<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>
<channel>
	<title>Publications | Economic Policy Institute</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.epi.org/publications/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.epi.org</link>
	<description>Research and Ideas for Shared Prosperity</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 19:37:12 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0.9</generator>

 
		<item>
		<title>Today’s working class is more diverse than ever:  A new picture emerges as demographic change and economic inequality challenge old perceptions</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/todays-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-a-new-picture-emerges-as-demographic-change-and-economic-inequality-challenge-old-perceptions/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2026 13:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Kyle K. Moore, Stevie Marvin, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328439</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Learn about who is included in the working class, how economic conditions have changed for them, where they work and live, and much more.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 24px;"><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #0e5b8b;">Key takeaways</span></strong></span></p>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">An expanded view of the working class&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>The </b><b>working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight, but there is no universal definition of what it is.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>A commonly used definition of working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree.&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;</li>
<li><b>The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. </b><span style="font-size: 14px;">That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;"><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">Given these factors, a</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> broader </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">definition</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">of</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> the working class can be </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW110786087 BCX0">considered</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">people in the labor force who</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">se family income </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">is in</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">the bottom 75%</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">, regardless of education</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">al</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> level or job type.</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> This works out to a family income </span></span><strong><span class="TextRun Highlight MacChromeBold SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0">below $150,000</span></span></strong><span class="TextRun Highlight SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW110786087 BCX0"> per year.</span></span><span class="EOP Selected SCXW110786087 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}'>&nbsp;</span></span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Under this broader definition, 31.5% of those in the working class have a bachelor&#8217;s degree or higher; a majority of working-class college graduates hold professional or managerial jobs.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Traditionally women-dominated jobs related to teaching, child care, or nursing make up some of the largest shares of working-class managerial and professional occupations.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">A racially diverse group&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>In 1979, the working class (defined by less than a bachelor&#8217;s degree) was 81.5% white.</b></li>
<li><b>Shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. Now, the working class is:&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>52% white&nbsp;</li>
<li>26.8% Hispanic&nbsp;</li>
<li>15.1% Black</li>
<li>4.7% Asian American</li>
<li>1.4% Native American</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>One-fifth of the working class was born outside the United States, and 11.6% are non-U.S. citizens.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><b>The working class is similarly diverse when defined by family income level.&nbsp;</b></li>
</ul>
<h4><span style="color: #0e5b8b;">Differences by state (using family income to define working class)&nbsp;</span></h4>
<ul>
<li><b>There is considerable variation in the working-class composition of states, based on differences in costs of living and labor force participation.&nbsp;</b></li>
<li><b>The five states (including Washington, D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>&nbsp;
<ul>
<li>Massachusetts (42.9%)</li>
<li>Washington, D.C. (42.9%)</li>
<li>New Jersey (44.9%)</li>
<li>Maryland (47.8%)</li>
<li>Washington state (47.9%)&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><b>The five states with the highest working-class population shares are:&nbsp;</b>
<ul>
<li>South Dakota (66.7%)</li>
<li>Iowa (64.9%)</li>
<li>Wyoming (64.7%)</li>
<li>Kansas (63.9%)</li>
<li>Nebraska (62.7%)</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>What is the working class?</h2>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he working class remains an often-used rhetorical concept that carries tremendous political weight. Despite having no official definition, “working class voters” are a heavily courted constituency during election years. In the most general sense, the “working class” as a political economic category describes people who rely almost exclusively on wage labor through steady employment to support themselves and their families.</p>
