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	<title>Search results for “Misclassification” | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Search results for “Misclassification” | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>Today’s working class is more diverse than ever:  A new picture emerges as demographic change and economic inequality challenge old perceptions</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/todays-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-a-new-picture-emerges-as-demographic-change-and-economic-inequality-challenge-old-perceptions/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 13:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle K. Moore, Stevie Marvin, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
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					<description><![CDATA[Learn about who is included in the working class, how economic conditions have changed for them, where they work and live, and much more.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 24px;"><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #0e5b8b;">Key takeaways</span></strong></span></p>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">An expanded view of the working class&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>The </b><b>working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight, but there is no universal definition of what it is.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>A commonly used definition of working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. </b><span style="font-size: 14px;">That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;"><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">Given these factors, a</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> broader </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">definition</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">of</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> the working class can be </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW110786087 BCX0">considered</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">people in the labor force who</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">se family income </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">is in</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">the bottom 75%</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">, regardless of education</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">al</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> level or job type.</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> This works out to a family income </span></span><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">below $150,000</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> per year.</span></span><span class="EOP Selected SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}'>&nbsp;</span></span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Under this broader definition, 31.5% of those in the working class have a bachelor&#8217;s degree or higher; a majority of working-class college graduates hold professional or managerial jobs.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Traditionally women-dominated jobs related to teaching, child care, or nursing make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">A racially diverse group&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>In 1979, the working class (defined by less than a bachelor&#8217;s degree) was 81.5% white.</b></li>
<li><b>Shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. Now, the working class is:&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>52% white&nbsp;</li>
<li>26.8% Hispanic&nbsp;</li>
<li>15.1% Black</li>
<li>4.7% Asian American</li>
<li>1.4% Native American</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>One-fifth of the working class was born outside the United States, and 11.6% are non-U.S. citizens.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><b>The working class is similarly diverse when defined by family income level.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">Differences by state (using family income to define working class)&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>There is considerable variation in the working-class composition of states, based on differences in costs of living and labor force participation.&nbsp;</b></li>
<li><b>The five states (including Washington, D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;
<ul>
<li>Massachusetts (42.9%)</li>
<li>Washington, D.C. (42.9%)</li>
<li>New Jersey (44.9%)</li>
<li>Maryland (47.8%)</li>
<li>Washington state (47.9%)&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>The five states with the highest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>
<ul>
<li>South Dakota (66.7%)</li>
<li>Iowa (64.9%)</li>
<li>Wyoming (64.7%)</li>
<li>Kansas (63.9%)</li>
<li>Nebraska (62.7%)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>What is the working class?</h2>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he working class remains an often-used rhetorical concept that carries tremendous political weight. Despite having no official definition, “working class voters” are a heavily courted constituency during election years. In the most general sense, the “working class” as a political economic category describes people who rely almost exclusively on wage labor through steady employment to support themselves and their families.</p>
<p>Historically, the term working class has been closely associated with nonmanagerial blue-collar workers and unions, often represented in the popular imagination by white tradesmen in hard hats. This popular image, however, has never represented a complete picture. Due to occupational segregation, Black workers have always made up a significant portion of nonmanagerial laborers commonly identified as working class. Additionally, since the 1970s, increases in women’s labor force participation and immigration have resulted in growing shares of women, Hispanic, and Asian workers in the U.S. labor force. Along with these demographic shifts, there have been changes in the composition of “working class” jobs over time. For example, as traditional blue-collar production and manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell sharply between 1998 and 2019, job opportunities for noncollege graduates were largely replaced by growth in service-sector employment (Scott et al. 2022).</p>
<h3>Who is working class?</h3>
<p>Contemporary views about who is included in the working class range from narrow to extremely broad: those earning very low wages, those without a bachelor’s degree, and anyone who works for a wage or salary, irrespective of their wage or education level. The latter definition, currently being pushed by the growing Democratic Socialist movement, has generated some debate around whether highly educated, relatively high-income wage and salary workers belong in a category with traditional blue-collar, noncollege-educated workers who often live vastly different material lives (Rotondaro 2026).</p>
<h3>What are some factors that complicate the traditional distinction between college-educated and other workers?</h3>
<p>For many, however, the line between the economic status of college- and noncollege-educated workers is not that clear and has been blurred by rising inequality and labor market discrimination. Over the last 10 years, the college wage premium has declined. In other words, the wage boost from a bachelor’s degree is lower than it used to be, and workers in many jobs that were once considered white collar now experience relatively modest pay and limited control over the pace and content of work (Fast and Gould 2026).</p>
<p>Research also shows that Black college graduates are more likely than white college graduates to work in jobs that don’t require a college degree, and even after controlling for college major, graduates of color, foreign-born graduates, and women of all races are much more likely to work alongside nongraduates (Williams and Wilson 2019; Attewell and Witteveen 2023). In addition to these forms of underemployment, racial and gender pay disparities among college graduates result in lower pay for women and Black and Hispanic men relative to white men (Quadlin, VanHuevelen, and Ahearn 2023; Wilson 2016a; Mora and Dávila 2018). Facing limited returns on their college education, debt-burdened bachelor’s degree holders may even find themselves in a more precarious position than nongraduate co-workers who are free of student debt.</p>
<h3>Which topics will this report cover?</h3>
<p>Taking these factors into consideration, this report updates prior EPI research on the changing demographics of the working class and presents a more expansive definition of this group that includes labor force participants in the bottom 75% of the family income distribution (Wilson 2016b). This report presents the working class as more racially diverse than ever before but also includes workers with and without college degrees employed in a range of blue-, pink<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>- and white-collar jobs that afford different standards of living across the United States. This analysis supports the idea that policies that strengthen labor standards and protect civil and workers’ rights will improve the lives of working people across traditional class lines defined by education or occupation.</p>
<h2>How are we defining the working class in this report?</h2>
<p>This report considers two definitions of the working class. Consistent with previous EPI research, the first definition is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Education captures much of what people typically associate with class, and in the labor market, a bachelor’s degree is commonly interpreted by employers as a signal of skill acquisition required for many white-collar occupations. Since educational categories have been more consistently coded in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) than other commonly used indicators of working-class status, like occupation or income, we use this definition in Part I of the report when comparing working-class demographic and economic outcomes over time.</p>
<p>The second definition, used in Part II of our analysis, is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with family income at or below the 75th percentile. In our sample, this corresponds to individuals with less than $150,000 in family income.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> The income-based definition captures people in similar economic circumstances, regardless of education or occupation. Implicit in this income-based definition of working class is the assumption that a job loss could result in significant economic hardship for most families below this threshold. We apply this more expansive definition to our more detailed analysis of the working class for disaggregated groups of workers by race, ethnicity, gender, nativity, geography, education, and occupation using pooled 2024–2025 CPS data (Part II).</p>
<p>Though slightly different, there is considerable overlap between these definitions: 82.9% of those who qualify as working class under the education-based definition are also defined as working class using the income-based definition.</p>
<h2>Part I: Changes in working-class demographic characteristics and economic conditions since 1979</h2>
<h3>Shifting demographic characteristics of the working class</h3>
<p>The demographic composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last five decades, as shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation among different groups have contributed to a more diverse workforce. For comparability over time, this part of our analysis relies on the education-based definition of working class: 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Since labor force participation fluctuates across different points in the business cycle, and to varying degrees for different groups of workers, we focus on demographic comparisons across peak years in the business cycle when employment and labor force participation are highest. Those years are 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, and 2019. The current time period covers 2024 and 2025, which combines the year with the highest rate of prime age employment since the 2019 business cycle peak (2024) and the most recent full year of data (2025) (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A </strong>clearly shows that the working class has grown more racially and ethnically diverse over the last 46 years. In 1979, the working class was over 80% white, but after 2000, the combined shares of Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN or Native American) workers increased rapidly. While white workers remain the largest single racial group, workers of color collectively accounted for nearly half of the working class in 2024–2025. Currently, the working class is 52% white, 26.8% Hispanic, 15.1% Black, 4.7% AAPI, and 1.4% Native American.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-325442 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325442" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325442-35936-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The changing race and gender composition of the working class are displayed separately for women and men in <strong>Figure B </strong>so that changes for each group are easier to see over time, but the combined percentages of men and women in each year sum to 100%. Overall, men have maintained a small majority over women in the working class (between 53% and 57%) since 1979. While there hasn’t been a huge shift in the overall gender demographics of the working class, an increase in the share of women between 1979 and 1989 reflects rising women’s labor force participation at a time when men were leaving the labor force (EPI 2026d). Women decline as a share of the working class after 2000 as the share of women with a bachelor’s degree or higher rose faster and surpassed the share of men with college degrees (Census 2022).</p>
<p>The intersection of race and gender in Figure B brings these joint demographic shifts in the working class into even sharper focus. For example, in 1979, white men alone accounted for nearly half (46.3%) of the working class. By 2024–2025, white men were less than a third (29.6%) of the working class. Over the same time, the share of working-class women of color more than doubled from 8.4% in 1979 to 21.2% in 2024–2025, with the largest increase occurring among Hispanic women (from 2.2% in 1979 to 11.1% in 2024–2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326126 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="326126" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326126-36098-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>An increase in immigration also contributed to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the working class since 1979 (Kramer and Passel 2025). While the immigrant population has grown increasingly diverse over the last 46 years, between 2010 and 2024, the 10 largest U.S. immigrant groups have come from Latin American or Asian countries. This has contributed to the growth in working-class Hispanic and Asian workers shown in Figures A and B (MPI 2025). <strong>Figure C</strong> further shows that the share of the working class that is foreign-born has grown from 13.8% in 2000 (the earliest year these data are available in the CPS) to 19.8% in 2024–2025 (a 43.5% increase). Currently, 11.6% of the working class are non-U.S. citizens.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325475 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325475" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325475-35938-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Changing economic conditions for the working class</h3>
<p>One of the most prominent narratives regarding the working class has been how people without a bachelor’s degree have been stripped of opportunities to earn a decent living and left behind in the modern economy. All too often, this narrative centers the white working class, and white men in particular, to the exclusion of all others. This section presents a more inclusive picture of changing economic conditions among the working class that depicts both shared class struggles and racial inequities within this group.</p>
<p><strong>Figure D</strong> shows that employment among prime-age (25–54-year-olds) adults without a bachelor’s degree peaked in 2000 but has since fallen for most groups. However, even at the high point in 2000, there were considerable gaps between racial and ethnic groups. As many as 80.9% of prime-age white adults with less than a bachelor’s degree were employed in 2000, compared with just 68.7% of similarly educated Native Americans in that age cohort. While employment among prime-age working-class white workers has fallen 4.0 percentage points since 2000, they have maintained the highest rates of employment among the working class, even as the gaps between white, Hispanic, and AAPI workers narrowed significantly after 2007. Over the decades, employment rates among prime-age working-class Black and Native American workers have been significantly lower than their white counterparts.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-326700 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326700" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326700-36012-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In addition to a shared peak in employment from the strong economy of the late-1990s–2000, the working class has also shared the experience of inconsistent, often tepid, wage growth since 1979 because of policy choices that suppressed wages for the vast majority of workers (Gould and Wething 2026). <strong>Figure E </strong>shows annualized rates of inflation-adjusted median hourly wage growth for each group between business cycle peaks. This chart notably shows that all racial and ethnic groups suffered real wage losses (adjusted for inflation) during the 1980s, as globalization and concerted efforts to weaken unions stripped many in the working class of good-paying union jobs and bargaining power.</p>
<p>After decades of slower wage growth, median hourly wages grew fastest for all groups between 2019 and 2025, with workers of color experiencing faster wage growth than white workers—from 1.2% a year for Black workers to 1.7% a year for Native Americans. This is consistent with research that shows between 2019 and 2023, the lowest-wage workers—a group that includes many working-class people of color—had the strongest wage growth (Gould and deCourcy 2024).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-326685 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326685" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326685-36010-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326689 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326689" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326689-36011-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Unfortunately, for most groups, the much-needed wage boost in recent years was not large enough to recover the prior four decades of lost ground, relative to state median wages. The wage boost failed to significantly reduce the share of working-class people whose hourly wage fell below their state median, as racial pay disparities within the working class persist. <strong>Figure F </strong>shows that between 1979 and 2019, the share of working-class Black and white workers whose wages were below the median hourly wage in their state increased by 11.1 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively. While wages among the Hispanic working class grew faster than other groups between 2000–2007 and 2007–2019, Figure F also shows they remained most likely to have wages below their state’s median in 2024–2025 (75.1%), followed closely by Black workers (74.9%). Even after receiving a stronger pandemic recovery wage boost, the median hourly wages of Black ($19.59) and Hispanic workers ($19.99) with less than a bachelor’s degree were significantly lower than those of similarly educated white workers ($22.65), as <strong>Table 1</strong> shows.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327450 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327450" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327450-36055-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Over the same time period that the hourly pay of more working-class wage earners dropped below the state median wage, a declining share of those workers were union members or covered by a union contract (see <strong>Figure G</strong>). The decline is especially stark among Black workers for whom union coverage in 2024–2025 (12.2%) was less than a third of what it was in 1979 (36.9%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326704 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326704" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326704-36013-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Part II: Current demographic and economic characteristics of the working class</h2>
<p>The remainder of this report is based on the more expansive definition of working class that includes all 18–64-year-old labor force participants in the bottom 75% of family income, regardless of educational level or occupation. This portion of the analysis takes a more detailed look at the current demographic and labor market characteristics of the working class in 2024–2025.</p>
<p><strong>Figure H</strong> shows the share of each group, by race, ethnicity, or nativity, that meets this more expansive definition of working class. As shown in Figure H, over 60% of Black and Hispanic adults between the ages of 18 and 64 meet this definition of working class, compared with more than half of Native American and white adults and 43.4% of AAPI adults.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Similarly, a larger share of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens is working class—62.1% compared with about 54% of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-325518 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325518" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325518-35943-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure I</strong> presents the educational distribution of the working class. Even under this broader definition that is unrestricted by educational level, the majority of those in the working class (68.5%) have less than a bachelor’s degree, with the largest group being those with only a high school diploma (32%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-325492 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325492" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325492-36095-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Defined in part by labor force participation, a large majority (69.2%) of those in the working class are between 25- and 54-years-old, or prime age. With large shares of younger people attending college and not working, the working class also includes more people ages 55–64 (17.1%) than under age 25 (13.7%) (see <strong>Figure J</strong>) (Gould et al. 2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-J"></a><div class="figure chart-325488 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325488" data-anchor="Figure-J"><div class="figLabel">Figure J</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325488-35939-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure J" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In addition to labor force participation, family income at or below the 75th percentile (less than $150,000 per year) is used to identify members of the working class under this more expansive definition. However, the relative precarity of families at the same income level can vary, based on family size and the number of household earners.</p>
<p><strong>Figure K</strong> summarizes basic family structures within the working class, based on marital status and the presence of minor children (under age 18). It shows that almost half of those in the working class are unmarried and childless (46.0%), while 30.8% have at least one child under age 18. The majority of working-class parents are married.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-K"></a><div class="figure chart-325495 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325495" data-anchor="Figure-K"><div class="figLabel">Figure K</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325495-35941-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure K" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class family income</h3>
<p>Although we are using a single-income threshold to define working class, <strong>Figure L</strong> reveals racial differences in family income among the working class that replicate differences in the overall population. For example, white and AAPI families are more likely to be at the upper end of the income distribution. One-third of each group has a family income of $100,000–$149,999 per year, compared with one-fourth of working-class AIAN families and one-fifth of working-class Black and Hispanic families. At the same time, all working-class families of color are more likely to be in the lower end of the income distribution than white families. More than a third of Hispanic (38.4%), Black (38.0%), and AIAN (35.8%) families have an income of less than $50,000 per year, compared with 25.2% of working-class AAPI families and 22.1% of white families. Most working-class Black and Hispanic families have income between $50,000 and $75,000 per year.</p>


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<a name="Figure-L"></a><div class="figure chart-325612 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325612" data-anchor="Figure-L"><div class="figLabel">Figure L</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325612-35953-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure L" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The number of workers contributing to family income also varies by race and ethnicity. The number of family earners is both a function of family structure and employment status. Consistent with the fact that over half of our working-class sample is not married (55%, as shown in Figure K), <strong>Figure M</strong> shows that most families include a single earner. However, lower rates of employment among Black and Native American families further contribute to their being most likely to be single-earner families (70.8% and 69.3%, respectively). White families (27.8%) are most likely to have two earners, while Hispanic (9.9%) and Asian (7.5%) families are more likely than other groups to include more than two earners.</p>


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<a name="Figure-M"></a><div class="figure chart-327433 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327433" data-anchor="Figure-M"><div class="figLabel">Figure M</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327433-36053-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure M" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Working-class jobs</h3>
<p>Another consideration in defining what it means to be working class is the type of jobs people have. Separating professional or managerial roles from more traditionally working-class jobs closely aligned with the typical “blue-collar” definition sorts most of the occupations associated with a low degree of control and autonomy at work from those in which workers have more control over the pace and content of their work. As professionals, however, teachers and nurses would not be considered working class under a traditional blue-collar occupation definition of working class, despite teachers’ low pay relative to their years of education and nurses’ lack of control over the pace and content of their work (Allegretto 2026; Stimpfel et al. 2025).</p>
<p><strong>Figure</strong> <strong>N</strong> shows that overall, those employed in nonprofessional and nonmanagement occupations are much more likely to be working class. Between 70% and 87% of people employed in jobs other than professional or management occupations have a family income at or below the 75th percentile, compared with less than 60% of professionals and managers. This further supports the idea that even under our broader definition, working class is more often a label that applies to those in traditional blue-collar jobs.</p>


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<a name="Figure-N"></a><div class="figure chart-325530 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325530" data-anchor="Figure-N"><div class="figLabel">Figure N</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325530-35945-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure N" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Occupation also captures much of the variation associated with education, given that education is used as a credential for access to different kinds of employment. <strong>Figure O</strong> shows the distribution of major occupation groups within the working class by level of education. Again, even under this broader definition of working class, education is still a major determinant of the types of jobs available to those in the working class. More than two-thirds of the jobs held by members of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in two major categories—professional and related occupations (43.9%), and management, business, and financial occupations (23.3%)—but the income threshold largely excludes the more highly paid college graduates in these occupations.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> While the most common jobs among those with less than a bachelor’s degree are service occupations (24.4%), at that level of education, workers are more evenly split between office and administrative occupations (11.8%), transportation and material moving occupations (11.7%), professional and related occupations (10.2%), and management, business, and financial occupations (10.0%).</p>


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<a name="Figure-O"></a><div class="figure chart-325503 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325503" data-anchor="Figure-O"><div class="figLabel">Figure O</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325503-35942-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure O" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>One limitation of using a strictly occupational definition is that the professional and management categories also include jobs that have many of the qualities traditionally associated with membership in the working class: modest pay and limited workplace autonomy, among other things. There are over 220 detailed occupations within the major occupation categories for managers and professionals, but just 22 of those occupations, depicted in <strong>Figure P</strong>, account for half of all working-class managers or professionals. Among those 22 occupations, nine are traditionally women-dominated, or pink-collar, jobs related to teaching and child care (depicted in orange) or nursing (depicted in green) that account for 22.4% of working-class managers and professionals. Seven of the 22 occupations are management positions (depicted in blue) that account for 17.8% of working-class managers and professionals. Besides the generic “all other managers” category, the most common working-class management positions are food service, general and operations, construction, and financial managers. The remainder of the occupations represented in Figure P includes other types of professional occupations (depicted in purple) such as accountants and auditors, social and human resource workers, and technology-related occupations.<br />


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<a name="Figure-P"></a><div class="figure chart-326197 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326197" data-anchor="Figure-P"><div class="figLabel">Figure P</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326197-35987-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure P" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<br />
</p>
<p>The types of jobs held by members of the working class can also vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, following broader patterns of occupational segregation. <strong>Figure Q</strong> shows how the six most common occupations for working-class men and women are distributed by race, ethnicity, and gender. The distribution across all 10 major occupational categories can be found in <strong>Appendix Table 1. </strong>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Figure Q shows that working-class women’s employment is more concentrated than working-class men’s, with more than 80% of women of any race or ethnicity employed in just five job categories. More than half of all working-class women are employed in just two types of jobs: service, and professional and related occupations. As shown in Figure P, this is consistent with the fact that a large number of working-class professional jobs include female-dominated occupations like teachers, child care workers, and nurses. Service occupations are most common among Black (28.3%), Hispanic (32.7%), and Native American (27.6%) women, while professional occupations are most common among white and AAPI women. Across all racial and ethnic groups, similar shares of working-class women are employed in office and administrative occupations.</p>


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<a name="Figure-Q"></a><div class="figure chart-325567 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325567" data-anchor="Figure-Q"><div class="figLabel">Figure Q</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325567-35948-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure Q" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>By comparison, except for AAPI men, fewer than 80% of working-class men are employed across six job categories. Among men, however, there is more variation in the types of jobs by race or ethnicity. For example, the most common jobs held by Black working-class men are transportation (20.8%) and service (20.7%) occupations, while Hispanic working-class men are most concentrated in construction (21.7%) and service (18.8%) occupations. The most common occupations for working-class AAPI and white men are professional and related, and management, but like AAPI women, AAPI men are largely concentrated in professional and related occupations (31.5%).</p>
<h3>Job characteristics for working-class women and men by race and ethnicity</h3>
<p><strong>Table 2 </strong>further details how the employment characteristics of working-class men and women vary by race and ethnicity, underscoring differences in the work intensity required to sustain working-class family incomes. Among working-class women, Black women are most likely to work full time (83.4%) and to be represented by a union (11.6%). Although working-class Black women are more likely to have full-time jobs than their counterparts, they are still more likely to hold multiple jobs than most other groups of women. Native American women are most likely to hold multiple jobs (8.4%) and to be self-employed (5.7%) but are less likely than Black women to be employed in full-time jobs.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-325608 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325608" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325608-35952-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Working-class men are more likely than women to work full time and therefore, less likely to hold multiple jobs. Working-class men are also more likely to be self-employed than working-class women. Among working-class men, AAPI, Black, and Native American men are least likely to be employed full time; however, Black men hold an advantage over other groups of men in union representation (13.0%) and multiple job holdings (5.9%). Hispanic working-class men are most likely to be self-employed (8.1%).</p>
<p>The lower half of Table 2 provides estimated median hourly wages by race, ethnicity, and gender in 2024–2025 as well as the share of workers in each group whose wage falls below the median hourly wage in their state. These estimates differ from those presented in Part I because they are disaggregated by gender and are based on the more expansive income-based definition of working class, which includes some college graduates. Table 2 further shows significant race and gender pay gaps within the working class. For example, larger shares of women than men in each race or ethnic group earn wages lower than their state’s median, including as many as two-thirds of Hispanic (68.3%) and Native American (67.8%) women.</p>
<h3>Working class across the country</h3>
<p>Differences in local labor market conditions, costs of living, and structural inequities across and within state boundaries introduce many more factors to consider in understanding what it means to be working class in different parts of the country. While we don’t attempt to reconcile all those things in this report, we do explore what share of people in each state fits our family income-based definition of working class and how that applies to people with different types of occupations and educational backgrounds.&nbsp;</p>
<p>On average, a larger share of those in nonmetropolitan areas, or in the Midwestern or Southern regions of the country fall within this definition of working class (see <strong>Table 3</strong>), largely because incomes and the cost of living are lower. For example, according to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, a family of two adults and two children in Boston, Massachusetts (the state with the lowest working-class share), would require over $66,000 more for a modest but adequate lifestyle than they would in the Midwestern city of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, (the state with the highest working-class share) (EPI 2026c). In fact, 26 metropolitan areas require a family income greater than $150,000 for a two adult and two child household to achieve a moderate lifestyle, of which all but one are located in the Northeast and the West.</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-325559 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325559" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325559-35946-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The map in <strong>Figure R</strong> shows what share of each state’s 18–64-year-old population is working class, including by occupation and education. Since we are using a nationwide family income threshold to identify individuals in the working class, the map also reports the state median hourly wage, as well as working-class median hourly wages by broad occupation and educational category to help contextualize how the working-class family income limit translates to individual workers’ wages in each state.</p>
<p>The map shows that there is considerable variation in working-class shares across states and within regions. While the Midwest and South in aggregate have the highest working-class population shares, in the West, there is notable variance in state working-class population shares. For example, in Idaho and Wyoming, more than 62% of the population is working class compared with states like California and Washington where less than half of the population fit our working-class definition.</p>


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<a name="Figure-R"></a><div class="figure chart-326089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326089" data-anchor="Figure-R"><div class="figLabel">Figure R</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326089-35979-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure R" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In each of the five states with the highest working-class population shares—South Dakota (66.7%), Iowa (64.9%), Wyoming (64.7%), Kansas (63.9%), and Nebraska (62.7%)—the state median hourly wage is below $25.00. In the five states (including D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares—Massachusetts (42.9%); Washington, D.C. (42.9%); New Jersey (44.9%); Maryland (47.8%); and Washington state (47.9%)–the state median hourly wage is over $29.00. Across all 50 states and D.C., the median hourly wage for members of the working class with less than bachelor’s degree ranges from $18.61 in Louisiana to $23.78 in Alaska and New Hampshire.</p>
<p>Figure R also illuminates how filtering the working class by occupation or education can surface different realities faced by workers across the country. Several states register lower-than-expected overall working-class population shares, given their reputation for being low-wage, low-income states. Even after filtering the map by people without a bachelor’s degree, in four states—Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, in descending order—fewer than 60% are working class. Those four states also have some of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the country, eliminating larger shares of their population from our working-class count. Since the Great Recession, the South has had the lowest labor force participation rate compared with other regions of the country, and people with less than a bachelor’s degree have much lower labor force participation rates than those with a bachelor’s or advanced degree (Childers 2024a; EPI 2026d).</p>
