The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was enacted on March 11, 2021. Among other provisions, ARPA allocated $350 billion for State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF). SLFRF was a recognition of the stark reality that the COVID-19 pandemic had wreaked havoc on state and local government finances (McNicholas, Bivens, and Shierholz 2020). SLFRF was also a reflection of lessons that policymakers learned from recent history. In the years following the Great Recession, inadequate fiscal support to state and local governments resulted in massive budget cuts, public-sector job losses, and reduced spending that dragged on the economy, delaying economic recovery by years (Shierholz and Bivens 2013). With the prospect of potentially devastating COVID-19-induced state and local budget shortfalls, Congress and the Biden administration made the decision to spend at the scale of the problem by making sure SLFRF was large enough to meet its recipients’ needs.

Of the $350 billion in fiscal recovery funds, $195.3 billion went to state governments, $65.1 billion to counties, $45.6 million to cities, $20 billion to tribal governments, $4.5 billion to territories, and $19.5 to small units of local government, mostly towns and villages. They could use the funds for five purposes: responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19; responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19; providing premium pay to “essential” workers; improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure; and replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19. Recipient governments had until December 31, 2024, to obligate those funds and until December 31, 2026, to spend them.

By any objective assessment, SLFRF was a transformative success. It averted a potential crisis. It empowered state and local leaders to address long-standing community needs. It helped millions of working families. It saved lives during the COVID-19 pandemic. The design and implementation of SLFRF offer many important lessons to future policymakers.

This report will highlight the smart design of SLFRF, which made it well positioned to address the needs of state and local governments in 2021 and beyond. The report will also note ways in which future policymakers could improve upon SLFRF’s design. The report will describe how SLFRF funds were deployed, showcasing the breadth and variety of uses to which they were put. State and local fiscal recovery funds were a vital part of the U.S. economic recovery post-2020. They provide a shining example of what government can achieve when it has adequate resources, and when the needs of communities and families are the main drivers of investment decisions.

SLFRF played a vital role in preventing a second Great Recession

The pandemic recession that began so suddenly in March 2020 was the biggest economic shock the country has seen since the Great Recession that started in 2008. Comparing the distinctly different policy responses to those two crises demonstrates how important SLFRF was to speeding the economic recovery and to preventing a second Great Recession.

First, SLFRF was vital in preserving and rebuilding the public-sector workforce. In the wake of the Great Recession, state and local governments faced devastating budget cuts that resulted in significant reductions in staffing and services. All faced fiscal crises because of sharp revenue declines caused by the Great Recession, but public services were further strained in many states by deliberate policy decisions, predominantly by Republican-controlled state governments, to cut taxes and slash public services (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). State and local government employment peaked in July 2008, then fell for five straight years. It took a total of 11 years to reach July 2008 levels again (Cooper 2020). By contrast, the peak in state and local governments jobs before the pandemic was in February 2020. By October 2023—just three years and eight months later—state and local public sector employment had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels.

In the first year following the passage of ARPA, there is evidence that the pace of a state’s SLFRF spending was positively correlated to the recovery of its public workforce:

Table 1

After that, the direct correlation between SLFRF spending and public-sector jobs faded, but that is hardly surprising, given all the other variables that impact job markets.

Second, this rapid recovery mirrored the recovery of the overall job market. The typical U.S. state needed 77 months after the start of the Great Recession for its job numbers to recover; it only took 29 months after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic for the same level of recovery. Of course, SLFRF was hardly the biggest factor in the overall economic recovery, but Cooper (2020) has shown that disinvestment in the public sector drags on growth in the private sector as well, and on economic growth overall. SLFRF supported conditions that made the private-sector economic recovery possible.

Third, SLFRF allowed states and localities to enact programs of social insurance and income support that directly responded to immediate community needs. In just the first two years of SLFRF’s operation alone, more than 4.5 million households received mortgage, rent, or utility assistance. Emergency programs offered housing to people who had been displaced by the pandemic and direct government assistance to food pantries and other programs that helped people facing food insecurity. These programs were valuable tools for helping working families in need.

Fourth, SLFRF has helped state and local governments and communities become more resilient against future downturns. Many states upgraded their unemployment insurance (UI) systems to make it easier to cope with an influx of claimants in the future. Some local governments created greater tenant protections and used recovery funds to give tenants facing eviction the right to free legal counsel. Several cities invested in pre-apprenticeship programs to help people in underserved communities gain access to high-quality infrastructure and climate jobs. These investments and others like them will help state and local governments to quickly distribute social insurance benefits when the next crisis hits and provide additional safety for working families put in jeopardy through job loss, illnesses, or natural disasters. (Kamper 2025).

SLFRF’s innovative program design meant funds could be used where they did the most good

The SLFRF program had two unusual characteristics that helped make it successful.

First, unlike previous iterations of state and local aid, SLFRF funds went directly to individual state and local governments. While payments to smaller cities were distributed first to states and then passed on to those cities, states were prohibited from imposing conditions on that distribution and could not hold back the payments; their role was purely administrative.

On previous occasions when federal money was allocated to local governments, it was much more common for the state government to hold federal aid on behalf of local governments. This was, for example, the mechanism behind the COVID-19-era financial assistance to school districts: the Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER, which had three iterations in 2020 and 2021, called ESSER I, ESSER II, and ESSER III respectively). A state’s department of education held ESSER funds and only parceled them out to school districts after the district had made a qualifying expenditure. The districts were not free to spend ESSER funds on their own. With SLFRF, however, recipients received funds before they needed to make expenditures and had complete control over how to use them.

This leads to a second important characteristic of SLFRF: Recipients were given broad latitude in how to use their funds. Under the legislation and the rules put out by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, SLFRF could be used for:

1. responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19
2. responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19
3. providing premium pay to “essential” workers
4. improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure
5. replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19

In 2023, the eligible uses for local governments were broadened to include government-built (or renovated) housing, surface transportation projects, and natural disaster relief, though in the end only a small share of recovery funds was used for those purposes.

Treasury rules also made the process simpler for smaller local governments by allowing up to $10 million to be used as public-sector revenue replacement without having to account for specific losses of funding—the SLFRF equivalent of the standard deduction on one’s taxes. Those rules also made clear that “negative economic impacts” could include existing inequities that predated the pandemic, such as long-standing racial employment and wage gaps (Economic Policy Institute 2025).

The combination of these two characteristics—state and local governments had the money within their control before making spending decisions, and great latitude in how to use it—meant that recipients could tailor the focus and pace of SLFRF spending to meet particular local needs. Given the extremely fluid state of the pandemic and the economy when ARPA was passed, this was the right decision to meet the pressing needs of the COVID-19 crisis. Overly prescriptive rules or additional bureaucratic hurdles to accessing and disbursing funds would have made it much harder for state and local recipients to respond rapidly to their specific needs.1

Lessons to apply for future policy design

Despite the great freedom given to recipients to use SLFRF in ways that best met their needs, of the roughly 31,000 local government recipients, almost 600 local government recipients did not report using their fiscal recovery funds at all and a further 600 reported using less than 99%. Another 220 local governments failed to file a single report on their use of fiscal recovery funds, and 1,089 more have been delinquent in filing for at least a year.

At least part of the explanation is that while ARPA guidance allowed for fiscal recovery funds to be used for myriad reasons, recipients (especially smaller local governments) with little experience in receiving money directly from the federal government often struggled to understand Treasury rules on allowed uses of funds. Unlike state governments with experienced personnel deeply versed in Treasury’s complex rules and how to navigate them, many local governments had no such in-house expertise. Advocacy organizations reported, again and again, that even in 2024, as the deadline to obligate ARPA funds was approaching, many local policymakers were still raising questions about how funds could be used and what was allowed (Rochford, Bauer, and Wallace 2024).

Relatedly, Treasury officials who talked with EPI noted that many of the smallest local governments did not have a website or internal email system. Because all SLFRF reporting was supposed to be done electronically, some of these recipients struggled to properly report their expenditures. Sometimes the departure of a single municipal official created significant problems because that person was the only one who knew the electronic passwords.

An abundance of reports from across the country make clear recipients struggled to choose from among many appealing options, creating a kind of paralysis of choice. This is completely understandable; the needs communities were facing at this time were myriad and diverse, and prior to SLFRF, most local government officials had likely never had access to such flexible resources before then.

These challenges were exacerbated because the Treasury Department made a conscious decision not to offer specific technical assistance regarding recipient governments’ possible uses of fiscal recovery funds. When local government officials reached out to Treasury to seek guidance on whether a particular idea was within the scope of the law, Treasury rarely offered definitive answers. This was understandable given that more than 31,000 governmental units received their own fiscal recovery funds; Treasury could not possibly handle detailed queries from more than a fraction of them. What this meant, though, is that many opportunities to use fiscal recovery funds in innovative and imaginative ways were missed. Many local governments chose caution over ambition, out of fear that particular uses of the funds would not be permitted and the funds rescinded.

To prevent a similar situation in the future, policy designers might do well to study Colorado’s Regional Grant Navigator program. Colorado chose 13 community and nonprofit organizations across the state to help local governments find ways to best access funds from the 2021 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. These navigators helped local governments understand the complex regulations around the laws, helped them design proposals to apply for funding, and offered advice on which programs might be best suited to the needs of those communities (Colorado n.d.). A similar model might allow local governments to get unbiased and timely assistance from organizations committed to helping them make the most of their funds.

A final challenge of the SLFRF policy design was the lack of clear definition of what “obligating” the funds meant. As advocates, policymakers, and others reported throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024, many local governments understood “obligation” to mean something similar to “budgeting” or “allocating”—making a formal decision as to how to use the funds (Kamper 2024). Recipients unfamiliar with the language used by Treasury could and did make that mistake. It was not until May of 2024 that Treasury explicitly stated in a webinar that “obligating” funds is not the same thing as budgeting (Treasury 2024). “Obligation” required not just a budgetary decision, but concrete steps to implement the decision, such as signing a contract with a vendor or an interagency agreement to send the funds to a particular department. Future fiscal recovery efforts should be more conscious of the need to clearly define terms, especially when plain-language definitions may not match Treasury’s technical definition.

How were fiscal recovery funds used?

General spending trends

The primary use of fiscal recovery funds—approximately 50% of state allocations and 60% of local government allocations—was revenue replacement, (replacing state and local funds that were lost because the economic shock of COVID-19 reduced tax and fee revenues). Revenue replacement had not been an allowed use of previous iterations of COVID-19 fiscal relief funds. Most notably the CARES Act, the first COVID-19 relief measure passed in 2020, did not allow use of Coronavirus Relief Funds for revenue replacement.

State and local governments face considerable constraints on their ability to raise revenues. Measures like Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights and California’s Proposition 13 often prohibit states from raising taxes or require legislative supermajorities to do so (Jefferson 2025). Local governments face even more constraints, with few policy levers available to raise revenues. As such, any shock to state and local government revenues can take a long time to reverse, a lesson we learned in the aftermath of the Great Recession. By allowing revenue replacement, SLFRF made it much easier for state and local governments to maintain adequate levels of funding, even as the pandemic recession lowered income from taxes. Revenue replacement was an important innovation in ARPA that should be replicated in the future.

Although the interim rules for ARPA put out by Treasury soon after the law was enacted required complex accounting of lost revenue, the final Treasury rule made the process much easier. For amounts less than $10 million, recipients did not need to calculate lost revenue. They could simply designate funds as revenue replacement and use them as needed. The appeal of this rule to local governments is evident in data summarizing subsequent uses of SLFRF; the smaller a recipient government, the more likely they were to use their fiscal recovery funds for revenue replacement.

Table 2

After revenue replacement, the next most popular use of SLFRF was addressing negative economic impacts of the pandemic. Once again, the flexibility given to recipients under this category was almost certainly a key factor encouraging use of funds for such purposes.

Table 3

Infrastructure was the third-largest use of fiscal recovery funds, and here there is a notable regional variation—state and local governments in the South allocated a far greater share of their funds to infrastructure than those in the rest of the country. In particular, 82% of all state funds obligated for broadband were in Southern states (not shown in Figure A).

Figure A

Not only is water and sewer infrastructure essential for people’s health, these investments are vital to a well-functioning economy. As EPI has extensively documented in its Rooted in Racism series, Southern states have long underinvested in in basic physical infrastructure (Childers 2023–2025). These spending choices likely reflect, at least in part, a need to address the long-standing underinvestment in the region—underinvestment driven by Southern lawmakers’ antipathy toward raising adequate revenue.