<p>Historically, the term working class has been closely associated with nonmanagerial blue-collar workers and unions, often represented in the popular imagination by white tradesmen in hard hats. This popular image, however, has never represented a complete picture. Due to occupational segregation, Black workers have always made up a significant portion of nonmanagerial laborers commonly identified as working class. Additionally, since the 1970s, increases in women’s labor force participation and immigration have resulted in growing shares of women, Hispanic, and Asian workers in the U.S. labor force. Along with these demographic shifts, there have been changes in the composition of “working class” jobs over time. For example, as traditional blue-collar production and manufacturing employment in the U.S. fell sharply between 1998 and 2019, job opportunities for noncollege graduates were largely replaced by growth in service-sector employment (Scott et al. 2022).</p>
<h3>Who is working class?</h3>
<p>Contemporary views about who is included in the working class range from narrow to extremely broad: those earning very low wages, those without a bachelor’s degree, and anyone who works for a wage or salary, irrespective of their wage or education level. The latter definition, currently being pushed by the growing Democratic Socialist movement, has generated some debate around whether highly educated, relatively high-income wage and salary workers belong in a category with traditional blue-collar, noncollege-educated workers who often live vastly different material lives (Rotondaro 2026).</p>
<h3>What are some factors that complicate the traditional distinction between college-educated and other workers?</h3>
<p>For many, however, the line between the economic status of college- and noncollege-educated workers is not that clear and has been blurred by rising inequality and labor market discrimination. Over the last 10 years, the college wage premium has declined. In other words, the wage boost from a bachelor’s degree is lower than it used to be, and workers in many jobs that were once considered white collar now experience relatively modest pay and limited control over the pace and content of work (Fast and Gould 2026).</p>
<p>Research also shows that Black college graduates are more likely than white college graduates to work in jobs that don’t require a college degree, and even after controlling for college major, graduates of color, foreign-born graduates, and women of all races are much more likely to work alongside nongraduates (Williams and Wilson 2019; Attewell and Witteveen 2023). In addition to these forms of underemployment, racial and gender pay disparities among college graduates result in lower pay for women and Black and Hispanic men relative to white men (Quadlin, VanHuevelen, and Ahearn 2023; Wilson 2016a; Mora and Dávila 2018). Facing limited returns on their college education, debt-burdened bachelor’s degree holders may even find themselves in a more precarious position than nongraduate co-workers who are free of student debt.</p>
<h3>Which topics will this report cover?</h3>
<p>Taking these factors into consideration, this report updates prior EPI research on the changing demographics of the working class and presents a more expansive definition of this group that includes labor force participants in the bottom 75% of the family income distribution (Wilson 2016b). This report presents the working class as more racially diverse than ever before but also includes workers with and without college degrees employed in a range of blue-, pink<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>- and white-collar jobs that afford different standards of living across the United States. This analysis supports the idea that policies that strengthen labor standards and protect civil and workers’ rights will improve the lives of working people across traditional class lines defined by education or occupation.</p>
<h2>How are we defining the working class in this report?</h2>
<p>This report considers two definitions of the working class. Consistent with previous EPI research, the first definition is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Education captures much of what people typically associate with class, and in the labor market, a bachelor’s degree is commonly interpreted by employers as a signal of skill acquisition required for many white-collar occupations. Since educational categories have been more consistently coded in the monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) than other commonly used indicators of working-class status, like occupation or income, we use this definition in Part I of the report when comparing working-class demographic and economic outcomes over time.</p>
<p>The second definition, used in Part II of our analysis, is based on the share of 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with family income at or below the 75th percentile. In our sample, this corresponds to individuals with less than $150,000 in family income.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> The income-based definition captures people in similar economic circumstances, regardless of education or occupation. Implicit in this income-based definition of working class is the assumption that a job loss could result in significant economic hardship for most families below this threshold. We apply this more expansive definition to our more detailed analysis of the working class for disaggregated groups of workers by race, ethnicity, gender, nativity, geography, education, and occupation using pooled 2024–2025 CPS data (Part II).</p>
<p>Though slightly different, there is considerable overlap between these definitions: 82.9% of those who qualify as working class under the education-based definition are also defined as working class using the income-based definition.</p>
<h2>Part I: Changes in working-class demographic characteristics and economic conditions since 1979</h2>
