June 22, 2026

Daniel Navarrete
Director of the Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Implementation
Wage and Hour Division
U.S. Department of Labor
Room S-3502
200 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20210

Re: Proposed Rule: Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (RIN 1235-AA48)

Dear Mr. Navarrete,

We write to submit this comment on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), responding to the Department of Labor’s proposed rule on Joint Employer Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (MSPA). EPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.

EPI strongly opposes the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) proposed rulemaking and urge the agency to withdraw this rule. If implemented, we conservatively estimate this rule would cost workers roughly $1 billion annually through increases in workplace fissuring and exposure to wage theft. Further, the FLSA’s joint employer definition is also used to apply protections under FMLA, MSPA, the Providing Urgent Maternal Protections (PUMP) for Nursing Mothers Act (now part of the FLSA), and the Equal Pay Act. Under the proposed rule, workers thus would not only be at risk of losing full protections to their right to earn the minimum wage over overtime pay, but also their right to unpaid but job-protected family and medical leave, pay discrimination protections, and the right to pump breastmilk while at work. Agricultural workers, already operating in notoriously underpaid and hazardous conditions, will also find it harder to enforce or get compensation for violations of their rights to the basic pay and housing requirements for agricultural workers under MSPA. Because of the broad impacts of structural racism and sexism on labor market outcomes, women and people of color are overrepresented in low-wage jobs overall, which are particularly vulnerable to fissuring and wage theft. As a result, women workers and workers of color are likely to be disproportionately harmed if this rule is finalized.

The proposed rule would undermine the original intent of the FLSA

At its most basic, the joint employer standard simply requires that when multiple employers co-determine or share control over a workers’ terms of employment (such as pay, schedules, and job duties), each of those employers is responsible for compliance with worker protection laws. Given the realities of the modern workplace, in which employees often find themselves subject to more than one employer, workers deserve a joint employment standard under the FLSA that guarantees these basic rights and protections.

As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has argued in their joint comments, also cosigned by EPI, the NPRM contravenes the statutory definition of “employ” under the FLSA, Supreme Court precedent. This rule also shares the same substantive defects as DOL’s 2020 Final Rule, which was largely invalidated by a federal district court in New York v. Scalia, 490 F. Supp. 3d 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

EPI has conducted extensive research and policy analysis on the harms to workers from weakened labor standards and weakened enforcement of those standards. There is no question that this proposed rule would weaken labor standards. As with the first Trump administration’s attempt at weakening these regulations, this rule would dramatically narrow the set of circumstances whereby a firm can be found to be a joint employer under the FLSA. The FLSA is our nation’s fundamental worker protection statute, providing wage and hour protections to the vast majority of U.S. workers. The FLSA was drafted broadly, and its definition of an employer was intended to cover most workplaces and most workers. The intention was and should remain that companies that use staffing agencies, temporary workers, or subcontractors in their business operations are held accountable for complying with the FLSA’s basic provisions, including minimum wage, overtime, and child labor protections. The proposed rule will make it nearly impossible for many workers in those types of workplaces to enforce these rights. It would also take away the ability of workers to recover unpaid wages from firms who use undercapitalized contractors in their work.

We believe it is also important to acknowledge some of the most frequently referenced critiques of a broad, protective joint employer standard, from those who would like to see that standard weakened. One argument, already present in some of the comments that the Department has received on this rule, is that this weakened standard is necessary to provide regulatory clarity for franchisee employers in particular. The International Franchise Association, for example, says this proposed rule “protects the independence of franchise small businesses.”1 However, these arguments obscure the fact that it is already large corporate franchisors who stand to benefit the most from having this “independence” protected.

Franchisee operators already bear the full responsibility for violations of the FLSA that occur on their watch, even if those violations may have been more likely to occur because of requirements or pressure exerted on them in their business agreements with the large corporate franchisors. Nothing in the FLSA’s current joint employer standard automatically labels a franchisor-franchisee relationship as a joint employment scenario. On the contrary, the longstanding joint employer standard is not one-size-fits-all, and always requires looking at multiple factors to determine how much control each entity is actually exerting on a worker. We urge the Department not to adopt a proposed rule that would continue to allow large employers to conceal their real interest—minimizing their own liability for FLSA violations—as a goal that is aligned with the best interests of small business owners and franchise operators.

The Department’s flawed economic analysis overlooks that workers will lose pay if this rule is implemented

DOL continues its misguided evaluation of the likely impacts of the proposed joint employer standard in its economic impact analysis. DOL has a responsibility to consider all relevant data in advancing this regulatory standard, but it fails to do so. The NPRM states that “the Department does not expect that there would be significant transfer effects as a consequence of the proposed rule,” explaining that “nothing in the proposed rule would reduce the wages owed to employees under the FLSA or MSPA [emphasis added].”2 

However, even if the proposed rule would not change the wages due to a worker under the FLSA or MSPA, this does not mean that the proposal will not result in transfers between employers and employees. It would, in at least two ways.

First, this rule would incentivize workplace “fissuring,” i.e., employers increasing their reliance on contractors, subcontractors, temporary help agencies, and franchises rather than hiring employees directly—a practice that suppresses workers’ wages.  The Department dismisses the idea that the rule would incentivize fissuring by essentially simply asserting that such concerns are “largely inapplicable” to this rulemaking.3  We, however, conservatively estimate that in the long run, the increase in workplace fissuring as a result of the rule would result in a transfer of at least $772.0 million from workers to employers annually. This calculation is discussed in depth below.

Second, this rule would increase losses due to wage theft by employers. The Department acknowledges that this is an issue when it states that “some workers in vertically-tiered industries may, in some cases, have more or less difficulty collecting their owed wages,” 4 but, astonishingly, dismisses this concern by stating, without evidence, that “the magnitude of this effect is unlikely to be significant.”5  We conservatively estimate that an increase in losses due to wage theft as a result of the rule will result in a transfer of at least $225.6 million from workers to employers annually. This calculation is discussed in depth below.

Putting together these two estimates—more than $772.0 million lost by workers as a result of the rule due to an increase in workplace fissuring and more than $225.6 million in losses by workers as a result of wage theft—we estimate workers will lose roughly one billion dollars ($997.6 million) annually as a result of this rule if it is finalized.

Quantifying the transfers from workers to employers due to an increase in fissuring

According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2023 Contingent Worker Supplement (CWS), there are 862,000 workers who work for contract firms and 945,000 workers who work for temporary help agencies.6 However, the CWS undercounts these workers. This is due in part to the fact that workers self-report what kind of firm they work for and may erroneously report that they work for the company where they are doing their work instead of for the contract firm or temporary help agency that placed them at that site. Establishment surveys—where the firm, not the worker, does the reporting—get around this problem. High-quality establishment data on employment in contract firms do not exist to our knowledge, but there are excellent establishment data on employment in temporary help agencies from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Establishment Survey (CES). These data show that there were 2.50 million workers in temporary help agencies in 2025,7 well over double (2.64 times) what is reported in the latest CWS. Adjusting the number of contract workers by the same multiple (2.64) results in an adjusted estimate of the number of contract workers of 862,000 * 2.64 = 2.28 million.

It is important to note that we believe this estimate still undercounts contract workers, because the CWS includes only one very specific type of contract worker in its count of workers employed by contract firms—workers who are usually assigned to only one client and usually work at the client’s worksite. That excludes the many contract workers who work for multiple clients (e.g., janitorial workers or IT consultants) or offsite (e.g., call center workers or industrial laundry workers). We do not attempt to quantify this undercount.

Another important form of fissuring in the workplace is the increasing reliance on franchising models. Data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017 Economic Census Franchise Statistics Report show that franchise employment in 2017 in key sectors where franchising is common was 9.59 million.8  Since 2017 is the latest year these data are available, we inflate the value by the growth rate in overall payroll employment between 2017 and 2025, 8.1%, from the Current Employment Statistics establishment survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.9  This results in an estimated level of franchise employment for 2025 of 10.36 million.

Putting this all together, we conservatively estimate that in 2025, there were a total of 15.14 million employees working in “fissured establishments”—working for temporary help agencies (2.50 million), working for contract firms (2.28 million), or working for franchises (10.36 million). It is important to note the degree to which this estimate of the fissured workplace is likely an undercount. David Weil estimated that in 2017, 18.9 percent of private-sector production and nonsupervisory workers—20.8 million workers in 2025—were in highly fissured industries, and that if additional fissured workers in occupations and in industries with mixed use of practices were included, that share could easily double.10

Because the rule would mean that employers would be able to avoid liability for FLSA violations for many workers in fissured establishments while still substantially controlling the wages and working conditions of those workers, companies will be incentivized to restructure and outsource parts of their business. Research shows that the wage losses associated with this kind of domestic outsourcing are substantial, on the order of 5% long-run earnings losses.11 Thus the rule will result in a substantial transfer away from workers whose firms decide, as a result of the rule, to outsource the work that they do.

CES data show that the average weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers in temporary help services in 2025 was $932.12 A 5% penalty (noted above) for working in a fissured workplace implies that these workers would be earning $981 if they were directly hired, a difference of $49 per week. Combined with our estimate of 15.14 million employees working for fissured establishments, we find that every percent increase in fissuring as a result of the rule would, in the long run, lead to a wage loss of $386.0 million annually.13 That means that an increase in domestic outsourcing of just 2 percent as a result of the rule—an implausibly conservative increase considering employers would newly be able to avoid liability for FLSA violations while still substantially controlling the wages and working conditions of domestically outsourced workers—would lead to a transfer of $772.0 million annually from workers to employers. Further, it is important to note that using the broader estimate, described above, of 20.8 million private-sector production and nonsupervisory workers in the fissured workplace, that number would be $1.1 billion.

Quantifying the transfers from workers to employers due to an increase in wage theft

Wage theft—the practice of employers failing to pay workers the full wages to which they are legally entitled—is a widespread and deeply rooted problem that directly harms millions of U.S. workers each year. Employers refusing to pay promised wages, paying less than legally mandated minimums, failing to pay for all hours worked, or not paying overtime premiums deprives working people of billions of dollars annually. It also leaves hundreds of thousands of affected workers and their families in poverty.14 Wage theft does not just harm the workers and families who directly suffer exploitation; it also weakens the bargaining power of workers more broadly and puts downward pressure on hourly wages in affected industries and occupations. For many low-income families who suffer wage theft, the resulting loss of income forces them to rely more heavily on public assistance programs, unduly straining safety net programs and hamstringing efforts to reduce poverty.

In 2008, Bernhardt et al. surveyed front-line workers in low-wage industries in the cities of Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York and found that two-thirds (68 percent) of these workers experienced at least one pay-related violation in any given week.15 The researchers estimated that the average cost to these workers over a year was $2,634 out of a total earnings of $17,616—15.0 percent of their wages. This adds up to a total of nearly $3 billion annually stolen across all forms of wage theft among these workers in 2008. Generalizing these three-city, 2008 results to the nationwide 2025 workforce, we estimate that low-wage workers in the U.S. lost $52.5 billion to all forms of wage theft in 2025.16

It is worth noting that though the Bernhardt et al. study is somewhat dated, more recent studies show that labor violations remain so prevalent that it is likely that simply extrapolating from the Bernhardt et al. study, as we have, will generate conservative numbers.  For example, a 2024 study out of the Shift Project at Harvard Kennedy School found that nearly all (91%) hourly service sector workers in California experienced at least one labor violation in the prior year.17

The proposed rule would increase losses due to wage theft by employers in at least three ways. Each of these impacts will be particularly acute in industries in which there is high reliance on subcontracting, temporary work, and other alternative work arrangements, where there is already a disproportionate occurrence of wage theft.18

First, the proposal would severely limit the ability of millions of workers to get justice when they are victims of wage theft. By limiting workers’ ability to recover wages from firms that contractually have the right to act with respect to the terms and conditions of employment, DOL is depriving workers of long-held rights to recover unpaid wages from their employers.

Second, there will be a reduction in wage theft deterrence caused by the reduction, as a result of the rule, of workers’ ability to recover wages. This reduction in wage theft deterrence will likely lead to an increase in wage theft.

Third, by allowing firms that hire contractors to avoid legal liability for wages, the rule would give these firms greater incentive to award contracts to undercapitalized firms that are more likely to have low bids on the basis of not paying their workers what they are owed. And, absent the legal liability stemming from being a joint employer, if the contractor goes out of business, the lead business is not liable for the lost wages of the workers. In other words, this rule would increase the incentive for firms to seek out undercapitalized contractors who will provide lower bids to the companies that use them—bids that are able to be so low because the contractors plan to steal from their workers (by underpaying them or not paying them at all).19

As described above, an estimated $52.5 billion was lost by low-wage workers to all forms of wage theft in 2025. We use several sources of data to estimate how much of that $52.5 billion was lost by workers in fissured establishments. As noted above, we conservatively estimate that in 2025, there were a total of 15.14 million employees working in “fissured establishments”—working for temporary help agencies (2.50 million), working for contract firms (2.28 million), or working for franchises (10.36 million).

To determine how many of these 15.14 million workers are low-wage, we turn to CWS microdata, which allow us to calculate the share of workers in contract firms and temporary help services who are low wage workers.  Unfortunately, microdata from the most recent (2023) CWS survey have not yet been released, so we use microdata from the 2017 CWS survey. We find that the share of workers in contract firms or in temporary help services who are low-wage—defined as earning $12 per hour or less in 2017—is 36.3 percent. Given wage growth between 2017 and 2025, $12 in 2017 was roughly equivalent to $17 in 2025.20 

Franchise workers are not identified in the CWS, so we simply assume that the share of workers in franchise firms who are low-wage is the same as the share of workers who are low-wage in contract firms and temporary help services. Multiplying 36.3% by our estimate of 15.14 million total workers in fissured establishments, we estimate that there are 5.5 million low-wage workers in fissured establishments.

There were 25.6 million workers who made less than $17 an hour in 2025,21 which means that 21.5 percent (5.5 million/25.6 million) of low-wage workers are in fissured establishments. Assuming that the incidence of wage theft among low-wage workers is no higher in fissured establishments than in traditional establishments (an extremely conservative assumption), we can simply multiply this 21.5 percent by the total amount of wage theft from low-wage workers—$52.5 billion—to estimate the amount of wage theft in fissured establishments. This comes out to $11.28 billion.

Annual wage theft of $11.28 billion in fissured establishments means that every percent increase in losses due to wage theft would lead to an aggregate transfer from workers to employers of $112.8 million annually. This means that an increase in losses due to wage theft of just 2 percent as a result of the rule—an implausibly conservative increase considering many former joint employers would newly be able to avoid liability for FLSA violations—would lead to an aggregate transfer from workers to employers every year of $225.6 million. Further, it is important to note that using the broader estimate described above of 20.8 million private-sector production and nonsupervisory workers in the fissured workplace, that number would be $309.8 million.

Conclusion

DOL’s proposed rule undermines the original intent of our nation’s fundamental worker protection laws and, if implemented, its impact on working people will be negative and significant. The proposed rule would incentivize the further “fissuring” of the workplace, putting strong downward pressure on wages, and it would make it nearly impossible for millions of workers to get justice when they are the victims of wage theft. Conservatively, we estimate that, if implemented, this rule would cost workers just under $1.0 billion annually—more than $772.0 million due to wage suppression from an increase in workplace fissuring and more than $225.6 million from an increase in wage losses due to wage theft by employers. We urge DOL to abandon this flawed rulemaking and ensure a meaningful joint employer standard under the FLSA, our nation’s fundamental worker protection law.

Sincerely,

Heidi Shierholz, Ph.D.
President
Economic Policy Institute

Samantha Sanders
Director of Government Affairs & Advocacy
Economic Policy Institute

Endnotes

1. International Franchise Association (IFA). 2026. “IFA Praises Trump Administration Joint Employer Rule” (press release). April 22, 2016.

2. 91 Fed. Reg. 21909

3. 91 Fed. Reg. 21909

4. 91 Fed. Reg. 21909

5. 91 Fed. Reg. 21910

6. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Table 5. Employed workers with alternative and traditional work arrangements on sole or main job by selected demographic characteristics, July 2023,” Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, November 2024.

7. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Temporary Help Services [TEMPHELPS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed June 2026 at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TEMPHELPS. 

8. U.S. Census Bureau, “Franchising in America: Key Data from the 2017 Economic Census,” September 2021.

9. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, All Employees, Total Nonfarm [PAYEMS], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Accessed June 2026 at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PAYEMS.

10. David Weil, “Understanding the Present and Future of Work in the Fissured Workplace Context,” Working Paper, Brandeis University, May 2019.

11. Dorn, D., Schmieder, J. F., Spletzer, J. R. (2018). Domestic Outsourcing in the United States. Chief Evaluation Office, U.S. Department of Labor; Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes F. Schmieder, “The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 132, no. 3 (August 2017): 1165–1217; Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, “Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards,” ILR Review 63, no. 2 (January 2010): 287–306.

12. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics (BLS-CES). Table B-8, Average hourly and weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm payrolls by industry sector, seasonally adjusted. Various years. Accessed June 2026 at https://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtab8.htm.

13. $386.0 million = 15.14 million * $49 * 52 weeks in a year * 1%.