Aside from infrastructure spending in the South, there are no clear regional trends in how fiscal recovery funds were used. This is not surprising, given the flexibility of the funding (a feature EPI has long supported) (Bivens 2020). When ARPA was enacted in early 2021, there was simply no way for the federal government, or state and local governments, to know what their needs would be. ARPA’s flexibility was the right decision. The ability of recipient governments to immediately fill unanticipated budget holes via revenue replacement meant hundreds of thousands of state and local jobs were preserved, vital public programs were maintained, and a deeper economic crisis averted. The most notable success of ARPA SLFRF lies in what did not happen: a collapse in basic public services, massive long-term unemployment, and an extended economic depression.

Innovative SLFRF investments supported working families

In all, SLFRF funded more than 159,000 different projects across the country. Some were gigantic, like a $787 million program in New Jersey to provide rental assistance to low- and moderate-income tenants, and some were very small, like the $28 that St. Clair County, Michigan, provided to help renovate the Port Huron Township Museum.

There are many examples of state and local governments using fiscal recovery funds to make transformative investments to build an economy that supports working families. Several types of uses deserve special attention: fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, investing in public health, and addressing problems with food access and nutrition.

First, ARPA SLFRF went a long way to address the health emergency the country faced in 2021. States, cities, and counties were on the front lines of keeping people safe, providing access to new vaccines once they became available, and saving lives throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over $1.8 billion in SLFRF was used to test, trace, and vaccinate people against COVID-19. Much of this money was used to deal with the practical and logistical challenges of testing and vaccination. Cities and counties, especially, bought personal protective equipment for government employees, especially first responders. Scores of governments purchased testing kits and lab equipment and worked to engage the public to encourage vaccination and tracing outbreaks. For example, Milan, Illinois, rented a meeting hall in town for $43,200 to host their vaccine clinic. Jefferson County, Missouri, hired a nurse for every public school district to oversee a contact-tracing program to track COVID-19’s progress through schools. Monroe County, Indiana, was one of many governments that instituted wastewater monitoring to check for COVID-19 surges While any individual expenditure may seem minor, together these measures did much to reduce COVID-19 infections and deaths.

Second, SLFRF allowed recipient governments to make long-term upgrades to infrastructure that both mitigated COVID-19 threats and made public spaces permanently safer, healthier, and more accessible. Almost $4.3 billion was obligated to upgrade the air quality and safety of public and private facilities. At least 550 projects upgraded HVAC systems in schools, nursing homes, public buildings, and correctional facilities. Governments invested in digital communications tools to reduce the need for in-person meetings. Typical examples include Peoria, Arizona, which allocated $124,996 to install touchless drinking fountains in public buildings, and Stafford County, Virginia, which spent $115,255 to add a glass partition to the entrance of the Commissioner of Revenue’s office so that the administrative staff could be protected from visitors’ virus transmission.

The freedom given to local governments to innovate was particularly evident in the way multiple localities sought to address problems related to food access and nutrition—an issue that has received tremendous public attention resulting from New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s plan to establish municipally operated grocery stores. While one commentator claimed such a project would resemble “the old Soviet Union” (McArdle 2025), the fact is that many SLFRF recipients used public funds to increase access to food for low-income communities, including by opening their own stores.

For example:

• Sioux Falls, South Dakota, set up a mobile grocery market that would operate in underserved parts of the city.
• The small town of Cutler, Illinois, set up a Community Commissary to make it easier to buy food without having to travel a long way.
• Branson, Colorado (population 74 in the 2010 census), constructed a community greenhouse to grow and sell fresh fruits and vegetables for the town and school.
• Charleston, West Virginia, opened a community grocery store that would provide access to fresh groceries for 14,000 residents, and the city of Austin, Texas, did something similar.

There were, in addition, scores of grants to food pantries and other nonprofits that help people find the food they need. The proposal for New York City fits well with how these communities used SLFRF to address food access.

Above are just a handful of the tens of thousands of useful projects made possible by fiscal recovery funds. Some uses were more effective than others, however. For example, although modernizing state unemployment insurance systems was a useful endeavor (see above), more than $22 billion was also spent replenishing state unemployment insurance trust funds, which was unnecessary. UI trust funds hold UI taxes paid by businesses, to make sure funds are available to pay UI claims during spikes in unemployment. While those funds had, indeed, been depleted by the pandemic recession, state UI trust funds are designed to be self-correcting.2 They have automatic mechanisms to raise employer payroll taxes when the trust fund has been drawn down, to rebuild the funds and be prepared for future downturns. It was wholly unnecessary to use fiscal recovery funds to refill trust funds that would have returned to full strength on their own. Spending SLFRF to refill trust funds was a missed opportunity to support economic growth and strengthened public services (Banerjee, Martinez Hickey, and Sawo 2021). Future fiscal recovery projects should not make refilling UI trust funds an allowed use, though they should continue to support modernization of and upgrades to UI systems.

SLFRF accomplished its goals without driving inflation

Finally, it is worth noting that, despite politically motivated claims to the contrary, there is little evidence that SLFRF, or indeed the entire $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, was a significant contributor to inflation. As Bivens, Banerjee, and Dzholos (2022) show, the rise in inflation starting in 2022 was a global phenomenon, one that impacted countries, regardless of whether they provided fiscal relief to their economies during COVID-19. Nor was inflation correlated with the rapid decrease in unemployment the U.S. saw, thanks in part to ARPA. Rather, inflation was primarily driven by the dramatic supply shocks to various sectors of the economy caused by COVID-19, and then exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Given the scale of the crisis policymakers were confronted with in early 2021, they were right to spend at the scale of the problem, and critiques blaming that spending for inflation are not backed up by the data. Moreover, policy measures that prioritized lowering inflation would have led to either lower employment or lower real wage growth, as there was no policy option that would have lowered inflation, increased wage gains, and supported the strong job growth of 2021–2024 (Bivens 2024).

Conclusion

ARPA’s State and Local Fiscal Recovery Fund was a great success. By spending at the scale of the problem, the federal government aided the economic recovery, supported the maintenance of public services, and gave myriad governments the chance to make innovative choices that have improved the well-being of their communities. A smaller SLFRF would have slowed our economic recovery and made governments more cautious about enacting bold policies to protect working families.

By giving recipient governments so much flexibility in using the funds, the Biden administration allowed every state, county, city, territory, and tribal government to fashion the response most appropriate to their particular needs. When faced with a crisis that had so much unpredictability, this was the right decision.

We don’t know when the next economic downturn, global pandemic, or climate disaster will hit. Whenever it does, federal policymakers should seek to emulate the model set by ARPA.

Notes

1. The devastating Flint, Michigan, water crisis of the 2010s is a prime example of a situation in which too many bureaucratic hurdles worsened a disaster. Flint was facing a serious fiscal crisis and therefore lacked the internal capacity to apply for federal funding (which they would have received) that might have prevented lead contamination of the water supply. See GAO 2015 for more details.

2. At least they should be, provided policymakers have set adequate UI tax base rates. See Perez 2025 for more information.

References

Banerjee, Asha, Sebastian Martinez Hickey, and Marokey Sawo. 2021. “States Are Choosing Employers over Workers by Using COVID Relief Funds to Pay Off Unemployment Insurance Debt: Policymakers Shouldn’t Be Afraid to Increase Taxes on Employers to Improve Unemployment Insurance.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), November 19, 2021.

Bivens, Josh. 2020. “Getting Serious About the Economic Response to COVID-19.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), March 9, 2020.

Bivens, Josh. 2024. “The Post-Pandemic Recovery Is an Economic Policy Success Story: Policymakers Took the Best Way Through a Rocky Path.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), October 1, 2024.

Bivens, Josh, Asha Banerjee, and Mariia Dzholos. 2022. “Rising Inflation Is a Global Problem: U.S. Policy Choices Are Not to Blame.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), August 4, 2022.

Callaghan, Peter. 2021. “The Minnesota Legislature Approved $250 Million for Pandemic Worker Bonuses. Should the State Give Away More Than That?” Minnpost, August 12, 2021.

Callaghan, Peter. 2022. “How the Legislature’s Deal on Pandemic Worker Bonuses and Unemployment Insurance Got Done.” Minnpost, May 4, 2022.

Childers, Chandra. 2023–2025. Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation (report series). Economic Policy Institute, October 2023–June 2025.

Colorado, State of. n.d. “Regional Grant Navigators” (web page). Accessed December 3, 2025.

Cooper, David. 2020. “Without Federal Aid, Many State and Local Governments Could Make the Same Budget Cuts That Hampered the Last Economic Recovery.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), May 27, 2020.

Cooper, David, Mary Gable, and Algernon Austin. 2012. The Public-Sector Jobs Crisis: Women and African Americans Hit Hardest by Job Losses in State and Local Governments. Economic Policy Institute, May 2012.

Economic Policy Institute. 2025. Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the United States: An Interactive Chartbook. Economic Policy Institute. October 2025.

Jefferson, Rita. 2025. Anti-Tax Revolts Backfire: What We’ve Learned from 50 Years of Property Tax Limits. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, July 2025.

Kamper, Dave. 2025. “Some States and Localities Will Be Better Prepared to Fight a Possible Recession Because of How They Used ARPA Fiscal Recovery Funds.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 30, 2025.

Kamper, Dave, and Emma Cohn. 2024. “Time Is Running out for State and Local Governments to Obligate American Rescue Plan Funds.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), October 17, 2024.

McArdle, Megan. 2025. “Zohran Mamdani Has a Seriously Bad Idea—for Grocery Stores.” Washington Post, July 1, 2025.

McNicholas, Celine, Josh Bivens, and Heidi Shierholz. 2020. “The Next Coronavirus Relief Package Should Provide Aid to State and Local Governments, Protect Employed and Unemployed Workers, and Invest in Our Democracy.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 27, 2020.

Perez, Daniel. 2025. Holding the Line: Unemployment Insurance. Economic Policy Institute, September 29, 2025.

Rochford, Patrick, Julia Bauer, and Michael Wallace. 2024. “Obligate It or Lose It! Preparing for the Upcoming ARPA SLFRF Obligation Deadline.” National League of Cities, October 1, 2024.

Shierholz, Heidi, and Josh Bivens. 2013. “Four Years into Recovery, Austerity’s Toll Is at Least 3 Million Jobs.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), July 3, 2013.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2024. “State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: New Obligation FAQs Webinar” (web page). Accessed December 3, 2025.

U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2025. “Public Data: State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds” (web page). Accessed December 11, 2025.

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2015. Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis: Federal Agencies Monitored Grants and Assisted Grantees, but More Could Be Done to Share Lessons Learned. Publication number 15-222, March 2015.

Wakeley, Dev. 2021. “Alabama Is Making a Costly Mistake on COVID-19 Recovery Funds. Here’s a Better Path Forward.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), November 8, 2021.

Who are low-income families of color?

Families in which the household head identifies as

• Black
• Hispanic
• American Indian or Alaska Native (AIAN)
• Asian American or Pacific Islander (AAPI)

With at least one child under the age of 18 living at home

With a total family income below 200% of the federal poverty line (below $64,300 in 2025 for a family of two adults and two children)

Introduction

Low-income families of color live in a permanent cycle of economic insecurity and uncertainty. These families make up a disproportionate share of the nearly 10 million families with children (9.7 million) who are either poor or vulnerable to poverty. As a result of their economic precarity, these families are among the first to experience the painful consequences of a recession. This was evident during the last two business cycle downturns: the Great Recession and the pandemic recession. We find that these two economic contractions dealt a mighty blow to the employment security of these families, triggering a rise in poverty and housing insecurity.

Given the weak policy response to the Great Recession, it took economically vulnerable families of color nearly a decade to recover in nearly all the economic domains we examine, including employment, poverty status, and housing insecurity. While the bold response to the pandemic recession led to a relatively faster rebound in employment, economically vulnerable families of color remain disproportionately burdened by poverty and housing insecurity.

Instead of easing the pain of economically vulnerable families, the Trump-Vance administration and congressional Republicans have been on the attack in the first half of 2025. They have gone after the agencies, laws, and programs that help protect these families from joblessness, discrimination, poverty, hunger, and premature death. In just its first 100 days, the administration deliberately cut the wages of workers, rolled back protections against bias in employment, and hacked away at staffing at agencies that support the well-being of low-income families (like the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services). As if this weren’t enough, the administration and congressional Republicans prioritized dealing a historic blow to Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). They cut spending on programs that provide desperately needed health care and nutritional support to families by more than $1 trillion (CBO 2025b).

