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	<title>Budget, Taxes, and Public Investment | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Budget, Taxes, and Public Investment | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>The economics of deficits, debt, and interest rates: Part 2: Structural deficits today are too large</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 13:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327691</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="box">
<p><em>This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/deficits-debt-and-interest-rates-some-questions-answered/">part one here.</a>&nbsp;</em></p>
</div>
<p>The effects of deficits and debt on the broader economy are largely straightforward—with one big exception: They differ radically depending on whether the economy is operating near its productive potential or is instead operating well below it (which occurs most notably during recessions).<span id="more-327691"></span></p>
<p>The main economic effects of deficits in these two states of the world are essentially as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>Large deficits during times when the economy is operating near its productive potential (or during times of <em>full employment</em>) put upward pressure on either interest rates (more likely) or inflation (less likely).
<ul>
<li>The higher interest rates in turn can “crowd out” productive private-sector capital investments. If this happens chronically, this can shrink the size of the capital stock U.S. workers have available to them—with the capital stock being factories and other buildings, equipment, software, and research and development efforts. This smaller capital stock in turn reduces productivity, or the income generated in an average hour of work in the U.S. economy, hence shrinking the growth of potential living standards.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Large deficits when the economy is operating well below potential actually stabilize the economy and aid its return to potential.
<ul>
<li>Economies start operating below full employment when aggregate demand—spending by households, businesses, and governments—falls short of what is needed to fully employ productive resources. By increasing spending and lowering taxes (hence boosting private-sector disposable income that can be spent), higher deficits boost aggregate demand and push the economy closer to potential.</li>
<li>Because private-sector investment responds to income growth as well as interest rates, deficits run during times of less than full employment can actually “crowd in” productive private-sector investment.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong>The one noncontroversial effect of budget deficits: They raise aggregate demand</strong></h4>
<p>If there is one noncontroversial statement about budget deficits, it is that <em>they raise the economy’s aggregate demand</em>. Whether this increase in aggregate demand is good or bad depends on the broader economy.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is strong</strong></h5>
<p>When private-sector sources of demand are strong—consumers are buying a lot, businesses are demanding lots of new capital goods to undertake production, and imports and exports are roughly balanced—all available productive resources (like workers) are fully employed and the economy does not need the public sector to inject extra demand into circulation with larger deficits; additional increments to demand will not bring forth more output. Instead, additional demand sent into a full employment economy will bid up <em>prices </em>rather than cause more output to be produced.</p>
<p>If the Federal Reserve is determined to not let strong demand bid up prices and push inflation above its preferred 2% target, it will respond to this excess of demand by raising its short-term policy rates to try to tamp down private sources of demand. Higher interest rates <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Semiparametric%20Estimates%20of%20Monetary%20Policy-V2.pdf">are generally effective in reducing demand</a> through lower consumption, business investment, and larger trade deficits.</p>
<p>Besides the Fed’s response, higher deficits in a full employment economy can also put upward pressure on interest rates through financial crowding out. At full employment, the supply of savings available to be loaned to households or businesses looking to make long-lived investments is largely fixed. Federal deficits <em>by definition</em> mean that the government has to go into financial markets, where supplies of savings and demands for investment meet, and increase <em>its own</em> demand for a share of these savings. Deficits are financed by selling government bonds to households and businesses—that is, by convincing savers to lend their money to the government for a period of time. The extra demand for borrowing meets the fixed supply of savings and pushes up the price of loans, or interest rates.</p>
<p>Because most capital investment by businesses (building new factories and buildings, purchasing new equipment and software, and paying salaries of workers engaged in research and development) is financed by borrowing, higher interest rates stemming from large budget deficits in economies that are already strong will slow capital investment over time. As the price of something rises—in this case, the price of borrowing to finance new investment—less of it will be demanded.</p>
<p>This reduction in capital investment slows long-run economic growth. A key contributor to growth in productivity—the amount of income generated in an average hour of work in the economy—is how much capital workers have available to them to do their jobs. Construction workers today are far more productive than 50 years ago because they’re more likely to use mechanized earth movers rather than shovels for excavation.</p>
<p>If deficits crowd out capital investment, this can slow productivity growth. Productivity growth is the ceiling on how fast average living standards can rise in an economy. So when large deficits during full employment crowd out of investment, this can damage economic growth. A key point in this analysis is that it is higher interest rates that are the transmission mechanism for this damage: If interest rates do not rise, there is no damage being done.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is weak</strong></h5>
<p>When private spending is too low to fully employ all available productive resources, the boost to aggregate demand from large deficits actually helps to employ these resources and move the economy closer to its productive potential.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy closer to its productive potential during downturns <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62568">happen automatically</a>. Spending rises on safety net programs like unemployment insurance, and this supports private consumption. Tax collections fall as private incomes fall, buffering disposable incomes from the full fall in pre-tax incomes.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy back to its potential come from discretionary legislation passed by Congress in direct response to the downturn—relief packages like the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/cea_8th_arra_report_final_draft.pdf">American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009</a> and the <a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/insight/research-summary/cares-impact-on-welfare/">CARES Act of 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Weak private spending places sharp downward pressure on inflation and interest rates as it generates idle resources (like rising unemployment). Given this, a boost to demand from larger deficits tends to <em>not</em> manifest as faster inflation or higher interest rates. A boost to demand when there are idle resources mostly causes output, not prices, to rise. And the higher output and income generated by higher deficits <em>create</em> savings that keep interest rates from rising in response to greater demand for investment.</p>
<p>Because this scenario sees no rise in interest rates, and because investment responds positively to output growth, larger deficits that boost economic activity <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2012a_delong.pdf">almost certainly “crowd in” private investment</a>, leading to more investment and higher productivity than would have occurred had deficits not been allowed to rise.</p>
<h4><strong>Excessive structural deficits are hurting the U.S. economy today</strong></h4>
<p>The upshot is that deficits can hurt if they’re too large when the economy is already near full employment, and that the data signature for this damage is rising interest rates. For decades, large budget deficits have not been accompanied by higher interest rates, making it very hard to argue that the economy’s long-run growth prospects were being damaged by crowded out private investment.</p>
<p>Over the past year, however, interest rates have risen noticeably. In fact, as of September 2026, 10-year Treasury rates have reached their highest levels since the early 2000s (though still far below highs reached between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s when—among other things—inflation expectations were much higher). Because inflation is a bit higher now than in the early 2000s, real (inflation-adjusted) rates have not risen quite as fast, but they are always noticeably higher than the average of the past 20 years. Between this and the fact that unemployment is likely not too far above full employment at the moment and the fact that inflation remains above the Fed’s 2% target level, it seems clear that too large U.S. deficits are putting unwelcome pressure on the larger economy.</p>
<p><iframe style="overflow: hidden; width: 540px; height: 433px;" src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=20dZ0&amp;width=540&amp;height=383" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p>Too large U.S. deficits are not the only driver of recent interest rate increases. Another contributor is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21102026-cp">larger deficits being run by many European countries</a>. Many of these countries have <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/08/council-activates-flexibility-in-eu-fiscal-rules-for-15-member-states-to-increase-defence-spending/">loosened fiscal rules to spend more on the military</a> in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Japanese economy is also stronger than it has been in decades, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/business/japan-interest-rates.html">interest rates there are rising</a> for the first time in decades. Finally, there has been a huge surge in <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">private investment demand</a> driven by the race between AI companies to dominate the market.</p>
<p>On the one hand, it seems hard to worry that higher interest rates are crowding out private-sector investment if it is precisely strong private investment contributing to higher rates. But the investment in AI is clearly not interest-sensitive (at least so far). It is driven by exogenous events and factors: Now just happens to be the time that the technology has reached tipping points where scalability and profitability seem possible, hence sparking a race between private companies to be the first to capitalize on this. Additionally, investment in sectors in the U.S. not being pulled along by the AI boom is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">notably weak in 2026</a>, posting negative growth. If U.S. fiscal deficits were lower and this led to lower interest rates, this would help <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">investment in non-AI sectors</a>.</p>
<p>Noting that too large structural deficits are likely slowing U.S. growth today does not map directly onto policy solutions. It’s not the case that the damage from too large deficits right now is so overwhelming that anything that reduces deficits should be done in response. In a later post, I will walk through the considerations about how policymakers should optimally respond to too high structural deficits. They definitely should do <em>something—</em>but it’s not the case that they should just do <em>anything</em>.</p>
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		<title>The economics of deficits, debt, and interest rates: Part 1: What rising interest rates say about today’s structural deficits</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/deficits-debt-and-interest-rates-some-questions-answered/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327689</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part one of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="box">
<p><em>This is part one of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/">part two here</a>.&nbsp;</em></p>
</div>
<p>Long-term interest rates have been rising steadily over the past six months and have now reached their highest levels since before the Great Recession of 2008. These higher rates, combined with inflation that remains above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, are likely driven in part by unsustainably high federal budget deficits.<span id="more-327689"></span></p>
<p><iframe style="overflow: hidden; width: 540px; height: 433px;" src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=20dZ0&amp;width=540&amp;height=383" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p>In an upcoming series of blog posts, I will examine some of the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and close with how policymakers should respond. The posts will examine the following questions, sketched out briefly below:</p>
<h4>How do we know when deficits are too high—or too low?</h4>