14. Margaret Poydock and Jiayi (Sonia) Zhang, More than $1.5 billion in stolen wages recovered for workers between 2021 and 2023, Economic Policy Institute, December 2024; David Cooper and Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ Paychecks Each Year: Survey Data Show Millions of Workers Are Paid Less Than the Minimum Wage, at Significant Cost to Taxpayers and State Economies, Economic Policy Institute, May 2017.

15. Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 2009, Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2009.

16. Generalizing the three-city, 2008 results to the nationwide 2025 workforce required several adjustments. The low-wage workforce in the Bernhardt et al. study represented 15.1% of all workers in those cities, and 68% of those workers experienced at least one pay-related violation in the prior week. This implies that at least 15.1%*68% = 10.3% of all workers experienced wage theft in a given week. Data from the BLS Current Employment Statistics (CES) survey shows there were158.5 million nonfarm payroll employees in 2025 nationwide. Applying the 10.3% estimate to that workforce yield 16.3 million workers, meaning that at least 16.3 million workers nationwide likely experienced wage theft in any given week in 2025. Bernhardt et al. found that workers who experienced wage theft lost, on average, 15% of their weekly earnings. Using the BLS Current Population Survey (CPS), we find that the lowest-paid 15.1% of workers who are 18 years old or older and worked at least five hours per week —a conservative proxy for the population surveyed in Bernhardt et al.—had median weekly earnings of $352 in 2025. Assuming 15% losses due to wage theft, the earnings of workers experiencing wage theft would have been $414 if wage theft hadn’t occurred, an average loss of $62. Multiplying the estimated16.3 million workers experiencing wage theft by the average loss of $62, we find that the total amount lost by low wage workers to wage theft in a given week is $1.01 billion. Annualized, this amounts to $52.5 billion in wages stolen from low-wage workers each year.

17. Daniel Schneider, Elizabeth Kuhlman, Kristen Harknett, and David Weil. 2024. Compliance and the Complaint Gap: Labor Standards Violations in the California Service Sector. The Shift Project at Harvard Kennedy School, May 2024.

18. Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 2009, Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, 2009.

19. This is an argument made by Judge Easterbrook in Reyes v. Remington Hybrid Seed Co. 495 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2007). In that decision, Easterbrook notes, “If Zarate [the labor broker in the case] had been solvent, Remington [the lead business in the case] would have to offer him enough that he could pay all the workers’ wages (including the minimum wage and any overtime premium), cover the costs of fringe benefits such as housing, and still be able to make a profit. But when a contractor has no business or personal wealth at risk, he may be tempted to stiff the workers (as Zarate did) and then treating the principal firm as a separate employer is essential to ensure that the workers’ rights are honored.”

20. $12 was 66.1% of the median wage in 2017, and 66.1% of the median wage in 2025 was $16.97.  Economic Policy Institute, State of Working America Data Library, “Hourly wage percentiles – Nominal hourly wage,” 2026.

21. Low-Wage Workforce Tracker, Economic Policy Institute, January 2026.

According to today’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) release, overall inflation was 4.2% over the last year. The sudden burst in inflation, along with slowing nominal wage growth, means that the average hourly real wage for private-sector workers is now no higher than it was in January 2025.

So far, excessive inflation has been limited to energy and airfares. But as long as the war continues, there is a heightened threat that price increases will spill over to the broader economy, triggering a more permanent increase in the cost of living and further reductions in real earnings.

Key takeaways:

• So far this year, at least 13 states have introduced bills weakening child labor protections, and four have enacted them.
• Meanwhile, only three states have introduced bills to strengthen standards in 2026, compared with 15 in 2025.
• Industry-backed attacks on child labor standards have followed four troubling trends: 1) lowering minimum wages for teen workers; 2) weaponizing “youth apprenticeships”; 3) eliminating youth permits; and 4) weakening safeguards for teen child care workers.
• The Trump administration has undermined federal enforcement of child labor standards, even amid rising violations.
• Oregon enshrined current federal child labor standards into state law, offering a replicable model for states to hold the line against potential federal rollbacks.

Many state lawmakers took encouraging steps in 2023 and 2024 to strengthen their child labor standards—in response to high-profile reporting of widespread child labor violations across the U.S. and simultaneous efforts to weaken state child labor standards in the wake of COVID-19. But trends in 2026 suggest that this momentum may be waning despite continued increases in child labor violations. Meanwhile, opponents of strong child labor standards have continued to erode state standards and—in effect—chip away at the basis for federal standards, which have also come under threat.

In fiscal year 2025, more cases of federal child labor violations were uncovered than during any other year since the Great Recession, and hazardous work violations ticked up again after declining in the year prior (see Figure A). The rate of young worker deaths nearly doubled between 2020 and 2024, and at least one minor was killed on the job in the past year. At the same time, enforcement of federal child labor standards appears to have diminished under the Trump administration, which has proposed weakening existing standards. Since Trump was inaugurated in January 2025, the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division (WHD) has published news releases about only three child labor enforcement actions. In the last year of the Biden administration, WHD published news releases about 26 cases.

Figure A

Amid this growing child labor crisis, a few states are taking necessary action to shore up or strengthen standards, but in far too many states industry-backed attacks are continuing to succeed in rolling back child labor laws.

Oregon enshrined current federal standards into state law, a model other states can emulate

The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets guidelines for the hours and nonhazardous jobs for which employers can hire minors. It sets a floor above which states can adopt and enforce their own stronger standards, but where state standards are weaker, federal law applies. Oregon, the only state to pass a bill strengthening child labor standards so far this year, enacted a law that enshrines into state law FLSA work hours for minors as of January 2026. Prior to the change, Oregon law followed federal hours guidelines for 14- and 15-year-olds,1 but had prevented the adoption of any state guidelines more restrictive than those in federal law (FLSA). The new law locks in current standards and guards against potential future erosion of federal standards, stipulating that Oregon’s minor work hours rules must be no less restrictive than FLSA standards as of January 1, 2026, and giving the state freedom to implement its own higher standards for minor work hours if needed in the future. Other states can propose legislation that enshrines federal child labor standards into state law and can go further by establishing standards that improve upon the existing federal floor.

Three other states proposed bills to strengthen existing standards

In 2026, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York lawmakers also made progress on bills to strengthen state child labor standards, but none have been enacted as of this publication. A 2025 New York bill mandating that minor workers receive information on their workplace rights in order to receive work authorization passed the Senate in March; a New Jersey bill proposes establishing minimum penalties and increasing penalties for certain child labor violations; and a Maryland bill establishing civil penalties and preventing the executive branch from seeking waivers from the FLSA passed the House but was not taken up by the Senate. The Maryland bill’s provision prohibiting FLSA waivers was likely a response to a proposal in Project 2025 that would allow states to opt out of certain FLSA provisions, which would erode workers’ right to federal minimum wage and overtime protections. Next year, lawmakers should recommit to advancing stronger state standards, especially given the distinct possibility that federal standards will come under threat.

Over a dozen state legislatures attempted to roll back child labor standards this year

So far in 2026, at least 13 states have introduced bills that weaken child labor protections, and four have enacted them (see Table 1). In contrast, only three states have introduced bills to strengthen child labor protections in 2026, and only one has enacted such legislation.2 For comparison, 15 states introduced bills to strengthen child labor standards in 2025.

Table 1

Proposals to erode existing standards this year included: weakening protections from hazardous work; implementing or expanding minimum wage exemptions for minors; extending the number of hours employers can schedule minors to work; eliminating the state’s youth employment documentation system; and lowering minimum age requirements for workers in child care centers (see Table 1). Four particularly troubling patterns have emerged in legislation attempting to weaken child labor standards across multiple states:

1. Attempts to lower the minimum wage for teen workers;
2. Attempts to use state legislation on “youth apprenticeship” or “work-based learning” programs as a vehicle for weakening state child labor standards;
3. Elimination of youth work permits or other systems that ensure the documentation of minor employment; and
4. Attempts to lower or remove safety standards and staffing ratios for teen workers in child care facilities.

Lawmakers continued to propose excluding teen workers from voter-approved state minimum wage increases

As in previous years, state lawmakers continued to advance proposals that would subject minor workers to lower minimum wages than adults, particularly in states where successful ballot measures recently increased the state minimum wage. Florida, Missouri, and Nebraska voters approved ballot measures in recent years that increased the state minimum wage to $15 an hour (Florida’s minimum wage will increase from $14 to $15 in September). Legislators in the same three states are now attempting to exclude minor workers from these higher minimum wages.

Florida lawmakers reintroduced a bill to allow minors in work-based learning programs to “opt out” of receiving the constitutionally-mandated state minimum wage; Missouri lawmakers proposed paying minors nearly $3 less than the state’s new $15 minimum wage; and Nebraska lawmakers successfully enacted a bill that increased the state’s temporary youth training wage but also implemented a permanent subminimum wage for 14- and 15-year-olds. Such proposals undermine the stated goals of lawmakers to boost youth employment, address the “labor shortage,” and allow teens to earn for their futures. Youth subminimum wages do not benefit young people and erode the wage floor, depressing wages for all workers—teens and adults alike.

States continued a troubling trend of using unregulated state “youth apprenticeship” programs to roll back child labor protections

As shown in Table 1, three states proposed bills to weaken hazardous work protections for minors enrolled in work-based learning programs, marking a continued trend of attempts to erode standards that ensure early career training programs provide valuable experiences and skills without unnecessarily exposing young people to hazards known to pose a high risk of illness, injury, or fatality.

In Pennsylvania, lawmakers proposed exempting minors enrolled in work-based learning programs from state child labor standards, except where such standards reflect federal law. In Virginia, lawmakers introduced legislation that would allow employers to set the standards for appropriate work in hazardous occupations, undermining existing state laws that require work-based learning programs to be accredited by the U.S. Department of Labor or state Board of Education. However, education advocates managed to neutralize the bill’s harms by removing that provision, limiting the scope of work-based learning programs to particular industries, and adding language requiring such programs to comply with federal laws prohibiting employers from exposing teens to hazardous work.

In West Virginia, lawmakers used their recently created “youth apprenticeship program” to further erode state child labor standards for all minor workers, exacerbating troubling conflicts between state and federal child labor law created by earlier state legislation. In 2024, West Virginia lawmakers established a new “youth apprenticeship program” (YAP) that appears to permit YAP-enrolled minors to be employed in any of the 17 hazardous occupations prohibited by federal law, even though federal law provides limited exemptions for apprentices and student learners for only seven of the 17 hazardous occupation orders. This year, lawmakers expanded the program by removing the requirement that hazardous work assigned to youth apprentices be “occasional and incidental” to their training. This guardrail, which originates in federal law, is meant to protect youth apprentices from being treated as adult workers in hazardous jobs and to ensure that they are assigned hazardous work very rarely and only when it is necessary to further their training.

As part of the same legislation, West Virginia lawmakers also removed from state code the list of hazardous occupations prohibited for minors under state law. As a result, working minors not covered by the FLSA will no longer have protection from being employed in the deadliest jobs, and if federal protections are unenforced or eroded as Trump’s Project 2025 agenda has threatened, all West Virginia minors working in these jobs would lack protection. Many states have their own list of state hazardous occupation orders, which may differ slightly from the federal list. Where state and federal standards differ, the more protective standard prevails. Removing the state’s list will both endanger young workers and create confusion for employers who may not realize they must still follow federal law in areas where state law has been eroded, leading to increased reputational risk and legal liability for the state’s businesses.

Several states have weakened restrictions on hazardous work while eliminating the state’s ability to identify and investigate child labor violations

The West Virginia playbook for rolling back state child labor laws represents a troubling pattern for lawmakers and advocates to continue to monitor and resist. In 2024, the state created a new work-based learning program that did not conform to federal law, then eliminated youth work permits (and replaced them with weaker age certificates, which have now also come under threat), and a year later further weakened the state’s hazardous work protections using their new work-based learning program as a vehicle.

In just the past three years, two other states—Indiana and Iowa—have both eliminated their systems for documenting youth employment while also weakening prohibitions on hazardous work for minors. In 2023, Iowa lawmakers eliminated youth work permits, weakened hazardous work protections for youth enrolled in “work-based learning” programs, and added new provisions allowing state agencies to “waive” restrictions on hazardous work that violated federal law, among a host of other changes.

And this year, Indiana lawmakers eliminated the state’s “youth employment system” for documenting minor employment after implementing the system to replace eliminated youth work permits in 2020. As a result, state agencies will have no record of teen employment—a change the legislature’s own fiscal analysts acknowledged will impede enforcement of child labor laws. Indiana’s 2026 rollback comes on the heels of numerous changes enacted in 2024 that extended work hours for minors, eliminated night work restrictions, weakened protections for hazardous work, and—though this provision was amended out of the final bill—proposed giving employers complete civil immunity for workplace fatalities of minors enrolled in work-based learning programs.

Recent research shows that youth work permits play an important role in preventing child labor violations by enhancing awareness of child labor standards, creating legal accountability, and aiding in enforcement. In 2024, Wisconsin lawmakers passed legislation eliminating work permits for minors under 16, but the governor vetoed the legislation and stated in his veto message that he objected to eliminating a process that protects youth from exploitation. This year, Wisconsin’s Department of Workforce Development uncovered more than 1,600 child labor violations by a single Burger King franchisee—the largest in the state’s history—including 593 work permit violations. Recent research has shown that states with work permit mandates have fewer child labor violations. Employers violating work permit rules are also often violating work hours and hazardous work protections.

Continued efforts to weaken protections for teen child care workers are part of a larger deregulatory agenda in the care industry

This year, for the third time since 2022, Iowa lawmakers proposed legislation to weaken standards related to teen supervision of children in child care facilities. In 2022, Iowa enacted a bill that lowered the minimum age for child care workers and increased the number of children facilities could place under the care of a single staff person. In 2024, lawmakers proposed allowing a 16-year-old to be charged with the care of four infants, seven toddlers, or 10 three-year-olds without direct supervision, but the bill failed. The bill was supported by the billionaire-founded right-wing dark money group Americans for Prosperity, which also lobbied in support of a 2023 Kansas bill to allow minors as young as 14 to care for young children and allow 16-year-olds to provide child care with no adult supervision.

In 2025, Iowa enacted additional changes through the administrative rulemaking process, allowing teenagers as young as 16 to care for children of any age in limited circumstances. And this year, lawmakers proposed allowing 15-year-olds to care for children without supervision. The 2026 Iowa bill received significant support from lobbyists representing The Family Leader and Family Leader Foundation, Iowa’s state affiliate of the Family Research Council, an anti-LGBTQ and anti-abortion hate group.

Michigan also issued new administrative rules effective April 2026 that increased child-to-staff ratios and allow 16-year-olds to care for numerous young children without supervision—in both group and family child care homes.

The push to lower the minimum age for child care providers and increase child-to-staff ratios is part of a larger industry agenda to deregulate the care economy and avoid reckoning with its true costs. This agenda—which has also involved reducing the education and experience requirements necessary for provider licensing and even using state power to block stronger local standards—has strained providers, degraded the quality of care, and led to injuries and even deaths of young children in recent years. Placing the burden of responsibility of caring for young children on teenagers who are still themselves children harms everyone while sidestepping the real issues facing our child care system: insufficient public investment to make child care affordable and to pay providers adequately.

In an era of federal retrenchment and continued state rollbacks amid rising violations, more state lawmakers should seek to strengthen standards

Though the news media has largely moved on and federal enforcement attention appears to have waned, child labor violations remain a persistent issue and may be getting worse. Fiscal year 2025 saw more child labor cases generally and more minors employed in violation of hazardous occupation orders than any year in recent memory. While some states continued advancing legislation to strengthen child labor standards in 2026, and Oregon succeeded in enacting legislation to guard against federal rollbacks, far more states focused their efforts on weakening existing standards.

Given the very real risk that aspects of FLSA child labor protections could be eliminated (or will go unenforced), all states should at a minimum lock in existing FLSA standards and ensure state capacity to enforce them. Beyond this, states have critical opportunities and responsibilities to modernize child labor standards beyond the minimal, outdated FLSA floor to ensure that minors who must work or choose to work can access safe work experiences that don’t harm their health or education.

1. Maximum of 3 hours per day, 18 hours per week when school is in session; 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week when school is not in session. See: https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor

2. We exclude legislation related to child influencers. At least five states have introduced bills to increased protections for children featured in video content in 2026 (AZ, MD, MO, NJ, TN), and two states (NJ, TN) have enacted such legislation.

Does raising the minimum wage increase unemployment?

In brief: No. High-quality economic research finds increasing the minimum wage does not significantly impact employment.

In detail: The 90% of high-quality economic studies show that increasing the minimum wage boosts wages for low-wage workers without meaningfully increasing unemployment. These studies use statistical tools and empirical methods to measure what happens to workers before and after a minimum wage increase, controlling for other factors that can impact employment. The consistency of these findings across time, place, and level of increase is powerful evidence that increasing the minimum wage creates a healthier low-wage labor market.

An increase in the minimum wage raises the cost of labor for businesses by definition, but the economy can absorb these changes through channels of adjustment including decreased turnover, modest price increases (see Question 2), lower profits, and the reallocation of workers to more productive firms. Even if a minimum wage increase leads businesses to adjust their staffing levels, what workers are likely to experience are decreases in hours worked or increased time between jobs, not categorical unemployment. Higher hourly earnings can more than offset these reductions, leaving many workers with greater total income even if they are working fewer hours.