<p>On the other hand, when we use nonprofessional and nonmanagerial (all other) occupations as the filter, it narrows the sample to a group of people who are in the labor force, and working-class shares rise to over 80% in those four states. Mississippi, the state with the lowest median hourly wage and a working-class population share of just 59.8%, has the nation’s highest share of working class among nonprofessional and nonmanagerial workers (89.7%).</p>
<p>This look into state working-class population shares sheds light on some of the conditions that produce unique labor dynamics across regions and states. The long-standing anti-worker policies of the Southern economic development model not only shape the configuration of the working class in the South, including characteristically low wages, but low labor force participation also creates a sub-working class (Childers 2023; Childers 2024b). It also demonstrates the need for strong and comprehensive labor standards and workers’ rights protections nationwide to reduce such large interstate disparities.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>While there is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of working class, this report proposes that based on similarities in family income and labor force participation, membership may reasonably extend to more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than previously considered. The decline in the college-wage premium, the teacher pay gap, and growing racial and gender pay gaps among college graduates have each contributed to this trend over the last 10–20 years. At the same time, more than 40 years of policy decisions that suppressed wages and led to a sharp decline in union density have undercut traditional opportunities for noncollege graduates to make a decent living, as increasing shares of those in the working class have an hourly wage that falls below their state’s median. In comparing what it means to be working class across different states, we find that the Southern economic development model not only contributes to lower working-class wages in some Southern states but also creates a sub-working class through low labor force participation (Childers 2023).</p>
<p>Finally, this analysis also shows that the working class has long outgrown the old image narrowly represented by white tradesmen in hard hats. Rather, shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. In the face of the growing diversity and interconnectedness of the working class, the racist and anti-immigrant policies being pushed by the current administration stand to alienate a larger share of this group. Elected leaders seeking to win support from today’s working class should prioritize issues and policies that improve the lives of workers across race, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and occupation. Previous EPI research demonstrates that some effective strategies for accomplishing this include tripling union density, ending mass deportations, curbing employer misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage (Bivens et al. 2026; EPI 2026e; Cid-Martinez et al. 2026; Zipperer 2026).</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-325563 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325563" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325563-35947-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The term pink-collar is commonly used to refer to jobs that are predominantly done by women and pay less than more male-dominated occupations. Examples include many clerical, administrative, and service jobs as well as teaching, nursing and care work.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Family income is reported in bands in the monthly CPS, with $150,000 as the lower limit for the highest income band, and 73.9% of the 18–64-year-old population have a family income below that level.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Though not depicted in the report, the shares of each group that met our education-based definition of working class were AIAN (79.1%), Hispanic (78.8%), Black (71.6%), white (57.8%), and AAPI (39.4%). Shares based on nativity were foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen (68.5%); native-born (63.0%); and foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen (54.6%).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> We estimate that 36.4% of working-class managers and professionals in our sample are early career or under age 35.</p>
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<p>Rotondaro, Vinnie. 2026. “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/213121/democratic-socialists-america-problem-middle-class-socialism">The Problem with Middle-Class Socialism</a>.” <em>New Republic,</em> July 23, 2026.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., Valerie Wilson, Jori Kandra, and Daniel Perez. 2022. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/"><em>Botched Policy Responses to Globalization Have Decimated Manufacturing Employment with Often Overlooked Costs for Black, Brown, and Other Workers of Color: Investing in Infrastructure and Rebalancing Trade Can Create Good Jobs for All</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2022.</p>
<p>Stimpfel, Amy Witkoski, Kathryn Leep-Lazar, Maile Mercer, and Kathleen DeMarco. 2025. “‘Scheduling Is Everything’: A Qualitative Descriptive Study of Job and Schedule Satisfaction of Staff Nurses and Nurse Managers.” <em>Western Journal of Nursing Research</em> 47, no. 10: 912–923. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280">https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>United States Census Bureau (Census). 2022. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/fig_6.png">Figure 6: Percent of Population 25 Years and Over, and 25 to 29 Years Old, with Bachelor&#8217;s Degree or Higher by Sex: 1947–2021</a>,” [chart image], <em>CPS Historical Time Series Visualizations. </em>Published February 24, 2022.</p>
<p>Williams, Jhacova, and Valerie Wilson. 2019. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-racial-disparities-in-employment/"><em>Black Workers Endure Persistent Racial Disparities in Employment Outcomes</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, August 2019.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016a. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-are-paid-less-than-whites-at-every-education-level/"><em>African Americans Are Paid Less Than Whites at Every Education Level</em></a> (economic snapshot). Economic Policy Institute, October 2016.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-changing-demographics-of-americas-working-class/"><em>People of Color Will Be a Majority of the American Working Class in 2032: What This Means for the Effort to Grow Wages and Reduce Inequality</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, June 2016.</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage: Raising the Wage to Two-Thirds of the National Median Wage Would Lift Pay for Nearly 40 Million Workers</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>News from EPI › New EPI policy brief details how states can protect workers from misclassification amid federal attacks</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/press/new-epi-policy-brief-details-how-states-can-protect-workers-from-misclassification-amid-federal-attacks/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:48:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=press&#038;p=328413</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[As the Trump administration prepares to release a new rule that will expand misclassification of workers as independent contractors, a new Economic Policy Institute brief explains what state policymakers can do to protect workers from Misclassification is a pervasive and widespread problem: as many as 10–30% of employers misclassify their workers.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the Trump administration prepares to release a new rule that will expand misclassification of workers as independent contractors, a <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">new Economic Policy Institute brief </a>explains what state policymakers can do to protect workers from misclassification.</p>
<p>Misclassification is a pervasive and widespread problem: as many as <a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/">10–30% of employers</a> misclassify their workers. Workers misclassified as independent contractors lose critical protections, benefits, and labor rights including the minimum wage, overtime pay, unemployment insurance, and the right to form a union. Additionally, these workers bear the full financial costs of Social Security and Medicare contributions. The loss of these protections has <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">real costs</a>: For example, a typical construction worker misclassified as an independent contractor would lose as much as $20,399 in annual income and job benefits compared with what they would have earned as an employee.</p>
<p>The Trump Department of Labor is currently <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/trump-dol-rule-easing-path-to-contractor-status-in-final-review">finalizing a regulation</a> that would narrow the definition of who qualifies as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). The new rule will encourage a race to the bottom, as employers will find it much easier to just classify workers as independent contractors and evade their obligations to workers. EPI <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/">estimates</a> that workers stand to lose over $3.7 billion annually in pay and benefits due to the rise in misclassification from the new Trump rule, and that social insurance funds would lose at least $357 million annually from lost employer contributions.</p>
<p>Amid these threats, states can take a range of measures to maintain and strengthen labor standards and enforcement, including:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Investigating the costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds. </strong>State-specific studies can help assess actual costs of misclassification, identify weak spots in existing state policy, and build urgency for taking targeted action to strengthen misclassification protections.</li>
<li><strong>Establishing a strong legal test—the ABC test—for determining employee status and pairing it with robust enforcement. </strong>The ABC test presumes that workers are employees, places the burden on the employer to prove otherwise, and provides a clear, narrow definition of independent contractor status.</li>
<li><strong>Implementing innovative strategies to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification, </strong>such as creating interagency task forces to more effectively crack down on misclassification in targeted industries.</li>
</ul>
<p>The policy brief is part of EPI’s “Holding the Line” series that provides state solutions to the U.S. workers’ rights crisis. Previous installments in the series have outlined how state policymakers can boost <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">minimum wage standards</a>, expand <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rights-to-unionize-and-collectively-bargain-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">union and collective bargaining rights</a>, and strengthen <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/child-labor-standards-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/?_gl=1*167r53t*_gcl_aw*R0NMLjE3NTE0Nzc0MTYuQ2p3S0NBandzWlBEQmhCV0Vpd0FEdU82eTlkMnl2ZDBha005eENhQlpGT296WnI0azRQamZIZXlvVFJGV0NtYUM4aThzaUhPOTNCRFlSb0NtbXdRQXZEX0J3RQ..*_gcl_au*NzM0MTkzNzQzLjE3NTMzNjEwMzg.*_ga*MzU0NzI0MDU3LjE3MDc0OTI1MzY.*_ga_WEFYC926YG*czE3NTM4ODQxMTgkbzEyNTIkZzEkdDE3NTM4ODcwMjYkajM2JGwwJGgwJGRkZGs2cGVKdi1mYzVvdDlEQWJEZDBJaE1kOF9MX1U1eVBR">child labor standards.</a></p>
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		<title>Misclassification: State solutions to the U.S. worker rights crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Mast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327039</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[What do federal laws say about employee status and worker Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>What do federal laws say about employee status and worker misclassification?</h2>
<p>Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor. This problem is pervasive and widespread: As many as <a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/">10–30% of employers</a> misclassify their workers.</p>
<p>The way a worker is classified has serious implications for their labor rights and economic security. Federal, state, and local labor laws provide extensive protections for employees that are not available to independent contractors. Workers misclassified as independent contractors:</p>
<ul>
<li>Are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which ensures workers are paid at least the federal minimum wage and receive overtime pay (150% of their regular pay rate for work in excess of 40 hours per week);</li>
<li>Are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which ensures workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively to improve their working conditions;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are not eligible for unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Do not qualify for paid sick or family leave, and are extremely unlikely to receive employer-provided health insurance or retirement benefits;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are <a href="https://www.abetterbalance.org/state-leadership-on-anti-discrimination-protections-for-independent-contractors/">not covered</a> by antidiscrimination and sexual harassment protections in most states.</li>
</ul>
<p>Workers misclassified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split these costs evenly with their employer.</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>How is employee status determined? Legal tests and their nuances</h3>
<p>There are various legal tests for determining employee status for the purpose of coverage under federal worker protection laws, such as the FLSA and NLRA, as well as tax laws. Likewise, states have adopted a range of their own definitions and tests for determining employee status under various state worker protection and tax policies.</p>
<p>At the federal level, interpretations of these tests have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">varied across different presidential administrations</a>. The Democratic Obama and Biden administrations defined “employee” more broadly under both the FLSA and NLRA, while Trump’s first-term Department of Labor (DOL) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appointees applied a more restrictive definition that denied more workers the protections afforded by employee status. The current Trump DOL recently issued a final rule that formally rescinds Biden-era guidance and makes it easier for employers to misclassify workers as independent contractors.</p>
<p>The three most common tests are (1) the “common law” test, (2) the “economic realities” test, and (3) the “ABC test,” though some jurisdictions combine elements of multiple tests.</p>
<p><strong>Common law test: </strong>Derived from court decisions over the years, the common law test uses a long list of factors for evaluating whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor. There are several versions of this test, including the <a href="https://udel.edu/~pollack/Acct351/handouts/definititions%20in%20restatement%202d%20law%20of%20agency.htm">“Restatement (Second) of Agency”</a> and the Internal Revenue Service’s <a href="https://www.valdosta.edu/administration/finance-admin/human-resources/documents/IRSFactorTest_000.pdf">20-factor test</a>. Typically, a test that includes a long list of factors is a version of common law. The common law test is primarily concerned with the &#8220;right to control&#8221; how the work is performed and has been <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2015/03/LegalLandscapeUS.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">criticized</a> for being insufficiently protective, overly subjective, and open to manipulation.&nbsp;However, it is the most prominently applied test at the state level, and it is also used by the NLRB to determine whether a worker is eligible for organizing and collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act.</p>
<p><strong>Economic realities test: </strong>A broader six-factor<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> test used to determine employee status, derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act definition of “employ,” which is “to suffer or permit to work.” Under this definition, most workers are considered employees. U.S. DOL has typically utilized this test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections.</p>
<p><strong>ABC test:</strong> The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining independent contractor status, offering more protections than either the Biden-era version of the economic realities test or the common law test. Unlike weaker standards, the ABC test establishes a presumption that an individual performing services for an employer is an employee—not an independent contractor—unless the employer can establish each of three factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>The work is done without the direction and control of the employer (“absence of control”);</li>
<li>The work is performed outside the usual course of the employer’s business (“outside usual course of business”); and</li>
<li>The work is done by someone who has their own independent business or trade doing that kind of work (“customarily engaged”).</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>What are the threats to existing protections against illegal worker misclassification?</strong></h2>
<p>Current federal threats include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>A weaker federal interpretation for determining employee status</strong>: The Trump administration is conducting its final review of an independent contractor rule that will expand misclassification and formally rescind&nbsp;the Biden administration’s 2024 <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/10/2024-00067/employee-or-independent-contractor-classification-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act">final rule</a>, which provided a strong interpretation of the legal test for determining independent contractor status. The proposed version of Trump’s rule was <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/">estimated to cost workers</a> over $3.7 billion annually and to rob federal and state social insurance funds of at least $357 million annually. Even before finalizing the rule, Trump’s DOL had instructed its staff to stop utilizing the 2024 rule.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Legislation to weaken the definition of “employee” under federal law: </strong>A <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1319/all-actions">bill before Congress</a> proposes changing the FLSA and NLRA definitions of “employee” to exclude more workers from protections under these laws by making it easier to classify them as independent contractors.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Attacks on immigrant workers: </strong>The Trump administration’s mass deportation agenda has terrorized communities, and past research suggests that anti-immigrant attacks sow fear in workplaces, leading to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/">increased labor abuses</a> in industries where immigrants tend to work and where misclassification is already rampant (e.g., construction, landscaping, and cleaning). Trump has also eliminated <a href="https://bettzedek.org/bloomberg-law-uscis-quietly-ends-program-to-shield-workers-reporting-abuse/">deferred action for workers who report labor abuses</a>, removing safeguards against retaliation that were intended to enable workers to come forward and report violations (including misclassification) without fear, regardless of their immigration status.</li>
<li><strong>Diminished resources for federal enforcement</strong>: Trump has <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-trump-has-dismantled-the-federal-workforce-in-his-first-100-days/">gutted</a> the federal workforce, including at DOL agencies that enforce workers’ rights, such as the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. And his budget bill proposed cutting <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/republican-budget-exacerbates-underfunding-of-worker-protection-agencies/">$72 million</a> from WHD and OSHA despite both agencies already being understaffed and underfunded. Trump’s budget bill also slashed <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/medicaid-and-snap-cuts-will-harm-students-and-local-economies/">federal</a> <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-has-cut-or-frozen-177-billion-in-grants-across-every-state-analysis-shows">funding</a> to states. New DOL <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pJlcv9vmjFjx88AqJ6tAEsCPBRNR1-mF/view">enforcement guidance</a> instructs agency staff to take a more permissive approach to enforcement and instead focus on &#8220;compliance assistance.” A <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-general-counsel-issues-case-handling-guidance">memo</a> issued earlier this year by the NLRB general counsel urges investigators not to pursue “enhanced remedies” against employers that commit unfair labor practices and to prioritize settlement over litigation of such cases. Trump’s recently confirmed secretary of labor has <a href="https://www.hrdive.com/news/sonderling-trump-DOL-EEOC-AI/824138/">voiced support</a> for more business-friendly regulations and employer self-audits.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ongoing industry attempts to erode labor standards:</strong> Industry groups representing employers that especially benefit from misclassifying workers as independent contractors—such as gig work and construction employers—have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">relentlessly attacked</a> state-level ABC tests<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> and sought to weaken the legal definition of “employment” to permanently exclude their workers from federal and state protections not available to independent contractors.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>
<ul>
<li>One of the latest manifestations of this agenda is the push by app-based companies—which classify their workers as independent contractors to avoid providing benefits—for “portable benefits” schemes (i.e., savings accounts that can be used for health care and other expenses). Portable benefits legislation has proliferated in at least 11 states in the past two years,<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> offering <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/why-workers-need-real-portable-benefits/">limited benefits to few workers</a> while allowing platform companies to keep avoiding providing workers legitimate employment benefits.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Federal legal frameworks for protecting against worker misclassification are limited in their applicability to begin with, and now even these limited protections are under threat. The FLSA and NLRA apply legal tests to determine employee status under these two laws, while many other protections and benefits workers may be eligible for are determined at the state level.</p>
<h2><strong>How can states maintain and strengthen labor standards and enforcement?</strong></h2>
<p>The erosion of employee classification standards has serious consequences for states. Misclassification not only hurts workers but also deprives federal and state social insurance funds of the revenue needed to support injured, unemployed, and older workers. At a time when states are facing budgetary shortfalls prompted by the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-radical-republican-budget-bill-steals-from-the-poor-to-give-tax-cuts-to-the-rich/">massive tax cuts</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/100-days-100-ways-trump-hurt-workers/">its gutting of the federal workforce</a> and federal programs, lost revenue from misclassification will constrain them even further. To safeguard workers’ right to proper classification under state wage and hour laws, states should, at a minimum: analyze the costs of misclassification, meaningfully enforce their existing standards, and—where possible—seek to enshrine in state law the interpretation of the six-factor economic realities test adopted by the Biden administration. Ideally, states should endeavor to go further and implement the even stronger ABC test for determining employee status. States should also pair a strong ABC test with additional protections against misclassification and robust enforcement.</p>
<p>Addressing misclassification will ensure that workers are paid at least the minimum wage for their work and made eligible for benefits to which they are legally entitled. It will also ensure that states receive the necessary revenue to support workers and state agencies charged with enforcing worker protections.&nbsp;</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>Getting started: Key questions to investigate how your state treats misclassification</h3>
<p>Legal standards on employee classification (and mechanisms for enforcing these standards) vary considerably across and even within states. For example, a state may have a strong legal standard for determining employee status for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits but not for protections under state wage and hour laws. Additionally, misclassification is typically addressed by amending state statutes through the legislative process, but some states have also used the administrative rulemaking process to clarify state agencies’ interpretation of existing legal standards, depending on the underlying statute and scope of state agencies’ authority.</p>
<p>Here are some key questions to investigate the legal landscape in your state:</p>
<ul>
<li>How is the term “employee” defined in relevant state laws, including the laws governing workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and wage and hour protections? Within your state’s wage and hour laws, are there any industry-specific provisions related to misclassification, such as in construction?</li>
<li>What are the legal tests used to determine whether a worker is an employee for the purposes of coverage under each law? Different interpretations may apply to different laws, and the test may not be spelled out in statute. You may need to search your state’s labor agency website.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, Wisconsin applies a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/wisconsin/chapter-108/section-108-02/">two-part test</a> to unemployment insurance but applies the economic realities test to wage and hour laws (the economic realities test is <a href="https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/worker-classification/er/laborstandards/employers.htm">not in statute</a> but is instead based on an interpretation of common law).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>In addition to statutory tests, does your state have administrative rules and regulations that provide guidance when interpreting legal tests?
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, New Jersey has a statutory ABC test covering six state statutes—including unemployment compensation, wage and hour, and earned sick leave—and <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">recently adopted new regulations</a> to codify the state’s longstanding interpretation of the test and provide more detailed regulatory guidance on how the ABC test applies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What remedies are available to illegally misclassified workers under state law? These remedies may be covered in a standalone section of a state’s employment statute.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, in Minnesota, remedies available to misclassified workers are not covered under “Payment of Wages” but under a separate “Misclassification of Employees” section.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Has your state already conducted research regarding the cost of misclassification to workers and the state? If so, that analysis may provide useful statistics for advocating for better enforcement or a stronger legal test.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h3>Step I: Enforce existing standards, assess costs, and ensure legal test is at least as strong as 2024 Biden rule</h3>
<h4><strong>Vigorously enforce existing standards and take note of their weaknesses</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>While state laws defining employee status vary considerably, a legal test is only as strong as its enforcement. Regardless of a state’s particular test, strong enforcement of the law is essential. (Specific recommendations for robust enforcement are covered in Step II.) For example, though Minnesota does not have an ABC test, <a href="https://www.littler.com/news-analysis/asap/effective-july-1-minnesota-employers-face-increased-scrutiny-and-possible">lawmakers</a>, the <a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/business/employment-practices/intergovernmental-misclassification-enforcement-and-education">labor agency</a>, and the <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/">attorney general</a> have taken significant steps to address misclassification and expand remedies for workers subject to illegal misclassification. In <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/minnesota/chapters-175-187/chapter-181/section-181-722/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Minnesota</a>, employers who misclassify workers can be penalized for the violation and required to pay back wages, overtime, and other compensation workers lost as a result. Workers can also <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">sue their employer directly</a> to enforce their right to proper classification.</p>
<h4><strong>Investigate the costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds</strong></h4>
<p>If their state has not already done so, lawmakers can propose legislation creating a task force to study the impact of illegal misclassification and then make policy recommendations to the legislature. Given the high costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds, these studies can help create a sense of urgency and build support for further action on misclassification protections among lawmakers who may not otherwise see it as a priority.</p>
<p>These task forces can be created by legislation, executive order, or existing agency authority. For example, in 2020, Louisiana lawmakers passed a <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://dam.ldr.la.gov/miscellaneous/SR%2022.pdf">resolution</a> requesting that the Department of Revenue establish a Misclassification of Employees Task Force to study the costs of misclassification and recommend ways for the legislature to address them. In 2008, Iowa Governor Chet Culver initiated a misclassification task force to study the issue and report its findings to him. And in 2023, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison formed an Advisory Task Force on Worker Misclassification; its <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/Meetings/20241220/AdoptedRecommendations.pdf">policy recommendations</a> formed the basis of <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">2024 legislation</a> that made it easier for workers to report misclassification, established a private right of action to recoup denied wages, increased penalties for violations, and improved government coordination on misclassification investigations.</p>
<p>Task forces to study the impact of misclassification can also lead to more cross-agency coordination to crack down on misclassification and other violations that often occur alongside it (see Step III for more on interagency coordination). By vigorously enforcing their existing standards and investigating the costs of misclassification, states can still address harm and deter violations, regardless of how strong those standards are.</p>
<h4><strong>Adopt the economic realities test in common law states</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>States can ensure that their employment laws include a test for determining independent contractor status that is at least as strong as the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20240109-1">six-factor economic realities rule issued to apply to the FLSA</a> during the Biden administration. The six-factor economic realities test is stronger than the common law test and overly simplistic “right to control” tests used by many states because it determines independent contractor status by asking whether the worker is in fact in business for themselves. For example, while one 2026 proposed bill in Kentucky (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) would enshrine an ABC test in the state&#8217;s wage and hour code, a narrower and less ambitious but perhaps more feasible bill (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/sb117.html">SB 117</a>) would prohibit misclassification on publicly funded construction projects—excluding workers in all other industries—and would use the six-factor economic realities test instead of an ABC test to determine whether a worker was misclassified. The economic realities test may be an option for lawmakers to consider in states where adopting an ABC test is not immediately feasible.</p>
<h3>Step II: Establish a strong ABC test and pair it with robust enforcement</h3>
<p>A strong legal test for determining employee status is fundamental to asserting workers’ right to proper classification and provides a strong basis for enforcement. The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining employee status. It differs from <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">other tests of employee status</a> (such as the common law test used under the NLRA and by the IRS, and the economic realities test used under the FLSA) because the ABC test presumes that workers are employees, places the burden on the employer to prove otherwise, and provides a clear, narrow definition of independent contractor status. The test seeks to determine whether an individual is truly in business for themselves, which reduces the likelihood that workers are misclassified and lose protections they should be guaranteed under the law as employees. States should adopt the ABC test in as many of their labor protection statutes as possible.</p>
<p>The ABC test has not yet been adopted at the federal level, though legislation has been proposed. For example, the federal Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act would enshrine the ABC test in at least one federal law (the National Labor Relations Act) for purposes of determining workers’ organizing and bargaining rights but has not yet passed both chambers of Congress. Even if the ABC test were someday widely adopted at the federal level, state ABC tests would still be needed to address exclusions from federal protections and ensure adequate enforcement.</p>
<p>Eighteen states and the District of Columbia currently use the ABC test for determining employee status for certain workplace laws, but the strength of states’ classification standards varies widely (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). Even within states with ABC tests, some apply the test only to workers in certain industries, and most of these states have adopted the test only for the purpose of determining unemployment insurance eligibility—and not for wage and hour protections or workers’ compensation. Most states do not have ABC tests and apply weaker tests to determine employee status or have implemented components of an ABC test that fall short of the full test (see Figure A), and almost no state has made progress on advancing ABC tests in the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">past three years</a>.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327198 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327198" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327198-36051-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Some states have recently taken action to implement an ABC test or strengthen their existing one. For example, in addition to pursuing strong, innovative <a href="https://www.nelp.org/new-jerseys-worker-classification-crackdown-could-have-broad-impact/">enforcement strategies</a> to combat misclassification, New Jersey’s labor department proposed a <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">new administrative rule</a> in 2025 to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-new-jerseys-proposed-regulation-codifying-its-interpretation-of-the-states-statutory-abc-test/">codify into state law</a> the agency’s existing interpretation of the state&#8217;s ABC test for preventing independent contractor misclassification. And in 2026, lawmakers in <a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">Kentucky</a> proposed establishing a new ABC test in state wage and hour law.</p>
<p>States should seek to apply ABC tests to as many worker protection statutes as possible and limit carveouts that exclude certain workers based on their industry or occupation—the goal is to protect all workers with the simplest, most effective standard possible. However, focusing on a particular problem industry may be more politically feasible and can ensure some of the most vulnerable workers are protected while advocates build pressure to expand the test’s coverage. For example, several states have implemented an ABC test for the construction industry—long known for its <a href="https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2022/11/erlich_ilrr_final_article_11.28.20.pdf">reliance on illegal misclassification</a>—covering all relevant standards, including wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and income tax.</p>
<p>Lawmakers and advocates should also beware of legislation intended to weaken existing ABC tests or undermine the ABC test’s presumption that a worker is an employee <em>unless the employer can prove otherwise</em>. For example, a <a href="https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2026/A1184">2026 bill</a> introduced on the heels of New Jersey’s new misclassification rule proposes eliminating the B and C factors in the state’s ABC test, effectively replacing the ABC test with a much weaker, single-factor “right to control” test. Additionally, a 2026 West Virginia bill (<a href="https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4571%20intr.htm&amp;yr=2026&amp;sesstype=RS&amp;i=4571">HB 4571</a>) proposes establishing an ABC test designed to prevent the state from being deprived of income tax revenue, but the test presumes a worker is an independent contractor <em>unless</em> the employer demonstrates that the worker is in fact an employee (a true ABC test requires employers to prove a worker is an independent contractor, not an employee).</p>
<p>For states with no existing ABC test, lawmakers can propose legislation to establish a standard and provide remedies for misclassified workers within a single proposal. For example, the 2026 Kentucky bill mentioned above (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) proposed enshrining an ABC test in state wage and hour code and proposed new remedies for misclassified workers, including back wages, liquidated damages, and the right to pursue legal action against their employer.</p>
<p>A strong legal standard must be paired with action to enforce the law, and there are numerous policy options to strengthen workers’ rights and improve the enforcement of the state’s misclassification standards. Lawmakers can:</p>
<ul>
<li>Establish specific penalties for misclassification and make them sufficiently high to deter violations. Under the FLSA, the act of misclassification carries no penalty. Instead, aggrieved workers are limited to remedies for minimum wage and overtime violations uncovered during an investigation. States can address this gap in federal law by making misclassification a standalone violation and establishing penalties for misclassification, as Minnesota does. Lawmakers can also amend their statutes to direct penalties toward enforcement, as <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/generalmisclassification.shtml">New Jersey</a> does.</li>
<li>Increase the remedies for workers, including by making aggrieved workers eligible for compensatory damages in addition to back wages, and establishing a private right of action for workers to pursue legal action against offending employers, as Minnesota does.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Encourage workers to report labor abuses by extending the timeframe for filing wage and misclassification claims and by establishing anti-retaliation protections that include a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Rather than putting the onus on workers to prove they faced retaliation, a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation assumes adverse action taken shortly after protected activity was retaliatory unless the employer can prove otherwise (see Pennsylvania’s <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/pa/title-43-ps-labor/pa-st-sect-43-933-10.html">Construction Workplace Misclassification Act</a>).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Where state law authorizes these approaches, use “stop work” orders and “hot goods” provisions to prohibit employers from continuing work or profiting from the shipment of goods produced using illegally misclassified workers.