<p>Today’s deficits are too high, but the same size of deficit (or an even larger one) might be fine and useful in times when the economy is weak and needs stimulus. But unemployment is just over 4%, <strong>the economy does not need significant fiscal stimulus,</strong> and interest rates are rising. These are all good signals that too high deficits are contributing to higher interest rates and pressuring the economy.</p>
<h4>What’s the best way to measure the pressure that excessive deficits and debt are putting on the U.S. economy?</h4>
<p>The best measure is <strong>the real debt service ratio</strong>—inflation-adjusted interest payments as a share of GDP.</p>
<h4>Is the rise of interest rates in 2026 just chickens coming home to roost from decades of too high deficits and debt?</h4>
<p>Deficits in the 2010s and early 2020s were either a function of or a useful response to economic conditions of the time. Today’s problems would be just as bad had we run more austere fiscal policy in those years.</p>
<h4>How do too high structural budget deficits harm typical families?</h4>
<p>The harm almost always comes gradually. Too high structural deficits reduce capital investment and lead to slower productivity growth. A crisis driven simply by the economics of U.S. debt is extremely unlikely. A crisis driven by deranged political choices and dysfunction that intersect with U.S. debt is sadly imaginable.</p>
<h4>What’s the optimal policy response to today’s too high structural deficits?</h4>
<p>Raising revenue significantly from the richest households and corporations is the best path forward.</p>
<h4>Does today’s too high structural deficit significantly constrain policymakers from doing the right things if the economy enters recession?</h4>
<p>Putting measures in place to solve the <strong>structural</strong> deficit should not preclude policymakers from responding to the next recession with fiscal relief that <strong>temporarily</strong> boosts deficits.</p>
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		<title>Voters in Colorado and Florida face major tax questions on the November ballot</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/voters-in-colorado-and-florida-face-major-tax-questions-on-the-november-ballot/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Oct 2026 14:37:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Cooper]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327377</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key Colorado Amendment 87 would help fix a structural funding problem that has undermined the state’s public services for 35 years.]]></description>
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<h4><strong>Key Takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>Colorado Amendment 87 would help fix a structural funding problem that has undermined the state’s public services for 35 years. The measure would modestly raise taxes on the top 3% of taxpayers while generating $2 billion in revenue.</li>
<li>Florida Amendment 3 would devastate public services across the state. It would cut annual local government revenue by an estimated $12 billion, equivalent to 17% of statewide local government compensation. This translates to 123,000 jobs at risk of being cut from local government payrolls across the state.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Lots of media attention around the upcoming midterm elections is understandably focused on which party will win control of Congress, as well as the many state legislative chambers and governorships that are up for grabs. However, there are also over 150 state ballot measures going before voters next month, some of which will be tremendously consequential in shaping state economies for years to come. Two such proposals warrant greater attention: Amendment 87 in Colorado and Amendment 3 in Florida. Both would be transformative for their respective states—the former in positive ways, the latter in catastrophic ones.<span id="more-327377"></span></p>
<h4>Colorado Amendment 87 would make the state tax system fairer while boosting revenues for essential public services</h4>
<p>On November 3rd, Colorado voters will vote on <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/ballots/graduated-income-tax-2/files/blue-book">Amendment 87</a>, a measure that would replace the state’s constitutionally mandated flat tax—which requires a teacher’s aide making $40,000 a year to pay the same tax rate as a billionaire tech CEO—with a progressive, graduated income tax. The new tax system would maintain current tax rates on households and businesses earning $100,000–$500,000 a year, lower taxes for those making less than $100,000 a year, and raise taxes modestly on households and businesses making more than $500,000 a year. All told, these changes <a href="https://bellpolicy.org/graduated-income-tax-faq/">would mean a modest tax increase on the richest 3%</a> of Colorado taxpayers, with everyone else in the state paying the same or less than before.</p>
<p>In a state and country shaped by tremendous income inequality, even modest changes to tax rates on the highest earners—like those being considered in Colorado—can yield substantial new revenues. Analysts estimate Amendment 87 <a href="https://bellpolicy.org/graduated-income-tax-faq/#how-much-revenue-could-a-graduated-income-tax-generate">would generate over $2 billion in new funds</a> to support public education, health, and child care in the state. (The state’s general fund gross revenues for FY25–26 <a href="https://content.leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/FY26-27ApprReptA.pdf">were projected to be about $17 billion</a>, so a $2 billion increase is sizable.)</p>
<p>In many ways, the Colorado measure is not very different from other high-earner taxes passed in Maine, Washington, Rhode Island, and Hawaii this past year. Massachusetts’ “fair share” tax, adopted by voters in 2022, has been a huge success, exceeding revenue projections and <a href="https://massbudget.org/2024/10/07/two-years-fsa/">funding significant investments</a> in public transit, free school meals, free community college, and early childhood education.</p>
<p>Amendment 87 is notable because it would begin to fix the state’s uniquely broken funding system. In 1992, Colorado voters adopted a “Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights” (TABOR) amendment that caps state revenue even when the state economy grows. Colorado is the only state that has such a measure, and for over 30 years, it has kept the state’s public services from keeping up with a growing and aging population. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-teacher-pay-penalty-remained-high-in-2025-teachers-and-students-nationwide-are-still-paying-the-price-of-decades-of-neglect/#epi-toc-5">Low teacher salaries</a> have driven high teacher turnover in Colorado public schools, many of which have <a href="https://coloradofiscal.org/tabor-the-colorado-con-2/">increasingly had to shift to four-day school weeks</a>. The state workforce has <a href="https://progov21.org/Download/Document/YX1532">similarly struggled with turnover</a>, and federal funding cuts to Medicaid, among other programs, exacerbate existing strains on programs serving <a href="https://bellpolicy.org/the-state-of-aging-in-colorado-2025/">one of the fastest aging populations in the country</a><a name="_Hlt243574891"></a>.</p>
<p>Unsurprisingly, opponents are making typical arguments that the measure would cause high earners and small businesses to flee the state en masse—arguments that <a href="https://www.asanet.org/wp-content/uploads/attach/journals/jun16asrfeature.pdf">empirical research</a> has <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/blog/states-should-forge-ahead-with-new-revenues-in-face-of-misleading-tax-migration-claims">thoroughly debunked</a>. Colorado’s Governor Jared Polis, <a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/how-these-ultrawealthy-politicians-avoided-paying-taxes">himself a wealthy tech entrepreneur</a>, has claimed the measure would hurt small businesses, though independent analysis from the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP) found that the corporate tax changes would fall overwhelmingly on large multinational corporations with shareholders located across the globe. ITEP estimates that 90% of the corporate impact would fall on people who aren’t Coloradans.</p>
<p>Amendment 87 would go a long way toward fixing a nearly 35-year-old structural funding problem that has hamstrung public services in Colorado while making the state tax system fairer. If voters there see through the fearmongering, it could help motivate lawmakers and advocates in other states to pursue similar tax changes critical to bolstering vital public services, combating inequality, and improving outcomes for everyday working families.</p>
<h4>Florida Amendment 3 would lead to substantial job losses and public service cuts</h4>
<p>Florida <a href="https://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_Homestead_Tax_Exemptions,_Property_Assessments,_and_Spending_Restrictions_Amendment_(2026)">Amendment 3</a>, a constitutional amendment placed on the ballot by the state legislature at the request of Governor Ron DeSantis, would fundamentally undermine Florida local governments’ ability to raise revenue and fund public services. The measure would dramatically increase the state nonschool property tax exemption on homesteads from the current $25,000 to $250,000 in 2028, indexing it to inflation thereafter; lower the 10% assessment growth cap on all other properties to 5%; and require the legislature to establish procedures allowing local governments to raise homestead exemptions even further—opening the door for potential full elimination of nonschool property taxes. The state Office of Economic and Demographic Research estimates that the amendment would <a href="https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/amendment-3-local-funding-cuts-calculator">cut local tax revenue by nearly $14 billion in the first two years alone</a> and structurally reduce local tax revenues by nearly $12 billion annually thereafter.</p>
<p>Funding losses of this magnitude would be devastating for public services <a href="https://amendment3.floridapolicyinstitute.org/">in every community across the state</a>. Keep in mind that when analysts describe funding cuts and reductions in “public services,” what they’re often really describing is people—who work on behalf of their neighbors and communities—losing their jobs.</p>
<p>To make Amendment 3’s potential damage concrete, we can compare the estimated permanent funding losses with current local government compensation and employment data in the state to get a rough sense of the potential shock to local government employment.</p>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-fh74x" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Amendment 3 funding losses represent large shares of local public jobs" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/fh74x/8/" height="798" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Choropleth map" data-external='1'></iframe><script type="text/javascript">(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();</script></p>
<p>The map above shows the projected permanent revenue losses that would result from Amendment 3 for every Florida county. It also shows what these losses represent as a share of total compensation of local government employees in each county. (<strong>Table 1 </strong>below contains the same data for all counties and the state overall.) The data show that the projected funding losses are equal to roughly 17% of total local government compensation statewide, rising as high as 39% of compensation in Flagler County.</p>
<p>The map and table also report local government employment as of 2025, which statewide totaled almost 720,000 workers. <strong>If local governments were forced to cut staffing in direct proportion to their funding losses, it would mean job losses for almost 125,000 local public-sector workers across the state.</strong> In Flagler County, a 39% loss in public-sector employment translates to over 1,500 people losing their jobs. Notably, Flagler county—a relatively small Atlantic-Ocean-adjacent county north of Daytona Beach—had fewer than 29,000 jobs total in 2025, meaning that a loss of 1,500 jobs would be over 5% of total employment (public and private) in the county.</p>
<p>Of course, not every county and municipality will absorb these funding losses entirely through staffing cuts; most will likely adopt a mix of staffing cuts, reductions in services, fewer supply purchases, canceled contracts with private vendors, and possibly sales of public assets. Each of these would have ripple effects on local households and businesses. If a county, for instance, is forced to stop contracting with a local lawn care or building services company, those formerly contracted local businesses could also have to cut staff.</p>
<p>Local governments will also likely try to increase revenues from other sources, such as service fees and tax increases on entities not eligible for the amendment’s exemptions. For instance, Amendment 3 does not provide an expanded tax exemption for non-homestead properties—meaning that commercial property owners will likely see their property taxes rise, which <a href="https://flhousingactionlab.substack.com/p/new-analysis-estimates-amendment">they could very likely pass on to renters</a> and tenant businesses.</p>
<p>This would shift more of the local tax bill away from homeowners and onto renters, who are typically less wealthy. With no income tax and a large portion of state and local revenues generated by sales and excise taxes, Florida already has <a href="https://itep.org/whopays/florida-who-pays-7th-edition/">the most regressive tax system in the country</a>. The lowest-income taxpayers in the state pay effective tax rates nearly five times higher than the top 1% of taxpayers.</p>