Will raising the minimum wage cause inflation?

In brief: No. Increasing the minimum wage does not meaningfully increase prices.

In detail: Economists do find that raising the minimum wage increases prices at affected businesses but only very modestly. For example, one study found that a 10% minimum wage increase was associated with a 0.14 percentage point increase in the Consumer Price Index. A study focused on the restaurant industry found a 10% increase in the minimum wage was associated with a 0.58% menu price increase. Even some of the most ambitious minimum wage policies, such as California’s $20 hourly wage floor for fast-food workers, only increased fast-food prices 2.1% (around 8 cents for a $4 item). 

The economic benefits of the minimum wage far exceed these price increases. For low-wage workers, the wage boost from the higher minimum wage more than compensates for increased prices of the goods and services they buy. These workers are in turn spending more in aggregate because of their additional income, which can boost the overall economy. It is also worth noting that modest price increases on things like restaurant menu items are redistributive. Higher-earning consumers pay higher prices, transferring income to low-wage workers receiving bigger paychecks.

Claims that increasing the minimum wage will dramatically increase prices in the economy are false. Low-wage labor is a small share of total business expenses. In restaurants, for example, total labor costs are around 30% of operating costs—which also include rent, food, utilities, and insurance—and the wage bill of the lowest paid workers is an even smaller amount. This, combined with the fact that minimum wage increases can be offset through reduced profits, lower turnover, and higher productivity, is why price increases are small.

Will businesses just relocate if a state or locality raises its minimum wage?

In brief: The best economic research suggests businesses do not move in response to minimum wage increases.

In detail: One way that economists try to understand the impact of minimum wage increases is to compare economic outcomes across jurisdictional borders where a minimum wage increase took effect on one side but not the other. An analysis of cross-state and county impacts of all local minimum wage differences between 1990 and 2006 found no evidence that employment decreased in the places where the minimum wage went up or that employment increased in the places without a minimum wage increase. More recent research supports these findings, strongly suggesting that businesses are not relocating or moving their workers in response to minimum wage changes.

Businesses commonly affected by minimum wage changes (such as restaurants and retail) want to locate where there are consumers with money to spend. Because raising the minimum wage boosts the spending power of low-income households, it can strengthen the local customer base for these direct-to-consumer businesses even as it raises their labor costs.

Is the minimum wage an effective way to fight poverty?

In brief: Increasing the minimum wage does reduce poverty and should be paired with a strong safety net.

In detail: Minimum wage increases do significantly reduce poverty by boosting household income, especially among low-income households. Research has found that a 10% increase in the minimum wage reduces nonelderly poverty by 2–4%. When EPI applied this research to the 2021 Raise the Wage Act (which would have gradually increased the minimum wage to $15 an hour), an estimated 1.8 to 3.7 million individuals would have been lifted out of poverty, including up to 1.3 million children.

The current weakness of the federal wage floor exposes workers to poverty-level wages. As of 2025, a full-time worker earning the federal minimum wage makes less than the poverty line. A stronger wage floor would generate more savings across critical safety net programs like Medicaid, SNAP, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and the Child Tax Credit (CTC), as fewer workers would need or be eligible for these programs due to their increased wages. The safety net would thus be more targeted toward the households that need assistance the most. Those public savings can and should be reinvested in those programs to make benefits more generous.

Can increasing the minimum wage harm workers by pushing them over a “benefits cliff”? 

In brief: The minimum wage does reduce safety net program eligibility, but the wage gains almost always outweigh the loss of benefits.

In detail: Most income-tested safety net programs are not characterized by “cliffs” but rather gradual phase outs. Nevertheless, when a worker’s income increases because of a minimum wage increase, they can lose eligibility to programs like Medicaid, EITC, CTC, SNAP, and housing assistance. Research on the interaction between the minimum wage and safety net eligibility finds that benefit reduction is significantly outweighed by the increase in income from the minimum wage. Benefit reductions offset around a third of the income increases for low-income families caused by the minimum wage—meaning that on net they still benefit overwhelmingly.

Higher minimum wages also help low-wage workers increase their access to medical coverage. While minimum wage increases can lift workers out of income eligibility for Medicaid, they simultaneously increase the take-up of employer-based health insurance plans by many low-wage workers, since those workers can more easily afford those plans. Many workers who lose Medicaid eligibility also can receive heavily subsidized private health care through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges. Researchers estimate that the $20 fast-food minimum wage in California could push almost 60% of Medi-Cal eligible workers in the industry off Medi-Cal and onto alternative health insurance. The wage benefits of the wage floor increase far outweigh the annual premium contributions workers must pay for ACA marketplace healthcare, even accounting for the Trump administration’s choice to let expanded subsidies for the ACA expire.

The reduction in public benefit usage created by higher minimum wages generates substantial savings for federal and state government. These savings should be reinvested in the safety net by expanding program eligibility or otherwise strengthening programs.

There are some safety net programs, which have cliff-like characteristics, like child care assistance, although states are required to provide a graduated phase-out. In rare cases where changes in program eligibility from a minimum wage increase does reduce a family’s total income, this indicates that the design of these programs’ eligibility criteria needs reform, not that the minimum wage increase should be abandoned.

Should lower cost of living in the South and Midwest mean a lower wage floor in those states?

In brief: Even accounting for differences in the cost of living, the minimum wage is far too low in many states across the South and Midwest.

In detail: Cost of living does vary between states and regions across the country, but the minimum wage is still too low across the South and the Midwest. According to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, even under conservative assumptions of what constitutes a living wage, there is almost no county in the U.S. where a single adult worker can achieve a modest but adequate standard of living earning less than $15 an hour. In fact, many metro areas in the South and Midwest are much more expensive to live in. The living wage in Austin, Atlanta, and Charlotte exceeds $20 an hour. Affordability is still a pressing issue across these regions, even if on average the cost of living is lower. Notably, voters in Florida, Missouri, and Nebraska passed ballot referenda to raise their state minimum wages to $15.

Low wage floors in Southern and Midwestern states hurt workers by suppressing their pay. Most of the states that use the $7.25 federal minimum wage are in the South and Midwest, meaning the effective wage floor in these states is a poverty-level wage (see Question 5). Compounding the problem, many states in these regions preempt localities from passing their own minimum wage policies, preventing policymakers in these jurisdictions from setting wage floors that meet the needs of workers. The use of preemption to dismantle higher labor standards like the minimum wage in the South and Midwest has a long history of being used to reinforce anti-Black racism and white supremacy in these regions.

Can employers ever pay less than the minimum wage?

In brief: Most U.S. minimum wage laws do exempt some groups of workers (such as farmworkers) or set lower minimum wages that apply in certain circumstances (such as for workers who customarily receive tips). Unfortunately, these exemptions can be deeply harmful to workers; in some cases, they were originally adopted to exclude workers of color from minimum wage protections.

In detail: Federal and state labor standards make several groups of workers either ineligible for minimum wage protections or subject to a separate “subminimum wage.”

The FLSA exempts a variety of occupations and types of workers from minimum wage protections. Agricultural workers are excluded from the federal minimum wage entirely and workers who customarily receive tips may be paid a subminimum wage (sometimes called the “tipped minimum wage”) as low as $2.13 an hour (see Questions 8–11). Both of these exemptions originated as ways to exclude Black workers from New Deal economic policies in order to appease Southern lawmakers. Originally, the FLSA also excluded domestic workers, another group of workers with a high concentration of Black workers, but lawmakers extended coverage to them in 1974.

The FLSA also allows employers who have been granted a certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor to pay less than the minimum wage to employees with disabilities (see Question 14).

Another category of federal exemptions and subminimum wages impact young workers. Youth under 20 can be paid as little as $4.25 per hour for their first 90 calendar days of employment. Full-time students, apprentices, and student-learners can also be subject to subminimum wages. And specific occupations typically held by young workers, like babysitters and seasonal amusement workers, are exempt.

Workers misclassified as independent contractors, such as gig economy workers and other wrongly classified employees are not eligible for FLSA protections, including the minimum wage. Also, despite the fact around half of incarcerated people work full-time, these individuals are also excluded from the minimum wage.

State and local policymakers in many states have made efforts to close many of these gaps in minimum wage coverage, but states that do not go beyond the federal standards maintain these exemptions.

Does raising the tipped subminimum wage hurt the restaurant industry?

In brief: Tipped workers are low-wage workers who need wage increases just as much as any other type of worker. Economic research does not find that boosting the minimum wage for tipped workers hurts the restaurant industry.

In detail: There is no inherent economic reason why tipped workers should be paid a lower minimum wage than other workers. The fact that U.S. law allows this can be traced directly back to racist economic practices following the abolition of slavery. Seven states do not have a separate subminimum wage for tipped workers yet still have strong restaurant and hospitality industries. Economic research on the restaurant industry finds that tipped minimum wage increases boost wages for workers without affecting employment. Similarly, when the District of Columbia increased its tipped minimum wage, the restaurant industry did not suffer in terms of employment growth or number of establishments when compared with the U.S average or nearby counties.

Don’t tipped workers earn enough to earn a living wage?

In brief: Tipped workers, including restaurant servers and bartenders, are overwhelmingly low-wage workers. Many struggle to make ends meet, especially those in states where they can be paid less than the minimum wage.

In detail: Tipped workers are more than twice as likely as non-tipped workers to be in poverty. Poverty rates of tipped workers who live in states that use the federal tipped minimum wage of $2.13 are substantially higher than poverty rates of tipped workers in states that use the same minimum wage for all workers, regardless of tips.

The subminimum wage for tipped workers exacerbates economic insecurity for many workers. Employers are legally required to ensure that on a weekly basis, tipped workers’ tips cover the gap between the tipped minimum wage and the regular minimum wage for all hours worked that week, on average. If they do not, employers are responsible for making up the difference. In practice, this requirement is exceptionally difficult to enforce, as it is largely left to workers themselves to track their hours and tips, make the relevant calculations, and then confront their employer if something seems amiss. As a result, tipped workers—who are already paid low wages—are particularly vulnerable to wage theft.

Will raising/eliminating the tipped minimum wage lead to fewer tips or force restaurants to end tipping?

In brief: Tipping is deeply embedded in U.S. culture. Even in places with no separate tipped subminimum wage, workers still receive tips and typically have higher overall take-home pay than their peers in places with a separate tipped subminimum wage.

In detail: In the seven states that do not have a tipped subminimum wage, tipped workers continue to receive tips. According to the Toast platform, California (a state where tipped workers receive the full minimum wage) had the lowest tipping rate (i.e., the average percentage tip on a bill) in the country at 17.2%. This is less than 5 percentage points less than Delaware, the highest tipping state (21.8%). By contrast, the effective minimum wage for tipped workers in California ($16.90) is more than seven times greater than in Delaware ($2.23). EPI research finds that tipped workers in states without a lower tipped subminimum wage earn, on average, 17% more per hour in total take-home pay (base wages plus tips) than tipped workers in states that use the federal $2.13 tipped subminimum.

There is nothing wrong with workers receiving tips for their work in service jobs, but formalizing tipping in minimum wage law allows employers to shift responsibility for paying their workers onto customers. This in turn means workers are more vulnerable to harassment, discrimination, and other forms of abuse. Restaurant workers, particularly women, are subject to the highest rates of sexual harassment of any industry. Research has also found that racial discrimination leads to Black workers receiving fewer tips than their white counterparts. Relying on tipping means workers have less ability to avoid or protect themselves from harmful interactions in the workplace.

Does the so-called “no tax on tips” deduction eliminate the need to raise the tipped minimum wage?

In brief: The 2025 budget tax bill did create a temporary tax deduction for tipped income, but for most tipped workers the benefits are modest and pale in comparison to the benefits of increasing the wage floor.

In detail: The 2025 Republican budget bill created a new, temporary federal income tax deduction for tipped income. This policy does little to address the precarity of tipped work and the benefits to most tipped workers pale in comparison to the gains they would receive through a significant minimum wage increase. The tax deduction encourages employers to rely more on tipped jobs and avoid raising base wages, exacerbating the low wages and challenging conditions of most tipped jobs (see Questions 9 and 10). Many tipped workers earn too little to qualify for the benefit, and those that do will likely see modest tax benefits. Whereas the average annual benefit for an eligible tipped worker will be around $1,700 a year for the three remaining years the deduction is in place, a minimum wage increase to $15 per hour would boost earnings by $3,200 a year for a full-time worker, in perpetuity.

Aren’t most minimum wage workers teenagers?

No, the vast majority of workers impacted by the minimum wage are not teenagers. Low-wage work is a widespread problem and not just isolated to younger workers. EPI’s analysis of the 2025 Raise the Wage Act found that only 14% of the workers that would be impacted by the policy were younger than 20 years old.

Will raising the minimum wage hurt young workers in their first jobs? 

In brief: Higher minimum wages cause little to no employment changes for teenagers.

In detail: The majority of studies find little to no evidence that the minimum wage causes employment losses for teen workers. Instead, their incomes increase as they earn higher pay. It is also worth keeping in mind that teen workers are a minority of low-wage workers, and a shrinking share of the workforce overall as the cultural and economic emphasis on education has grown. To that end, minimum wage increases can support young workers’ educational attainment, particularly for low-income teens. Minimum wage increases significantly improve high school graduation rates for low-income students, a vital investment that can have large long-term consequences for those workers’ lifetime earnings.

Do workers benefit from the FLSA’s subminimum wage for workers with disabilities?

In brief: The federal subminimum wage for disabled workers does not provide real wage protections and is out of step with the most effective ways to boost employment for workers with disabilities.

In detail: Under Section 14(c) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, employers can apply for special certificates with the Department of Labor that allow employers to pay workers with mental or physical disabilities less than federal minimum wage. Employers can only apply for certificates if the worker’s disability actually impairs the worker’s earning or productive capacity. An overwhelming share (96%) of 14(c) employees work in so-called “sheltered workshops” which put workers with developmental disabilities in isolated, noncompetitive environments.

These certificates apply to a small number of workers (less than 37,000 nationally) but also produce exceedingly low pay for workers with disabilities. Nearly half of 14(c) workers were paid less than $3.50 an hour, exacerbating the economic precarity experienced by disabled workers. Disabled adults are 24.1% more likely to live in poverty than other adults. The low pay permissible under 14(c) perpetuates these workers’ struggle to make ends meet. This measure is also unnecessary for providing well-paying employment opportunities to workers with disabilities.

Researchers studying state repeals of 14(c) have found that the change has not hurt disabled workers’ employment. In Maryland, eliminating the provision caused no significant change to disabled worker employment, while in New Hampshire, employment increased. An analysis of the federal AbilityOne program, which is composed of nonprofits that primarily employ workers with disabilities, found that state and local minimum wage increases did not impact the employment of those workers. Employers also do not appear to shift more workers to 14(c) certificates in response to minimum wage increases.

Overall, the use of 14(c) certificates has been declining over time. Across the country, 27 states and D.C. have eliminated or restricted the use of the provisions, reflecting that the policy does not offer real wage protections for disabled workers and that there are superior models of employment for workers with developmental disabilities. Respecting the dignity of workers with disabilities requires prioritizing real pay and inclusion in supportive, but integrated employment opportunities.

Many cities and states already have minimum wages above $15 an hour. Is increasing the federal minimum wage still important?

In brief: Yes, tens of millions of workers still earn less than $15 an hour. In many states and cities, higher wage floors are needed to provide meaningful economic security.

In detail: In the last decade, dozens of cities and states have responded to federal minimum wage inaction by enacting stronger wage floors, in many cases reaching or exceeding $15 an hour. As of 2026, more workers work in a state with at least a $15 minimum wage than in a state using the federal minimum wage. However, there are still 20 states that use the federal $7.25 wage floor and around 14 million workers earn less than $15 an hour.

Even places with recent minimum wage increases might need higher wage floors. The first $15 minimum wage was enacted in 2013. Prices have risen substantially since then, and consequently, the value of targets like $15 an hour has declined significantly. According to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, $15 is not a living wage almost anywhere in the country. Many cities and states have at least partially protected their wage floors by adopting automatic annual adjustments to account for inflation, but if the initial value is too low, this inflation-indexing only locks in an unlivable floor.

Very few workers earn the federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour. Is the minimum wage even relevant anymore?

In brief: The fact that so few workers earn the federal minimum wage is a policy failure, not a reason to abandon the policy. The minimum wage is a vital tool for lifting wages and addressing systematic power imbalances between workers and employers. The failure to adequately raise the minimum wage over time has left millions of workers being paid less today than they could have been earning.

In detail: It is true that a small fraction of the labor force earns exactly the federal minimum wage, but this is a policy failure that has left tens of millions of workers with lower wages. Had Congress simply raised the federal minimum wage to keep pace with inflation since the late 1960s, it would be over $12.50 today. According to EPI’s Low Wage Workforce Tracker, 14 million workers earn less than $15 an hour, while 42 million earn less than $20 an hour. The minimum wage does not just impact workers at the very bottom of the wage distribution; it exerts upward pressure for low-wage workers in general. Minimum wage increases create “spillover effects,” where workers above the new minimum wage threshold also see wage increases as employers keep wage ladders and seniority consistent in their firms.