<ul>
<li>New Jersey&#8217;s <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/conindindependentcontractoract.shtml">Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act</a> was recently used to <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260807_Stop_Work.shtml">stop work</a> by four subcontractors after investigators found wage theft and multiple labor law violations affecting 15 workers. In 2026, the New York Senate <a href="https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S1514">passed a bill</a> that would permit “stop work” orders to be implemented for willful misclassification in any industry.</li>
<li>In the spirit of a “hot goods” provision, California’s labor code pertaining to the <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/california/code-lab/division-2/part-11/chapter-2/section-2680/">garment industry</a> requires manufacturers to be registered with the state; if apparel is manufactured without registration, state labor enforcers may confiscate the garments and destroy or dispose of them.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Require employers to provide workers with transparent statements of their employment status and a justification for their classification, as was <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3178">proposed</a> in the 2011 Employee Misclassification Prevention Act.</li>
</ul>
<p>In the past two years, at least 15 states have proposed legislation or administrative rules to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification and state agencies’ enforcement of misclassification laws (see<strong> Appendix Table 1</strong>).</p>
<h3>Step III: Implement innovative strategies to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification</h3>
<p>Beyond the remedies described in Step II, which focus on holding employers accountable and expanding worker protections, state lawmakers and agencies can implement the below actions to more effectively combat misclassification and prevent misclassification from happening in the first place:</p>
<h4><strong>Establish interagency coordination and enforce protections against misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>Misclassification is pervasive across many industries, but often states and cities lack the resources to address the issue comprehensively. States across the country have created <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/public-task-forces-take-on-employee-misclassification-best-practices/">interagency task forces</a> with dedicated resources, staff, and <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/Toolbox_Tool12_Intro_to_Co-enforcement_final.pdf">partnerships with worker organizations</a>, enabling them to more effectively crack down on misclassification in targeted industries. These task forces allow the state to pool efforts and expertise and use its limited resources more efficiently to address misclassification as well as other labor violations that frequently occur alongside misclassification. For example, last year, Washington’s attorney general <a href="https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-nick-brown-launches-worker-rights-unit-enforce-protections-fight-exploitation">established a worker rights unit</a> to combat wage theft and misclassification through strategic litigation, increased collaboration with state agencies, and partnerships with legislators to advance new worker protections. Interagency misclassification enforcement task forces have delivered significant results for workers and the state. For example, in 2018, in a one-year period Tennessee’s Employee Misclassification Education and Enforcement Fund and Uninsured Employers Fund unit found <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/workforce/documents/injuries/2019ComplianceAnnualReport.pdf">over 250 workers’ compensation and misclassification violations</a> and assessed nearly $6 million in penalties for the violations. The programs also helped over 1,250 employees gain workers’ compensation coverage for work-related illnesses and injuries. The same year, audits conducted by Oregon’s interagency task force on misclassification discovered over <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_engagement/Reports/2019-ICN-Interagency-Compliance-Network-Report.pdf">$73 million</a> in unreported payroll and resulted in the reclassification of nearly 7,000 workers.</p>
<h4><strong>Create a presumption of employee status for workers</strong></h4>
<p>One simple and effective way to deter misclassification in states without an ABC test is to create a presumption of employee status, meaning that workers are presumed to be employees unless proven otherwise. For example, New Mexico does not apply an ABC test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections, but the state does apply a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/chapter-60/article-13/section-60-13-3-1/">presumption of employee status</a> to workers in the construction industry. Construction contractors that improperly report employees as independent contractors are subject to criminal penalties.</p>
<h2>Additional recommended resources</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</a> [full report] and <a href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet/">state fact sheets</a> (Economic Policy Institute)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Policy-Brief-Public-Task-Forces-Take-on-Employee-Misclassification-Updated-August-2020.pdf">Public Task Forces Take on Employee Misclassification: Best Practices</a> (National Employment Law Project)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347871314_Misclassification_in_Construction_The_Original_Gig_Economy">Misclassification in Construction: The Original Gig Economy</a> (Cornell University Industrial &amp; Labor Relations Review)</li>
</ul>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The author is grateful to EPI Senior Fellow Lynn Rhinehart for her expertise and guidance.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break">&nbsp;</div>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327055 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327055" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327055-36036-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<div class="pdf-page-break">&nbsp;</div>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The six factors are: (1) opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill; (2) investments by the worker and the potential employer; (3) degree of permanence of the work relationship; (4) nature and degree of control; (5) extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the potential employer’s business; and (6) skill and initiative.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See, for example, New Jersey A1184 (failed in 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> See, for example, Nebraska LB 229 (enacted in 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> See Alabama SB 86 (2025), Georgia HB 987 (2026), Idaho H 645 (2026), Kentucky HB 732 (2026), Louisiana HB 301 (2026), Massachusetts HB 1108 (2026), Nebraska LR 414 (2026), Rhode Island H 7365 (2026), West Virginia SB 269 (2025) and HB 4009 (2026), Wisconsin SB 269 (2025), and Wyoming SF 41 (2026).</p>
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		<title>Nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/nearly-1-billion-in-stolen-wages-was-recovered-for-workers-in-2025/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 13:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Matthew Wich, Samantha Sanders]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327812</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for Affordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every year.</li>
<li>Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in 2025.</li>
<li>These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion annually.</li>
<li>Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for perpetrators.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p><span class="dropped">A</span>ffordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S. Much of the affordability debate has focused narrowly on prices. But the true underlying driver of today’s affordability squeeze is suppressed pay—the result of decades of policy decisions that have weakened workers’ bargaining power. Weakened bargaining power not only suppresses workers’ wages but also makes workers more vulnerable to exploitation. Among the most pervasive forms is wage theft, which robs millions of workers of billions of dollars each year (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Poydock and Zhang 2024). Wage theft occurs anytime an employer fails to pay a worker the amount they are legally owed for their labor. This can take many forms, including not paying overtime to eligible workers, not providing meal breaks as required by law, or paying workers less than the minimum wage. Existing laws enable workers to recoup these stolen wages through government enforcement, individual wage claims, and class action lawsuits.</p>
<p>Our survey of all states and review of federal data find that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025. This figure significantly understates the scale of wage theft, as it only accounts for recovered wages. Further, the Trump administration has pursued policies that make it easier for employers to minimize their liability for wage and hour violations and harder for workers to recoup money they are owed. The report highlights wage theft recovery efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), by state agencies, and via class action litigation. Finally, the report provides policy recommendations at both the federal and state levels to combat the pervasive practice of wage theft across the United States.</p>
<div class="box">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>What is wage theft?</strong></span></p>
<p>Wage theft is the failure to pay workers the full wages to which they are legally entitled. It can take many forms, including but not limited to:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Paying workers less than the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Overtime violations:&nbsp;</strong>Failing to pay nonexempt employees time and a half for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week</li>
<li><strong>Off-the-clock violations:&nbsp;</strong>Requiring employees to work off the clock before or after their shifts</li>
<li><strong>Meal break violations:&nbsp;</strong>Denying workers their legal meal breaks</li>
<li><strong>Illegal deductions:&nbsp;</strong>Taking illegal deductions from wages for business expenses such as uniforms or use of equipment</li>
<li><strong>Tipped minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Confiscating tips from workers, or failing to pay tipped workers the difference between their tips and the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Employee misclassification violations:&nbsp;</strong>Misclassifying employees as independent contractors to pay a wage lower than the legal minimum or avoid paying overtime&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>The scale and cost of wage theft</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a costly and widespread problem that affects millions of workers each year. Research by Cooper and Kroeger (2017) estimates that workers lose $15 billion annually in minimum wage violations alone. This does not account for other forms of wage theft, such as overtime pay violations, off-the-clock violations, or the denial of legal meal breaks. To put that into perspective, Cooper and Kroeger’s (2017) estimate of minimum wage violations alone exceeds the value of any form of property crime reported in Federal Bureau of Investigation data in the last year, including stolen value from all currency ($10.96 billion) and locally stolen motor vehicles ($8.22 billion).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>Wage theft occurs in all industries and impacts all workers, but workers in low-wage industries are significantly more likely to experience wage theft. A 2008 survey of workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City found that two-thirds (68%) of these workers experienced at least one pay-related violation in any given week, robbing these workers of nearly $3 billion in wages each year (Bernhardt et al. 2009). Applying these rates to the national workforce, EPI estimates that low-wage workers in the U.S. lost $52.5 billion to all forms of wage theft in 2025 (Shierholz and Sanders 2026). According to DOL, low-wage workers in construction, food service, health care, and retail experience high rates of wage theft (WHD 2026a).</p>
<p>Wage theft is costly not only to the workers whose wages are stolen but also to taxpayers and the communities those workers live in. Failing to pay workers, particularly low-wage workers, the wages they are owed can cause them to fall into poverty. This increases reliance on public assistance, effectively shifting the costs of paying workers away from employers and onto taxpayers. When employers do not pay wages owed, they also suppress consumer demand in local economies because workers have less money to spend, which can hurt small businesses.</p>
<p>In this report, we present findings about the amount of <em>recovered</em> wages, which is only a small percentage of the total stolen from workers every year. Previous EPI reports found that between 2017 and 2020, $3.24 billion was recovered, and between 2021 and 2023, $1.5 billion was recovered (Mangundayao et al. 2021; Poydock and Zhang 2024).</p>
<h2><strong>Findings and analysis</strong></h2>
<p>In this report, we aggregated available data on stolen wages that were recovered across the United States. To be as comprehensive as possible, we reviewed current U.S. DOL wage enforcement data, surveyed state labor departments and attorneys general, and analyzed data on the largest class action wage and hour settlements.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025 through the U.S. Department of Labor, state agencies, and class action lawsuits. Importantly, as stated above, this figure does not account for all wage theft in the United States. Our analysis focused only on wages recovered, not total wages stolen, which we expect to be much greater. Whether it be out of fear of retaliation or a lack of knowledge about their rights, many workers never file a claim to recover stolen wages.</p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery by the U.S. Department of Labor</strong></h3>
<p>According to Wage and Hour Division (WHD) enforcement data, U.S. DOL recovered $259 million in fiscal year 2025, as shown in <strong>Table 1</strong>. These wages were recovered on behalf of 176,957 workers, which equates to $1,465.30 per worker on average.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-322767 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322767" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322767-36078-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Breaking down those aggregate numbers by specific violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find that overtime violations accounted for the largest share (79%) of total back wages recovered in 2025, as shown in <strong>Figure A</strong>. Minimum wage violations had the second-largest share at 15%, followed by tip-related violations (5%) and retaliation violations (under 1%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322810 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322810" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322810-36079-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3><strong>Wage recovery by state departments of labor and attorneys general</strong></h3>
<p>During the summer of 2026, EPI contacted state departments of labor and attorneys general via phone and email to compile data on their wage recovery efforts. We collected data, summarized in <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>, from 39 states and the District of Columbia. The remaining 11 states either did not recover wages for workers, did not respond to our request, did not track the requested data, or were unable to provide the requested data.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a></p>
<p>According to our analysis, state departments of labor and attorneys general in 39 states and the District of Columbia recovered $267 million in 2025.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery through class action settlements</strong></h3>
<p>Class action lawsuits, brought by workers themselves, can be an effective way for workers to recoup stolen wages. In <strong>Figure B</strong>, we present data collected by two law firms, Seyfarth Shaw LLP and Duane Morris LLP, that totals the value of the 10 largest class action lawsuits over the last decade. According to Duane Morris LLP, the value of large class action lawsuits totaled $434 million in 2025.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-322760 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322760" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322760-36080-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>One of the largest class action wage settlements in recent years was settled in 2025, with Disney agreeing to pay out more than $233 million to over 50,000 current and former employees of the Disneyland Park (Palm 2025). In 2018, voters in Anaheim, California, passed Measure L—legislation that required resorts in the area to raise the minimum wage to $15 per hour if they receive tax rebates from the city. Disney argued for several years that it was not covered by the new law. Though the trial court ruled in favor of Disney, the appellate court and California Supreme Court disagreed, and Disney ultimately settled—a massive win for Disneyland employees which demonstrates the power of workers joining together to hold employers accountable.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
As illustrated above, class action lawsuits are an effective strategy for recovering wages. However, many workers are barred from joining class action cases because they are subject to forced arbitration agreements. According to Colvin (2018), 56.2% of private-sector, nonunion workers are subject to forced arbitration agreements, which typically recover much lower awards for workers than class action lawsuits. For example, Stone and Colvin (2015) find the typical award per worker in forced arbitration ($36,500) is only 21% of the median award in a class action lawsuit in the federal courts ($176,426).</p>
<h2><strong>Case studies</strong></h2>
<p>The case studies presented below highlight the important work of federal, state, and local enforcement agencies and the power of workers who stand up against their employers to fight for the wages owed to them.</p>
<h3>U.S. Department of Labor</h3>
<p>In July 2026, the U.S. Department of Labor recovered over $500,000 in back wages and damages for six deli workers in San Diego, California (DOL 2026). Chau Deli was found to have failed to pay workers minimum wage for regular hours and overtime pay for hours worked over 40 per workweek. DOL determined that the employer was paying workers a flat rate of $100 per day, despite the workers averaging 11-hour days. The investigation resulted in each worker being paid approximately $83,000 in back wages.&nbsp;</p>
<h3>New York: NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection</h3>
<p>In January 2026, New York City secured a $5.2 million settlement with three delivery app companies—Uber Eats, Fantuan, and HungryPanda—to pay approximately 50,000 workers who were denied pay for deliveries that customers canceled (NYC 2026). The city’s minimum wage law requires companies to pay delivery workers for the time they spent on the delivery regardless of whether the customer cancels the order.</p>
<h3>Minnesota: Department of Labor and Industry</h3>
<p>In 2019, Minnesota labor officials began investigating two construction companies, Advantage Construction and Property Maintenance &amp; Construction, for committing wage violations at several construction sites. In 2026, the companies settled and agreed to pay $1.28 million to 26 workers on 19 different projects (Minnesota DLI 2026). This settlement is particularly noteworthy because when construction companies compete for contracts, companies that break the law by underpaying their employees have a competitive advantage. Holding employers accountable for wage theft is pivotal to ensure competition for contracts is based on quality and not exploitation.</p>
<h2><strong>Policy recommendations</strong></h2>
<h3>Federal solutions</h3>
<p>As illustrated in this report, wage theft is a costly and pervasive problem for workers in the United States. The Trump administration has only exacerbated this issue by reinstating the “Payroll Audit Independent Determination” (PAID) program, which permits employers who have stolen workers’ wages to confess their violations up front in order to avoid applicable penalties, essentially allowing employers to steal their workers’ wages without facing the full legal consequence (FPW 2025). Further, the Trump administration has proposed policies that would allow large corporations to minimize their liability for FLSA violations. In 2026, the Department of Labor proposed changes to independent contractor status and the joint employer standard under the FLSA. According to EPI analysis, the Trump administration’s proposed joint employer rule would cost workers more than $225.6 million each year in additional stolen wages (Shierholz and Sanders 2026).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Policymakers should enact policies that protect workers against wage theft and, more generally, build worker power. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>One of the best ways to combat wage theft is to strengthen the right to form unions and bargain collectively. Wage theft is exceedingly rare in unionized workplaces because union contracts typically provide covered workers with full transparency and legally binding employer commitments regarding work hours, pay periods, and pay rates (including rules on overtime and premium pay). Union contracts typically have grievance procedures that can quickly resolve any pay-related violations of the contract, ensuring that workers are paid what they are owed in a timely manner and without fear of retaliation.</p>
<p>It is also imperative that Congress increase funding for the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division. Beginning in 2020, the WHD has seen a decline in inflation-adjusted allocation each year (<strong>Figure C</strong>). The number of full-time employees at the WHD has also decreased consistently over time. Increased funding and investigators will help the WHD recover more stolen wages, investigate additional instances of wage theft, and better enforce the FLSA.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322773 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322773" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322773-36081-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Finally, providing workers with greater transparency in their terms and conditions of employment is another key tool for protecting them against wage theft. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would require employers to provide disclosures, regular pay stubs, and final payments, which would help workers identify when they have not been paid what they are owed. Increasing the penalties to make wage theft more costly for employers would also help curb the practice. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would increase such penalties significantly. The Don’t Stand for Taking Employed Americans’ Livings (Don’t STEAL) Act would do the same by increasing penalties and fines and elevating the most severe violations to possible felony charges.</p>
<h3><strong>State and local efforts</strong></h3>
<p>As we demonstrate in this report, state and local agencies play an important role in enforcing wage theft laws and recovering stolen wages for workers (Sherer 2025).</p>
<p>While federal legislation combating wage theft has made little progress, many states have taken important action to fill gaps in federal law, such as 1) requiring written pay stubs, 2) ensuring timely pay on scheduled paydays, 3) regulating forms of pay and employer uses of third-party payroll vendors or electronic pay cards, 4) preventing unauthorized paycheck deductions, and 5) mandating prompt payment of final paychecks when a worker’s employment ends.</p>
<p>At a minimum, states can ensure workers greater transparency about their terms and conditions of employment. For example, 44 states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring pay stubs from employers (ADP 2026). This empowers workers to verify if they are being compensated correctly. States can also adopt explicit codes that prohibit payroll deductions without worker authorization, as New York has.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Additionally, states like Minnesota require employers to provide a written notice with terms of employment at the time of hire (Sherer 2025). Both the initial notice and pay stub documentation can deter unauthorized deductions from paychecks.</p>
<p>Timeliness of payment is another concern that states have the capability to address. States should more widely adopt codes that set consistent, predictable payday intervals. Nevada and others have also taken steps to address prompt payment of a final paycheck.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> To address forms of wage theft related to the growing employer use of third-party payroll services or electronic bank cards to deposit workers’ pay, many states like Arkansas have laws to require their employers to provide the option of receiving wages via check and set standards for the use of pay cards in order to ensure workers receive their full, entitled pay (ADP 2020).</p>
<p>Finally, many states have passed legislation strengthening enforcement of wage theft violations by increasing fines and allowing for enforcement against certain wage payment violations under criminal statutes. Colorado and Connecticut, among several other states, classify wage theft as a felony if certain circumstances are met, which can result in jail time.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In March 2026, Washington state passed a law which strengthens penalties for repeat offenders and creates a Wage Recovery Account to help unpaid workers receive some of the wages they are owed while cases are ongoing.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<h2><strong>The work of ending wage theft continues</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a pervasive epidemic that cheats many workers, families, and communities out of billions of dollars each year. Federal, state, and local enforcement efforts win back some of the stolen wages, but those efforts only recover a small fraction of the total wages stolen. Our report finds that through efforts conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, by state agencies, and through class action lawsuits, <span style="background-color: #9bd8c9;">nearly $1 billion</span> was recovered for workers. Although strong examples of recovery efforts exist, much more is necessary to ensure workers are paid what they are rightfully owed, including greater wage transparency for workers, bolstered enforcement capacities by agencies, and meaningful penalties for perpetrators.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The authors would like to thank Mallory Miller, Christina Ayon, and Salma Abdi for their research assistance in this report.</p>
<h2><strong>Appendix</strong></h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-326588 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326588" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326588-36082-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Authors’ analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Data Explorer data (FBI-CDE 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Seven states defer to the federal government for recovery efforts: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Note that 2025 total includes some data from 2024 or 2026, as some states tracked wage recovery efforts by fiscal year instead of calendar year.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> EPI conservatively estimates workers will lose roughly one billion dollars ($997.6 million) annually as a result of this rule if it is finalized: more than $772.0 million lost by workers as a result of the rule due to an increase in workplace fissuring and more than $225.6 million in losses by workers as a result of wage theft.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> NY Lab L § 193 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> NV Rev Stat § 608.040 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> CO Rev Stat § 8-4-114 (2025) and CT Gen Stat § 31-71g (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> HB 2479 &#8211; 2025-26</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>ADP. 2020. <a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/employer_paycard_wp.pdf?rev=731797839037413386e2aaad33dcff78&amp;hash=871BCF8EC1C49EBAC5BD9992BF99E5F2"><em>Employer Pay Cards: Staying on the Right Side of Compliance: A Guide to Federal and State Employer Pay Card Compliance Requirements</em></a>.</p>
<p>ADP. 2026. “<a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/pay_statement_requirements_chart.pdf">Pay Statement Requirements</a>” (web page). Last updated October 6, 2026.</p>
<p>Bernhardt, Annette, Ruth Milkman, Nik Theodore, Douglas Heckathorn, Mirabai Auer, James DeFilippis, Ana Luz González, Victor Narro, Jason Perelshteyn, Diana Polson, and Michael Spiller. 2009. <a href="http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1"><em>Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 2009</em></a>. Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment.</p>
<p>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2026. “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.t01.htm">Table 1. Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State, Seasonally Adjusted</a>.” Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Last modified September 18, 2026.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>
<p>Cooper, David, and Teresa Kroeger. 2017. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year/"><em>Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ Paychecks Each Year</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 2017.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20260717">U.S. Department of Labor Recovers More Than $500K in Back Wages from San Diego Deli for 6 Workers</a>” (news release). July 17, 2026.</p>
<p>Duane Morris LLP. 2026. <a href="https://www.duanemorris.com/pressreleases/duane_morris_publishes_wage_hour_class_collective_review_0126.html"><em>Wage &amp; Hour Class and Collective Review</em></a>. January 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (FBI-CDE). 2026. “<a href="https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/explorer/crime/property-crime">Expanded Property Reported in United States</a>” (web page). Last updated September 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Policy Watch (FPW). 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/department-of-labor-restarts-employer-friendly-self-audit-compliance-program-on-wage-and-hour-laws/">Department of Labor Restarts Employer-Friendly &#8216;Self-Audit&#8217; Compliance Program on Wage and Hour Laws</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, July 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Iowa Department of Inspections, Appeals, and Licensing (Iowa DIAL). 2025. <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/DF/1544407.pdf"><em>SFY25 DIAL Annual Report</em></a>.</p>
<p>Mangundayao, Ihna, Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Ali Sait. 2021. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021/"><em>More Than $3 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2017 and 2020</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2021.</p>
<p>Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Minnesota DLI). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/news/dli-recovers-128-million-back-wages-and-liquidated-damages-construction-workers">DLI Recovers $1.28 Million in Back Wages and Liquidated Damages for Construction Workers</a>” (news release). April 27, 2026.</p>
<p>New York City, Office of the Mayor (NYC). 2026. “<a href="https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces--5-million-settlement--reinstatement-of-">Mayor Mamdani Announces $5 Million Settlement, Reinstatement of as Many as 10,000 Wrongfully Deactivated Food Delivery Workers</a>” (news release). January 30, 2026.</p>
<p>New York Department of Labor (NY DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://dol.ny.gov/wage-theft-dashboard">Wage Theft Investigation Dashboard</a>” (web page). Accessed&nbsp; October 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Palm, Iman. 2025. “<a href="https://ktla.com/news/theme-parks/disneyland/unionized-disneyland-workers-say-233m-settlement-validates-years-of-organizing/?link_id=4&amp;can_id=ab0184786856562d7c97b3a362f2fb49&amp;source=email-daily-brief-sept-xx-2025-21&amp;email_referrer=email_2908984&amp;email_subject=daily-brief-sept-29-2025&amp;&amp;">Unionized Disneyland Workers Say $233M Settlement Validates Years of Organizing</a>.” KTLA, September 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Poydock, Margaret, and Jiayi (Sonia) Zhang. 2024. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021-23"><em>More Than $1.5 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2021 and 2023</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2024.</p>
<p>Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 2022. <a href="https://www.content.seyfarth.com/publications/Workplace-Class-Action-Report-2022/i/"><em>18th Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report</em></a>. January 2022.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-payment-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/"><em>Wage Payment: State Solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 30, 2025.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi, and Samantha Sanders. 2026. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-joint-employer-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act/">EPI Comment on DOL’s Proposed Rule on &#8216;Joint Employer Status&#8217; Under the Fair Labor Standards Act</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, June 22, 2026.</p>
<p>Utah Labor Commission. 2025. <a href="https://laborcommission.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Annual.Report25-copy-6-1.pdf"><em>Utah Labor Commission Annual Report: For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025</em></a>.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026a. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/low-wage-high-violation-industries">Low Wage, High Violation Industries</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026b. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/all-acts">All Acts</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026c. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/fair-labor-standards-act">Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026d. <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-2027-V2-09.pdf"><em>FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour Division</em></a>. Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>West Virginia Division of Labor (WV DOL). 2025. <a href="https://labor.wv.gov/index.php/media/261/download?inline"><em>FY 2025</em></a>.</p>
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	</item>
		<item>
		<title>A pro-worker AI policy playbook: Strengthening unemployment insurance and building a better safety net</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/a-pro-worker-ai-policy-playbook-strengthening-unemployment-insurance-and-building-a-better-safety-net/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mary Beech]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=326852</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Policymakers can act now to reduce the harm to workers of losing a job for any reason, by strengthening the safety net to support them until they find another.