The chaos and uncertainty ushered in by the economic mismanagement of the Trump-Vance administration even led to the first quarterly contraction in economic growth since 2022. With the prospects of another recession rising, the administration has done everything in its power to leave low-income families even more vulnerable to the pain ahead. As we illustrate in this report, economic downturns hit these families the hardest, and while we’ve learned a great deal since 2007 about how to protect them, the administration has chosen not to build upon those lessons. Instead of protecting the strong labor market they inherited, empowering workers to bargain for better pay and working conditions, and strengthening basic needs programs, the Trump-Vance administration is fighting for an economic agenda centered on austerity for the economically vulnerable and subsidies for the rich.

In just a short period of time, the Trump-Vance administration has left low-income families more economically insecure and vulnerable to pain as recession risks continue to rise

Since taking office, the Trump-Vance administration has worked to dismantle the basic protections that help shelter low-income families from even deeper economic insecurity and hardship. This attack on families has taken the form of executive actions undermining civil and workers’ rights. While some of President Trump’s executive orders have been challenged in court, their introduction has altered the policy discourse and the lived experience of low-income families of color throughout the U.S. with an explicitly racist and xenophobic agenda. Beyond executive actions, the Trump-Vance administration and congressional Republicans also passed one of the most sweeping cuts to the U.S. social safety net in recent history, gutting basic needs programs and making Medicaid and SNAP benefits much more difficult for families in need to access (Shierholz 2025). All of this was done to help offset the cost of tax cuts that disproportionately benefit rich households and corporations (The Budget Lab 2025).

Few policy issues have received as much priority in the Trump-Vance administration as their attack on economic justice and initiatives promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI). In just his first day in office, President Trump rolled back numerous executive actions expressing the federal government’s commitment to racial justice for Black, Hispanic, Native American, and Asian American, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islanders (EPI 2025d). President Trump later also rescinded executive actions that identified systemic barriers impeding Black Americans’ opportunity to fully participate in American society on a level playing field (EPI 2025e). Equity in the classroom is also under attack. This was evident when President Trump rescinded an executive order stating that all students should be guaranteed an educational environment free from discrimination, including discrimination in the form of sexual harassment, sexual violence, and on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity (EPI 2025c). These efforts form part of more than a dozen executive actions signed by President Trump in his first 100 days to roll back years of progress on racial and economic justice (McNicholas et al. 2025).

The Trump-Vance administration is also working to roll back anti-discrimination protections by weakening the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (Maye and Wilson 2025). Just days into his second term, President Trump dismissed two EEOC commissioners and the agency’s general counsel, years before the expiration of their appointment (Olson and Savage 2025; EPI 2025b). As a result of these dismissals, the commission lost the quorum needed to perform key functions. Trump has also redirected the EEOC’s priorities to focus more on investigating so-called DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination and anti-American national origin bias and discrimination (EEOC 2025; DOJ 2025). Because wages are the primary source of income for low-income families, weaker enforcement of anti-discrimination laws leaves families of color more vulnerable to employment and pay discrimination in the labor market.

The EEOC is not the only federal body that the Trump-Vance administration has weakened to the detriment of low-income families. In March 2025, President Trump signed an executive order that would effectively eliminate the U.S. Department of Education (ED). The U.S. Supreme Court later lifted a lower court decision that had blocked the administration from firing more than 1,300 employees at ED (Sherman 2025). While the merits of the case before the Supreme Court have yet to be decided, the gutting of ED will disproportionately harm children from low-income families of color that benefit from federal funding for under-resourced schools and programs aimed at closing learning and achievement gaps (Dianis 2025; EPI 2025a; Santhanam 2025).

More broadly, ED serves an essential role in helping enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in programs or activities that receive federal financial assistance (ED n.d.). Even the U.S. public health infrastructure is now under attack, as the Trump administration is committed to carrying out layoffs at federal health agencies focused on reducing premature and preventable deaths associated with pervasive racial health disparities (Moore 2025).

President Trump’s attacks on federal agencies that are vital to the provision of public goods and services for families are part of a larger war his administration has waged on workers. In his first 100 days, Trump replaced the leadership of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)—the federal agency tasked with protecting the most fundamental U.S. labor rights—with members more likely to carry out his agenda to erode workers’ union and collective bargaining rights (McNicholas et al. 2025). This will hurt the ability of workers to form and join unions at work. Unions are vital to working families, as union workers enjoy better wages and working conditions than their nonunion peers (Banerjee et al. 2021).

Beyond executive actions, the main legislative priority of the Trump-Vance administration imposed more than $1 trillion in cuts to basic needs programs in exchange for continuing a tax regime that overwhelmingly favors rich households and corporations (CBO 2025b; Shierholz 2025). Extending the 2017 tax cuts that President Trump enacted in his first term will not just favor the rich disproportionately. On its own, this extension can even suppress economic growth over the long run and leave policymakers with significantly less room to respond to another recession (Bivens 2025b). To help offset the cost of these large tax cuts to the rich, the Republican-led budget reconciliation bill that Trump signed into law adds more stringent work requirements to Medicaid and SNAP on top of historic cuts.

This combination will leave more than 22 million families at risk of losing some or all of their SNAP benefits and strip away health coverage for more than 11 million people (CBO 2025a; Wheaton et al. 2025). These cruel and misguided efforts will disproportionately hurt low-income families of color and children who are more likely than their peers to rely on Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) for health insurance, and SNAP and other nutritional assistance programs to avoid going hungry in the face of growing food insecurity (Cid-Martinez, Moore, and Maye 2025; Cid-Martinez 2025).

In its totality, the policy positions President Trump has advanced in his first 100 days via executive orders and legislative priorities will leave low-income families of color and children much more vulnerable to hardship. In the face of a recession, which is no longer a hypothetical scenario, the consequences would be devastating. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reported the first quarterly contraction of economic growth since 2022, and while growth climbed again in the second quarter, the U.S. economy is now growing significantly slower in the first half of 2025 than in the previous year (BEA 2025). And the chaotic economic climate that the current administration has generated with its trade, immigration, and macroeconomic policy management has increased the prospects of a recession (Bivens 2025a).

The fear of an approaching recession increased with the downward revision of employment gains that defined the weak jobs report published in August 2025 (EPI Staff 2025). What we see in the first half of 2025 is an economy being held back by anemic growth and a deteriorating labor market.

The upheaval that this administration has produced leaves low-income families of color exposed to future hardship. Without a bold policy response to recessions and the support of a strong welfare state, these families are hit hardest by economic downturns and sluggish economic recoveries (Bivens et al. 2025). This report sheds light on this reality by examining how the last two recessions impacted the well-being of low-income families, as captured by their employment situation, poverty status, and housing insecurity.

Low-income families of color with children and the last two recessions

What do we mean by low-income families of color with children?

The sample of families included in this analysis are those in which the household head has at least one child of their own, under age 18, living at home. Within these households, there may also be other members who have children under 18. Families of color are broadly defined as those whose household head identifies as Black, Hispanic, American Indian or Alaska Native (AIAN), or Asian American or Pacific Islander (AAPI).[1]

We further restrict this sample to a subset of economically vulnerable, or low-income, families, defined as having total family income below 200% of the federal poverty threshold.[2] To place the poverty threshold in context, the federal poverty line (FPL) for a single individual in the 48 contiguous states (excluding Alaska and Hawaii), and Washington, D.C., is $15,560 in 2025. While the FPL increases by $5,500 for each additional family member, a year-round worker earning the federal minimum wage ($7.25 an hour) can’t afford to keep their family out of poverty in 2025 (Hickey and Cid-Martinez 2025). For the remainder of this report, we will use families (of color) to refer to families (of color) with children, and the terms “economically vulnerable” and “low income” will be used interchangeably.

Drawing a demographic portrait of economically vulnerable families

While our main economic analysis is focused exclusively on Black and Hispanic families due to data limitations associated with the sample size of other groups, this section provides a demographic picture of low-income families of color more broadly. Table 1 shows low-income families by race and ethnicity, using data from the 2023 American Community Survey (ACS). As depicted in Table 1, families of color are generally overrepresented among the 9.7 million families with children that are economically vulnerable. While Black, Hispanic, AIAN, and AAPI families collectively account for 44.4% of all families with children, they represent 61.1% of economically vulnerable families with children. Although white families make up a larger share of low-income families than any other single racial or ethnic group, they are underrepresented among low-income families (38.9%) relative to their share of all families (55.6%).

More than 3 in 10 (32.6%) low-income families are Hispanic and more than 1 in 5 (21.5%) are Black. Together, Black and Hispanic families represent more than half (54.1%) of all low-income families with children, but just over one-third (35.1%) of all families with children. While less than 1.5% of all families are AIAN, they too are slightly overrepresented (1.8%) among the economically vulnerable. AAPI families account for 7.9% of all families and 5.2% of economically vulnerable families; however, the aggregate socioeconomic status of AAPI families hides important differences that become evident when we separate groups by country of origin (Cid-Martinez and Marvin 2023).

Immigrant families also make up a disproportionate share of low-income families and are especially prevalent among low-income Hispanic and AAPI families. Foreign-born families made up 23.6% of all families in 2023, but a higher share (30.5%) of low-income families were immigrant families. Slightly more than 8 in 10 (81.1%) economically vulnerable AAPI families are foreign-born, as are more than 6 in 10 (61.9%) comparable Hispanic families.

Beyond economic insecurity, these families face ongoing threats under Trump’s draconian mass deportation agenda, which the administration and congressional Republicans bolstered with new financing in the budget reconciliation bill that Trump signed into law (Costa 2025; NIJC 2025). These attacks on immigrant families and the immigrant workforce will also have ripple effects on the labor market, costing the U.S. economy nearly 6 million jobs, particularly in construction and child care (Zipperer 2025). All of this will also put upward pressure on food and housing prices (McNicholas et al. 2025).

In terms of family structure, low-income families are generally more likely to be headed by women or a non-married household head.[3] However, one finds noticeable variations in these patterns across racial and ethnic groups. For example, Black and AIAN families are most likely to be headed by women, 78.7% and 69.5% respectively, compared with less than half (43.3%) of low-income AAPI families. There are also differences in marital status. Low-income AAPI families are significantly more likely to be led by a married couple (76.2%), compared with about half of white (50.5%) and Hispanic (51.6%) families. More than one-third of low-income AIAN families and one-quarter of low-income Black families are led by married couples. Apart from Black families, less than 1% of low-income families report having a partner or spouse of the same sex in 2023. Because most low-income Black families are headed by women, attacks on women’s reproductive rights, along with efforts to undermine nondiscrimination enforcement for racial and ethnic minorities, women, and LGBTQ+ individuals, impose additional disadvantages for these families.

Economically vulnerable families are also more likely to have more than one child (under age 18): 67% of low-income families have two or more children, compared with 58.7% of all families. However, among low-income families, there is little variation in the number of children across racial and ethnic groups. For example, about two-thirds of all low-income families has two or more children, and only 12.6% have four or more children.

The share of low-income families with either a disabled child or parent of a child shows considerable variation across race and ethnicity. AIAN families stand out as having the highest prevalence of disability. About 1 in 3 (33.7%) AIAN households has a parent or child with a disability. Similarly, more than one-quarter of white families, and more than 1 in 5 Black and Hispanic households have a parent or child with a disability. AAPI households had the smallest share (16.2%) of households with a disabled parent or child.

The share of low-income families that is a part of intergenerational households varies significantly by race and ethnicity group. More than 1 in 8 (13.1%) AAPI households are multigenerational or intergenerational, followed by 7.8% of Hispanic households and 5.9% of AIAN households. Economically vulnerable white families are the least likely to be intergenerational, as less than 4% have a grandparent in the household.

Table 1

The Great Recession and the pandemic recession: Differences and similarities

As this report contrasts the economic experience of families during two different recessions, it is important to first understand the severity and duration of these events.

By official accounts, the Great Recession began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009, representing the longest economic downturn to impact the U.S. economy in the postwar period (NBER 2010). We assess the severity of the Great Recession by examining the impact that it had on the labor market via the employment situation of workers of color (EPI 2025g). These workers are among the first to lose a job during a downturn of the business cycle. Between 2007 and 2010, for example, the unemployment rate for Hispanic workers more than doubled, rising from 5.6% to 12.5%. Similarly, the unemployment rate for Black workers shot up from 8.3% in 2007 to 15.9% in 2010. While the recession had been declared officially over by 2009, it took nearly a decade for the unemployment rate of workers of color to fully recover. This prolonged suffering was largely due to the anemic policy response that followed the Great Recession, largely characterized by austerity measures at both the federal and state levels (Bivens 2019; Bivens 2011). 