It is important to recognize that without leveraging policy tools like the minimum wage, the low-wage labor market gives employers excess power to set low wages. Workers have limited information about the wages and work policies at alternative employers and can be constrained in their job choices by limited transportation options or the need to maintain specific schedules for child care and other family needs. These economic “frictions” add up, providing leverage for employers to pay lower wages than is optimal for the economy. In short, the longstanding failure to increase the federal minimum wage suppresses worker pay, leaving low-wage workers worse off every year there is no increase.

Does raising the minimum wage lead to automation of low-wage jobs?

In brief: The minimum wage is not a primary cause of automation of low-wage work, but automation is changing the tasks and occupations of some low-wage workers.

In detail: Increasing the cost of low-wage labor can encourage businesses to invest in automation. This can lead to disruption for specific low-wage jobs, or changes in the roles in those occupations. Since we see that the minimum wage does not increase unemployment for low-wage workers (Question 1), the effects of automation on these low-wage jobs are either limited or counterbalanced by expanding employment in other occupations. Evidence suggests that while in recent years automation is taking over a growing number of routine tasks from low-wage workers, the minimum wage has a limited contribution in driving that adoption. Researchers with access to extensive data on McDonalds franchises nationwide found that, while the adoption of touch-screen ordering kiosks grew significantly between 2017 and 2019, there was no evidence that uptake was driven by minimum wage increases. So far, the overall employment impact of automation on low-wage workers has been insignificant, as reductions in occupations with high amounts of routine tasks have been replaced with greater demand for jobs with interpersonal tasks.

Technology is a tool, but the balance of labor market power determines who it helps. Automation has been a feature of our economy since the industrial revolution, boosting productivity in our economy. Technological change can disrupt employment for specific sectors or professions, but in aggregate the economy benefits. Workers benefit from these productivity increases when there are strong labor institutions like access to unions, a strong minimum wage, and policies that support full employment. When those institutions are weak, the gains from technological advancement are not shared widely and contribute to increased inequality.

Key takeaways:

• Misclassification of workers as independent contractors is a pervasive and widespread problem. AAPI workers are overrepresented in three of the 11 commonly misclassified occupations: manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides. Vietnamese, Bangladeshi, Filipino, Samoan, and other Pacific Islander workers are overrepresented within these occupations.
• Groups with lower median hourly wages also have larger shares of their working populations in the 11 commonly misclassified occupations.
• Federal protections against misclassification are limited and currently under attack by the Trump administration. The state and local landscape for curbing misclassification is varied, which leaves some workers less protected than others.

In March, EPI published updated research highlighting the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified occupations. Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers were overrepresented in three of those occupations—manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides—relative to their share of the overall workforce.

Most federal, state, and local labor laws apply only to employees and not to independent contractors, so misclassification strips workers of key protections such as minimum wage laws or qualifying for employer-provided health insurance and retirement benefits. Additionally, both misclassified workers and social insurance funds lose out on income: the report conservatively estimates that for the three jobs in which AAPI workers are overrepresented, misclassification costs workers at least $7,000 annually and costs social insurance programs $600 to $800 per worker each year.

With the understanding that the umbrella term “AAPI” encompasses an immensely diverse population both in ethnic origin but also in economic outcomes, this piece goes beyond the narrow view that all AAPI workers are high-wage earners. Below, we provide more detail on which groups of AAPI workers are most likely to be employed in lower-wage commonly misclassified occupations.

Disaggregated data shed light on particular AAPI communities that may be vulnerable to misclassification

Across all occupations, AAPI workers comprise approximately 8% of the total workforce. For three of the 11 occupations highlighted in the report—manicurists and pedicurists, home health aides, and personal care aides—AAPI workers make up 67%, 13%, and 10% of employment, respectively, according to Current Population Survey (CPS) data.

Table 1 provides a detailed breakdown of the composition of the AAPI workforce for the three occupations in which AAPI workers are overrepresented. Here, we use the American Community Survey (ACS) as it offers detailed race definitions which the CPS does not offer due to sample size restrictions.

Asian Indian and Chinese populations combined make up over 40% of the working-age AAPI population, thus their relatively large shares of the AAPI workforce in these occupations are not surprising. However, several groups are disproportionately represented across these occupations compared with their share of the overall AAPI workforce.

For example, Bangladeshi workers make up 5.1% of AAPI workers employed as home health aides while only constituting 1.1% of the total AAPI workforce. Chinese workers represent almost half (47.7%) of AAPI home health aides while representing just over one-fifth of the overall AAPI workforce (20.9%). AAPI employment among manicurists and pedicurists is largely held by those of Vietnamese origin (71.4%).

Finally, a majority of AAPI personal care aides are either Filipino (32.8%) or Chinese (20.8%). Filipino workers, however, are overrepresented by twice their share of the overall workforce. While Samoans and other Pacific Islanders comprised a much smaller share of personal care aide employment, they are also overrepresented in this occupation by more than twice their share of the overall workforce.

Table 1

Figure A provides a more comprehensive picture of the share of each detailed group employed across all 11 commonly misclassified occupations, revealing that smaller communities—often overlooked because of their size relative to the aggregate AAPI workforce—may be among the most vulnerable to misclassification. Workers belonging to seven of those groups are more likely than the average U.S. worker to be employed in one of those occupations. Almost 20% of Vietnamese workers are employed in one of those occupations, with over half concentrated as manicurists and pedicurists.

Samoan, Hawaiian, and other Pacific Islanders have the next highest shares working in the 11 occupations, making up 15% or more of their total working-age population. These groups also earn lower median hourly wages than the national median and the aggregate AAPI median hourly wage. Their disproportionate representation in commonly misclassified occupations further exposes these workers to wage suppression due to misclassification.

Misclassification enforcement varies by state—meaning different AAPI populations can be disproportionately impacted

Federal protections from misclassification are limited and are currently under attack by the Trump administration, which has proposed a rule to weaken standards to determine worker classification under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Protection Act. The proposed rule narrows the definition of who is a covered employee under these statutes, encouraging employer schemes to reclassify their employees as independent contractors to evade those obligations.

Broadly, the Trump administration has been actively dismantling long-standing federal worker protections, leaving states to bear the responsibility of ensuring workers are given rights and protections and that they can exercise them. For most states, labor and employment protections only apply to workers classified as employees, meaning workers misclassified as independent contractors are denied their legal rights and protections.

EPI’s 2026 misclassification report outlines state and federal policy recommendations that ensure proper enforcement mechanisms to curb misclassification. One of the recommendations includes implementing the ABC test. Unlike the six-part “economic reality” test or the “common law” test, the ABC test presumes that a worker is an employee unless they can demonstrate they are an independent contractor based on three criteria. Placing the onus on the employer to determine the employment status of a worker provides protections against misclassification and extends proper protections to workers. Many states have adopted the ABC test for unemployment insurance programs and, to a lesser extent, for wage and hour orders and other employment applications.

As shown in Figure B, The AAPI population is highly concentrated across a handful of states. Almost half of the prime-age working Asian population is concentrated in California, New York, and Texas, and a majority of the Pacific Islander population resides in California, Hawaii, and Washington. Overall, 21 states have significant numbers of AAPI residents, and some are home to large shares of specific AAPI communities. For example, the Hmong community in Minnesota and the Burmese community in Indiana are concentrated in states that have smaller total AAPI populations.

The current landscape for state policy protections against misclassification is quite varied. For example, among the states with the largest AAPI populations, California is the only state to adopt the ABC test for both unemployment insurance and employment law, although certain occupations are exempt from the test—including app-based drivers. California also institutes penalties for misclassifying a worker, which can include restitution payments and, if the misclassification was willful, a penalty between $5,000 to $25,000 per violation.

Texas, on the other hand, has significantly less state enforcement. Apart from using the common law test for its unemployment insurance program and providing a definition of an independent contractor for workers’ compensation, Texas mainly relies on federal law for classifying workers as employees. In the last 15 years, Texas lawmakers have introduced several bills that would create penalties for misclassifying workers in the construction industry, but all have stalled or failed.

Figure B

Comprehensive protections are needed to protect workers from misclassification

AAPI workers are facing multi-pronged attacks from the Trump administration through the degradation of federal protections for workers, immigration, and equity. Occupational segregation and other labor market disparities lead women, people of color, and immigrants to be disproportionately represented in occupations that are commonly misclassified. These factors—in addition to historical and current geopolitical relations that shape the flow of labor to the U.S., immigration and citizenship status, and English language proficiency—can contribute to the concentration of AAPI workers in these occupations. Disaggregated data further identify which specific AAPI communities are overrepresented, revealing that smaller, less economically secure groups are often most exposed to the costs of misclassification. Strong policies at the federal, state, and local levels are needed to combat misclassification and to ensure workers can exercise their rights.

Key takeaways:

• The federal minimum wage is at its lowest real value in 77 years. Frozen at $7.25 since 2009, the federal minimum wage has lost 30% of its purchasing power during this 17-year freeze.
• Setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage would raise pay for 39.6 million workers in 2030, about 1 in 4 of the wage-earning workforce.
• The policy would move the federal floor meaningfully toward one definition of a living wage, meeting EPI’s Family Budget Calculator thresholds in half of U.S. counties for a single adult working full time. But it falls short for many families, meaning that policies to strengthen unionization, provide a more robust safety net, and keep unemployment low remain essential.
• Decades of economic research support this two-thirds benchmark, finding little to no employment loss from ambitious minimum wage increases.
• Indexing the federal minimum wage to median wage growth would lock in these gains. Median wages typically outpace prices, so median wage indexing would prevent the kind of decades-long slide that has eroded the current floor.

Introduction

The federal minimum wage, frozen at $7.25 since 2009, is now at its lowest real value in 77 years and a major driver of the affordability crisis facing low-wage workers. For over a decade, the senior Democrats on the House and Senate’s labor committees have consistently introduced and championed the Raise the Wage Act, which would significantly raise the federal level (most recently, to $17 an hour in 2030) and index it to median wage growth going forward. But Congress as a whole has failed to take action on the legislation. In the absence of federal movement, states have moved on their own: Thanks in large part to the Fight for $15 campaign, 21 states and the District of Columbia, home to half of all U.S. wage earners, will have a minimum wage of at least $15 by 2028. But that patchwork still leaves 20 states—home to about 55 million workers—at $7.25, and updating the federal floor to a modern benchmark is the only way to reach these workers.

Raising the federal minimum wage to two-thirds of the national median wage would lift pay for nearly 40 million workers, about a quarter of the workforce. Two-thirds of the median—equivalent to roughly $17.70 today, a projected $20 in 2030, and a projected $25 in 2038—matches the benchmarks used in other high-income countries and tracks the direction of recent minimum wage research. Indexing to median wage growth thereafter would keep the floor from losing ground to inflation or falling behind the broader economy.

A federal minimum at two-thirds of the national median would eliminate poverty wages and move the floor meaningfully toward a living wage in much of the country: A single adult working full time could cover modest expenses in half of U.S. counties under EPI’s Family Budget Calculator thresholds. Maintaining the two-thirds minimum-to-median ratio would lock in those gains, improving affordability for U.S. workers and their families. It would also durably narrow the gap between low-wage workers and the typical worker, with Black workers and women seeing the largest benefits.

The two-thirds benchmark is also well-supported by economic research. Decades of studies of state and federal minimum wages find that higher floors raise pay for low-wage workers with little to no effect on employment, and a smaller but growing body of work on minimum wages approaching two-thirds of the median reaches the same conclusion. Setting the federal floor at two-thirds of the median, and updating it annually, would raise incomes at the bottom and prevent the kind of decades-long slide that has left the current minimum at its lowest real value in 77 years.

The outdated federal minimum wage and extent of low pay

The federal minimum wage is now at its lowest real value in 77 years. Stuck at $7.25 since 2009, it is in its longest stretch without an increase since the federal wage floor was established in 1938 (Figure A). Inflation has eroded 30% of its purchasing power over those 17 years, gradually cutting real pay for the lowest-wage workers in states still tied to the federal floor. Simply indexing the 2009 wage to inflation, a far weaker standard than this report proposes, would put the federal minimum at about $10.60 today.

The minimum wage was once meaningfully higher in real terms. Civil rights organizers in the late 1960s pressed Congress not only to raise the wage floor but also to extend its coverage to service industries that had previously been excluded because they disproportionately employed Black workers. By 1968, the federal minimum wage reached $1.60 per hour, equivalent to $12.62 in 2026 dollars and roughly 61% of the national median wage at the time, close to the two-thirds benchmark this report proposes. Even a federal minimum wage of $12.62 today would raise the wages of about 12 million workers.

Because Congress has not raised the federal floor in 17 years, states and localities have moved on their own. Thirty states, the District of Columbia, and dozens of cities and counties have raised their minimum wages, many in response to the Fight for $15 campaign (EPI 2026a). By the end of 2028, more than half of the U.S. workforce, about 74 million workers, will live in a state with a minimum wage of at least $15.

The state-by-state patchwork has delivered real successes but also left tens of millions of workers behind. Roughly 55 million people work in the 20 states still tied to the $7.25 federal floor, and they are nearly twice as likely as workers elsewhere to earn less than $15 per hour. Nationally, almost no one is paid exactly $7.25 anymore: The floor is so low it rarely binds. Yet 14 million workers, about 9% of the workforce, still earn less than $15. Closing that gap and preventing the federal floor from eroding further requires a national standard pegged to a modern benchmark.

A new standard: Two-thirds of the median wage

The federal minimum wage suffers from two related deficiencies: Its level is too low, and it does not adjust as the economy grows. Both can be solved by tying the federal minimum to two-thirds of the national median wage. Congress would first raise the floor to that level, and each subsequent year the minimum would adjust to maintain the same ratio.

First, the new benchmark replaces a poverty-level federal floor (Hickey and Cid-Martinez 2025) with one that pushes the minimum wage toward a living wage. As Oakford (2026) argues, two-thirds of the median is “a realistic stepping stone to living wages,” and standards below that ratio leave too large a gap between earnings and the cost of necessary expenses. A federal minimum at two-thirds of the median also better fulfills the original promise of the federal standard, which Congress described in 1937 as protecting “this Nation from the evils and dangers resulting from wages too low to buy the bare necessities of life” (U.S. Congress 1937).

Second, maintaining the two-thirds ratio guarantees automatic increases as the economy grows, ending the recurring erosion that comes from a frozen federal floor. Because median wages typically outpace prices, median wage indexing produces real gains, not just inflation protection. In 2025, two-thirds of the national median wage was $17.11 per hour (Figure B), and today, it is estimated to be $17.70. By 2030, applying Congressional Budget Office (2026) Employment Cost Index projections, it would reach $20.02. A federal minimum tied to two-thirds of the median would likely reach or exceed $25 by 2038, four years sooner than if a $17.11 wage in 2025 had been indexed only to the cost of living going forward.1

Nineteen states and the District of Columbia index their minimum wages to inflation, but Connecticut goes further by indexing to average wage growth and capturing the real gains that wage growth typically delivers above prices. Congress should follow Connecticut’s lead and link the federal minimum to the national median wage. Of course, indexing to price inflation would be an enormous improvement to current federal minimum wage policy and to state and local minimum wage policies that have also failed to implement automatic increases. Tying the minimum wage to median wages—i.e., indexing the minimum to typical workers’ wage growth—would yield even larger increases over time.

Tying the federal minimum to two-thirds of the median would also durably narrow inequality in the bottom half of the wage distribution. Whenever the minimum wage fails to keep pace with economy-wide wage growth, the gap between low and median earners widens. But a substantial increase in the minimum to a fixed ratio of the median shrinks and bounds that gap by construction. The gains disproportionately affect Black workers and women, who are overrepresented in low-wage jobs due to persistent racism and sexism (Banks 2019). Minimum wages are a major determinant of Black-white wage gaps (Derenoncourt and Montialoux 2020; Wursten and Reich 2023), and the long erosion of the federal minimum was a leading driver of widening pay inequality among women (Autor, Manning, and Smith 2016).

The state of minimum wage research and new policies

Minimum wages and job losses

A federal benchmark of two-thirds of the national median would significantly raise wages, and recent research strongly supports the conclusion that ambitious minimum wage targets work as intended, with little to no employment downsides. Across more than three decades of modern economic research, the median estimated employment effect is small; among studies that look at all low-wage workers rather than narrow subgroups, the effect is essentially zero (Zipperer 2024). The recurring scare stories about job losses are not borne out by the body of evidence.

Businesses adjust to higher minimum wages through what Dube (2026b) and Bernstein (2013) call the “Three P’s”: productivity, prices, and profits.2 Take productivity first. Higher wages reduce the rate at which workers quit, particularly in high-turnover sectors like restaurants and retail. That lowers hiring and training costs and means employment levels can hold steady even as new hiring slows. Better-paid workers, and workers with longer tenure, are also typically more productive, further offsetting the cost of the wage increase.

The minimum wage also redistributes income to low-wage workers when employers cover higher labor costs through reduced profits or modestly higher prices. Vergara (2026) and Coviello, Deserranno, and Persico (2022) both find that minimum wage increases shrink profits in low-wage industries. Price pass-through is small in aggregate terms because low-wage workers’ earnings are only a fraction of total labor costs, which are themselves a fraction of total business expenses. California’s $4 overnight increase in the fast-food minimum generated a one-time increase in fast-food prices of 2.1% to 3.6% (Sosinskiy and Reich 2026; Clemens et al. 2026). To put that in context: The price of a $6.00 hamburger would have risen to about $6.17.