<h3>Shifting demographic characteristics of the working class</h3>
<p>The demographic composition of the working class has changed dramatically over the last five decades, as shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation among different groups have contributed to a more diverse workforce. For comparability over time, this part of our analysis relies on the education-based definition of working class: 18–64-year-olds in the civilian labor force with less than a bachelor’s degree. Since labor force participation fluctuates across different points in the business cycle, and to varying degrees for different groups of workers, we focus on demographic comparisons across peak years in the business cycle when employment and labor force participation are highest. Those years are 1979, 1989, 2000, 2007, and 2019. The current time period covers 2024 and 2025, which combines the year with the highest rate of prime age employment since the 2019 business cycle peak (2024) and the most recent full year of data (2025) (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A </strong>clearly shows that the working class has grown more racially and ethnically diverse over the last 46 years. In 1979, the working class was over 80% white, but after 2000, the combined shares of Black, Hispanic, Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI), and American Indian and Alaska Native (AIAN or Native American) workers increased rapidly. While white workers remain the largest single racial group, workers of color collectively accounted for nearly half of the working class in 2024–2025. Currently, the working class is 52% white, 26.8% Hispanic, 15.1% Black, 4.7% AAPI, and 1.4% Native American.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-325442 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325442" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325442-35936-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>The changing race and gender composition of the working class are displayed separately for women and men in <strong>Figure B </strong>so that changes for each group are easier to see over time, but the combined percentages of men and women in each year sum to 100%. Overall, men have maintained a small majority over women in the working class (between 53% and 57%) since 1979. While there hasn’t been a huge shift in the overall gender demographics of the working class, an increase in the share of women between 1979 and 1989 reflects rising women’s labor force participation at a time when men were leaving the labor force (EPI 2026d). Women decline as a share of the working class after 2000 as the share of women with a bachelor’s degree or higher rose faster and surpassed the share of men with college degrees (Census 2022).</p>
<p>The intersection of race and gender in Figure B brings these joint demographic shifts in the working class into even sharper focus. For example, in 1979, white men alone accounted for nearly half (46.3%) of the working class. By 2024–2025, white men were less than a third (29.6%) of the working class. Over the same time, the share of working-class women of color more than doubled from 8.4% in 1979 to 21.2% in 2024–2025, with the largest increase occurring among Hispanic women (from 2.2% in 1979 to 11.1% in 2024–2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326126 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none chart-has-feature--two-column-chart-group-with-separator" data-chartid="326126" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326126-36098-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>An increase in immigration also contributed to changes in the racial and ethnic composition of the working class since 1979 (Kramer and Passel 2025). While the immigrant population has grown increasingly diverse over the last 46 years, between 2010 and 2024, the 10 largest U.S. immigrant groups have come from Latin American or Asian countries. This has contributed to the growth in working-class Hispanic and Asian workers shown in Figures A and B (MPI 2025). <strong>Figure C</strong> further shows that the share of the working class that is foreign-born has grown from 13.8% in 2000 (the earliest year these data are available in the CPS) to 19.8% in 2024–2025 (a 43.5% increase). Currently, 11.6% of the working class are non-U.S. citizens.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325475 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325475" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325475-35938-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3>Changing economic conditions for the working class</h3>
<p>One of the most prominent narratives regarding the working class has been how people without a bachelor’s degree have been stripped of opportunities to earn a decent living and left behind in the modern economy. All too often, this narrative centers the white working class, and white men in particular, to the exclusion of all others. This section presents a more inclusive picture of changing economic conditions among the working class that depicts both shared class struggles and racial inequities within this group.</p>
