the fragile river ecosystem. The lithium battery factory is not the only strain—just eight companies along the river drain tens of millions of gallons of water daily (Wadhwani 2024). This enormous water usage has lowered river water levels, threatened biodiversity, and harmed local tourism and recreation. Advocates for the river’s health blame the state’s prioritization of manufacturing expansion without regard to the long-term environmental or economic consequences for local residents or other existing local industries.

CBAs are a tool that may help community-labor coalitions address the environmental impacts of data centers in the South. Data centers are booming across the United States, but particularly in Southern states like Georgia, Texas, and Virginia (Walker and Goldsmith 2026). New centers are heavy users of water and energy, create noise and air pollution, and are driving up electricity costs nationwide both by increasing demand for energy and requiring utilities to invest in new infrastructure paid for by all ratepayers (Merchant and Guerra 2025; Bizo et al. 2021; AI NOW 2025; Reed 2025). For example, in Virginia, electric bills were on track to increase as much as 25% in 2025 because of data centers (Penn and Weise 2025).

Growing community concerns surrounding data centers could create leverage for labor-community coalitions to pursue CBAs and other community benefits strategies. In 2025, community opposition blocked or delayed $64 billion in data center projects across the nation (Data Center Watch 2025). As community resistance to data centers continues to grow, more developers may recognize the need to come to the table with local coalitions to negotiate binding commitments on environmental and economic outcomes to secure project approvals. A handful of localities have begun to create agreements with data center developers regulating water use and securing commitments to green energy use (Turner Lee and West 2026).

Past development projects provide examples of how communities have used CBAs to secure long-term commitments to clean energy transition and protection of local natural resources in a multitude of ways, from mandating that any new construction must meet specific sustainability standards to requiring companies to contribute a set dollar amount to a city’s renewable energy transition fund. In Virginia, the City of Richmond Resort Casino CBA ensured the developing and operating company would design and construct all project buildings to Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) Silver standards and would use previously existing pavement where possible (WRI 2021). The agreement also required the developer to attempt to reduce the urban heat island effect by planting shade trees along sidewalks and using other landscaping methods (WRI 2021). These agreements can mitigate additional environmental harm in areas that have already been polluted. A CBA between the Town of Waterloo, New York, and Seneca Meadows, Inc. regarding a landfill expansion commits the waste management company to pay for the development of new public water lines and other potable water infrastructure if existing public water wells become contaminated (WRI 2005).

CBAs can also be used to expand the positive impact of an already climate-friendly project. In New York, a CBA with an offshore windfarm developer stipulates that the company must contribute $2 million to the town of East Hampton’s Ocean Industries Sustainability Program (WRI 2018). Additionally, Deepwater Wind South Fork, LLC must spend $200,000 to establish an Energy Sustainability and Resilience Fund to support East Hampton’s transition to 100% renewable energy (WRI 2018). CBAs with environmentally focused companies provide valuable opportunities for communities looking to address climate change, especially where state governments have failed to invest in environmental programs.

A CBA can achieve a variety of climate and environmental commitments from a company but is also a strong starting point for building local capacity to monitor resource use, pollution, and other environmental priorities. A strong coalition of community, labor, and environmental groups can play essential roles in implementing and enforcing CBA commitments in contexts where understaffed government agencies have limited ability to monitor or investigate pollution and other environmental harms. Instead, workers and community members are often the first to report harmful practices and safety concerns. A strong CBA can provide opportunities for labor and environmental groups to work together to monitor and protect worker and community health, natural resources, and ecosystems.

Conclusion

For decades, Southern economic policies shaped by dominant business and corporate interests have resulted in poor working conditions and failed to ensure that profits generated by publicly subsidized development are shared with local workers and communities. Confronting the deep, long-standing imbalances of power that have entrenched this failed economic development model will require significant organizing and coalition-building to increase the collective power of workers and community members to shape different outcomes from the latest Southern manufacturing boom. Building new forms of worker and community power will be equally necessary to counter escalating authoritarian actions of the Trump administration, which closely parallel many features of the failed Southern economic development model that by design prioritizes corporations over workers and communities.

Our analysis shows that community benefits agreements could be powerful tools for Southern labor and community groups building the shared power necessary to reshape local and eventually regional economies. When strong coalitions of labor, environmental, faith-based, and other grassroots community organizations are able to build the necessary power to bring a company or developer to the table to negotiate an enforceable agreement, such coalitions can secure measurable economic benefits like higher wages, respect for workers’ rights to unionize, local or targeted hiring, protection of natural resources, or more affordable housing. Such economic gains are beneficial in themselves, but they also raise expectations, build local capacity to pursue additional gains, and demonstrate to the community at large that local residents can shape their own economic futures, and that these types of victories are achievable in the face of the Southern status quo.

While the urgent project of upending the Southern economic development model will require vigorous and persistent organizing across many sectors and geographies, community benefits agreements are one key strategy for turning manufacturing jobs into good jobs, ensuring long-term local economic gains from new industrial investments, and even renewing democracy in contexts where it has long been suppressed. Forming strong, long-lasting labor-community coalitions is essential to winning concrete gains for local workers as well as reshaping the political fabric of Southern communities and increasing working people’s influence over broader state or regional economic policy decisions. Winning and implementing any strong CBA requires the formation of an empowered labor-community coalition, which ideally endures and gains greater strength, experience, and influence over time. Just as the economic benefits of unionization extend far beyond an individual workplace, establishing a strong CBA coalition can create broader positive impacts across a community or region—delivering higher-quality jobs; more equitable tax systems; stronger public services; and healthier, more inclusive political systems.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the AFL-CIO Center for Transformational Organizing for their partnership and invaluable contributions in the production of this report. The authors are also grateful to Athena Last and Ian Elder at Jobs to Move America and Ben Beach at PowerSwitch Action for their expert feedback.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1

Notes

{{1.}} Clean energy manufacturing includes manufacturing of batteries, electric vehicles, mineral products, solar energy products, and wind energy products.

{{2.}} Workers in Southern states experience lower wages than in other regions even after adjusting for cost-of-living differences (Childers 2023).

{{3.}} The facilities covered by these agreements included plants in Alabama, California, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, and Wisconsin.

{{4.}} This category includes workers who are Black, Indigenous, and/or people of color; women; LGBTQ+ persons; systems-impacted people (formerly incarcerated people); persons emancipated from the foster care system; residents of Anniston, Alabama, lacking GED or high school diploma; and veterans.

{{5.}} Southern states excluding D.C., Delaware, and Maryland.

{{6.}} EPI analysis of Family Budget Calculator and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages data.

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The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes a “floor under wages” mandating that employers pay covered employees no less than a minimum hourly rate for all hours worked, whether they are paid on an hourly or salaried basis. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour—a rate set in 2009. FLSA minimum wage rules apply to all private businesses with annual revenue of at least $500,000, as well as hospitals, care centers, schools, and public agencies. 

The FLSA exempts a variety of specific occupations from the minimum wage, such as newspaper delivery workers, seasonal farm workers, workers in commercial fisheries and canneries, private investigators, and babysitters. It allows workers under 20-years-old to be paid as little as $4.25 per hour for their first 90 days of employment. The FLSA also allows employers who have been granted a certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to pay less than the minimum wage to employees with disabilities. It also allows employers to pay workers who customarily receive tips as little as $2.13 per hour, so long as the tips they receive over the course of a workweek bring them to an average hourly combined wage (tips plus base wage) of at least the minimum wage.

What are the threats to federal minimum wage protections?

• Allowing the value of the minimum wage to continue to erode: Since the federal minimum wage was last raised in June 2009, its value has declined by 30%. At its 1968 high point in inflation-adjusted terms, the federal minimum wage was worth roughly $12 in 2024 dollars. In 2019, the U.S. House passed a bill to gradually raise the federal minimum wage to $15 and then automatically update it for inflation every year thereafter; however, the Senate never took up the bill. Every year it remains unchanged, the purchasing power of the minimum wage erodes, undermining wage growth for millions of low-wage workers, including many earning wages above the minimum. Moreover, without an increase, the gap between the current minimum wage and what would constitute a true living wage gets larger—making any eventual effort to reach a living wage more challenging.
• Continuing to subject tipped workers to a lower and difficult-to-enforce subminimum wage: The subminimum wage for tipped workers was set in 1991 at $2.13 per hour and has not been raised since. At such a low level, many tipped workers effectively receive no pay from their employers; their take-home pay comes entirely from what they receive in tips. Consequently, tipped workers’ income is volatile and unpredictable, and they can be subject to abuse by customers and employers who, in every shift and transaction, hold power over tipped workers’ pay. Although the FLSA requires that employers must “top off” workers’ paychecks if their tips do not make up the difference between the tipped minimum and full minimum wage, this requirement is notoriously hard to enforce.
• Denying minimum wage coverage to some groups of workers: The Trump administration has already taken initial steps to roll back existing DOL rules that ensure minimum wage coverage for direct care workers (home health aides) and has withdrawn a proposed rule that would have phased out programs allowing payment of subminimum wages to workers with disabilities. Proposals laid out in Project 2025 recommend altering the FLSA to allow states to seek waivers to core FLSA provisions—which could open the door to exclusions of additional groups of workers from coverage.
• Increasing likelihood of underpayment: Failure to pay the minimum wage is one of the most common forms of wage theft and diminished DOL capacity to enforce federal wage and hour laws will exacerbate this problem.

How can states maintain and strengthen minimum wage protections?

States have legal authority to establish their own minimum wages that are higher and more expansive in coverage than the federal minimum. Given the very real risk that aspects of FLSA minimum wage protections could be eliminated (or will go unenforced), it is important for states to at least lock in existing FLSA minimum wage protections. However, states should seek to go beyond the current floor, as the federal minimum wage is far too low and does not cover all workers.

Step I: Update state statutes to lock in current federal protections

Because updates to the federal minimum wage have been infrequent and inadequate over the last 40 years, many states—though not all—have established their own minimum wages. The strength of these laws varies greatly. For example:

• 30 states and the District of Columbia have set minimum wages higher than the federal minimum, ranging from $8.75 in West Virginia, to $16.66 in Washington, and $17.50 in the District of Columbia.
• Five states (Tennessee, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) have no state minimum wage. Two states (Georgia and Wyoming) have state minimum wages below the federal minimum. The federal minimum wage applies in these states to all workers covered by the minimum wage under the FLSA.
• Some states (such as New Hampshire, Idaho, North Carolina, and Texas) set the state minimum to explicitly equal the federal minimum (whatever it may be), while others have set it specifically at $7.25.

To lock in current federal minimum wage protections, states should:

1. Guarantee a strong state minimum wage floor: States without a minimum wage or with one lower than the federal minimum should enact one that is at least as strong as the federal minimum wage—and ideally stronger. States should codify that the state minimum wage always equals the greater of the federal minimum wage or whatever higher explicit value state lawmakers or voters (in the case of a ballot measure) set.
2. Ensure the state minimum wage covers at least those workers covered by the FLSA: Most states, though not all, link coverage of their state minimum wage to the coverage definitions in the FLSA. States should consider spelling out coverage definitions in state code so that currently covered workers remain covered if federal coverage definitions are eroded to exclude certain groups or occupations in the future.
3. Ensure state agencies have authority and capacity to enforce minimum wage laws: Many states rely, at least in part, on federal enforcement of wage and hour laws. Florida, for example, will have a $15 minimum wage in 2026, yet has no state-level wage and hour enforcement body.

State minimum wage rules are typically part of state labor and employment or wage and hour statutes. In some cases, they are set in state constitutions—the result of citizen-initiated ballot measures. Policymakers and advocates should review their state’s labor laws to assess whether their state minimum wage laws codify at least the same level of protection currently provided under the FLSA, and to ensure that the state has the power to enforce its own minimum wage laws without relying on the federal government.

Step II: Raise the minimum wage to an adequate level, set it for automatic annual increases going forward, and eliminate harmful exemptions

While the FLSA sets an important floor for minimum pay, the current level is woefully inadequate and there remain notable gaps in coverage that state policymakers should close. Priority steps states can take to update the minimum wage include:

1. Gradually raise the minimum wage to at least $17 per hour by 2028: Today, there is no county in the country where a single, childless worker can achieve a modest, but adequate standard of living on a wage of less than $15. By targeting at least $17 by 2028, states can raise their minimum wages to an adequate level allowing for any inflation that may occur as the new wage floor is gradually phased in.
2. Gradually raise and eliminate the subminimum wage for tipped workers: There are currently seven states where tipped workers are paid the regular minimum wage, regardless of tips. In these states, tipped worker wages are higher, poverty rates are lower, and the restaurant industry thrives. States should gradually increase the minimum wage that applies to tipped workers (or reduce any “tip credit” employers can claim against their minimum wage obligation) so that eventually all workers are paid the full minimum wage regardless of any tip income.
3. Index the minimum wage for inflation: States should establish that once the minimum wage has reached at least $17 per hour, it must be automatically updated each year to account for any growth in prices over the preceding year. There are 20 states and D.C. that already have automatic inflation-adjustment built into their state minimum wage laws. Most require that the minimum wage be raised the same percentage as any change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) over a preceding 12-month period, rounded to the nearest 5 cents. If the CPI-U decreases, the minimum wage should not be lowered.
4. Codify minimum wage coverage for direct care workers: As noted above, the 2013 FLSA rule that clarified minimum wage and overtime coverage for home care companions who provide direct care services for seniors and persons with disabilities is under attack in the courts, and the Trump DOL has taken initial steps to reconsider it. To protect such workers from losing these key protections, states should ensure that their wage and hour laws clearly cover them. In states where they are exempted or where state coverage of such workers depends on FLSA coverage (such as Connecticut), state laws should be updated to clearly cover such workers, regardless of what happens to the federal rule.
5. Eliminate harmful minimum wage exemptions: Agricultural workers are not covered by the FLSA, a racist holdover from when the act was initially passed in 1938. Other exceptions apply to smaller categories of workers. States have it in their power to eliminate these exemptions. For example, several states—including California, Washington, and Colorado—cover agricultural workers under the state minimum wage. Also, many states have a “training wage” allowing workers—often only those under age 20 or in school—to be paid less than the full minimum wage. Lawmakers should consider whether these training wages are necessary, and if they are maintained, they should be limited to a short period (e.g., 30 days) after a worker’s initial hiring.
6. Ensure localities can establish their own minimum wages above the state minimum: There are nine states in which a city or a county has established a local minimum wage that exceeds the state minimum—with nearly 60 local minimum wages now in effect. Because costs of living can vary considerably within a state, local governments should be able to establish higher wage standards if the people in those localities deem that the state wage floor is inadequate. There are 25 states where state law currently prohibits local wage minimum wages. Lawmakers in those states should reverse that prohibition.

Step III: Modernize minimum wage policies by establishing stronger mechanisms to adjust the level of the minimum wage over time

In addition to codifying FLSA minimum wage rules, setting an adequate minimum wage level, and closing coverage gaps, there are other steps state lawmakers can take to ensure all workers can afford a decent life and benefit from a growing economy.

1. Set the minimum wage to automatically adjust each year based on growth in prices or median wages—whichever is greatest: Indexing the minimum wage to changes in prices ensures that low-wage workers can buy the same amount of goods and services year after year. But as the economy grows and productivity rises, low-wage workers’ standard of living should improve, not just stay the same. Instead of indexing the minimum wage to price changes, lawmakers can index the minimum wage to changes in the median wage.
   • Linking the minimum wage to the median wage ensures that the gap between the lowest paid job and a “middle-class” job never grows; as a middle-class worker’s pay rises, so would pay for a minimum wage worker.
   • Over the long run, wage growth should outpace price growth, but on a year-over-year basis, that may not be true and in some years, median wages could decline. The law should be written such that the minimum wage never goes down and is raised at least as much as any increase in prices—and more when wage growth exceeds price growth.
2. Establish wage boards to periodically evaluate the strength of the minimum wage overall and for specific industries: In some countries—such as the United Kingdom— minimum wage levels are set by boards or commissions (composed of nonpartisan analysts, worker representatives, and members of the business community) that periodically review the level of the minimum wage and recommend changes. In some states—such as in New York and California—there are wage boards for individual industries, such as fast food, that set minimum wages (and potentially other workplace standards) for all workers in that industry. Policymakers should consider establishing or creating mechanisms allowing for such boards to periodically review whether the state minimum wage level is adequate for workers overall, and/or for those in industries with large numbers of low-wage workers.

Additional recommended resources 

• Why the U.S. needs at least a $17 minimum wage (Economic Policy Institute) 

• The impact of the Raise the Wage Act of 2023 (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Minimum Wage Tracker (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Most minimum wage studies have found little or no job loss (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Minimum Wage for Agricultural Workers (The National Agriculture Law Center) 

• Low Wage Workforce Tracker (Economic Policy Institute) 

Editor’s note: This piece was revised on October 23, 2025, to add an “Additional recommended resources” section.

The data in this report show that over the last several years, job growth across South Carolina has outpaced job growth at the national level. The state also boasts a low unemployment rate. But when we look beyond the headline numbers, we see that many workers across the state are being paid very low wages and family incomes are falling short of what is needed for a modest yet adequate lifestyle. South Carolina’s levels of inequality and poverty rates are high; in 2023, 13.9% of the state’s population fell below the poverty line, compared with a national poverty rate of 12.5%. Workers across the state also lack access to basic resources like paid sick leave and public transportation. Access to these resources would help many would-be workers participate in the labor market more easily.

These outcomes for workers and families reflect, at least in part, the long shadow of worker exploitation that started with the state’s horrific embrace of slavery and what continued to closely resemble slavery after it was outlawed. Today, South Carolina is one of just five states that has no state minimum wage and its workers have some of the lowest typical wages in the country. It is one of two dozen states with so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws that undermine workers’ ability to form unions and contribute to the lowest unionization rate in the country. These and other laws in South Carolina are designed to disempower workers, ensuring that wealthy corporations can continue to exploit their labor.

The state is now being presented with an opportunity to shift its strategy from labor exploitation to worker- and family-centered policies that would strengthen the economy for all South Carolinians. Pro-worker policies that allow more South Carolinians to participate in the labor market, be more productive, and share in the wealth they create are, in fact, pro-business policies that can help sustain the state’s economic growth. The federal funding bills mentioned above include pro-worker policy levers that state policymakers can use to ensure that the jobs being created in South Carolina are good jobs that truly serve workers and families, instead of reinforcing the inequities that have left so many across the state economically insecure.

The health of the economy nationally and in states are impacted by a myriad of factors. State policymakers have little to no control over some of these factors such as federal macroeconomic policy, natural disasters, foreign supply chain disruptions, or global pandemics. Their responses to these events, however, determine how well and how quickly the economy recovers. Below we examine South Carolina’s economy with a special focus on the post-pandemic period and how workers are faring in that economy.