How high is too high?

A common way to measure the level of a given minimum wage is to use the minimum-to-median wage ratio. Sometimes called the Kaitz index, the minimum-to-median wage ratio compares the minimum with the underlying distribution of wages by measuring the share of the typical wage that the floor reaches. This report proposes setting that ratio at about 67%. Most of the U.S. evidence base reflects periods when the ratio sat well below that level, because until recently, U.S. minimum wages were rarely considered high by today’s standards. But a growing body of recent research, together with recent state and local policies, has pushed the evidence into higher ratios—and the results are the same: There is substantial room for higher minimums without large employment losses.

Cengiz et al. (2019) found no negative employment effects at minimum-to-median ratios up to 59%. Dube and Lindner (2021), studying city-level minimum wages with ratios averaging 58% to 64%, found small and statistically insignificant effects. Godoy and Reich (2022) found no employment effect across localities with ratios ranging from 56% to 82%. And the 1968 federal minimum, which reached roughly 61% of the median,3 has been reexamined in two recent studies that likewise found small or no employment effects (Bailey, DiNardo, and Stuart 2021; Derenoncourt and Montialoux 2021).

The most direct evidence that the floor can go meaningfully higher comes from California’s $20 fast-food minimum wage. In April 2024, the state raised the wage for fast-food chain workers from $16 to $20, pushing the ratio of that minimum to the state’s median wage to about 74%, well above most U.S. precedents.4 One might worry that customers would substitute toward lower-priced independent restaurants exempt from the policy, generating job losses at the chains. The actual evidence shows otherwise. Despite the large wage increase, research finds little to no employment effect of the policy (Bivens and Zipperer 2026), and the median employment effect in Dube (2026a) is essentially zero. Evaluations of the UK minimum wage through 2019, when it reached nearly 60% of the median wage, also find small, statistically insignificant effects on the employment of low-wage workers (Giupponi et al. 2024).

A federal benchmark set at two-thirds of the national median will push some states above two-thirds of their own median wage. There is good reason to be optimistic about employment changes there as well. The studies above already span a wide range of Kaitz ratios, from the high 50s through the low 80s, and consistently find little or no employment effect. California’s $20 fast-food minimum extends this evidence to a 74% state-level ratio with essentially no employment losses, and only five states would have a minimum-to-median wage ratio above that threshold under the proposed federal benchmark. And while the minimum wage would be at a higher level relative to the state median in those states, it would still be less than a “living wage” for many families in those areas, as I discuss later.

Even if some employment loss does occur, that is not the right test of policy success. Low-wage labor markets are dominated by job-to-job churn, so reduced employment in response to a higher minimum typically shows up as longer gaps between jobs rather than workers permanently shut out of the labor market (Cooper, Mishel, and Zipperer 2018). On net, low-wage workers come out ahead in annual earnings when significantly higher hourly pay more than offsets a modest increase in unemployment.

Policymakers and organizers campaigning for minimum wage increases have considerable room to maneuver above the current federal floor before needing to worry about job losses. To assuage concerns about employment impacts, a federal proposal could be structured to limit annual increases of the federal minimum wage so that they never exceed two-thirds of the national median wage. States and localities, of course, can and should continue to push for higher minimum wages, as many will have higher median wages and costs of living than the national average.

Existing proposals and policies reaching two-thirds of the median

Some recent federal proposals already target or are consistent with the two-thirds benchmark. The recent Give America a Raise Act would raise the federal minimum to $20 by 2029, close to this report’s projection of two-thirds of the 2029 median wage ($19.44). The Living Wage for All Act names the two-thirds benchmark explicitly and locks in indexation in statute: “once the minimum wage equals two-thirds of the national median hourly wage, it shall thereafter be automatically adjusted each year to maintain that ratio.” The Bold Economic Program for America (Reich 2026) likewise proposes $20 by 2030, and Oakford (2026) embeds the two-thirds target in a broader portfolio that includes just cause protections and stronger wage theft enforcement.

The benchmark also aligns U.S. policy with international practice. The UK Low Pay Commission has targeted two-thirds of the median for the National Living Wage since 2024, and in the EU, 17 of 22 countries benchmark their statutory minimum wages to a ratio of the median or average wage. The 2022 European Union Minimum Wage Directive obligates member states to use “indicative reference values”—such as 60% of the gross median wage—to assess adequacy of their wage standards (Luebker and Schulten 2026).

Some of these international benchmarks may look numerically lower than two-thirds, but they are usually defined against a different denominator. Germany, for instance, benchmarks against the median wage of full-time workers. In the United States, the full-time median is about 10% higher than the overall median, so 60% of the full-time median is roughly equivalent to two-thirds of the overall median that this report proposes.

Implementing a minimum wage equal to two-thirds of the median wage

Any federal legislation will need a phase-in period, but it must specify two things: a clear path to the target and an explicit guarantee that automatic median wage indexing kicks in once the floor reaches two-thirds of the median.

Implementing the benchmark also requires choosing a wage source. Legislation should designate the Department of Labor (DOL)—which already publishes median wage estimates through the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS)—to publish the official median wage each year. DOL has two ready sources: OEWS, an establishment survey, and the Current Population Survey (CPS), the household survey already used to produce the unemployment rate, which collects detailed wage and hours data.

Each source has tradeoffs. The CPS is timelier, with wage data available at a one- to two-month lag, but smaller samples, the difficulty of computing hourly earnings for salaried workers, and respondents’ tendency to round wages all introduce noise. OEWS uses an established BLS hourly wage methodology and median wage calculation that may be less volatile, but it is published with a one-year lag and pools data from earlier, lower-wage years. DOL could pick one source or use a weighted average; recent data show only about a $1 difference between the two surveys.5 Either way, expanding resources at BLS and the Census Bureau would strengthen the underlying data and support further refinements to the methodology.

Once DOL has a baseline median, indexing requires projecting that median forward to the year the new minimum takes effect. The UK Low Pay Commission, which recommends a two-thirds median target to the UK government, offers a useful template: It estimates a midyear median wage by combining lagged historical data with timely indicators and short-run forecasts (Low Pay Commission 2024). A concrete schedule illustrates the approach. To set the minimum for January 1, 2030, DOL would announce the new wage on July 1, 2029, six months in advance, based on its best projection of the July 2030 median, the midyear point representative of the median wage workers will face on average throughout 2030. The projection would proceed in three steps: compute the 2028 median from CPS or OEWS data; roll it forward to early-to-mid-2029 using a combination of available data—like the Current Employment Statistics, the Consumer Price Index, and the Employment Cost Index (ECI); and then roll it forward one more year using short-run wage projections like those in the CBO Budget and Economic Outlook (2026).

National and state effects of a federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the median

To estimate the economic benefits of a federal minimum wage set at two-thirds of the median wage, I model how many low-wage workers would see higher pay under this policy. I assume the policy is phased in over five years, so that if it went into effect today, the federal minimum would reach two-thirds of the median in 2030 and then automatically adjust each year to maintain that ratio.

Concretely, I assume the federal minimum rises to $12 immediately in 2026 and then increases incrementally to $20 in 2030, which is about two-thirds of the projected national median wage.6 Legislation should build in a path adjustment if 2030 median wages come in higher or lower than projected.

I focus on the effects in 2030. I assume the same phase-in path and automatic indexing applies to the federal tipped minimum wage, which has been frozen at $2.13 per hour since 1991.7 Wages elsewhere are assumed to grow in line with CBO ECI projections from 2026 to 2030, and the model incorporates the effects of scheduled state-level minimum wage increases (see the appendix for details).

In 2030, a federal minimum wage equal to two-thirds of the national median would raise pay for 39.6 million workers, about 1 in 4 of the wage-earning workforce (Table 1).8 Annual earnings would rise substantially, and the gains would be largest for Black workers: A full-time, full-year Black worker affected by the increase would earn about $5,000 more per year, compared with $4,400 for all affected workers. In line with other minimum wage increases, women would gain more than men, with 31% of women seeing higher pay compared with 23% of men.

Adults ages 20 and over would make up 9 in 10 affected workers (teens would have the largest share of affected workers of any age group, but they make up a small share of total employment). The problem of low pay is far from limited to the youngest workers.

Although several states with scheduled minimum wage increases will see the gap between their minimum wage and the new federal floor shrink, workers in every state would still be affected (Figure C). With the exception of D.C., no state’s scheduled 2030 minimum wage reaches $20. The largest gains go to workers in the 20 states still tied to $7.25: 1 in 3 (33%) would see a raise, and annual pay for those affected would rise by about $6,200 on a full-time, full-year basis.

Figure C

Beyond who gets a raise and how much, a related question is whether the raise is enough to cover a family’s basic costs. Setting a target of two-thirds of the median would push the federal floor much closer to a living wage for many families. What counts as a living wage varies across the country, depending on local costs and on family size and composition. EPI’s Family Budget Calculator thresholds make this concrete: They calculate the income a given family type needs in a given place to afford a “modest but adequate” standard of living. For example, in 2025 a two-adult, one-child family in Los Angeles County, California, needed about $118,000 in annual pretax earnings to pay for housing, food, child care, transportation, health care, taxes, and other necessities. In more rural Early County, Georgia, a similar family needed about $74,000. These budgets are minimal by design, with no allowance for savings, emergencies, retirement, college, or entertainment.

Of course, other business income and government provided social benefits can lower the amount of labor market earnings a family needs to maintain the same standard of living. Gould, Mokhiber, and deCourcy (2024) report that, according to Congressional Budget Office data, about 81% of a middle-income family’s budget is met by labor market income.

Applying that 81% adjustment to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator thresholds gives a more useful benchmark for what wages need to deliver. Under this adjusted measure, the Los Angeles County family would have needed about $96,000 in earnings to meet their 2025 budget, equivalent to both adults working full time, year round at about $23 per hour. The Early County family would have needed about $60,000, equivalent to both adults working full time, year round at $15 per hour.

The implications for everyday affordability are significant. After inflating these adjusted thresholds to 2030 dollars using CBO Consumer Price Index projections, a federal minimum at two-thirds of the median substantially closes the gap between full-time annual earnings and necessary expenses for low-wage workers and their families. A single adult working full time at the 2030 minimum of $20 would cover modest but adequate expenses in half of U.S. counties. Two full-time working parents with two children would meet their family budget in roughly a quarter of U.S. counties. Using similar thresholds, Oakford (2026) finds that a federal minimum at two-thirds of the national median in 2025 would be “90% to 99% of the median living wage of a single adult without children in 16 states.”

A federal minimum tied to two-thirds of the national median would therefore make enormous progress in increasing affordability and helping families make ends meet. Closing the remaining gaps will require a broader set of policies, including strengthening other labor standards like overtime protections and their enforcement, a more robust safety net, expanded public goods like universal health insurance, fewer barriers to unionization, and a renewed commitment to full employment.

Conclusion

The federal minimum wage is at its lowest real value in 77 years, and tens of millions of low-wage workers are paying for that erosion every paycheck. Pegging the federal floor to two-thirds of the national median wage, and maintaining that ratio, would correct the two flaws that have left the floor unfit for purpose: a level too low to function as a meaningful wage standard and a structure that does not adjust as the economy grows.

A federal minimum at two-thirds of the median would raise pay for nearly 40 million workers in 2030, deliver the largest gains to Black workers and to women, and bring the floor close to a living wage in much of the country. Decades of research, recent state and local experience, and California’s $20 fast-food minimum all point to the same conclusion: The labor market can absorb minimum wages of this size with little to no employment cost. The benchmark also brings U.S. policy into line with the UK and most of the EU, where two-thirds-style targets are now standard practice.

A higher floor cannot, on its own, guarantee economic security for working people. That will require a broader agenda: a stronger safety net, expanded public goods, fewer barriers to unionization, and a renewed commitment to full employment. But updating the federal minimum to a modern, indexed benchmark is the single most direct step Congress can take to raise wages at the bottom, and the only step that reaches the 55 million workers in the 20 states still stuck at $7.25.

Appendix

State benefits

Methodology

Underlying wages are based on the 2025 Current Population Survey and between 2025 and 2030. I assume wages increase at the rate of CBO (2026a) ECI projections and because of future state-level minimum wages. Due to the Trump administration’s immigration policies and the possibility of continued labor market weakening, how the baseline level of employment grows over the next five years is very uncertain. For simplicity, I hold the estimated employment level constant between 2025 and 2030 instead of making additional assumptions about either employment rates or population growth. In terms of total population growth, this assumption may not be too far off the mark of current projections; CBO (2026b), for example, estimates that between 2025 and 2030, the civilian population ages 16 to 64 will only grow by 0.06%, or 130,000 people.

Affected workers include those “directly” affected, whose wages would otherwise be less than the new federal minimum wage, as well as “indirectly” affected workers who earn up to 115% of the new minimum (Cooper, Mokhiber, and Zipperer 2019). These particular estimates may overstate the number of workers affected because while they incorporate already scheduled state-level increases, they exclude city-level minimum wage increases, and some cities will have higher than $20 minimum wage standards in 2030. On the other hand, if the labor market continues to weaken, low-wage workers will, in the absence of minimum wages, face slower than usual wage growth because their wage growth slows disproportionately when unemployment is higher (Bivens and Zipperer 2018).

Notes

1. These projections follow CBO ECI and CPI projections from 2025–2036, and for subsequent years assume 2026–2035 annual growth rates of 2.26% for CPI and 2.94% for ECI. 

2. For additional discussion, see Dube and Lindner (2025), Schmitt (2013), and Zipperer (2023).

3. OECD (2026) estimated the U.S. minimum-to-median wage for full-time workers was 55.05% in 1968. Assuming a 10% premium for the full-time median wage relative to the overall median wage results in a minimum-to-median wage ratio of 60.56%.

4. In April 2024, the state raised the wage for fast-food chain workers from $16 to $20, pushing the ratio of that minimum to the state’s median wage to about 74%, well above most U.S. precedents.

5. The 2024 OEWS national median wage (which is the latest available data) was $23.80 (BLS 2025). The EPI State of Working America Data Library (EPI 2026b), which uses CPS wage data and which we use for wage levels throughout this paper, reports a 2024 median wage of $24.87.

6. The exact schedule simulated below is $12 in 2026, $13.50 in 2027, $15.50 in 2028, $17.50 in 2029, and $20 in 2030.

7. Ideally other subminimum wages would be phased out, including those for some workers with disabilities and youth workers. I do not model the effects of those changes due to data constraints.

8. I concentrate on the effects in 2030. Were low-wage workers’ wages to grow slower (or faster) than median wages, these estimates would understate (or overstate) the effects in later years.

References

Banks, Nina. 2019. “Black Women’s Labor Market History Reveals Deep-Seated Race and Gender Discrimination.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), February 19, 2019.

Bernstein, Jared. 2013. “If Increasing the Minimum Wage Doesn’t Cost Jobs, How Does It Get Absorbed?” Huffington Post, August 14, 2013.

Bivens, Josh, and Ben Zipperer. 2018. The Importance of Locking in Full Employment for the Long Haul. Economic Policy Institute, August 2018.

Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2025. “Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) Tables, May 2024” [Excel file], Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics. Accessed May 13, 2026. 

Clemens, Jeffrey, Olivia Eduwards, Jonathan Meer, and Joshua D. Nguyen. 2026. “The Effects of Calfornia’s $20 Fast Food Minimum Wage on Prices.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 34990, March 2026.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2026a. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036. February 11, 2026.

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 2026b. The Demographic Outlook: 2026 to 2056. January 7, 2026.

Cooper, David, Zane Mokhiber, and Ben Zipperer. 2019. Minimum Wage Simulation Model Technical Methodology. Economic Policy Institute, February 2019. 

Coviello, Decio, Erika Deserranno, and Nicola Persico. 2022. “Minimum Wage and Individual Worker Productivity: Evidence from a Large US Retailer.” Journal of Political Economy 130, no. 9: 2315–2360.

Derenoncourt, Ellora, and Claire Montialoux. 2021. “Minimum Wages and Racial Inequality.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 136, no. 1 (February): 169–228.

Dube, Arindrajit. 2026a. “Labor Market Effects of California’s $20 Fast-Food Minimum Wage.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 35171, May 2026.

Dube, Arindrajit. 2026b. The Wage Standard: What’s Wrong in the Labor Market and How to Fix It. New York: Penguin Random House.

Dube, Arindrajit, and Attila S. Lindner. 2024. “Minimum Wages in the 21st Century.” In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 5, edited by Christian Dustmann and Thomas Lemieux. 

Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Minimum Wage Tracker. Accessed May 5, 2026.

Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. State of Working America Data Library. Accessed May 5, 2026. 

Giupponi, Giulia, Robert Joyce, Attila Lindner, Tom Waters, Thomas Wernham, and Xiaowei Xu. 2024. “The Employment and Distributional Impacts of Nationwide Minimum Wage Changes.” Journal of Labor Economics 42, no. S1: S293–S333.

Hickey, Sebastian, and Ismael Cid-Martinez. 2025. “The Federal Minimum Wage is Officially a Poverty Wage in 2025.” Working Economics Blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 28, 2025.

Low Pay Commission. 2024. “What Will the Minimum Wage Be Next Year?” (blog post). April 19, 2024.