<p><strong>Figure D</strong> shows that employment among prime-age (25–54-year-olds) adults without a bachelor’s degree peaked in 2000 but has since fallen for most groups. However, even at the high point in 2000, there were considerable gaps between racial and ethnic groups. As many as 80.9% of prime-age white adults with less than a bachelor’s degree were employed in 2000, compared with just 68.7% of similarly educated Native Americans in that age cohort. While employment among prime-age working-class white workers has fallen 4.0 percentage points since 2000, they have maintained the highest rates of employment among the working class, even as the gaps between white, Hispanic, and AAPI workers narrowed significantly after 2007. Over the decades, employment rates among prime-age working-class Black and Native American workers have been significantly lower than their white counterparts.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-326700 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326700" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326700-36012-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In addition to a shared peak in employment from the strong economy of the late-1990s–2000, the working class has also shared the experience of inconsistent, often tepid, wage growth since 1979 because of policy choices that suppressed wages for the vast majority of workers (Gould and Wething 2026). <strong>Figure E </strong>shows annualized rates of inflation-adjusted median hourly wage growth for each group between business cycle peaks. This chart notably shows that all racial and ethnic groups suffered real wage losses (adjusted for inflation) during the 1980s, as globalization and concerted efforts to weaken unions stripped many in the working class of good-paying union jobs and bargaining power.</p>
<p>After decades of slower wage growth, median hourly wages grew fastest for all groups between 2019 and 2025, with workers of color experiencing faster wage growth than white workers—from 1.2% a year for Black workers to 1.7% a year for Native Americans. This is consistent with research that shows between 2019 and 2023, the lowest-wage workers—a group that includes many working-class people of color—had the strongest wage growth (Gould and deCourcy 2024).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-326685 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326685" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326685-36010-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->




<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326689 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326689" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326689-36011-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Unfortunately, for most groups, the much-needed wage boost in recent years was not large enough to recover the prior four decades of lost ground, relative to state median wages. The wage boost failed to significantly reduce the share of working-class people whose hourly wage fell below their state median, as racial pay disparities within the working class persist. <strong>Figure F </strong>shows that between 1979 and 2019, the share of working-class Black and white workers whose wages were below the median hourly wage in their state increased by 11.1 and 6.4 percentage points, respectively. While wages among the Hispanic working class grew faster than other groups between 2000–2007 and 2007–2019, Figure F also shows they remained most likely to have wages below their state’s median in 2024–2025 (75.1%), followed closely by Black workers (74.9%). Even after receiving a stronger pandemic recovery wage boost, the median hourly wages of Black ($19.59) and Hispanic workers ($19.99) with less than a bachelor’s degree were significantly lower than those of similarly educated white workers ($22.65), as <strong>Table 1</strong> shows.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327450 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327450" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327450-36055-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Over the same time period that the hourly pay of more working-class wage earners dropped below the state median wage, a declining share of those workers were union members or covered by a union contract (see <strong>Figure G</strong>). The decline is especially stark among Black workers for whom union coverage in 2024–2025 (12.2%) was less than a third of what it was in 1979 (36.9%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326704 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326704" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326704-36013-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h2>Part II: Current demographic and economic characteristics of the working class</h2>
<p>The remainder of this report is based on the more expansive definition of working class that includes all 18–64-year-old labor force participants in the bottom 75% of family income, regardless of educational level or occupation. This portion of the analysis takes a more detailed look at the current demographic and labor market characteristics of the working class in 2024–2025.</p>
<p><strong>Figure H</strong> shows the share of each group, by race, ethnicity, or nativity, that meets this more expansive definition of working class. As shown in Figure H, over 60% of Black and Hispanic adults between the ages of 18 and 64 meet this definition of working class, compared with more than half of Native American and white adults and 43.4% of AAPI adults.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Similarly, a larger share of foreign-born non-U.S. citizens is working class—62.1% compared with about 54% of U.S. citizens, both native-born and naturalized.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-H"></a><div class="figure chart-325518 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325518" data-anchor="Figure-H"><div class="figLabel">Figure H</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325518-35943-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure H" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p><strong>Figure I</strong> presents the educational distribution of the working class. Even under this broader definition that is unrestricted by educational level, the majority of those in the working class (68.5%) have less than a bachelor’s degree, with the largest group being those with only a high school diploma (32%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-I"></a><div class="figure chart-325492 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325492" data-anchor="Figure-I"><div class="figLabel">Figure I</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325492-36095-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure I" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Defined in part by labor force participation, a large majority (69.2%) of those in the working class are between 25- and 54-years-old, or prime age. With large shares of younger people attending college and not working, the working class also includes more people ages 55–64 (17.1%) than under age 25 (13.7%) (see <strong>Figure J</strong>) (Gould et al. 2025).