Compared with the Great Recession, the pandemic recession was considerably shorter. Officially, the pandemic recession only lasted two months, from February 2020 to April 2020, making it the shortest economic contraction in U.S. history (NBER 2021). But this doesn’t mean that the impact on workers was less severe. Just between February 2020 and April 2020, the unemployment rate for Hispanic workers more than tripled, and that of Black workers more than doubled.

Unlike previous contractions, the economic impact on women was particularly pronounced (Alon et al. 2021).[4] By April 2020, more than 1 in 5 (20.3%) Latina workers were out of a job and seeking employment, as the unemployment rate of these workers quadrupled between February and April of that year.[5] Similarly, the unemployment rate of Black women more than tripled during this period, rising from 5% in February 2020 to 16.4% in April 2020.[6] The nature of the economic shock explains much of the disproportionate impact on these workers, as the public health crisis and mitigation efforts fell most heavily on low-wage industries and occupations in which women of color are overrepresented due in large part to occupational segregation (Wilson 2020).

Despite the sharp rise in joblessness caused by the pandemic recession, the economic suffering didn’t last as long as during the Great Recession. Within two years, the unemployment rate for Black and Hispanic workers had fully recovered to 6.2% and 4.3% respectively, reaching historical lows (EPI 2025g). Black women and Latinas experienced similar rebounds; by 2022, the unemployment rate for Black women and Latinas (at 6.2% and 4.4% respectively) was among their lowest in recorded history (EPI 2025g). This swift and atypically even rebound was not just a function of a much shorter recession. As we detail later in this report, the swift and bold policy response to the pandemic and the economic contraction that followed was qualitatively different from that of previous recessions in the United States. Rather than the austerity and conditional support provided during the Great Recession, policymakers responded to the pandemic crisis with more generous cash transfers and extended support for unemployed workers and families with children.

Weathering crises: How did the last two recessions impact the employment security, poverty status, and housing insecurity of economically vulnerable families?

In this section, we examine how the Great Recession and the pandemic recession impacted the well-being of low-income families in three domains: their employment security, poverty status, and housing insecurity.

Employment security: Labor market attachment of families and employment rate of parents

One way of assessing the impact that business cycle downturns have on the economic well-being of families is by examining the impact that these events have on their employment security and attachment to the labor market. Since earnings represent the primary source of income for most families, involuntary separation from the labor market is likely to magnify the economic hardship experienced by these households. In this section, we examine changes in the labor market attachment of economically vulnerable families by looking at the share of families with at least one full-time earner and by capturing shifts in the employment rate of parents between the ages of 25 and 54.

Labor market attachment

Given the importance of work for low-income families, the prevalence of full-time employment in the household provides a measure of their attachment to the labor market. On average, more than two-thirds of low-income families had at least one full-time earner before the Great Recession. However, as can be seen in Figure A, differences in attachment existed by race and ethnicity even before the crisis. In 2007, 63.6% of Black families had at least one full-time earner, compared with more than 67.7% of white families and 77.7% of Hispanic families.

The Great Recession, and the weak policy response that followed, left a major dent in the labor market attachment of families. By 2010, the attachment gap between white and Black families had widened, as only 56% of Black families had at least one full-time earner that year, compared with 63.1% of their white counterparts. The share of low-income Hispanic households with at least one full-time earner also fell by nearly 10 percentage points, from 77.7% in 2007 to 68.1% in 2010. Comparatively, the rate of attachment for white families dropped by less than five percentage points during this period. While Hispanic families were more likely to report a stronger attachment to the labor market than their white peers, this advantage declined during the crisis and its aftermath. Overall, Black and Hispanic families took nearly a decade to recover, as their attachment to the labor market remained below the pre-crisis level in 2016. 

Leading to the COVID-19 pandemic and the recession, families of color regained a significant measure of the employment they had lost during the Great Recession. By 2018, for example, 64.4% and 76.6% of Black and Hispanic families respectively had at least one full-time earner. Largely due to the much shorter duration of the contraction and the robust policy response that followed, the pandemic recession had a much more muted impact on the labor market attachment of these families. Between 2018 and 2020, the share of economically vulnerable families of color with at least one full-time earner in the household declined only marginally, by about three percentage points for Black and Hispanic families.

By 2022, the share of Black families with a full-time earner had rebounded to 68.1%. This figure was nearly identical to the attachment rate for white families in the same year, and it represented the highest rate for Black families since 2007. While that number declined in 2023, it was still higher than in most years since 2007. On the other hand, by 2023, Hispanic families continued to lag considerably behind their 2007 peak.

Figure A

Employment rate of prime-age low-income parents

Examining changes in the prevalence of full-time earners within the household can provide us with a sense of the impact that crises have on the annual labor market attachment of families. But it does not capture monthly changes in the employment situation of parents over the business cycle. This is particularly important in the context of the pandemic recession since it represents the shortest economic recession in U.S. history. To best capture the impact that this economic contraction had on the employment situation of economically vulnerable parents of color, we examine changes in the employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio of low-income parents between the ages of 25 and 54.

In Figure B, prime-age Hispanic parents enjoyed higher employment rates than their Black and white peers before the pandemic. This pattern is also consistent with those shown in Figure A. Leading to the pandemic in January 2020, 94.7% of low-income Hispanic parents between the ages of 25 and 54 were employed, compared with 89.8% of white parents and 88.6% of Black parents, who face the greatest employment disadvantage historically.

As evidenced in Figure B, the gap in employment between Black and white prime-age parents widened during the pandemic recession. Much of this is explained by the disproportionate impact that the pandemic recession had on parents of color. Between January 2020 and April 2020, the employment rate of prime-age low-income Black and Hispanic parents plummeted by more than 32.7 and 27.0 percentage points respectively. By April 2020, only around half (55.9%) of prime-age Black parents had a job. At this point, prime-age Hispanic parents also saw their employment rate drop to a low of 67.7%. While the employment rate of white parents declined by 17.6 percentage points between January 2020 and April 2020, these parents remained about 29% and 7% more likely to be employed in April 2020 than their Black and Hispanic peers respectively. 

While the employment rate of parents of color declined to historically low levels in 2020, the bold policy response to the pandemic recession led to a quick rebound in the labor market. By the end of 2023, 88.9% of prime-age low-income Black parents and 91.6% of their Hispanic peers had a job. The strong recovery of parents of color also helped narrow the racial gaps in employment seen at the height of the pandemic recession in April 2020.

Figure B

Poverty status: Prevalence of poverty and severe poverty

As low-income families are largely dependent on wage earnings to meet their financial obligations, business cycle fluctuations can significantly affect their economic vulnerability. Without a proportional policy response or adequate social protection systems, these families are the first to fall victim to material hardship during an economic downturn. The Great Recession and the pandemic recession exemplify this, as these crises pushed more low-income families of color into poverty and severe poverty. This is evident when we examine changes in the prevalence, severity, and distribution of poverty over time.

Prevalence of poverty

Leading to the Great Recession, economically vulnerable Black and Hispanic families were more likely than their white peers to fall below the federal poverty line (FPL).[7] In 2007, more than half (53.6%) of low-income Black families were poor, relative to 44.6% and 38.7% of Hispanic and white families respectively (see Figure C). The Great Recession and the inadequate policy response to the downturn pushed a larger share of these families into poverty quickly and for a prolonged period of time. By 2010, more than half (51.2%) of Hispanic families fell below the FPL. The poverty rate for Black families continued to rise the following year, reaching nearly 6 in 10 (58.5%) in 2011. The poverty rates of both Hispanic and Black families did not return to pre-Great Recession levels until 2015, more than half a decade later. While racial gaps first widened and then narrowed throughout the crisis and the slow recovery, poverty rates remained much higher among Black and Hispanic families, relative to their white counterparts. 

By the lead-up to the COVID-19 pandemic and the recession that followed, the poverty rates of families of color were lower than they were in 2007, but a large racial poverty gap remained. While less than half (49.3%) of Black families fell below the FPL in 2018, they remained about 30% more likely to suffer material hardship than their white peers.

Largely because of policy, the material situation of families was not impacted as severely by the pandemic recession as it was during the Great Recession. While Hispanic families experienced a marginal increase in poverty between 2019 and 2022, rising by 3.3 percentage points (relative to the larger increase, of 6.6 percentage points, during the previous downturn), the share of Black families that fell below the FPL during this period declined. By 2022, low-income Black families recorded the lowest poverty rate (44.1%) in the entire period between 2007 and 2023. After economic relief measures expired, poverty rates were relatively stable for Hispanic families but had increased for Black families.

Figure B

Prevalence of severe poverty 

Economic downturns don’t just push economically vulnerable families into poverty. Without the support of a strong social safety net, families can fall deeper into economic deprivation when parents lose their jobs during a recession. The parents struggle to make ends meet and provide their children with the resources they need to flourish and to participate in society without shame. This happened far too often during the Great Recession as an increasing share of low-income families experienced severe poverty, with an income below half (50%) of the federal poverty line. To place this figure in context, the severe poverty threshold for the 48 contagious states and Washington, D.C., amounts to $7,825 annually for a single individual in 2025 (HHS n.d.).

Before being hit by the Great Recession, more than 1 in 4 (26.1%) Black families suffered severe poverty in 2007 (see Figure D). At this stage, Black families were about 61% more likely than their white peers to fall among the poorest of the poor. While Hispanic families fared relatively better in 2007 (with a severe poverty rate close to that of white families), disparities quickly widened. By 2010, more than 1 in 5 (21.6%) Hispanic families fell among the poorest of the poor, and an even larger share (30.3%) of Black families experienced similar material hardship, compared with 18% of their white peers. The anemic policy response to the Great Recession left an elevated share of these families under a prolonged state of economic deprivation until about 2015.

The strong policy response to the pandemic recession prevented a large uptick in the prevalence of poverty, especially for Black families, but severe poverty rates rose significantly for families as the material shortcomings of the most vulnerable worsened. Between 2018 and 2020, the share of Black families that fell among the poorest of the poor increased by 4.7 percentage points, from 22.5% to 27.2%. Hispanic families fared slightly better, as the severe poverty rate for these families rose from 15.6% in 2018 to 18.9% in 2021.

While the exposure of families of color to severe poverty fell in 2022, reaching a historic low of 22% for Black families, severe poverty again rose once economic relief measures ended. By 2023, the share of Black and Hispanic families among the poorest of the poor remained above the pre-recession levels of 2018. In contrast, severe poverty among white families had returned to the pre-recession rate by 2023.

Figure D

Housing insecurity: Prevalence and severity

Business cycle downturns that lead to significant job losses don’t just leave low-income families more vulnerable to poverty. Recessions also leave families much more exposed to housing insecurity, irrespective of whether these families own or rent their homes. As we illustrate below, this is because housing represents a significant expense for resource-constrained families. Low-income families of color are particularly vulnerable to even more pain during downturns as they are also forced to contend with an economy that suffers from an obstinate deficit in affordable housing and one in which the housing and lending markets have historically discriminated against them (Moore and Maye 2024).

In this section, we examine the impact that both the Great Recession and the pandemic recession had on the rent and homeownership rates of families of color. We also look at how the cost burden of housing evolved for both renters and homeowners during and after the crises.

Renters and housing insecurity

Given the high economic barriers to homeownership, Black and Hispanic families are generally more likely to rent, relative to their white peers (see Appendix Table 1). But, as homeownership rates declined during the Great Recession, the share of low-income families who rent has increased. Leading to the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2018, more than 80% of Black families and more than 70% of Hispanic families were renters. In contrast, slightly more than half (55.3%) of white families rented their homes that same year. While the share of renters was lower post-pandemic, racial gaps widened in 2023 with Black and Hispanic families being 61% and 36%, correspondingly, more likely to rent than their white peers.

The pandemic and the short economic downturn that followed exacerbated the already precarious position that low-income renters found themselves in after the Great Recession. By 2017, nearly a decade after the Great Recession, the share of economically vulnerable families that spend 30% or more of their income on rent remained above the pre-recession levels of 2007 (see Figure E). In 2018, for example, more than 8 in 10 Black and Hispanic families that rent were housing poor. The strong pandemic recovery did little to shelter these families from the housing affordability crisis in the U.S. that was amplified by the global health crisis (Moore and Maye 2024). By 2023, racial gaps had widened as the share of Black and Hispanic families that spend over 30% of their income on rent climbed above the peaks reached in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Figure E

The impact of the last two recessions on families fell most heavily on those that spend more than half of their income on rent. While some of these renting families had recovered by the time that the pandemic recession rolled in, the share of Hispanic families experiencing severe housing insecurity remained above pre-recession levels in 2019 (see Figure F). Black families were particularly disadvantaged. Nearly half (48.3%) of low-income Black families spent over half of their income on rent in 2019. The situation quickly worsened for all families, as the strong economic recovery failed to protect these families from the growing affordability crisis in housing. By 2023, a higher share of white, Black, and Hispanic families spent more than half of their income on rent than at any other point since 2007. Low-income Black and Hispanic families remain most disadvantaged, as more than half of these families spend over 50% of their income on rent.