Oakford, Patrick. 2026. Federal Employment Standards as the Foundation of Economic Security: Revisiting Minimum Wage, Just Cause, and Tools to Combat Wage Theft. Roosevelt Institute, May 2026.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 2026. OECD Data Explorer. Accessed May 5, 2026.

Reich, Michael. 2026. The Unexpected Effects of a $20 Federal Minimum Wage. Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics, February 2026.

Reich, Michael, and Denis Sosinskiy. 2026. “Effects of a $20 Minimum Wage: Evidence from Granular Data on Wages, Employment, and Prices.” Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Working Paper, April 1, 2026.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Education and Labor. 1937. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937. S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

Wursten, Jesse, and Michael Reich. 2023. “Racial Inequality in Frictional Labor Markets: Evidence from Minimum Wages.” Labour Economics 82, 102344.

Key takeaways:

• Affordability is not just about prices; it’s the outcome of a race between income growth and price inflation. When income growth is slower than price inflation, affordability worsens. When income growth is faster, affordability improves.
• Focusing just on prices is bad for understanding how the economy works and how it has performed in the recent past, and it leads to an overly restrictive policy menu for improving families’ affordability.
• Policy can more reliably address income growth for typical families. This growth has been stunted for decades by the rise of inequality. Closing this gap by ensuring more equitable distribution of future growth is the strongest tool we have for improving affordability.

Affordability has been the policy buzzword of recent years. Much of the affordability discourse—both among policymakers and the public—has focused near-exclusively on prices as the big affordability problem. But affordability is not a problem of high prices, instead it’s the outcome of a race between incomes and prices. And the reason typical families have faced an affordability crunch in recent decades is not because prices have grown exceptionally fast, it’s because incomes for the vast majority have grown too slowly. This income growth has been suppressed mostly by rising inequality that has put a growing wedge between overall economic growth and the income growth of typical families.

Getting the drivers of affordability right is important—it’s not just quibbling. If you only examine price growth and try to infer what has happened to affordability over periods of economic history, you’ll usually get the story wrong. And if policymakers only look at how to change the trajectory of prices while ignoring what they can do to change the trajectory of incomes, they will be far less effective in providing useful relief to U.S. families. There are far more ways to use policy to raise incomes in a targeted and effective way than there are to suppress price growth.

Below, we provide some more background on why analyses of affordability need to include incomes, why policymakers have much more scope to raise incomes in a useful way as opposed to pushing down prices, and why focusing just on prices can obscure whether affordability has improved or worsened.

Why do prices dominate today’s affordability debates?

In modern capitalist economies, prices rise essentially every year (though at quite different rates), but so do incomes. Determining what has happened to families’ ability to afford a decent and secure life requires looking at measures that take into account both sides of the affordability equation, such as real (inflation-adjusted) income growth. Nobody really disputes this. After all, Americans could buy a new car for $600 in the 1930s, but nobody thinks society was generally richer back then.

The narrow focus on prices in assessing one’s own economic struggles likely stems from several factors.

First, inflation was very fast in the early 2020s. Americans hadn’t experienced inflation rates that high in decades, and they didn’t like them, so prices remain front of mind for many.

Second, it is true that price changes can dominate what happens to real incomes over very short time periods (say a year or less). This recognition is why we can be so sure that the oil price shock inflicted by the U.S. bombing of Iran is going to be so damaging to U.S. families. The rise in oil prices so far this year has likely baked in at least a 1.5% increase in inflation over the next 6–12 months. In 2025, real wage growth for the large majority of workers was slower than 1.5% (which was the outcome of roughly 4% nominal wage growth minus 2.5% inflation). Given this, a sharp and unexpected 1.5% jump in prices will likely erase any prospective real wage gains for workers in 2026.

Finally, it has been noted that many Americans see wage gains as something they accomplished themselves through hard work, while prices are out of their immediate control. Inflation is hence seen as damage done to them and something they need relief from. But this is mostly wrong—policy choices impact wage growth at least as much as inflation, and the most effective policy relief for living standards will come through measures that raise wages, not restrain prices.

Policy can target incomes more effectively and precisely than prices

One person’s income is another person’s cost, which means prices are a bundle of different stakeholders’ incomes. The bill you pay at the grocery store must cover payments the store makes to its shareholders, the salary of the CEO and managers, the wages of cashiers, and the cost of buying food from producers. We don’t want all these incomes to be forced down. Given extreme levels of inequality in the U.S., we would likely be fine with lower CEO pay and payments to shareholders, but we would want wages of cashiers and many in the food production supply chain to rise. Efforts to simply clamp down on this price will have uncertain effects on incomes.

In the jargon of economists, focusing on prices is sector-based policy but to genuinely improve affordability we need factor-based policies, where factors of production like capital, rank-and-file workers, and corporate management can be specifically targeted by policies that aim to raise or restrain their incomes.

Fortunately, there are many good policy options for targeted affordability policy specifically toward low- and middle-income families. Incomes for these families—and for anybody without dynastic wealth—are dominated by wages and public benefits. We talk about each of these in turn below.

Boosting public benefits is affordability policy

Public benefits are entirely under policymakers’ control. If policymakers really cared about the affordability of groceries or health care or energy, they could boost benefits for food stamps, Medicaid, and the low-income heating energy assistance program. These programs currently deliver needed assistance to tens of millions of families to make life more affordable—and they do this with vanishingly small administrative costs, meaning they are highly efficient. Yet all of these programs are slated for steep cuts in the coming decade due to the Republican tax and spending megabill passed in 2025. This bill will inflict large damage to the most vulnerable families’ ability to afford decent and secure lives.

Further, Congress and the Trump administration chose to not extend the Biden administration’s more-generous subsidies for people to buy health insurance through the marketplace exchanges of the Affordable Care Act. The failure to extend these subsidies—even after a full federal government shutdown engineered by congressional Democrats aimed at prioritizing this issue—means that average out-of-pocket costs will double for those buying insurance in the exchanges.

Besides just reversing these cuts, making the U.S. welfare state more robust could also greatly boost the affordability of a decent life. Things like making health coverage more universal with lower out-of-pocket costs, reforming unemployment insurance to make it more protective, and providing all families with children a generous universal child allowance could dramatically improve affordability.

Policy can boost affordability through higher wages as well

The link between policy changes and wage growth is slightly less direct than for public benefits, but it remains very strong. Capitalist labor markets are inherently tilted toward employers and against workers. The only periods of history that have seen strong and equal rates of wage growth across the workforce have been periods where policy supported institutions that boosted workers’ leverage with employers.

The 30 years after World War II saw the creation of policies and institutions that successfully spread the gains from rising productivity equitably among workers up and down the wage distribution, with low- and middle-wage workers seeing growth rates as fast as high-wage workers. This equitable distribution of wage growth was a crucial way that income growth more broadly was kept equitable in this period.

Since 1979, however, these institutions have been steadily attacked and weakened with no new institutions being stood up to take their place in ensuring an equitable distribution of economic growth. The result has been that wages and incomes of typical families have lagged far behind average income and wage growth (or productivity). The wedge between income growth experienced by the vast majority of families and average growth is simply income being generated in the economy that is not helping typical families’ affordability struggles. Instead, it is income being funneled reliably away to the top.

There’s no reason that the institutions that equalized wage growth cannot be built back up and modernized.

The federal minimum wage is the most obvious policy institution for raising wages at the low end of the labor market. Raising the federal minimum wage from its current shamefully low $7.25 would directly boost affordability for tens of millions of workers. In the middle of the wage distribution, unions have proven to be the institution that has historically counteracted employer power and given typical workers increased leverage. However, unions are in a far weaker position today relative to their high points because of intentional policy choices—specifically because policymakers failed to act to curb employers’ growing hostility (and often their illegal activities) toward union organizing. If stronger policy boosted union density, unions would raise wages for both members and non-members alike.

Low- and middle-wage workers also benefit enormously from a determined effort to keep unemployment low for extended periods of time. In recent decades, policymakers have tolerated excess unemployment to keep inflation in check, but this is far too costly a strategy to keep potential inflation in check. Besides locking out millions of willing workers from job opportunities, long periods of excess unemployment were periods when real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth became literally stagnant.

Policymakers often seem skeptical of the effectiveness of these wage-boosting policies, arguing that the effects are too indirect and will take too long to provide benefits to workers. It’s true that efforts to boost unionization and sustain full employment will take some time to push up wages. But they will do this reliably. Further, many policies advanced in the name of reducing prices would also take a long time to come to fruition. For example, calls to tighten antitrust restrictions against corporate mergers and to break up established monopolies often have lots of merit. However, they are not policies that happen instantly and have purely predictable effects.

Focusing too hard on prices can obscure when affordability is actually improving

Finally, one key reason to broaden the affordability debate beyond prices is simply to make sure the public and policymakers can correctly identify periods of improvement or degradation of affordability. As an example of how focusing only on prices can lead to an incorrect diagnosis of affordability trends, take the example of two five-year stretches in recent economic history, both measured from a business cycle peak and going five years forward from there: In the years between 2007 and 2012, annual inflation averaged 1.8% and peaked at 5.5%, while between 2019 and 2024, inflation averaged 4.2% and peaked at 9%. Based on price growth alone, one would expect affordability to have eroded more rapidly in that second period, and indeed the popular narrative is that the early 2020s inflation was particularly destructive for affordability.

But between 2007 and 2012, the nation’s unemployment rate averaged 8.3%, while it averaged less than 5% between 2019 and 2024. After 2007, it took 93 months to re-attain the pre-recession unemployment rate, while it took just 29 months after the 2019 business cycle peak. In short, the labor market was far stronger in the second period.

And when it comes to real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth, the second period—largely because of its lower unemployment—saw far better outcomes than the first. In the 2019–2024 period, inflation-adjusted wages for low-wage workers (those at the 10th percentile) and the median worker rose by a cumulative 15.3% and 5.8%, respectively. In short, contrary to most conventional wisdom, affordability improved in this time. Between 2007 and 2012, real wages outright fell for both low-wage and median workers. Even with very slow inflation, affordability was demonstrably worse in that earlier period.

Figure A

More recently, inflation averaged slightly lower in 2025 (2.5%) than 2024 (2.9%). Yet for many workers—and particularly low-wage workers—2025 saw weaker (or even negative) real wage growth. This is largely due to some slight cooling in the labor market as unemployment rose from 4.0% to 4.4% over the course of 2025. Hence, even as inflation decelerated, the cooling labor market led to an even faster deceleration in nominal wages, which meant that affordability worsened for many workers.

Figure B

Reducing inequality is the key to improving affordability

Because many policymakers believe that affordability concerns are a new problem caused by inflation of recent years, they are now on a frenzied search for new and creative solutions to this price problem. But because the real affordability problem for U.S. families did not emerge in the past few years (remember, affordability was improving in the five years before 2025) and because the genuine long-run problem of affordability was about the inequality of income and wage growth, not excess inflation, most of these new and creative solutions just won’t hit the mark.

It’s understandable why many policymakers seem frustrated with being reminded of the long-diagnosed problem of inequality and the proven remedies—such as sustained full employment, higher wage standards like minimum wages, protecting workers’ fundamental rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, and a more robust welfare state.

Some, of course, just don’t believe in some of these solutions, while many who do would argue that these proven remedies are politically unrealistic in the current moment. But because the real affordability problem is an inequality problem that requires those at the top of the income and wealth scales having to accept less growth going forward (less than the stratospheric gains they’ve gotten used to, it should be said), any genuine solution is going to seem impossible in today’s political system that is dominated by the wealthiest families and corporations. Any policy—whether old and well-tested or new and creative—that actually aims to redistribute income, wealth, and power away from where it sits today will face a wall of opposition that must be politically overcome one way or the other. There’s no “one weird trick” where you can develop a policy creative and neat enough that it will somehow fool the rich and powerful about what its end result will be. And if the end result of the new and creative policy does not threaten the prerogatives of the rich, it’s not a real solution.

Today’s affordability concerns are indeed rooted in objective facts about the material circumstances of middle- and working-class families in the United States. Precisely because of this, they deserve more serious analysis and policy responses than they have been getting. This means focusing more on incomes than prices, and it means being clear-eyed that it has been the upward redistribution of income to the top—abetted by policy decisions—that is the drag on typical families’ affordability. Until solutions address that, they’re mostly just noise.

Daniel Navarrete, Director
Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation
Wage and Hour Division
U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502
200 Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20210

Comments on RIN 1235-AA46: Employee or Independent Contractor Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act

Dear Director Navarrete:

We submit these comments from the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) on the Department of Labor’s (“Department” or “DOL”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) regarding the standard for determining who is an employee and who is an independent contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”).

The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.

We strongly oppose the Department’s rule as proposed. We urge the Department to withdraw this rule and instead allow the long-standing test for determining employee status under the FLSA to stand.

EPI has conducted extensive research and analysis over the years on the harms of worker misclassification. As we have outlined, workers classified as independent contractors have no right to earn the federal minimum wage, or to earn overtime pay. They lose eligibility for unemployment insurance if they lose their work, and to workers’ compensation if they are injured on the job. They are less likely to receive employer-provided job benefits, such as health insurance and retirement benefits. They lose the right to paid sick or family leave in states and localities that extend those rights, and they would lose the right to even unpaid, but job-protected, family and medical leave under FMLA. Workers classified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.

We attach here an April 2026 EPI report1 estimating the concrete economic costs of misclassification for 11 commonly misclassified types of jobs, among those most likely to be negatively affected by this rule. These include lower-wage, labor intensive jobs such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers. Workers in these and other occupations stand to lose wages, benefits, and the basic labor protections they should be owed under the FLSA.

The FLSA has a plain-language definition of “employ,” which “includes to suffer or permit to work.” This is a deliberately broad definition that was intended to provide the FLSA’s protections to most workers. The NPRM also seeks to once again upend the clear, long-standing “economic reality” test, which examines multiple factors to get to the central issue of worker classification: is the worker truly in business for themselves, or do they depend economically on finding work in the business of others, under the control and terms of the employer?

Instead of examining all of the relevant factors in a worker’s situation, the NPRM proposes elevating the factors of the level of control the employer exerts, and the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, above all others in making a determination about whether someone is truly in business for themselves.

This would fail to account for the economic realities of many working relationships: for instance, would the primary work of the employer be able to get done without the worker? How permanent or exclusive is the work being performed—is there a fixed ending date? Does the worker invest in their own tools and equipment, marketing, or business plan, or is it the employer making those investments? Does the worker rely on the employer for training on how to get the job done? All of these questions fall under the factors that the NPRM would deprioritize—even though they provide important information about whether or not someone is truly in business for themselves, and thus that the employer doesn’t have an obligation to them under the FLSA.

This would narrow the definition of who is a covered employee under these three statutes. DOL’s NPRM will encourage misclassification schemes and a race to the bottom, where employers will be able to reclassify their employees as independent contractors and evade their obligations under these laws. Further, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common.

An analysis of the proposed rule’s potential costs to workers

In the proposed rule, the Department egregiously fails to estimate the transfers between employers, workers, and the social insurance system that would occur if this proposal were finalized. The requirements that agencies must follow as a part of the rulemaking process are very clear, and among them is the requirement that agencies must assess all quantifiable costs and benefits “to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated.”2 There is no question that DOL could have produced estimates; in what follows, we show that it is straightforward to produce estimates using data researchers routinely use and taking a methodological approach that is in the spirit of estimates the Department of Labor undertakes on a regular basis. One plausible explanation for why DOL left out the required estimate is that any good-faith estimate would have shown this rule will result in a substantial transfer from workers and the social insurance system to employers.

The Department only briefly touches on potential benefits to workers from their proposal. DOL estimates a 1-3% increase in the total number of independent contractors as a result of their proposed rule.3 However, DOL appears to assume that this increase will come entirely from people who were otherwise not engaging in paid work entering the workforce anew as independent contractors. This means the Department also assumes that there will not be significant reclassification of workers who are currently employees to independent contractor status. Given what we know about the scale of misclassification already occurring under current law, this seems to be, at best, a woefully naive understanding of what employers might do when faced with a weaker standard sanctioned by DOL. Further, our analysis of commonly-misclassified occupations shows that the independent contractor version of paid work actually has less value for the worker than the employee-status version that the same worker could find – in other words, the worker still bears costs because the independent contractor version of the work likely offers lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer protections.

In this comment we will estimate these transfers from workers and the social insurance system to employers. The basic structure of this analysis is to take (1) the estimated change in the value of a job to a worker if they are classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and (2) the estimated change in payments to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and then multiply these figures by the estimated number of workers who will shift to independent contractor status if this rule is finalized. This approach will yield the aggregate impact of the rule on workers and on social insurance system coffers.

In a recent publication, EPI estimated (1) and (2) above for workers in lower-wage, labor intensive occupations most likely affected by the rule, such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers.4

The cost to workers in these occupations of being classified as an independent contractor instead of a payroll employee ranges from $6,294 annually for retail sales workers (under extremely conservative assumptions), to $23,266 annually for truck drivers (under less conservative assumptions). Similarly, the annual cost to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee ranges from $600 for manicurists (again under extremely conservative assumptions), to $3,046 for construction workers (again under less conservative assumptions).

Given that we do not have a way to determine where the average impact for those affected by the proposed rule falls in those broad ranges, we simply take the lower bound in both cases, to be extremely conservative. Thus, we assume that the cost to workers is $6,294 annually, and the cost to social insurance programs is .