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-J"></a><div class="figure chart-325488 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325488" data-anchor="Figure-J"><div class="figLabel">Figure J</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325488-35939-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure J" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In addition to labor force participation, family income at or below the 75th percentile (less than $150,000 per year) is used to identify members of the working class under this more expansive definition. However, the relative precarity of families at the same income level can vary, based on family size and the number of household earners.</p>
<p><strong>Figure K</strong> summarizes basic family structures within the working class, based on marital status and the presence of minor children (under age 18). It shows that almost half of those in the working class are unmarried and childless (46.0%), while 30.8% have at least one child under age 18. The majority of working-class parents are married.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-K"></a><div class="figure chart-325495 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325495" data-anchor="Figure-K"><div class="figLabel">Figure K</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325495-35941-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure K" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3>Working-class family income</h3>
<p>Although we are using a single-income threshold to define working class, <strong>Figure L</strong> reveals racial differences in family income among the working class that replicate differences in the overall population. For example, white and AAPI families are more likely to be at the upper end of the income distribution. One-third of each group has a family income of $100,000–$149,999 per year, compared with one-fourth of working-class AIAN families and one-fifth of working-class Black and Hispanic families. At the same time, all working-class families of color are more likely to be in the lower end of the income distribution than white families. More than a third of Hispanic (38.4%), Black (38.0%), and AIAN (35.8%) families have an income of less than $50,000 per year, compared with 25.2% of working-class AAPI families and 22.1% of white families. Most working-class Black and Hispanic families have income between $50,000 and $75,000 per year.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-L"></a><div class="figure chart-325612 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325612" data-anchor="Figure-L"><div class="figLabel">Figure L</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325612-35953-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure L" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>The number of workers contributing to family income also varies by race and ethnicity. The number of family earners is both a function of family structure and employment status. Consistent with the fact that over half of our working-class sample is not married (55%, as shown in Figure K), <strong>Figure M</strong> shows that most families include a single earner. However, lower rates of employment among Black and Native American families further contribute to their being most likely to be single-earner families (70.8% and 69.3%, respectively). White families (27.8%) are most likely to have two earners, while Hispanic (9.9%) and Asian (7.5%) families are more likely than other groups to include more than two earners.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-M"></a><div class="figure chart-327433 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327433" data-anchor="Figure-M"><div class="figLabel">Figure M</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327433-36053-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure M" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3>Working-class jobs</h3>
<p>Another consideration in defining what it means to be working class is the type of jobs people have. Separating professional or managerial roles from more traditionally working-class jobs closely aligned with the typical “blue-collar” definition sorts most of the occupations associated with a low degree of control and autonomy at work from those in which workers have more control over the pace and content of their work. As professionals, however, teachers and nurses would not be considered working class under a traditional blue-collar occupation definition of working class, despite teachers’ low pay relative to their years of education and nurses’ lack of control over the pace and content of their work (Allegretto 2026; Stimpfel et al. 2025).</p>
<p><strong>Figure</strong> <strong>N</strong> shows that overall, those employed in nonprofessional and nonmanagement occupations are much more likely to be working class. Between 70% and 87% of people employed in jobs other than professional or management occupations have a family income at or below the 75th percentile, compared with less than 60% of professionals and managers. This further supports the idea that even under our broader definition, working class is more often a label that applies to those in traditional blue-collar jobs.