&#160;]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/EPI-Workshop_WeBuild-Cobrand-2.png" width="430"></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #1372ae;">Key takeaways</span></strong></h4>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Policy choices will determine whether AI helps or harms workers.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Given that, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers to meet any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">To strengthen the unemployment insurance system that provides funds to workers who have lost their jobs, we should do the following:&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">increase the amounts and duration of unemployment benefits&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">center delivery on worker needs and power</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">build stronger data infrastructure to support workers while they are searching for new jobs</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Establishing a stand-alone unemployment program solely focused on AI raises important considerations. These include program design, stakeholder roles, eligibility criteria challenges, the resources needed to be effective, and vulnerability to reauthorization hurdles in Congress.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i>This is the first brief in a series exploring comprehensive federal policy recommendations around AI and workers.</i></p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid the seemingly endless predictions about AI, one point is essential to remember: How this plays out is not predetermined. Policy choices determine whether workers are helped or harmed by technological change. Even without AI, many workers already face harmful disruptions. Every year, 20 million workers are laid off in the U.S. economy<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>—due to employer mismanagement, once-profitable products becoming less so, offshoring, automation, and other factors. For individual workers, losing a job fo<em>r any reason</em> and for <em>any period of time</em> is traumatic and damaging in large part because we lack adequate social insurance programs to smooth those transitions.</p>
<p>As lawmakers debate how to best regulate AI deployment in our workplaces, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers in any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods. Decades of underinvestment, coupled with attacks on unions and other labor supports, have left workers without an adequate safety net.</p>
<p>We can improve our current systems to better provide livable benefits for workers who lose their jobs because of large-scale economic shocks that are not their fault and outside their control. We can also learn from other periods of workforce disruption—the COVID-19 pandemic, trade-related shocks, and the 2008 recession—about which policy choices were effective and which fell short.</p>
<p>When workers lose their jobs due to factors outside their control, they are considered “displaced” or “dislocated.” If they meet certain requirements, these workers are eligible for unemployment insurance (UI). To strengthen outcomes for workers, this brief will provide recommendations to:</p>
<ul>
<li>increase UI benefit amount and duration</li>
<li>expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
<li>align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
<li>center worker needs and power</li>
<li>strengthen data infrastructure to support workers</li>
</ul>
<p>These recommendations should be considered amid conversations focused on creating a stand-alone unemployment program geared toward AI-driven job loss. These discussions should weigh considerations and potential pitfalls, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>a blank slate for program design</li>
<li>relevant roles for key stakeholders</li>
<li>eligibility criteria challenges</li>
<li>the allocation of resources, time, and awareness to be effective</li>
<li>reauthorization vulnerability</li>
</ul>
<p>If policymakers are serious about easing the impact of AI-related job transitions for workers, the priority solution should be strengthening already existing social insurance programs to reduce the economic consequences of losing any job and to provide adequate support to workers while they seek other employment.</p>
<p>Changes to the current system or establishing a new program will require robust resources, including time, money, and expertise. This investment can help all workers, regardless of their risk of AI-based displacement. With a strong safety net, workers who lose their jobs can get the assistance they need, including the opportunity to find work that is well suited to their skills and experiences, and businesses are more inclined to improve their practices because they know workers aren&#8217;t trapped in their current jobs by economic necessity.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This moment presents an opportunity to strengthen the labor market for everyone and to ensure workers have the safety net they deserve.</p>
<h2>How to strengthen our current system</h2>
<p>Any effective approach to fixing the UI system must be comprehensive and should apply regardless of whether a worker is displaced due to AI. Numerous experts have weighed in on the best approach—including the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) Unemployment Insurance Taskforce,<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> the National Employment Law Project (NELP),<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a>,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> and The Century Foundation,<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> among others. This brief draws from those recommendations to strengthen outcomes for workers. Other important issues, such as modernizing UI system technology and infrastructure, fraud detection and prevention, and the use of AI in benefit determinations and delivery, also shape worker outcomes but fall outside this brief&#8217;s scope.</p>
<h3>Increase benefit amount and duration</h3>
<p>First and foremost, UI should be designed to ensure that workers can afford housing, food, and other essentials during their period of joblessness. The percentage of wages that UI replaces for workers has declined over time and has not kept pace with inflation.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In 2025, national average UI benefits replaced well under half of national average wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> This gap leaves workers across the income spectrum unable to maintain their standard of living and can push those whose earnings were close to the minimum wage into poverty.</p>
<h4>Ensure benefit amounts are consistent across states</h4>
<p>Benefit amounts vary across states. In Arizona and Florida, UI benefits replace less than 15% of average weekly wages.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> In some states, the weekly benefit amount is just $222 per week.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> While state variation in benefit amounts hurts all workers in stingy states, it weighs especially heavily on Black and Hispanic workers.</p>
<p>One recent study finds that differences in state rules cause the wage replacement rate for Black workers to be meaningfully lower than the rate for white workers, and that the discrepancies harm overall well-being.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> These disparities compound. Even among those likely eligible, Black workers are less likely than white workers to receive UI benefits—a gap explained primarily by structural factors, not a difference in eligibility, that has held steady for three decades.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>Wage replacement rates should be consistent across states. A recent federal bill has proposed changes to increase the replacement rate to 75% and provide additional weekly funding for dependents.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> Given growing wage inequality, the rate also should vary by income level. In one proposal, the lowest earners would receive benefits that represent 85% of their wages.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<h4>Extend the duration of benefits across states</h4>
<p>The duration of benefits also varies greatly from state to state. Until 15 years ago, eligible workers across the country had access to 26 weeks of benefits, a generally agreed-upon standard.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> After the Great Recession however, federal law barred states from cutting benefit amounts, so many states instead cut the duration of unemployment benefits to stabilize their trust funds and lower tax rates for employers.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Some states now only provide 12 weeks of benefits, a short bridge to find a new job well-matched to workers’ skills and experiences.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> A minimum of at least 26 weeks of benefits should be a uniform requirement across states.</p>
<p>Workers cannot currently depend on the Extended Benefits program, which was intended to provide support during economic downturns by providing additional weeks of benefits during periods of high and rising unemployment. The triggers for Extended Benefits have not been effective, leaving workers to wonder if they are available. In their absence, workers must rely on temporary programs funded by Congress, which depend on political priorities.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> More reliable triggers, higher wage replacement levels, and a longer duration of benefits would make the Extended Benefits program more effective.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<h3>Expand and standardize eligibility for benefits</h3>
<p>Only certain workers are eligible for UI, leaving others stranded without benefits if they lose their jobs. Eligibility criteria and the base period used to calculate benefits are set by state law, rather than federal statute. This state-by-state variation can make it difficult for workers to know whether they qualify for assistance and plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Generally, the group of workers ineligible for benefits includes independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and those who have exhausted their benefits. Some employers have incorrectly classified many workers as independent contractors, and this misclassification prevents those workers from requesting access to the UI benefits to which they would otherwise be legally entitled.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></p>
<p>UI should cover a broader range of workers, including part-time workers, independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and seasonal and temporary workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress tasked states with implementing new UI programs for gig and platform workers who fell outside of the usual verification system, creating significant challenges.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> Barring changes to account for the unique situation of these workers, these same issues will arise again.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> By incorporating these workers into the UI system now, instead of waiting for a crisis, future challenges can be mitigated.</p>
<p>Policymakers should also consider stronger presumptive eligibility standards, under which workers are presumed eligible for benefits and paid promptly, with the burden placed on employers or the state to prove otherwise. Lowering the barriers for workers to receive benefits could meaningfully increase uptake among workers who currently go without benefits.</p>
<h3>Align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</h3>
<p>All eligible workers should be able to access UI benefits if they want them. State UI programs are generally financed through employer experience rating: Employers pay more taxes when they lay off more workers who are eligible for UI.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Therefore, the system’s setup incentivizes employers to limit their tax liability by restricting eligibility for the program in different ways. This can include not hiring certain workers as employees, not proactively informing workers about their eligibility, attempting to reclassify workers as independent contractors, and other forms of suppressing UI program access.</p>
<p>A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that only about a quarter of workers who were unemployed in 2022 applied for benefits.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> Further, a recent survey found that 19% of recently unemployed workers encountered actions from an employer that were meant to deter them from applying, in addition to a quarter of all UI filers who said that their employer contested their benefits.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> Low-income workers more frequently reported employer contestations , and workers who reported contestations of their claims by employers were less likely to receive benefits and to experience greater material and psychological burdens during the filing process.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> There is a real opportunity to better align employer incentives to support workers in accessing UI benefits.</p>
<p>Presumptive eligibility, discussed above, would address some of these access barriers by shifting the burden of proof away from workers, but it would not resolve the underlying incentive employers have to minimize their tax liability. There have been many proposals for how to address this issue: broadening the tax base, payroll contributions from employees to UI, or increasing state taxes to fund programs.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Most basically, employers could pay taxes based on the total number of workers they lay off, not just those eligible for UI.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> These questions are tied to broader considerations about how to finance a more effective program.</p>
<h3>Center on worker needs and power</h3>
<p>The UI system should be structured around ensuring that workers have the support they need as they seek reemployment. This requires a real investment in active labor market policy, including communicating with workers and unions about their needs in order to align training and placement. Congress should allocate funds to revitalize the Employment Service in the U.S. Department of Labor, which once played a key role in supporting reemployment.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> For example, in a 1986 New Jersey pilot program, job search assistance measurably helped dislocated workers return to work sooner and increased their earnings.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> A well-resourced and staffed U.S. Employment Service can leverage state labor market information—frequently used by employers—to help job seekers find opportunities aligned with their skill sets.<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a></p>
<p>Worker organizations can also play an important role in the delivery of benefits, including facilitating training and connections to job search assistance.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> In 2022, unemployed people who were members of a union were twice as likely to apply for UI benefits, and among applicants, 30 percentage points more likely to receive those benefits.<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> This sizable gap suggests that when workers have organizational support navigating the UI system, they are far more likely to receive the benefits they are entitled to, reinforcing the case for involving worker organizations directly in UI outreach, filing assistance, and perhaps even delivery. Furthermore, unions routinely negotiate with employers, both in collective bargaining agreements and when bargaining before layoffs, to secure agreements that employers will not contest workers’ applications for UI benefits.</p>
<p>In some Northern European countries, unions are responsible for administering unemployment benefits, and scholars have found that this system leads to stronger unions and worker voice in the economy.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Policymakers in the United States should consider how unions and other worker organizations could deliver unemployment benefits to workers.</p>
<h3>Strengthen data infrastructure to improve outcomes</h3>
<p>State workforce agencies collect quarterly wage records from employers to facilitate UI administration to gauge eligibility for benefits as well as benefit levels. States share wage records with the federal Census Bureau, and these data are included in longitudinal data sets that can follow workers over time. These data are used for both research and the administration of other policies (such as facilitating child support payments or tracking the performance of job training programs). Wage records provide an important but limited set of information that varies by state. A growing number of states have expanded their wage records to include additional information such as job titles, total hours worked, and job location.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>State-level data are a valuable source of information about what is happening to workers, but the lack of standardization across states makes it difficult to gain a clearer picture of employment. To remedy this, lawmakers should create standardized requirements for enhanced wage records to analyze who is losing their job and where workers are finding new opportunities.</p>
<p>The enhanced information coming from states would be especially useful with the advent of AI since no single federal data source can reliably track how AI adoption is reshaping demand for specific occupations in real time or identify when firms are reducing jobs through attrition. Further, workers would benefit from better information about opportunities that align with their skill set.<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> Better integration with job posting data—including the National Labor Exchange—and reemployment systems would help workers navigate the job-search process.</p>
<h2>Considerations for a stand-alone program</h2>
<p>The UI system should be improved regardless of how AI affects employment and job opportunities. Additionally, some policymakers have suggested creating a stand-alone program geared toward AI-driven job loss. There is precedent for this approach. Congress has acted nine times since 1958 to create temporary, additional UI benefits, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> There is much to be learned from successes and challenges of these previous programs.</p>
<p>Some of these programs also included benefits or services beyond unemployment insurance for workers. For example, Trade Adjustment Assistance has, at various points, included relocation assistance, training programs, a health coverage tax credit, and wage insurance for older workers who took a lower-paying job.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> A new stand-alone program could similarly go beyond cash benefits, offering workers support to develop new skills, cover the costs of a transition, or find new opportunities.</p>
<h3>Blank slate for program design</h3>
<p>A new program can address the key structural issues with the current system discussed in the previous section. Any new program should be uniform across states so that benefit levels, duration, and eligibility are consistent for every worker regardless of where they live. A new program also presents the opportunity to build in the other improvements outlined above, including benefit levels set to a livable amount, expanded eligibility, and stronger data infrastructure. A new program could also adopt more fundamental changes to the claims process, such as the presumptive eligibility standards that Michigan moved toward during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a></p>
<p>As discussed in the worker power section, a new program should be explicitly structured around building worker power, for example, by involving worker organizations in program administration or benefit delivery. Further, a new program can focus on effective job placement by leveraging relationships between employers, unions, and other worker organizations.</p>
<p>Finally, a new program should also be designed to avoid UI&#8217;s employer-financing structure, which—as discussed—in most states, disincentivizes employers from making sure workers get the benefits they are due. Left unaddressed, that same structure would allow employers to game or underreport AI-related job loss in a new program.</p>
<h3>Relevant roles for key stakeholders</h3>
<p>A successful program requires effective coordination among stakeholders. As with UI and previous stand-alone programs, states would likely retain a central role in delivering benefits and services, given their existing infrastructure and more direct knowledge of local labor market conditions. Local agencies can provide labor market information to workers, worker organizations, and employers to facilitate job placement. Any program should carefully consider how to balance flexibility for states to tailor the program to meet local needs, while maintaining strong, uniform standards across states.</p>
<p>As discussed, worker organizations and unions can play a central role in program administration. Worker organizations can support workers in accessing relevant benefits and training opportunities, ensuring that worker needs and outcomes are central to programmatic strategy and implementation.</p>
<p>Employers bear significant responsibility for the program&#8217;s success. They are often the first to know a layoff is coming and should proactively connect workers to available services, for example, by supporting on-site services when requested by state or local Rapid Response teams. Employers can proactively share specific information about their talent and skills needs with labor agencies and worker organizations, and hire workers during or after relevant training.</p>
<h3>Eligibility criteria challenges</h3>
<p>Creating clear and consistent eligibility criteria will be a significant challenge in establishing a stand-alone program for workers affected by AI-related job displacement. For instance, a program to compensate Department of Energy workers harmed by nuclear materials has faced significant challenges determining eligibility, including the complexity of reconstructing historical exposure to nuclear materials to establish causation.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> Challenges in establishing causation have also been an enormous barrier to worker relief through the Trade Adjustment Assistance program.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>In another example, some pandemic unemployment assistance benefits are still hung up over eligibility disputes years later.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a> And from the start of the pandemic, there have been hotly contested debates about who should receive benefits.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> Moreover, concerns about fraud can also complicate eligibility determinations. In the wake of fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic, many states adopted stricter verification requirements to confirm eligibility.<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> A new program focused on AI-driven job loss would need to balance similar integrity concerns against the risk of preventing eligible workers from receiving the benefits they are due.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a></p>
<p>It is virtually impossible to systematically link job loss with AI adoption. In many instances, AI’s effects on a worker or industry may be indirect. For example, workers may lose their jobs in part due to AI adoption months or years earlier or because of broader economic disruption caused by AI’s impact on different industries. Even setting aside these implementation challenges, restricting eligibility to AI-driven job loss raises a separate concern: fairness. AI is not the only source of economic disruption. Global trade (including offshoring and outsourcing) and the green energy transition continue to displace workers across industries.</p>
<p>Other workers should be entitled to the same benefits as those directly displaced by AI. Drawing arbitrary boundaries around a single cause of job loss will create inequities, a risk compounded if states must independently interpret what counts as AI-driven job loss, therefore creating inconsistent standards nationwide.</p>
<h3>Resources, time, and awareness to be effective</h3>
<p>Standing up a new program will take significant time and resources. In addition to providing benefits, this includes making meaningful investment in technological systems and program administration, a particular challenge in light of years of underinvestment in modernizing UI systems.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Federal and state governments need adequate resources for user experience testing, efficient application determinations, coordination with relevant partners, data collection and analysis, and programmatic evaluation. The challenges of implementing relief programs during COVID-19 are instructive. Slow initial payments, overwhelming caseloads that strained public servants, technological breakdowns, and significant confusion about eligibility requirements demonstrated the need to proactively develop systems that can respond more nimbly in times of crisis.<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>Starting a new program also requires sustained public outreach, as new and stand-alone programs have historically struggled because of a lack of public familiarity. For example, over half of workers did not know they had access to emergency sick leave during COVID-19.<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> In another example, when the Reagan administration made changes to the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, applications plummeted, perhaps because many workers believed the program had been abolished.<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> Further, most workers did not know that other services including training, job counseling, and relocation assistance were available through the program.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a></p>
<p>A stand-alone program could also come at the expense of the existing UI system, which the vast majority of states say is underfunded.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a> From 1999 to 2019, federal funding for UI administration declined by 30% on an inflation-adjusted basis.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a> If policymakers decide to divert resources that would otherwise go to the existing UI system, the system’s further deterioration could harm workers served by that system in both the short and long term.</p>
<h3>Reauthorization vulnerability in Congress</h3>
<p>If an AI-specific UI program requires congressional reauthorization, it will be vulnerable to the difficulty of coordinating bipartisan action in Congress. Several previous programs have been subject to a sunset date, requiring periodic reauthorization to continue accepting new claims. Sunsets and other reauthorization requirements leave workers vulnerable to congressional inaction, especially if the impacts of AI on the workforce play out over an extended time period.</p>
<p>For an example of a program caught up in this type of reauthorization limbo, Trade Adjustment Assistance lapsed multiple times, including most recently in 2022, leaving additional workers without access to the program. Another example is The Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, which was created in 2008 and lapsed five times between 2010 and 2013, before expiring for good at the end of that year.<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a> This immediately cut off benefits for 1.3 million workers and for more than 3.6 million workers by the following September.<a href="#_note54" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='54' id="_ref54">54</a></p>
<h2>Financing and the path forward</h2>
<p>The current worker safety net has failed to expand enough to cover the basic realities of today&#8217;s labor market, and inadequate benefit levels, incomplete coverage, and diminished worker representation are persistent problems. Deployment of AI and related technologies in the workplace adds urgency to addressing these issues.</p>
<p>Implementing the recommendations in this issue brief requires a significant investment that should be considered, along with program parameters and design. As AI drives up stock prices and generates wealth for a select few, policymakers are considering how the public should share in these gains. Ideas include increasing taxes for wealthy individuals, closing the gap between labor and capital tax rates, taxing AI use, and taxing data center development, with the proceeds from these new taxes financing programs that redistribute income more broadly across the economy. Considerations for potential taxation approaches will be discussed in a forthcoming brief.</p>
<p>This moment requires big thinking and corresponding action. While AI drives changes to the economy, improvements to the worker safety net are long overdue. We can learn from the past to improve the labor market for everyone.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>Angela Hanks, Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Ben Zipperer, Gillian Gutierrez, Jacob Leibenluft, Janelle Jones, Josh Bivens, Michele Evermore, Patrick Oakford, Raj Nayak, and Stephen Nuñez.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Layoffs and Discharges: Total Nonfarm” [JTSLDL]. Accessed from <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>, October 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Patrick Oakford, Josh Bivens, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/"><em>Federal AI Legislation: An Evaluation of Existing Proposals and a Road Map Forward</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>Unemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Amy Traub, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/boosting-economic-resilience-seven-ways-states-can-support-more-workers-with-unemployment-insurance/"><em>Boosting Economic Resilience: Seven Ways States Can Support More Workers with Unemployment Insurance</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, July 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2023/11/Policy-Advocacy-Brief-Benefit-Amounts-11-2023.pdf."><em>Policy Advocacy Brief: Benefit Amounts</em></a>, November 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp">UI Replacement Rates Report</a>,” Benefit Accuracy Measurement data. Public data prepared by the OUI Division of Performance Management, Accessed August 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Megan Rivera, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/why-unemployment-insurance-alone-is-not-enough-in-the-ai-era/"><em>Why Unemployment Insurance Alone Is Not Enough in the AI Era</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Daphné Skandalis, Ioana Marinescu, and Maxim Massenkoff, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/racial-inequality-in-the-u-s-unemployment-insurance-system/"><em>Racial Inequality in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance System</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper, July 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Elira Kuka and Bryan A. Stuart, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29595"><em>Racial Inequality in Unemployment Insurance Receipt and Take-Up</em></a>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 29595, December 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Office of U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, “<a href="https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2025/07/16/bennet-wyden-beyer-reintroduce-bicameral-bill-to-overhaul-unemployment-insurance/">Bennet, Wyden, Beyer Reintroduce Bicameral Bill to Overhaul Unemployment Insurance</a>” (press release), July 16, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>U</em><em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf">U<em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez, Nina Mast, Margaret Poydock, and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Costly for Workers and Social Insurance Systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a>&nbsp;The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> Adam Grundy and Lucie Alleyne, “<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2025/07/nes-gig-economy.html">Nonemployer Businesses Are Key Contributors to Gig Activities and Economic Growth Nationally</a>” (blog post), U.S. Census Bureau website, July 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2023/most-unemployed-people-in-2022-did-not-apply-for-unemployment-insurance-benefits.htm">Most Unemployed People in 2022 Did Not Apply for Unemployment Insurance Benefits</a>” (blog post), <em>The Economics Daily (TED)</em>, April 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> Amy Traub, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Sanjay Pinto, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/the-unemployed-worker-study/"><em>The Unemployed Worker Study</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Alix Gould-Werth, &#8220;<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739410">Employer Contestations and Access to Unemployment Insurance: Implications for Benefit Receipt, Material Hardship, and Administrative Burden</a>,&#8221; <em>Social Service Review</em> 100, no. 1 (March 2026): 38–68.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Stephen A. Wandner, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17848/9781441680389"><em>Solving the Reemployment Puzzle: From Research to Policy</em></a>, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 2010.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “<a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/solidarity-insurance-reimagining-unemployment-insurance-as-a-platform-for-worker-power/">Solidarity Insurance: Reimagining Unemployment Insurance as a Platform for Worker Power.</a>” (policy brief), Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/uisup_03292023.htm">Characteristics of Unemployment Insurance Applicants and Benefit Recipients—2022</a>” (economic news release), March 29, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> Bruce Western, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691010335/between-class-and-market"><em>Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies</em></a> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Michele Evermore and Will Raderman, <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>T</em></a><a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>he Case for Enhanced Wage Records: Lessons from States</em></a>, National Academy of Social Insurance and The Niskanen Center, January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10336">The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation</a>,” Congressional Research Service, IF10336, updated January 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/05/NELP-Michele-Evermore-Testimony-Michigan-UI-Processing-5-21-2020.pdf">Michigan Unemployment Claims Processing</a>,” testimony on behalf of National Employment Law Project to a hearing before the Michigan Legislature, Joint Select Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 21, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> U.S. Government Accountability Office, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-74"><em>Energy Employees Compensation: DOL Generally Followed Its Procedures to Process Claims but Could Strengthen Some Internal Controls</em></a>, GAO-16-74, March 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Julie Kay, “<a href="https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/north-carolina-unemployment-benefits-still-delayed-five-years-after-pandemic/275-5b6093e8-1e0f-46bc-811a-d446166114a3">‘No Accountability’: Pandemic-Era Unemployment Benefit Delays Persist, 5 Years Later</a>,” <em>WCNC Charlotte</em>, April 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> Annelies Goger, Tracy Hadden Loh, and Nicole Bateman, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debunking-myths-about-covid-19-reliefs-unemployment-insurance-on-steroids/"><em>Debunking Myths About COVID-19 Relief&#8217;s ‘Unemployment Insurance on Steroids,’</em></a> The Brookings Institution, May 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/id-verification/"><em>ID Verification</em></a>, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, “<a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Testimony of Michele Evermore, Senior Fellow, National Academy of </a><a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Social Insurance</a>,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Work and Welfare Subcommittee, March 5, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Emma Jelliffe, Paul Pangburn, Stefan Pichler, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth, “<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2107670118">Awareness and Use of (Emergency) Sick Leave: US Employees&#8217; Unaddressed Sick Leave Needs in a Global Pandemic</a>,” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 118, no. 29 (July 20, 2021): e2107670118.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42444"><em>Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration</em></a>, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Product Number R42444, August 11, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='54'><a href="#_ref54" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note54">54. </a> U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee Democrats, <a href="https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/hot-topics/unemployment-insurance"><em>Unemployment Insurance</em></a> (fact sheet), 2014.</p>
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		<title>Who are the Asian American and Pacific Islander workers in commonly misclassified occupations?</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/who-are-the-asian-american-and-pacific-islander-workers-in-commonly-misclassified-occupations/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 15:51:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stevie Marvin, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=322192</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[In March, EPI published updated research highlighting the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified occupations.]]></description>
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<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>Misclassification of workers as independent contractors is a pervasive and widespread problem.&nbsp;AAPI workers are overrepresented in three of the 11 commonly misclassified occupations: manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides. Vietnamese, Bangladeshi, Filipino, Samoan, and other Pacific Islander workers are overrepresented within these occupations.</li>
<li>Groups with lower median hourly wages also have larger shares of their working populations in the 11 commonly misclassified occupations.</li>
<li>Federal protections against misclassification are limited and currently under attack by the Trump administration. The state and local landscape for curbing misclassification is varied, which leaves some workers less protected than others.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>In March, EPI published <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">updated research</a> highlighting the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified occupations. Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers were overrepresented in three of those occupations—manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides—relative to their share of the overall workforce.</p>
<p>Most federal, state, and local labor laws apply only to employees and not to independent contractors, so misclassification strips workers of key protections such as minimum wage laws or qualifying for employer-provided health insurance and retirement benefits. Additionally, both misclassified workers and social insurance funds lose out on income: the report conservatively estimates that for the three jobs in which AAPI workers are overrepresented, misclassification costs workers at least $7,000 annually and costs social insurance programs $600 to $800 per worker each year.</p>