It should be noted that these lower-bound estimates assume that workers classified as independent contractors are paid not just the full regular pay of a W-2 employee, but also are fully compensated for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This is, however, highly unlikely in these occupations. The theory that businesses will not be able to pay less in total compensation to workers if their status shifts from employee to independent contractor—that their base pay will rise to make up for a reduction in benefits—is based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets. There is broad and growing evidence that perfect competition is rare, and that most labor markets do not function competitively—particularly low-wage labor markets like those under consideration here, where workers are more likely to lack the power to bargain for higher wages to compensate for their loss of benefits and increase in taxes when they become independent contractors.5 Further, very low-wage employees whose wage is elevated by the minimum wage could easily see their wage drop when, as independent contractors, they no longer legally must be paid the minimum wage.

How will the share of the workforce who are payroll employees and the share of the workforce that are independent contractors change as a result of this rule?

To begin to answer that question, we need to know how many independent contractors there currently are. There is a great deal of uncertainty around this number (the Department notes that “there are a variety of estimates of the number of independent contractors, and these span a wide range based on methodologies and how the population is defined”).6 The July 2023 Contingent Worker Supplement finds that there were 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. This number, however, drastically underestimates the total number of independent contractors by not including workers who do independent contracting on the side, in addition to a payroll job. The Department makes a correction for this issue and estimates that there are 24.8 million individuals working as contractors at a given time. For the sake of the calculations in this comment, we will limit the analysis to the 11.9 million workers the CWS finds are independent contractors in their main job, since workers who do independent contracting as a side job likely work fewer hours and therefore may lose less than the $6,294 we are conservatively assuming workers whose status changes as a result of this rule lose annually. It should be noted that this means we are leaving out many millions of independent contractors and our estimates will, as a result, be extremely conservative for this reason as well. 

How much will independent contracting increase as a result of this rule?

The Department’s proposal would potentially allow companies to legally argue that workers who are now misclassified as independent contractors, or who are working “off the books,” would be legitimately classified as independent contractors under the narrow terms of the proposal. As such, one approach would be to use the percentage of workers misclassified or working off the books under current law to estimate the number of workers who could be reclassified as independent contractors under the proposed rule. However, due to severe data constraints, estimates of the share of workers who are misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books are limited. A 2020 paper estimates that between 12.4% and 20.5% of workers in the construction industry are either misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books.7 Conservatively assuming that the bottom of this range applies more broadly to the lowest-paid quartile of the U.S. labor market, that is 5.1 million low wage workers who may be affected by this rule.8 Of course, these are workers who are already not getting the benefit of being a payroll employee, so the economic impacts described above would not apply. However, this exercise does provide a broad sense of the potential scope of workers affected. Further, even these workers lose something of value under this rule given the current enforcement regime, namely the legal right to the wages and benefits they would receive if they were properly classified. We do not attempt to quantify this effect.

To be exceedingly conservative, we will simply assume that there will be an increase as a result of this rule of 5% in the number of workers who are independent contractors in their main job.9 This translates into an increase of just 595,000 workers who are independent contractors at their main job, given the conservative CWS estimate of 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. Multiplying that by our conservative estimate that these workers would lose $6,294 per year yields an aggregate loss to workers of over $3.7 billion annually. Further, social insurance funds would lose at least $357 million annually (595,000 times $600) in the form of reduced employer contributions, meaning this rule also results in a transfer of at least $357 million annually from social insurance funds to employers.10

The NPRM would also have ripple effects in lost benefits and protections that employees are entitled to under other statues. The proposed rule would also extend the weakened definition of employee status to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (MSPA). Farm workers are already among the most vulnerable, low-paid workers in the U.S., and often face challenges at worksites including poor workplace safety conditions. If farm employers and farm labor contractors have the ability to offload more of their basic responsibilities under MSPA, more farm workers will be at risk of classification as independent contractors and lose even their basic rights under MSPA11, such as to be paid on time or have their working conditions disclosed. More workers would also be at risk of losing access to the right to take job-protected, unpaid family and medical leave under FMLA, which also references the definition of “employee” under the FLSA to determine eligibility for FMLA coverage. The National Partnership for Women and Families has estimated that 15 million workers took advantage of FMLA leave in 2025 alone.12 Protections for break time for nursing mothers—recently expanded under the PUMP Act—are also tied to FLSA employee status. Losing the right to take job-protected time off for illness or the birth of a child, the right to take a break to pump milk, the right to know when you will be paid and to be paid on time—these all specifically conflict with DOL’s stated interest in improving flexibility and satisfaction for workers. This is false flexibility.

The reality of flexible work

The Department focuses on “flexibility and satisfaction” as important non-pecuniary attributes that workers may trade income to receive. However, it is difficult to imagine that there are a meaningful number of workers who would get more satisfaction from doing the same job for substantially less compensation as an independent contractor than for substantially more compensation as a payroll employee. Many workers indeed may value flexibility, but notably, employers are able to provide a huge amount of flexibility to payroll employees if they choose to; the “inherent” tradeoff between flexibility and payroll employment is greatly exaggerated. Workers also highly value other factors, like income stability, which are much less prevalent among independent contractors and are not taken into account here.

In 2024, EPI published a report reviewing the available research and survey data on worker preferences regarding flexibility, stability, and predictability.13 While workers do often prefer flexibility and control over their own schedules, they also want stable, full-time work with predictable pay and benefits.

Employers often incorrectly claim that the FLSA prevents flexible scheduling, but employers control scheduling decisions and can organize work schedules to meet FLSA’s requirements. Employers have long been able to provide flexible schedules and comply with wage and hour laws, and flexible schedules have been negotiated by employers and unions in compliance with the law. Scheduling decisions are the employer’s prerogative (in negotiation with their workers’ union, if there is one), and they can and do set and change schedules in accordance with production demands. Independent contractor status is hardly needed for employers to provide their workers with flexibility.

In conclusion, we urge DOL to withdraw this rule as proposed. The Department should not be in the business of weakening labor protections standards, and should instead seek to vigorously enforce laws against misclassification.

Sincerely,

Samantha Sanders
Director of Government Affairs & Advocacy
Economic Policy Institute

Heidi Shierholz, Ph.D.
President
Economic Policy Institute

Valerie Wilson, Ph.D.
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy
Economic Policy Institute

Endnotes

1. Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems, Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.

2. Maeve P. Carey, Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2014.

3. 91 Fed. Reg. 9967.

4. Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems, Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.

5. Alan Manning Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Anna Sokolova and Todd Sorensen, Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, February 2020; Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri, “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets,” American Economic Review: Insights 2, no. 1 (March 2020): 33-46, https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150.

6. 91 Fed. Reg. 9962. 

7. Russell Ormiston, Dale Belman, and Mark Erlich, An Empirical Methodology to Estimate the Incidence and Costs of Payroll Fraud in the Construction Industry, Institute for Construction Economics Research, January 2020. 

8. Data from the Current Population Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics find that there were 163.0 million workers in the U.S. in the first quarter of 2026; 5.1 million = 163.0 million * .25 * .124. 

9. A 5% increase is a conservative assumption, given that the Department is proposing to amend the five-part economic realities test—which has always been interpreted by the Supreme Court in its totality, not weighing any one factor more than another—in a way that will place undue weight on two factors and then narrows those two factors further, making it more likely that workers will be classified as independent contractors and as a result likely leading to a substantial increase in the number of independent contractors. 

10. Some might argue that social insurance funds wouldn’t be hurt by not having employers pay into unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation because independent contractors aren’t eligible for those benefits. However, low-paid independent contractors who lose their contracts and are without work, or get hurt on the job, will be likely to need to depend on safety net programs to survive, so the social insurance system as a whole would still be depleted. 

11. Wage & Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, “Fact Sheet #35: Joint Employment and Independent Contractors Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act,” revised January 2020. 

12. National Partnership for Women & Families. 2026. Key Facts: The Family and Medical Leave Act (fact sheet), January 2026.

13. Margaret Poydock, Lynn Rhinehart, and Celine McNicholas, Flexible Work: What Workers, Especially Low-Wage Workers, Really Want And How Best To Provide It, Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.

Key takeaways:

• Income inequality has skyrocketed since 1979 because of intentional policy choices that suppressed wages for typical families to accelerate income growth at the top.
• Middle-class household incomes would be roughly $30,000 higher today if their incomes had simply kept pace with average income growth since 1979.
• Recognizing that today’s affordability problems are overwhelmingly inequality problems is the key to constructing the right policy solutions.
  • As a start, protecting workers’ right to organize unions, fostering long periods of very low unemployment, and keeping minimum wages high will help typical families claim their fair share of income growth.

When most people—including policymakers—complain about a lack of affordability, they think of prices being too high. But affordability is the outcome of a race between prices and incomes. After all, goods and services were a lot cheaper 90 years ago during the Great Depression, but we all know that nearly everybody is richer today than their peers back then. Bringing incomes into the affordability picture makes for better understanding and better policy.

New Congressional Budget Office (CBO) data show that rising income inequality is the main reason that affordability feels out of reach for too many U.S. families. For more than four decades, most of the income growth in the U.S. economy has been funneled to those at the very top, leaving typical families with far less than their proportionate share of the economy’s gains. If middle-class household incomes had simply kept pace with average income growth since 1979, their pay would be roughly $30,000 higher today. If we account for taxes and government transfers, incomes would still be $19,000 higher today for these middle-class households. Think of this gap as an “inequality tax”: the amount that rising inequality has cost the typical U.S. family. Life would be much more affordable for these families today if they hadn’t been hit by this inequality tax.

This inequality is not the result of competitive markets fairly rewarding people’s skills and hard work. Instead, it resulted from an intentional policy campaign of wage suppression. Labor markets in capitalist economies are inherently tilted toward employers. Fair pay and broadly shared prosperity only materialize when policy affirmatively aims to correct this power imbalance. This can happen—policy choices that bolstered workers’ leverage and bargaining power in labor markets kept growth fast and equal for decades following World War II, for example. But lawmakers rolled back these policies at the behest of capital owners and corporate managers.  

The latest CBO inequality data make the scale of this policy shift visible. Figure A shows the distribution of market income growth for non-elderly households by income group since 1979. We use market income to look at pre-tax, pre-transfer outcomes to assess the equality of outcomes generated by markets. We isolate non-elderly incomes because older households tend to have very low market incomes and these older households have grown as a share over time—so we don’t want any poor performance of market incomes documented here to simply be the outcome of natural population aging. Among this non-elderly group, the top 1% have captured a hugely disproportionate share of market income growth. Between 1979 and 2022, market income for the top 1% grew 277% (from $784,573 to $2.958 million) compared with just 26% growth for the middle fifth of households (from $76,359 to $96,335). This lopsided growth is the root of America’s affordability problem. Even as the economy grew and average incomes rose, typical families fell further behind those at the top who captured most of income growth.

Figure B shows the inequality tax over time, plotting actual market income for the middle fifth of households against what their income would have been if it had grown at the same rate as overall average income. By 2022, the inequality tax reached $30,676 per household, meaning middle-class families are forgoing that much income each year because of rising inequality. The gap has widened steadily since 1979, a sign that the affordability problem facing typical families is not a recent development but rather the cumulative result of decades of policies that have shifted income upward.

Because market income for middle-class families is driven predominantly by labor income, the inequality tax in Figure B reflects the consequences of decades of wage suppression. Of course, the United States has a system of taxes and means-tested transfers (safety net programs like Medicaid and food stamps, for example) that leads to post-tax and transfer income being more equal than market income in any given year. But the tax and transfer system did not ramp up in importance as market income inequality grew after 1979, and even after accounting for its effects, inequality increased significantly. Figure C shows that even when using post-tax and transfer income, the inequality tax remained substantial at $19,320 per middle fifth household in 2022.

Figure D shows who loses and who gains from rising inequality. While the inequality tax cost middle-income families $19,320 in 2022, families at the very top benefited enormously. The 96th to 99th percentiles gained about $88,000 from rising inequality, while the top 1% gained $1.1 million in 2022.

Perhaps surprisingly, the lowest quintile also slightly gained. For this group, lower taxes and higher levels of means-tested benefits counterbalanced a significant loss of market income due to inequality (their market income inequality tax would be around $4,000). The greater fiscal transfers to the bottom fifth are an under-recognized policy achievement of recent decades. It is also an achievement under constant threat, with the latest one being the large cuts to Medicaid and food stamps coming because of the Republican tax and spending bill that passed in 2025.

Figure D

U.S. families’ feeling that life is less affordable than it should be is grounded in objective realities about how the economy has failed them. And it’s understandable why so many of these families think about prices, which they see as the final barrier between them and being able to obtain what they need for a good life, whether the price is for a gallon of gas or a loaf of bread or a monthly health insurance premium.

But the forces causing this affordability crunch are far larger than any given set of prices. Instead, they are mostly the forces that led to rising income inequality by intentionally suppressing the power of workers in labor markets. This wage suppression meant that middle-class income growth was never going to outpace inflation consistently enough to ensure steadily improving economic security.

In short, today’s affordability problems are overwhelmingly inequality problems. Recognizing this fact is the key to constructing the right policy solutions. As a start, protecting workers’ right to organize unions, fostering long periods of very low unemployment, and keeping minimum wages high will help typical families claim their fair share of income growth.

Key findings:

• This analysis estimates the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified jobs. We find, for example, that a typical construction worker misclassified as an independent contractor would lose as much as $20,399 in annual income and job benefits compared with what they would have earned as an employee. A typical truck driver, if misclassified as an independent contractor, would lose as much as $23,266 annually.
• Lost compensation due to misclassification varies by state. Estimated annual per-worker costs in lost compensation are as high as $31,326 for truck drivers in New Jersey. On average, misclassified workers stand to lose more in higher-wage states and occupations because W-2 earnings are greater, but losses are substantial in all states.
• Misclassification can happen in any occupation. However, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common, like most of the 11 occupations analyzed in this report.
• Misclassification shifts the full burden of social insurance—like Social Security and Medicare—to workers, while also reducing the total revenues received by the social insurance system. We estimate that social insurance systems can lose up to roughly 30% of per-worker revenue when workers are misclassified as independent contractors.
• In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in at least 12 states proposed or passed legislation to address worker misclassification. Most recent state efforts have focused on increasing accountability of employers that misclassify workers, bolstering remedies for workers subject to illegal misclassification, and strengthening enforcement capacity.

Read fact sheets by state here.

What is misclassification?

The type of misclassification addressed in this report occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor. The problem of workers being misclassified as independent contractors is pervasive and widespread. An analysis from the National Employment Law Project focusing on state-level reports on misclassification estimated that as many as 10–30% of employers misclassify their workers.1

The way a worker is classified has serious implications for their labor rights and economic security. Federal, state, and local labor laws provide extensive protections for employees that are not available to independent contractors. For example:

• When a worker is misclassified as an independent contractor, they are stripped of minimum wage and overtime protections.
• These misclassified workers are no longer eligible for unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation.
• They do not qualify for paid sick or family leave, even in places where those benefits are statutorily prescribed for employees, and they are extremely unlikely to receive employer-provided health insurance or retirement benefits.
• They are no longer protected by the National Labor Relations Act, which ensures workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively to improve their working conditions.
• In most states, misclassified workers are not covered by anti-discrimination and sexual harassment protections.2
• Workers misclassified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.

Losing these benefits and protections leaves independent contractors in a far more vulnerable position than employees when it comes to their basic rights on the job. Employers have argued that many workers prefer being classified as independent contractors because they value “flexibility” over fundamental labor rights. But this so-called flexibility is often illusory, given the degree of control many employers retain over workers and their schedules.3

Misclassification remains pervasive in part because its costs to individual workers can be hard to quantify and thus easy to obscure. Prior research has estimated the costs of misclassification by quantifying the number of workers misclassified; the amount of wage theft experienced by misclassified workers; and the loss in federal and state tax revenues resulting from employers not paying payroll taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.4 This report presents estimates of two types of costs caused by misclassification for 11 commonly misclassified occupations:

1. What workers lose when they are misclassified—that is, the difference in the value of a job to a worker if the worker is classified as an independent contractor rather than as an employee; and
2. What social insurance funds lose when workers are misclassified—that is, the difference in payments to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor rather than as an employee.

Misclassification can happen to any worker. However, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common, such as most of the 11 occupations investigated in this analysis (see Appendix Table 1). Any policy conversations about worker classification status should center these types of occupations, as workers classified as independent contractors in these occupations are often not genuine independent contractors with full control over their work conditions and are more likely to be exposed to the harms of reduced earnings and loss of labor protections.

The cost to workers

Table 1 presents estimates of the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 occupations that are highly prone to misclassification.5

For example, when classified as an employee, the typical construction worker had annual earnings of $58,360 in 2025 (column 1, top row of Table 1). This includes the average value of supplemental pay—overtime, shift differentials, and paid time off. When we also include the value of health insurance and retirement plans and subtract the worker contribution to Social Security and Medicare, the full value of the job to the worker when classified as an employee rises to $62,567 (column 2, top row). But when the typical construction worker is misclassified as an independent contractor—and therefore loses access to legal protections, supplemental pay, and employer contributions to Social Security and Medicare—we estimate that the value of that job falls to between $42,169 and $49,382 (columns 3 and 4, top row). That estimated range depends on the assumptions we make about the degree to which the employer increases the base pay of independent contractors, if at all, to offset the fact that the worker does not have access to many rights and benefits.