Figure F

Homeowners and housing insecurity

The Great Recession deepened the racial divide in homeownership rates, as families of color were disproportionately touched by the crisis (see Appendix Table 1). The share of low-income Black families that owned their home declined from 21.5% in 2007 to 15.7% in 2016, and from 34.6% to 28.3% during the same period for their Hispanic peers. By 2017, a decade after the start of the crisis, the homeownership rate of families had yet to recover, and racial disparities had widened. At this stage, economically vulnerable white families were 169% and 48% more likely than their Black and Hispanic peers respectively to own their home. 

Despite the steep gaps in homeownership, the pandemic recession didn’t quite lead to a suppression of homeownership rates for families. Partly as a function of younger households transitioning toward ownership, low interest rates, and the generous (albeit temporary) economic relief measures enacted in response to the pandemic recession, the downturn failed to reverse the gains in homeownership that economically vulnerable families of color were already experiencing in 2018 and 2019 (Sanchez-Moyano 2024; Callis 2023).

By 2023, slightly more than one-third (34%) of low-income Hispanic families owned their home, compared with about 3 in 10 (29.7%) in 2018. Black families also experienced gains. During this period, the homeownership rate of low-income Black families increased by 5.3 percentage points, from 16.4% in 2018 to 21.7% in 2023. By 2023, the homeownership of low-income Black and Hispanic families had achieved a near full recovery from both the Great Recession and the pandemic recession. While these achievements in homeownership helped narrow racial disparities, economically vulnerable families of color remained significantly less likely to own their homes in 2023 compared with their white peers.

While owning a home can be an important step toward wealth creation, economically vulnerable homeowners spend a significant share of their income on housing costs associated with mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, and more (U.S. Census Bureau 2004). Leading to the pandemic recession, Black homeowners remained more likely to spend over 30% of their income on housing costs (see Figure G). At this stage in 2019, 65.2% of economically vulnerable Black families who owned their homes were housing poor, compared with fewer than 6 in 10 Hispanic and white families. Despite the economic relief measures that helped economically vulnerable families weather the shock of the pandemic recession, housing insecurity rose for nearly all families. By 2023, a slightly higher share of Black and Hispanic families who owned their homes spent over 30% of their income on housing than in 2019.

Figure G

The impact of the pandemic recession and the increasing cost of housing in the U.S. is even more evident when we examine the situation of low-income families suffering from severe housing insecurity (Moore and Maye 2024). These are homeowning families who spend over half of their income on housing. Despite the short duration of the most recent downturn, the share of economically vulnerable families who face severe housing insecurity climbed by more than four percentage points between 2019 and 2023 (see Figure H). By 2023, Black families remained disproportionately vulnerable to economic pain with a prevalence of severe housing insecurity comparable to the hardship they experienced in the lead-up to the Great Recession. Since 2007, more than 2 in 5 economically vulnerable Black families who own their homes were unable to escape severe housing poverty as a result of having to spend over 50% of their income on housing costs.

Figure H

Lessons learned: Key policy choices that made a difference during the pandemic recession and are still needed to break the cycle of economic vulnerability for families

By nearly every measure of economic well-being examined above, low-income families of color weathered the pandemic recession better than the Great Recession largely because of policy choices. The weak policy response to the Great Recession, centered on austerity at the federal and state levels, contrasted sharply with the bold response to the pandemic recession guided by economic relief measures and public investments. This enabled families to avoid a prolonged separation from the job market and a worsening of their material conditions.

The last two recessions and their distinct recoveries left us with a clear blueprint for action. The economic lessons are not unfamiliar:

• Full employment policies that create tight labor markets also promote economic equity for workers and their families.
• Good jobs are union jobs.
• A strong social safety net helps families avoid unnecessary and scarring economic deprivation.

Breaking the vicious cycle that leaves low-income families more susceptible to hardship during recessions will require a renewed commitment to full employment, stronger worker rights and unions, and a robust welfare state that meets the needs of families and children. While the policies that can accomplish these objectives commonly face political headwinds, actions taken by the Trump administration and Congress will create even worse conditions.

Full employment policies are equity-enhancing policies 

While economists debate the overall rate of unemployment that constitutes full employment, there is less debate about the equity-enhancing effects of a tight or “high-pressure” labor market, one in which willing workers can obtain access to a job and the working hours they prefer (Bivens 2021; Bivens and Zipperer 2018). Sustained periods of low unemployment can effectively boost the earnings of low-wage workers and help narrow persistent racial disparities in a labor market that disproportionately disadvantages the employment situation of workers of color and the economic well-being of their families (Wilson 2023; Bivens 2021). The narrowing of these gaps would not constitute full healing from the legacy and continued expression of structural racism and xenophobia in the U.S. economy, but it would be a step in the right direction. Historical evidence points to increased economic equity via low unemployment and rapid job growth. 

The recent economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic contraction that followed serves as a good example of a policy regime that aimed, in large part, to provide a strong or high-pressure labor market. Unlike the economic recovery from the Great Recession, the rebound from the pandemic recession has been characterized by bold fiscal policies, via much-needed relief and strategic public investments, and more accommodating monetary policy that kept downward pressure on unemployment (Wilson 2023; Bivens 2024; Bivens 2016). The results of this policy regime are unambiguously clear: Workers of color made historic gains over the last five years in both employment and earnings, with Black and Hispanic real wages (adjusted for inflation) growing more than three times faster over the last five years than the four decades prior (Cid-Martinez, Maye, and Marvin 2025).

Instead of providing continuity to the economic regime they inherited, the Trump-Vance administration is pursuing a macroeconomic and trade policy that is sowing economic uncertainty and chaos and has already led to a contraction of economic growth in the first quarter of 2025.

Unions help narrow economic disparities that hurt workers and their families

It is easy to envision growing income disparities that threaten the economic security of working families as endemic features of the U.S. economy. Between 1979 and 2023, for example, the real annual earnings for the top 1% of earners increased by 181.7%, while the earnings for the bottom 90% grew just 43.7% (Gould and Kandra 2024). This economic divide mirrors another increasing gap between economywide productivity and the hourly pay of the typical worker, a gap that is even more pronounced for the typical Black and Hispanic worker (Moore and Banerjee 2021). But none of these trends is inevitable.

Behind these rising inequities one finds a wide range of deliberate policies choices that have weakened labor standards and stripped workers of their ability to bargain collectively for better compensation and working conditions (Mishel and Bivens 2021), including the erosion of union membership since the late 1950s (Bivens et al. 2023b).

Workers of color have been disproportionately touched by the decline of union density in the U.S. economy since they typically receive a larger wage boost from union membership. Compared with the premium of the average worker, the union pay premium is higher for Black and Hispanic workers (Bivens et al. 2023a). Black workers, for example, are more likely than white workers to be unionized (13.1% vs 11.2%), and the wage advantage unionized Black workers receive from being covered by collective bargaining is 12.6% (EPI 2025f; EPI 2025h). This premium is higher than the 11.9% average wage premium for unionized white workers. While Hispanic workers have slightly lower union coverage (9.7%) than white workers, they claim a higher union wage advantage of 16.4%.

Unions can also protect workers from discrimination and improve working conditions. Because private employment in the U.S. is for the most part “at will,” employers can terminate workers for nearly any reason, without providing notice or severance. This power imbalance harms workers of color disproportionately, as they are more likely than their white peers to report unfair dismissals (Bivens et al. 2023a). Unions protect these workers with the provision of “just cause” rights that shelter workers from discriminatory and retaliatory practices and unfair dismissals. Unions also offer workers better employment conditions. This is important for economically vulnerable families who face care needs alongside scarce resources. Unionized workers, for example, are more likely than their nonunion peers to have access to paid sick days and employer-sponsored health and retirement benefits (Shierholz et al. 2024).

Low-income working parents stand to gain the most from union membership. However, few of them belong to a union. Only 8% of prime-age Black parents and 4.9% of Hispanic parents belonged to a union in 2023. Similarly, only 5.3% of economically vulnerable white parents between the ages of 25 and 54 belonged to a union in the same year.

Instead of strengthening the rights of workers to bargain collectively, President Trump has openly embarked on an anti-worker agenda centered on weakening the federal agency tasked with protecting the most basic and fundamental U.S. labor rights, the National Labor Relations Board (McNicholas et al. 2025). These efforts will leave families of color much more vulnerable to discrimination in the labor market and to wage theft and mistreatment at work.

The social safety net expanded in response to the pandemic, which demonstrated that poverty remains a policy choice

The welfare of economically vulnerable families of color and their children is not an insurmountable problem beyond the reach of public policy. This became most evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. The federal government responded to this crisis boldly with an array of economic relief measures, such as economic impact or stimulus payments; with provisional expansions of social programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program and the unemployment insurance (UI) program; with temporary enhancements of tax credits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC); and with increased federal assistance to state and local governments. Overall, these measures kept millions of people out of poverty in 2021 (Banerjee and Zipperer 2022). The economic impact or stimulus checks alone kept nearly 9 million people out of poverty in 2021, including more than 2 million children (Shrider and Creamer 2023).

The expanded social safety net had a notable impact on alleviating the material hardship experienced by families of color. This is most evident when we look at trends in the prevalence of child poverty. For this, we rely on child poverty rates based on the Census Bureau‘s Supplemental Poverty Measure, which accounts for cash and in-kind transfers as well as geographic differences in housing costs. By this measure, the post-pandemic social policy regime looks particularly effective in its ability to reach children of color and to alleviate the human suffering that accompanies deprivation at a young age. Between 2019 and 2021, for example, child poverty rates fell by more than half across nearly all groups, reaching their lowest levels in recorded history (see Figure I). Before the pandemic, more than 1 in 5 Black and Hispanic children fell below the supplemental poverty line in 2019. By 2021, these rates plummeted by nearly 60%, as the Black and Hispanic child poverty rate dropped to 8.3% and 8.4% respectively. The Asian American and AIAN child poverty rates also declined by more than 40% during this period, reaching historic lows of 5.1% and 7.4% respectively in 2021.

Many of the gains in poverty reduction were driven by the expansion of the Child Tax Credit (Gould 2022). Relative to all income transfers in 2021, the expanded CTC drove an estimated 44% of the reduction in child poverty that year (Parolin 2023). The impact was especially pronounced for children of color (Burns and Fox 2022). For example, this expanded credit lifted an estimated 1.2 million Hispanic children out of poverty in 2021. Similarly, more than 700,000 Black children and over 100,000 Asian children avoided falling below the supplemental poverty line in 2021 because of the expanded CTC. The rest of the social policy levers (aside from Social Security) that drove the bulk of the historic reduction in child poverty had also been provisionally expanded under the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), including EITC, SNAP, and UI benefits.

Despite the powerful effect these measures had in extinguishing poverty, nearly all the enhanced social safety net measures under ARPA expired by 2022. This purposeful expiration erased the bulk of the gains in poverty alleviation that families and children of color had achieved economically in 2021 (Cid-Martinez and Zipperer 2023). This is evident when we examine how the end of the expanded welfare state impacted the prevalence of poverty for children of color. Between 2021 and 2023, the poverty rates of Black, Hispanic, Asian, and AIAN children had more than doubled, returning to or exceeding 2019 levels (see Figure I). This increase marked an obliteration of the gains achieved in poverty reduction between 2019 and 2021. In fact, by 2023, the poverty rates of all groups were either higher, or no different, than the pre-pandemic estimates of 2019. 

Instead of expanding the CTC to help more low-income parents meet the basic needs of their children and reduce poverty, the Republican-led budget reconciliation bill that Trump signed into law fails to increase benefits for the 17 million children who receive less than the full value of the credit because their parents earn too little to meet the earnings requirement (Maag 2025). The Republican law is also particularly harmful to children of migrant parents, as it revokes the credit eligibility of children that are U.S. citizens if both spouses in a married couple lack a Social Security number (Tax Policy Center 2025). At least one spouse will now need to have a Social Security number in order for a U.S. citizen child to qualify for the CTC. While the Republican law increases the maximum credit from $2,000 to $2,200 per child, no significant changes in the refundability structure and earnings requirement mean that CTC benefits will remain out of reach for the children of the poorest of the poor, while middle- and high-income families continue to receive most of the benefits (Collyer et al. 2025; Crandall-Hollick, Maag, and Jha 2025).