<p>With the understanding that the umbrella term “AAPI” encompasses an immensely diverse population both in ethnic origin but also in <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/understanding-economic-disparities-within-the-aapi-community/">economic outcomes</a>, this piece goes beyond the narrow view that all AAPI workers are high-wage earners. Below, we provide more detail on which groups of AAPI workers are most likely to be employed in lower-wage commonly misclassified occupations.</p>
<p><span id="more-322192"></span></p>
<h4><strong>Disaggregated data shed light on particular AAPI communities that may be vulnerable to misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>Across all occupations, AAPI workers comprise approximately 8% of the total workforce. For three of the 11 occupations highlighted in the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">report</a>—manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides—AAPI workers make up 67%, 13%, and 10% of employment, respectively, according to Current Population Survey (CPS) data.</p>
<p><strong>Table 1 </strong>provides a detailed breakdown of the composition of the AAPI workforce for the three occupations in which AAPI workers are overrepresented. Here, we use the American Community Survey (ACS) as it offers detailed race definitions which the CPS does not offer due to sample size restrictions.</p>
<p>Asian Indian and Chinese populations combined make up over 40% of the working-age AAPI population, thus their relatively large shares of the AAPI workforce in these occupations are not surprising. However, several groups are disproportionately represented across these occupations compared with their share of the overall AAPI workforce.</p>
<p>For example, Bangladeshi workers make up 5.1% of AAPI workers employed as home health aides while only constituting 1.1% of the total AAPI workforce. Chinese workers represent almost half (47.7%) of AAPI home health aides while representing just over one-fifth of the overall AAPI workforce (20.9%). AAPI employment among manicurists and pedicurists is largely held by those of Vietnamese origin (71.4%).</p>
<p>Finally, a majority of AAPI personal care aides are either Filipino (32.8%) or Chinese (20.8%). Filipino workers, however, are overrepresented by twice their share of the overall workforce. While Samoans and other Pacific Islanders comprised a much smaller share of personal care aide employment, they are also overrepresented in this occupation by more than twice their share of the overall workforce.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-321030 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="321030" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/321030-35730-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure A </strong>provides a more comprehensive picture of the share of each detailed group employed across all 11 commonly misclassified occupations, revealing that smaller communities—often overlooked because of their size relative to the aggregate AAPI workforce—may be among the most vulnerable to misclassification. Workers belonging to seven of those groups are more likely than the average U.S. worker to be employed in one of those occupations. Almost 20% of Vietnamese workers are employed in one of those occupations, with over half concentrated as manicurists and pedicurists.</p>
<p>Samoan, Hawaiian, and other Pacific Islanders have the next highest shares working in the 11 occupations, making up 15% or more of their total working-age population. These groups also <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/examining-the-economic-impact-of-language-proficiency-on-aapi-populations/">earn lower median hourly wages</a> than the national median and the aggregate AAPI median hourly wage. Their disproportionate representation in commonly misclassified occupations further exposes these workers to wage suppression due to misclassification.</p>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-4tg0g" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Share of workers in 11 commonly misclassified occupations by detailed group, 2024" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/4tg0g/3/" height="901" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Stacked Bars" data-external='1'></iframe><script type="text/javascript">(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();</script></p>
<h4><strong>Misclassification enforcement varies by state—meaning different AAPI populations can be disproportionately impacted</strong></h4>
<p>Federal protections from misclassification are limited and are currently under attack by the Trump administration, which has <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/">proposed a rule</a> to weaken standards to determine worker classification under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Protection Act. The proposed rule narrows the definition of who is a covered employee under these statutes, encouraging employer schemes to reclassify their employees as independent contractors to evade those obligations.</p>
<p>Broadly, the Trump administration has been <a href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">actively dismantling long-standing federal worker protections</a>, leaving states to bear the responsibility of ensuring workers are given rights and protections and that they can exercise them. For most states, labor and employment protections only apply to workers classified as employees, meaning workers misclassified as independent contractors are denied their <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/">legal rights and protections</a>.</p>
<p>EPI&#8217;s 2026 misclassification report outlines <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/#epi-toc-10">state and federal policy recommendations</a> that ensure proper enforcement mechanisms to curb misclassification. One of the recommendations includes implementing the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/">ABC test</a>. Unlike the six-part “economic reality” test or the “common law” test, the ABC test presumes that a worker is an employee unless they can demonstrate they are an independent contractor based on three criteria. Placing the onus on the employer to determine the employment status of a worker provides protections against misclassification and extends proper protections to workers. Many states have adopted the ABC test for unemployment insurance programs and, to a lesser extent, for <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R46765">wage and hour orders and other employment applications</a>.</p>
<p>As shown in <strong>Figure B</strong>, The AAPI population is highly concentrated across a handful of states. Almost half of the prime-age working Asian population is concentrated in California, New York, and Texas, and a majority of the Pacific Islander population resides in California, Hawaii, and Washington. Overall, <a href="https://asianresourcehub.org/demographics/">21 states have significant numbers of AAPI residents</a>, and some are home to large shares of specific AAPI communities. For example, the Hmong community in Minnesota and the Burmese community in Indiana are concentrated in states that have smaller total AAPI populations.</p>
<p>The current landscape for state policy protections against misclassification is quite varied. For example, among the states with the largest AAPI populations, California is the only state to adopt the ABC test for both unemployment insurance and employment law, although certain occupations are <a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm">exempt</a> from the test—<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">including app-based drivers</a>. California also institutes <a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm">penalties for misclassifying a worker</a>, which can include restitution payments and, if the misclassification was willful, a penalty between $5,000 to $25,000 per violation.</p>
<p>Texas, on the other hand, has significantly less state enforcement. Apart from using the <a href="https://www.twc.texas.gov/programs/unemployment-tax/classifying-employees-independent-contractors">common law test</a> for its unemployment insurance program and <a href="https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/?tab=1&amp;code=LA&amp;chapter=LA.406&amp;artSec=406.141">providing a definition</a> of an independent contractor for workers’ compensation, Texas mainly relies on federal law for classifying workers as employees. In the last 15 years, Texas lawmakers have introduced several bills that would create penalties for misclassifying workers in the construction industry, but all have <a href="https://capitol.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=83R&amp;Bill=HB1925">stalled or failed</a>.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-321118 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="321118" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/321118-35733-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong>Comprehensive protections are needed to protect workers from misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>AAPI workers are facing multi-pronged attacks from the Trump administration through the degradation of federal protections for workers, immigration, and equity. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">Occupational segregation</a> and other labor market disparities lead women, people of color, and immigrants to be disproportionately represented in occupations that are commonly misclassified. These factors—in addition to historical and current geopolitical relations that shape the flow of labor to the U.S., immigration and citizenship status, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/examining-the-economic-impact-of-language-proficiency-on-aapi-populations/">English language proficiency</a>—can contribute to the concentration of AAPI workers in these occupations. Disaggregated data further identify which specific AAPI communities are overrepresented, revealing that smaller, less economically secure groups are often most exposed to the costs of misclassification. Strong <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/#epi-toc-10">policies</a> at the federal, state, and local levels are needed to combat misclassification and to ensure workers can exercise their rights.</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 17:12:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa, Ron Hira]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=322162</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via&#160;FederalRegister.gov at Brian D. Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Employment and Training Department of Room 200 Constitution Avenue Washington, DC RE: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DOL Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via&nbsp;FederalRegister.gov at </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals"><em>https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals</em></a></p>
<p>Brian D. Pasternak,<br />
Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Certification<br />
Employment and Training Administration<br />
Department of Labor<br />
Room N-5311<br />
200 Constitution Avenue NW<br />
Washington, DC 20210</p>
<p><strong>RE:</strong> <strong>Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals"><strong><em>Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States</em></strong></a><strong>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DOL Docket No. ETA-2026-0001, RIN 1205-AC30 (March 27, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>Dear Brian Pasternak:</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the updated four-tiered wage structure for H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant workers and DOL permanent labor certifications for employment-based permanent immigrant visas (i.e. green cards) in the second and third employment-based preference categories (EB-2 and EB-3). EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the H-1B program and other temporary work visa programs and green cards. EPI has published extensively on H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuse of H-1B and other visa programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>EPI generally supports the main substance of the NPRM and believes it is an improvement as compared to the status quo for the current four-tiered wage structure for H-1B, and will also improve H-1B1 and E-3 nonimmigrant visas, and permanent labor certifications in EB-2 and EB-3, because the NPRM will make incremental progress towards ensuring that the wages of U.S. workers are safeguarded and that the Labor Condition Application (LCA) and PERM programs are not hijacked by employers as a loophole to underpay migrant workers according to U.S. wage standards. The proposal will also help disincentivize firms from using H-1B visas as a primary tool to outsource professional jobs and send them overseas.</p>
<p>However, as we will detail in this comment, we believe DOL should go beyond what the NPRM proposes by setting the wage floor—i.e. the Level I wage—at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile so that no H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, or EB-3 jobs are ever certified at a wage that is below the local median wage for the occupation. If DOL implements such a rule in the final version of the regulation, the rule would address a major critique EPI has long held about the program, and which Members of Congress from both major parties have attempted to address through repeatedly proposed legislation that was first introduced nearly two decades ago.</p>
<p>It must also be noted at the outset of these comments that recent actions taken by DOL with respect to wages for migrant workers in temporary work visa programs have been inconsistent and confusing. While DOL is considering action proposed in this NPRM that will raise wage rates closer to true market rates for migrant workers in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, as well as those with labor certifications for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards, it is important to note that in October of 2025, DOL issued a new wage rule for the H-2A program that will cut wages dramatically for the migrant farmworkers in that program and unfairly charge them for lodging<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a>—which, as EPI has estimated—will lead to a pay cut of roughly $2 billion for H-2A farmworkers and $3 billion for U.S. farmworkers per year.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> DOL should issue regulations that lead to improved labor standards and fair wages for all work visa programs, and not treat workers differently based on their education levels, occupations, and nationalities. All temporary migrant workers deserve to be paid fairly for their work, and no work visa programs should operate as loopholes that allow employers to legally underpay migrant workers.</p>
<h2>The NPRM is an improvement on the status quo but DOL should amend the proposal to better protect workers</h2>
<p>In general, the NPRM improves upon the current wage structure but should be further enhanced to better protect workers and align the program with congressional intent and the goals of the H-1B statute. The principal change made by the NPRM is to update the four prevailing wage levels required in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs—temporary work visa programs for college-educated migrant workers—setting levels at higher percentiles in the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) survey distribution of wages, in order to more adequately reflect market wage rates in the U.S. labor market. The NPRM also applies the new wage rates/percentiles to the permanent labor certification requirements for employment-based (EB) green cards in the EB-2 and EB-3 preference categories (sometimes referred to as the PERM process).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a></p>
<p>The current and newly proposed wage level percentiles are as follows:</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-322164 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322164" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322164-35778-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>As we have detailed in published research,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> the two lowest wage levels in the current wage computation method are below the local median wage according to the occupation and local area based on DOL wage survey data in the OEWS, allowing employers to undercut U.S. wage standards. The NPRM sets the lowest wage level at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, previously the Level II wage, thereby continuing to permit employers to pay H-1B workers at below-market wage rates—but not at the absurdly low levels allowed by the current Level I wage at the 17<sup>th</sup> percentile.</p>
<p>DOL’s faulty prevailing wage computation has cost foreign-born workers at least $6.56 billion annually (see NPRM Exhibit 1). Even that is likely to be a serious underestimate for two reasons. First, it does not account for the losses suffered by U.S. workers and students who have had their wages, job opportunities, and career development suppressed and undermined as a result of the current wage methodology. Second, it does not estimate the costs incurred due to foreign-born workers’ weakened bargaining power vis-à-vis their employment through nonimmigrant visa programs. Employers exert much more control over visa workers than U.S. workers and permanent residents. Foreign-born workers on nonimmigrant visas have less opportunity to, and are far less likely to, switch jobs. Switching jobs, or the threat of switching jobs, is fundamental to any worker’s ability to demand higher wages and better working conditions. Professor George Borjas estimates that, in fiscal year (FY) 2024, visa holders had an annual separation rate of 9.4%, less than half of comparable U.S. workers.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Workers also face dire circumstances should they be terminated. They must find a new job within 60 days or else leave the United States. All these conditions place foreign-born workers in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs in a much weaker position than similarly situated U.S. counterparts when bargaining for wages and working conditions. Simply put, foreign-born visa workers have fewer employment rights than U.S. citizens and permanent residents, and employers rationally take advantage of their relatively weak position when setting employment terms. Further, the agency has never enforced the Labor Condition Application’s (LCA) <em>Working Conditions</em> attestation, where employers promise to “not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed,” so employers disregard it.</p>
<p>In addition, the ability of H-1B workers to become lawful permanent residents and remain in the United States is entirely up to the whims of their employers. Even after working for an employer for six years in H-1B status, the employer has the power to decide if an H-1B worker can remain in the country—in many cases after an H-1B worker has established firm roots in the United States. That power keeps H-1B workers from complaining and asserting their employment rights. That leaves H-1B workers in a difficult position where they might decide, rationally, to abandon any demands for higher wages and better working conditions in exchange for the possibility of being sponsored for lawful permanent residence.</p>
<p>Prevailing wages must be raised sufficiently to compensate for this government-created labor market distortion, to protect both foreign-born workers with nonimmigrant visas and U.S. workers who already reside in the United States.&nbsp;</p>
<p>DOL’s proposal to increase the wage-level percentiles is the best approach. It is straightforward and understandable to implement. The effects are easily modeled. Employers can respond to it predictably and effectively. It will improve the quality and skill mix of the pool of workers who are issued visas, pay those workers fairer salaries, and have fewer adverse impacts on the domestic workforce and labor supply. Recent results reported by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), from the fiscal year (FY) 2027 H-1B lottery, the first to use the new wage-level weighting process, show that a large majority of H-1B registrations selected met at least the 34th percentile threshold, 82%, while also increasing the share of F-1 advanced degree graduates selected from 57% to 71.5%.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> The latter demonstrates that concerns about this proposal shutting off the foreign student pipeline are overblown and misguided.</p>
<p>However, as noted above, the increases don’t go far enough. We believe that the Level I wage should be set no lower than the median (50th percentile) to effectively adjust for the non-compensated effects of limited job-switching, an absent or ineffective labor market test, weaker bargaining position, and non-enforcement of the actual wage requirement. Recent college graduates, especially those earning degrees in computer science and computer engineering, are facing the highest unemployment rates amongst all majors according to analysis by the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and the worst job market in recent memory according to dozens of media accounts.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a><a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> Most analysts and executives predict that artificial intelligence (AI) will only make that labor market segment even worse. Major firms have laid off thousands of workers, citing AI the reason they need fewer workers. Many of those same firms employ thousands of H-1B workers. AI is predicted to reduce labor demand especially of recent graduates, the very U.S. workers competing for Level I jobs. The rules should ensure that workers assigned at Level I wages have truly special skills and will not undercut opportunities for recent university graduates.</p>
<h2>Analysis of the NPRM: “Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States”</h2>
<h3><strong>1. </strong><strong>Raising wages for H-1B workers and permanent labor certifications will benefit migrant workers and protect wage standards for U.S. workers</strong></h3>
<p>For years, H-1B employers have been allowed to pay their H-1B workers at wage rates that do not reflect local market rates, by having an option to pay them at the two lowest permitted wage levels. Our 2020 report discusses the available data, the mechanics of the current rule, and why it is important to modify the H-1B wage levels to adequately reflect market wages and ensure that H-1B workers are paid fairly, and to preserve U.S. wage standards.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> In the report, we recommend that DOL prohibit any H-1B job from being certified at a wage that is below the local median for the occupation and region. In that respect, by proposing to set the lowest wage level (Level I) at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, DOL’s NPRM fails to do enough to protect wage standards in H-1B jobs. In the report we also recommend that DOL prohibit downward pressure on wages at the national level by requiring that every H-1B job be certified at a wage that is no lower than the national median wage for the occupation.</p>
<p>Many commentators on this NPRM, especially from the business community, including universities, are likely to claim that raising wages for migrant workers and safeguarding U.S. wage standards will harm the U.S. economy. When the misleading rhetoric is stripped away, the employers who oppose higher wage percentiles for H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visas, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards, are simply claiming, in essence, that employers will only hire workers in the LCA and PERM programs if they are underpaid relative to similarly situated U.S. workers, and portray higher wages as an obstacle to migration or to the hiring of adequate talent that will prevent them from being successful and innovating.</p>
<p>Accepting this argument leads to a race to the bottom in terms of labor standards and excuses the co-optation of the immigration system in order to pad corporate profits. And such a line of argumentation is not supported by the available evidence. In fact, many advocates on all sides of the current H-1B debate now agree that the current H-1B wage rules are undercutting U.S. wage standards and should be updated. Even previous staunch defenders of the status quo, such as those representing or funded by the tech industry, as well as representatives of major employer associations, now admit that U.S. wages and U.S. workers are being undercut via the current prevailing wage rule.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>Adequate labor standards are never a barrier to migration or economic success—instead, they are a prerequisite to fair treatment for the migrant workers who are recruited by employers into the U.S. labor market and similarly situated U.S. workers.</p>
<p>Under the current rule, the wages of H-1B workers are being kept artificially low. The higher wage levels in DOL’s NPRM are more reasonable and closer to reflecting market wages in particular occupations and specific geographic regions. In other words, DOL’s proposal will push wage levels <em>toward</em> market wages, meaning it will <em>increase </em>labor market efficiency. It will also improve the quality and skill mix of the pool of foreign-born workers who are hired, increasing the productivity and innovation spillovers that skilled immigration promises.</p>
<h3><strong>2. </strong><strong>DOL should raise the wage percentiles so that Level I is set no lower than the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of total wages surveyed in an occupation and region and prohibit any LCA or PERM approval for a wage that is lower than the national average for the occupation</strong></h3>
<p>The purpose of the H-1B and related programs is to “help employers who cannot otherwise obtain needed business skills and abilities from the U.S. workforce.”<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a>&nbsp;Specialized skills should command high wages; such skills are typically a function of inherent capability, education level, and experience. It would be reasonable to expect that these workers should receive wages higher than the local median wage. One would therefore expect most H-1B positions to be assigned as Level IV (the only current wage level above the median), but as DOL and USCIS data show, H-1B employers as a whole assign only a very small minority of H-1B positions as Level IV, usually roughly 15% or less in recent fiscal years, while as DOL notes in the NPRM, 63% of H-1B positions were assigned at Levels I and II. For all LCA programs, DOL notes in the NPRM that in FY 2024, 16% of all LCA positions were certified at Level IV. At the USCIS petition level, Level IV wages are even less common: data disclosed by USCIS shows that in 2019 and 2020, only 4% of approved petitions for new employment under the regular cap were assigned at Level IV and only 2% of approved new H-1B petitions under the advanced degree exemption cap were assigned at Level IV.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> We also know from more recent data from DHS that the five-year average of H-1B registrations at Level IV was just 5% over the FY 2020 to 2024 period.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<p>The data presented in our reports over the past decade and a half and more recently, the data reported by USCIS on the distribution of H-1B petitions by wage level, all point to the obvious fact that nearly all H-1B employers, but especially the largest employers, use the H-1B program&nbsp;<em>either</em>&nbsp;to hire relatively lower-wage workers (relative to the wages paid to other workers in their occupation) who possess ordinary skills&nbsp;<em>or</em>&nbsp;to hire skilled workers and pay them less than the true market value of their work. Either possibility raises important policy questions about the use and allocation of H-1B visas.</p>
<p>By setting two of the H-1B prevailing wage levels so low relative to the median and not requiring that firms pay at least market wages to H-1B workers, DOL has incentivized firms to earn extraordinary profits by legally hiring much-lower-paid H-1B workers instead of workers earning at least the local median wage. The fact that firms earn those profits through poorly crafted wage rules and by underpaying H-1B workers—instead of by offering a better or more innovative product or service—means DOL has, in effect, made wage arbitrage a feature of the H-1B program. And as the wage-level data we have reported on and cited here clearly shows, nearly all H-1B employers are exploiting these H-1B wage rules in order to pay below-median wages.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> We believe the evidence is clear that these firms are not using the H-1B program sparingly to hire truly specialized workers, nor are they using it only when U.S. workers are unavailable. Given the business models and occupations, it is likely that the H-1B1 and E-3 programs are being abused similarly.</p>
<p>So how should DOL set a wage rule that guards against this and complies with the statutory requirement to prevent adverse effects on wages and working conditions?</p>
<p>The existing statutory language that sets out the H-1B prevailing wage requires four H-1B wage levels, but it does not prescribe specific percentiles, and no law requires DOL to set any of these prevailing wage levels below the local median wage. To ensure that H-1B workers possess specialized skills and are fairly paid, and to protect local wage standards and eliminate wage arbitrage as a feature of the H-1B program, <strong>DOL should issue a final rule that sets the lowest (Level I) wage for the LCA programs and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards at the 50th percentile for the occupation and local area, at least, and require that wage offers to workers in the LCA and EB-2 and EB-3 programs never be lower than the national median wage for the occupation, in order to prevent downward pressure on wages nationwide. </strong></p>
<p>Requiring and enforcing above-median wages for H-1B and other LCA and PERM program workers would disincentivize the hiring of workers with nonimmigrant visas and green cards as a money-saving exercise, ensuring that companies will use the program as intended—i.e., to bring in workers who have special skills—instead of using them as a way to hire underpaid indentured workers for jobs that require at least a college degree.</p>
<h3><strong>3. </strong><strong>DOL should set the updated wage percentiles at the 50<sup>th</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles according to the total surveyed wages for the occupation and local area in the OEWS</strong></h3>
<p>As noted and discussed above, the lowest wage level, Level I, should be set no lower than at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile. Instead of the proposed four wage levels in the NPRM, DOL should set the lowest wage level, Level I, at the median wage (at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile), Level II at the 62<sup>nd</sup> percentile, Level III at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, and Level IV at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile—according to the overall distribution of OEWS wages for each occupation and region. (See table below.)</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-322168 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322168" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322168-35780-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>These levels would ensure that no LCA or EB-2 or EB-3 positions are certified at a wage that is below the overall local median wage for an occupation, which in turn will prevent downward pressure on U.S. wage rates in such occupations. An additional benefit of using the 50<sup>th</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, as DOL points out, is “that they are close to dividing the upper half of the distribution equally.”<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a></p>
<h3><strong>4. </strong><strong>DOL’s experience benchmarking proposal is inferior to the NPRM’s core proposal on wage levels and should not be implemented</strong></h3>
<p>The NPRM requests comments on ‘experience benchmarking’ as an alternative computational method to the core proposal of Level I at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, Level II at the 52<sup>nd</sup>, Level III at the 70<sup>th</sup>, and Level IV at the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile, based on the overall OEWS wages by occupation and region. <strong>We believe that this experience benchmarking alternative is significantly inferior to the core proposal and urge DOL to reject it for four main reasons.</strong> First, the methodological description is insufficient to evaluate, with just two pages of text. This is especially troublesome since it is an entirely novel method of setting prevailing wages that has never been rigorously tested or examined. It will impact literally millions of workers and hundreds of thousands of employers. To our knowledge, Mincer equations have never been used to this large an extent for setting wages in any government program. Second, the data necessary to calculate prevailing wages do not exist; they must be synthesized through estimation procedures after marrying two distinct surveys that were never designed for these purposes. Are the sample sizes sufficient? There’s no exploration of these potential flaws in the NPRM. Third, the method biases against women. The method does not directly measure experience; instead, it estimates experience by the age of the candidate. Women are more likely than men to have gaps in their labor force participation. The agency does not provide a method for adjusting the calculations based on gender. Fourth, this method would surely fuel age discrimination by allowing firms to legally pay younger H-1B workers less than U.S. workers doing the same job. Professor Norman Matloff, one of the leading scholars of the H-1B program, has repeatedly expressed concerns that firms prefer to hire H-1B workers because they are younger, and therefore lower-paid, than equivalent Americans.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> The government would be endorsing such behavior by adopting experience benchmarking.</p>
<p>More broadly, adopting benchmarking to set prevailing wages rests on the assumption that labor markets are highly segregated by age and educational attainment. Is it true that a 28-year-old does not compete with a 35-year-old? Is it true that someone with a master’s degree does not compete with someone with a bachelor’s degree? The DOL provides no evidence to test this hypothesis with a single occupation or example, let alone whether it would hold across the roughly 400 occupations eligible for visa programs covered by this NPRM.</p>
<p>The example provided in the NPRM, of an accountant working in Dayton, Ohio, illustrates the difficulty for anyone to assess the accuracy of the procedure.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">If ACS data and Mincer wage equation estimated that U.S. accountants with 10 years of experience and a master’s degree typically earn 20 percent more than the median accountant nationwide, the Experienced Benchmarked ratio for that education-experience combination in accounting would be expressed as a wage premia factor of 1.2. Then, to compute the Level I prevailing wage for an employer seeking visa labor certification to employ an alien worker as an accountant in Dayton, Ohio, with 10 years of experience and a master’s degree, the Department would take the OEWS 50th percentile for accountants in the Dayton MSA (currently $78,710) and multiply it by 1.2, yielding an experience-benchmarked Level I prevailing wage of $94,452. The Level II prevailing wage would apply the same 1.2 ratio to the OEWS 62nd percentile; Level III to the 75th percentile; and Level IV to the 90th percentile.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>This hypothetical example presents several shortcomings.</p>
<p>First, we encounter problems with identifying the data. The NPRM reports the OEWS 50<sup>th</sup> percentile wage in Dayton MSA of $78,710. We are unable to validate this wage using the OFLC Wage Search page.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a> The OEWS 50<sup>th</sup> percentile wage (current Level III) for the occupation is shown below, with the results listed for three different years of data available in the database:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Occupations: <em>SOC 13-2011.00 – Accountants and Auditors<br />
</em>Location: <em>Dayton OH BLS Areas Montgomery County<br />
</em>Series: <em>All Industries</em></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>7/2023-6/2024 Level III Wage: <strong>$77,251.00<br />
</strong></em><em>7/2024-6/2025 Level III Wage: <strong>$82,576.00<br />
</strong></em><em>7/2025-6/2026 Level III Wage: <strong>$86,403.00</strong></em></p>
<p>Further, based on the absence of data and sparse description of the methodology, there’s no way for us, or anyone else, to test or examine the method used to calculate the wage premia/discount using the Mincer equations. The “hypothetical” example claims a premia of 20%, but it is unclear whether this result comes from real calculation or if it’s a fabrication created to illustrate a point. If it is the latter, that raises serious questions about the agency’s ability to implement experience benchmarking across hundreds of occupations, thousands of locations, four skill levels, and a half-dozen educational levels.</p>
<p>More importantly, is the example, and its wage outcomes, representative of the universe of covered workers and the U.S. workers they compete with? The evidence shows that this hypothetical example is neither typical of H-1B workers nor their U.S. counterparts. The description of experience benchmarking does not investigate its implications, but such testing is fundamental to validating the method across occupations, locations, and skill levels. The hypothetical worker has 10 years of experience, which, if they had no gaps in labor force participation, would put them at 34 years old. A 34-year-old worker is older than most new H-1B workers approved for initial employment, ranking near the 68<sup>th</sup> percentile by age.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> We also know that this worker is not typical of U.S. accountants. Most practicing accountants hold no more than a bachelor’s degree, 59%, and are older—with a median age of 45—than this candidate.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> The example raises many more questions than it answers.</p>
<p>The median age of all H-1B workers approved for initial employment is approximately 31, whereas the median age of an American worker in an H-1B eligible occupation is approximately 40, even in STEM occupations.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> H-1B workers are generally significantly younger than the typical U.S. worker with whom they compete. Experience benchmarking would favor H-1B workers by offering them a significant wage discount, based on the Mincer method, over the U.S. workers with whom they compete. The upshot is that experience benchmarking would surely fuel age discrimination in these labor markets.</p>
<p>It is likely that experience benchmarking would yield substantial wage discounts (premia ratios &lt;1.0) for H-1B workers, compared with the NPRM’s core approach. But we simply do not know because DOL has not compared the wage outcomes between experience benchmarking and raising the wage level percentiles. DOL has not published experience benchmarking wage tables for every occupation, geography, skill level, experience, and education.</p>
<p>One think tank, the Institute for Progress (IFP), a supporter of the experience benchmarking alternative, attempted to simulate the method using FY 2024 approved petitions and found that experience benchmarking wages for most H-1B workers are substantially lower than the NPRM’s core proposal. <strong>Contrary to IFP, we believe experience benchmarking should be rejected, in part for that reason.</strong> See its report, specifically the scatterplot chart “Blind Benchmarking misses underpaid H-1B workers” on page 20, where the number of red dots (i.e., experience benchmarking yields a lower prevailing wage than NPRM core proposal) far outnumbers the green dots (i.e., experience benchmarking yields a higher prevailing wage than NPRM core proposal).<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Even these analysts admit they don’t know whether their calculations are consistent with DOL’s sparse description of experience benchmarking. If this think tank’s analysis is roughly correct or on the right track, then experience benchmarking will yield much lower prevailing wages than the core NPRM proposal. If this is true, then the experience benchmarking method undermines the goals of this rulemaking.</p>