<p>If voters adopt Amendment 3 next month, the consequences for communities across the state will be dire. Researchers at the Florida Policy Institute have described in detail how Amendment 3 would gut resources for <a href="https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/fact-sheet-potential-impact-of-amendment-3-on-floridas-public-hospital-districts">public hospitals</a>, <a href="https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/local-services-for-florida-children-and-parents-would-see-deep-funding-cuts-under-amendment-3">child and family services</a>, and <a href="https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/a-one-two-punch-fema-cuts-and-amendment-3s-property-tax-reductions-could-both-hit-florida-at-once">emergency and disaster response services</a>, among other things. In the short run, especially as the labor market is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/weak-september-jobs-report-shows-hiring-and-wage-growth-slow/">looking increasingly unsteady</a>, enacting massive funding cuts to local governments is incredibly foolish just for the direct impacts it will have on jobs and spending in local economies. In the long run, the harm to the welfare of Florida residents from a severely diminished public sector could be devastating.</p>
<p>Together, these measures show how much is at stake on state ballots this November. Colorado could begin to fix a decades-old structural funding problem, while Florida may create a new one of its own—one that would strip billions from local governments and the services they provide.</p>


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		<title>Consequences of austerity: How reductions in BLS funding threaten the credibility of our statistics</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/consequences-of-austerity-how-reductions-in-bls-funding-threaten-the-credibility-of-our-statistics/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Sep 2026 18:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hilary Wething, Joe Fast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=326266</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Government funding cuts are undermining the Bureau of Labor Statistics' ability to provide the reliable information that businesses and policymakers need to make sound decisions about the economy.]]></description>
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<p><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;"><strong>Key takeaways</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">Years of government funding cuts are undermining the U.S.’s position as a global leader in providing the reliable statistical information that businesses and policymakers need for sound decision-making.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The Trump administration has accelerated the funding cuts and worked to degrade the effectiveness and independence of data-collecting agencies.</span></li>
<li><span style='font-size: 16px;'>The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is a prime example of an agency whose data collection in areas like employment and wages is integral to our understanding of the economy’s health and whether it is heading into a recession.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">A decline in response rates to one of the BLS’s key surveys was already underway but, absent funding increases and survey modifications, it will be harder for economists and policymakers to make timely sense of changes in the labor market.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Historically, the U.S. has been a leader in providing reliable and timely statistical information to support business strategy and policymaking. The value of information provided publicly and free of charge to businesses, households, and governments <a href="https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/27934/chapter/4">is immense.</a> Yet underinvestment over the past 15 years is a key reason why the U.S. lost its position on the cutting-edge of public statistical services worldwide.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of the second Trump administration, this underinvestment has accelerated, and the administration has made intentional efforts to degrade the effectiveness and independence of the federal statistical agencies (FSAs). This accumulation of threats to the effectiveness of the FSAs will rapidly degrade the value of the key public good they provide, unless policy changes course sharply.</p>
<p>This blog post provides just one example of how cumulative underinvestment has blocked the ability of a key FSA to respond to developments, making its data less reliable over time. The Bureau of Labor Statistics collects a range of necessary data tracking the performance of the U.S. labor market. This BLS data are a key input into high-stakes decisions across the U.S. economy—including for both public and private actors. For example, the Federal Reserve relies on BLS data about unemployment rates, payroll job growth, wage growth, and price indexes to set monetary policy. The more volatile the BLS data are from month to month, the worse the information that guides Federal Reserve decisions.</p>
<p><span id="more-326266"></span></p>
<p>Private industry also relies heavily on these statistics. A <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.1.131">2018 survey</a> conducted by the National Association for Business Economists found that 95% of businesses responded “yes” to the question: “Are government data important for analyses and forecasting that drive business decisions?” Employment and unemployment data produced by the BLS were rated as the most important data source for <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.33.1.131">informing business decisions</a>.</p>
<p>Yet over the past 15 years, the BLS has gradually lost personnel and funding, which has been undermining their mandate of producing timely, accurate statistics on wages, prices, and the labor market. More recently, the Trump administration’s choices to freeze BLS hiring has further strained Census field staff charged with collecting household survey data. Worst of all, the Trump administration took the unprecedented step of firing the commissioner of the BLS simply because the agency accurately reported data that the administration happened to find politically inconvenient.</p>
<p>Even without further blatant political pressure on the BLS’s independence, the agency will encounter growing difficulty in doing its job effectively in coming years. One of their most important efforts is the fielding of the Current Population Survey (CPS), a survey of thousands of households across the U.S. taken every month, which provides detailed employment and wage information. The CPS is the source data for the monthly estimate of the nation’s unemployment rate, for example. This is in turn a key criterion for assessing whether the economy is heading into recession. In recent years—after the COVID-19 pandemic—the response rates for the CPS have sharply declined. These declines, if not countered with greater investment in response rates, may make it harder for economists and policymakers to make timely sense of changes in labor market, particularly for populations that already have small sample sizes, such as rural areas or detailed demographic groups.</p>
<p>The rest of this blog post highlights the problem of falling response rates, demonstrates that they have made some labor market measures more volatile month to month, and shows that these falling response rates have occurred over the same period as the retrenchment in resources for the BLS.</p>
<h4><strong>Nonresponse reduces sample size in the Current Population Survey</strong></h4>
<p>The Current Population Survey asks questions about employment and other labor market characteristics to 60,0000 households or about <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cex/cecomparison/cps_profile.htm">110,000</a>&nbsp;individuals every month. Between 2005–2016, the Current Population Survey household survey was able to steadily receive responses from around 107,000 people, ages 16 and older. However, as noted by <a href="https://www.briefingbook.info/p/cps-sample-size-cut-may-save-some">others</a> and shown in <strong>Figure A</strong>, the number of households responding to the survey has declined since the mid-2010s and then fell precipitously after the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first few months of 2026, just over 75,000 individuals, ages 16 and older, had responded to the monthly CPS.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322962 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322962" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322962-35835-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The decline in response rate has likely occurred for a few reasons. The Bureau of Labor Statistics notes <a href="https://www.bls.gov/osmr/research-papers/2014/pdf/st140220.pdf">that the rate of refusals had been increasing as early as the 1990s</a>, likely as the world became more connected with computers and the internet, leading to less reliance on in-person interactions to conduct business. Social trust has also gone down over the past few decades, and the share of adults who agree that “most people can be trusted” <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/2025/05/08/americans-trust-in-one-another/">has decreased by more than 15% since 1984</a>.</p>
<p>More recently, the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled with concerns for privacy and distrust in the government, may be the reason that the rate of decline grew in recent years. The COVID-19 pandemic forced many workers to transition to remote work, and concerns about contagion limited overall social interactions, making response collection increasingly difficult. Additionally, concerns about privacy or retribution from the state felt by groups like immigrants may make some people more reluctant to answer questions for fear of deportation.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, distrust in the federal government, fueled by recent overtly political activity, could be behind some of the reduction in response rates. For example, when the Bureau of Labor Statistics published two consecutive months of large negative revisions to the number of payroll jobs in mid-2025, the Trump administration leveled charges—which were baseless and never backed up by any evidence—that the BLS had manipulated the data for political purposes and fired then Commissioner Erika McEntarfer. People are less likely to trust government if they think publicized information and facts are politically motivated.&nbsp;</p>
<h4><strong>Smaller sample sizes are linked to less precision in key labor-market estimates </strong></h4>
<p>If the size of sampled households is large enough, declining participation does not have to significantly affect the reliability of statistics produced from the survey. However, if declines in participation reduce usable sample sizes too much, this can lead to estimates with less precision, which can reduce researchers’ ability to parse a signal from statistical noise in a timely manner, especially for economically vulnerable groups.</p>
<p>For example, because the unemployment rate for Black workers is volatile, it can be difficult to accurately diagnose labor market softness for this group. If the sample size is too small to generate statistical precision in each month, researchers will require increasingly more months of data to be able to diagnose labor market softness, which could jeopardize the timeliness of proper policy responses to support the labor market.</p>
<p>Every month, the Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes statistical significance summary tables, identifying whether changes in labor force indicators are statistically significant at the 90% level. BLS publishes these statistical significance tests for dozens of indicators across several demographic groups, including for Black workers. We collected these tables over time and documented the margin of error needed in order to claim a 1-month change in unemployment was statistically significant, shown in <strong>Figure </strong><strong>B</strong>.</p>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-1IxI7" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Figure B: The CPS Black unemployment rate estimate has become less precise" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/1IxI7/12/" height="602" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe></p>
<p>While the margin of error that is needed to claim a change is statistically significant varies with the level of unemployment rate, the reduction in precision from lower response rates is evident when we hold the unemployment rate constant. The two red lines in Figure B identify the effect size needed to claim statistical significance for a change from a starting unemployment rate of 7.3%. In November 2017, when the sample size of the labor force was 63,346, a 0.66 percentage point change in unemployment would have been considered a statistically significant change. In April 2026, when sample size of the labor force decreased to 45,416 respondents, a 0.84 percentage point change in unemployment is required to claim statistical significance.</p>
<p>If the declines in survey participation are not random across the U.S. population, estimates may also be biased, which runs the risk of conveying inaccurate information about the state of the economy. For example, if nonresponse is more likely <a href="https://cepr.net/documents/undercounting_cps_2006_01.pdf?utm_source=Macro+Newsletter&amp;utm_campaign=e736b411d7-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_04_26_09_12_COPY_01&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_c7f77b552d-e736b411d7-&amp;mc_cid=e736b411d7&amp;mc_eid=%5b1e8229297d%5d">to occur among unemployed respondents</a> compared with employed respondents, <a href="https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_150-Cai-Baker.pdf">the statistics derived from these samples may suggest labor market softness when there is none</a>. These concerns are already materializing: The Census reported that nonresponse had biased income statistics from the CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement upward by <a href="https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/research-matters/2025/09/administrative-data-nonresponse-bias-cps-asec.html">2%–3% since 2020.</a></p>