The estimates in columns 3 and 4 are based on two scenarios, described below, that together define the endpoints of this range and establish plausible estimates of the cost of misclassification to workers. It should be noted, however, that this range is conservative because it does not account for the loss independent contractors face of many rights associated with being an employee—for example, it excludes the impact of the loss of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, such as the right to union representation.

In both scenarios, we assume that the worker—if classified as an independent contractor—receives the full regular pay of a W-2 employee but does not receive supplemental pay (like overtime or paid time off), must pay the full combined employer and employee contribution to Social Security and Medicare (15.3% of earnings), and must cover paperwork costs like invoicing, bookkeeping, and small business tax filings.

Scenario 1: No compensation for health and retirement benefits

In the first scenario, we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This generates our low estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs—along with the high estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs—in Table 1.

Under this assumption, we conservatively estimate the net value of a construction job done as an independent contractor falls to $42,169 per year. This is $20,399—or 32.6%—less than if that worker were a W-2 employee ($62,567 in column 2). Notably, misclassified truck drivers also see a massive decline in net value of the job. As a W-2 employee, a truck driving job is worth $64,474, while an independent contractor receiving the same wage, but no supplemental pay or benefits, earns $41,208, which is $23,266 less.

Table 1

Scenario 2: Full compensation for health and retirement benefits

In the second scenario, we assume employers fully compensate independent contractors for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This generates our high estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs, along with the low estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs, in Table 1.

Access to these benefits increases the annual earnings of an independent contractor, but not to the level of a W-2 employee. For a construction worker, the net value of the job as an independent contractor is only $49,382, or more than $13,000 below the net value of the same job done as an employee. For a truck driver, the switch to independent contractor status would cost $13,760.

Table 1 also shows estimates for nine other occupations with lower annual earnings than construction workers and truck drivers. As W-2 employees, these workers had median annual earnings between $33,690 and $44,140. Under the estimates in scenario 1 (no compensation for health and retirement benefits), being misclassified as an independent contractor would cost between $8,858 (retail sales workers) and $17,939 (light truck delivery drivers). Under scenario 2 (full compensation for health and retirement benefits), the costs would be $6,294 and $10,634, respectively.

Mapping cost to workers by state

See fact sheets by state.

Because worker pay varies meaningfully across states, we also estimate the cost of misclassification to workers by state. We follow the same methodology we used for our national-level estimates but incorporate state-level data where available.

Figure A maps the financial penalty that workers face when wrongfully misclassified as independent contractors. This figure uses estimates from scenario 1, where we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. (See Appendix Table 2 and Appendix Table 3 for a detailed breakdown of costs to workers by occupation and state for independent contractors with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits.)

The cost of misclassification ranges from $5,774 annually for housekeeping cleaners in Mississippi to $31,326 for truck drivers in New Jersey. This range of estimates reflects the fact that misclassified workers stand to lose more in higher-wage states and occupations where the W-2 earnings of employees are greater. Even so, losses are substantial across all states.    

Figure A

The cost to social insurance

Social insurance consists of government programs funded by dedicated payroll taxes paid by workers and/or employers, which entitle workers to benefits when they experience qualifying events—such as reaching retirement age (Social Security and Medicare), being laid off (unemployment insurance), or being injured on the job (workers’ compensation). When a worker is misclassified as an independent contractor, the entire cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions is shifted to the worker.6 Misclassification also renders workers ineligible for participation in state and federal unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation programs.

Misclassification does not just shift the full burden of social insurance to workers—it also reduces the total revenues received by the social insurance system. This occurs for several reasons. First, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation systems receive no contributions from independent contractors—though it is worth noting that this in no way ensures that these workers will not need to rely on public safety net programs if they are laid off or injured on the job. Second, independent contractors in the occupations we analyze may earn less than they would as employees, because, for example, they are no longer legally entitled to the minimum wage, overtime protections, and are highly unlikely to receive any paid time off. Because Social Security contributions are a percentage of earnings (and the taxable maximum is not binding in these occupations), lower pay translates directly into lower contributions.

Table 2 illustrates the impact of worker misclassification on payments to social insurance funds in the 11 occupations analyzed above. For example, the typical construction worker classified as an employee and their employer jointly contributed a total of $10,663 toward these social insurance programs in 2025. When misclassified as an independent contractor, total payments toward social insurance programs fall to between $7,617 and $8,920 per construction worker (using the same two scenarios described above). This represents a decline in social insurance revenues between $1,743 and $3,046 per construction worker per year.

Under our scenario 1 assumptions (where employers do not increase pay to compensate independent contractors for their lack of employer-provided health and retirement benefits), total contributions to social insurance fall from between 21% ($1,220) for manicurists/pedicurists and 29% ($3,046) for construction workers. Under our scenario 2 assumptions (where employers increase pay enough to fully compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits), payments to social insurance drop by somewhat less—10% ($601) for manicurists/pedicurists and 16% ($1,743) for construction workers—due to the higher base pay.

Table 2

Mapping the cost to social insurance funds by state

Expanding this methodology to states reveals how misclassification deprives social insurance funds of crucial dollars needed to maintain crucial programs, such as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation. Figure B maps the difference in contributions to social insurance funds between W-2 employees and independent contractors under scenario 1, where we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. The median cost to social insurance funds ranges from $654 per person annually for housekeeping cleaners in Mississippi to $4,008 for construction workers in Hawaii. See Appendix Table 4 and Appendix Table 5 for a detailed breakdown of costs to social insurance funds by occupation and state for the full range of estimates for independent contractors with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits.

Figure B

Recent state and federal policy changes

Strong statutory language, like the ABC test, provides the legal foundation for identifying misclassification 

Given the high stakes of misclassification for workers’ access to fundamental rights and protections, embedding strong legal definitions in state and federal law is fundamental to ensuring that employees are not improperly classified as independent contractors.  

The ABC test is the strongest, most protective test for determining employee status. The test establishes a presumption that an individual performing services for an employer is an employee—not an independent contractor—unless the employer can establish three factors: 

1. The work is done without the direction and control of the employer; 
2. The work is performed outside the usual course of the employer’s business; and 
3. The work is done by someone who has their own, independent business or trade doing that kind of work. 

The ABC test differs from other “tests” of employee status such as the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) “common law” test and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) “economic realities” test because the ABC test shifts the presumption to one of employee status, places the burden on the employer to prove independent contractor status, and provides a clear, narrow definition of independent contractor status. In turn, this reduces the likelihood that workers are misclassified and lose protections they should be guaranteed under the law as employees.  

The strength of frameworks used to determine employee status is highly varied across states. At least 18 states and the District of Columbia currently use the ABC test for determining employee status for certain workplace laws. Some states have taken action recently. In addition to pursuing strong, innovative enforcement strategies to combat misclassification, New Jersey’s labor department proposed a new administrative rule in 2025 to codify into state law the agency’s existing ABC test for preventing independent contractor misclassification (the rule has since been paused). This year, a West Virginia bill proposed establishing a new ABC test into state law. 

However, the number of states with ABC tests has decreased in the past decade, with some states weakening or repealing their statutory definitions as a result of lobbying efforts by digital platform companies (e.g. Uber) and other industries whose business models depend on designating large numbers of workers as “independent contractors.” While most states with ABC tests apply them to determine workers’ eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits, only a few states apply them to wage and hour standards like the minimum wage and overtime compensation, and some states have them in place only for workers in certain occupations.

Strong enforcement mechanisms allow lawmakers to protect workers and hold employers accountable 

While strong legal tests provide a basis for determining whether an employee has been misclassified as an independent contractor, they must be paired with strong enforcement mechanisms to uphold workers’ rights and deter employers from violating the law. Many states are taking steps to strengthen enforcement. In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in at least 12 states proposed or passed legislation to address worker misclassification. For example, Delaware passed a law in 2025 to hold contractors liable when their subcontractors misclassify workers, Colorado enacted a law to penalize employers that willfully misclassify workers, and Minnesota enacted a law requiring the state labor agency to study the impact of misclassification on workers and state revenue. In 2026, lawmakers in at least eight additional states7 have proposed legislation to address worker misclassification, and two states (Virginia and Washington) have sent approved legislation to the governor. 

At the same time, attacks also continued in 2026. Bills in several states proposed weakening existing ABC tests and excluding certain occupations from being subject to the tests. Other bills proposed establishing corporate-backed sham “portable benefits” schemes that promise some limited (but often inaccessible) benefits for gig workers while locking them out of full coverage under standard state programs and protections by treating them as “independent contractors.”8

Strong enforcement is important, and whether a given situation will be subject to enforcement depends on the strength of a state’s statutory definitions of employment. Both strong legal tests and enforcement are critical to protecting workers from being misclassified.  

Policy recommendations 

Policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels should act to curb misclassification and enforce the rights to which all workers should be entitled. Unfortunately, federal protections from misclassification are limited, and recent progress to address misclassification has been undermined. For example, the ABC test is not currently part of any federal workplace laws. In 2024, the Department of Labor finalized a rule to combat misclassification by adopting a six-factor test to determine worker classification under wage and hour laws. However, the Trump administration stopped enforcing the 2024 rule and recently proposed replacing it with a weaker standard. Given federal retrenchment, state lawmakers have an opportunity and responsibility to strengthen existing state standards.

State and federal policymakers should:

• Establish or expand the use of a strong, uniform protective legal test for determining employee status, such as the ABC test;9
• Strengthen enforcement and increase penalties to deter the misclassification of workers as independent contractors; 
• Pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act,10 which would make it harder for employers to misclassify employees in order to prevent them from forming a union and bargaining collectively;
• Strengthen enforcement of wage theft and misclassification, and fully fund the federal and state agencies responsible for enforcing workers’ wage and hour rights;
• Require employers to provide workers with transparent statements of their employment status and a justification for their classification;
• Extend basic wage and hour protections, workplace health and safety protections, paid sick leave, and other protections to independent contractors to discourage misclassification as a “race to the bottom” for workers’ rights; and
• Improve coordination among state and federal tax and labor enforcement agencies by establishing interagency misclassification task forces with dedicated resources and staff and strong co-enforcement partnerships capable of effectively cracking down on misclassification in targeted industries.11

Methodology

Since there are no comprehensive private or public data sources on workers misclassified as independent contractors, we apply a methodology that makes use of available employee total compensation and earnings data to estimate the costs of misclassification. For each of the 11 occupations included in our analysis, we begin with the average compensation profile drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) database. This profile provides a breakdown of average employer costs for employee compensation in the private sector. As an example, Table 3 presents the average hourly compensation profile for construction workers broken into its component parts. We take the ratio of the individual compensation components to regular pay—which includes wages, salaries, supplemental pay, and paid leave—to estimate the ratio of compensation to pay.

Table 3

Next, we apply the ratios of total compensation to pay to median annual earnings obtained from the BLS’ Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics data (OEWS). This gives us estimates of the regular pay, supplemental pay, paid leave, and insurance and retirement benefits for a W-2 employee. We then calculate the net value to the worker as an employee based on the sum of all pay, paid leave, insurance and benefits, minus Social Security and Medicare taxes.

From here, we model two possible ways that the value of a job to a worker can change if the employee is misclassified as an independent contractor. In both scenarios, we assume that the worker, if classified as an independent contractor, receives the full regular pay of a W-2 employee, does not receive supplemental pay (like overtime or paid time off), must pay the full employer and employee contribution to Social Security and Medicare (15.3% of earnings), and must cover paperwork costs like invoicing, bookkeeping, and small business tax filings. We calculate paperwork costs by updating the methodology used in 2020 comments on independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act.12 The difference in the two scenarios is in our assumptions about the degree to which the employer increases the base pay of independent contractors, if at all, to offset the fact that the worker does not have access to many rights and benefits.

1. In the first scenario, we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. This generates our low estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs—along with the high estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs.
2. In the second scenario, we assume that employers fully compensate independent contractors for the cost of health insurance and retirement benefits that employers would have paid to the same worker working as an employee. This generates our high estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs, along with the low estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs.

State estimates

Estimates of the cost of misclassification by state and occupational group are produced similarly to national estimates, using compensation data from the BLS’ ECEC data and state earnings data from the BLS’ OEWS data.

Compensation profiles can be obtained from the ECEC that detail the total hourly cost of compensating a worker, including the share of total compensation derived from regular pay, insurance and retirement benefits, and legally required benefits. A ratio of compensation to pay can be calculated from these profiles by dividing each compensation component by regular pay, as in Table 3.

The ECEC does not have compensation profiles for occupational groups at the state level. They do, however, have compensation profiles for all workers, for all workers by occupation, and for all workers by census division, which we combine to estimate compensation profiles for occupational groups at the census division level. Table 4 illustrates this procedure using construction workers in New England as an example. First, we create compensation to pay ratios for private-sector workers at the national level, for each occupational group (e.g. construction workers), and for each census division (e.g. New England). Next, we divide the occupation-specific ratio by the national ratio and multiply this quotient by the census division ratio. This yields a unique compensation to pay ratio for New England construction workers, which is then mapped onto all states within this respective census division. This procedure is followed for all occupational groups and census divisions to produce compensation to pay ratios for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

Table 4

We apply the state- and occupation-specific compensation to pay ratios to state and occupation median annual earnings obtained from BLS’ OEWS data. This gives us estimates of total compensation that comes from regular pay, supplemental pay, paid leave, and insurance and retirement benefits for W-2 employees across all states and occupations.

As in the national estimates, the cost of misclassification to both workers and to social insurance funds is calculated by comparing the net value of a job for a W-2 employee with that of an independent contractor under two scenarios: with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits. Appendix Tables 2–5 provide detailed breakdowns of these costs in both net dollar amounts and percentage differences relative to W-2 employees.

Notes

1. National Employment Law Project, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, October 2020.

2. Meghan Racklin, Molly Weston Williamson, and Dina Bakst, “State Leadership on Anti-Discrimination Protections for Independent Contractors,” Future of Work Blog (A Better Balance), April 22, 2020.

3. Margaret Poydock, Lynn Rhinehart, and Celine McNicholas, Flexible Work: What Workers, Especially Low-Wage Workers, Really Want And How Best To Provide It, Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.

4. Françoise Carré, (In)dependent Contractor Misclassification, Economic Policy Institute, June 2015; Government Accountability Office, Employee Misclassification: Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection and Prevention, GAO-09–717, August 2009.

5. For discussions of occupations where workers are particularly vulnerable to misclassification as independent contractors, see Annette Bernhardt, Sarah Thomason, Chris Campos, Allen Prohofsky, Aparna Ramesh, and Jesse Rothstein, Independent Contracting in California: An Analysis of Trends and Characteristics Using Tax Data, UC Berkeley Labor Center and California Policy Lab, March 2022; Françoise Carré, (In)dependent Contractor Misclassification, Economic Policy Institute, June 2015; National Employment Law Project, Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries, October 2020; and Lisa Xu and Mark Erlich, Economic Consequences of Misclassification in the State of Washington, Harvard Labor and Worklife Program, December 2019.

6. When workers are employees, they pay the employee share of Social Security and Medicare (7.65% of W-2 earnings). Their employers also make identical payments to Social Security and Medicare.

7. Arizona HB 2463, Illinois HB 2794, Iowa HB 2385, Kentucky HB 449, Virginia SB 644, Washington SB 6302, West Virginia HB 4571, and Wisconsin AB 1160.

8. See, for example, New Jersey A 1184, California SB 527, and Georgia HB 987.

9. Lynne Rhinehart et al. Misclassification, the ABC Test, and Employee Status, Economic Policy Institute, June 2021.

10. Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Lynne Rhinehart, Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.

11. For more on interagency misclassification task forces, see Rebecca Smith, Public Task Forces Take on Employee Misclassification: Best Practices (policy brief), National Employment Law Project, updated August 2020. For more on co-enforcement partnerships, see Janice Fine, Daniel Galvin, Jenn Round, and Hana Sheperd, “Strategic Enforcement and Co-enforcement of U.S. Labor Standards Are Needed to Protect Workers Through the Coronavirus Recession,” Boosting Wages for U.S. Workers in the New Economy series, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, January 2021.

12. Heidi Shierholz, “EPI comments on independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” comments submitted on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute to Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation (Wage and Hour Division) Director Amy DeBisschop, October 26, 2020.

The IRS estimates that business taxpayers spend 13 more hours than nonbusiness taxpayers doing their taxes. If we conservatively assume that independent contractors spend 30 minutes per week on other (non-tax) paperwork costs that they wouldn’t have to spend if they were a payroll employee, that, plus the additional 13 hours spent on taxes, is an additional 39 hours of paperwork per year. This is equivalent to 1.8% of pay, or $880 annually for an independent contractor who earns $48,887 in regular pay annually.  

Additionally, we estimate these paperwork costs as the annual purchase of basic bookkeeping software ($114 on the lowest end, using FreshBooks, see https://www.freshbooks.com/pricing, accessed October 16, 2024), self-employed tax filing software for federal taxes ($129, using TurboTax, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/live/, accessed October 16, 2024) and state taxes ($64, using TurboTax).

Data appendix

Appendix Table 1

Appendix Table 2

Appendix Table 3

Appendix Table 4

Appendix Table 5