<p>In its justification for considering experience benchmarking, the NPRM states that “the methodology employed under the current rule may allow positions to be classified at wage levels that are less comparable to the actual education and experience of the alien worker.” Experience benchmarking, on the other hand, would “address this limitation by comparing the sponsored alien worker’s wage to the wages earned by U.S. workers with comparable education and experience…”<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a></p>
<p>But elsewhere, the NPRM undermines the case for experience benchmarking by noting that educational attainment is often a poor determinant of wages:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">an examination of the top end of the wage distribution within the H–1B program shows that, for H–1B nonimmigrants with graduate and bachelor’s degrees, the association between education and income level begins to break down to some extent. An analysis of the highest earners within the H–1B program reveals that H–1B workers—particularly those with bachelor’s and graduate degrees—can be among the most skilled and capable in their fields. Interestingly, at this top end of the wage distribution, the typical link between education level and income begins to weaken. <em>Among the most highly compensated H–1B workers, the higher the income level, the more likely the alien worker only has a bachelor’s degree.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> </em>(Emphasis added.)</p>
<p>While skill-level misclassification is a major problem, experience benchmarking is the wrong solution because it creates new, unnecessary loopholes. Instead, as we describe below, we recommend that you require employers document their Prevailing Wage Determination (PWD) aligned with the National Prevailing Wage Center (NPWC) guidance and provide it for inspection.</p>
<p>The NPRM’s core proposal—the 34<sup>th</sup>, 52<sup>nd</sup>, 70<sup>th</sup>, and 88<sup>th</sup> percentiles based on the overall OEWS wages by occupation and region—coupled with skill classification oversight and accountability, better achieves the program goals than the experience benchmarking proposal discussed in the NPRM.</p>
<h3><strong>5. </strong><strong>DOL should calculate an additional amount of compensation based on available data on the cost of benefits for workers in private industry and add a reasonable amount to the required prevailing wage</strong></h3>
<p>While we believe utilizing the OEWS data set and wage percentiles within the distribution is reasonable and preferable to other data sources and methods, the OEWS falls very short in terms of providing a holistic and realistic picture of what U.S. workers earn in H-1B occupations, as well as those in other LCA programs and PERM programs, by virtue of not including fringe benefits. We urge that DOL also calculate an additional amount of compensation based on available data on the cost of benefits for workers in private industry. If employers do not have to provide fringe benefits to the college-educated migrant workers they recruit or reasonable compensation that accounts for those fringe benefits, that will result in employers underpaying or undercompensating workers with visas vis-à-vis their U.S. worker counterparts, thereby causing adverse effects on workers in occupations covered by H-1B and the other LCA programs. The fissuring of the U.S. workforce has been abetted in part by employers practicing benefits’ arbitrage—in other words, employers seeking a workforce they do not need to provide benefits for—the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, and EB-3 program should not facilitate it.</p>
<p>Davis Bacon and Service Contract Act wage determinations—which are both valid wage sources for determining H-1B wage rates under current H-1B rules—include an additional hourly monetary value that is owed to the worker in “fringe benefits.” Under both Acts, the employer must pay the fringe benefits either in the form of a permissible fringe benefit listed by the applicable Act, or any combination of benefits thereof, or with an equivalent cash payment.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> The lack of any fringe benefits in OEWS prevailing wage determinations<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> constitutes a severe deficiency in the OEWS wage data that conflicts with and undermines the statutory requirement that the H-1B prevailing wage will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Reliance on the OEWS to determine prevailing wages—without an adjustment for fringe benefits—is not an adequate method to set prevailing wages for LCA and PERM programs. If the prevailing wages and benefits for a particular occupation in a particular Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) are, for example, $30 per hour plus $10 per hour in leave, pension, and health benefit costs, but DOL determines the prevailing wage to be simply $30, U.S. workers will be adversely impacted.&nbsp;Employers will be encouraged to hire H-1B workers instead of U.S. workers, saving themselves $10 in benefit costs per hour and putting downward pressure on the locally prevailing compensation.&nbsp;Hiring H-1B workers at $30 an hour for example, with no benefits, would allow employers to underprice labor by 30%—which is the average benefit share of total compensation costs for private industry workers<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a>—and it could encourage employers to replace U.S. workers with H-1B workers, or hire H-1B workers instead of U.S. workers, since employers are not required to recruit and hire U.S. workers before hiring H-1B workers. H-1B workers and those employed through other LCA programs cannot be expected to complain about this or have the bargaining power to negotiate adequate fringe benefits, because their employers control and have near-total power over their immigration status, and some workers will be also willing to accept the lower compensation, because it will likely be far more than they could earn in their country of origin.</p>
<p>BLS already collects the necessary data to determine the appropriate amount of fringe benefits that should be required as a supplement to the OEWS wages used to set a prevailing wage.&nbsp;The <em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation</em> (ECEC) report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) “provides the average employer cost for wages and salaries as well as benefits per employee hour worked” for workers in the civilian economy.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> The ECEC reports the total average wages and benefits paid by employers and lists these data as they correspond to broad occupational employment categories. These data are also differentiated according to the average amount paid for the major categories of fringe benefits: paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings and legally required benefits. The ECEC also reports the average total compensation, wages and salaries, and total costs of fringe benefits paid by employers, broken down by geographic region, census division, and locality.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a></p>
<p>Using the aforementioned data sets from the ECEC, DOL can determine the appropriate level of fringe benefits that must be offered and paid to LCA and PERM program workers. The ECEC provides data on health and retirement benefits, and wages and wage-related pay such as paid leave and supplemental pay. The wages reflected in the OEWS survey capture the wages and wage-related parts of total compensation. Employers paying wages will already be paying the ‘legally required’ payroll taxes. Therefore, the compensation missing from the OEWS wage rates is the cost of retirement and health benefits, which are about 11% of private sector compensation. The amount of pay reflecting these benefits that employers of LCA and PERM program workers should pay can easily be determined by taking the ratio of the sum of health and retirement benefits to the wages paid (the sum of wages, paid leave and supplemental pay). This can be determined for a broad occupational grouping and perhaps done at a regional level as well. This ratio when multiplied by the OEWS wage shows the amount of benefits that would be comparable to that earned in the private sector or civilian sector.</p>
<p>Although the occupational groups and geographic areas listed and reported in the ECEC are not as numerous and detailed as those in the OEWS’s occupational categories and geographical areas, this should not deter the DOL from utilizing these data to calculate the percentage of wages that should be added on as fringe benefits to the OEWS wage. Only a percentage to be added on must be determined – not an exact dollar amount.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus, the ECEC data are sufficient to provide DOL–by region and broad occupational group–an average level of insurance and retirement benefits received by employees in that job and in that area. Following precedent from the DBA and SCA, the fringe benefits could be paid by the employer through any combination of a variety of options, such as paid leave, health and life insurance, retirement and savings accounts, etc., or the employer could simply pay the benefits in cash.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, there is very little transparency regarding whether employers using the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and EB-2 and EB-3 programs are offering fringe benefits, or to what extent. A requirement that these fringe benefits be offered to LCA and PERM program workers would ensure that the wages and working conditions of similarly employed workers are not adversely impacted.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The current DOL compliance guidance on benefits for H-1B workers encourages benefits arbitrage through outsourcing and fissuring. The Wage and Hour Division fact sheet on the subject (#62L) reads, “The employer must offer benefits to H-1B workers on the same basis, and in accordance with the same criteria, as the benefits the employer provides to similarly employed U.S. workers.”<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a> By defining <em>similarly employed</em> workers as restricted only to those directly employed by the H-1B employer, DOL is encouraging benefits arbitrage by outsourcing firms, which can offer substandard benefits to all its employees and still comply with this interpretation of the H-1B rules.</p>
<h3>6. <strong>DOL should prohibit employer-provided private wage surveys from being used as alternative sources of wage data to set prevailing wages </strong></h3>
<p>Under the main H-1B prevailing wage regulation language at 20 C.F.R. §655.731, an employer has a number of options at their disposal to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA. In other words, the OEWS wage levels are just one of the available options. The employer may use one of the following sources to establish a prevailing wage: the OEWS wage, the wage set in an applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, an applicable wage set by the Davis-Bacon Act or McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act, an Office of Foreign Labor Certification National Processing Center prevailing wage determination, or a wage set by an independent authoritative source or another legitimate source of wage data. However, if the employer is paying a higher wage to similarly situated U.S. workers that it already employs, then it must pay the H-1B worker same higher “actual wage,” that it is paying the U.S. worker. (Specifically defined as “the wage rate paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question.”)</p>
<p>Therefore, employers do not need to use the OFLC’s calculated levels from OEWS data to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA or permanent labor certification application. The NPRM would improve the longstanding problems in how the prevailing wage is determined when using the OFLC-generated OEWS wage rates, but in the NPRM, DOL states that it considered whether to prohibit—but ultimately decided to permit—the continued use of an independent authoritative source or another legitimate source of wage data, which includes private wage surveys provided by employers and accepted by DOL. Standards for such alternative sources of wage data are described in 20 CFR § 655.731. In our 2020 report, we showed in Table 1 that in 2019, at least 9% of all certified wages for H-1B positions on LCAs were set by a private wage survey or other source accepted by the OFLC as legitimate.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a></p>
<p>We strongly urge DOL to eliminate the use of private wage surveys provided by employers for setting wage rates in the LCA programs or for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards. While the share of LCAs approved with wages set by private wages surveys is relatively small at the moment, it is likely that the use, and abuse, of private wage surveys will expand substantially after publication of a final rule that is consistent with the wage level percentiles proposed in the NPRM. This will occur because employers will be motivated to use private surveys as a loophole to avoid paying the new higher wage percentiles.</p>
<p>DOL’s justification for continuing to allow private wage surveys is based on an analysis that is confusing. On the one hand, the agency claims that private surveys yield a wage 20% higher on average than the OEWS equivalent, but also says that wage surveys are necessary for niche or very specialized markets where, “occupations [are] not well represented in OEWS datasets.”<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> The two claims are in contradiction. If a private wage survey is used to establish a wage in a niche job market, presumably not covered by the OEWS, then how can DOL feasibly calculate the differences? Footnote 211 in the NPRM does not provide sufficient detail to test this claim.</p>
<p>If DOL does not immediately eliminate the use of private surveys, it should at least ensure that usage of such surveys are rare and approved in only exceptional cases. Employers should be required to provide extensive documentation and justification for why the OEWS is an inadequate data source for determining the prevailing wage.</p>
<p>The recent history of the use of private wage surveys to set wages in the H-2B visa program—a temporary work visa program for lower-wage jobs outside of agriculture including in landscaping, forestry, hospitality, and construction—is instructive and should inform DOL’s review of wage surveys and other sources of wage data for setting H-1B wages. The evidence is clear in the H-2B context that when employers use private wages surveys, they primarily use them to pay lower wages than would otherwise be required.</p>
<p>In 2013 when DOL raised the minimum H-2B prevailing wage from the 17<sup>th</sup> wage percentile to the mean wage for the occupation and local area, H-2B employers immediately and en masse, shifted their business model to use private wage surveys to set H-2B wage rates at below-average wage rates. Evidence revealed in federal litigation clearly suggests that the shift to the use of private wage surveys was a systematic response to higher wage rates, and one that was clearly successful. Specifically, in the nine months beginning soon after the H-2B wage rule was updated—between July 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014—employers increased their submissions of private wage surveys for H-2B prevailing wage determinations by 3,182%, as compared with the 12 months leading up to the federal court decision that invalidated the previous H-2B wage rule. In 21.1% of those prevailing wage determinations set by private wage surveys, the certified H-2B wage was lower than the previous prevailing wage system where the Level I H-2B prevailing wage was set at the 17th percentile wage by occupation and local area, according to OFLC-generated OEWS wage survey data, and 94.4% of the determinations were for a wage that was lower than the Level II wage, at the 34th percentile.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Despite the fact that the H-2B prevailing wage has been set at the local average wage and DOL restricted the use of private wage surveys in 2015, they are still commonly used and successful at lowering wages for H-2B workers. One clear example of this which has been detailed, is a group of H-2B workers employed as crabpickers in Maryland—they earned roughly 25% less per hour than they should have been paid according to the local corresponding OEWS wage.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>The downside risk of continuing to allow private wage surveys—creating loopholes and administrative burdens—outweighs the risk to workers that the OEWS prevailing wage results in lower wages. If DOL’s calculations are accurate, employers should welcome the elimination of private wage surveys because the OEWS provides lower wage requirements and reduced costs in terms of purchasing survey data and/or conducting entirely new surveys.</p>
<h3><strong>7. </strong><strong>If DOL considers permitting the use of employer provided private wage surveys, it should first conduct a detailed analysis of their usage and impact on H-1B wage rates, make the findings public, and issue a separate NPRM focused solely on private wage surveys</strong></h3>
<p>In order to promote transparency and comport with the statutory requirement that H-1B employers “will provide working conditions for [H-1B workers] that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed,”<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> DOL should immediately prohibit the use of private wages surveys. However if DOL wishes to still consider their usage, DOL should conduct a study to benchmark the use of alternative wage data and especially private wage surveys against the OFLC-generated OEWS prevailing wages, to identify whether there are any systematic biases in such sources. If such biases are found, DOL could propose a new NPRM with additional guidance and safeguards to ensure that the alternative wage sources are not undermining U.S. wage standards. DOL should also conduct an analysis on the occupations that have been approved for wage setting with private wages surveys, to examine which occupations employers are claiming to be so unique that they do not fit within the definitions of over 800 occupations available in BLS’s Standard Occupational Codes, as well as analyze whether private wage surveys have negatively impacted conditions for H-1B workers and similarly situated workers.</p>
<p>It is important to note that, while in the aggregate, the use of private wage surveys is roughly 6.5% according to the NPRM, we know from our own reviews of LCA disclosure data that some firms rely on private wage surveys extensively. DOL should examine how private wage surveys vary across firms, industries, and occupations. Firms that rely on private wage surveys for more than 3% of the positions in their LCAs should be scrutinized and audited to ensure they are not being utilized to undercut the standards set by OEWS wage data.&nbsp;</p>
<h3><strong>8. </strong><strong>DOL must put measures in place that would prevent employer misclassification of H-1B workers at the wrong wage levels</strong></h3>
<p>As noted earlier, the NPRM requires that minimum H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, and EB-3 salaries are set at more realistic wage rates that reflect the local market rates for the jobs they fill. While each wage level is intended to correspond to the position description, in practice the employer has substantial discretion choosing the skill level and DOL does not verify that a prevailing wage is appropriate unless a lawsuit or a complaint is filed by a worker. Such complaints are unlikely since it would require a migrant worker to blow the whistle on their own employer, the same employer that controls the worker’s visa status and ability to remain in the United States. We are unaware of any cases in which DOL has investigated an LCA-stage misclassification of an H-1B wage level, but there have been reports of, for example, H-1B employers receiving approval for LCAs that certify they will pay employees at the same prevailing wage level despite having job titles that clearly warrant different wage levels.</p>
<p>Simply put, employer selection of skill levels should be anchored to the actual duties of the position and verified by DOL and USCIS. There is no reason to allow employers to identify a skill level on a whim. If DOL does not fix this obvious problem, then the NPRM’s core objective of eliminating wage arbitrage will be undermined.</p>
<p>Skill level misclassification and inconsistencies undermine good governance of the H-1B program. Even a cursory examination of the LCA and I-129 data shows that such misclassifications, whether purposeful or inadvertent, are common. For example, positions with job titles leading with ‘senior’ are frequently misclassified as Level I. And even within the same employer, identical job titles are classified under different skill levels.</p>
<p>Yet the effectiveness of this NPRM hinges on ensuring that employers properly and consistently classify their positions at the correct skill level. DOL should take two actions. First, it should update and expand the NPWC’s Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> Second, it must hold employers accountable for their skill level selections.</p>
<p>The policy guidance should be rewritten and expanded so that it not only serves PWD adjudicators but also all employers, whether they use the OEWS or a private wage survey to determine the prevailing wage. The document should clarify skill level classification and serve as compliance guidance for all employers. The most recent NPWC policy guidance, published in 2009, is obviously inadequate and outdated. Employers are not effectively or consistently interpreting and identifying skill levels. The description of each skill level, Levels I through IV, consists of a single paragraph of ambiguous language. For example, how many years of experience should Level II consist of? Can an employer’s position that requires two to three years of experience ever be classified as Level I (Entry-Level)? If a worker with a master’s degree is filling a position that typically requires only a bachelor’s degree, can they be bumped up in skill level?</p>
<p>All employers should be required to follow the five-step Prevailing Wage Determination process outlined on pages 9 through 13 to identify the position’s skill level. Employers should be required to document and retain those records for inspection by USCIS when the I-129 petition for the LCA is filed. This will ensure consistent skill level identification within and across companies whether the firm uses the OEWS, private wage survey, a CBA, or requests a PWD.</p>
<p>Then USCIS should ensure that the worker being placed in the position is not overqualified in terms of education and experience for the position&#8217;s skill level.</p>
<p>Consider this example: A well-known firm received approval for two different LCAs at the same wage level (Level II), even though one LCA had the job title&nbsp;<em>Senior Software Engineer</em>&nbsp;and the other had the job title&nbsp;<em>Software Engineer</em>.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> The firm, a major employer of H-1B workers, is not accounting for differences in skill levels as evident from its own job titles when selecting the wage level for the LCA. Both engineers and senior engineers are receiving the exact same salary and wage level, and they are approved by DOL with zero scrutiny. Using the DOL Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, the LCAs in this case should be instantly flagged by identifying keywords such as&nbsp;senior, head, chief, and lead&nbsp;in job titles, and should be checked to determine whether the prevailing wage levels are appropriate. This example underscores a broader need for DOL to create a more robust compliance system to ensure employers do not misclassify workers at inappropriate wage levels. Our own cursory review has found hundreds of similar examples.</p>
<p>As a result, the LCA and petition process should be updated so that DOL reviews the qualifications of individual workers before USCIS approves a petition, to ensure that wage levels match up with the age, education, and experience of the workers being hired through the LCA and PERM programs. While USCIS currently performs this role to some extent, its adjudicators lack expertise in wage-and-hour issues and do not have the same mandate to protect labor standards as DOL staff. Therefore, these functions should be undertaken by the proper agency. DOL and USCIS already have a mandate to cooperate on H-1B applications and enforcement; a memorandum of understanding between the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Labor could detail a process where DOL plays a prominent role in ensuring that H-1B workers are classified at the appropriate wage levels. Published guidance from DOL on skill levels that is more detailed, clearer, and more realistic would also be helpful for everyone involved—employers and adjudicators alike.</p>
<h3><strong>9. </strong><strong>DOL has failed to enforce the “actual wage” component of the H-1B prevailing wage rule and should begin enforcing it immediately</strong></h3>
<p>Under the prevailing wage statute, although an employer has several options at their disposal to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA, they must offer the higher of either the prevailing wage or the “actual wage,” which the corresponding regulation at 20 C.F.R. §655.731 defines as “the wage rate paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question.”</p>
<p>DOL has not exercised its authority to enforce the actual wage requirement. This is a wasted opportunity for one of the most important tools DOL has at its disposal to hold employers accountable for required wages. In order to ensure that H-1B employers are not undercutting the wage rates they pay H-1B workers, DOL should immediately begin enforcing this requirement.</p>
<p>In late 2021, we published a report detailing how thousands of skilled migrants with H-1B visas working as subcontractors at well-known corporations like Disney, FedEx, Google, and others appear to have been underpaid by one firm to the tune of at least $95 million in one single year.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a> The victims likely included not only the H-1B workers but also the U.S. workers who were either displaced or whose wages and working conditions were degraded when employers were allowed to underpay skilled migrant workers with impunity. The workers in question were employed by HCL Technologies, an India-based IT staffing firm that earned $11 billion in revenue in 2020. HCL is consistently one of the top 20 H-1B employers and appears to have engaged in the systematic and strategic wage theft of its H-1B workers by exploiting the lax to nonexistent enforcement of the actual wage requirement. According to its own internal documents, HCL targeted its new H-1B hires expressly based on the spread between what it paid its own U.S. employees versus what it pays its own H-1B workers.</p>
<p>The report discusses our analysis of an internal HCL document, released as part of a whistleblower lawsuit against the firm. The document suggests that HCL—and perhaps other firms with similar business models—are not paying the legally required amount that corresponds to what is being paid to U.S. worker employees at HCL. The HCL document revealed that the large-scale illegal underpayment of H-1B workers that appears to be occurring is a core part of the HCL’s competitive strategy, and likely facilitated $95 million in stolen wages from HCL’s H-1B employees in just one year. Such abuses are surely widespread among H-1B employers because DOL has done virtually nothing to ensure program integrity by enforcing the H-1B wage rules, in particular the actual wage rule.</p>
<p>DOL could easily begin enforcing the actual wage provision by requiring H-1B employers to submit evidence documenting the wage rates paid to U.S. workers who are similarly employed in occupations for which the employer is also hiring H-1B workers. Employers must already “keep records for how they calculate the actual wages.” To our knowledge, DOL has never initiated an investigation regarding compliance with the “actual wage” provision of the law. The DOL Secretary should exercise their authority to inspect the actual wages paid by H-1B employers. The Secretary can do so without a complaint from a worker, under their authority to certify investigations, and should do so if presented with credible evidence of violations. DOL should provide clear compliance guidance for the actual wage provision and then require that H-1B employers attest to the wage rates they pay similarly situated U.S. workers and include them in the LCA documentation, and DOL should conduct audits of employers on a regular basis to ensure compliance. The audits could begin with the employers that hire large numbers of H-1B workers, for example, those that employ more than 25 H-1B workers, as well as H-1B dependent firms.</p>
<p>Secondary employers should also be required to submit LCAs and evidence documenting the wage rates paid to U.S. workers in the occupations that H-1B workers will be hired for through an outsourcing firm. Otherwise, some H-1B outsourcing firms—which almost exclusively pay H-1B workers at the two lowest wage levels, and employ H-1B and L-1 workers almost exclusively—will be able to game the system by using the actual wage paid to their own employees to meet the requirement, and not the employees of the secondary employer, where the H-1B workers will be placed—and where wages paid to the U.S. workforce are likely to be higher.</p>
<h3><strong>10.</strong><strong> DOL should require secondary employers of H-1B workers to attest that they will not adversely affect wages and working conditions</strong></h3>
<p>Outsourcing companies are using the H-1B program to underpay H-1B workers, replace U.S. workers, and send tech jobs abroad. Typically, in this scenario, H-1B workers do computer and engineering work at the office of a U.S. employer but are employed by an outsourcing company, some of which are based abroad or have major operations abroad.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> The many reported cases of U.S. workers being laid off and replaced by H-1B workers have all been facilitated by this arrangement. In multiple incidents, the H-1B workers have been hired with annual wages&nbsp;of around $30,000 to $40,000 less than the workers they have replaced. Before they are laid off, the U.S. workers are often forced to train their own H-1B replacements as a condition of their severance packages; this is euphemistically known as “knowledge transfer.” Major, profitable U.S. employers like Disney and Toys “R” Us—as well as public employers and institutions like the University of California and Southern California Edison—have laid off thousands of U.S. workers who were forced to train their own replacements. Eventually, many of the outsourced jobs filled by H-1B workers get moved offshore.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>Contrary to the popular narrative proffered by corporations that support expanding and deregulating the H-1B visa program—the staffing firms that use H-1B visas are not using them to keep technology jobs in the United States—instead they are using them precisely to facilitate the offshoring of as many of those jobs as they can. That is in fact, the business model of those firms. News reports, including from the <em>New York Times</em> and <em>Bloomberg</em>, have shown that outsourcing companies “game the system” in order to obtain a high share of H-1B visas, which leaves fewer available for the firms that directly employ H-1B workers.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a></p>
<p>The outsourcing/staffing model of employment generally may increase the incidence of labor and employment law violations by separating the main beneficiary of the labor provided by H-1B workers—the third-party firm that hires the outsourcing firm, i.e. the “lead” employer—from the H-1B workers who perform the work. Firms that rely on outsourced H-1B workers are a textbook example of what former DOL Wage and Hour administrator David Weil calls a “fissured” workplace, where the relationship between the worker and the lead employer is fissured, or broken, via the use of a temp agency or subcontractor<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> (in this case the temp agency or subcontractors are the H-1B outsourcing firms). Research shows that fissuring leads to a wage penalty for workers who are subcontracted, employed as temps, and work for staffing firms,<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> in part because the subcontractor keeps a percentage of the wages earned by the workers. It is also common knowledge that employers use this model to avoid paying for benefits like health care, retirement funds, and to avoid liability for labor violations. Because the staffing and outsourcing model contributes to the fissuring of the labor market, it should not be allowed as part of the U.S. immigration system—not in H-1B or in any other temporary or permanent immigration programs.</p>
<p>One way to address the abuses of the outsourcing/staffing firms, which operate as secondary employers, would be to issue policy guidance and update the appropriate DOL ETA application forms so that secondary employers to which H-1B workers are outsourced will be required to file Labor Condition Applications with DOL. Such&nbsp;guidance, which was considered in 2021 but then abandoned,<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a> would close the loophole that allows firms like Disney and Southern California Edison to&nbsp;replace&nbsp;its U.S. employees with H-1B workers by employing them through an outsourcing firm.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Using Disney as an example, implementing this rule would require client firms like Disney—that benefit and profit from hiring outsourcers—to acknowledge their employment relationship with H-1B workers who are employed by outsourcers like Infosys and Tata, by requiring Disney to file its own LCA. By doing so, Disney would attest that hiring the H-1B worker through the outsourcer is not adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of the Disney workforce.</p>
<h3><strong>11.</strong><strong> DOL should publish Labor Condition Application and permanent labor certification data in real-time on a central database</strong></h3>
<p>DOL publishes detailed LCA and permanent labor certification (PERM) disclosure data, but it is typically lagged by at least one quarter, and often much longer. The agency should publish LCA and PERM public access file applications in real-time to enable U.S. workers to apply for these positions. This would enhance the integrity of the programs and better align them to their purposes by ensuring that workers hired with temporary visas and green cards are filling true labor shortages.</p>
<p>U.S. workers have long complained loudly that employers hide job openings from them, reserving them for visa holders and PERM applicants. Even when those jobs are advertised, as is required by the PERM labor certification process, they are often placed in obscure locations. Workers call such job advertisements “fake job postings.” A recent ProPublica investigation has referred to the practice as “The Tech Recruitment Ruse.”<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>The agency already collects the data and publishes it regularly on the OFLC disclosure data. But even a one-quarter year lag time renders it useless for job seekers. Publishing it in real-time would unlock enormous value for workers at little or no cost to the government or employers.</p>
<h3><strong>12.</strong><strong> DOL had the requisite legal authority to update the H-1B prevailing wage levels</strong></h3>
<p>As discussed in detail in our 2020 report, DOL has the requisite legal authority to change the H-1B prevailing wage levels to an appropriate rate that protects wage standards and prevents adverse effects on U.S. workers in H-1B occupations. No analyst or commentator has credibly argued otherwise. For far too long, the H-1B wage levels have been set at an artificially low level that undercuts U.S. wage standards, therefore, it is reasonable for DOL to increase the minimum wage levels so that Level I is no lower than the local median wage.</p>
<h3><strong>13.</strong><strong> DOL should expand the LCA process to include a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers; those that have violated certain laws in the previous five years should be prohibited from hiring through the H-1B program</strong></h3>
<p>In a previous comment to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), regarding the 2023 H-1B “modernization” rule,<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> we recommended that DHS should expand the H-1B Registration System to include a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers. If employers have violated certain laws, they should be prohibited from hiring through the H-1B program. We further recommended that DHS should consult with DOL to develop a list of key applicable laws and operate the system jointly with DOL, and ideally, also operate the updated registration process jointly, with DOL screening employer records through the LCA process. We reiterate that recommendation here and urge DOL to take steps to exclude lawbreaking employers that violate labor, employment, and immigration laws. <em>While we realize our comment will only be read by DOL, we nevertheless include our discussion about DHS’s role in this process because we believe DOL and DHS should work in tandem to reduce labor and employment violations in the H-1B program.</em></p>
<p>In the 2023 proposed rule, <em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections,<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a></em> DHS proposed to create or expand several additional bars to approval of new petitions filed by H-2 petitioners who have previously committed legal violations related to the H-2 programs. EPI submitted comments generally supporting the proposed changes, which were adopted as a final rule.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a> Although they fail to go far enough on their own, if adequately implemented the provisions will help curb abusive employers’ exploitation of the H-2 programs and will level the playing field for employers that obey the law. EPI additionally commented that employers that commit serious violations repeatedly should be permanently banned from the H-2 programs, as they have demonstrated their inability or unwillingness to comply with the programs’ requirements.</p>
<p>In those comments EPI further recommended that the DHS strengthen section 214.2(h)(10)(iii)(3), which addresses violations of “any applicable employment-related laws and regulations” by expanding it to include a number of other violations and making denial of petitions mandatory—rather than discretionary—if employers have violated any of those laws in the preceding five years.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>We believe DHS should consider similar provisions for employers seeking to hire through the H-1B program because there have been numerous credible accusations of lawbreaking against H-1B employers, as well as investigations and litigation, finding that H-1B employers and recruiters that have been guilty of wage theft, financial bondage, and even human trafficking. The reality is that DOL has limited resources and has interpreted its authority to investigate H-1B employers as constrained, and it is difficult in practice for H-1B workers to come forward and complain themselves about employer lawbreaking—because they could face retaliation and lose their status, and possibly the opportunity to become lawful permanent residents—which means DOL likely receives fewer complaints than they otherwise would. And even when DOL does receive complaints, as numerous reports have shown, DOL often lacks the resources to investigate and take action against lawbreaking employers.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a></p>