<p>Researchers and field staff at Census and the BLS are aware of potential concerns of bias in their estimates and do their best to weight estimates using population counts from administrative data and other sources so that these issues don’t happen. However, if sample size declines continue on this trajectory, the BLS will need to create new methodologies and sampling strategies, all of which will require funding.</p>
<h4><strong>Steady throttling of BLS funding makes all decision-makers—public and private—less well informed</strong></h4>
<p>The declining precision of estimates in the Black unemployment rate is just one of the key indicators affected by a BLS that lacks resources to respond effectively to growing data collection challenges. Achieving a larger sample size for key surveys requires a well-functioning and well-funded BLS with personnel who can take on the challenges of administering surveys in the 21st century. Yet this is the exact opposite of what is happening. <strong>Figure C</strong> shows that from 2005 to the present, the staffing at the BLS went from roughly 2,500 employees to just over 2,150, a drop of about 15%.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322945 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322945" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322945-35833-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Funding has followed a similar trajectory. Since its high-water mark in 2010, the BLS budget has declined from $810 million to $636 million in inflation-adjusted terms, a decrease of 20%. These cuts don’t hurt just the estimates generated by the Current Population Survey. In the past couple of years, the BLS has been forced to reduce data collection for the Consumer Price Index and to discontinue certain <a href="https://www.bls.gov/ppi/notices/2025/bls-to-discontinue-selected-ppis.htm">Producer Price Indexes</a> in an effort to cut costs. At a time when affordability and price changes are top of mind for U.S households and businesses, depriving public and private decision-makers of accurate and timely information about prices makes little sense.</p>
<p>Increased funding would allow the BLS to maintain all their current functions and implement new procedures to address declining sample sizes. In 2023, BLS began to modernize the collection process of the CPS to improve response rates by allowing online <a href="https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/about/modernization.html">self-completion of the survey</a> and other collection process improvements for certain data products. This BLS initiative is happening in parallel to similar initiatives in several other countries undertaking modernization efforts. The <a href="https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/publication/state-of-the-uk-statistical-system-2025/pages/6/">United Kingdom</a>, <a href="https://doi.org/10.3233/SJI-140803">the Netherlands</a>, <a href="https://www.isi-next.org/abstracts/submission/3084/view/">Australia</a>, and Canada have all received funding to launch similar modernization efforts for their own household surveys to address declining response rates. However, the BLS <a href="https://www.friendsofbls.org/updates/2025/5/7/fy-2026-appropriations-request-for-bls">requests for increased funding for the modernization efforts</a> have not been fully granted.</p>
<p>The decision to steadily defund the BLS is especially striking when weighed against the large economic benefits provided by the agency and other federal statistical agencies. The BLS provides up-to-date precise estimates of economic indicators that policymakers and business leaders alike rely on. Previous research finds that increased <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1094202520300454?ref=pdf_download&amp;fr=RR-9&amp;rr=a402ba36be37b712">economic uncertainty can have negative effects on the economy</a>, proving the important role that the BLS plays. Moreover, some economists have estimated in 2025 that the BLS generates economics benefits of about <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w35135">$25 for every $1 spent on the agency’s budgets</a>. The 2025 FY BLS budget was approximately $636 million, meaning the BLS currently generates about $15.9 billion in economic benefit. Across all agencies, in FY 2022, the combined budget request for statistical agencies was <a href="https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/27934/chapter/4#25">$7.1 billion or 0.3% GDP, yet the benefits have been measured to be around $770 billion</a>.</p>
<h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<p>At a time when more information on the economic and social well-being of people and communities is needed, not less, <a href="https://www.friendsofbls.org/updates/2025/5/7/fy-2026-appropriations-request-for-bls">funding the BLS should be a top priority.</a> Addressing nonresponse will require substantial effort and creativity to counteract declining levels of social trust and anti-government sentiment. It will, for example, require public campaigns to convey that information provided to the BLS is confidential and safe, and changes in methodology to render the correct statistical adjustments, such that the statistics generated are unbiased.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Rather than tackle these challenges head on however, the Trump administration put forward a proposal that would reduce the number of statistics about rural and less populous substate areas that could be published without running the risk of disclosing personally identifiable information. These proposals are a lazy solution to the real but solvable problem of making public data widely available and fully confidential. They would provide less information on the economic and social well-being of citizens, likely leading to delays in accurately diagnosing economic and social problems.</p>
<p>When agencies like the BLS are underfunded and understaffed, they aren’t able to conduct the critical functions of their agency or serve the public to the degree their mission entails. Funding for these organizations shouldn’t be up for debate, given how strong of an economic benefit they deliver.</p>
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		<title>The cost of mass deportations in states like Minnesota—and what federal tax dollars could be funding instead</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/the-cost-of-mass-deportations-in-states-like-minnesota-and-what-federal-tax-dollars-could-be-funding-instead/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Aug 2026 18:34:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Gordon Lafer]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=324054</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This week, EPI will release a new tool showing the cost of mass deportations to taxpayers in every U.S. city, county, and state.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This week, EPI will release <a href="https://www.epi.org/deportation-calculator" target="_blank">a new tool showing the cost of mass deportations</a> to taxpayers in every U.S. city, county, and state. For the first time, the actual economic tradeoffs imposed on all taxpayers will be shown in one place. Below, we preview the data for Minnesota, a prominent target of the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement crackdown earlier this year.</p>
<p>At a time when families across the country are struggling to afford housing, health care, and education, the Trump administration and its allies in Congress have been cutting support for basic needs and diverting huge sums of money to deportations.</p>
<p>In Minnesota, $4.4 billion in federal taxpayer dollars is being spent on detaining immigrants—many of whom are <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/30/us/refugees-asylum-seekers-minnesota-detained-ice">in the country lawfully</a>—and even some <a href="https://www.npr.org/2026/02/01/nx-s1-5689031/minnesota-citizens-detained-ice">U.S. citizens</a>. That means, on average, every household in the state is paying roughly $2,000 to track down, intimidate, detain, or deport people.</p>
<p>If that money were spent instead on programs proven to improve the lives of working families—education, health care, living wages—it could improve Minnesota communities dramatically. Here are a few different ways the money could be spent over the remaining 2.5 years of the Trump administration:</p>
<p><span id="more-324054"></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Schools across the state are being forced to <a href="https://mndaily.com/city/minnesota-public-schools-face-cuts-as-students-and-teachers-fight-to-save-vital-programs/05/07/2026/eicmndaily-com/">cut staff and increase class size</a>. With the money being spent on mass deportations, <strong>the state could hire 14,000 more full-time school teachers</strong>. This would mean, for example:
<ul>
<li>1,100 more teachers in Minneapolis</li>
<li>340 more teachers in Minnetonka</li>
<li>215 more teachers in Bloomington</li>
<li>140 more teachers in Duluth</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>With the cuts to the Affordable Care Act, over 140,000 people in Minnesota are <a href="https://www.mprnews.org/story/2026/04/17/minnesota-up-against-the-clock-on-medicaid-changes">projected to lose their health insurance</a>. Due to cuts in Medicaid funding, hospitals are <a href="https://www.citizen.org/article/big-ugly-threat/">at risk of closing down</a> in Austin, Staples, Mahnomen, Baudette, Little Falls, Hibbing, and Minneapolis. With the money being spent on deportations, we could <strong>keep 129,000 people on health insurance</strong>, which would also help keep hospitals open.</li>
<li>Over <a href="https://dcyf.mn.gov/get-involved/speak-snap/cuts-snap-hurt-minnesotans">400,000 Minnesotans rely on food stamps</a>, primarily working families with children and elderly people on fixed incomes. But because of cuts in the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill (the OBBBA), 45,000 people across the state are <a href="https://minnesotareformer.com/2025/05/29/45000-minnesotans-at-risk-of-losing-snap-benefits/">at risk of being cut off</a>. With the money being spent on deportations, <strong>Minnesota could protect food stamps for all hungry families in the state</strong>.</li>
<li>Last year, <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/blog/veterans-have-borne-trump-administrations-deep-cuts-to-federal-personnel">over 600 Veterans Administration positions</a> were cut in Minnesota. With the funds being diverted to deportations, we could reverse all these cuts and <strong>guarantee Minnesota veterans the care they deserve</strong>.</li>
<li>Or, instead of restoring any of these services, every household in Minnesota could be given a <strong>$2,000 tax refund</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p>EPI and others have documented the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/">economic harms</a> of a draconian immigration policy and enforcement on immigrants and their families, as well as <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/">U.S.-born workers</a> and the economy as a whole. Any of the alternatives listed above would be a better use of taxpayer dollars for improving the welfare of everyday Minnesotans. It is critical that we take into account the missed opportunities of funding a mass deportation regime, including the badly needed services being ignored or cut off to keep this policy funded and to keep immigrants living in fear.</p>
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		<title>Congress has long underfunded worker protection agencies. The Republican budget would deepen the damage.</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/republican-budget-exacerbates-underfunding-of-worker-protection-agencies/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 14:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Christina Ayon, Margaret Poydock]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=323988</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[On June 9, the Republican majority on the U.S. House Appropriations Committee approved a 2027 budget that slashes funding for worker protection The bill includes a combined $71.9 million cut for the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 9, the Republican majority on the U.S. House Appropriations Committee <a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy27-labor-health-and-human-services-and-education">approved a 2027 budget</a> that slashes funding for worker protection agencies.</p>
<p>The bill includes a combined $71.9 million cut for the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Further, the measure implements a 3% cut to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). While the legislation slightly increases funding for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/a-more-diverse-workforce-isnt-dei-motivated-discrimination-its-just-demographic-change-how-trump-is-weaponizing-the-eeoc-against-the-workers-it-was-built-to-protect/">that the Trump administration has weaponized</a> for political reasons, the amount overall remains insufficient. The appropriations measure now moves to the Senate, where the budget cuts face an uncertain future.</p>
<p>If enacted, these reductions would further strain these agencies that have faced over a decade of flat funding that hasn’t accounted for inflation or rising labor force participation (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). This chronic underfunding has severely impacted their ability to enforce worker protection laws.</p>