South Carolina’s industrial mix from the antebellum period until today

The industrial composition of South Carolina’s economy has shifted substantially over time, but it continues to be shaped by its history of slavery and the relentless pursuit of free or exploitable labor. This is best exemplified by the state’s textile manufacturing industry, which began to flourish in the mid-1800s. Enslaved Africans were forced to farm the raw materials—namely cotton—on which textile manufacturing depended. South Carolina’s manufacturers were able to siphon off business from manufacturers in New England with the promise of low labor costs and weak labor standards. Wages were as much as 50% lower in South Carolina than in New England, mills were kept running 60 hours or more every week, and 30% of mill workers were children (Carlton 2016). By the mid-1950s, South Carolina’s mills produced more than half the clothing worn in the United States. As exploitative as mill work was, poor white South Carolinians viewed it as preferable to farm work, which was even more difficult and lower-paid.

Through the 1900s, the mills asserted near-complete control over economic and social life for a large share of white South Carolinians. Mills not only housed workers, but they also ran local schools, stores, religious institutions, and recreational activities—in part to “keep their workers close” and quell organized resistance to labor exploitation and dangerous working conditions (WYFF News 4 2022). The economic opportunity and generational wealth building provided by jobs in the mills were largely out of reach for Black South Carolinians. Under state law, Black people were legally excluded from all but the most menial jobs in the textile industry until civil rights lawsuits mandated integration during the mid-1960s (Bainbridge 2018). The textile industry was quicker to integrate than other industries, leading Black employment in the industry to grow significantly through the 1980s. However, Black advancement was curtailed by the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1992, which facilitated the pursuit of even lower cost labor outside the U.S. over the 1990s and 2000s and ushered in the collapse of South Carolina’s dominance in the industry.

Figure A shows a rapid decline in the number of workers employed in textile mills by the end of the 2000s. It also shows that this rapid decline in the textile industry was followed by rapid growth in another industry: the transportation equipment manufacturing industry, beginning around 2011. Today, what’s left of the textile industry in the state primarily supplies the U.S. military and the automative industry—South Carolina’s new primary manufacturing industry (Holdman 2024).

Figure A

South Carolina’s industrial mix has become much more diverse. Yet, as we show below, it continues to be characterized by the exploitation of workers, strong opposition to worker organizing, subsidies to wealthy corporations, and lax regulation of businesses (Childers 2024a). South Carolina also continues to use this low-road economic development model to lure businesses from other states and countries, contributing to growth across several industries—especially auto, steel, tire, and aircraft manufacturing—as well as the expansion of warehousing, transportation, and logistics, among other sectors (AFL-CIO 2019; Childers 2024b; SCDC 2024a).

Figure B shows job growth across industries in the U.S. and in South Carolina between June 2010 and June 2019, when the state experienced significant job growth. These data reveal that job growth in South Carolina exceeded job growth nationally across almost all industries during this period. Professional and business services experienced the greatest growth at 38.2%, followed by the construction industry (33.3%), leisure and hospitality (30.9%), and manufacturing (25.6%). The growth in manufacturing in the state stands out when compared with an increase of just 11.1% nationally over this period.

Figure B

South Carolina saw the least growth in state and local government, which grew by just 5.2% from 2010 to 2019, despite a population growth of 10.7% (America Counts 2021). According to the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (SCDEW 2023a, 19), most state and local public-sector workers work at the local level (233,400 in local government compared with 110,000 in state government). These local government workers are public school teachers and staff, police and firefighters, public health care staff, and other municipal employees. A significant number of both state and local government workers are employed in state (50,700 workers) and local educational services (112,400).

Job growth since the COVID-19 pandemic

South Carolina has had strong job growth as the state recovered from the COVID-19 pandemic. Figure C shows the percentage change in jobs for South Carolina and the nation between January 2020 and December 2023. These data show that South Carolina’s job losses during the pandemic were somewhat less than national losses. The data also show that since the recovery got underway, South Carolina and the Southern region had stronger job growth than the nation as a whole. This is not surprising given that across this period, South Carolina was one of the states experiencing the fastest population growth (U.S. Census Bureau 2023; U.S. Census Bureau 2024b).

Figure C

Figure D shows that South Carolina has outperformed on job growth since the pandemic across a range of industries. These data show that the greatest growth since 2019 has been in the financial sector, which includes not just finance but also insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing, reflecting in part the growth in population across the state. Education and health (15.9%) and trade, transportation, and utilities (10.1%) both experienced greater than 10% growth. The industries with the least growth over this period were manufacturing (4.3%) and state and local governments (1.3%).

Figure D

In many ways, South Carolina’s strong growth across industries in recent years served to diversify South Carolina’s economy and bring its industry mix more in line with the national economy. Figure E shows the share of South Carolina workers employed in each industry across the state in 2024. The single largest sector is trade, transportation, and utilities, which employs 18.9% of the workforce—almost one in five workers. This is just slightly more than the national average (18.3%). The largest individual subsector of the trade, transportation, and utilities industry in South Carolina is transportation and warehousing, which made up 20.6% of the industry as of December 2023 (SCDEW 2023a, 19). In addition to transportation and warehouse jobs, this industry further includes utilities, wholesale trade, and retail trade (including motor vehicle and parts dealers, food and beverage stores, clothing and clothing accessories stores, and general merchandise stores).

Figure E

While state and local government experienced little growth since 2010, the public sector makes up the second largest sector of the state’s economy. The public sector includes workers who perform a range of important tasks for South Carolinians. Many of these workers are critical to maintaining public order, safety, and providing key services as teachers, police officers, firefighters, garbage collectors, bus drivers, and many other critical roles.

Despite strong job growth, the financial and the construction industries respectively make up just 5.2% and 4.9% of South Carolina’s economy. Their share of the state’s economy closely resembles their share of the total U.S. economy—5.8% and 5.2%, respectively.

Notably, despite strong growth in education and health, these industries account for a far smaller share of jobs in the state than the national average: 12.5% and 16.6% respectively. This may be indicative of the fact that South Carolina is one of only 10 states that has failed to adopt the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act, depriving the state’s health care industry of billions of dollars of federal funds and its residents of a key resource for health care (KFF 2024).{{1}} It is also likely a reason the state is ranked 39th in education quality and 46th in health outcomes for children in the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s 2024 Kids Count Databook. As described in fuller detail later, a large swath of 17 mostly poor, rural counties in South Carolina have been dubbed the state’s “Corridor of Shame” because they have failed to provide students in those counties with even a “minimally adequate” education (Click and Hinshaw 2015; Temoney and Ullrich 2018).

Finally, while the data in Figure E are for nonfarm workers, the South Carolina Farm Bureau (n.d.) reports that agribusiness is actually South Carolina’s largest economic sector, contributing just under $42 billion to the economy and employing more than 200,000 workers. That means agribusiness is about 9% of all employment in the state.{{2}} The largest industry sector within agriculture is poultry processing, production, and other poultry-related products (Von Nessen 2022). Non-poultry meat and beef production are also among the top agricultural sectors .

Black and brown South Carolinians make up a large segment of these workers. Black South Carolinians, for example, make up 26% of the population in the state but are 37.1% of all food production workers and 63.5% of animal slaughter workers. Hispanic workers are just 7.5% of the population but are 11.7% of all food production workers (U.S. Census Bureau 2024a).{{3}}

Finally, immigrant workers, including those who are undocumented, make up 11.7% of the food production workforce. In 2023, South Carolina was one of the top five states for H-2A visas—visas that allow migrant workers to come into the U.S. on a temporary basis, often to fill jobs Americans don’t want to do. These workers constitute a pool of labor with few protections, making them easy to exploit (Atkinson 2024).

Low-wage service and retail workers

Some of South Carolina’s lowest-wage workers work in food services, retail, and hospitality. With low rates of unionization and very low minimum wages for both tipped and non-tipped workers, these workers often lack the bargaining power to demand better pay and working conditions. As a result, service and retail workers regularly deal with low wages, limited benefits, and serious safety concerns in the workplace.

The median hourly wage of food industry workers in 2023 was $12.95. The lowest paid positions were bartenders and waiters/waitresses, whose median 2023 hourly wages were $8.95 and $8.98 respectively. This number includes tips. Because South Carolina has no state minimum wage for tipped or non-tipped workers, the federal minimum wage applies. Thus, for these workers who receive tips, employers only have to pay the federal minimum subminimum wage of $2.13, forcing these workers to rely on tips from customers for the majority of their income.

But even with tips, many workers are unable to afford basic goods and services. Figure F shows the median annual earnings for full-time workers in each of the occupations in the figure. These data show that a full-time waiter or waitress making $8.98 an hour earns just $18,680 annually. To provide context for these wages, we used EPI’s Family Budget Calculator to estimate the amount of income it would take for a single adult with no children to afford a modest yet adequate standard of living in each of the four largest metro areas in South Carolina. These data show that none of these occupations pay workers enough to reach even this low standard.

Figure F

Figure F also shows the median annual earnings of some key hospitality occupations. Tourism is a key industry in South Carolina, as shown in Figure E. The South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism says one in 10 South Carolinians work in hospitality, supporting over 200,000 jobs. In places like Myrtle Beach, tourism is the largest sector of the economy (Perez 2024). Many of those who work in hospitality, however, don’t make enough to live in these communities. The median wage for hotel desk clerk is just $28,610 a year. The estimated cost of living to have modest economic security in Myrtle Beach for a single adult with no children, however, is $46,117. For those workers trying to support families, the economic strain is even greater.

Finally, Figure F shows that retail salespersons are also paid very low wages. These workers are paid a median wage of just $13.89 or $28,900 per year. Like many service and hospitality workers, retail workers face employers who show little regard for their safety and health (Sainato 2023; Vasquez 2023). Dollar General, for example, has the largest number of retail stores of any retail chain in the nation with over 18,000 stores in 47 states (Sainato 2023). MacGillis (2020) reports high rates of violence and deaths at Dollar General stores and Dollar Stores more generally. While there are multiple factors contributing to this, understaffing and disarray within and outside the store are noted as key factors making these stores targets for robberies and other crimes. In 2022, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) proposed adding $3.4 million in fines to the over $21 million in fines that had been proposed since 2017 after inspecting nine Dollar General locations in four states. These fines were for blocked emergency exits, fire extinguishers, and electrical panels. Boxes and materials were stacked unsafely, causing fire and crushing hazards and blocking the ability of employees to exit in emergencies. In one store, OSHA reported at least six employees had been exposed to toxic vapors with three seeking medical treatment. OSHA found that Dollar General had not provided workers with adequate respiratory protection or personal protective equipment, and they failed to train workers how to safely handle hazardous chemicals and how to properly clean them up (DOL OSHA 2023).

In many of these cases, federal OSHA officials can step in, as noted above. South Carolina, however, is one of 22 states in the country where state government is responsible for enforcing OSHA standards, rather than falling directly under the enforcement authority of federal OSHA. South Carolina has been approved to run its own operations and oversight as long as it is “at least as effective as OSHA in protecting workers and in preventing work-related injuries, illnesses and deaths” (DOL OSHA n.d.). There is some concern that South Carolina is not meeting this standard. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) reported that in 2022, South Carolina’s Department of Labor, Licensing & Regulation had an OSHA inspection rate less than one-third that of neighboring states—where South Carolina conducted an average of 1.9 inspections per 1,000 establishments, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia’s rates were respectively 6.2, 7.8, and 6.2 inspections per 1,000 establishments. These states also have state plans (DOL OSHA n.d.).

Additionally, South Carolina refuses to enforce sufficient consequences for businesses who violate OSHA standards. The state’s OSHA office levied an average penalty of $2,019 for violations across the private sector, a number significantly below the national average of $3,259 for serious violations (SEIU 2023). Fewer inspections and weaker fines mean employers feel empowered to commit more violations and continue to exploit vulnerable workers with impunity.

Yet despite the imbalance of power between workers and employers, workers at a Dollar General in Irmo, SC, went on strike in January 2023. They cited many of the safety concerns reported in media and that federal OSHA officials found in Dollar General stores in other states: mold, extreme heat, dangerous exposure to improperly stored chemicals, and unpaid wages (Martinez 2023). This strike was led by workers under the newly formed Union of Southern Service Workers.

Job growth was industrially diverse, but geographically concentrated

Although spread across a range of industries, South Carolina’s job growth was highly concentrated in major metropolitan areas. Table 1 shows that of the 174,264 jobs created between January 2020 and December 2023, 89.4% (or more than 155,000) were located in eight metropolitan areas of the state. Most of these jobs were located in just four metro areas: Charleston-North Charleston (45,750), Greenville-Anderson-Greer (38,795), Myrtle Beach-Conway-North Myrtle Beach (25,870), and Columbia (24,961), four of the state’s largest metro areas. The remaining four metro areas received less than 5% of all jobs.

Table 1

When we consider the distribution of the population, the geographic concentration of this job growth becomes even more stark—and potentially more problematic. More than four in 10 (42.7%) South Carolinians live outside of the top four metro areas that have collectively received more than 77% of all new jobs. More than one in four (25.6%) live outside the eight metro areas shown in Table 1. The uneven distribution of new jobs means that South Carolinians in other areas and those in more rural parts of the state will have less opportunity to benefit from this job growth. One reason is that those outside the major metropolitan areas may not have the same access to information about available new jobs, computers or broadband commonly needed to apply for many jobs, or transportation to reach these jobs. They will also incur greater costs in terms of transportation and commuting time if they are able to fill these jobs.

While South Carolina has experienced strong job growth and the state’s industrial composition has diversified, the state’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) remains among the lowest in the nation. The GDP per capita is the total value of goods and services produced by the state’s economy, divided by the number of people. GDP grows primarily when the demand for goods and services increases and when government and businesses invest in the state. These might be investments in machinery, technology, or public infrastructure, all of which make workers and businesses more productive. Or they could be investments in workers’ education, training, and compensation, improving workers’ skills and ensuring that they have the resources to afford their basic needs and the ability to balance work and family demands.

Figure G shows the GDP for the U.S. and the 10 states with the lowest per capita GDPs in the nation. Only four states—Alabama, Arkansas, West Virginia, and Mississippi—have a lower GDP than South Carolina.

Figure G

Workers’ engagement with the labor market across the Palmetto state

The data above show that South Carolina has had strong job growth across industries that have diversified rapidly over the last decade and a half. The state’s low per capita GDP, however, may be an indicator of weakness in the labor market. Below, we examine workers’ engagement with South Carolina’s labor market.

Unemployment

The first indicator we examine is the unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is the share of people in the labor market without a job who are actively looking for work. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the nation and many “non-essential” businesses closed their doors as people isolated in their homes. This led to the COVID-19-induced recession with a dramatic rise in unemployment. Figure H shows that while unemployment rose considerably nationally and in South Carolina, both peaked in April 2020 at 14.8% and 11.8% respectively. These data also show the unemployment rate in South Carolina consistently remained below the national average. As of June 2024, South Carolina had an unemployment rate of 3.6%, up slightly from the 3.2% in April.

Figure H

The benefits of low unemployment did not extend to all South Carolinians equally. Figure I shows annual unemployment rates for Black and white workers nationally and in the state of South Carolina from 2019 through 2023. Black and white workers in South Carolina have lower rates of unemployment than nationally and the disparities between them are smaller. The unemployment rate for white workers in South Carolina fell below the pre-recession rate by 2023, while Black workers’ unemployment rate was still above pre-recession levels in 2023.

Figure I

While the annualized data in Figure I show Black unemployment had not dropped below the pre-recession level in 2023, more recent data show that both Black and white unemployment may be increasing—with a much larger increase for Black workers. Figure J shows the unemployment rate for Black, Hispanic, and white workers over the last two quarters of 2023 and the first two quarters of 2024. These data show a slight increase of 0.2 percentage points in unemployment for white workers between the first and second quarter of 2024. Black (0.9 percentage points) and Hispanic (0.5 percentage points) South Carolinians have had larger increases.

Figure J

As of mid-2024, overall unemployment was lower in South Carolina than in the nation as a whole and racial disparities were smaller but substantial. Still, unemployment for Black workers in South Carolina was still above its pre-recession rate, while unemployment for white workers was lower than before the pandemic.

Employment as a share of the population

Rapid job growth across the state and low levels of unemployment may indicate that South Carolina’s economy is strong, but data on employment rates challenge this notion. Figure K shows the employment-to-population ratio (EPOP) for prime-age workers (ages 25–54) in both 2019 and 2023. We exclude workers younger than 25 and older than 54 because many of these younger workers may be out of the labor force completing their education or gaining additional skills and some workers 55 and older may have retired early.

Figure K

These data show that in 2019, before the pandemic, there was little difference in the EPOPs for South Carolina and the South more broadly at 78.8% and 79.0% respectively. The EPOP nationally was higher at 80%. From 2019 to 2023, the employment rate among prime-age workers rose from 80.0% to 80.7% nationally and from 79.0% to 79.8% in the South. In South Carolina, however, it remained essentially flat falling from 78.8% to 78.7%, widening the gap with the broader region and the nation. In 2019, South Carolina’s prime-age employment rate was 39th out of 50 states plus D.C.; by 2023, it had fallen to 42nd.

When we examine prime-age EPOPs by race and ethnicity, the data show significant disparities. Figure L shows prime-age EPOPs by race, ethnicity, and gender for South Carolina and the nation. These data show that across racial and ethnic groups, women are less likely to be employed—with the lowest employment rate among Hispanic women (61.1%), followed by Black women (73.9%). White women have the highest employment among South Carolina’s women (76.7%) but still lag behind women nationally.

Figure L

These data also show that most groups of workers in South Carolina—white men, white women, Black women, and Hispanic women in particular—are less likely to be employed than their counterparts nationally.{{4}} In contrast, Black and Hispanic men in the state are just slightly more likely to be employed compared with their counterparts nationally.

These data in the context of strong job growth and low unemployment rates in the state suggest that many South Carolinians experience significant barriers to employment. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2024) tracks the number of unemployed people—those looking for a job—compared with the number of job openings in their Job Openings and Labor Turnover survey (JOLTS). This ratio in South Carolina was 0.5 in May 2024. This means that there were twice as many job openings as there were people looking for a job. In the following sections, we discuss some of the likely barriers keeping would-be workers out of the labor market.

Despite job growth exceeding national rates, a lack of worker power means the strong labor market fails to translate into wage growth for workers

Wages and economic insecurity

One likely reason that many jobless South Carolinians are not actively looking for work is poor job quality (Millan Chicago LLC 2022). In other words, the available jobs do not provide adequate wages for workers to support themselves and their families and lack basic benefits, such as paid sick leave or paid family and medical leave. As discussed above, poor job quality has long been a fixture of South Carolina’s economy.

First, many working South Carolinians are paid exceptionally low wages. Figure M shows the share of workers that are paid less than $15 per hour nationally, across the South and in South Carolina. These data show that 18.5% of South Carolinians (almost one in five) are paid less than $15 per hour compared with 15% across the South and 12% nationally.