The Republican budget reconciliation bill that the president signed into law also missed an opportunity to break the cycle of economic vulnerability that poor children face with the “Trump accounts.” These new tax-free investment accounts will provide a single government contribution of $1,000 to every child born in the next four years (Hamilton and Pressley 2025). The current administration is also discussing these accounts as a “back door for privatizing Social Security,” a program that helps narrow racial and income disparities, lifting more than one million children out of poverty in 2023 (Price and Mascaro 2025; Morrissey and Bivens 2025; Shrider 2024).

Unlike the more popular Baby Bonds, which require sustained contributions from the federal government throughout childhood with the goal of narrowing the racial wealth gap, the Trump accounts are built on the mistaken premise that low-income families lack an incentive to save when the real issue is that they lack enough discretionary income to put into a savings account (Markoff, Radcliff, and Hamilton 2025). The employment, income, and wealth disadvantages that low-income families with children face leave them in a perennial struggle to access basic necessities like health care, housing, and child care. These families are often an emergency away from falling into poverty or severe poverty. Helping families escape this generational challenge will require more than a new savings vehicle that will further widen the divide between the rich and poor by providing yet another giveaway to rich families.

Figure I

Conclusion

Low-income families of color were disproportionately impacted by the economic suffering that came in the wake of the last two recessions. Both the Great Recession and the pandemic recession worsened the employment security, poverty status, and housing insecurity of these families. In contrast with the Great Recession, policymakers responded to the pandemic with a show of strength that helped families recover their employment and bounce back from poverty significantly faster. But housing insecurity and poverty continue to leave these families particularly vulnerable when the next recession strikes.

While the prospects of a recession continue to rise due to the chaos and uncertainty generated by the Trump-Vance administration, they are deliberately ignoring the lessons of the past. This administration has failed to protect the strong labor market they inherited, has failed to empower workers to bargain for better pay and working conditions, and has failed to strengthen basic needs programs. Instead, the administration is proudly advancing an economic agenda that forces austerity on low-income families, strips away protection from discrimination for people of color, and offers more tax cuts for those who do not need it—the ultrarich. This economic agenda will push even more families into poverty and prolong the pain that follows a recession.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1

Acknowledgments

Support for this research was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The views expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation.

Notes

[1] Our classification of race and ethnicity is mutually exclusive, such that white families are non-Hispanic white, and Black families represent all families in which the head identified their race as Black in combination with other races. Hispanic families include those in which the head identified Hispanic origin, irrespective of race. Among the remaining pool, those who identified as American Indian in combination with other races are listed as AIAN, and respondents who identified as Asian or Pacific Islander in combination with other races (such as Asian and white or Pacific Islander and white) are listed as AAPI.

[2] Total family income is the sum of the individual incomes of each family member. Because unmarried partners are nonrelated household members, the unmarried partner’s total income is not incorporated in the primary family’s total family income. In cases where the income statuses of the household head and the unmarried partner are different, we use the income status of the household head.

[3] Similarly to race and ethnicity, the marital status of the family is informed by the status of the household head, such that married captures respondents who identify as married, irrespective of the presence of the spouse. All other responses are classified as not married.

[4] As we point out below, this disproportionately affected low-income families of color,  which are more likely to be headed by women.

[5] The unemployment rate here is captured by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of Hispanic women, 20 years old and over.

[6] The unemployment rate here is captured by the seasonally adjusted unemployment rate of Black women, 20 years old and over.

[7] This federal poverty line is informed by the official poverty measure (OPM) published annually by the Census Bureau since 1967. This measure uses a set of money income thresholds that vary by family size and composition to determine who is in poverty. While the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) is considered to be a more accurate and comprehensive measure because it accounts for government transfers and geographic cost-of-living expenses, including housing, published estimates only go back to 2009 (Shrider 2024). For the purpose of this analysis, we rely on OPM to capture the impact of both the Great Recession and pandemic recession.

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The COVID-19 pandemic had a devastating impact on state, city, county, tribal, and territorial governments. Close to 1.5 million state and local public employees lost their jobs in the first few months of the pandemic, severely limiting governments’ ability to effectively provide basic public services. After the Great Recession of 2008–2009, it took more than a decade for public-sector job numbers to return to their previous levels, in part because the federal government did not provide enough assistance to state and local governments. Austerity in public spending directly contributed to a much slower economic recovery in the 2010s. With ARPA, however, Congress and President Biden dedicated resources sufficient to tackle the scale of the problem, avoiding the missteps policymakers made in responding to the Great Recession.

State and local governments were given great latitude in how to spend the fiscal recovery funds they received, from supporting public health measures to recruiting and retaining public employees to infrastructure spending on water, sewer, and broadband. This meant that policymakers were able to make spending decisions in line with the needs of their communities. As EPI has documented, these funds were used to support transformative investments across the country and did much to improve the lives of working families.

While recipients have until the end of 2026 to spend their fiscal recovery funds, December 31, 2024, was the deadline to obligate the funds, meaning commit the funds to specific projects. Any funds not obligated by December 31 are to be refunded to the Treasury. The final quarter of 2024 saw a flurry of activity by recipients to meet the deadline. Of the 159,000 spending projects created by recipients between 2021 and the end of 2024, more than one in six, according to EPI analysis of Treasury data, were created or modified in just the last three months of 2024.

Forty-nine states and the District of Columbia succeeded in fully obligating their fiscal recovery funds. (Florida did not obligate $8.7 million, less than 0.1% of its total $8.8 billion allocation.) This is a welcome result and a considerable improvement from the data as of September 30, 2024, when only seven states had obligated their funds.

The overwhelming majority of the roughly 27,000 local governments receiving fiscal recovery funds also obligated 100% of their funds. There are exceptions to this trend, though. EPI analysis shows nearly 2,500 failed to report obligating any of their funds, and more than 4,000 more obligated less than 75% of their funds. Thirty-seven cities and counties were allocated more than $5 million yet reported no obligations. It is perhaps not a surprise that 23 of them (62%) come from the South, a region that has long disinvested in public services.

There is reason to believe, however, that these numbers may come down over time. A majority of the local governments that reported no obligations received fewer than $150,000 in fiscal recovery funds, supporting local reports and communications with policymakers and stakeholders that indicated smaller cities and counties were having a more difficult time navigating the reporting system. A Treasury email to local governments on May 21 extended a grace period for those that were unable to file their reports on time or that had errors in their reporting, and Treasury will not begin procedures to recoup unobligated funds until July.

ARPA fiscal recovery funds played an essential role in helping restore the economy and public services in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Government spent at the scale of the problem, bolstering demand in the macroeconomy, providing critical services, and helping millions of workers and families weather the crisis. The success of the program is a valuable lesson that policymakers would do well to remember in the future, when the next recession hits.

Behind these aggregate statistics, however, there is a more nuanced picture of one of the most diverse ethnic groups in the United States. This blog provides a brief description of how different groups of Hispanic workers have fared during the economic recovery from the pandemic recession.  

The unemployment rate of Hispanic workers from all backgrounds has declined, but notable differences remain  

In 2022, the Hispanic unemployment rate reached 4.3%, one of the lowest figures in recorded history. By 2023, the unemployment rate of both Latinos and Latinas had returned to pre-pandemic levels, below 5%. Though the economic recovery has been robust, noticeable differences in employment outcomes have remained depending on country of origin (see Figure A). 

Among Latina workers, those originating from Cuba had the lowest unemployment rate at 2.5% in 2023. However, unemployment rates were more than twice as high for Latinas of Dominican, Puerto Rican, and Central American (excluding Salvadoran) origin. While the unemployment rate for Latinas originating from Mexico, South America, and the Dominican Republic had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels by 2023, the unemployment rate for Latinas of Salvadoran origin remained above the pre-pandemic rate.  

Figure A

Among Latinos, workers of Salvadoran and South American origin had the lowest unemployment rates at 3.6% in 2023 (see Figure B). While declining from a high of 14.9% in 2020, the unemployment rate of Dominican men stood higher than that of their peers at 6.0% in 2023. While Latino workers of Puerto Rican origin had a lower unemployment rate in 2023 than before the pandemic, the unemployment rate of Latinos originating from Central America (excluding El Salvador), among other countries in the region, had yet to fully recover.

Figure B

The share of Hispanic workers with a job has increased for all groups  

While the unemployment rate can provide us with insights into the employment situation of job seekers, it can be misleading since it can rise or fall with changes in labor force participation. For this reason, it is useful to also look at the share of a given population that is actively employed, as captured by the employment-to-population (EPOP) ratio. In 2023, the share of Hispanic workers between the ages of 25 and 54 with a job reached a historic high. This achievement was in large part a result of the bold policy response to the COVID-19 economic shock. Hispanic workers from nearly all backgrounds shared the gains of the robust economic recovery.  

Among Latinas, workers of Dominican and Cuban origin saw the sharpest rebound in their EPOP ratio, as the share of these individuals with a job rose by more than eight percentage points between 2020 and 2023 (see Figure C). By 2023, the employment share of Latinas of nearly all backgrounds, except those originating from Puerto Rico and El Salvador, had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels. Latinas of South American origin recorded the highest EPOP ratio among their peers at 62.7% in 2023, a share notably higher than in 2019.  

Figure C

Between 2020 and 2023, Latinos of Salvadoran origin experienced the strongest rebound in employment, as the share of these individuals with a job increased by 8.9 percentage points from 71.3% to 80.2% (see Figure D). However, Latinos of Salvadoran origin were the only ones among their peers who had surpassed pre-pandemic employment by 2023. Notable differences by country of origin remained, as the employment share of Latinos of Puerto Rican origin lagged that of their peers at 61.7% in 2023.

Figure D

Latinx workers remain an integral part of the U.S. economy and labor market  

In 2023, Hispanics accounted for nearly 1 in 5 (19.03%) of the workers in the labor force. This figure has increased by more than half over the last two decades. While Hispanics of Mexican origin make up the largest share of workers in the labor force, Hispanic workers represent a diversity of nationalities and ethnicities that remains hidden behind aggregate statistics. Because the labor market characteristics of all these Latinx workers vary as much as their country origin and racial makeup, expanded and disaggregated data help us capture the rich diversity and unique experience of these workers in the U.S. labor market. Solidifying the recent gains of these workers will require a continued commitment to job and wage growth, workers’ rights, and improved disaggregated data on race and ethnicity.

This labor market strength was also 100% a policy choice. Unlike previous business cycles, policymakers passed fiscal relief and recovery measures at the scale of the shock, and it proved that low unemployment could be restored very quickly after recessions so long as this policy lever was pulled with enough force.

Public appreciation of this accomplishment has been blunted by the outbreak of inflation in 2021 and 2022. While inflation has been steadily reined in since early 2023, the public’s perception of the economy remains soured by it. In a strict economic sense, the public mood seems odd: If real wages are higher and more equal now than at equivalent points in previous recoveries, why isn’t the public mood much better?

One reason put forward as to why the public dislikes inflation even if real wages and incomes are rising is pretty persuasive: workers see wage growth as something they individually achieved while inflation was a policy mistake inflicted on them. This outlook is understandable, but it’s totally wrong.

Policy choices influence wage growth every bit as much as inflation—and sometimes more. When wage growth is slow, policymakers deserve blame—not workers. When wage growth is strong, however, it is because policy has done something right, not because workers spontaneously decided to become more productive or harder-working.

It is deeply damaging to U.S. policy debates that this is not more broadly appreciated.

For decades when wage growth for the vast majority of workers was anemic, these workers were often told it was because they weren’t skilled enough to keep pace with the demands of technological changes and globalization. This was false. It was intentional policy decisions that suppressed wage growth in those decades, policy choices meant to redistribute income upwards toward capital-owners and corporate managers.

In the past four years, workers have seen fast wage growth not because they are working more productively or harder—U.S. workers have always been the most productive in the world and have always worked hard. What changed was that policymakers decided to target a rapid return to sustained low unemployment, keeping unemployment below 4.5% for the longest stretch of time since the Vietnam War. In 2021, these tight labor markets were also accompanied by unprecedently large and expansive unemployment insurance benefits and cash transfers to households. These public supports gave workers more breathing room than ever before to be choosy about which jobs they took. These policy choices are why wages grew so fast so early in the pandemic recovery.