<p><span id="more-323988"></span></p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-323746 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323746" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323746-35863-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong>The consequences of underfunding worker protection agencies </strong></h4>
<p>The Department of Labor serves the nation’s workers by administering and enforcing most federal worker protection laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act. Within this framework, WHD ensures that workers receive wages earned while OHSA evaluates safe workplace conditions and standards. Moreover, independent agencies such as the EEOC enforce a range of anti-discrimination laws while the NLRB enforces private-sector labor law, including workers’ rights to a union and collective bargaining. Together, these government agencies are designed to equip workers with the tools to combat workplace abuses and rectify unequal bargaining power. However, enforcement agencies are unable to fulfill their mandates with reduced staffing and resources.</p>
<p>Since 1992, OSHA has experienced a <a href="https://aflcio.org/dotj-2026">16.0% decrease</a> in inspectors. OSHA has been left with so few resources that it would take <a href="https://aflcio.org/dotj-2026">191 years</a> for its inspectors to visit every workplace under its coverage just once. Furthermore, a recent Government Accountability Office <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-25-108003.pdf">report</a> flagged critical agency shortcomings, noting OSHA&#8217;s weak efforts to address the rising tide of workplace violence against health care and social service workers.</p>
<p>WHD has faced similar staffing challenges. The number of WHD investigators is at its <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/WJL_immigration_databrief_May2025.pdf">lowest point</a> since at least 1973, despite being tasked with protecting many more workers. As a result, the total number of resolved WHD investigations has <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/all-acts">dropped</a> significantly over the past few years (see <strong>Figure B</strong>).</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-323755 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323755" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323755-35865-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Meanwhile, the EEOC has experienced an uptick in discrimination claims over the decades alongside <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/new-report-finds-rising-u-s-labor-force-participation-over-the-past-decade-but-policymakers-arent-investing-enough-in-the-future/">rising labor force participation</a>, yet its resources have not matched the pace of these shifts. For the NLRB, funding for the agency has remained flat except for a recent <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-155/performance-budget-justification-2027.pdf">$6 million </a>reduction in case-handling. The lack of funding has severely impacted field offices—the primary point of contact for union elections—with <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/pages/node-155/performance-budget-justification-2027.pdf">six closing</a> between 2014 to 2025. In 2024, the NLRB released <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/union-petitions-up-35-unfair-labor-practices-charge-filings-up-7-in-the">a statement</a> describing their struggle to meet responsibilities such as conducting hearings and elections amid funding and staffing shortages. The consequence of these challenges is evident. Although favorability for unions nears a record <a href="https://news.gallup.com/poll/694472/labor-union-approval-relatively-steady.aspx">high</a>, major efforts to undermine worker organizing <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-employers-spend-more-than-1-5-billion-annually-on-union-avoidance/">persist</a>.</p>
<h4><strong>House budget cuts would leave workers more vulnerable to exploitation</strong></h4>
<p>If enacted, the House’s budget cuts would exacerbate an already precarious workplace reality. There were <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf">5,070 fatal work injuries</a> in 2024, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (see <strong>Figure C</strong>). Put another way, a worker died every 104 minutes from a work-related injury. Foreign-born Latinx workers were disproportionately <a href="https://www.bls.gov/charts/census-of-fatal-occupational-injuries/fatal-work-injuries-to-hispanic-or-latino-workers.htm">impacted</a>. Reducing OSHA funding and staffing will make it even harder to ensure preventable deaths do not occur.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-323763 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323763" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323763-35866-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Additionally, amid eroding worker protections, workers have had <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year/">billions of dollars</a> of wages stolen each year. Undocumented workers are especially <a href="https://crownschool.uchicago.edu/student-life/advocates-forum/workplace-discrimination-and-undocumented-first-generation-latinx">impacted</a>, with many <a href="https://captimes.com/news/business/wage-theft-costs-workers-millions-this-madison-organizer-wants-it-to-stop/article_7ca83aa4-e980-11ef-a132-73ce54a20881.html">fearing to report violations </a>especially amid the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant policies.</p>
<p>Furthermore, workers continue to face <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/data/enforcement-and-litigation-statistics-0">discrimination</a>, filing an average of <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trump-is-making-it-easier-for-employers-to-discriminate-this-stifles-equity-and-hurts-economic-growth/">83,000 charges per year since 1997</a>. Political attacks on diversity, equity, and inclusion have only eroded the mechanisms designed to address these injustices.</p>
<p>The House budget proposal claims to champion efficiency, but true efficiency cannot be achieved by <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/doge-is-not-worth-engaging-you-cant-cut-your-way-to-a-federal-government-that-does-more/">dismantling</a> an already vulnerable labor protection ecosystem or by slashing public-sector resources. The chronic underfunding of worker protection agencies turns legally guaranteed protections into hollow promises and leaves workers exposed to unchecked exploitation and vulnerability. A budget that truly supports U.S. workers would pass robust funding for staffing, investigators, and programs that guarantee safety, fairness, and justice across every workplace.</p>
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		<title>Arkansas county’s ARPA troubles are the exception that proves the rule: Fiscal relief funds provided to state and local governments during the pandemic were a wise investment</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/arkansas-countys-arpa-troubles-are-the-exception-that-proves-the-rule-fiscal-relief-funds-provided-to-state-and-local-governments-during-the-pandemic-were-a-wise-investment/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 16:27:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Kamper]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=323192</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Over the weekend, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette ran a deeply reported analysis of Pulaski County’s use of the $76 million it received in fiscal recovery funds under the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA).]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the weekend, the <em>Arkansas Democrat-Gazette</em> ran a deeply reported <a href="https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2026/jul/05/pulaski-county-received-76-million-in-federal/">analysis</a> of Pulaski County’s use of the $76 million it received in fiscal recovery funds under the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). This legislation, among many other things, gave $350 billion to state and local governments to fight the pandemic and deal with the economic fallout, averting a prolonged recession. The paper found the county—which is the largest in Arkansas and includes the state capitol of Little Rock—failed to document how it spent the funds, and that lack of documentation raises questions about whether the use of funds were in line with ARPA’s rules. By contrast, thousands of cities and counties used ARPA funds to bolster economic recovery and improve the lives of working families. The missed opportunity in Pulaski County case is the exception, not the rule, and demonstrates how important federal oversight of the program was.</p>
<p><span id="more-323192"></span></p>
<p>As part of the passage of ARPA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued extensive <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/new-u-s-treasury-final-rule-supports-state-and-local-spending-for-an-equitable-economic-recovery/">rules</a> outlining both how State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) could be spent and how the spending should be tracked. Unlike most other federal disbursements to state and local governments, recipients had great discretion in how they used their SLFRF allocation. This was one of the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/">great strengths</a> of the program, as it allowed each recipient to tailor its use of the funds to meet their specific needs.</p>
<p>Because of the wide flexibility they were given, state and local governments had to follow very clear procedures in accounting for the funds. Passing a budget alone was insufficient; governments had to formally obligate their ARPA funds through written contracts or interagency memoranda.</p>
<p>While this process did indeed cause some <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/cities-and-counties-might-be-at-risk-of-losing-billions-if-they-dont-obligate-american-rescue-plan-funds-correctly-advocates-should-pay-close-attention-to-the-2024-obligation/">confusion</a>, especially among smaller local governments with less experience dealing with federal funds, Treasury provided local governments with regular <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/July-2026-PE-Report-User-Guide.pdf">updates</a>, held <a href="https://youtu.be/Tf9IZZHvjAA?si=yr1vNAR5wU_xUKps">informative</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xfxm55DN_WM">webinars</a>, and created an extensive <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SLFRF-Final-Rule-FAQ.pdf">FAQ document</a> to address the many issues that arose. Additionally, groups like the <a href="https://www.nlc.org/covid-19-pandemic-response/american-rescue-plan-act/arpa-local-relief-frequently-asked-questions/">National League of Cities</a> and the <a href="https://www.naco.org/resource/arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-fund-obligation-updates-guidance">National Association of Counties</a> provided extensive assistance to local governments to help them navigate SLFRF.</p>
<p>Pulaski County, like all other cities, counties, states, and tribal governments, was required to fully obligate its fiscal recovery funds by December 31, 2024. Despite this, the <em>Democrat-Gazette</em> found that the county could not account for over half of the funds it received—at least $38.6 million of the $76 million—and much of the information the county did provide the paper did not meet the Treasury Department’s reporting standards.</p>
<p>An EPI analysis of the county’s most recent <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds/public-data">filings</a> with Treasury, from the end of 2025, bear this out. Pulaski County reported over $41 million falling under “Administrative Expenses,” but that category is supposed to be used only for the costs of “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SLFRF-Compliance-and-Reporting-Guidance.pdf">administering</a> the SLFRF program.” Only five governments (out of more than 30,000 total state and local governments receiving funds) reported spending more than $41 million on administrative expenses: Three were states/commonwealths, and the other two were the City of Detroit and Fulton County, Georgia, whose SLFRF allocations were much larger than Pulaski County’s. It is difficult to imagine that Pulaski County needed to use 54% of its total SLFRF funds just to administer its use of SLFRF funds.</p>
<p>Moreover, the <em>Democrat-Gazette</em> reported the county’s reserve fund ballooned by almost $40 million during the same period. Treasury’s rules specifically prohibit SLFRF from being used for rainy-day funds or to replenish reserves. The funds were intended to be spent to address the myriad challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<h4><strong>SLFRF was a vital resource</strong></h4>
<p>It is important that state and local governments are held to account for their use of fiscal recovery funds. The case of Pulaski County illustrates that accountability safeguards for the program are necessary and effective rather than being bureaucratic burdens. Pulaski County’s apparent failure to follow the guidelines for using SLFRF funds is a rare exception. The Treasury Department implemented a novel, flexible program with guardrails and responsibilities that the vast majority of state and local governments were able to abide by. SLFRF was a vital component of ARPA, and did much to speed the economic recovery and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/#epi-toc-1">prevent</a> a Great Recession like the U.S. saw in 2008–2009.</p>