Figure M

Figure N shows the median wage—i.e., the wage of a worker paid more than 50% of all other workers in the economy and less than the other half—for workers nationally, across the South, and for South Carolina in 2019 and 2023 (in constant 2023 dollars). While the South generally has lower wages than other regions of the country, these data show that in 2023, middle-class workers in South Carolina were paid even less than their peers in the region—$22.46 per hour compared with $22.57. When compared with workers’ wages nationally, the typical (median) South Carolina worker was paid considerably less—$1.52 less per hour.

Figure N

These data also show that while wages have risen for workers across each geography since 2019, workers in South Carolina saw the smallest increase. The typical worker in South Carolina saw their wages rise by just $0.17 (0.8%) per hour over the four-year period, despite exceptionally strong job growth and many employers reporting they were unable to find enough workers (Bivens 2024; Green 2023). Workers across the South saw a larger increase of $0.39 (1.8%), but workers nationally saw an increase more than five times greater than in South Carolina at $0.87 (3.8%) per hour.

It is particularly remarkable that even as South Carolina’s job growth outpaced the rest of the region and the country, overall wage growth in the state remained tepid. This underscores how unbalanced South Carolina labor market is, and how policies have stacked the deck against the state’s workers.

Raising wages would strengthen the state’s economy and bring workers back into the labor market. A key reason that wages are lower in South Carolina is that it does not have a state minimum wage. This means that for most workers in South Carolina (and the other four states without a minimum wage{{5}}) the federal minimum of $7.25 applies.{{6}} And those not covered by the federal minimum wage can be paid even less. The lack of a suitable floor on wages means that workers in the state can have some of the lowest wages in the country, holding down wages for workers higher up the wage scale. An analysis by the Economic Policy Institute showed that raising the minimum wage to $17 would lift the wages of 584,000 workers in South Carolina alone, including 220,000 workers who would be earning above the minimum (Zipperer 2023).{{7}}

Voters and lawmakers in most states have recognized that a $7.25 minimum wage is too low for workers to support themselves and their families, which is why more than half of all states have set their minimum wage above the federal minimum. The failure to make any effort to raise the lowest wages in South Carolina reflects state lawmakers embracing the Southern economic development model that relies heavily on low wages for workers (Childers 2024a).

Auto manufacturing jobs are growing in South Carolina, but their wages are falling

A substantial contributor to South Carolina’s strong job growth in recent years is the rapidly growing auto and auto parts manufacturing sector. The state boasts a range of auto manufacturing, auto suppliers, and auto parts manufacturing companies moving into the state or expanding their operations. These companies include BMW, Michelin, Giti Tire, Mercedes-Benz, Honda, and Volvo (SCDC 2024a; SCDEW 2023b, 4). The South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (SCDEW 2023b, 5) reports South Carolina ranks third overall in exports across their auto manufacturing industry with over $12 billion in sales in 2022. The state is also number one in exports of tires (Carroll 2024; SCDC 2021).

Figure O shows the number of auto manufacturing jobs has grown more than 63% over the past decade in South Carolina, increasing from 23,207 jobs in 2013 to 37,838 in 2023. While auto manufacturing jobs fell from 2019 to 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic and related recession, these data show a steady increase in auto manufacturing jobs in each subsequent year.

Figure O

These numbers only include jobs in the actual manufacturing of autos and auto parts; they do not include the many other jobs required in these sectors or the jobs that are created up and down the supply chain. For example, BMW’s Spartanburg plant employs more than 11,000 people, including many who may not directly work in auto parts production (Carroll 2024; SCDEW 2023b).

There are multiple reasons auto manufacturing jobs are increasingly locating in the South generally, and in South Carolina, in particular (see Childers 2024b for trends in job growth by region). First, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) incentivizes automobile and parts manufacturers to make their cars, batteries, and electric vehicles in the U.S., as opposed to in a foreign country. Since the passage of the IRA, nationally there has been $110 billion in capital investments announced for electric vehicle manufacturing alone (Carroll 2024).

Within the U.S., there are several reasons corporations specifically choose South Carolina. The state provides auto and auto parts manufacturers with massive subsidies to locate in the state. Volkswagen’s Scout Motors, for example, received $1.29 billion in state incentives and up to $180 million in job development tax credits to build their plant in the state (Shepardson 2023; Udavant 2023). The subsidies provided to automakers can include subsidies for infrastructure such as the construction of facilities and transportation systems. They can also provide state funding for employee training and even for employees’ wages (AFL-CIO 2019).

Because the massive subsidies provided to auto and auto parts manufacturing companies have not been coupled with requirements that workers and local communities also benefit from the new projects and facilities, these economic development projects may bring jobs, but they also could bring real harm to workers and communities. In the simplest sense, these subsidies divert funds away from the provision of public goods and services (such as public schools, roads, and health care) and instead give those dollars to large, multinational corporations and their shareholders. For example, South Carolina’s public schools report the highest total tax abatement revenue losses of any state in the country (Wen 2022). In fiscal year 2021, for example, $534 million that would have gone to South Carolina public schools, a school system already facing a major K-12 funding crisis, was lost to tax abatements. Further, public school losses to abatements have been increasing each year and some of the largest increases are in poor districts and districts with larger numbers of students of color including Chester, Dillon, Lee, and Richland (Wen 2022).

South Carolina also has corporation-friendly tax policies that further allow large national and international corporations to maximize their profits at the expense of workers and local communities. The South Carolina Department of Commerce (SCDC 2024b) notes the state’s 5% corporate tax rate is the lowest in the Southeast. It also reports ways for corporations to further lower their tax rate including a job tax credit, which eliminates up to 50% of their tax liability over multiple years.

Finally, South Carolina has the lowest union coverage rate of any state. According to Carroll (2024), 85% of the $110 billion in capital investments into EVs went to so-called right-to-work states where union coverage rates are lower (Sherer and Gould 2024). Data show that lower union coverage rates are associated with lower wages for workers (Banerjee et al. 2021). While auto manufacturing jobs in South Carolina pay more than many other jobs in the state, they are paid considerably less than their counterparts in Midwestern states (Childers 2024b).

Table 2 shows the median hourly wage for the three industries that make up auto manufacturing in the ten largest auto manufacturing states. These data show that auto manufacturing workers in South Carolina don’t have the lowest wages of the top ten states, but they are lower than in many of the states in the Midwest and West, especially Michigan, Illinois, and California. Motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing workers, however, face a substantially lower wage than their counterparts across all other states except Tennessee.

Table 2

Not only are they lower, however, the real value of auto manufacturing wages in South Carolina are falling. Table 3 shows the hourly wages for auto and auto parts manufacturing workers for 2012 and 2023, both in 2023 dollars. The real value of median wages for all three groups of auto workers have fallen since 2012. This is a remarkable trend—that a fast-growing industry with many employers needing to rapidly staff new facilities would face so little pressure to raise pay (such that that typical wages for workers in this industry would not even keep up with inflation) exemplifies just how little bargaining power workers in South Carolina have.

Table 3

The decline in the purchasing power of auto worker’s wages is substantial. The decline is largest for motor vehicle and trailer manufacturing workers, whose wages fell by $11.58 per hour. That amounts to a decline of $463.37 for a 40-hour work week. Motor vehicle manufacturing (-$4.37) and motor vehicle parts manufacturing (-$2.09) workers saw smaller, yet substantial, declines that would amount to a loss of $175.00 and $83.60 respectively, for each 40-hour work week.

As more auto and auto parts manufacturing companies move into or expand in the state and the region, they are investing billions of dollars building up plants, facilities, infrastructure, and supplier networks. For example, Scout Motors, mentioned above, has broken ground on their new $2 billion plant that will span about 1,600 acres in Blythewood, SC. (Santaella 2024). Redwood Materials, a battery recycling company, has broken ground on a $3.5 billion battery plant in Charleston (Visconti 2024). Envision AESC, a battery supplier for BMW, has announced an $810 million battery cell production plant in the state (SCDC 2022). There are nearly 500 auto-related companies in the state (SCDC 2021). South Carolina also provides one of the few deep-water ports on the east coast (Udavant 2023).

These factors along with massive state and federal subsidies and access to established supply networks provide auto workers in South Carolina with a key source of leverage to demand better pay and greater investments in their communities. Unionization has been crucial to other workers as a way to achieve these goals, especially long term.

The largest occupations in the state pay low wages, particularly to Black workers

As noted above, many states outside the South where wages are considerably higher have raised their state’s minimum wage. In South Carolina, not only has the state not raised its minimum wage, but state lawmakers have enacted abusive preemption laws that prevent localities within the state from doing so (EPI 2024a). Below we examine what this means for workers in some of the most common occupations in the state.

Table 4 shows the 15 largest occupations in the state, the number of workers in the occupation, and earnings of workers at the 25th percentile and the median. The workers in just these 15 occupations make up 31% of all workers in the state. They fill crucial roles in the state’s economy, including caring for the sick and elderly; ensuring the fast-growing trade, transportation, and utilities sector continues to be strong; and making sure the hospitality industry (so crucial to South Carolina’s economy) is thriving.

Table 4

At $20.30, the median wage among all workers in South Carolina is too low to provide a full-time, year-round worker with enough income to meet their most basic needs in any metropolitan area in the state for which we have data.{{8}} And most of the workers represented in these top 15 occupations are paid much less. Waiters and waitresses are paid just $8.98, fast-food and counter workers are paid just $12.40, cashiers are paid $12.69, and retail salespersons are paid just $13.89 per hour.

Because the median is often used to represent the typical worker in an occupation, there is a tendency to overlook the even more dire struggles of the half of workers in low-wage jobs that are paid less than the median. These data highlight the need to account for the variation in wages within occupations. For example, the largest occupation in Table 4 is “retail salespersons” who were paid a median wage of $13.89 per hour (or $28,900 annually) for someone working full time, year-round. This would leave a two-parent family with two children and both parents working full time unable to live a modest yet adequate lifestyle (EPI 2024c). Because half of retail salespeople are paid less than the median, they will struggle even more to provide for their families. For example, retail salespeople at the 25th percentile are paid just $11.15 per hour or $23,190 annually—$5,710 less than workers at the median.

Looking at the racial makeup of workers in these occupations also shows that low wages also reinforce racial inequality. Table 5 shows the racial composition of workers across the 15 largest occupations in the state. While workers across racial and ethnic backgrounds are represented in all 15 occupations shown, the jobs that pay the most are filled primarily by white South Carolinians, while Black South Carolinians are overrepresented in lower-wage jobs. Black workers make up almost a quarter of the workforce—24.9% of all workers—but they are seriously overrepresented among home health and personal care aides (57.7%), miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators (52.3%), laborers and freight, stock, and material movers, hand (42.2%), and cashiers (36.5%). They are underrepresented however, among general and operations managers who are 77.3% white workers and registered nurses who are 79.4% white.

Table 5

Now is the time for state lawmakers and employers to reconsider compensation policies and break from historically all-too-common practices that exploit workers. Figure P shows the 20 occupations projected to add the largest numbers of new jobs by 2032. Many of these are low-wage jobs that make up the largest occupations in the state today. Of the 20, less than half have hourly pay rates at or above the $20.30 median for all workers. None of the top five occupations pay at or above this rate despite constituting the vast majority of new jobs—45.5% of the 20 occupations projected to add the largest numbers of new jobs by 2032 and 18.3% of all projected new jobs.

Figure P

All workers, independent of race, gender, or other characteristics, should have sufficient earnings to allow them to purchase food, housing, transportation, and all the other items that support a basic standard of living and help fuel the state’s economy. When large segments of the population cannot afford to buy basic necessities, consumer demand is reduced, shrinking the pool of potential customers that businesses need to buy their goods and services. Further, inadequate pay can make it difficult for many people to remain fully attached to the workforce. For instance, if someone cannot afford child care or a car payment, they may opt to stay out of the formal workforce or may be forced to work sporadically or only part time. This only further weakens the state’s long-term growth if large segments of the potential workforce are not fully participating in the labor market.

Jobs in South Carolina lack many basic workplace benefits

Workers across the state not only face low wages but they are also less likely than workers nationally to have access to key workplace benefits, such as paid family leave. In 70% of households with children across the state, all parents are in the labor market (National Partnership 2023b). A lack of paid family leave coverage forces workers to lose income if they take time off to welcome a child into their family, to care for an elder parent, or to receive care themselves for an extended period. In many cases, it can mean losing their jobs or opting to stay out of the workforce. According to data from the National Partnership for Women and Families (2023b), about 1.9 million workers in South Carolina, or 78% of the state workforce, do not have access to paid family and medical leave. They estimate that if women in South Carolina participated in the labor market at the same rate as women in countries that do have paid family leave, there would be an additional 82,000 people working in the state.

Workers across South Carolina are also less likely to have paid sick leave, another key workplace benefit. Paid sick leave ensures workers can take time off from work if they or a family member are sick or injured. Since South Carolina does not have a law requiring paid sick leave, it is up to employers to decide whether to offer this benefit to their workers. Many employers choose not to do so and, predictably, access to paid sick leave in South Carolina is lower than the national average. While nationally almost 78% of workers have paid sick leave, just 67% do in South Carolina (Mehta and Milli 2023). Worse, employers of low-wage workers—the very workers least able to afford to lose any income—are much less likely to have access to paid time off (Gould and Wething 2023). This is not just a hardship for workers and families, it also endangers public health when workers go to work sick or must send their children to school or daycare when they are ill.

Poor job quality is a product of policymakers’ decisions that have disempowered workers

One key reason that job quality is lower in South Carolina and much of the South is the lack of worker power. Employers are only able to retain staff despite low wages and poor job quality when employees lack the bargaining power to demand better working conditions or to find a new job. As noted, lawmakers in South Carolina—and in many other Southern states—have advanced an economic development strategy designed to keep wages low, limit regulations on corporations, and not require worker benefits or supports, such as employer-provided health insurance or paid leave. This allows lawmakers to advertise their state as “business friendly” to lure businesses into the state (Childers 2024a). A key feature of this strategy is to prevent and undermine workers’ ability to join together with their coworkers in unions. Unions are one of the most powerful means for workers to negotiate better wages and benefits. In fact, one of the best indicators of job quality is whether workers are unionized.

Unionized workers have higher wages; are more likely to have employer-provided health care, paid sick leave, paid family and medical leave; and they experience less inequality compared with nonunion workers (Banerjee et al. 2021). Many employers therefore oppose workers’ efforts to form a union, frequently with the help of lawmakers. For instance, South Carolina is one of 25 states in which lawmakers have passed a deceptively named right-to-work law. These laws do not guarantee workers a job; rather, they make it more difficult for workers to form and maintain unions by limiting collective bargaining rights. RTW laws emerged in the 1940s as a means of preventing workers from joining together in solidarity, especially across racial lines.

Given how central slavery and racial division were to South Carolina’s history, the state’s fierce opposition to unions may be viewed as just one more part of that legacy. Figure Q shows that South Carolina has the lowest union coverage rate of any U.S. state—meaning that a smaller share of the state’s workers is covered by a union contract than in any other state in the country.{{9}}

Figure Q

Another factor in lower rates of unionization is the composition of the jobs across the state. As we show above, many of the largest occupations in the state—retail salesperson, fast-food and counter workers, cashiers, home health and personal care aides—are occupations that have traditionally been more difficult to organize for several reasons, including high turnover rates among workers and workers being spread out across different employment sites. Moreover, some of the largest industries in South Carolina are those in which workers lack collective bargaining rights under federal labor law. Agricultural workers, domestic workers, and state and local public-sector workers are explicitly omitted from federal labor laws, leaving legal protections for these workers up to states. Unlike most states—which have enacted policies extending some form of collective bargaining rights to public employees—South Carolina law explicitly declares collective bargaining illegal for all state and local government workers (CLJE 2024, 10).

Even for those workers who are protected by federal labor law, trying to form a union is an incredibly difficult undertaking. Employers nationwide collectively spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year to dissuade workers from exercising their right to form a union. And many employers willfully violate workers’ rights to organize and form a union knowing they will face minimal, if any, repercussions (McNicholas et al. 2019; Shierholz et al. 2024).

Still, workers across the South are working to overcome these barriers to organize in new ways. For example, the Union of Southern Service Workers (USSW) organizes across workplaces in South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. The federal funding from the BIL, IRA, and the CHIPS Act is leading to rapid growth in industries such as manufacturing, especially auto manufacturing. New public and private investments promise to create good jobs that are providing potential new leverage for organizing. Labor, faith, and community coalitions are forming to try to take advantage of this opportunity to make sure that they and their communities also benefit from these investments and not just wealthy corporations, many of which are foreign companies (AFL-CIO 2019). 

Unless wages are raised and workers have stronger leverage to fight for better wages and benefits, current economic and racial inequalities will be reinforced and deepened in the future. Not only will this impact workers directly, but it also has implications for their families, broader communities, and the overall economy.

Low wages, paltry benefits, and a lack of public supports leaves many South Carolinians in poverty

Perhaps the most commonly used measure of economic well-being is the official poverty rate. An individual or family is considered in poverty if their total personal or family income falls below the federal poverty threshold for their family’s size and composition. For example, in 2023, a family with two parents and two children had a poverty threshold of $30,900 (U.S. Census Bureau 2024c). A family with income below this amount would be considered in poverty—a level of income below which most, if not all, families would struggle to meet their families’ basic needs.

In South Carolina, 13.9% of the population falls below the poverty line. This is higher than the poverty rate in the South (13.5%) and the U.S. as a whole (12.5%). South Carolina’s poverty rate in 2023 was the 12th highest in the country. The state also has a substantially higher child poverty rate than the nation at 19.1% compared with 16.0% nationally.{{10}} Its child poverty rate is the 10th highest in the nation.

There is particularly acute racial inequity among those facing poverty in South Carolina. Like the country as a whole, the poverty rate for Black and Hispanic South Carolinians is markedly higher than the poverty rate for white South Carolinians. Table 6 shows that in both South Carolina and nationally, the poverty rate among non-Hispanic white people in 2023 was 9.4%. Nationally, the poverty rate among Black people was more than twice that at 20.8%, while Hispanic poverty was slightly less than double at 16.6%. In South Carolina, however, both the Black and Hispanic poverty rates were markedly higher, at 23.0% and 22.0% respectively. Notably, the Black poverty rate in South Carolina is much higher than both the national rate and the poverty rate for Black people in the South as a whole (which is actually lower than the national rate).

Table 6

With lower earnings and high poverty rates across the state, the average family in South Carolina has a family income that is well below what would be needed to attain an adequate yet modest standard of living. EPI’s (2024c) Family Budget Calculator estimates metro- and county-specific costs for families based on the number of parents (1 or 2) and presence of and number of children (up to 4) for all counties and metro areas in the United States. It includes the cost of housing, transportation, food, health care, child care, and taxes. This provides a more accurate and complete measure of economic security than the federal poverty measure.