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-N"></a><div class="figure chart-325530 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325530" data-anchor="Figure-N"><div class="figLabel">Figure N</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325530-35945-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure N" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Occupation also captures much of the variation associated with education, given that education is used as a credential for access to different kinds of employment. <strong>Figure O</strong> shows the distribution of major occupation groups within the working class by level of education. Again, even under this broader definition of working class, education is still a major determinant of the types of jobs available to those in the working class. More than two-thirds of the jobs held by members of the working class with a bachelor’s degree or higher are in two major categories—professional and related occupations (43.9%), and management, business, and financial occupations (23.3%)—but the income threshold largely excludes the more highly paid college graduates in these occupations.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> While the most common jobs among those with less than a bachelor’s degree are service occupations (24.4%), at that level of education, workers are more evenly split between office and administrative occupations (11.8%), transportation and material moving occupations (11.7%), professional and related occupations (10.2%), and management, business, and financial occupations (10.0%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-O"></a><div class="figure chart-325503 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325503" data-anchor="Figure-O"><div class="figLabel">Figure O</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325503-35942-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure O" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>One limitation of using a strictly occupational definition is that the professional and management categories also include jobs that have many of the qualities traditionally associated with membership in the working class: modest pay and limited workplace autonomy, among other things. There are over 220 detailed occupations within the major occupation categories for managers and professionals, but just 22 of those occupations, depicted in <strong>Figure P</strong>, account for half of all working-class managers or professionals. Among those 22 occupations, nine are traditionally women-dominated, or pink-collar, jobs related to teaching and child care (depicted in orange) or nursing (depicted in green) that account for 22.4% of working-class managers and professionals. Seven of the 22 occupations are management positions (depicted in blue) that account for 17.8% of working-class managers and professionals. Besides the generic “all other managers” category, the most common working-class management positions are food service, general and operations, construction, and financial managers. The remainder of the occupations represented in Figure P includes other types of professional occupations (depicted in purple) such as accountants and auditors, social and human resource workers, and technology-related occupations.<br />


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-P"></a><div class="figure chart-326197 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326197" data-anchor="Figure-P"><div class="figLabel">Figure P</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326197-35987-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure P" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

<br />
</p>
<p>The types of jobs held by members of the working class can also vary by race, ethnicity, and gender, following broader patterns of occupational segregation. <strong>Figure Q</strong> shows how the six most common occupations for working-class men and women are distributed by race, ethnicity, and gender. The distribution across all 10 major occupational categories can be found in <strong>Appendix Table 1. </strong>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Figure Q shows that working-class women’s employment is more concentrated than working-class men’s, with more than 80% of women of any race or ethnicity employed in just five job categories. More than half of all working-class women are employed in just two types of jobs: service, and professional and related occupations. As shown in Figure P, this is consistent with the fact that a large number of working-class professional jobs include female-dominated occupations like teachers, child care workers, and nurses. Service occupations are most common among Black (28.3%), Hispanic (32.7%), and Native American (27.6%) women, while professional occupations are most common among white and AAPI women. Across all racial and ethnic groups, similar shares of working-class women are employed in office and administrative occupations.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-Q"></a><div class="figure chart-325567 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325567" data-anchor="Figure-Q"><div class="figLabel">Figure Q</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325567-35948-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure Q" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>By comparison, except for AAPI men, fewer than 80% of working-class men are employed across six job categories. Among men, however, there is more variation in the types of jobs by race or ethnicity. For example, the most common jobs held by Black working-class men are transportation (20.8%) and service (20.7%) occupations, while Hispanic working-class men are most concentrated in construction (21.7%) and service (18.8%) occupations. The most common occupations for working-class AAPI and white men are professional and related, and management, but like AAPI women, AAPI men are largely concentrated in professional and related occupations (31.5%).</p>
<h3>Job characteristics for working-class women and men by race and ethnicity</h3>