<p>SLFRF was vital in preserving and rebuilding the public-sector workforce. In the wake of the Great Recession, it took <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/without-federal-aid-many-state-and-local-governments-could-make-the-same-budget-cuts-that-hampered-the-last-economic-recovery/">11 years</a> for state and local government employment to recover. Because of SLFRF, it took a fraction of that time (just three years and eight months) for the public sector to recover from the COVID-19 downturn. This rapid recovery mirrored the recovery of the overall job market. The typical U.S. state needed 77 months after the start of the Great Recession for its job numbers to recover; it only took 29 months after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic for the same level of recovery.</p>
<p>Additionally, SLFRF allowed states and localities to enact programs of social insurance and income support that directly responded to immediate community needs. In just the first two years of SLFRF’s operation alone, more than 4.5 million households received mortgage, rent, or utility assistance. Emergency programs offered housing to people who had been displaced by the pandemic and direct government assistance to food pantries and other programs that helped people facing food insecurity. These programs were valuable tools for helping working families in need.</p>
<p>Pulaski County, therefore, missed a tremendous opportunity to use its fiscal recovery funds to spur economic recovery and provide assistance to working families. The $350 billion SLFRF program was a vital resource during the pandemic and its aftermath. The example of Pulaski County demonstrates the importance of federal accountability requirements for largely unrestricted funds, not the failure of the program. Lessons from the vast majority of localities that successfully used SLFRF funds and the rare exceptions in which local governments failed to do so should continue to inform<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/#epi-toc-3"> future</a> policy design for similar programs.</p>
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		<title>Raising revenues the right way: How we tax matters for building trust in the public sector</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/raising-revenues-the-right-way-how-we-tax-matters-for-building-trust-in-the-public-sector/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 12:00:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle K. Moore]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=321377</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Taxes are the price of living well in a modern democratic community. The social contract relies on the idea that people both benefit from and contribute to maintaining a community in the ways they can; the tax code is one way of making sure that happens.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Taxes are the price of living well in a modern democratic community. The social contract relies on the idea that people both benefit from and contribute to maintaining a community in the ways they can; the tax code is one way of making sure that happens. Public <a href="https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/97068564-14fd-5d2f-b0f1-f45ee1505ca1/content">trust builds</a> under certain conditions: when the government collects tax revenue fairly and equitably and when people perceive that government institutions are competent and well intentioned in using that revenue to provide community services. This in turn makes it easier to collect revenue and provide expanded services in the future. When governments collect revenues in ways that feel unfair or inequitable, and when programs are hamstrung and unable to meet community needs, people become understandably skeptical.</p>
<p>Our decisions about whom and how to tax are decisions about which community needs we have the capacity to address and at what scale. Progressive taxes like personal, investment, and corporate income taxes generate more revenue from those who have the greatest ability to pay, and for whom the cost of losing the next dollar is small, relative to the last dollar of a family struggling to make rent and afford groceries. On the other hand, regressive revenue strategies like non-strategic tariffs, fees and fines, and an overreliance on sales taxes, especially when combined with cuts to social programs, heighten the sense that the system is unfair. Where progressive revenue strategies can bind a community together in mutual support and expand capacity to meet needs through good governance, regressive strategies erode people’s trust in the public sector.</p>
<p><span id="more-321377"></span></p>
<h4>H.R. 1 presents a vision of public finance that is unsustainable and erodes trust in government</h4>
<p>Much of the federal tax code is in fact progressively structured, but for decades conservatives have weakened and attacked that progressivity. <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/epi-condemns-house-passage-of-dangerous-tax-and-spending-bill/">H.R. 1 (which the White House has referred to as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” or “OBBBA”) is the latest Republican-led effort</a> toward breaking down trust in the public sector and social contract. H.R. 1 provides a suite of tax breaks to households across the income distribution; however, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-radical-republican-budget-bill-steals-from-the-poor-to-give-tax-cuts-to-the-rich/">the wealthiest households and corporations see a</a> far bigger tax cut from the package than the typical household does. In service to these tax breaks, the bill introduces devastating cuts to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/cutting-medicaid-for-low-taxes-on-the-rich-is-terrible-for-american-families/">Medicaid</a>, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/cuts-to-snap-benefits-will-disproportionately-harm-families-of-color-and-children/">SNAP</a>, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-gutting-of-public-health-institutions-is-setting-the-stage-for-our-next-crisis/">critical government agencies</a> designed to help workers and their families thrive. Despite their size and the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/tcja-extensions-2025/">pain they will cause</a>, these drastic cuts in the federal government’s capacity to serve and support working families are not enough to cover the costs of the corporate tax breaks; the Tax Policy Center estimates that H.R. 1 could <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/research-reports/one-big-beautiful-bill-preliminary-assessment">increase the federal deficit by between $3.7 trillion and $5.1 trillion by 2034</a>.</p>
<p>But unlike the federal government, states and localities cannot run budget deficits; their budgets must be balanced yearly. When major federal cuts happen, states and localities <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-sources-revenue-state-and-local-governments">that rely on federal dollars</a> to maintain critical services are <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-consequences-of-a-federal-funding-freeze-in-the-states/">forced to curtail</a> and <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-consequences-of-a-federal-funding-freeze-in-the-states/">eliminate services</a>, dive into <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-state-rainy-day-funds-and-how-do-they-work">emergency savings</a> where they exist, or <a href="https://www.naco.org/resource/big-shift-analysis-local-cost-federal-cuts">else shift to revenue generation strategies</a> that often fall disproportionately on Black, brown, and poor households. The combination of directly hampering public services working people rely on while shifting more of the burden of raising revenue toward Black, brown, and poor workers and their families weakens worker power and <a href="https://apps.urban.org/features/federal-income-tax-system-can-worsen-racial-disparities/">exacerbates racial disparities</a>.</p>
<p>H.R. 1 combines a shift toward regressive revenue strategies with massive tax breaks to corporations and the wealthiest households, in service to the Trump administration’s overarching goal: <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/weve-been-here-before-and-we-know-what-comes-next-white-supremacy-has-always-been-used-to-usher-in-massive-economic-inequality/">reasserting white, wealthy, and corporate privilege</a> through tax cuts, deregulation, and the defunding of public institutions.</p>
<h4>Regressive revenue strategies: Taking from the poor to give the rich even more breaks</h4>
<p>The Trump administration has floated&nbsp;<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/02/27/trump-tariffs-income-taxes.html">using tariffs as a replacement (either in full or part) for the federal income tax</a>. This is not a new Republican strategy: Tariffs are a kind of consumption tax (on imported goods, along with&nbsp;the intermediate products businesses need to create goods and provide services domestically), and&nbsp;Republican-led state governments tend to rely more on consumption taxes<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> (like sales taxes) and less on income taxes to increase revenue. Because poorer households spend a larger share of their income purchasing goods and services than the rich do, consumption taxes are inherently more regressive. The current federal income tax <a href="https://www.davidsplinter.com/Splinter-TaxProgressivity-NTJ.pdf">is progressively structured</a>, in spite of the ways conservatives have attempted to weaken that progressivity over time. While tariffs can be <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/tariffs-everything-you-need-to-know-but-were-afraid-to-ask/">a sensible part of a larger industrial policy strategy</a>, governments place too large a burden on low- and moderate-income households when they try to use consumption taxes as a primary source of revenue.&nbsp;</p>
<p>States and localities may turn to <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-do-state-and-local-revenues-fines-fees-and-forfeitures-work">fines and fees to raise revenues</a> in the absence of adequate federal support. These penalties are a poor substitute for progressive taxes. Fines and fees historically have only been able to cover <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/feature/what-would-it-take-states-reform-local-fines-and-fees">a small fraction of state and local budget costs</a>. And this is baked into the design: If the point of a fine or fee is to deter behavior, the best-case scenario (ending the behavior) would result in no revenue.</p>
<p>Even so, fines and fees cause significant economic pain for working-class families in the <a href="https://www.urban.org/research/publication/how-fines-and-fees-criminal-legal-system-hinder-black-economic-mobility">Black communities that are most affected by them</a>. On an ethical level, a modern idiom applies: “If the penalty for a crime is a fine, that crime only exists for the poor.” The criminal justice system can trap poor folks in a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor">cruel cycle of penalization</a> for being <a href="https://www.urban.org/research/publication/following-money-fines-and-fees">unable to pay traffic tickets, court fees</a>, and <a href="https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/articles/electronic-monitoring-fees-a-50-state-survey-of-the-costs-assessed-to-people-on-e-supervision/">even their own surveillance through ankle monitors</a>. Fines and fees increase the economic burden on those with the least ability to pay, all for a low return, making them a poor substitute for broad, progressive taxes.</p>
<h4>Faux-progressive revenue strategies are ineffective and distract workers, their families, and policymakers from the need for real change</h4>
<p>Ineffective tax gimmicks like temporary deductions on<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/everything-you-need-to-know-about-no-tax-on-tips/"> overtime and tipped</a> income distract from the need for real reform around worker pay and scheduling. The point of requiring businesses to <a href="https://www.history.com/articles/how-long-have-americans-earned-overtime">pay time-and-a-half for overtime</a> is to discourage pushing workers to work beyond what we have collectively decided is a full and reasonable period of labor. Tipping is an <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-racism-tipping/">outdated practice with racist roots</a>, designed to shift the cost of maintaining a workforce onto consumers, rather than having employers properly compensate employees. Instead of <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/no-tax-on-overtime-is-another-gimmick-that-would-do-more-harm-than-good/">cynically gesturing toward affordability</a> through encouraging bad business practices, we should empower workers to fight for <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/increase-the-minimum-wage-forget-no-tax-on-tips/">better wages</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/no-tax-on-overtime-is-another-gimmick-that-would-do-more-harm-than-good/">consistent scheduling</a>.</p>
<p>Conservatives may also try to balance budgets by allowing progressive tax expenditures to expire (e.g., the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/failing-to-extend-the-enhanced-aca-premium-tax-credits-is-an-attack-on-working-class-black-families-and-major-metro-areas/">recent expiration of the ACA premium tax credits</a> or the expiration of the <a href="https://taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-2021-american-rescue-plan-act-change-child-tax-credit">expanded child tax credits passed as pandemic relief</a>). Temporary tax breaks themselves are not the most effective means of addressing structural economic issues; if health care or health insurance is persistently inaccessible to wide swaths of the population, we should seek to remedy that by making access universal—or, at the very least, making the credits that allowed greater access in the first place permanent. Allowing tax breaks implemented to address structural inequities to expire without an alternative solution to the problem being addressed is negligence. There are ways to balance budgets that do not involve <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/despite-a-strong-labor-market-the-choice-to-allow-pandemic-era-public-assistance-programs-to-expire-increased-poverty-across-all-racial-groups-in-2022/">reversing hard-won progress toward equity</a>.</p>