In fact, over the pandemic recovery, the policy fingerprints on fast wage growth are far clearer than those on too-high inflation. Inflation after 2019 was driven by two global shocks—the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Inflation accelerated everywhere in the advanced world, and the precise amount by country was wholly unrelated to policy choices they made.

The most common critique of policymakers is that the Federal Reserve should have engineered softer labor markets and tolerated higher unemployment to break inflation’s momentum. This thinking is wrong. There is a long and extremely well-developed literature nearly unanimously showing that higher unemployment has larger and more reliable effects in reducing wage growth than it does in reducing inflation.

Policymakers who chose not to target significantly higher unemployment rates to tamp down inflation made the correct judgement that inflation was mostly driven by shocks that would fade even with labor markets remaining strong. That is, they chose to not sacrifice wage growth (and the jobs of millions of workers) to pull down inflation.

In short, the inflation of recent years was—sadly—inevitable. The fast wage growth over the past four years was made possible entirely by proactive policy decisions. Getting this straight is crucial for getting better policy going forward. And it should make the public much more appreciative about the macroeconomic choices made since 2020.

Are some folks still having a hard time? Absolutely. Even when the unemployment rate is low, there are still sidelined workers, and it remains difficult for many families to make ends meet on wages that are still too low. Unfortunately, that’s a long-term phenomenon stemming from a too-stingy U.S. welfare state, rising inequality, and the legacy of anemic wage growth during past economic recoveries. But when comparing the labor market with four years ago (during the pandemic recession) or even before the pandemic began, the answer is clear: More workers have jobs and wages are beating inflation by solid margins.

More people have jobs

If I had to pick one, the best measure of labor market strength is the prime-age employment-to-population ratio (EPOP). This measure takes into account population growth by looking at the share of the population between the ages of 25 and 54—and hence not a group likely to be in school or retired—who have a job. As shown in Figure A, this prime-age EPOP is now at 80.9%, the highest share since 2001.

Figure A

Real wages are higher, especially for lower-wage workers

It’s not only that more workers have jobs. On average, wages in those jobs are up: Year-over-year wages have been rising faster than inflation for 16 months in a row as inflation has dramatically fallen from its peak in 2022.

Real (inflation-adjusted) wages are up across the wage distribution when compared with 2019, as shown in Figure B. Wage growth was strongest for lower-wage workers, increasing a whopping 16.8%. Even at the middle, workers’ real wages are 6.5% higher now than in 2019. Growth at the higher end isn’t anything to sneeze at, but the fact that it’s faster at lower parts of the wage distribution means that we’ve seen a compression in wages at least among the bottom 90% of the workforce, meaning a reduction in inequality. It’s worth noting that many more-affluent workers have also received the benefit of greater flexibility about where they work over the past four years. The value of this flexibility is likely immense—and it would not have happened without the strong labor market over this period.

Figure B also compares this strong wage growth with the slow and prolonged recovery from the Great Recession, a time when the policy response was far from adequate and the pursuit of austerity meant years more pain for workers and their families. We can see the difference in wage growth, as low- and middle-wage workers experienced a fall in purchasing power, while even high-wage workers experienced slower growth than this time around. The vast majority of workers were worse off, and inequality grew. In short, the current labor market recovery has been faster and fairer.

Figure B

Strong real wage growth, particularly for historically disadvantaged groups

Figure C shows how median wage growth was strong for every demographic group between 2019 and 2024, but particularly for Black men, Hispanic women, and young workers right out of high school. Median Black worker wages grew 7.2%, with Black men experiencing growth of 7.7%. Hispanic and Black women also had especially strong wage growth of 6.6% and 6.2%, respectively. It is only in the tightest of labor markets that historically disadvantaged groups experience improvements in jobs and faster wage growth. That said, even inflation-adjusted wages of middle-wage white men grew 2.4% since 2019, increasing their standard of living.

Young workers right out of high school experienced the fastest wage growth (8.3%) of any group. These workers are often left out in weaker labor markets and also lost their jobs in great numbers when the pandemic recession hit because of the types of jobs they tend to have.

Figure C

Slowing job growth doesn’t mean the labor market isn’t still strong

The labor market continues to add jobs, though at a slower pace. But there isn’t reason to worry at this point: As the economy continues to approach full employment, job growth will tend to slow because the pool of sidelined workers dwindles. Hiring and quitting have also come down over the last few months as workers are staying put instead of moving in and out of jobs at the pace they did two years ago. Now that the Federal Reserve has started lowering interest rates, I’m hopeful that any signs of weakness will recede, and the labor market will continue with strength.

The answer—underappreciated by far too many—is very well!

In a nutshell, the Biden-Harris administration pushed a frontloaded and significant fiscal stimulus as the first major priority of their administration. The Federal Reserve accommodated this stimulus early on, and then began raising interest rates (more sharply than I would have) to try to rein in inflation. But they wisely never followed the advice of many to “keep raising rates until something breaks.”

In short, a return to full employment was prioritized in the Biden-Harris fiscal approach, and the value of low unemployment was clearly appreciated by the Fed. The results of this approach have been a clear success. There is no other plausible set of decisions about fiscal policy and interest rates over the past four years that would have led to lower inflation yet still would have seen real (inflation-adjusted) wages as high as today or as many people employed. That means there is no real argument against the assessment that macroeconomic policy has been a success.

What about inflation? Well, if real incomes today are higher than they would have been under any different policy decisions, why should inflation independently matter when grading policy outcomes? Say that two policy paths offered different pairs of inflation and nominal wage growth. Path one offers nominal wage growth of 6% and inflation of 5%, while path two offers nominal wage growth of 3% and inflation of 3%. Which path is better? Obviously, it’s path one which leads to higher inflation-adjusted wages. You can quibble that path one was unsustainable and that it should have been impossible to rein in such high rates of inflation without eventually inflicting damage to the economy, but the disinflation of the past two years clearly shows this is untrue (and it was known to be untrue throughout this episode).

Maybe some are worried that the patterns of wage growth and inflation look good on average over the past four years but are skewed toward the top and are leaving the most vulnerable workers behind? For one of the few times over the past 40 years, we can confidently say that’s not true—wage growth has been much faster for the lowest-wage workers over the pandemic recovery (see Figure A below). Further, this fast wage growth led to many measures of debt burdens falling for households—unexpected inflation has the silver lining of making debt cheaper to pay back.

Figure A

Because I have not been living under a rock for the past four years, I realize this is not how many people see this time, and I realize that many seem extremely unhappy about the independent effects of inflation. This popular discontent about inflation is genuine information that economists should try to process and wrestle with. But the fact that inflation-adjusted wages are higher now than four years ago is also genuine information that the general public should wrestle with (and is far more relevant for actual living standards). Yet far too few economic observers seem to be pointing it out on a consistent basis.

When people complain about the inflation of the past four years, they likely think it should have been possible to hold other key economic outcomes constant—like nominal wage growth or unemployment—while having lower inflation. But all of these economic variables affect each other. You’re not allowed to order lower inflation alone off of some a la carte menu of policy outcomes. If that was possible of course policymakers would have done this.

Those claiming that this period of inflation represents some obvious policy mistake need to specify what they would have done differently and how this would have led to lower inflation but not to lower real wage growth or higher unemployment. This is awfully hard to do credibly. The general criticism is that the fiscal relief and recovery measures were too aggressive, and the Federal Reserve waited too long to start raising interest rates. In the jargon, the criticism is that aggregate demand—spending by households, businesses and governments—should have been reined in much more sharply.

Often excess aggregate demand can be a key source of inflation, but it was much more complicated than this during the pandemic recovery for a number of reasons.

First, much of the inflation came from easily identifiable shocks having nothing to do with aggregate demand management. The pandemic led to huge changes in the composition (not the level) of demand—people quit gyms and bought Pelotons, swapping out service consumption for goods consumption in a massive wave. The pandemic also led to cascading supply-chain snarls—ports closed and labor supply was affected by COVID-19 and knock-on effects like child care challenges spurred by remote schooling. The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a conflict between two of the largest producers of energy and food in the world, leading to large price spikes in both. The durability of increased work-from-home led to a reshuffling of housing as millions began valuing greater space more than shorter commute times.

Second, the pandemic’s effects on the supply side of the economy were intense but much more volatile and temporary than other supply shocks. Normally, the supply side of the economy is moving slowly on a predictable path, and policymakers—who only have influence over aggregate demand—have a clean target to aim for when they try to match this demand to supply. But the pandemic didn’t slow supply-side growth in a predictable way—instead it jumped up and down almost month-to-month depending on the virus’s current effects both home and abroad. In short, this time aggregate demand managers did not have a clean supply-side target to shoot for, making their job exponentially harder than usual.

If policymakers had tried to match the unusual short-run changes in the economy’s supply side with short-run changes to demand, lags in policymaking and its effects would have made growth more volatile and slower. If they had decided to avoid any demand overshoot over supply in any given month or quarter, this would have locked a temporary supply shock into a much longer-lasting depression of incomes and employment.

Policymakers instead essentially decided to chart a path that assumed the economy’s supply side was fundamentally going to return to what it had been pre-pandemic and stick to it through the rocky path of inflation (while also undertaking proactive measures to aid supply-side healing). This was wise, and if there was a flaw in that approach it was that this assumption turned out to be slightly pessimistic—measures like prime-age labor force participation are actually higher today than pre-pandemic, meaning today’s supply side is stronger than we thought it would be in 2024 before the pandemic struck.

The paragraphs above provide the intuition of why inflation was mostly inevitable and there was no painless fix for it. The most persuasive evidence as to why U.S. policymakers took the best policy path through the economic turbulence is the simple fact that the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine were global shocks that led to a sharp acceleration of inflation in every advanced country in the world (see Figure B below).

Figure B

It is theoretically possible that every country in the world made the same policy blunder as the United States, but this global acceleration of inflation happened in countries that undertook large fiscal relief and recovery efforts like the U.S. and also in countries that did not. It happened in countries that saw a rapid return to pre-pandemic unemployment rates like the U.S. and in countries that did not see such a rapid return. Country-specific inflation is almost totally unrelated to how aggressively they pushed unemployment back down to (or even below) pre-pandemic levels (see Figure C below). If anything, higher inflation is associated with less progress in reducing unemployment.

Figure C

The honest version of criticisms of the U.S. policy path argues straightforwardly that we simply should not have tried to push unemployment as low and as quickly as we did in 2021 and 2022.

But tolerating high unemployment would have been a very high-cost policy, with small and uncertain benefits in terms of inflation control. It is worth remembering that unemployment rates in 2019 were almost the same as the lowest levels of 2022, yet inflation was very low and not rising in 2019. What could have changed from 2020–2022 to generate much higher inflation? The question answers itself.

The most obvious cost of a strategy of tolerating more unemployment to keep inflation in check would have been the millions of workers who didn’t find jobs in 2021 and 2022. But this strategy also would have had another hugely underappreciated cost, even for workers that remain employed: Higher unemployment pulls down wage growth faster than it pulls down inflation. Taking a macroeconomic path aimed at keeping inflation low by tolerating higher rates of unemployment would therefore have left real wages lower today, and millions more workers would have been jobless along the way. This trade-off would not have been worth it.

Less-honest, hand-wavy criticisms of macroeconomic policymaking argue that the U.S. had a wide and easily attainable path to lower inflation with unemployment and real wage growth unchanged if only fiscal and monetary policy was less expansionary and kept aggregate demand in check. These invariably make extremely loose references to “vertical portions of the aggregate supply curve” (for a fuller argument against this kind of reasoning, see this). But there is no episode in the history of the post-World War II era when policymakers were able to identify and adjust aggregate demand smoothly to change just inflation but no other variable (i.e., they have never been able to find and then toggle aggregate demand along some “vertical portion of the aggregate supply curve”). Again, the a la carte option of “less inflation but the same amount of everything else” has never been a clear option in the U.S. macroeconomic history—those claiming it was easily available in the past four years have a very high burden of proof that they haven’t even tried to meet.

When analysts use existing macroeconomic models and plug in changes to the levers actually available to policymakers (like higher or lower interest rates), none of these models show a plausible path wherein inflation is kept much lower while unemployment and real wage growth matches what we’ve seen in the past four years.