Figure S shows the family income a typical two-parent household with two children would need to cover the basics in seven of South Carolina’s major metropolitan areas along with the median family income in those metro areas. The data show that in no metropolitan area for which we have data is the typical family income at a level that meets the needs of families. The metro area where the median family income comes closest is the Charleston-North Charleston Metro, with much larger gaps in other metro areas.

Figure S

The prevalence of low incomes in the state means that many South Carolina families struggle to afford basic necessities and likely face considerable hardship caring for themselves and their families; enjoying whatever leisure time they may have; and trying to find and maintain regular employment. For low-income families, any economic shock—such as an unexpected medical bill or car repair—can be all it takes for them to be put into default, be evicted from their home, face repossession on a vehicle, among many other potential challenges that can lead them deeper into economic despair. In the following sections, we examine how housing, transportation, and food insecurity represent additional challenges for many low-income South Carolinians.

Low incomes and inadequate public investment make it hard for families to afford the basics

Housing security

Without housing, everything else falls apart.
– Rev. Jason W. Myers, Director, Chester Worker Empowerment Center

Housing is a basic need that is fundamental to achieving economic security. Reliable, safe, and affordable housing increases the ability of people to participate in the labor market, apply for jobs, and maintain employment once they have a job. When people lack reliable housing, they are less able to focus on finding a job since their attention and energy will often be focused on securing a place to sleep. Further, reliable housing increases the likelihood they will have access to the technology to search for and apply for a job. The process of applying for jobs requires applicants have a fixed address in addition to a current phone number and email address to send and receive communications with potential employers. Finally, having reliable housing further increases the likelihood that workers are ready to work, rested, in appropriate attire, and able to focus on skill development.

Unfortunately, many South Carolinians—especially those who rent—are housing insecure. Compared with the South and the U.S., South Carolina homeowners spend a slightly smaller share of their household income on the monthly costs of homeownership (19.6% of homeowners spend 35% of monthly household income on these costs, compared with 20.8% in the South and 21.3% in the U.S.; U.S. Census Bureau ACS 2022a). However, renters in South Carolina are more likely to be cost burdened.

There are over 150,000 households in South Carolina designated as extremely low income (below the poverty line or 30% of the area’s median income), and nearly three-quarters (73%) of those households are severely cost burdened, meaning they spend more than half of their income on housing. There is a shortage of nearly 90,000 rental homes available and affordable to extremely low-income renters (NLIHC n.d.). Beyond being unaffordable and in short supply, the existing housing stock in many low-income areas is substandard or even dangerous. For example, advocates in Chester County reported that a natural disaster relief organization came to Chester in 2017 and returned in 2018. They stepped in to demolish and rebuild houses that were in severe disrepair. Advocates noted that some families were living in homes with no running water and one family was living in a house that had been knocked off its foundation.{{14}}

Transportation access

Lack of transportation is another major barrier for many workers across the state, especially when jobs are not in areas where job seekers are located. Not all counties or all parts of all counties have access to public transportation, according to the South Carolina Department of Transportation annual report (SCDOT 2024). South Carolina ranks 49th in the nation (ahead of only Alabama) for public transit usage in terms of the annual average number of miles per resident traveled via public transit. South Carolina’s largest public transit systems, measured in passenger trips, are the Charleston Area Regional Transportation Authority (2,142,165 trips in 2023) and the Central Midlands Regional Transportation Authority (1,725,176 trips in 2023). All other bus systems in the state provide fewer than 100,000 trips per year (FTA 2024).

Lack of transportation was one of the top reasons given for not having a job in a survey conducted by the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Millan Chicago LLC 2022). The report indicates that the federal Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) is providing substantial dollars for public transit. If this results in more low-cost, accessible public transportation that allows workers without private transportation to connect with available jobs, it could not only increase employment and economic security for many South Carolinians, but it will also likely make it easier for businesses to recruit workers.

Lacking adequate public transit options, many South Carolinian workers drive to work and they too face substantial challenges, including long commute times on dangerous and failing roads. According to a 2024 report, 41% of South Carolina’s major roads are in “poor or mediocre condition,” costing drivers $2.8 billion a year in repairs, vehicle depreciation, and increased fuel consumption. Fortunately, the 2021 federal IIJA is expected to provide $5 billion in state funds for highway and bridge improvement in South Carolina. As of mid-2024, federal funds supported over half (56%) of the state’s spending on such improvements (TRIP 2024a).

South Carolina has some of the deadliest roads of any state{{15}} and its roads have gotten more dangerous over time. In 2023, the state’s traffic fatality rate was 1.7 fatalities per million vehicle miles traveled (compared with 1.26 in the U.S.) and 1,028 people were killed, a 34% increase since 2013 (TRIP 2024c). Rural roads are particularly deadly, and South Carolina’s fatality rate on rural roads is also the highest in the nation (TRIP 2024b).

Food insecurity

Over 300,000 households in South Carolina (14.4% of households in the state) are unable to acquire adequate food due to limited resources. South Carolina is one of only seven states where food insecurity is higher than the national average, and it is one of only six states where the prevalence of very low food security is higher than average.{{16}} Very low food security is a severe form of food insecurity in which one or more household members are forced to eat less because of limited resources. South Carolina was the only state in the nation to see statistically significant increases in very low food security from 2013 to 2023, while these rates declined in 18 states (Rabbit et al. 2024).{{17}} South Carolina has the fourth highest share of free lunch-eligible children{{18}}—70% of the state’s K-12 students relied on free schools meals during the 2022–2023 school year (ED NCES 2024).

Despite high rates of food insecurity, including among children, South Carolina lawmakers have not invested in policy solutions to address hunger. In fact, two Republicans cosponsored a 2023 federal House bill to expand the already harsh work requirements of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).{{19}} The bill would put SNAP benefits at risk for 30% of households participating in the program, one of the highest state participation rates in the nation (Bolen, Rosenbaum, and Nchako 2023). And Governor McMaster opted out of the 2024 Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer program, which would have given eligible families food vouchers to use during the summer break when students do not receive free lunch (Brams and James 2024). These provide further examples of how lack of public investment makes it more difficult for families to meet their basic needs.

Conclusion

South Carolina has a long history of exploitative labor practices extending back to before it was even a state with the first enslaved African arriving in 1526 (Brockell 2019). The state’s labor policies and practices today are, in many ways, a direct extension of that same strategy to extract labor at the lowest possible cost while keeping workers disempowered. It is this model that has meant that despite South Carolina’s economy experiencing exceptional job growth during and after the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic with employers struggling to find workers, wages remain low and show less growth than wages across the South or the nation.

Compounding the challenges facing workers in South Carolina, recent job growth has been distributed unequally across the state. Many employers fail to provide workplace benefits, such as paid leave, that might allow or encourage more working parents and caregivers to fully participate in the workforce. Many South Carolinians lack access to safe, reliable, affordable transportation that might give them access to these job centers. For all these reasons, a substantial share of the prime-age South Carolina population is not participating in the labor market at all.

Many South Carolinians, especially children and Black and brown residents, are experiencing high rates of poverty and overall economic insecurity.

Policymakers across the state have the opportunity to shift directions. Instead of continuing to embrace anti-worker policies, they can begin to adopt pro-worker policies that will allow South Carolinians broadly to share in the prosperity their labor creates. This could begin with state lawmakers implementing a minimum wage for the state that is truly a living wage. This would be a first step toward ensuring that all jobs in the state are good jobs.

State lawmakers could also embrace the job quality levers built into the BIL, IRA, and CHIPS bills. For instance, lawmakers could require that workers on federally funded projects are paid prevailing wages—setting a wage floor for workers—and that new infrastructure and manufacturing facilities are built using project labor agreements.

State lawmakers could further ensure that large employers benefiting from federal and state public subsidies enter community benefits agreements (CBAs), legally binding agreements between community coalitions that can include labor organizations, racial justice groups, environmental advocates, government agencies, and developers and contractors (Reimagine Appalachia n.d.). These commitments range from hiring local workers, paying prevailing wages, and ensuring minimum benefits and safety standards for workers. They can also include agreements on land use and contributions to affordable housing and child care. These agreements help ensure that workers, their families, and their communities also benefit from the public tax dollars spent to build up infrastructure, like roads and bridges.

State lawmakers could also ensure workers have access to basic benefits that would allow them to balance work and family demands. Paid family and medical leave, for example, has been shown to have significant benefits for families including increasing their economic security and overall better health outcomes (National Partnership 2023a). But this also benefits employers because access to state paid leave programs have been shown to reduce turnover among workers and it makes participation less expensive for small businesses (Corley 2016; National Partnership 2023a). Thus, this should be a priority for lawmakers concerned about labor force participation and who care about healthy families.

State lawmakers can also respect workers’ right to unionize. As discussed above, workers joining together with their coworkers in a union gives them better bargaining power with their employers and a stronger voice in their workplace. Workers who are unionized have higher wages, smaller wage gaps, and are more likely to have benefits such as health insurance, retirement benefits, and paid leave.

Finally, South Carolina, along with many states across the South, have passed preemption laws at the state level that prevent cities, counties, and other local entities from raising standards for workers and families in their communities. Some of the specific labor standards that have been preempted in South Carolina are raising the minimum wage, establishing a paid family leave program, regulating wages and working conditions for so-called gig workers, and preventing the requirement of project labor agreements when private businesses receive public dollars.

Because local governments are also an important force in economic development, they should use their leverage to encourage things like CBAs where they can (Gerstein and Gong 2024). Where they are preempted, however, their ability to contribute to overall economic development is hindered. State lawmakers should therefore rescind the preemptions, giving local communities the opportunity to pass laws that respond to their needs.

Together, these policies would improve workers lives by raising wages and help ensure their hard work allows them to provide for themselves and their families, to balance the demands of work and family, and give them a voice on their jobs. These policies would give local communities within South Carolina more control and raise standards for families and broader communities across the state.

Notes

{{1.}} The Affordable Care Act expanded Medicaid coverage to most adults with incomes up to 138% of the federal poverty level. To date, 40 states and D.C. have adopted the Medicaid expansion. The 10 states that have failed to adopt the Medicaid expansion are Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (KFF 2024).

{{2.}} Dividing 200,000 jobs by the 2,279,240 jobs in the state would produce an estimate of 8.8% of all jobs in the state. The total number of jobs shown in Table 1 assumes that all farm workers are included in the total number of jobs in the state. The QCEW data, however, exclude small farms so it is unclear how many of these jobs are represented in these data. If the 200,000 agribusiness jobs are in addition to the jobs shown in Table 1, the total number of jobs would be 2,479,240.

{{3.}} EPI analysis of ACS data.. Share of food production workforce and animal slaughter workers based on EPI analysis of the 2017–2019, 2021–2023 one-year American Community Survey. Sample sizes too small to estimate racial and ethnic composition of other food production occupations such as crop production. 

{{4.}} The exceptionally large discrepancy between Hispanic women’s employment rate in South Carolina compared with their national employment rate deserves greater attention than is possible in this report and it should be explored in future research.

{{5.}} The remaining states without state minimum wage laws are Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee. While Georgia and Wyoming have minimum wage laws, their minimum wages are lower than the federal minimum wage, so the federal minimum wage applies.

{{6.}} There are exceptions that allow some workers to be paid less than the $7.25 federal minimum wage. Some groups covered by these exceptions include tipped workers, workers with disabilities, some youth workers, and seasonal or agricultural workers. However, when a state law requires a higher minimum wage than federal law, the state law would apply (DOL n.d.).

{{7.}} They would get a raise as employers adjust pay scales to reflect the new minimum.

{{8.}} Median hourly earnings in Table 4 differ from that in Figure N because they are taken from a different source, which allows us to examine earnings across detailed occupations. Earnings for detailed occupations should be compared only with overall median earnings in Table 4.

{{9.}} Union density, the share of South Carolina workers who belong to a union, is even lower at 2.3% (EPI analysis of Current Population Survey.)

{{10.}} ACS 2023 one-year estimates.

{{11.}} The unofficially defined counties include Bamberg, Beaufort, Calhoun, Clarendon, Colleton, Darlington, Dillon, Dorchester, Florence, Hampton, Jasper, Lee, Marion, Marlboro, Orangeburg, Sumter, and Williamsburg.

{{12.}} Bamberg (60.6%), Clarendon (45.6%), Darlington (41%), Dillon (46.4%), Florence (42.8%), Hampton (52.7%), Lee (62.9%), Marion (56.3%), Marlboro (49.4%), Orangeburg (61.5%), Sumter (45.9%), and Williamsburg (63.6%).

{{13.}} According to Click and Hinshaw (2015), the high court returned the case to the circuit court in 1999 and reduced the number of plaintiff districts to eight—Allendale, Dillon 4 (previously Dillon 2), Florence 4, Hampton 2, Jasper, Lee, Marion 7 and Orangeburg 3.

{{14.}} The source is a discussion with advocates from South Carolina who helped inform this report. These advocates included Rev. Jason W. Myers, Director, Chester Worker Empowerment Center and Leslie Brakefield, among others from the local community.

{{15.}} As measured by traffic fatalities per vehicle mile traveled.

{{16.}} Statistically significantly higher.

{{17.}} Data cover three-year period such that 2013 data include data from 2011–2013 and 2023 data include data from 2021–2023.

{{18.}} After Mississippi, Nevada, and New Mexico.

{{19.}} H.R. 1581.

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In March, workers at the Waffle House in Conyers, Georgia, went on strike. It’s not difficult to see why: They are paid wages as low as $2.90 per hour before tips, with a $3.00 per shift “meal credit” taken from their already meager wages regardless of whether they have eaten a meal at the restaurant.    

But that is not all—worker safety is also at issue. Waffle House workers report working in dangerous environments and point to the constant threat of violence and the lack of trained security in the restaurants. Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for customers to start fights with or to attack workers. Waffle House staff is expected to deescalate these fights and call police rather than the store ensuring their safety and the safety of other customers. There are also robberies—one Waffle House worker was shot and killed during an armed robbery in Tifton, Georgia.  

Finally, there is the practice of Waffle House restaurants being kept open during hurricanes and other disasters which endanger workers who are still expected to report for their shifts. One worker reported being asked to go to the store to purchase paper towels during a hurricane.  

The conditions faced by staff at Waffle House restaurants exemplify the harmful philosophy of the Southern economic development model: that workers are just another commodity that can be replaced and a cost to be minimized. While financials are not public, Forbes estimates the owner of Waffle House has a net worth of $1.7 billion. Yet, 66% of Waffle House workers are paid less than $15 an hour and 24% are paid less than $10, according to our Company Wage Tracker. Thousands of Waffle House workers are paid poverty-level wages, with a portion of those wages being taken back as a “meal credit.” The meal credit that is automatically deducted from workers’ pay could add up to almost $30 million annually for Waffle House, according to reported estimates. 

The Southern economic development model is characterized by low wages, lax regulation of businesses, low corporate taxes, and a lack of safety net supports for workers and families. But perhaps most important of all, this model requires that workers are divided because when they come together across racial, gender, class, and other differences, they are empowered to demand change.   

Fortunately, workers across the region are increasingly recognizing that they have the power to stop wealthy and powerful corporations from continuing to extract their labor without fair compensation and without regard for their well-being or that of their families and communities. The Waffle House strike is part of a much larger movement of service workers across the South–in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina–joining together as the Union of Southern Service Workers to demand change. 

Any policy regime or business model that does not protect the security of workers and goes so far as to require them to battle hurricanes to ensure that businesses remain open is not a model that should be maintained. Waffle House workers and many others in service jobs across the South are fighting to change this.

Previously from Rooted in Racism: Southern policymakers leave workers with lower wages and a fraying safety net

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In reality, this economic development model is fundamentally flawed as a strategy for improving living conditions for most Southerners. In fact, the Southern economic development strategy was never designed to help the vast majority of working Southerners; rather, it reflects efforts to ensure continued access to the cheap labor of Black people following emancipation, and that of Black and brown people more generally today. 

In this report, we describe the Southern economic development model in detail and document the historical evolution of various components of the model. We show how politicians and the wealthy across the South have used racism and drawn on notions of white supremacy to divide the population along racial, ethnic, nativist, and economic lines. This has prevented Southerners from coming together in solidarity to demand policies that would uplift everyone in the region.

Many Southern politicians try to obscure and distort the historical record on race and the origins and purposes of many of their policies. They point to population growth over the last 50 years and the increasing number of businesses—primarily in manufacturing—that have located in some Southern states to try to sell their deceptive narrative. In this report, and in the companion reports and fact sheets in this series, we will scrutinize such claims and draw on empirical data to illustrate how the Southern economic development model has failed most workers and families across the U.S. South.

This project exposes the exploitative policies and practices that impoverish Southerners across demographic groups and highlights their complex connections to the prevailing power structure in the South. This report begins with a detailed description of the Southern economic development model. What follows is a brief history of the origins of the model, which developed as a way for wealthy and powerful people to ensure continued access to the labor of Black people following the Civil War and to that of Black and brown Southerners today, for little or no compensation. Finally, the report emphasizes that civil rights for Black and brown Americans are intimately intertwined with the rights of workers, independent of race. This reality is recognized by many conservative economic and political leaders and has led to their vociferous opposition to unions, an institution that can create cross-racial solidarity, empower workers, and undermine the racial hierarchy across the region.

Figure A

What is the Southern economic development model?

The Southern economic development model is designed to enable businesses to extract labor from large pools of workers as cheaply as possible. Businesses in the South have particularly sought the labor of Black and brown Southerners. For over 300 years, these laborers have been used to cultivate cotton and tobacco, produce the food we eat, care for our children and the elderly, build the nation’s infrastructure, and perform many other critical jobs—often for little or no compensation. The labor provided by enslaved men and women was overwhelmingly unpaid.{{1}} After emancipation, many Black men and women—who faced limited employment opportunities—were often forced into sharecropping. They worked the land and grew crops on plantations owned by former enslavers who typically took half or more of the value of their crops (Bode 2020; USDA 2003). It was also common for Black men and women to work as porters and maids on Pullman railcars, where they were forced to rely on tips for most, if not all, of their income (Hasso 2021; Trotter Jr. 2019; Tye 2005). Today, incarcerated workers can be required to work without pay and they often are (ACLU and GHRC 2022; Mast forthcoming a).

The racist roots of this model have been obscured in favor of a more acceptable “pro-business” narrative. The pro-business narrative suggests that low wages, low taxes, anti-union policies, a weak safety net, and limited regulation on businesses creates a “rising tide that lifts all boats.”

Below we examine the key features of the Southern economic development model in detail. We then trace the development of this model over time, highlighting the ways civil rights for Black and brown Southerners are necessary for ensuring that all workers are empowered.