<h4>Progressive ways to generate revenue: Worker-centered tax policies can reduce inequality and expand the tax base</h4>
<p>There are better ways of raising revenue that will support workers and their families, rebuild public trust in government, and get us the public goods and services we want and need. Since most Americans earn their living through selling their labor, it makes sense to keep some progressive tax on income to ensure people remain invested in the social contract. But with so much wealth and income concentrated amongst a few individuals, a necessary step is shifting more of the tax burden toward extremely high earners, wealth, and investment income. This will generate more revenue to improve public services and infrastructure, while tamping down on inequality. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/raising-taxes-on-the-ultrarich-a-necessary-first-step-to-restore-faith-in-american-democracy-and-the-public-sector/">Adding tax brackets for the highest earners, adopting a legitimate tax on wealth holdings</a>, and taxing the income made from investments at a rate <a href="https://www.faireconomy.org/wealth_vs_work">closer to that of income from wages and salaries</a> progressively raise revenues without increasing the burden on most U.S. households.</p>
<p>Proper enforcement of the current tax code would go a long way toward improving both our ability to raise funds and the public’s trust in public finance. The tax code is rife with opportunities for wealthy individuals and corporations to evade paying their fair share of taxes, allowing them to skirt holding up their end of the social contract. The <a href="https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/weakened-irs-has-substantial-consequences">IRS is also critically underfunded</a> and recovering <a href="https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2026/03/watchdog-warns-challenges-irs-handles-first-tax-season-after-trump-staffing-cuts/412158/?oref=ge-topic-lander-river">from recent staff reductions from the Trump administration</a>. With enough resources to enforce existing tax law effectively, the IRS could go after the largest tax evaders and see returns that matter, as opposed to <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Letter-from-the-Audit-Disparities-Fairness-Tax-Administration-Subcommittee-9-9-24.pdf">disproportionately targeting Black households</a> without the funds to instigate a drawn-out legal battle over an audit.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-320983 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="320983" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/320983-35726-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4>We need a tax code that supports states and localities and promotes full economic participation, not temporary tax gimmicks and handouts to the wealthiest</h4>
<p>Taxpayers (literally) cannot afford to accept the conservative propaganda that all taxation is a burden on households. Taxes are one way of binding a democratic community together and allowing us to share in the costs of creating collective prosperity and community. Especially at the state and local levels, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/taxes-are-good-actually-especially-if-you-care-about-affordability/">tax revenues are essential to providing the services people need to thrive</a>. When federal funding gets pulled back and states and localities turn to regressive revenue strategies, it is working-class families who pay the price.</p>
<p>If we are going to rebuild a sense of trust in the social contract, we need to structure the tax code such that it becomes more progressive, tapping into a greater portion of the massive amounts of wealth and income that have pooled at the top. We can use that revenue to fund programs and new infrastructure that allow more people to fully participate in the economy:</p>
<ul>
<li>improved funding for public schooling, increasing teacher pay and quality of education</li>
<li>a fully funded federal food assistance program, and/or adequate funding to states to support their own cash-assistance programs more comprehensive than Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (<a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/income-security/temporary-assistance-for-needy-families">TANF</a>)</li>
<li>expanded access to and adequacy of Medicaid, or <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3069">Medicare for All</a></li>
</ul>
<p>Each of these initiatives could improve affordability and remove the need for state and local governments to pursue revenue regressive strategies that do more harm than good (like fines and fees). We won’t solve every structural inequality and eliminate all disparities through reforming the tax code; but building the resources and will to collect taxes in a progressive way are steps toward a fairer economy and a government that earns the public’s trust.</p>
<hr>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Consumption taxes have some potential uses. Carbon taxes, for example, tax the consumption of goods whose production intensively uses greenhouse gas-emitting inputs; if consumers look to avoid these goods by switching to others whose production involves fewer greenhouse gas emissions, we achieve an important social good.</p>
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		<title>Voucher programs fail rural schools</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/voucher-programs-fail-rural-areas/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2026 14:20:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hilary Wething]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=320380</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Voucher programs—which use public funds to finance private education—have been sweeping state and federal legislatures over the past few years. These bills are harmful to public schools, especially public schools in rural communities.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Voucher programs—which use public funds to finance private education—have been sweeping <a href="https://inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-New-Federal-Voucher-Program.pdf">state</a> and <a href="https://inthepublicinterest.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-New-Federal-Voucher-Program.pdf">federal</a> legislatures over the past few years. These bills are harmful to public schools, especially public schools in rural communities. Yet, this week, the “<a title="https://www.kelly.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/kelly-hirono-lead-bill-to-repeal-federal-private-school-voucher-program-keep-public-dollars-in-public-schools/" href="https://www.kelly.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/kelly-hirono-lead-bill-to-repeal-federal-private-school-voucher-program-keep-public-dollars-in-public-schools/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-auth='NotApplicable' data-linkindex='3'>Keep Public Funds in Public Schools Act</a>” was introduced in the Senate, which would repeal the national private school voucher program passed in the 2025 reconciliation bill, thereby protecting rural communities from these programs. Often framed as “school choice” programs, vouchers give parents the equivalent of per-pupil public school funding to send their child to any private or homeschool program they choose.</p>
<p>But diverting public funds away from public K–12 schools and toward private schools does not guarantee educational opportunities will be expanded for all students—and this is especially true in rural communities. Most obviously, because students in rural communities often don’t have a private school option and therefore cannot use the vouchers, state voucher programs—which are financed by all the taxpayers in a state—amount to an education subsidy for wealthy urban families at the expense of strong public schools. Moreover, for rural areas that <em>can</em> support multiple school systems, voucher programs introduce a potentially large cost for the students that remain in public schools, as any sharp drop in public school enrollment will raise the fixed cost per pupil of running schools. For example, school facilities and staff that are efficient for 1,000 students in a school may no longer be efficient if enrollment were to drop to 800 or 900.<span id="more-320380"></span></p>
<p>Voucher programs work like this: Parents who wish to send their kid to private school can receive public funding to cover part of the tuition or education-related expenses, rather than paying out of pocket. In states with vouchers programs, this added cost to government of paying for private educational expenses makes a big dent in state budgets—see examples <a href="https://learningpolicyinstitute.org/product/understanding-cost-universal-vouchers-report">here</a>, <a href="https://policymattersohio.org/research/keep-public-funds-in-public-schools/">here</a>, and <a href="https://www.wusf.org/education/2025-01-21/florida-growing-school-voucher-program-high-price-tag">here</a>. These programs also often entail fraud and abuse of funds and strip away funding for public schools. <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-five-alarm-fire-of-public-education/">As a share of K–12 budgets, voucher spending accounted for as much as 26% in 2025</a>, squeezing public schools of sorely needed funds. Moreover, recent reports have documented accounts of voucher funding getting used for <a href="https://www.12news.com/article/news/investigations/i-team/education-impact/arizona-school-voucher-funds-used-for-broadway-show-tickets-concerts-and-trips-records-obtained-by-12news-show/75-60cc15d8-1017-4af2-a38d-1ed3b5d40996">high-end concert tickets and rideshare apps like Uber and Lyft</a>. For wealthy parents in urban districts who were already planning to send their kids to private school, these slippery regulations and extra funding for education expenses are a feature, not a bug, of voucher programs. Vouchers are disproportionately taken up by <a href="https://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Who-Really-Benefits-from-School-Voucher-Programs-FINAL.pdf">students <em>already attending</em> private</a> school, compared with those who consider a private school option when voucher laws get passed in their state.</p>
<p>For students in rural areas with no private school option, voucher programs simply mean there is less to spend on public schools, which leads to teacher shortages, fewer educational opportunities, and worse building maintenance. In rural communities with homeschooling or private school options, voucher programs impose an added cost to public education when students transition from public to private school.</p>
<p>We call this cost the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/vouchers-harm-public-schools/"><em>fiscal externality</em></a> of voucher programs, and it is borne by school districts, students, and their families when voucher-driven declines in student enrollment intersect with the fixed nature of many school costs. In rural districts, many key education costs—such as interest on bonds issued in the past, heating, electricity for school buildings, bus drivers, and even some staff—cannot easily adjust to student enrollment declines.</p>
<p>While public schools’ fixed costs do not decline when they lose students to voucher programs, their revenue does. Thus, when students in rural areas take up vouchers to leave public school for private school or homeschool, public schools have less revenue to cover the same level of <em>fixed</em> costs. The costs that <em>can</em> be adjusted—such as supplies or certain personnel—will get forced down due to shrinking school budgets. These variable costs are crucial for effectively educating children, meaning students who remain in public schools will pay the price of voucher program takeup.</p>
<p>This fiscal externality therefore leaves districts unable to deliver the same level of instruction to the remaining public school pupils. When students leave public schools in rural areas with voucher programs, there are fewer resources available on a daily basis to educate kids—fewer teachers and other staff members and fewer curriculum and education supplies. Education quality suffers.</p>
<p>How large is the fiscal externality that voucher programs impose on public schools in rural districts? Take the McComb Local School District in Ohio, which had 627 students in 2022 and is classified as a rural district according to the U.S. Census. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/vouchers-harm-public-schools/">Using EPI’s Fiscal Externality Calculator</a>, we estimate that a 5% decline in enrollment would lead to an increased cost of $520 per pupil for the remaining students in the district, or a total of $309,530.</p>
<p>The key assumption is that there is some fraction of schools’ costs that is fixed and can’t be adjusted in the near term when enrollment falls. We assume that instruction and services costs (the cost of teachers and services like transportation, counseling, nurses, and school administrators) can only partially adjust to changes in enrollment. Specifically, we assume that when enrollment declines, instruction costs are only able to adjust by 50% of the enrollment decline, and service costs are only able to adjust by 20%. We assume that capital and building and maintenance costs can’t be adjusted at all. (Users can set their own adjustment rates for their school districts using the fiscal externality calculator <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/vouchers-harm-public-schools/">here</a>. The method behind this calculation is detailed in <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/vouchers-harm-public-schools/">our report</a>.)</p>