<p>Thus, at a minimum, to keep lawbreaking employers out of the H-1B program, DHS should have its own list of legal violations and deny any petition for an employer that has violated any of the laws on the list in the preceding five years. That would act as a backstop to prevent lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-1B program. At present, as DHS rightly points out in the November 2023 Modernizing H-2 Program NPRM, even some of the worst violators of the law are allowed to recruit and hire H-2 workers. We know that this is also the case in the H-1B program. In fact, in the H-1B program, some of the biggest users of the program are also the most egregious violators, receiving thousands of H-1B petition approvals per year. And then after they violate the law, H-1B employees are afraid to complain to authorities because their immigration status is tied to their employer, and even if they are brave enough to lodge a complaint, as noted above, DOL may lack the resources to investigate violations and hold the employer accountable.</p>
<p>As EPI also recommended in the H-2 NPRM, DHS should go further to implement this by also cooperating with DOL to develop a front-end screening process that takes place at the labor condition application (LCA) stage, to vet the labor and employment law records of employers before they can be allowed to hire through the H-1B program. In multiple EPI reports and in comments in response to NPRMs, EPI has made a similar proposal—namely, that a front-end screening process should be created to prohibit employers with track records of wage and hour, labor, immigration, and other legal violations from hiring through the H visa programs.</p>
<p>To make a front-end screening process a reality, ideally, DOL should require employers to register for eligibility to use the H-1B program at the LCA stage, so employer records on compliance with labor and employment laws can be screened up front, before getting to the registration or petition stage. DOL could set up a registration process in which employers list basic information about their business and the purported need for H-1B workers (as is already done via the DOL temporary labor certification forms). As part of that new process, employers could be required to attest, under penalty of perjury and of being banned from hiring through the H-1B and other visa programs, that they have not been found to have violated any of the listed labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, or anti-discrimination laws during the past five years. DOL could then attempt to verify by cross-referencing enforcement data and other relevant records—and could cooperate with other worker protection agencies like the NLRB and EEOC—and ultimately certify employers that have not violated the applicable laws.</p>
<p>To break established patterns of abuse, employers that have violated any labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking or anti-discrimination laws should be prohibited from submitting an LCA (or having their LCA approved) and ultimately not be allowed to hire H-1B workers. Employers that have clean records and an LCA approved by DOL could then continue on with the petition process at USCIS.</p>
<p>Given the present and likely future reality that WHD and other worker protection agencies will continue to be vastly underfunded and understaffed,<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a>&nbsp;such a screening process on the front end of the H-1B application process could act as a useful and efficient tool to prevent legal violations without WHD having to go through lengthy and costly investigations on the back end, after workers have arrived in the United States and been robbed or otherwise exploited.</p>
<p>At the petition level, if a new screening process at DOL is not created that takes place before or as part of the LCA process, DHS should, at a minimum and as noted above, build on proposed section 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(10)(iii)(B) for H-2 petitions by creating a list of key labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, and anti-discrimination laws, the violation of which would establish strong evidence that an employer does not treat their employees well and is unlikely to follow employment and immigration laws with respect to their H-1B employees. Although this would work best in tandem with a front-end screening process at the LCA stage, DHS could make significant progress in keeping lawbreaking employers out of the H-1B programs by mandating that any employer that has violated any of the listed laws will be prohibited from having a petition approved for hiring H-1B workers.</p>
<p>Another option would be for DHS to modify the existing H-1B Registration System so that it also screens the records of employers. That way DHS could use it to both manage the annual cap and to assess and certify whether employers are eligible to hire through H-1B based on their past legal violations. Employers could be required to attest, under penalty of perjury and of being banned from hiring through the H-1B and other visa programs, that they have not been found to have violated any of the listed labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, or anti-discrimination laws during the past five years. USCIS could work to verify the employer attestation, although ideally DOL should partner with to do this, by cross-referencing DOL enforcement data and other relevant records—preferably also in partnership with other worker protection agencies like the NLRB and EEOC—and would then ultimately certify employers that have not violated the applicable laws, allowing them to continue with the registration process.</p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>The H-1B visa program is the largest temporary work visa program in the United States and an important pathway into the U.S. labor market for skilled migrants from around the world—but a pathway that has serious deficiencies when it comes to the workplace rights of migrant workers and for preserving U.S. labor standards. While less is known about the other LCA programs, H-1B1 and E-3, they have even fewer applicable rules in place to protect workers, which likely means they are having similar impacts on worker rights and labor standards. By issuing this NPRM, DOL has taken an important first step towards reversing decades of artificially depressed wage rates for H-1B workers, and for making the prevailing wage methodology rules consistent across the other LCA programs and for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards. This will benefit other similarly situated workers and simplify and streamline the prevailing wage determination process. Nevertheless, as our comment recommends, more must be done—in this rulemaking and other executive actions—to improve the effectiveness of the updated prevailing wage rates and on enforcement in the LCA and PERM programs, in order to safeguard U.S. wages and labor standards.</p>
<p>Daniel Costa<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute<br />
Washington, DC</p>
<p>Ron Hira, Ph.D., P.E.<br />
Associate Professor<br />
Department of Political Science<br />
Howard University</p>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, Interim Final Rule, request for comments, U.S. Department of Labor, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s new H-2A wage rule will radically cut the wages of all farmworkers: New estimates show farmworkers stand to lose $4.4 to $5.4 billion annually under DOL’s updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics </em>blog (Economic Policy Institute) November 26, 2025; for additional discussion and background, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-2025-interim-final-rule-modifying-the-aewr-methodology-for-h-2a-farmworkers/">EPI comment on DOL’s 2025 Interim Final Rule modifying the AEWR methodology for H-2A farmworkers</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, December 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> PERM stands for Program Electronic Management Review, and is the first step for employers who wish to sponsor an employee for permanent residence in the United States through the EB-2 and EB-3 categories.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> George Borjas, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w34793/w34793.pdf"><em>The H-1B Wage Gap, Visa Fees, and Employer Demand</em></a>, NBER working paper 34793, March 2026. See pages 3-4.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> USCIS, X.com post, May 21, 2026 at 1:37 PM, <a href="https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339">https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339</a></p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market#--:explore:outcomes-by-major">https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market#&#8211;:explore:outcomes-by-major</a></p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Here are just a sample of some of the recent news accounts in major media outlets: Katherine Bindley, “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/careers/tech-jobs-hiring-artifical-intelligence-35cd66b0?mod=Searchresults_pos15&amp;page=1">The ‘Great Hesitation’ That’s Making It Harder to Get a Tech Job</a>,” <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, May 18, 2025; Christopher Rugaber, “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/college-graduates-job-market-unemployment-c5e881d0a5c069de08085a47fa58f90f?utm_source=copy&amp;utm_medium=share">Unemployment among young college graduates outpaces overall US joblessness rate</a>,” <em>Associated Press</em>, June 26, 2025; Sydney Ember, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/business/economy/college-graduates-job-market-hiring.html">Young Graduates Face the Grimmest Job Market in Years</a>,” <em>NY Times</em>, March 24, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> See for example, Connor O&#8217;Brien, Jeremy Neufeld, and Amy Nice, <a href="https://ifp.org/prevailing-wage-benchmarking/"><em>A Prescription for Fixing the Prevailing Wage System: Replacing Blind Benchmarking with Experience Benchmarking</em></a>, Institute for Progress, March 27, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See Overview section in Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b">H-1B Program</a>,” web page on the U.S. Department of Labor website.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/08/2021-00183/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions"><em>Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, 86 Fed. Reg. 1676, at 1720, Table 7, June 8, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> See Table 12 in Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H–1B</em></a><em> Petitions</em>, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS Docket No. 2820-25, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0040, RIN: 1615-AD01 (September 24, 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B Visas and Prevailing Wage Levels: A Majority of H-1B Employers—Including Major U.S. Tech Firms—Use the Program to Pay Migrant Workers Well Below Market Wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Norman Matloff, “<a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/h-1b-visas-are-transforming-america/">H-1B Visas Are Transforming America</a>,” <em>Compact</em>, October 8, 2025; Norman Matloff, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp356-foreign-students-best-brightest-immigration-policy/"><em>Are foreign students the ‘best and brightest’? Data and implications for immigration policy</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #356, February 28, 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://flag.dol.gov/wage-data/wage-search">OFLC Wage Search</a>, last visited on May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/ola_signed_h1b_characteristics_congressional_report_FY24.pdf"><em>Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers</em></a>, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report to Congress, October 1, 2023 – September 30, 2024, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 29, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/educational-attainment.htm">Table 5.3 Educational attainment for workers 25 years and older by detailed occupation, 2022–23 (Percent)</a>, Employment Projections, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm">Table 11b. Employed people by detailed occupation and age</a>, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm">Table 11b. Employed people by detailed occupation and age</a>, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Connor O&#8217;Brien, Jeremy Neufeld, and Amy Nice, <a href="https://ifp.org/prevailing-wage-benchmarking/"><em>A Prescription for Fixing the Prevailing Wage System: Replacing Blind Benchmarking with Experience Benchmarking</em></a>, Institute for Progress, March 27, 2026. PDF available here: <a href="https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/IFP_Prevailing_Wage_Experience_Benchmarking_.pdf">https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/IFP_Prevailing_Wage_Experience_Benchmarking_.pdf</a></p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> NPRM at 15474.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> For the Davis-Bacon Act, see 40 USC §3141(2); and the Service Contract Act at 41 USC §351(a)(2).</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm"><em>Occupational Employment Wage Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions</em></a>, at Section C, Number 8.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> See tables, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/62l-h1b-benefits">Fact Sheet #62L: What benefits must be offered to H-1B workers</a>,” U.S. Department of Labor, Revised July 2008.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> NPRM at 15479.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> See discussion of the 2013 Interim Final Rule setting the H-2B prevailing wage methodology in Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/"><em>The H-2B temporary foreign worker program: For labor shortages or cheap, temporary labor?</em></a> Economic Policy Institute, January 19, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/h-2b-crabpickers-maryland-seafood-industry-paid-less-than-average/">H-2B crabpickers are so important to the Maryland seafood industry that they get paid $3 less per hour than the state or local average wage</a>,” <em>Working Economics </em>(Economic Policy Institute blog), May 26, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2016-title8/html/USCODE-2016-title8-chap12-subchapII-partII-sec1182.htm">8 U.S.C. 1182 (n)(1)(A)(i)(II)</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf"><em>Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Revised November 2009.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Ethan Baron, “<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/17/h-1b-uber-snatches-up-more-foreign-worker-visas-as-it-lays-off-hundreds-of-employees/">H-1B: Uber snatches up more foreign-worker visas as it lays off hundreds of employees</a>,” <em>Mercury News</em>, October 17, 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021. See also, news coverage of our report, for example, Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmpvb/analysis-claims-migrant-tech-workers-have-been-underpaid-by-tens-of-millions">Analysis Claims Migrant Tech Workers Have Been Underpaid by Tens of Millions</a>,” Vice News, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> See for example, Senator Richard Durbin, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2dR4Z6dRIo">How American Jobs are Outsourced</a>,” YouTube.com video, April 16, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> See for example, Stef Kight, “<a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-att-outsourcing-h1b-visa-foreign-workers-1f26cd20-664a-4b5f-a2e3-361c8d2af502.html">U.S. companies are forcing workers to train their own foreign replacements</a>,” <em>Axios</em>, December 29, 2019; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2kkTUZu">Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, June 3, 2015; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2jINcfX">Toys ‘R’ Us Brings Temporary Foreign Workers to U.S. to Move Jobs Overseas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, September 29, 2015;&nbsp;Michael Hiltzik, “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-uc-visas-20170108-story.html">How the University of California Exploited a Visa Loophole to Move Tech Jobs to India</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Los Angeles Times</em>, January 6, 2017;&nbsp;Patrick Thibodeau, “<a href="https://www.computerworld.com/article/2879083/it-outsourcing/southern-california-edison-it-workers-beyond-furious-over-h-1b-replacements.html">Southern California Edison IT Workers ‘Beyond Furious’ over H-1B Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Computerworld</em>, February 5, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?terminal=1">How thousands of middlemen are gaming the H-1B program</a>,” <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/large-companies-game-h-1b-visa-program-leaving-smaller-ones-in-the-cold.html">Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs</a>,” <em>New York Times</em>, November 10, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> David Weil, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975446&amp;content=reviews"><em>The Fissured Workplace: How Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It</em></a>, Harvard, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> A number of studies show a wage penalty for subcontracted/outsourced workers. For example, see Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300206">Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards</a>,” Cornell University ILR Review. January 1, 2010); Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmieder, “<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v132y2017i3p1165-1217..html">The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure</a>,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), 2017, pages 1165-1217; Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, and Benjamin Schoefer “<a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/schoefer_files/Temp_Argentina_Sept_2020.pdf">Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data</a>,” Econometrics Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, September 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20210115-2">U.S. Department of Labor revises interpretation, issues new guidance clarifying filing, compliance requirements in H-1B visa program</a>,” Press Release Number 21-97-NAT, January 15, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julia Preston, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/last-task-after-layoff-at-disney-train-foreign-replacements.html">Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, June 3, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Alec MacGillis, “<a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-immigration-h1b-visas-perm-tech-jobs-recruitment">The Tech Recruitment Ruse That Has Avoided Trump’s Crackdown on Immigration</a>,” ProPublica, June 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dhss-proposed-rule-on-modernizing-h-1b-requirements-providing-flexibility-in-the-f-1-program-and-program-improvements-affecting-other-nonimmigrant-workers/#epi-toc-18">EPI comments on DHS’s “Modernizing H-1B” proposed rule</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, December 22, 2023; commenting on U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/23/2023-23381/modernizing-h-1b-requirements-providing-flexibility-in-the-f-1-program-and-program-improvements"><em>Modernizing H-1B Requirements, Providing Flexibility in the F-1 Program, and Program Improvements Affecting Other Nonimmigrant Workers</em></a>, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS No. 2745-23, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0005, RIN: 1615-AC70, 88 Fed. Reg. 72870 (October 23, 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/09/20/2023-20123/modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections"><em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections</em></a>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CIS No. 2740-23 and DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0012, RIN: 1615-AC76, 88 Fed. Reg. 65040 (September 20, 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/18/2024-29353/modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections"><em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections</em></a>, Final Rule, CIS No. 2740-23; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0012, RIN 1615-AC76, 89 Fed Reg. 103202 (December 18, 2024).</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> See EPI comment on the H-2 programs in the comment submitted to DHS in November 2023; Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dhs-proposed-rule-on-modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections/"><em>EPI comments on DHS’s proposed rule on “Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections,”</em></a> Economic Policy Institute, November 20, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> See for example, Rebecca Rainey, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/inadequate-labor-department-resources-stymie-enforcement-efforts">Inadequate Labor Department Resources Stymie Enforcement Efforts</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Bloomberg Law</em>, November 7, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> See for example, AFL-CIO, <a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/workers-rights-iced-out"><em>Workers’ Rights Ice’d Out</em></a>, February 25, 2026; Rebecca Rainey, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employment/trumps-federal-workforce-cuts-hit-labor-department-enforcement">Trump’s Federal Workforce Cuts Hit Labor Department Enforcement</a>,” Bloomberg Law, Feb. 24, 2025; Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-benefits-from-immigration/#epi-toc-20"><em>The U.S. benefits from immigration but policy reforms needed to maximize gains: Recommendations and a review of key issues to ensure fair wages and labor standards for all workers</em></a>, October 4, 2024 (see Figure J); Daniel Costa and Philip Martin, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/"><em>Record-low number of federal wage and hour investigations of farms in 2022: Congress must increase funding for labor standards enforcement to protect farmworkers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2023; Ihna Mangundayao, Celine McNicholas, and Margaret Poydock, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/worker-protection-agencies-need-more-funding-to-enforce-labor-laws-and-protect-workers/">Worker protection agencies need more funding to enforce labor laws and protect workers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), July 29, 2021.</p>
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		<title>U.S. employers spend more than $1.5 billion annually on union avoidance</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-employers-spend-more-than-1-5-billion-annually-on-union-avoidance/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 14:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Teke Wiggin (LaborLab)]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=321180</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key Many U.S. employers hire union avoidance consultants to keep their workers from organizing and bargaining for better pay and working conditions.]]></description>
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<h4>Key takeaways</h4>
<ul>
<li>Many U.S. employers hire union avoidance consultants to keep their workers from organizing and bargaining for better pay and working conditions. We estimate that employers spend roughly $1.7 billion a year on union avoidance consultants and law firms for this purpose, which has an undeniable impact on workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively.</li>
<li>Over the past several decades, large law firms have developed substantial&nbsp;business specializing in union avoidance&nbsp;services.&nbsp;This includes exploiting the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) administrative processes and creating nearly endless delays for workers who are trying to form a union.</li>
<li>Large law firms—such as Littler Mendelson, Morgan Lewis, and Jackson Lewis—have represented employers in their fights against some of the largest organizing efforts over the last decade, including Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<h4>Key takeaways</h4>
<ul>
<li>Many U.S. employers hire union avoidance consultants to keep their workers from organizing and bargaining for better pay and working conditions. We estimate that employers spend roughly $1.7 billion a year on union avoidance consultants and law firms for this purpose, which has an undeniable impact on workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively.</li>
<li>Over the past several decades, large law firms have developed substantial&nbsp;business specializing in union avoidance&nbsp;services.&nbsp;This includes exploiting the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) administrative processes and creating nearly endless delays for workers who are trying to form a union.</li>
<li>Large law firms—such as Littler Mendelson, Morgan Lewis, and Jackson Lewis—have represented employers in their fights against some of the largest organizing efforts over the last decade, including Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>In 2025, unionization in the United States grew to its highest levels since 2009 (McNicholas, Poydock, and Shierholz 2026). This growth is a testament to the fact that Americans increasingly view unions favorably and recognize them as critical instruments for building a just economy. Yet more than 50 million nonunion workers would join a union but are unable to do so because our nation’s labor laws allow employers to derail workers’ unionization efforts (McNicholas et al. 2019).</p>
<p>It is well documented that employers often hire union avoidance consultants to dissuade and weaken workers’ unionization efforts. These consultants work to prevent a union election from taking place—and if that fails, to ensure that workers vote against the union and then stall negotiations over a first collective bargaining agreement. Over the past several decades, large law firms have developed substantial business specializing in union avoidance services. These firms now play a significant role in denying workers their rights to a union and collective bargaining (Kaufman and Stephan 1995).</p>
<p>The role of these law firms in defeating workers’ organizing campaigns and frustrating workers’ attempts to reach a first contract has largely gone unexamined. While employers are required to disclose money spent on lawyers engaged in persuading employees on their union and collective bargaining rights, there is an exemption around reporting money spent on “advice” services, which is ill-defined under the law. Union avoidance law firms have taken full advantage of this reporting loophole and have constructed an industry providing counsel on union busting. Further, many union avoidance law firms provide employers services beyond these persuader activities, including representation at the NLRB and the stalling of first contract negotiations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In this report, we examine the union avoidance industry and the law firms that play integral roles in this business. We calculate the revenue law firms generate from employers who try to avoid unions and undermine collective bargaining with their workers. Further, we discuss the impacts of the union avoidance industry on workers’ ability to organize and what it means for workers, our economy, and our democracy.</p>
<h2>Employers spend millions on union avoidance consultants</h2>
<p>When workers seek to form a union, employers often hire union avoidance consultants to dissuade and weaken workers’ unionization efforts. These consultants include both non-attorney consultants and attorney consultants. Under the Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), employers and the consultants they hire must file disclosure reports on agreements in which the consultant is engaging in union-busting activities. <strong>Table 1</strong> lists just a few of the employers who filed mandatory reports with the Department of Labor during 2025.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-320469 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="320469" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/320469-35745-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>These reports represent only a fraction of the total money spent on anti-union campaign services, not to mention legal counsel, representation, and litigation aimed at union avoidance. That’s for two main reasons: 1) consultants are not required to report activity that counts as “advice,” which is ill-defined but currently interpreted to exempt nearly all activities that don’t involve direct contact with workers, even though this accounts for the vast majority of work that consultants engage in; and 2) even activities that clearly must be reported very often are not. Research from LaborLab found that 57% of employers who were <em>known</em> to owe a financial disclosure for having hired a union avoidance consultant in 2024 had failed to file their required disclosure by June 30, 2025, three months after the filing deadline (LaborLab 2025). In 2024, a total of 153 employers filed a financial disclosure, according to the LaborLab report. This showcases a significant amount of underreporting from employers when one considers that over 3,200 union election petitions were filed in 2024, and that 71%–87% of employers hire a union avoidance consultant when faced with a union-organizing drive (NLRB 2026; DOL n.d.). If most “advice” provided by consultants were included, EPI estimates employers spend $442 million per year on both attorney and non-attorney consultants for anti-union campaign services.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>However, that still represents only a fraction of what employers spend on union avoidance. The EPI estimate excludes spending on legal counsel, representation and litigation aimed at defeating organizing drives and stalling contract negotiations, as well as strike preparation and strike-breaking services (McNicholas et al. 2019). It further excludes spending on consultants to implement or enhance employee engagement and “positive employee relations” programs that center around “union-substitution” policies (Levine et al. 2025). These programs feature techniques that are deliberately crafted to preempt, detect, and rapidly quash union organizing, including supervisor training, manipulative communication policies, surveillance techniques, “voice” mechanisms (like suggestion boxes), and employee-involvement programs (such as employee committees and teams).</p>
<p>As mentioned, EPI estimates that employers spend at least an estimated $442 million on anti-union campaign services provided by consultants that are designed to persuade or intimidate workers into voting “no” in union elections. Many of these consultants are also practicing attorneys who simultaneously will provide legal counsel and representation services related to NLRB proceedings. These attorneys also will help employers bend the law to their advantage during contract negotiations, prepare for and break strikes, file unfair labor practice charges to weaken unions and defend employers against such charges, sometimes appealing them not just to the NLRB but also into federal courts. Inclusive of all of these services, the traditional labor relation practices of these law firms generate an estimated $1.48 billion on average.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> When we account for overlap (much labor practice revenue comes from providing anti-union campaign services, not just representation and counsel), these two figures suggest that total spending on attorneys (whether for representation, consulting, or both) and non-attorney consultants is roughly $1.7 billion a year.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> <strong>Table 2</strong> shows top law firms’ share of cases at NLRB and the estimated revenue the labor relations practices of these firms generated in 2024.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-320466 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="320466" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/320466-35746-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Union avoidance law firms</h2>
<p>Prominent law firms—such as Littler Mendelson, Morgan Lewis, and Jackson Lewis—have generated substantial business in union avoidance work on behalf of U.S. employers seeking to frustrate worker organizing and collective bargaining. As shown in Table 2, these law firms do a great deal of business before the National Labor Relations Board, the independent agency charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRA is the nation’s fundamental labor law that guarantees most private-sector workers the right to organize and the right to collective bargaining. However, decades of federal policy and court decisions have weakened the NLRA (Shierholz et al. 2024). Union avoidance consultants and law firms have long exploited the law’s significant loopholes, making it harder and harder for workers to win unions. For nearly 80 years, policymakers have failed to address the NLRA’s weaknesses and restore meaningful union and collective bargaining rights to workers.</p>
<p>These law firms have represented employers in fighting against some of the largest organizing efforts over the last decade, including worker organizing drives at Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s (Logan 2025). These law firms have essentially created a specialized practice of union busting and together have generated billions of dollars in revenue, as shown in Table 2. The firms range from exclusively labor and employment firms to full-service corporate firms offering representation in a range of matters. The following are profiles of three law firms that have been at the center of the largest union avoidance campaigns in recent years.</p>
<h3>Littler Mendelson</h3>
<p>One of the largest union avoidance law firms is Littler Mendelson, a global management-side law firm with more than 1,800 attorneys who can make upwards of $1,700 an hour (Littler Mendelson 2026).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> In Littler Mendelson’s 80-year history, it has represented the likes of Amazon, Delta Airlines, and McDonald’s and has played a predominant role in Starbucks’s anti-union campaign (Logan 2022; Logan 2025). Beyond offering their union-busting services to employers, Littler Mendelson has expanded their services to include promoting anti-worker legislation. For example, Littler Mendelson’s Workplace Policy Institute (WPI) played a predominant role in opposing California’s Assembly Bill (AB) 5, legislation aimed at protecting workers by combatting misclassification (Poydock 2020). WPI also supported the passage of Proposition 22, which exempted gig workers from AB5 (McNicholas and Poydock 2019). WPI is part of the Coalition for Workplace Innovation, which has lobbied for proposals that weaken workers’ rights, including the exclusion of gig/app-based workers from employee status (Pinto 2022).</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h3>Morgan Lewis</h3>
<p>Morgan Lewis also has a large practice aimed at union avoidance (Morgan Lewis 2026). The firm is a global law firm with nearly 2,000 attorneys, representing the likes of Amazon, REI, and McDonald’s. In addition to being one of the largest union avoidance law firms, Morgan Lewis is also known as one of the most expensive firms, with partners making $1,100 to $1,900 an hour.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Morgan Lewis is the lead law firm engaged in the legal challenge to have the NLRB declared unconstitutional, despite employing multiple former NLRB officials (Rhinehart and McNicholas 2024).</p>
<h3>Jackson Lewis</h3>
<p>Another law firm with a significant union avoidance practice is Jackson Lewis, a national labor and employment law firm with a nearly 70-year history in union avoidance (Jackson Lewis 2026). The firm has over 1,000 attorneys who can make upwards of $730 per hour.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Jackson Lewis has an especially robust presence in the higher education and health care industries but also serves major companies in a wide range of other industries, such as ExxonMobil, Amazon, and Google. As with other union avoidance law firms, Jackson Lewis’s services go beyond legal representation—often providing employers a “full-service” campaign in which they train supervisors and design materials, including speeches, to dissuade workers from organizing a union (Correia 2019).</p>
<h2>How union avoidance law firms frustrate worker organizing</h2>
<p>The NLRB election process is designed to be straightforward. Workers seeking to form a union file an election petition with the NLRB with signatures of at least 30% of the proposed bargaining unit. If parties cannot agree on a bargaining unit and election logistics, the NLRB will hold a hearing on issues of disagreement and then issue a decision and direct that an election be held. Either party can file post-election objections over the conduct of the election and other issues. Once these issues are resolved, if a majority of workers casting valid ballots in the election vote for union representation, the NLRB will certify the union and direct the parties to begin bargaining.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While the NLRB election process is supposed to be relatively simple, the strategy of union avoidance law firms follows a standard playbook—they use their overwhelming resources to exploit the NLRB’s administrative processes and sometimes create nearly endless delays. This includes challenging bargaining units and election results and filing endless appeals of adverse decisions (See <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong> for examples). The result is to create an unnecessarily complicated and protracted legal process for workers. The NLRB’s own performance objectives aim to ensure that the median age of representation and unfair labor practice cases before the Board is 180 days or less (NLRB 2025). While the NLRB has achieved this goal for many years, the median age for cases is over 100 days and for some workers, it can take years. For example, the NLRB only recently ordered Amazon—an employer known for hiring Littler Mendelson, Morgan Lewis, and Ogletree Deakins—to bargain with workers <strong><em>who voted to unionize over four years ago</em> </strong>(Bensinger 2026).</p>
<h2>Impact of union avoidance</h2>
<p>The roughly $1.7 billion U.S. employers spend each year on anti-union law firms and consultants has an undeniable impact on workers’ ability to organize and bargain collectively. It also contributes to the creation of an economy marked by inequality: It has been well documented that the decline in unionization has contributed to increased income inequality over the last several decades (Bivens et al. 2023). It is no coincidence that the overall decline in unionization follows decades of federal policy neglect that have weakened U.S. labor law. The loopholes in U.S. labor law, which union avoidance consultants and law firms exploit, routinely frustrate workers’ organizing and collective bargaining, enabling wealthy corporations to prosper at workers’ expense.</p>
<p>Why would these corporations want to frustrate workers’ organizing? Consider the benefits unions provide for workers and their communities. When workers join together in a union and engage in collective bargaining, they see higher wages and better benefits (McNicholas, Poydock, and Shierholz 2026). Further, in communities with higher union density rates, working families have higher incomes, greater access to health care, and few voter restrictions (McNicholas et al. 2025). It is clear that when unions are strong, workers have more power and their communities thrive.</p>
<p>Despite the erosion of U.S. labor law and the standard playbook of union avoidance, workers do win unions and union contracts. In 2025, 16.5 million workers in the United States were represented by a union—an increase of 463,000 from 2024 and the highest number of unionized workers in the U.S. in 16 years. The 2025 rise in union density coincides with a high public favorability toward unions, with nearly 70% of people in the U.S. viewing unions favorably (Brenan 2025). Further, research from the Pew Research Center finds that most people in the U.S. see the decline in union density as bad for the country (60%) and bad for working people (62%) (Van Green 2025).</p>