Low wages

Many states across the South promote low wages for many workers by the policies they implement or, in many cases, the policies they choose not to implement. For example, five Southern states—Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina—have no state minimum wage at all. Georgia has a minimum wage set at $5.15 per hour. Because the federal minimum wage is set at $7.25 per hour and $2.13 per hour for tipped workers, all workers across the South are supposed to be paid at least these minimums (EPI 2023).

Fewer than half of the Southern states (six states plus D.C.) have a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. In every other region, most states have minimum wages higher than $7.25 (EPI 2023). In fact, of the 20 states where the federal minimum wage applies, 10 are in the South.

Many Southern states have weak, if any, labor law enforcement. This means that workers in the South, who are already receiving low minimum wages, are particularly vulnerable to wage theft. This is especially true in industries such as food and drink services, agriculture, and retail (Cooper and Kroeger 2017).

Cooper and Kroeger (2017) analyze data on the share of workers who have experienced minimum wage violations—i.e., were paid less than the applicable minimum wage—in the 10 most populous U.S. states. They find that large shares of low-wage workers in Florida (24.9%), North Carolina (12.3%), Texas (10.8%), and Georgia (9.4%) have experienced minimum wage violations.

Failing to pay the minimum wage is just one of the ways employers cheat workers out of their earnings.{{2}} Employers who commit wage theft are rarely punished (Cooper and Kroeger 2017). In Florida, for example, there is no state Department of Labor to enforce wage standards; all of the state’s wage and hour enforcement is deferred to federal authorities. While Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are states which technically do have Departments of Labor (DOLs), their DOLs do not make any concrete effort to recover wages that are stolen by employers (Mangundayao et al. 2021).

Wage theft victims can technically pursue action against an unscrupulous employer by submitting claims with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division. However, in the absence of in-state enforcement, businesses face little risk of being held accountable if they cheat their employees.

Notably, some Southern states have actively fought against federal government efforts to raise wages in their states. In 2022, the attorneys general of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi sued the federal government to prevent an increase in the wages of federal contractors (Texas v. Biden 2022).

It is important to understand that federal standards governing minimum wages, overtime, and even what activities are to be included in the number of hours worked were designed to keep wages low in the South. When the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 establishing these rules, large categories of workers—primarily agricultural workers, domestic workers, tipped workers, and public-sector workers—were excluded from its protections.

Agricultural workers, domestic workers, and tipped workers were excluded specifically because the formerly enslaved were limited almost entirely to these lines of work across the South; Southern lawmakers would not agree to vote for the legislation without these exclusions (Dixon 2021; Perea 2011). The practice of using tips to compensate service workers in the United States in fact proliferated in the 19th century after the end of slavery; it allowed businesses to hire the formerly enslaved without having to pay them, instead forcing them to rely on tips (Dixon 2021; Tye 2005).

When the FLSA was amended in 1966 to include service workers—among other coverage expansions—a special “tip credit” was created that allowed employers to count tips received by staff against a portion of the minimum wage the employer was required to pay, effectively creating a separate, lower minimum wage (Allegretto and Cooper 2014). Today, Southern tipped workers continue to rely heavily on their tips. The federal minimum wage for tipped workers, which applies in most Southern states, is only $2.13 per hour—a level that has remained unchanged since 1991 (Schweitzer 2021).

We continue to see the influence of racism and sexism in the low wages and lack of protections offered to workers in jobs that were historically held by enslaved people. Domestic work, for example, has historically been—and continues to be—performed by Black, brown, and immigrant women. These women work as nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides; personal and home care aides; and nursing assistants in private households. Across the South, Black women make up 43% of home health care workers, followed by Hispanic women at 17% (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022). Workers in these jobs remain undercompensated despite the clear value of this work—providing care that allows families to work and that allows elderly and disabled Southerners to age in their homes (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022; Robertson, Sawo, and Cooper 2022).

Minimal levels of regulation

Another key component of the Southern economic development model is regulating businesses as little as possible. As noted in the previous section, this means lack of regulation or enforcement around labor laws such as federal minimum wage laws, overtime laws, and safety standards for workers (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Fleischman and Franklin 2017; FPI 2022; Terrell and St. Julien 2023; Waldman 2017). It also includes minimal regulation of business activities that pollute the air, water, and soil, which disproportionately impact Black and brown communities.

In Louisiana, there is a roughly 130-mile-long area between Baton Rouge and New Orleans running along the Mississippi River that is known as “Cancer Alley.” Cancer Alley has a heavy concentration of 200 or more oil refineries and petrochemical plants spewing toxic chemicals into the air, elevating cancer and other health risks among the area’s predominantly Black residents (Laughland 2023; Terrell and St. Julien 2022). Terrell and St. Julien (2023) found that lax permitting processes in the state have resulted in Black and brown communities across Louisiana having a seven to 21 times greater exposure to air pollutants—especially those from chemical manufacturers—compared with white communities.{{3}}

Younes et al. (2021) mapped the spread of cancer-causing chemicals in air pollution across the country that moves into residential neighborhoods and exposes residents. They identified places across the country where residents were exposed to hazardous chemicals, with or without their knowledge. Younes et al.’s study found that almost all states with the highest levels of exposure are Southern states, with Texas and Louisiana being the states whose residents have the greatest excess exposure. In Texas, for example, one of the largest refineries globally has put millions of pounds of toxic chemicals in the air over the years. The result is an excess risk of cancer in these areas of three to six times what is considered acceptable by the EPA (Younes et al. 2021).

These communities are exposed to these dangerous chemicals because of the lax regulations of policymakers in Southern states. For example, in Louisiana, land use plans which label many majority-Black districts as “industrial” or “future industrial” have been approved despite these being residential communities (Laughland 2023). And according to a lawsuit by residents of these communities, every request by these large industrial corporations to locate in predominantly Black communities is approved by local governments (Laughland 2023).

Instead of expanding their staffing for pollution control, states with the worst environmental exposures have actually cut funding to state environmental agencies. In Texas and Louisiana, the states whose residents face the highest rate of exposure to toxic chemicals, funding for state environmental agencies was cut by 35.2% and 34.8% respectively between 2008 and 2018. Funding was down by 33.7% in North Carolina, 32.8% in Delaware, 20.8% in Georgia, 20.3% in Tennessee, and 10% in Alabama. But not all Southern states cut their operational funding for state environmental agencies: Maryland, South Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Florida, and West Virginia increased their funding (EIP 2019).

Low income and corporate taxes

Next, the Southern economic development model seeks to severely limit corporate and personal income taxes, particularly any that would increase the tax burden on higher-income households and individuals.

The roots of the South’s tax structure

To understand public attitudes toward taxes across the South, it is important to consider the roots of the current stance on taxes in the Southern economic development model. Before the Civil War, taxes on enslaved people were paid primarily by wealthy plantation owners and constituted a significant source of revenue for states across the South (Hill et al. 2019; Lyman 2017).

After slavery was abolished, plantation owners represented themselves as “concerned taxpayers” who opposed compensating for lost state revenue from taxes on enslaved people with rising property taxes. They were joined by poor white farmers who would now also be subject to rising property taxes raised by newly—and temporarily—empowered Black political leaders.

These leaders were raising taxes to provide basic services such as public education and to rebuild infrastructure after the devastation of the Civil War. But wealthy Southerners stoked racial animus to divide poor and working-class Southerners along the lines of race and ensure majority support to implement highly regressive tax policies (Williamson 2021; Young 2023).

Low corporate and income taxes force reliance on regressive sales taxes

Today, Southern politicians, business interests, and other wealthy Southerners continue to seek to eliminate or severely limit corporate and personal income taxes. For example, several Southern states used temporary budget surpluses—surpluses resulting from the distribution of federal dollars to states intended to address COVID-19 and the associated recession—as an excuse to further cut already low income-tax rates (Das 2022b).

Corporate and personal income taxes tend to be progressive, meaning they are structured such that higher-income earners pay a larger share of their income in taxes, while lower-income earners pay a smaller share. But when collection of corporate and personal income taxes declines, states are forced to rely more heavily on sales and property taxes, which are regressive. When sales and property taxes are assessed, lower-income people end up paying a larger share of their income for those taxes than higher-income people do (Wiehe et al. 2018; Young 2023).

Texas, Florida, and Tennessee have no income tax. In other Southern states with income taxes, tax rates are so low that they fail to raise adequate revenue, requiring the state to rely on sales and property taxes and fees and fines to pay for many public services including education, public health, public safety, infrastructure, and other services.

In 2019, sales tax accounted for more than 40% of all state and local tax revenue in many Southern states. These included Tennessee (56.6%), Louisiana (53.3%), Florida (50.9%), Arkansas (49.6%), Alabama (48.0%), and Mississippi (45.5%). These shares are substantially higher than the 34.4% of state and local tax revenue that sales taxes account for nationally (Das 2022a).

To generate this revenue, these states had sales taxes ranging from 4.0% in Alabama to 7.0% in Mississippi and Tennessee. And while most states at least exempt food from sales taxes, as of January 2023, Mississippi, Alabama, and Oklahoma did not (Tax Policy Center 2023).{{4}}

This approach to taxes means that public services are underfunded in the South

Proponents of this tax model argue that it increases the incomes of all households by allowing them to keep more of their money. Further, they argue that it allows businesses to reinvest and grow their businesses, thereby increasing tax revenue. But this regressive approach to taxes simply means there is not sufficient revenue to properly fund education, health care, public transportation, water and sewer system maintenance, and the many other public services Southerners rely on (Das 2022b).

The lack of resources to provide services for ordinary Southerners is further exacerbated when state governments give huge subsidies to private companies. For example, Mississippi gave a $247 million subsidy to Steel Dynamics in 2022, and South Carolina spent $1.3 billion on a subsidy for Scout Motors in 2023 (Good Jobs First 2023a, 2023b). To illustrate how these subsidies harm South Carolinians specifically, we can consider the impact of abatements on public education. In fiscal year 2021, South Carolina public schools reported that they lost $534 million in property tax revenues to abatements, money that would have gone to funding school staff and providing services to students (Wen 2022). The districts that lost the most funding had a majority of students coming from low-income households that qualified for free or reduced-price lunches (Wen 2022). This harms students, families, and communities—with the harshest impacts on those facing the greatest hardships.

A weak safety net

The Southern economic development model is further characterized by a weak social safety net. Most Southern states offer relatively few and weak protections against hardship for individuals and families who suffer some kind of economic shock, such as the loss of a job, an illness, or the need to care for someone. This weak social safety net cements low-income Southerners’ precarity, further disempowering the labor force by making any economic shock all the more harmful. In this context, a Southern worker with little private savings is more likely to take or endure exploitive or underpaid work.

Southerners face greater insecurity when they lose their jobs

Unemployment insurance (UI) , is a crucial component of the social safety net, meant to ensure families have economic security in the face of a job loss by replacing some percentage of their prior earnings (Bivens and Banerjee 2021). During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 recession, UI also helps stabilize the broader economy by enabling households to continue spending, which helps maintain overall consumer demand (Bivens et al. 2021). While the UI system is funded jointly by federal and state funds, it is the state that has primary control over who is eligible to receive benefits, the levels and duration of benefits, and how the system is financed (Bivens et al. 2021).

UI is also a system that, if properly designed, helps support workers’ bargaining power. By giving workers support when they lose a job, UI allows those workers to take the time necessary to find a job that matches their skills and that pays as well as the one they lost. Conversely, weak UI benefits force many workers to take the first available job—even if it suits their skills poorly or pays less than the job they lost.

While many states’ UI systems need reform, the level and ease of accessing benefits in many Southern states is particularly problematic. Data show that of the 10 states with the lowest maximum weekly UI benefit amounts, seven—Mississippi ($235), Alabama ($275), Florida ($275), Louisiana ($275), Tennessee ($275), South Carolina ($326), and North Carolina ($350)—are in the South (The Century Foundation 2023). Many Southern states also have particularly onerous requirements for accessing benefits, which are made available for incredibly short durations. For example, most states make standard UI benefits available for a maximum of 26 weeks. Only 13 states set their maximum number of weeks below 26, more than half of which are Southern states: Alabama (14 weeks), Arkansas (16), Florida (12), Georgia (14), Kentucky (12), North Carolina (12), South Carolina (20), and Oklahoma (16) (CBPP 2023b).

The fact that the states where most Black Americans live have the least accessible UI systems with the least generous benefits, shortest durations for receiving benefits, and some of the most onerous requirements is not a coincidence or an accident. The UI system as structured is rooted in a racist agenda: Southern Democrats agreed to support the New Deal only if states controlled access to UI and other social benefits. This allowed them to design systems that would limit Black workers’ access to benefits (Edwards 2020; Traub and Diehl 2022).

Southerners face barriers to health care access

Full participation in the economy—not to mention in one’s family and community—are much easier when one is healthy both physically and mentally. Unfortunately, far too many people in the United States lack access to quality, affordable health care. This problem is particularly salient across Southern states; Southerners are less likely to have access to health insurance than those living in other regions. In 2020, 7.7% of all children living in Southern states lacked health insurance coverage compared with 3.3% in the Northeast, 4.4% in the Midwest, and 4.9% in the West. For working age adults, the share was 16.4% in the South, 6.6% in the Northeast, 8.6% in the Midwest, and 11.3% in the West (Keisler-Starkey and Bunch 2021).

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) included an expansion of Medicaid eligibility to adults with incomes up to 138% of the official poverty line. While most states have adopted and implemented the expansion, 10 states have failed to adopt it, seven of which are in the South: Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas (KFF 2023).{{5}} This is one reason Southerners are less likely to have health insurance coverage, which is particularly concerning given high rates of illness and comorbidities across the South (Akinyemiju et al. 2016).

The failure to expand Medicaid creates additional challenges even for those who have insurance coverage but live in rural areas, denying increased revenue to many rural hospitals that were already facing closure (Levinson, Godwin, and Hulver 2023).

Southern states have some of the lowest levels of cash assistance for families with children

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a cash assistance program for poor families with children, was established in 1935 as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).{{6}} In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). TANF differs from AFDC in several important ways. Under AFDC, states could receive unlimited federal matching funds. Under TANF, federal support is distributed to states through a block grant. TANF also has five-year lifetime limits on the receipt of benefits and requires that states increase their work participation rates for TANF recipients (DHHS n.d.).

TANF is funded by the federal government, but states determine benefit levels, set income and resource limits, and administer or oversee administration of the program. They have a great deal of discretion in how they use TANF funds because the specific goals of the program are so broad. The stated goals of the program are to (1) assist families in need so children can be cared for in their own homes; (2) reduce parental dependence on government by promoting job training, work, and marriage; (3) prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encourage two-parent families (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.).

Under the first goal, states can provide direct cash assistance to families to provide for their children (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.). In 1997, 71% of TANF dollars were spent in direct cash assistance, but by 2020, this share had fallen to just 22% nationally (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022). There are, however, large variations in TANF spending by state. In 2021, 15 states spent 10% or less of TANF dollars to provide cash assistance to families. Almost half of these—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas—are in the South.{{7}} Alabama spent just 7% of their TANF dollars on general spending, most in cash dollars. They spent 1% of their TANF dollars on work supports, 11% on childcare, but 29% on “other” services (CBPP 2023a).{{8}} Mississippi spent 6% in general spending, with only 3% going to childcare, while 17% of spending fell under the “other” category (CBPP 2023c). Across the South, only the District of Columbia and Kentucky spent 30% or more of their TANF funds on direct assistance, and in Kentucky, more than half of those funds went to foster care for children fostered by relatives and adoption and guardianship subsidies (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

Despite spending millions of dollars on TANF-related activities, states had millions of unspent TANF dollars as of 2021.{{9}} For example, Alabama had $113 million in unspent TANF dollars in 2021—amounting to 122% of their $93 million block grant for the year (CBPP 2023a). At $98 million, Mississippi’s unspent TANF funds amounted to 113% of their $86 million grant for that year (CBPP 2023c). Texas and Oklahoma each had more than $300 million in unspent TANF funds (CBPP 2023d; CBPP 2023f). Tennessee was even worse, with $798 million in unspent funds (CBPP 2023e).

Compounding the impact of unspent TANF dollars are low benefit levels in many states, especially in the South. The maximum monthly benefit for a single mother with two children ranges from $204 in Arkansas to a high of $1,151 in New Hampshire. There are only four Southern jurisdictions with a benefit amount of $500 or more for a one adult three-person family: the District of Columbia ($665), Maryland ($727), Virginia ($587), and West Virginia ($542) (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).

The maximum nominal TANF benefit in 2022 is the same or lower than it was in 1996 in 16 states, seven of which—Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—are in the South. The result is that the inflation-adjusted value of TANF benefits in these states is 45% to 56% lower than it was in 1996 (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).{{10}}

The current structure of TANF in many Southern states reflect efforts of politicians to control the behavior and reproduction of Black women and compel their participation in the low-wage labor market (Floyd et al. 2021; King v. Smith 1968; CBPP 2022). Historically, states have used concepts of “deservingness,” “suitable homes,” and the “man in the house” to exclude Black families from the program.

To be deserving, a mother needed to be widowed, have her husband be unable to provide due to disability, or have been abandoned by the children’s father “through no fault of the mother.” A home was “unsuitable,” by definition, if the mother was unwed or engaged in sexual activity outside of marriage (Floyd et al. 2021; Floyd and Pavetti 2022). The “man in the house” rule denied mothers benefits if a man was found in the house or if the mother was found to be sexually active even if no man lived in the house with her and her children. These rules applied regardless of whether the man the mother was involved with was the children’s father (Floyd et al. 2021; King v. Smith 1968; O’Connor 1969). Today, states with larger Black populations—primarily Southern states where most of the Black population lives—tend to have more stringent requirements for accessing TANF benefits, and those benefits tend to be more meager (Shrivastava and Thompson 2022).

Anti-union policies

Crucially, advocates of the Southern economic development model vociferously oppose unions and other collective actions in which workers band together—especially across racial, ethnic, and immigration statuses. Research has shown that higher rates of unionization are associated with higher wages, better working conditions, less inequality, less racial animosity, greater economic mobility, and greater civic participation (Banerjee et al. 2021; Freeman et al. 2015; Frymer and Grumbach 2020; Mishel 2021; Mishel, Rhinehart, and Windham 2020). Given these effects, it is unsurprising that states across the South have adopted policies that hamstring workers’ ability to form unions, which pose a threat to the Southern economic development model.