Some have argued that real wage growth over the past four years has been worse than what you would get from simply extrapolating the pre-pandemic trend. Of course it’s been worse than that—we had a genuinely terrible series of economic shocks in that time. Comparing real wage growth over the first four years after a business cycle peak to the last 2-4 years of growth before the peak is either dishonest or trivial. Essentially, it’s an argument that we would all be richer and happier today had the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine never happened. Obviously. A better comparison would be to analyze growth over the first four years after previous business cycle peaks. On this measure, the macroeconomic path of the last four years looks astoundingly good (see Figure D below).

Figure D

The economic shocks of 2020–2022 offered only bad options to policymakers looking to chart a course through the subsequent years. The economic path following the pandemic has been hard on working families in many ways, but it was the best bad option macroeconomy policymakers had over this time, by far. They deserve more credit for taking it.

The nursing home industry has attempted to equate a staffing decline with a worker shortage. But this decline mirrored a decline in occupancy, and, if anything, suggests that there’s a pool of sidelined workers who could be lured back if pay and working conditions improved. This is true in both urban and rural areas.

The industry trade organization issued a report that described the 13.3% decline in nursing home jobs during the pandemic as a “workforce shortage” causing “wage increase pressures and reliance on contracted or agency nursing.” But this was a decline in jobs, not in available workers, as 168,579 residents died and would-be residents opted for alternative care arrangements due to the rapid spread of COVID-19 in facilities. It’s misleading to characterize reduced demand as a workforce shortage when staffing ratios actually improved somewhat during this period.

Tellingly, staffing levels are lower in for-profit nursing homes compared with other ownership types. As we document in our comment, for-profit nursing homes, which dominate the industry, provide fewer nursing hours per resident per day (3.6) than government (4.2) and non-profit facilities (4.3). For-profit facilities also have higher rates of turnover.

While there’s no evidence of a widespread worker shortage, there is a pay shortage. EPI found that nursing homes pay registered nurses and aides less than other health care providers.

Many aides earn poverty-level wages despite difficult working conditions. It’s difficult to explain a national shortage of workers in an occupation that doesn’t require highly specialized skills or training, unless the supposed “shortage” stems from the fact that employers aren’t offering pay commensurate with the demands of the job.

Increased workloads and unsafe conditions also induced many registered nurses to quit or retire early during the pandemic and contributed to the first decline in nursing school enrollment in 20 years. Staffing standards would help nursing homes attract and retain nurses by improving working conditions.

Our analysis suggests that short-term workforce shortages are unlikely, and long-term shortages can be averted. Rather than indicating a nationwide shortage of trained staff, the recent downturn in employment suggests that there’s a pool of experienced workers who could return to nursing homes if pay and working conditions improved.

The industry lobby says that low staffing levels aren’t due to profit-seeking, but rather a shortage of workers. However, the supposed “shortage” is self-inflicted. As we explained in a public comment on the proposed rule, nursing home workers are grossly underpaid and overworked. Declines in nursing home employment also reflect a shift toward home- and community-based services (HCBS) that accelerated in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, which devastated nursing home residents and staff.

Nursing home care is expensive, yet many homes are dangerously understaffed

The annual cost of nursing home care is around $100,000, far more than most seniors can cover with savings and income. Since most people who need long-term care for extended periods run out of money, the government is the main source of funding for nursing home care and HCBS.

However, Medicare only covers short rehab stints after hospitalization, while Medicaid only picks up the tab after people have drawn down other resources. Since private long-term care insurance is expensive and provides limited coverage, all except the wealthiest households risk being impoverished by long-term care needs, though Medicaid at least guarantees access to nursing home care when other funds run out. The Biden administration’s proposed American Jobs Plan included $400 billion in funding to allow more people to obtain home-based care instead of being forced to live in a facility, but this didn’t make it into final legislation.

Despite nursing homes’ high cost, aides who provide most of the hands-on care earn poverty or near-poverty wages while enduring harsh working conditions. The average aide assists 13 residents. Most aides are women of color, including many immigrants. Workers suffered high illness and injury rates even before the pandemic. Turnover is high—fewer than half of nursing home workers last a year on the job—and affects the quality of care.

What are we getting for the $100 billion Medicare and Medicaid spend annually on nursing homes and similar care provided in continuing care retirement communities? Though it may seem hard to believe, there are no strict requirements for how much care is provided in nursing homes even when taxpayers foot the bill. Much of the money flows to for-profit companies who own 70% of nursing homes and have an incentive to minimize costs at the expense of residents.

Private equity owners are among the worst offenders because they focus on maximizing short-term profits and have fewer reputational constraints. The private equity business model often targets sectors such as newspapers, hospitals, and nursing homes where previous owners had invested in building and maintaining reputations for quality products and services. The new owners take advantage of lingering goodwill and workers’ sense of responsibility while gutting staff and engaging in self-dealing, such as selling facilities to companies controlled by the private equity partners and then charging inflated rent for their use.

Real estate sale-leasebacks and other related-party transactions hold several advantages for private equity partners in nursing home deals. These include hiding profits and shielding assets from creditors in case of bankruptcy or litigation, including wrongful-death lawsuits. High rents and fees from such transactions may be passed on to payers, including Medicaid and Medicare, while proceeds aren’t equitably shared with pension funds and other partners in the deal who put up most of the money and bear almost all the risk.

Though poor health and safety records and bad press coverage may eventually catch up with unscrupulous nursing home owners, they can continue to do business by changing names and hiding behind complex ownership structures. In addition to proposing a minimum staffing standard, the Biden administration has also moved to increase transparency in nursing home ownership given the evidence that private equity and real estate investment trust ownership is associated with poor quality of care.

Unscrupulous nursing home owners take advantage of the fact that residents may have limited options. Medicaid tends to pay less than Medicare and private payers, and, in some states, may not cover the cost of quality care. Higher-quality nursing homes may therefore limit the number of Medicaid beds even while nursing homes that provide substandard care are able to earn a profit. The result is frail nursing home residents—disproportionately people of color—languishing in dangerous homes and cared for by guilt-ridden, stressed, and underpaid workers.

A minimum staffing standard is long overdue

Federal law currently requires only that nursing homes be supervised by a registered nurse (RN) and provide “sufficient” staffing, a standard that isn’t defined or enforced. Some states do better, but all jurisdictions except the District of Columbia require less than the 4.1 hours of total nursing care per resident per day that many experts recommend based on a 2001 study commissioned by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. Actual care provided varies widely across states, from an average of 3.3 hours in Missouri and Texas to 7.5 hours in Alaska.

The proposed standard isn’t perfect. It’s presented as a compromise between improving resident well-being and preserving access to care given industry claims of worker shortages. It requires nursing homes to have an RN available around the clock in addition to providing at least 0.55 hours of daily RN care and 2.45 hours of daily nurse aide care per resident. While 24-hour RN supervision is an improvement over many previous recommendations, total nursing care prescribed in the proposed standard falls short of 4.1 hours per resident. The proposed standard also fails to include a role for licensed practical nurses, who could end up being laid off in favor of aides.

The nursing home lobby—the American Health Care Association (AHCA)—is trying to derail the proposed standard, saying it would have “disastrous results” by failing to improve quality while potentially displacing hundreds of thousands of residents. But the industry is grasping at straws. For example, it trumpets the fact that a study backing the proposed standard finds no “specific threshold” where quality improves or declines. But the reason the study finds no specific threshold is because health and safety improve with staffing at every level examined, including levels well above the proposed standard. This is hardly an argument against a minimum standard; instead, it’s an argument that tougher standards would yield substantial health and safety benefits.

Industry claims of a worker shortage are equally unfounded, relying on the fact that the workforce shrank during the pandemic as nursing home occupancy plummeted. AHCA says that 15% of nursing home workers left or lost their positions during the pandemic, but this reflects reduced demand for workers, not short supply, as hundreds of thousands of residents and would-be residents died in nursing home outbreaks and others fled or avoided the facilities due to the high risk of COVID-19 infection. If there were an actual worker shortage, nursing homes would be bidding up wages, but nursing home wages have been flat even as workers in other industries have seen gains in a tight labor market. If anything, the fact that the industry has shed workers suggests that there’s a pool of trained workers who could be hired back, especially if pay and working conditions improved. A similar illogic is evident in the claim that rural hospital closures—which are often due to states’ refusal to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act and other financial factors—are evidence of labor shortages that would also affect nursing homes. Instead, these hospital closures would likely have increased the pool of available nurses and aides in these areas.

It’s true that the nursing home industry is in decline, a process that accelerated during the pandemic. But this is a positive trend if more seniors can access better and more cost-effective care at home. Whether or not a federal staffing standard causes more nursing homes to close their doors, as the industry warns, residents may be better off in different care settings. While the industry lobby points to the fact that 38% of nursing homes that closed during the pandemic had four- or five-star ratings, our analysis of August nursing home data finds that 57% of all nursing homes received such ratings, indicating that lower-rated homes were more likely to shut down.

The industry’s warnings of large-scale displacement are almost certainly overblown, since they can’t point to evidence that this happened in states that implemented stricter standards. Studies looking at the experiences of New Mexico, Vermont, and New Jersey found that nursing homes affected by stricter standards were no more likely to close than those already in compliance. Similarly, careful research has found that state and local minimum wage increases didn’t cause nursing homes to shut down but did reduce turnover among low-wage employees and improve residents’ health outcomes, including lower mortality rates. Since nursing home occupancy has rebounded but remains below pre-pandemic levels, any consolidation that does happen would result in efficiency gains by reducing overhead costs per resident. Adequate staffing could also help repair nursing homes’ tarnished reputations and slow their decline.

The staffing standard is critically important, notwithstanding the nursing home industry’s unconvincing arguments

It’s highly unlikely that the rule will cause widespread shuttering of nursing homes and reduce access to quality care as the industry claims. However, ownership changes in existing facilities are both likely and welcome, as the greediest owners will exit the industry. It’s scandalous that the public is paying for-profit companies to care for vulnerable seniors without setting minimum standards for care or understanding where the money is going. The Biden administration’s proposed rules for nursing home staffing and transparency are critical to fixing this broken system.

The industry’s attempt to derail the proposed staffing rule by claiming a widespread worker shortage is outrageous given that the industry continues to pay workers below-market and often poverty-level wages for difficult and dangerous work. The decline in employment that the industry cites as evidence of a shortage is mostly due to a decline in the number of residents—a trend that reflects a preference for aging in place as well as the inadequate care offered in many nursing homes, especially during the pandemic. To the extent that workers fled or were sidelined by illness during the pandemic and would need to be lured back with higher pay and better working conditions, this is a welcome corrective and not reason to weaken the standard.

Absent federal action, new Bureau of Labor Statistics data released today reveal stark inequalities in access to paid sick leave. One that hits hard is the inability of 61% of the lowest-wage workers in the U.S. to be able to earn paid sick days to care for themselves or family members.

Figure A below breaks down access to paid sick days: Whereas 96% of the highest-wage workers (top 10%) had access to paid sick days, only 39% of the lowest-paid workers (bottom 10%) are able to earn paid sick days. That means the highest-wage workers are 2.5 times as likely to have access to paid sick leave as the lowest-paid workers.

Workers without paid sick leave often have to choose between going to work sick (or sending a child to school sick) or risk losing their job or forgoing a vital household expense. In a forthcoming EPI report, we will demonstrate that the costs of these expenses from not having paid sick leave can be high.

Figure A

Workers’ ability to earn paid sick days varies greatly across the country. In lieu of federal action, many states have passed legislation to guarantee paid sick days, but many workers have been left behind. Figure B shows vast differences across Census divisions in workers’ ability to use paid sick time to take care of themselves or their family members. The share with access to paid sick days ranges from only 64% in the West South Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas) up to 94% in the Pacific states (California, Oregon, and Washington). Notably, many state governments in the East South Central and West South Central Census divisions have passed preemption laws prohibiting local municipalities from passing paid leave and sick day policies.

Figure B

There is also huge variation in access to paid sick days across the private sector. Full-time workers are much more likely to have paid sick days than part-time workers (87% vs. 51%). Unionized workers have greater access to paid sick days than nonunion workers (86% vs. 77%). At 96% access, workers in management, business, and financial occupations have higher rates than any other occupation category. Services occupations have the least at 61%. 

During the pandemic, workers and their families benefited when the government acted quickly to protect workers from the threat of COVID and the threat of economic insecurity. Giving up on these protections, including support for employers to provide access to paid sick leave, hurts everyone. Cities and states that implement sick leave have lower influenza-like-illnesses transmission rates than jurisdictions without the policy, showing just how important paid sick leave is in protecting community-level health. Paid sick leave not only helps reduce transmission of disease, it also provides economic security for workers who might otherwise lose income if they have to take time off from work.