<p>Under these assumptions, aggregating all the rural Ohio districts using <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/vouchers-harm-public-schools/">the rural categorization of school districts from the National Center for Education Statistics,</a> a voucher-driven 5% enrollment decline would impose a fiscal externality of just over $206 million on Ohio public schools.</p>
<p>Rural districts have the most to lose when states enact voucher programs. For rural communities, vouchers are not a cost-free policy that simply expands education options for children—they are a subsidy for wealthy urban and suburban families at the expense of strong public schools. Voucher programs also introduce a large potential cost for the students that remain in rural public schools. The public spending declines associated with the introduction of vouchers will reliably cause significantly worse educational outcomes <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-investment-in-public-education-is-at-risk-vouchers-state-budget-austerity-and-federal-attacks-on-the-department-of-education-threaten-childrens-futures/">at a time when states should be spending more—not less—on public schools</a>. States that promote voucher programs at the expense of funding for strong public education are signaling that rural students are not a priority.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Taxes are good, actually—especially if you care about affordability</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/taxes-are-good-actually-especially-if-you-care-about-affordability/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 16:05:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=320363</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[For decades, anti-tax politicians have tried to smuggle in large tax cuts for the ultrarich and corporations by loudly offering tax cut crumbs to the middle class.]]></description>
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<h4>Key takeaways:</h4>
<ul>
<li>Recent Democratic proposals to exempt broad swaths of the middle class from federal income taxes accept a damaging frame of taxes as a pure drain on affordability.</li>
<li>But taxes aren&#8217;t a drain on affordability; they fund the public services and social insurance programs that make a decent life possible for middle-class families.</li>
<li>Progressive taxes on the ultrarich and corporations are essential and should be the immediate priority, but they cannot sustain the public sector alone, let alone expand it in ways needed.</li>
<li>Middle-class tax rates have fallen by a third since 1979, yet economic anxiety remains high. Tax-cutting has failed because it has left the private-sector drivers of inequality untouched and starved public services. </div></li>
</ul>
<p>For decades, anti-tax politicians have tried to smuggle in large tax cuts for the ultrarich and corporations by loudly offering tax cut crumbs to the middle class. Key to this effort has been framing taxes as a pure drain on typical families’ ability to afford a secure economic life. Any success in this dishonest campaign to foster anti-tax sentiment is a disaster for working people—and that’s why some recent tax policy ideas from <em>Democrats</em> and the rhetoric around them are so deflating.<span id="more-320363"></span></p>
<p>Two things are true about taxes in the United States. First, taxes on the richest families and corporations are far too low. Second, it is broad-based taxes on the middle-class that are the foundation of a functioning public sector and a decent society.</p>
<p><em>Progressive</em> taxes on the ultrarich and corporations are mostly needed to reduce the potential gains to the rich and powerful from rigging the rules of markets. When the powerful rig these rules and hugely disproportionate shares of income concentrate at the top—like in the United States today—progressive taxes can also raise significant revenue.</p>
<p>But if sharply progressive taxes succeed in reducing the incentive for rigging the rules of markets and if <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">other policies</a> help lead to more broadly shared income growth in the country, this means that progressive taxes will raise a lot less revenue over time.</p>
<p>To be clear, this would be a victory for a better society. For example, the <em>purpose</em> of a carbon tax is to lower greenhouse gas emissions and if it’s highly successful, it will <em>by definition</em> stop raising much revenue. Progressive taxes aimed at reducing inequality will see the revenue they raise start to decline when they are their most successful. Right now, we <em>do</em> have deep inequality in the U.S. and progressive taxes <em>will</em> raise a lot of money—but we shouldn’t make the public sector’s resources dependent on this remaining true forever.</p>
<p>But more importantly, taxing only the very rich has never been the primary foundation of public-sector resources and can’t be going forward. The revenue needed to support programs that provide social insurance and income support (Social Security and Medicaid, for example), as well as public investment and services like highways, transit, and public education requires <em>broad-based</em> taxation. Without Social Security providing secure retirement, Medicare, Medicaid, and the Affordable Care Act providing access to health care, and public schools providing universal education, a decent life for the middle-class would be entirely unaffordable. And without middle-class taxes supporting all of these things, they would collapse.</p>
<p>If typical Americans lose faith that paying broad-based taxes to support public services and investments is a good deal, it will be a disaster for their ability to afford a decent life. Sadly, some recent Democratic proposals capitulate to this view of taxes as a “pure burden” rather than an investment in the country and its people.</p>
<p>Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Cory Booker (D-NJ) have both floated ideas that would draw a line below which nobody would pay any federal income tax (Van Hollen’s line is $92,000 for a married couple while Booker’s is $75,000). Both proposals pay for this with tax increases on the rich. If these tax increases on the rich were standalone pieces of legislation, they’d be excellent. But they are instead paired with tax benefits that mostly miss the bottom of the income distribution. In Booker’s proposal, the gains from the higher standard deduction that zeroes out taxes for many are <a href="https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/senator-bookers-keep-your-pay-act">actually <em>largest</em></a> for families between the 60th and 80th percentiles, and gains persist on average through the 99th percentile. Van Hollen’s bill phases out the “alternative maximum tax” that zeroes out taxes for many, and the <a href="https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/senator-van-hollens-working-americans-tax-cut-act">biggest gains</a> hit in the middle of the income distribution, but the proposal still provides gains on average for families between the 60th and 80th percentiles.</p>
<p>Both proposals clearly aim to address the affordability challenge that politicians have seized on, but in doing so both frame taxes as a pure drain on affordability, with Booker even calling his the “Keep Your Pay Act.” But taxes <em>aren’t</em> a drain on affordability. They provide the resources needed to run the public sector, and the public sector in turn does a great deal to make life more secure and more affordable over people’s lifetimes.</p>
<p>Social Security and Medicare, for example, both rely on payroll taxes on workers’ wages. But they also provide income for these workers in retirement. Instead of draining affordability, these programs smooth income over the lifecycle to ensure working families can afford a decent life even when they can no longer work. Food stamps and Medicaid are financed by taxes and provide benefits to people who otherwise would not be able to afford the most basic necessities: food and health care. The same people who receive Medicaid and food stamps in one era of their lives will contribute to them through taxes in other periods when they have found steady work. Again, the taxes collected are recycled back into families’ incomes in ways that minimize suffering and severe affordability crises throughout their lives.</p>
<p>State and local taxes—often borne quite heavily by the broad middle class—pay for public education. This education—both K–12 and higher education—is incredibly valuable and necessary for anyone operating in modern economies. Without the taxes to support education, families would have to dig into their own pockets to pay for private schooling, and it would be delivered less efficiently and much less equitably.</p>
<p>Other taxes finance infrastructure and other key public goods and services, without which life would be harder and more expensive for most families.</p>
<p>Cutting taxes even fails on the crass political grounds of buying voters’ short-term goodwill. It’s often underrecognized (mostly, again, because of conservative campaigns to hide this fact), but taxes for the middle class have been cut a lot in recent decades. <strong>Figure A</strong> below shows the percentage point change in tax rates of households at different parts of the income distribution between 1979–2019. We stop at 2019 to compare equivalent points of the business cycle. Tax rates tend to fall sharply during recessions, which can obscure the full extent of legislative changes to tax rates. Further, cutting taxes temporarily during recessions can make some sense—tax cuts are one form of fiscal stimulus that can be used to fight recessions (unless these tax cuts are quite well-targeted on low- and moderate-income families, they tend to be less efficient stimulus than spending measures).</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-320208 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="320208" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/320208-35693-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The largest tax cuts have gone to the bottom fifth of households—a key policy victory of recent decades. The expansion of refundable tax credits like the Earned Income Tax Credit and the Child Tax Credit—credits that are paid directly to lower-income families even if their amount is greater than the families’ tax liability—have essentially made the problem of taxing families into poverty almost nonexistent. These tax cuts should clearly be kept. But <em>all</em> households, not just those with very low incomes, have seen sizable tax cuts. Tax rates for households in the middle of the income distribution have been cut by <em>a third</em> since 1979.</p>
<p>And yet, does anybody feel like this tax-cutting has led to most U.S. households feeling great about their place in the economy and their prospects for affording a decent life today? Do these voters express warm feelings about the policymakers from both parties who provided these middle-class tax cuts?</p>
<p>The tax-cutting strategy has failed to make these households happy for two reasons. First, it leaves the <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">private-sector drivers of inequality</a> untouched, and as governments have <em>collected</em>&nbsp;less in taxes, employers and corporations <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/opinion/even-better-than-a-tax-cut.html">have <em>contributed</em> less</a> to middle-class families’ wages. Second, lower taxes have starved public-sector capacity and led to a degradation of public services. Strangely, the newly fashionable “abundance” movement often frames this degradation as a problem of public-sector <em>excesses, </em>but it’s clearly <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/you-cant-starve-the-public-sector-to-excellence/">driven by disinvestment</a>. In short, middle-class families value public services and the decades-long campaign to cut taxes has harmed the ability to provide them. The lessons for today’s tax debates should be clear.</p>
<p>The failure of tax-cutting to foster economic security and happiness is not all that surprising for scholars of U.S. attitudes toward taxes, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/books/the-price-of-democracy/">who argue</a> that Americans are not universally anti-tax. Instead, Americans view paying taxes as a patriotic good and a moral obligation. But they are angry about paying <em>their</em> taxes when they think others are shirking their part of the social contract, particularly when they think the richest people and corporations aren’t paying their fair share.</p>
<p>Because we are starting with such high levels of inequality and because of this public cynicism about the rich ever being forced to pay their fair share, the first priority—by far—for policymakers today should be to enact significant stand-alone tax increases on the ultrarich and corporations. The revenue raised solely from the ultrarich <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/raising-taxes-on-the-ultrarich-a-necessary-first-step-to-restore-faith-in-american-democracy-and-the-public-sector/">could close today’s <em>fiscal gap,</em></a> the difference between today’s budget deficits and what is needed to put them on a sustainable path going forward. And this act would convince the rest of Americans that the ultrarich are not always prioritized in policymaking and would make future debates about the costs and benefits of higher taxes for higher levels of public goods much healthier.</p>
<p>But we can’t run a decent society based on just taxing the rich and telling everybody else that taxes are an unfair drain. Oliver Wendell Holmes famously said that taxes are the price you pay for civilization. But if the taxes are paid only by the rich, we will get the civilization <em>they</em> want. That doesn’t seem good enough to me.</p>
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