First, unions threaten the Southern economic model because they have historically been the primary counterweight against businesses seeking to keep workers’ wages and benefits low. In this way, unions threaten the central economic goal of the Southern model, which is to keep labor costs as low as possible. Second, the labor movement in the U.S. today is one of the foremost institutions promoting cross-racial solidarity. Strong unions could potentially undermine the racial and class divisions that the wealthy and their political supporters have used to promote and preserve the Southern model. Third, they are a key driver of greater equity in the workplace; racial and gender wage and wealth gaps are smaller among unionized workers, and union contracts ensure that all workers receive negotiated benefits. Further, unions protect Black and brown workers from discriminatory, retaliatory, or other arbitrary firing with the “just cause” and “due process” protections they provide (Bivens et al. 2023; EPI 2021; Gould and McNicholas 2017). Finally, unions threaten the Southern economic development model because they educate and encourage civic engagement among union members. Unions shape how voters understand their interests by discussing issues and candidates. They also activate their members to actively engage in campaigns and to turn out voters (EPI 2021; Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018).

Race and the Southern economy

Historically, the economy of the American South was largely agrarian and heavily dependent on cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, and other labor-intensive agricultural products (Baptist 2014, Conlin 2018). The intense need for large pools of labor and the desire to retain the wealth generated from that labor lies at the heart of the economic policies implemented across the South since even before the colonies became the United Sates. This includes policies of enslaving African people, supporting child labor, opposing unions, and allowing corporations to pollute the environment and poison the air and water—all in the name of keeping costs low and profits high.

Even as workers have fought to improve working conditions, many Southern lawmakers have used their power to ensure employers in their states retain access to large numbers of workers at poverty-level wages. While the economy was predominantly agrarian in the past, today there are significantly more auto manufacturing, professional, technological, and business services jobs across the South. There remain many jobs in oil and gas production, animal slaughter and processing, and service jobs as well. Yet even as the industrial composition of the South has modernized, much of the region’s business practices, labor standards, and underlying political economy has not. Below is a brief historical overview of the battle to maintain a low-wage labor force, particularly one comprised of Black and brown workers.

Extracting cheap labor from indentured and enslaved people

Since before the founding of the United States, the states that would become the American South have relied on cheap labor to drive economic growth and generate the illusion of widespread prosperity. The colonies imported white indentured servants and African people to meet their labor needs. The African people would eventually shift from being indentured to becoming enslaved people (Bennett 1962; Hannah-Jones 2021). Their enslavement ensured a consistent source for Southern businesses and landowners labor needs, while minimizing the costs of that labor. Plantation owners in the South used as much cruelty as was necessary to drive ever-increasing productivity from those enslaved Africans who worked in the fields producing ever-higher yields (Baptist 2014). This not only benefited wealthy Southern planters, but also Northern industrialists, financiers, and universities. The cotton that was produced in the South was processed in Northern factories and financed by Northern banks, creating wealth for everyone except those whose labor produced the wealth (see Baptist 2014).

Little changed following emancipation

Following the Civil War, the South remained tied to an agricultural economy. Instead of relying on enslaved people to provide much of the backbreaking labor required, they shifted to a sharecropping and tenant-farmer model which still relied on “freed” Black men and women’s labor. Plantation owners would “lend” newly freed men and women resources for sharecropping, but they ensured the vast majority would never be paid enough to pay off their debts. This was a system known as debt peonage which effectively meant that most freed Black men and women were often forced to work on the same plantations and for the same wealthy white landowners who had enslaved them. This effectively tied sharecroppers to their employers and, for many Black sharecroppers, their conditions under this system were difficult to distinguish from bondage.

States across the South also employed many other ways of ensuring they could retain access to Black labor for little or no compensation. They passed sets of laws known as Black Codes. These codes were designed to closely control the actions of Black men and women and maintain the racial hierarchy. These laws made it illegal for Black people to drink from white water fountains, attend white schools, or have a supervisory position over white workers (Dewey 1952; Hill 1965). In fact, Black men and women were often limited to the same menial jobs they held before the Civil War and were often pushed out of skilled work they had previously performed (Hill 1965). And to ensure that Black people would have no other choice but to take these jobs, it was common to require proof of employment from Black men and women. If they could not prove they were employed, they could be arrested and “rented” out to work on plantations, to build railroads, or just to provide general unskilled labor. Black women were often forced back into the same domestic work roles in white homes or in agricultural work alongside Black men. These laws were justified using the constitutional loophole in the 13th Amendment that allows “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” as a punishment for crime (Alexander 2020; Mercer 2022).

Extracting cheap labor from Black and brown Southerners today

This loophole enables Southern states to incarcerate a disproportionate number of Americans. For every 100,000 people nationally in 2021, the U.S. had 664 people incarcerated in prisons, jails, and other forms of confinement. This rate far exceeds the incarceration rates of our peer nations, such as the United Kingdom (129 for every 100,000 people), Canada (104), France (93), and many other democratic nations (Widra and Herring 2021).

While the national U.S. incarceration rate dwarfs those of our peers, the prison and jail incarceration rates of 13 of the 16 Southern states and the District of Columbia exceed the national average, with Louisiana (1094), Mississippi (1031), Oklahoma (993), and Georgia (968) having the highest rates of incarceration (Mast forthcoming a; Widra and Herring 2021). Further, Black Americans are disproportionately represented among the prison populations. While Black people are just over 32% of the population in Louisiana, they are 66% of those incarcerated in prisons and 57% of those in jails (PPI 2021a). In Mississippi, they are 37% of the population but 61% of the prison and 49% of the jail population (PPI 2021b). In Oklahoma they are 7% of the population but are 27% of the prison population and 23% of those incarcerated in jails (PPI 2021c).

Of the 1.2 million state and federal prisoners in the U.S., nearly 800,000 are forced to work in the prisons themselves, in prison industries, for other state or local government agencies, or for private-sector businesses (ACLU and GHRC 2022; Mast forthcoming a, PPI 2017).{{11}} These prisoners, disproportionately Black men, are often paid very low wages, if they are paid at all—the vast majority of work done by prisoners in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas is unpaid (ACLU and GHRC 2022). In many instances, mass incarceration effectively reinstates the slave system (Alexander 2020).

Hispanic men and women, especially immigrant workers, also continue to face exploitation by wealthy business owners and corporations across the South. According to Gershon (2020), by the early 1960s, 95% of meatpacking workers outside the South were unionized with wages comparable to those of steel production workers. Meatpacking companies responded by moving operations to more rural areas, and, by the 1990s, they began seeking immigrant workers to keep wages low. Black workers make up the majority of meat processing workers in states across the South (56.4% in Maryland, 67.1% in South Carolina, and 73.1% in Mississippi) but the representation of immigrant and Hispanic workers in these grueling, low-wage jobs is high. Hispanic workers make up 25.8% of the South’s meat processing workers and 26.2% are foreign-born workers (Gershon 2020; Hickey forthcoming).{{12}}

The Southern economic development strategy helps maintain the racial hierarchy

Race and ethnicity have long been used by politicians and varied economic interests to divide Southerners along racial lines and increase animosity and distrust between groups (Haney López 2014; McGhee 2021). Southern politicians fearmonger about immigrants or Black and brown people receiving “unearned” benefits as the population of young Black and brown Southerners continues to increase. This is often achieved by drawing on stereotypes or racist tropes. One example is when politicians make receiving benefits (e.g., food stamps or Medicaid) conditional upon fulfilling work requirements or passing drug tests.{{13}} Such practices create deep divisions, which are likely among the key reasons why the South has not become more progressive—given that Black and brown communities generally favor more progressive policies and politicians—despite the increasing diversity of the population.

In the current political climate, it has become common, particularly among conservative politicians and commentators, to hear arguments that “American” voters are being disenfranchised by voters who vote “illegally” or who “cheat.” Typically, “American” appears to apply to white voters while “cheaters” and “illegal” voters seem to refer to Black and brown Americans who are simply casting their ballots legally. For example, the places where challenges and lawsuits were filed in the 2020 presidential election were primarily places with large Black and brown populations (Phillips 2020).

We also see that in many states across the country, with the South being well represented, there is a push to privatize public education and to push public dollars into privately run charter schools (Pierce 2021). Pierce (2021) writes that this move toward privatization was largely in response to the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education which ordered states to desegregate. In other words, the push towards privatizing education in the United States aimed to preserve the racial hierarchy. Similarly, it is not uncommon to hear arguments about immigrants coming to the United States and living on public benefits (Thomas 2020). The goal of these arguments is to make the broader white population feel that their tax dollars are going to people who are deemed “undeserving” and increase the white public’s support for policies that would exclude Black and brown Southerners.

Using dog whistles to divide

Politicians and other influential and powerful interests activate racism in ways that they and their supporters can deny by using dog whistles. A dog whistle in political speech refers to discourse that uses a code that specific segments of the population understand as racial but that gives people cover to deny that they are being racist to those who abhor racism. Haney López (2014) refers to the practice of dog whistles as “a steady drumbeat of subliminal racial grievances and appeals to color-coded solidarity” (3).

The development of the concept of the “taxpayer” provides one clear example of this practice. The common appeal to the “taxpayer” developed out of racism and white supremacy. During the Reconstruction period directly following the abolition of slavery, large Black populations in states like South Carolina were large enough, especially with the support of some poor whites, to elect Black leaders. Many poor white men voted in support of policies that required raising taxes on white landowners to fund things like schools, roads, and a basic safety net. Williamson (2021) reports that the wealthy white landowners developed the identity of the “taxpayer” as a means of dividing poor white landowners and Black freedmen. Since most Black freedmen lacked any substantial landholdings, wealthy landowners could engender hostility among poor white landowners toward Blacks, even if their material conditions were not dramatically different. This approach allowed powerful interests to oppose paying taxes for general welfare and encouraged poor white Southerners—especially poorer landowners who would also be taxed—to identify with the wealthy white landowners rather than with Black elected officials (Williamson 2021).

When the concept of “taxpayer” is invoked, it is used as a dog whistle to imply that “undeserving” people—particularly “undeserving” Black, Hispanic, and immigrant people—will take advantage of public resources paid for by hardworking white people who pay their own way and do not ask for “handouts.” This also instills the idea that asking for assistance is shameful, which further reinforces the status quo.

Meanwhile, poor, working- and middle-class workers of all racial backgrounds—especially Black and brown men and women who are disproportionately low-income—pay much larger shares of their incomes for sales, income, social security, and other taxes (see Mast forthcoming b).

The conservative strategy

While these dog whistles have been part of the conservative strategy at least since Reconstruction, they have been essential in convincing the majority to support racist, exploitative, and regressive politicians and policies. For example, John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs under then President Richard Nixon, admitted that the Nixon administration intentionally linked anti-war hippies and Black people with drug use and then proceeded to heavily criminalize drugs in order to “arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news” (Baum 2016). Campaigns based on “law and order” or appeals to increase criminal punishments for violence and/or drug use were thinly veiled racial appeals. This was especially the case following the tumultuous era of the Civil Rights Movement when Black Americans were demanding equality. Many white Americans opposed that equality, and Black rebellions—often called “riots”—broke out across the nation. These so-called riots were in response to police violence, high poverty rates, poor housing, and the many other inequities that Black communities were, and are, facing (Alexander 2020; Haney López 2014; Purnell and Hinton 2021).

When Ronald Reagan kicked off his presidential campaign, he began in the South, specifically in Philadelphia, Mississippi, which is known for the murders of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner for trying to register Black people to vote. Reagan used this first campaign stop to state his support for states’ rights, a signal to segregationists to support him (Sharon 2021). As his campaign moved forward, he became ever-more explicit in his racist appeals. He painted a picture of a “Chicago welfare queen,” who drove a Cadillac while using 80 different names to receive Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare totaling over $150,000 annually and of “a strapping young buck” buying T-bone steaks (presumably with food stamps) while the implied hardworking white person whose taxes provided the food stamps could only afford to buy hamburger for their family (Haney López 2014).

The key to the effectiveness of dog whistles is to deny that they have anything to do with race. It is common to hear political and economic leaders claim that it is in fact the people calling out the racism that are racist. Fortunately, we have the words of one of these conservative political leaders who was willing to admit this was indeed what they were doing. According to Lee Atwater, they had to adjust the way they used race in their electoral strategy:

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So, you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… (Perlstein 2012)

This shift can also be seen in the work of MacLean (2021). She describes how white supremacists—who wanted to maintain Jim Crow segregation in education and who had been explicitly using race to resist the Brown v. Board of Education decision—learned from Milton Friedman that they could make more progress by using more “neutral” language. They thus began saying “personal liberty,” “government failure,” and the “need for market competition” to move toward school vouchers and private schools to preserve Jim Crow segregation.

In many of the Southern states with the largest Black populations—such as Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia—state legislatures have been more likely to implement regressive policies that produce higher negative outcomes such as poverty, food insecurity, incarceration, reliance on fees and fines to fund government, high infant and maternal mortality, and a host of other negative outcomes. Although all low- and middle-income Southerners are negatively impacted by these policies, Black Southerners experience the worst outcomes.

Despite large and growing Black and brown populations in many Southern states, communities and workers of color still struggle to enact policy changes that would improve their economic conditions. One reason for this is state lawmakers—who are overwhelmingly white—enacting “preemption” laws to prevent elected officials in cities and counties from enacting their own local policies. Southern legislatures have preempted local governments from passing laws on everything from environmental protections and progressive taxes to minimum wages and paid sick day requirements (Blair et al. 2020). State lawmakers further interfere with these communities’ ability to improve economic conditions through restrictions on voting and practices such as gerrymandering legislative districts. Gerrymandering disempowers and dilutes the voting power of Black and brown communities, denying them greater representation in state legislatures. Yet the Black and brown populations of cities, counties, and states across the South will keep growing—even as state lawmakers continue their efforts to prevent them from deviating from the Southern economic development model.

Civil rights and labor rights

While the fight for civil rights is often discussed separately from the fight for workers’ rights, these movements have often been one and the same. Race and racism have been leveraged to weaken both movements. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the face of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, was standing with striking sanitation workers in Memphis when he was assassinated. He was fighting for the poor and for workers and families independent of race and ethnicity.

Whenever civil rights and labor leaders have been able to bring Black and white workers together to fight to improve their working conditions, Southern elites wielded notions of white supremacy and implemented policies to undermine labor generally and labor unions specifically. This was designed to ensure permanent divisions along racial lines and maintain Jim Crow race and labor relations (Pierce 2017). While right-to-work laws were pushed across the country, they initially took root in the Southern states where—due to racial terrorism, poll taxes, literacy tests, and outright violence—most Black people (and many poor white people) could not vote. Working together would have empowered both Black and white workers, but it also would have undermined the racial order in the South.

According to Pierce (2017) and Griffith (1988), while unions like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were organizing both Black and white workers, the Christian American Association was raising money from wealthy Southern planters and industrialists to get anti-union laws enacted. This same group was also enlisted to help fight against the New Deal. Similarly, when Black and white workers came together to form the Knights of Labor following the Civil War in Virginia, Black voters were disenfranchised once white politicians were able to regain control of state government and white workers were offered privileges not available to Black workers to maintain the racial hierarchy (Scribner 2021).

Opponents to interracial solidarity and union organizing warned:

White women and White men will be forced into organizations with Black African apes…whom they will have to call ‘brother’ or lose their jobs. (Pierce 2017)

Other material designed to maintain the racial divisions include Figure B, a flyer produced to motivate support for right-to-work in North Carolina, which highlights that George Benjamin, a Black man, would be in charge of organizing white workers.

Figure B. This flyer was an effort to mobilize racial prejudice against the CIO. The irony here is that, according to Griffith (1988), the Tobacco Workers International Union under criticism was an American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate, one which did not share the CIO’s progressive position on interracial organizing. (Photo by David Haberstich. Courtesy of Donald McKee, cited in Griffith 1988.)

In 1944, Arkansas and Florida became the first two states to adopt the anti-worker right-to-work laws. When the key leader of these efforts, Vance Muse, was called out for his use of racism to achieve his goals, he reportedly said “They call me anti-Jew and anti-nigger. Listen we like the nigger—in his place” (Pierce 2017).

Southern politicians and employers were not only interested in using their state and local policies to maintain the racial hierarchy; they also wielded power at the national level as well, threatening to oppose federal legislation that did not exclude Black workers and families from the protections and benefits of federal laws. The exclusion of Black workers was not explicit in the legislation. Testimony and debates over federal legislation leaves little doubt about their goals, however. For example, when the Fair Labor Standards Act was being debated, Southern Democrats threatened to tank the legislation if Black workers were included:

The organized Negro groups of the country are supporting [the FLSA] because it will, in destroying state sovereignty and local self-determination, render easier the elimination and disappearance of racial and social distinctions…. (Congressman Cox of Georgia, cited in Perea 2011)

Another congressman, Representative J. Mark Wilcox of Florida remarked:

There has always been a difference in the wage scale of white and colored labor. So long as Florida people are permitted to handle the matter, this delicate and perplexing problem can be adjusted; but the federal government knows no color line and of necessity it cannot make any distinction between the races. We may rest assured, therefore, that …it will prescribe the same wage for the Negro that it prescribes for the White man. …Those of us who know the true situation know that it just will not work in the South. You cannot put the Negro and the White man on the same basis and get away with it. (Perea 2011)

It was not just politicians; however, employers shared the same sentiments with one employer stating:

A Negro makes a much better workman and a much better citizen, insofar as the South is concerned, when he is not paid the highest wage. (Perea 2011)

These attitudes and threats to the passage of important legislation was not limited to the FLSA. The same threats were made to ensure the exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers—jobs primarily filled by Black men and women across the South—from the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. As noted above, racism and maintaining the racial hierarchy in the South was at the root of many policies including taxation, policing, and economic policies. In institution after institution, efforts were made to ensure that Black labor could be extracted as cheaply as possible. And while there was also a great desire to get white labor cheaply as well, there was a clear sense that white workers must always be above Black workers to maintain the racial hierarchy (Perea 2011; Dixon 2021).

The changing demography of the South is an opportunity to uplift everyone

The American South is a dynamic region of the country with a growing population that is increasingly diverse. Made up of 16 states and the District of Columbia—including Texas and Florida, two of the largest states in the country—the South is home to almost four in 10 Americans. These are Americans whose lives and livelihoods are heavily shaped by the state and local policies implemented across the region. Not only is the South the largest region of the country, but it is also the fastest growing. Figure C shows that over the last few decades the share of the population living in the South grew faster and larger than the population of any other region. In fact, the share of Americans living in the Midwest and the Northeast declined.

Figure C

This growth in the population of the South reflects a natural increase in the region—more births than deaths. It also reflects international immigration–especially across the Southern border from Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean—as well as domestic migration to the region. While politicians point to population growth across the South to argue for the positive impacts of their policies, this increase tends to be concentrated in specific states and cities. For example, while Texas and Florida had the highest population growth from 2021 to 2022, Louisiana, West Virginia, Maryland, and Mississippi were in the top 10 for population decline (U.S. Census Bureau 2022).

Many of those moving to the South from other regions, including New York and California, are seeking cheaper housing (Henderson 2016). Land generally tends to be cheaper across the South, contributing to housing that is much more affordable than places like California and New York. Texas and Florida also benefit from immigration across the Southern border and the Caribbean.