<p>To sustain the modest gains seen in union density in 2025, policymakers must act to restore workers’ rights to a union and collective bargaining. This is critical to the health of our economy and to ensuring that workers receive a fair share of the profits they help produce. Policymakers must pass the Richard L. Trumka Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act, which would help restore private-sector workers’ ability to form unions and bargain collectively.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> The PRO Act addresses many of the major shortcomings with U.S. labor law by establishing civil penalties for employers who violate workers’ rights, creating an election process that limits employer interference, and establishing a bargaining process for reaching a first contract in a timely manner. The PRO Act also would shed light on the union avoidance industry by requiring prompt disclosure of union-busting activities and closing the “advice” loophole through which employers and consultants have evaded reporting (McNicholas, Poydock, and Rhinehart 2021).</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>The authors would like to thank Joe Fast and Hannah Faris for their research assistance for this report.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Appendix</h2>
<h3>Methodology for labor practice revenue estimate</h3>
<p>Estimated revenue of company-level labor practices and of U.S. labor practices as a whole was calculated in the following manner.&nbsp;</p>
<p>First, we divided the number of attorneys listed in a company’s labor practice in 2026 by the number of attorneys that Law.com reported that the firm had in 2024, the most recent year for which Law.com data are available. We treated that figure as an initial indicator of the fraction of the firm’s total revenue that came from its labor practice. We then multiplied that fraction by the company’s total 2024 revenue, as reported by Law.com. Next, we discounted the result by 50%, on the conservative assumption that half of the revenue generated by attorneys in a company’s labor practice was earned for work performed in other areas of law than labor law. (Many labor relations attorneys belong to multiple practices, often practicing both labor law and employment law at the same company.) This calculation yielded our estimate of the revenue generated by a firm’s labor practice in 2024, inclusive of both representation and consulting services.&nbsp;</p>
<p>We performed this calculation for the six law firms with 1.5% market share or more in 2024, where market share is defined here as a firm’s share of all NLRB cases in 2024. We then estimated the total revenue generated by all U.S. labor practices by dividing the sum of the six firms’ estimated labor practice revenue by the sum of the six firms’ market share.</p>
<p>Market share data were obtained through a custom query of NLRB data compiled by Labor Data (https://labordata.bunkum.us/). The number of attorneys in a company’s labor practice was obtained by tallying the number of attorneys listed on each company’s labor relations practice page in March 2026 and weeding out any attorneys practicing outside the U.S.&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Note:</strong> The share of revenue generated by attorneys in a labor practice that comes exclusively from labor relations services (rather than other areas of practice, such as employment law) may vary significantly by each law firm. For example, our labor practice revenue estimate for Littler Mendelson is lower than our estimate for Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &amp; Stewart, even though the former has greater market share than the latter does. This may be because our 50% assumption is too low in Littler Mendelson’s case. Perhaps attorneys in Littler Mendelson’s labor practice specialize in labor relations more often and more intensively than attorneys in Ogletree’s labor practice, thereby leading to higher labor practice revenue for Littler than our estimate suggests.</p>


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<h2><strong>Notes</strong></h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Julia Wolfe, Ben Zipperer, Gordon Lafer, and Lola Loustaunau, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/"><em>Unlawful: U.S. Employers Are Charged with Violating Federal Law in 41.5% of All Union Election Campaigns</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 2019. To arrive at the $442 million figure, we take the $338 million dollar estimate from McNicholas et al. 2019, which covered the four-year period 2014–2017, and adjust it for inflation to 2025 dollars, according to Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) estimates using the annual average of the BLS CPI-U for 2014–2017 and BLS C-CPI-U for 2025. The estimated rates for consultants are from McNicholas et al. 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Full methodology for this calculation can be found in the methodology section in the appendix.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> We assume about half ($221 million) of the $442 million goes to attorney consultants for anti-union campaign services, which we also capture in the law firms’ labor practice revenue of $1.48 billion. To get to the $1.7 billion, we add the remaining of the $442 million ($221 million) on non-attorney consultants with the law firm revenue estimates ($1.48 billion).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Author’s analysis of public court documents and engagement letters sourced from LexisNexis and municipality websites.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Author’s analysis of public court documents and engagement letters sourced from LexisNexis and municipality websites.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Author’s analysis of public court documents and engagement letters sourced from LexisNexis and municipality websites.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Richard L. Trumka Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2025, [H.R. 20], 119th Cong. (2025).</p>
<h2><strong>References</strong></h2>
<p>Bensinger, Greg. 2026. “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/amazon-must-negotiate-with-staten-island-warehouse-workers-nlrb-says-2026-04-02/">Amazon Must Negotiate with Staten Island Warehouse Workers, NLRB Says</a>.” <em>Reuters</em>, April 2, 2026.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh, Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Jennifer Sherer, and Monica Leon. 2023. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/summer-strike-activity/"><em>What to Know About This Summer’s Strike Activity</em>.</a> Economic Policy Institute, August 2023.</p>
<p>Brenan, Megan. 2025. “<a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/694472/labor-union-approval-relatively-steady.aspx">Labor Union Approval Relatively Steady at 68% in U.S.</a>” Gallup, August 28, 2025.</p>
<p>Correia, David. 2019. “<a href="https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/4267-union-busting-on-campus-jackson-lewis-and-higher-education-anti-unionism">Union Busting on Campus: Jackson Lewis and Higher Education Anti-Unionism</a>.” Verso Books, March 11, 2019.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). n.d. <em><a href="https://static.politico.com/24/b9/727920a748889063f7ce7213ab5d/persuader-rule-fact-sheet.pdf">Persuader Agreements: Ensuring Transparency in Reporting for Employer and Labor Relations</a></em> (fact sheet). n.d.</p>
<p>Department of Labor, Office of Labor–Management Standards (OLMS). 2026. “OPDR–LM-10 Employer” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Gregg, Forest. 2026. “<a href="https://labordata.bunkum.us/">Labor Data</a>.” Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Jackson Lewis. 2026. “<a href="https://www.jacksonlewis.com/firm/about-us">About Us</a>” (web page). Accessed May 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Kaufman, Bruce E., and Paula E. Stephan. 1995. “<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02685719">The Role of Management Attorneys in Union Organizing Campaigns</a>.” <em>Journal of Labor Research</em> 16 (December 1995): 439–454. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02685719.</p>
<p>LaborLab. 2025. <a href="https://laborlab.us/widening-divide-employers-and-union-busters-skirt-reporting-rules-while-unions-comply/"><em>One-Sided Transparency: The Growing Gap Between Required Annual Union Versus Employer and Persuader Filings and OLMS Compliance Efforts Continues to Widen</em></a>. July 2025.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Fisher Phillips” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Jackson Lewis” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Littler” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Morgan Lewis” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Ogletree Deakins (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Law.com. 2026. “Seyfarth” (web page). Accessed May 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Levine, Jonathan O., Tanja L. Thompson, Brooke E. Niedecken, and Brendan Fitzgerald. 2025. <a href="https://www.littler.com/news-analysis/littler-report/littler-labor-survey-report-2025"><em>Littler’s 2025 Labor Survey Report</em></a>. Littler Mendelson, September 30, 2025.</p>
<p>Littler Mendelson. 2026. “<a href="https://www.littler.com/about/history">Our Firm History</a>” (web page). Accessed May 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Logan, John. 2022. “<a href="https://lawcha.org/2022/03/07/10-key-facts-littler-mendelson/">Not Your Father’s Anti-Union Movement: Ten Key Facts About Starbucks’ Union Avoidance Law Firm, Littler Mendelson</a>.” The Labor and Working-Class History Association (LAWCHA), March 7, 2022.</p>
<p>Logan, John. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/corporate-union-busting/"><em>Corporate Union Busting in Plain Sight: How Amazon, Starbucks, and Trader Joe’s Crushed Dynamic Grassroots Worker Organizing Campaigns</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2025.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, and Margaret Poydock. 2019. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-californias-ab5-protects-workers-from-misclassification/">How California’s AB5 Protects Workers from Misclassification</a></em> (fact sheet). Economic Policy Institute, November 14, 2019.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Lynn Rhinehart. 2021. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/why-workers-need-the-pro-act-fact-sheet/">Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act</a></em> (fact sheet). Economic Policy Institute, February 9, 2021.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Heidi Shierholz. 2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/workers-resolve-drives-increase-in-unionization-in-2025/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Workers’&nbsp;Resolve Drives Increase in Unionization in 2025</em></a>.&nbsp;Economic&nbsp;Policy Institute, February 2026.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, Heidi Shierholz, and Hilary Wething. 2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-arent-just-good-for-workers-they-also-benefit-communities-and-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Unions Aren’t Just Good for Workers—They Also Benefit Communities and Democracy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, Julia Wolfe, Ben Zipperer, Gordon Lafer, and Lola Loustaunau. 2019.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/"><em>Unlawful: U.S. Employers Are Charged with Violating Federal Law in 41.5% of All Union Election Campaigns</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2019.</p>
<p>Morgan Lewis. 2026. “<a href="https://www.morganlewis.com/our-firm" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Our Firm</a>” (web page). Accessed May 8, 2026.</p>
<p>National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-130/nlrb-fy2025-par.pdf"><em>The National Labor Relations Board 2025&nbsp;Performance and Accountability Report</em></a>.&nbsp;Fiscal Year 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>National Labor Relations Board&nbsp;(NLRB). 2026. “<a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/search/case?f%5b0%5d=case_type:R&amp;s%5b0%5d=Open&amp;s%5b1%5d=Closed&amp;s%5b2%5d=Open%20-%20Blocked&amp;date_start=01%2F01%2F2024&amp;date_end=12%2F31%2F2024" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Case Search</a>” (web page). Accessed May 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Pinto, Maya. 2022.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/how-the-coalition-for-workforce-innovation-is-putting-workers-rights-at-risk/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>How the ‘Coalition for Workforce Innovation’ Is Putting Workers’ Rights at Risk</em></a>.&nbsp;Gig Workers Rising,&nbsp;National Employment Law Project,&nbsp;PowerSwitch&nbsp;Action,&nbsp;Service Employees International Union, and&nbsp;Temp Worker Justice, July 2022.</p>
<p>Poydock, Margaret.&nbsp;2020.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-passage-of-californias-proposition-22-would-give-digital-platform-companies-a-free-pass-to-misclassify-their-workers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Passage of California’s Proposition 22 Would Give Digital Platform Companies a Free Pass to Misclassify Their Workers</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Working Economics Blog</em>&nbsp;(Economic Policy Institute),&nbsp;October 22, 2020.</p>
<p>Rhinehart, Lynn, and Celine McNicholas.&nbsp;2024.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/whats-behind-the-corporate-effort-to-kneecap-the-national-labor-relations-board-spacex-amazon-trader-joes-and-starbucks-are-trying-to-have-the-nlrb-declared-unconstitutional/">What’s Behind the Corporate Effort to Kneecap the National Labor Relations Board?: SpaceX, Amazon, Trader Joe’s, and Starbucks Are Trying to Have the NLRB Declared Unconstitutional—After Collectively Being Charged with Hundreds of Violations of Workers’ Organizing Rights.</a>”&nbsp;<em>Working Economics Blog</em>&nbsp;(Economic Policy Institute),&nbsp;March 7, 2024.</p>
<p>Shierholz,&nbsp;Heidi,&nbsp;Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Jennifer Sherer. 2024.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/union-membership-data/"><em>Workers&nbsp;Want Unions, but&nbsp;the Latest Data Point&nbsp;to Obstacles&nbsp;in Their Path:&nbsp;Private-Sector Unionization Rose by More Than a Quarter Million&nbsp;in 2023, While Unionization&nbsp;in State&nbsp;and Local Governments Fell</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2024.</p>
<p>Van Green, Ted. 2025. “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/27/majorities-of-adults-see-decline-of-union-membership-as-bad-for-the-us-and-working-people/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Majorities of Adults See Decline of Union Membership as Bad for the U.S. and Working People</a>.” Pew Research Center, August 27, 2025.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DOL&#8217;s proposed rule on &#8220;Employee or Independent Contractor Status&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 17:58:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heidi Shierholz, Samantha Sanders, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=320850</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Daniel Navarrete, Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Wage and Hour U.S. Department of Labor, Room 200 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical&nbsp;</a></em></p>
<p>Daniel Navarrete, Director<br />
Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation<br />
Wage and Hour Division<br />
U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502<br />
200 Constitution Avenue NW<br />
Washington, D.C. 20210</p>
<p><strong>Comments on </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical"><strong>RIN 1235-AA46</strong></a><strong>: Employee or Independent Contractor Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act</strong></p>
<p>Dear Director Navarrete:</p>
<p>We submit these comments from the <a href="https://www.epi.org/">Economic Policy Institute</a> (EPI) on the Department of Labor’s (“Department” or “DOL”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) regarding the standard for determining who is an employee and who is an independent contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”).</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.</p>
<p>We strongly oppose the Department’s rule as proposed. We urge the Department to withdraw this rule and instead allow the long-standing test for determining employee status under the FLSA to stand.</p>
<p>EPI has conducted extensive research and analysis over the years on the harms of worker misclassification. As we have outlined, workers classified as independent contractors have no right to earn the federal minimum wage, or to earn overtime pay. They lose eligibility for unemployment insurance if they lose their work, and to workers’ compensation if they are injured on the job. They are less likely to receive employer-provided job benefits, such as health insurance and retirement benefits. They lose the right to paid sick or family leave in states and localities that extend those rights, and they would lose the right to even unpaid, but job-protected, family and medical leave under FMLA. Workers classified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">We attach here an April 2026 EPI report</a><a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> estimating the concrete economic costs of misclassification for 11 commonly misclassified types of jobs, among those most likely to be negatively affected by this rule. These include lower-wage, labor intensive jobs such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers. Workers in these and other occupations stand to lose wages, benefits, and the basic labor protections they should be owed under the FLSA.</p>
<p>The FLSA has a plain-language definition of “employ,” which “includes to suffer or permit to work.” This is a deliberately broad definition that was intended to provide the FLSA’s protections to most workers. The NPRM also seeks to once again upend the clear, long-standing “economic reality” test, which examines multiple factors to get to the central issue of worker classification: is the worker <em>truly</em> in business for themselves, or do they depend economically on finding work in the business of others, under the control and terms of the employer?</p>
<p>Instead of examining all of the relevant factors in a worker’s situation, the NPRM proposes elevating the factors of the level of control the employer exerts, and the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, above all others in making a determination about whether someone is truly in business for themselves.</p>
<p>This would fail to account for the economic realities of many working relationships: for instance, would the primary work of the employer be able to get done without the worker? How permanent or exclusive is the work being performed—is there a fixed ending date? Does the worker invest in their own tools and equipment, marketing, or business plan, or is it the employer making those investments? Does the worker rely on the employer for training on how to get the job done? All of these questions fall under the factors that the NPRM would deprioritize—even though they provide important information about whether or not someone is truly in business for themselves, and thus that the employer doesn’t have an obligation to them under the FLSA.</p>
<p>This would narrow the definition of who is a covered employee under these three statutes. DOL’s NPRM will encourage misclassification schemes and a race to the bottom, where employers will be able to reclassify their employees as independent contractors and evade their obligations under these laws. Further, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common.</p>
<h3>An analysis of the proposed rule’s potential costs to workers</h3>
<p>In the proposed rule, the Department egregiously fails to estimate the transfers between employers, workers, and the social insurance system that would occur if this proposal were finalized. The requirements that agencies must follow as a part of the rulemaking process are very clear, and among them is the requirement that agencies must assess all quantifiable costs and benefits “to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated.”<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> There is no question that DOL&nbsp;could&nbsp;have produced estimates; in what follows, we show that it is straightforward to produce estimates using data researchers routinely use and taking a methodological approach that is in the spirit of estimates the Department of Labor undertakes on a regular basis. One plausible explanation for why DOL left out the required estimate is that any good-faith estimate would have shown this rule will result in a substantial transfer from workers and the social insurance system to employers.</p>
<p>The Department only briefly touches on potential benefits to workers from their proposal. DOL estimates a 1-3% increase in the total number of independent contractors as a result of their proposed rule.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> However, DOL appears to assume that this increase will come entirely from people who were otherwise not engaging in paid work entering the workforce anew as independent contractors. This means the Department also assumes that there will not be significant reclassification of workers who are currently employees to independent contractor status. Given what we know about the scale of misclassification already occurring under current law, this seems to be, at best, a woefully naive understanding of what employers might do when faced with a weaker standard sanctioned by DOL. Further, our analysis of commonly-misclassified occupations shows that the independent contractor version of paid work actually has less value for the worker than the employee-status version that the same worker could find – in other words, the worker still bears costs because the independent contractor version of the work likely offers lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer protections.</p>
<p>In this comment we will estimate these transfers from workers and the social insurance system to employers. The basic structure of this analysis is to take (1) the estimated change in the value of a job to a worker if they are classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and (2) the estimated change in payments to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and then multiply these figures by the estimated number of workers who will shift to independent contractor status if this rule is finalized. This approach will yield the aggregate impact of the rule on workers and on social insurance system coffers.</p>
<p>In a recent publication, EPI estimated (1) and (2) above for workers in lower-wage, labor intensive occupations most likely affected by the rule, such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a></p>
<p>The cost to workers in these occupations of being classified as an independent contractor instead of a payroll employee ranges from $6,294 annually for retail sales workers (under extremely conservative assumptions), to $23,266 annually for truck drivers (under less conservative assumptions). Similarly, the annual cost to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee ranges from $600 for manicurists (again under extremely conservative assumptions), to $3,046 for construction workers (again under less conservative assumptions).</p>
<p>Given that we do not have a way to determine where the average impact for those affected by the proposed rule falls in those broad ranges, we simply take the lower bound in both cases, to be extremely conservative. <strong>Thus, we assume that the cost to workers is $6,294 annually, and the cost to social insurance programs is $600 per reclassified worker annually</strong><strong>. </strong></p>
<p>It should be noted that these lower-bound estimates assume that workers classified as independent contractors are paid not just the full regular pay of a W-2 employee, but also are fully compensated for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This is, however, highly unlikely in these occupations. The theory that businesses will not be able to pay less in total compensation to workers if their status shifts from employee to independent contractor—that their base pay will rise to make up for a reduction in benefits—is based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets. There is broad and growing evidence that perfect competition is rare, and that most labor markets do not function competitively—particularly low-wage labor markets like those under consideration here, where workers are more likely to lack the power to bargain for higher wages to compensate for their loss of benefits and increase in taxes when they become independent contractors.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Further, very low-wage employees whose wage is elevated by the minimum wage could easily see their wage drop when, as independent contractors, they no longer legally must be paid the minimum wage.</p>
<h4>How will the share of the workforce who are payroll employees and the share of the workforce that are independent contractors change as a result of this rule?</h4>
<p>To begin to answer that question, we need to know how many independent contractors there currently are. There is a great deal of uncertainty around this number (the Department notes that “there are a variety of estimates of the number of independent contractors, and these span a wide range based on methodologies and how the population is defined”).<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> The July 2023 Contingent Worker Supplement finds that there were 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. This number, however, drastically underestimates the total number of independent contractors by not including workers who do independent contracting on the side, in addition to a payroll job. The Department makes a correction for this issue and estimates that there are 24.8 million individuals working as contractors at a given time. For the sake of the calculations in this comment, we will limit the analysis to the 11.9 million workers the CWS finds are independent contractors in their main job, since workers who do independent contracting as a side job likely work fewer hours and therefore may lose less than the $6,294 we are conservatively assuming workers whose status changes as a result of this rule lose annually. It should be noted that this means we are leaving out many millions of independent contractors and our estimates will, as a result, be extremely conservative for this reason as well.&nbsp;</p>
<h4>How much will independent contracting increase as a result of this rule?</h4>
<p>The Department’s proposal would potentially allow companies to legally argue that workers who are now misclassified as independent contractors, or who are working “off the books,” would be legitimately classified as independent contractors under the narrow terms of the proposal. As such, one approach would be to use the percentage of workers misclassified or working off the books under current law to estimate the number of workers who could be reclassified as independent contractors under the proposed rule. However, due to severe data constraints, estimates of the share of workers who are misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books are limited. A 2020 paper estimates that between 12.4% and 20.5% of workers in the construction industry are either misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> Conservatively assuming that the bottom of this range applies more broadly to the lowest-paid quartile of the U.S. labor market, that is<strong> 5.1 million low wage workers who may be affected by this rule</strong>.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> Of course, these are workers who are already not getting the benefit of being a payroll employee, so the economic impacts described above would not apply. However, this exercise does provide a broad sense of the potential scope of workers affected. Further, even these workers lose something of value under this rule given the current enforcement regime, namely the legal right to the wages and benefits they would receive if they were properly classified. We do not attempt to quantify this effect.</p>
<p>To be exceedingly conservative, we will simply assume that there will be an increase as a result of this rule of 5% in the number of workers who are independent contractors in their main job.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> This translates into an increase of just 595,000 workers who are independent contractors at their main job, given the conservative CWS estimate of 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. Multiplying that by our conservative estimate that these workers would lose $6,294 per year yields <strong>an aggregate loss to workers of over $3.7 billion annuall</strong>y. Further, <strong>social insurance funds would lose at least $357 million annually</strong> (595,000 times $600) in the form of reduced employer contributions, meaning this rule also results in a transfer of at least $357 million annually from social insurance funds to employers.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a></p>
<p>The NPRM would also have ripple effects in lost benefits and protections that employees are entitled to under other statues. The proposed rule would also extend the weakened definition of employee status to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (MSPA). Farm workers are already among the most vulnerable, low-paid workers in the U.S., and often face challenges at worksites including poor workplace safety conditions. If farm employers and farm labor contractors have the ability to offload more of their basic responsibilities under MSPA, more farm workers will be at risk of classification as independent contractors and lose even their basic rights under MSPA<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a>, such as to be paid on time or have their working conditions disclosed. More workers would also be at risk of losing access to the right to take job-protected, unpaid family and medical leave under FMLA, which also references the definition of “employee” under the FLSA to determine eligibility for FMLA coverage. The National Partnership for Women and Families has estimated that 15 million workers took advantage of FMLA leave in 2025 alone.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Protections for break time for nursing mothers—recently expanded under the PUMP Act—are also tied to FLSA employee status. Losing the right to take job-protected time off for illness or the birth of a child, the right to take a break to pump milk, the right to know when you will be paid and to be paid on time—these all specifically conflict with DOL&#8217;s stated interest in improving flexibility and satisfaction for workers. This is false flexibility.</p>
<h3><strong>The reality of flexible work </strong></h3>
<p>The Department focuses on “flexibility and satisfaction” as important non-pecuniary attributes that workers may trade income to receive. However, it is difficult to imagine that there are a meaningful number of workers who would get more satisfaction from doing the same job for substantially less compensation as an independent contractor than for substantially more compensation as a payroll employee. Many workers indeed may value flexibility, but notably, employers are able to provide a huge amount of flexibility to payroll employees if they choose to; the “inherent” tradeoff between flexibility and payroll employment is greatly exaggerated. Workers also highly value other factors, like income stability, which are much less prevalent among independent contractors and are not taken into account here.</p>
<p>In 2024, EPI published a report reviewing the available research and survey data on worker preferences regarding flexibility, stability, and predictability.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> While workers do often prefer flexibility and control over their own schedules, they also want stable, full-time work with predictable pay and benefits.</p>
<p>Employers often incorrectly claim that the FLSA prevents flexible scheduling, but employers control scheduling decisions and can organize work schedules to meet FLSA’s requirements. Employers have long been able to provide flexible schedules and comply with wage and hour laws, and flexible schedules have been negotiated by employers and unions in compliance with the law. Scheduling decisions are the employer’s prerogative (in negotiation with their workers’ union, if there is one), and they can and do set and change schedules in accordance with production demands. Independent contractor status is hardly needed for employers to provide their workers with flexibility.</p>
<p>In conclusion, we urge DOL to withdraw this rule as proposed. The Department should not be in the business of weakening labor protections standards, and should instead seek to vigorously enforce laws against misclassification.</p>
<p>Sincerely,</p>
<p>Samantha Sanders<br />
Director of Government Affairs &amp; Advocacy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<p>Heidi Shierholz, Ph.D.<br />
President<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<p>Valerie Wilson, Ph.D.<br />
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Maeve P. Carey, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf"><em>Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process</em></a>, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 9967.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Alan Manning Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Anna Sokolova and Todd Sorensen, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/monopsony-in-labor-markets-a-meta-analysis/"><em>Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, February 2020; Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri, “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets,” American Economic Review: Insights 2, no. 1 (March 2020): 33-46, <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 9962.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Russell Ormiston, Dale Belman, and Mark Erlich, <a href="http://iceres.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ICERES-Methodology-for-Wage-and-Tax-Fraud.pdf"><em>An Empirical Methodology to Estimate the Incidence and Costs of Payroll Fraud in the Construction Industry</em></a>, Institute for Construction Economics Research, January 2020.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Data from the Current Population Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics find that there were 163.0 million workers in the U.S. in the first quarter of 2026; 5.1 million = 163.0 million * .25 * .124.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> A 5% increase is a conservative assumption, given that the Department is proposing to amend the five-part economic realities test—which has always been interpreted by the Supreme Court in its totality, not weighing any one factor more than another—in a way that will place undue weight on two factors and then narrows those two factors further, making it more likely that workers will be classified as independent contractors and as a result likely leading to a substantial increase in the number of independent contractors.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Some might argue that social insurance funds wouldn’t be hurt by not having employers pay into unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation because independent contractors aren’t eligible for those benefits. However, low-paid independent contractors who lose their contracts and are without work, or get hurt on the job, will be likely to need to depend on safety net programs to survive, so the social insurance system as a whole would still be depleted.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Wage &amp; Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/35-mspa-joint-employment">Fact Sheet #35: Joint Employment and Independent Contractors Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act</a>,” revised January 2020.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> National Partnership for Women &amp; Families. 2026. <a href="https://nationalpartnership.org/report/fmla-key-facts/"><em>Key Facts: The Family and Medical Leave Act</em></a> (fact sheet), January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Margaret Poydock, Lynn Rhinehart, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/flexible-work/"><em>Flexible Work: What Workers, Especially Low-Wage Workers, Really Want And How Best To Provide It</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.</p>
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		<title>News from EPI › New report shows that misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and states</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/press/new-report-shows-that-misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-states/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 14:04:39 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=press&#038;p=320335</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Misclassification of employees as independent contractors robs workers of thousands of dollars per year&#160;and&#160;reduces revenue&#160;for&#160;social safety net&#160;programs, according to a&#160;new Economic Policy&#160;Institute analysis&#160;of 11 commonly misclassified Workers misclassified as independent contractors lose out on critical protections, benefits, and labor rights including the minimum wage, overtime pay, unemployment insurance, the right to form a union, and anti-discrimination protections in most states.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Misclassification of employees as independent contractors robs workers of thousands of dollars per year&nbsp;and&nbsp;reduces revenue&nbsp;for&nbsp;social safety net&nbsp;programs, according to a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">new Economic Policy&nbsp;Institute analysis</a>&nbsp;of 11 commonly misclassified jobs.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Workers misclassified as independent contractors lose out on critical protections, benefits, and labor rights including the minimum wage, overtime pay, unemployment insurance, the right to form a union, and anti-discrimination protections in most states. Additionally, these workers must bear the full financial costs of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Construction workers, truck drivers, and home health aides are some of the&nbsp;commonly misclassified jobs analyzed in the report.&nbsp;A&nbsp;typical construction worker misclassified as an independent contractor would lose as much as $20,399 in annual income and job benefits compared with what they would have earned as an employee. A typical truck driver, if misclassified as an independent contractor, would lose as much as $23,266 annually.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lost compensation due to misclassification varies by state. Estimated annual per-worker costs in lost compensation are as high as $31,326 for truck drivers in New Jersey. On average, misclassified workers stand to lose more in higher-wage states and occupations because W-2 earnings are greater, but losses are substantial in all states—as <a href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet/">accompanying state fact sheets show</a>.</p>
<p>Misclassification does not just shift the full burden of social insurance to workers—it also reduces the total revenues received by the social insurance system. The report estimates that social insurance systems can lose up to roughly 30% of per-worker revenue when workers are misclassified as independent contractors. This is because independent contractors do not contribute to unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation systems, and because they may earn less than they would as employees (and lower pay translates directly into lower contributions).</p>
<p>Embedding strong legal definitions—like the ABC test—in state and federal law is fundamental to ensuring that employees are not improperly classified as independent contractors. These strong legal tests&nbsp;must&nbsp;also&nbsp;be paired with strong enforcement mechanisms to uphold workers’ rights and deter employers from violating the law.&nbsp;</p>
<p>“Illegal misclassification of employees as independent contractors deprives workers of their labor rights, slashes their pay, and undermines funding for crucial social safety net programs,” said Nina Mast, EPI economic analyst and co-author of the report. “Policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels should act to curb misclassification and enforce the rights to which all workers should be entitled.”&nbsp;</p>
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