The widespread use of air conditioning during the 1960s and 1970s further contributed to population growth across the region. The oppressive heat during summer months along with high humidity left many Southerners in misery. This has been fundamentally changed, however, by air conditioning in cars, homes, and businesses (Arsenault 1984). As Figure C shows, before 1980 the share of the population living in the South fluctuated around 30–31%. From 1980 onward, it has continued to increase in each subsequent decade.

This report highlights the true origins of key components of the failed Southern economic development strategy—the extraction of labor from Black Americans after the end of slavery and from Black and brown Americans today as cheaply as possible. The emphasis on low wages, lack of regulation, regressive taxation and giveaways to corporations has not, and cannot, produce broadly shared prosperity. It was never designed to do so.

The youthful and increasingly diverse population across the South, however, presents a great opportunity to shift the policy landscape across the region. While wealthy and powerful people across the region have fought long and hard to keep the people divided and to maintain the racial hierarchy that maintains these divisions, Southerners can choose a different way forward. Southerners can demand an economic strategy that raises wages, strengthens the safety net, implements fair and progressive taxation, and perhaps most importantly, empowers workers to act on their own behalf by unionizing. This approach can help eliminate the racial hierarchy that holds all Southerners back from an economically secure future. But, as long as the powerful can keep low- and middle-income Southerners focused on racial, political, and economic divisions, they can keep them from seeing what they have in common: They are all being exploited by those at the top.

Notes

{{1.}} Enslaved men and women might be “hired out” to a third party if their labor was not immediately needed. In some instances, they might be allowed to retain a portion of the money generated (Butler 2022).

{{2.}} See Cooper and Kroeger 2017 for descriptions of other forms of wage theft.

{{3.}} While “Cancer Alley” is a high-profile area in the environmental racism literature, Terrell and St. Julien (2023) report that there are other industrial areas of the state with higher exposure to these toxins.

{{4.}} As of September 1, 2023, the sales tax on food in Alabama dropped from 4.0% to 3.0%. For more information, see Sell 2023.

{{5.}} North Carolina has adopted the expansion of Medicaid, but as of September 2023, it had not yet been implemented; implementation is dependent on the passage of the 2023–2024 budget. Virginia and Oklahoma adopted the Medicaid expansion in 2016 and 2021, respectively (KFF 2023).

{{6.}} ADC was changed to AFDC in 1962.

{{7.}} The remaining states spending 10% or less of funds in direct assistance were primarily in the Midwest, with two in the Northeast. The Midwestern states spending 10% or less are North Dakota, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas. The Northeastern states are Connecticut and New Jersey. See the complete map here.

{{8.}} “Other” includes a wide range of expenditures across states, but can include short-term benefits for families in crisis; transfers to the social services block grant; after school programs; pregnancy prevention; and programs promoting two-parent families (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

{{9.}} States can carry unspent federal TANF dollars over into future years.

{{10.}} To a see graphic representation of change in the real value of TANF benefits, see here.

{{11.}} Mast (forthcoming a) is a fact sheet focused on mass incarceration and how it continues the tradition of extracting cheap labor from primarily Black Americans in states across the South. It describes ways that Black Americans continue to have their labor extracted by the state or leased out to private companies.

{{12.}} Hickey forthcoming includes fact sheets that will address the experiences of immigrant workers and provide a deep dive on domestic workers and food processing workers, especially meat processing workers.

{{13.}} Arkansas Department of Human Services 2023 and Reuters Fact Check 2022 are examples of these dog whistles.

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Wiehe, Meg, Aidan Davis, Carl Davis, Matt Gardner, Lisa Christensen Gee, and Dylan Grundman. 2018. Who Pays? A Distributional Analysis of the Tax Systems in All 50 States. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, October 2018.

Williamson, Vanessa. 2021. “The Austerity Politics of White Supremacy.” Dissent, Winter 2021.

Younes, Lylla, Ava Kofman, Al Shaw, Lisa Song, and Maya Miller. 2021. “Poison in the Air.” ProPublica, November 2, 2021.

Young, Caitlin. 2023. “What Policymakers Need to Know About Racism in the Property Tax System.” Housing Matters (Urban Institute), March 15, 2023.

Many states across the Southern United States{{1}} employ an economic model that prioritizes business interests and the wealthy over ordinary citizens. This model—which we refer to in this report as the “Southern economic development model”—is characterized by low wages, low taxes, few regulations on businesses, few labor protections, a weak safety net, and vicious opposition to unions. The model is marketed as the way to attract businesses into Southern states, with the implicit promise that this will lead to an abundance of jobs and shared economic prosperity for all Southerners.

The reality is this economic development model is fundamentally flawed as a strategy for improving living conditions for most Southerners. In fact, the Southern economic development strategy was never designed to help the vast majority of working Southerners; rather, it reflects efforts to ensure continued access to the cheap labor of Black people following emancipation. Today the cheap labor sought is increasingly diverse, yet it is still overwhelmingly made up of Black and brown workers across the region.

In this report, we use empirical data to show that the Southern economic development model has failed to provide economic security for workers and families across the South. In fact, the South lags other regions of the country on most indicators of economic health.{{2}} We also show—through historical context and case examples—how the Southern economic development model continues to serve as a means of maintaining racial hierarchies across the South.{{3}}

What characterizes the Southern economic development model?

To maintain the disproportionate levels of wealth and power enjoyed by many Southern politicians, corporate interests, and many wealthy and powerful people across the nation, businesses in the South have relied on access to large pools of cheap labor.

Businesses in the South have particularly depended on the labor of Black and brown Southerners. These laborers are used in cotton and tobacco fields, to produce the food we eat, to care for our children and the elderly, to build the nation’s infrastructure, and to perform many other jobs for little or no compensation.

Enslaved Africans were not paid at all. After the end of slavery, many Black workers, such as the Pullman porters, were forced to rely on tips. Today, while slavery is illegal in most cases, incarcerated workers can be—and often are—required to work without pay (ACLU and GHRC 2022). Below, we discuss other ways worker’s wages are kept low or kept from them entirely.

The racist roots of this model have been obscured and have been replaced by a more acceptable “pro-business” narrative. The pro-business narrative suggests that low wages, low taxes, anti-union policies, a weak safety net, and limited regulation on businesses creates a rising tide that “lifts all boats.”

Below we examine the key features of the Southern economic development model in detail.

Low wages

Many states across the South promote low wages for many workers by the policies they implement or, in many cases, the policies they choose not to implement.

For example, five Southern states—Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina—have no state minimum wage at all. Georgia has a minimum wage set at $5.15 per hour. Because the federal minimum wage is set at $7.25 per hour and $2.13 per hour for tipped workers, all workers across the South are supposed to be paid at least these minimums (EPI 2023).

Fewer than half of the Southern states (six states plus D.C.) have a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. In every other region, more than half of states have minimum wages higher than $7.25 (EPI 2023).

Because many Southern states have weak, if any, labor enforcement, wage theft is common across the South. That means some workers are not even paid these too-low minimum wages. This is especially true in industries like food and drink services, agriculture, and retail (Cooper and Kroeger 2017).

Cooper and Kroeger (2017) analyze data on the share of workers who have experienced minimum wage violations—i.e., were paid less than the applicable minimum wage—in the 10 most populous U.S. states. They find that large shares of workers in Florida (24.9%), North Carolina (12.3%), Texas (10.8%), and Georgia (9.4%) have experienced minimum wage violations.

Failing to pay the minimum wage is just one of the ways employers cheat workers out of their earnings.{{4}} Employers who commit wage theft are rarely punished (Cooper and Kroeger 2017). In Florida, for example, there isn’t a state department of labor to enforce wage standards; employers therefore have no reason to fear being caught or punished. In Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—which technically do have departments of labor (DOLs)—the DOLs do not in practice make any effort to recover wages that are stolen by employers (Mangundayao et al. 2021).

Notably, some Southern states have actively fought against federal government efforts to raise wages in their states. In 2022, the attorneys general of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi sued the federal government to prevent an increase in the wages of federal contractors.{{5}}

It is important to understand that federal standards governing minimum wages, overtime, and even what activities are to be included in the number of hours worked were designed to keep wages low in the South. When the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938, establishing these rules, large categories of workers—primarily agricultural workers, domestic workers, tipped workers, and public-sector workers—were excluded from the FLSA’s protections.

Agricultural workers, domestic workers, and tipped workers were excluded specifically because the formerly enslaved were limited almost entirely to these lines of work across the South; Southern lawmakers would not agree to vote for the legislation without these exclusions (Dixon 2021; Perea 2011). As noted above, the practice of using tips to compensate service workers in the United States began in the 19th century after the end of slavery. This practice allowed businesses to hire the formerly enslaved without actually having to pay them (Dixon 2021; Tye 2005).

When the FLSA was amended in 1966 to include service workers—among other coverage expansions—a special “tip credit” was created that allowed employers to count tips received by staff against a portion of the minimum wage the employer was required to pay—effectively creating a separate, lower minimum wage (Allegretto and Cooper 2014). Today, Southern tipped workers continue to rely heavily on their tips. As noted above, the federal minimum wage for tipped workers, which applies in most Southern states, is only $2.13 per hour—a level that has remained unchanged since 1991 (Schweitzer 2021).

We continue to see the influence of racism and sexism in the low wages and lack of protections offered to workers in jobs that were historically held by enslaved people. Domestic work, for example, historically has been—and continues to be—performed by Black, brown, and immigrant women. These women work as nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides; personal and home care aides; and nursing assistants in private households. Across the South, Black women make up 43% of home health care workers, followed by Hispanic women at 17% (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022). But workers in these jobs remain undercompensated despite the clear value of this work—providing care that allows families to work and that allows elderly and disabled Southerners to age in their homes (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022; Robertson, Sawo, and Cooper 2022).

Minimal levels of regulation

Another key component of the Southern economic development model is ensuring that businesses aren’t “hampered” by regulation. This includes minimal regulation of business activities that pollute the air, water, and soil. It also means lack of regulation or enforcement around labor laws such as federal minimum wage laws, overtime laws, or safety standards for workers (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Fleischman and Franklin 2017; Florida Policy Institute 2022; Terrell and St. Julien 2023; Waldman 2017).

Issues resulting from weak regulatory standards can be particularly widespread in Black and brown communities (Donaghy et al. 2023). Terrell and St. Julien (2023), for example, found that, due to a lax state permitting process, these communities across Louisiana had a seven to 21 times greater exposure to air pollutants, especially those from chemical manufacturers, compared with white communities. Black and brown communities experience similar disproportionate impacts from coal ash, which contains toxic metals that pollute the air and water in North Carolina and other states (Bienkowski 2016; SELC 2019).

Low income and corporate taxes

Next, the Southern economic development model seeks to limit corporate and personal income taxes, particularly any that would increase the tax burden of higher-income households and individuals.

The roots of the South’s tax structure

To understand attitudes toward taxes across the South, it is important to understand the roots of the current stance on taxes in the Southern economic development model. Before the Civil War, taxes on enslaved people—considered the private property of slaveholders—were paid primarily by wealthy plantation owners and constituted a significant source of revenue for states across the South (Williamson 2021).

After slavery was abolished, plantation owners represented themselves as “concerned taxpayers” who opposed rising property taxes. They were joined by poor white farmers who would now also be subject to rising property taxes raised by newly—and temporarily—empowered Black political leaders.

These leaders were raising taxes to provide basic services such as public education and to rebuild infrastructure after the devastation of the Civil War. But wealthy Southerners stoked racial animus to divide poor and working-class Southerners along the lines of race and ensure majority support to implement highly regressive tax policies (Williamson 2021; Young 2023).

Low corporate and income taxes force reliance on regressive sales taxes

Today, Southern politicians, business interests, and other wealthy Southerners continue to seek to eliminate or limit corporate and personal income taxes. For example, several Southern states used temporary budget surpluses—surpluses resulting from the distribution of federal dollars to states intended to address COVID-19 and the associated recession—as an excuse to further cut already low income-tax rates (Das 2022a).

Corporate and personal income taxes tend to be progressive, meaning they are structured such that higher-income earners pay a larger share of their income in taxes, while lower-income earners pay a smaller share. But when collection of corporate and personal income taxes declines, states are forced to rely more heavily on sales and property taxes, which are regressive. When sales and property taxes are assessed, lower-income people end up paying a larger share of their income for those taxes than higher-income people do (Wiehe et al. 2018; Young 2023).

Texas, Florida, and Tennessee have no income tax. In other Southern states, income tax rates fail to raise adequate revenue, requiring those states to rely on sales and property taxes and fees and fines to pay for many public services, including education, public health, public safety, infrastructure, and other services.

In 2019, for example, more than 40% of all state and local tax revenue came from sales taxes in many Southern states. These included Tennessee (56.6%), Louisiana (53.3%), Florida (50.9%), Arkansas (49.6%), Alabama (48.0%), and Mississippi (45.5%). These shares are substantially higher than the 34.4% of state and local tax revenue that sales taxes account for nationally (Das 2022a).

To generate this revenue, these states had sales taxes ranging from 4.0% in Alabama to 7.0% in Mississippi and Tennessee. And while most states at least exempt food from sales taxes, as of January 2023 Mississippi, Alabama, and Oklahoma did not (Tax Policy Center 2023).{{6}}

This approach to taxes means that public services are underfunded in the South

Proponents of this tax model argue that it increases the incomes of all households by allowing them to keep more of their money. Further, they argue that it allows businesses to reinvest and grow their businesses, thereby increasing tax revenue. In reality, this regressive approach to taxes simply means there is not sufficient revenue to properly fund education, health care, public transportation, water and sewer system maintenance, and the many other public services Southerners rely on (Das 2022b).

The lack of resources to provide services for ordinary Southerners is further exacerbated when state governments give huge subsidies to private companies. For example, Mississippi gave a $247 million subsidy to Steel Dynamics in 2022, and South Carolina spent $1.3 billion on a subsidy for Scout Motors in 2023 (Good Jobs First 2023b, 2023c).

A weak safety net

The Southern economic development model is further characterized by a weak social safety net. Unemployment insurance (UI), for example, is a crucial component of the social safety net, meant to ensure families have economic security in the face of a job loss by replacing some percentage of their prior earnings (Bivens and Banerjee 2021). During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 recession, it also helps stabilize the broader economy (Bivens et al. 2021).

Southerners face greater insecurity when they lose their jobs

While the UI system is funded jointly by federal and state funds, it is the state that has primary control over who is eligible to receive benefits, the level and duration of those benefits, and how the system is financed (Bivens et al. 2021).

The fact that the states where most Black Americans live have the least accessible UI systems with the least generous benefits and some of the most onerous requirements is not a coincidence or an accident. The UI system as structured is rooted in a racist agenda: Southern Democrats agreed to support the New Deal only if states controlled access to UI and other social benefits. This allowed them to design systems that would limit Black workers’ access to benefits (Edwards 2020; Traub and Diehl 2022).

Data show that of the 10 states with the lowest maximum weekly UI benefit amounts, seven—Mississippi ($235), Alabama ($275), Florida ($275), Louisiana ($275), Tennessee ($275), South Carolina ($326), and North Carolina ($350)—are in the South and have large Black populations (The Century Foundation 2023).

Southerners face barriers to health care access

The South is also the least likely of any region to ensure its constituents have access to health care. This is particularly concerning given high rates of illness and comorbidities across the South (Akinyemiju et al. 2016).

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) included an expansion of Medicaid eligibility to adults with incomes up to 138% of the official poverty line. While most states have adopted and implemented the expansion, 10 states have failed to adopt it, and seven of these—Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas—are in the South (KFF 2023).{{7}}

Southern states have some of the lowest levels of cash assistance for families with children

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a cash assistance program for poor families with children, was established in 1935 as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).{{8}} In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).

TANF differs from AFDC in several important ways. Under AFDC, states could receive unlimited federal matching funds; under TANF, federal support is distributed to states through a block grant. TANF also has five-year lifetime benefit limits and requires that states increase their work participation rates for TANF recipients (DHHS n.d.).

While the federal government funds TANF, states determine benefit levels and income and resource limits, and they administer or oversee administration of the program. States have a great deal of discretion in how they use TANF funds because the specific goals of the program are so broad. The stated goals of the program are to (1) assist families in need so children can be cared for in their own homes; (2) reduce parental dependence on government by promoting job training, work, and marriage; (3) prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encourage two-parent families (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.).

Under the first goal, states can provide direct cash assistance to families to provide for their children (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.). In 1997, 71% of TANF dollars were spent for this purpose, but by 2020 this share had fallen to just 22% nationally (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

There are large variations in spending by state. In 2021, 15 states spent 10% or less of TANF dollars to provide cash assistance to families. Seven of these states—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas—are in the South and have large Black and Hispanic populations. Of the remaining states spending 10% or less of funds in direct assistance, six were in the Midwest and two were in the Northeast.{{9}} Across the South, only the District of Columbia and Kentucky spent 30% or more of their TANF funds for direct assistance (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

Benefit levels are also low in many states, especially in the South. The maximum monthly benefit for a single mother with two children ranges from $204 in Arkansas to a high of $1,151 in New Hampshire. Only four Southern jurisdictions—the District of Columbia ($665), Maryland ($727), Virginia ($587), and West Virginia ($542)—have a benefit amount greater than $500 for a three-person family (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).

In 16 states, the nominal TANF benefit in 2022 is the same as or lower than it was in 1996. Seven of these states—Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—are in the South. The failure to raise the nominal benefit means that in these states, the inflation-adjusted value of the benefit is 45% to 56% lower than it was in 1996 (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).{{10}}

The current structure of TANF in many Southern states reflects efforts of politicians to control the behavior and reproduction of Black women and compel their labor into the low-wage labor market (Floyd et al. 2021; CBPP 2022).{{11}} Historically, states like Alabama and Louisiana have used “deservingness,” “suitable homes,” and “man in the house” rules to exclude Black families from the program. States began to pass these morals-based eligibility rules in the 1940s as the ADC rolls began to become more diverse (Floyd et al. 2021; Gordon and Batlan 2011; O’Connor 1969).

To be “deserving,” a mother needed to be widowed, have a husband that was unable to provide for the family’s needs due to disability, or have been abandoned by the children’s father “through no fault of the mother.” A home was “unsuitable,” by definition, if the mother was unwed or engaged in sexual activity outside of marriage (Floyd et al. 2021; Floyd and Pavetti 2022).

The “man in the house” rule denied mothers benefits if a man was found to be living in the house or if the mother was found to be sexually active, even if no man lived in the house with her and her children. In either case, it did not matter whether the man involved was the children’s father or not (Floyd et al. 2021; O’Connor 1969).{{12}}

Today, those states with larger Black populations—primarily Southern states where the majority of the Black population lives—tend to have more stringent requirements to access TANF benefits, and those benefits tend to be more meager (Shrivastava and Thompson 2022).

Anti-union policies

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, advocates of the Southern economic development model vociferously oppose unions and other collective actions in which workers band together, especially across racial, ethnic, and immigration statuses.

Research has shown that higher rates of unionization are associated with higher wages, better working conditions, less inequality, less racial animosity, greater economic mobility, and greater civic participation (Banerjee et al. 2021; Freeman et al. 2015; Frymer and Grumbach 2021; Mishel 2021; Mishel, Rhinehart, and Windham 2020). Despite this, states across the South have adopted policies that hamstring workers’ ability to form unions because they pose a threat to the Southern economic development model.

First, unions threaten the Southern economic development model because they have historically been the primary counterweight against businesses seeking to keep wages and benefits low. Second, the labor movement in the U.S. today is one of the foremost institutions promoting cross-racial solidarity. Third, unions are a key driver of greater equity in the workplace (Bivens et al. 2023).

Labor unions have not always fulfilled the roles of cross-racial solidarity or racial equity in the workplace—many unions have a history of anti-Black racism. Throughout the 20th century, businesses would pit Black and white workers against one another, including by using Black workers as strikebreakers (Arnesen 2003).

Many white workers viewed Black workers as competition. This—coupled with the belief that Black workers were inferior to them—led them to oppose including Black workers in their unions. Unions such as the American Federation of Labor and many trade unions would not organize Black workers (Hill 1959). In response, Black workers began forming their own unions. A. Philip Randolph, for example, organized Black porters in the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters (AFL-CIO 2014; Tye 2005).

Not all unions were opposed to organizing workers across race, though. Some, like the Congress of Industrial Organizations, realized that as long as workers were divided, their power would continue to be undermined. As noted above, when Black workers or any other group of workers are systematically excluded from joining a union, they can then be used as strikebreakers. This makes it less likely that a strike will be effective and less likely that workers’ demands will be met.

Despite the negative experiences many Black workers had with discriminatory unions, many civil rights leaders were also labor leaders who wanted to bring workers together to demand economic justice and equality for all workers. The organizers of the 1963 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, which everyone remembers for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech, included A. Philip Randolph. Randolph had not only led the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters but had also demanded racial integration of the military and called for a march on Washington in the 1940s to force President Roosevelt to issue an executive order banning discrimination in war industries (AFL-CIO n.d.).

Figure A. Racist flyer used to drive opposition to the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in the 1940s. (Photo by David Haberstich. Courtesy of Donald McKee, cited in Griffith 1988.)

In pushing back against interracial labor organizing, wealthy and powerful Southerners would invoke white supremacy to thwart these efforts for collective economic justice. During a campaign to get a so-called right-to-work (RTW) law on the books in Arkansas, advocates made clear that RTW was critical to maintaining racial segregation. (RTW laws require unions to represent all workers but restrict their ability to collect dues, thereby weakening the unions.) To advance their cause, they drew on the racial animus of white Southerners with the warning that

White women and White men will be forced into organizations with Black African Apes…whom they will have to call “brother” or lose their jobs. (Pierce 2017)

In another instance, those trying to mobilize racial prejudice in the 1940s against the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO)—which supported interracial organizing—produced the flyer shown in Figure A. The flyer shows a photo of George Benjamin, a Black man, with a caption noting that Benjamin had been put in charge of organizing the tobacco workers. In all capital letters it states, “INCLUDING THE WHITE EMPLOYEES.” Ironically, the Tobacco Workers International Union under attack was in fact an American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate and was not as supportive of interracial organizing as the CIO (Griffith 1988).

In many Southern states, the campaigns to get RTW laws passed were successful (NCSL 2023). In the 1940s, Florida and Arkansas were the first two states to adopt these anti-worker laws. It is important to emphasize that—contrary to the “right to work” moniker—these laws in no way guarantee workers a right to a job or a right to work; instead, they simply make it more difficult for workers to form and maintain unions.{{13}}

Across the South, states have continued to adopt RTW laws, with some legislatures enshrining them in their state constitutions (Ballotpedia 2022). One result is that Southern states have some of the lowest rates of union coverage in the country. While nationally union coverage rates stand at 11.3%, rates were as low as 1.9% in South Carolina, 3.9% in North Carolina, and 5.4% in Georgia in 2022 (BLS 2023).{{14}}

The Southern economic development model: A summary

Collectively, these economic policy positions form what we refer to as the Southern economic development model. Most states across the South census region—with the exception of Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia{{15}}—adhere to most, if not all, of these components and have adopted a wide range of policies consistent with this model. Some Southern states—such as Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, South Carolina, Kentucky, and West Virginia—adhere to this model particularly closely.

Future reports from EPI will delve deeper into the Southern economic development model and how it manifests in specific states across the region.

Throughout the rest of this report, we examine several key indicators of economic well-being for workers and families across the South. We compare the South with other regions and look at variations across states within the South. The data show that those states that adhere most closely to the Southern economic development model fare worse in general than those states that have taken a different path.

The Southern economic development model has failed to promote the economic well-being of workers and families across the South

On the surface, the Southern economic development model may seem purely like a set of economic policy choices. However, as we describe above, it in fact emerged out of efforts in the late 1800s and beyond to maintain racial hierarchies across the South—hierarchies that would ensure continued access to the cheap labor of the newly freed Black population (Harris 1993; Perea 2011).

Below, we use empirical data to refute proponents’ argument that this model creates jobs and overall prosperity. We show that it actually produces worse outcomes for workers and families across the South.

Southern states are well represented among the lowest-GDP states

If the Southern economic development model led to better economic performance, one likely place that would show up would be in measures of state GDP. The gross domestic product, or GDP, is the total value of goods and services produced in an economy. It is a comprehensive measure that represents overall spending by government, the output of businesses and their workers, investments made by actors in the economy, and the trade conducted with economic actors in other jurisdictions. It is an important measure of overall economic trends; a rising per-worker GDP is necessary (although insufficient on its own) to achieve rising living standards for the broad population.

The data indicate that on this overall measure of economic growth, the South does not perform particularly well. Figure B lists the 15 states with the lowest per-worker GDP in 2019 before the COVID-19 recession. Nine of these states are in the South. Mississippi has the lowest per-worker GDP in the nation. The other eight Southern states on the list are Arkansas, Alabama, Kentucky, South Carolina, Florida, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Tennessee.

Figure B

Of the remaining states in the South census region (not shown in Figure B), the majority have per-worker GDPs below the U.S. average. Only Maryland, Delaware, and the District of Columbia have per-worker GDPs above the national average. As noted above, these three jurisdictions adhere less closely to the Southern economic development model than other Southern states.

Job growth across the South largely reflects population growth, not economic growth

The health of an economy is also frequently assessed by looking at job growth. As demand for goods and services grows among the general population, workers are hired to provide those goods and services. When demand is weak or constrained, workers are not hired and some may lose their jobs, further dampening GDP and weakening the growth that can improve living standards.

Many Southern politicians have argued that the policies associated with the Southern economic development model produce greater job growth and that this exceptional job growth creates a “rising tide that lifts all boats.” They point to the strong job growth across the South that has occurred since the late 1970s—i.e., the larger increase in the total number of jobs in the South compared with other regions of the country. When we examine the data, however, we find that job growth across the South largely reflects a growing Southern population.

Various factors largely unrelated to the South’s economic development strategy (e.g., the widespread adoption of air conditioning, proximity to the Southern U.S. border, and increased domestic and international migration) have driven strong population growth in the South (Arsenault 1984; Frey 2023). Yet job growth across the region has lagged population growth since the early 2000s.

Figure C shows that between 1976 and 2001, job growth in the South generally moved in tandem with population growth but never exceeded growth in the working-age population. Since 2001, job growth has failed to keep up with population growth, especially after the Great Recession of 2008–2009. This is in contrast to the Northeast and Midwest regions, where job growth has exceeded population growth for the majority of the more-than-four-decade period.

Figure C

Southern states are well represented among the states with the lowest prime-age employment-to-population (EPOP) ratios

Arguably the best way to assess labor market health is to evaluate whether job growth is providing adequate employment for everyone in their prime working years. We can measure this by looking at the prime-age employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio, which is the share of workers ages 25 to 54 with a job. If the Southern model provided exceptionally strong job growth, we would expect Southern states to have relatively high EPOPs.

Figure D shows the 10 states with the lowest prime-age EPOP. Of the 10 states with the lowest EPOP nationally, seven are Southern states. The five states with the lowest EPOPs—Louisiana, Alabama, New Mexico, Mississippi, and West Virginia—have more than a fourth of their prime-age population out of the workforce; four of these are in the South.

Figure D

Of the remaining states in the South census region (not shown in Figure D), the majority have prime-age EPOPs below the U.S. average. Only Maryland, Virginia, Delaware, and the District of Columbia have prime-age EPOPs above the national average. As noted above, Maryland, Delaware, and D.C. adhere less closely to the Southern economic development model than other Southern states.

Many of the workers missing from the EPOPs are not in the labor force at all—they are not employed and they are not looking for work. While there are a variety of reasons why prime-age workers would leave the labor market, one of the most common reasons is they have become discouraged. They have been unable to find suitable work or they face obstacles—such as the need for child care or transportation—that prevent them from seeking or keeping employment.

Workers in Southern states tend to have lower earnings even after adjusting for regional differences in the cost of living

Table 1 shows the nominal median annual earnings and median annual earnings adjusted for regional differences in the cost of living for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. States are ranked from highest to lowest cost-of-living-adjusted earnings. States in the South census region are marked with an asterisk.

Three Southern states—Maryland, Virginia, Delaware—and the District of Columbia are among the top 20 highest-earning states. As noted previously, three of these jurisdictions—Maryland, Delaware, and D.C.—do not adhere to the Southern economic development model as closely as the nine Southern states that fall into the 20 lowest-earning states. Three states that adhere particularly closely to this model—Florida, South Carolina, and Mississippi—fall into the 10 lowest-earning states.

Table 1

Wages are even lower for some groups in the South. Table 2 highlights dramatic differences in earnings across the region by gender and race/ethnicity. The state-level median earnings listed in Table 1 may not be representative of the typical earnings of Black and Hispanic workers in those states, especially Black and Hispanic women, who are generally paid even less than their male counterparts. On average, Black women in the South are paid $35,884 at the median and Hispanic women just $30,984, compared with $58,008 for white men.

Table 2

Poverty rates in most Southern states are higher than the national rate

Arguably the best-known measure of economic well-being is the official poverty rate. According to the official poverty measure, a family of four with two minor children in 2019 would fall below the poverty line if their family income was less than $26,000. Figure E shows official poverty rates for each state in the South and for the nation as a whole in 2019. The data provide a clear indicator that the Southern economic development model is leaving large numbers of Southerners in dire economic conditions.

Figure E

The poverty rate nationally, at 12.3%, is much higher than it should be in a nation as wealthy as the United States. However, the poverty rate is significantly higher in many states across the South. Almost 1 in 5 residents in Mississippi and Louisiana fall below the poverty line. Only three states in the South have a poverty rate below the national rate: Delaware, Virginia, and Maryland. As noted above, Maryland and Delaware do not adhere as closely to the Southern economic development model as other states in the South census region.

While overall poverty rates across the South are appalling, when we consider differences by race and ethnicity they become even more so. Black women across the South have a poverty rate of 20.0% and Hispanic women are at 18.5% (see Figure F).

Figure F

These extremely high rates of poverty—roughly 1 in 5 women—are not due to unwillingness to work. Black women in fact have a higher prime-age employment-to-population ratio than women from any other racial or ethnic group in the South.{{16}}

Table 3 shows that Black women in the South have a higher poverty rate than Black women in the Northeast (19.0%) or the West (19.2%), although Black women’s poverty rates are highest in the Midwest (23.4%). Black men’s poverty rates across the South (15.7%) are higher than in the West (15.5%) but lower than in the Northeast (16.0%) and the Midwest (20.1%). Extreme disparities by race/ethnicity and gender in the U.S. are not limited by geographic boundaries.

Table 3

Hispanic men and women have the highest poverty rates in the Northeast (13.9% and 20.6%, respectively), followed by the South (12.4% and 18.5%). Their lowest poverty rates are in the West (11.3% and 15.7%) and the Midwest (11.6% and 16.9%).

Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) men and women living in the South actually have lower poverty rates than AAPI men and women in other regions. In the South, their poverty rates are 8.7% and 9.6%, respectively. These are lower than in the West (8.9% and 9.8%), the Northeast (10.4% and 11.4%), or the Midwest (11.0% and 11.2%). Lower rates of poverty among AAPI men and women in the South likely reflect the fact that they tend to live in higher-earning Southern states such as Maryland (Childers 2023c).

Finally, white men and women across the South have much lower poverty rates than Black and Hispanic Southerners but have higher poverty rates than white men and women in any other region. In the South, white men and women have poverty rates of 8.2% and 10.8%, respectively, while in the Midwest their poverty rates are 7.5% and 10.1% and, in the West, 7.8% and 9.5%. Their poverty rates are lowest in the Northeast, at 6.7% and 8.6%.

One reason Black women’s poverty rates remain high in the South—despite a relatively high EPOP—is that they are disproportionately employed in jobs consistent with the occupations they were largely limited to during and after the end of slavery: care work, cleaning, and food production, including agricultural and animal slaughter work. Because this work is largely done by Black, brown, and immigrant workers, consistent with the Southern economic development model, these jobs pay very low wages.

While Black and Hispanic men are paid more than Black and Hispanic women in the South, their earnings are lower than white men’s earnings. This means that among two-adult households, Black and Hispanic households are more likely to rely on Black and Hispanic women’s earnings to meet household needs than white households do. Black women in particular are frequently co-breadwinners in their households (Banks 2019; Glynn 2019).

Child poverty is higher in the South than in any other region

Low wages across the South also mean that many children will suffer economic hardships. Their parents’ earnings determine to a great degree the resources available to them, especially when public safety nets are as limited as they are across most of the South. Figure G shows the geographic distribution of all U.S. children living in households where the household head is paid less than $10.00 per hour. More than half of these children, 53.4%, live in Southern states.

Figure G

The large number of Southern children in households where the head of household is paid less than $10.00 per hour, and high rates of poverty overall, mean that many children across the South live in poverty. Figure H shows that child poverty is significantly higher in the South than in other regions. At 20.9%, child poverty rates in the South are 3.7 percentage points higher than the region with the next-highest child poverty rate, the Midwest at 17.2%. While child poverty across the South is clearly worse than in other regions, it is troubling that the lowest regional rate nationwide is as high as 16.6%, in the Northeast.

Figure H

The high overall child poverty rates obscure extreme racial inequities in child poverty. As seen in Figure I, across Southern states, Asian American children have the lowest poverty rates, at 9.9%, followed by 12.5% of non-Hispanic white children. The next-highest rate is more than double that; 26.3% of American Indian and Alaska Native children, 28.1% of Hispanic children, and 33.0% of Black children live in poverty across the South.

Figure I

High levels of income inequality are seen in every state across the South

In this final section, we consider how the Southern economic development model has performed in addressing income inequality. Figure J shows the share of all household income that goes to the top 5%, the top 20%, and the bottom 20% of households in each Southern state and across the U.S.

Figure J

In every Southern state, more than 20% of all household income goes to just the richest 5% of households. In most Southern states, more than 50.0% of all household income goes to the richest 20%. The bottom 80% of households share the remaining 50%, with the bottom 20% sharing between 2.0% and 3.5% of all household income. Further, the share to the top 5% has increased over the last decade and the share to the bottom 20% has declined (not shown in Figure J).{{17}}

It is important to note here that this is the one indicator on which the South does not differ from the rest of the nation. Though the South has not performed worse than the rest of the country on this particular measure, it also has not performed any better. Indeed, this pattern of inequality holds for every state in the nation.

Conclusion

Efforts to instigate racial division today may not be as overt as the flyers featuring George Benjamin, but we know that racial dog whistles are still at play across the South. When states gerrymander maps to dilute the voting strength of Black and brown residents or engage in voter suppression, or when wages are kept low in jobs held primarily by Black, brown, and immigrant workers, this is all done in the service of maintaining a racial hierarchy across the South.

Many Southerners may believe their politician’s arguments that the Southern economic development model will deliver good, well-paying jobs. However, the data presented here show clearly and emphatically that this model has failed those living in Southern states. This economic model has garnered vast amounts of riches for the wealthiest and most powerful people across the region but is leaving most Southerners with low wages, underfunded public services, a weak safety net in times of economic downturns, deep racial divisions, and high rates of poverty.

The failed Southern economic development model is still being used to maintain the color line across the South and to exploit and oppress Black, Hispanic, Indigenous, poor, and women residents. While these exploited groups face the greatest hurdles to social and economic security, all Southerners are harmed by this failed model.

Notes

{{1.}} In this report we follow the definition of the South used by the U.S. Census Bureau, which includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

{{2.}} Census-defined regions outside the South include the Midwest, the Northeast, and the West. The Midwest includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The Northeast includes Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The West includes Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.

{{3.}} States in other regions may draw on some components of the Southern economic development model, for example, lowering tax rates or implementing so-called right-to-work laws. States across the South, however, are much more likely to consistently implement all or almost all components of the model and to implement them to a greater degree.

{{4.}} See Cooper and Kroeger 2017 for descriptions of other forms of wage theft.

{{5.}} Texas v. Biden (S.D. Tx. 2022).

{{6.}} As of September 1, 2023, the sales tax on food in Alabama dropped from 4.0% to 3.0%. For more information, see Sell 2023.

{{7.}} North Carolina has adopted the expansion, but as of September 2023 it had not yet been implemented; implementation is dependent on the passage of the 2023–2024 budget. Virginia and Oklahoma adopted the Medicaid expansion in 2019 and 2021, respectively (KFF 2023).

{{8.}} ADC was changed to AFDC in 1962.

{{9.}} The Midwest states spending 10% or less are North Dakota, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas. The Northeastern states are Connecticut and New Jersey. See this map (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi, Figure 2).

{{10.}} For a graphic representation of change in the real value of TANF benefits, see this chart (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023, Figure 2).

{{11.}} See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).

{{12.}} See also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).

{{13.}} For more information on RTW, see Sherer and Gould 2023.

{{14.}} See BLS 2023 for union membership and union coverage rates for all states.

{{15.}} For simplicity, we refer to the District of Columbia as a state in this report.

{{16.}} EPI analysis of the 2017–2021 Current Population Survey Basic data. Data on the prime-age EPOP by race/ethnicity and gender in the South will be examined in more detail in a forthcoming report (Childers 2023a).

{{17.}} EPI analysis of American Community Survey Table B19082, “Shares of Income by Quintile,” from the U.S. Census Bureau. Analysis of income distribution in the Southern states over time will be discussed in a forthcoming report (Childers 2023b).

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