<p><strong>Table 2 </strong>further details how the employment characteristics of working-class men and women vary by race and ethnicity, underscoring differences in the work intensity required to sustain working-class family incomes. Among working-class women, Black women are most likely to work full time (83.4%) and to be represented by a union (11.6%). Although working-class Black women are more likely to have full-time jobs than their counterparts, they are still more likely to hold multiple jobs than most other groups of women. Native American women are most likely to hold multiple jobs (8.4%) and to be self-employed (5.7%) but are less likely than Black women to be employed in full-time jobs.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-325608 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325608" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325608-35952-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Working-class men are more likely than women to work full time and therefore, less likely to hold multiple jobs. Working-class men are also more likely to be self-employed than working-class women. Among working-class men, AAPI, Black, and Native American men are least likely to be employed full time; however, Black men hold an advantage over other groups of men in union representation (13.0%) and multiple job holdings (5.9%). Hispanic working-class men are most likely to be self-employed (8.1%).</p>
<p>The lower half of Table 2 provides estimated median hourly wages by race, ethnicity, and gender in 2024–2025 as well as the share of workers in each group whose wage falls below the median hourly wage in their state. These estimates differ from those presented in Part I because they are disaggregated by gender and are based on the more expansive income-based definition of working class, which includes some college graduates. Table 2 further shows significant race and gender pay gaps within the working class. For example, larger shares of women than men in each race or ethnic group earn wages lower than their state’s median, including as many as two-thirds of Hispanic (68.3%) and Native American (67.8%) women.</p>
<h3>Working class across the country</h3>
<p>Differences in local labor market conditions, costs of living, and structural inequities across and within state boundaries introduce many more factors to consider in understanding what it means to be working class in different parts of the country. While we don’t attempt to reconcile all those things in this report, we do explore what share of people in each state fits our family income-based definition of working class and how that applies to people with different types of occupations and educational backgrounds.&nbsp;</p>
<p>On average, a larger share of those in nonmetropolitan areas, or in the Midwestern or Southern regions of the country fall within this definition of working class (see <strong>Table 3</strong>), largely because incomes and the cost of living are lower. For example, according to EPI’s Family Budget Calculator, a family of two adults and two children in Boston, Massachusetts (the state with the lowest working-class share), would require over $66,000 more for a modest but adequate lifestyle than they would in the Midwestern city of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, (the state with the highest working-class share) (EPI 2026c). In fact, 26 metropolitan areas require a family income greater than $150,000 for a two adult and two child household to achieve a moderate lifestyle, of which all but one are located in the Northeast and the West.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-325559 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325559" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325559-35946-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>The map in <strong>Figure R</strong> shows what share of each state’s 18–64-year-old population is working class, including by occupation and education. Since we are using a nationwide family income threshold to identify individuals in the working class, the map also reports the state median hourly wage, as well as working-class median hourly wages by broad occupation and educational category to help contextualize how the working-class family income limit translates to individual workers’ wages in each state.</p>
<p>The map shows that there is considerable variation in working-class shares across states and within regions. While the Midwest and South in aggregate have the highest working-class population shares, in the West, there is notable variance in state working-class population shares. For example, in Idaho and Wyoming, more than 62% of the population is working class compared with states like California and Washington where less than half of the population fit our working-class definition.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-R"></a><div class="figure chart-326089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326089" data-anchor="Figure-R"><div class="figLabel">Figure R</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326089-35979-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure R" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>In each of the five states with the highest working-class population shares—South Dakota (66.7%), Iowa (64.9%), Wyoming (64.7%), Kansas (63.9%), and Nebraska (62.7%)—the state median hourly wage is below $25.00. In the five states (including D.C.) with the lowest working-class population shares—Massachusetts (42.9%); Washington, D.C. (42.9%); New Jersey (44.9%); Maryland (47.8%); and Washington state (47.9%)–the state median hourly wage is over $29.00. Across all 50 states and D.C., the median hourly wage for members of the working class with less than bachelor’s degree ranges from $18.61 in Louisiana to $23.78 in Alaska and New Hampshire.</p>
<p>Figure R also illuminates how filtering the working class by occupation or education can surface different realities faced by workers across the country. Several states register lower-than-expected overall working-class population shares, given their reputation for being low-wage, low-income states. Even after filtering the map by people without a bachelor’s degree, in four states—Mississippi, West Virginia, New Mexico, and Louisiana, in descending order—fewer than 60% are working class. Those four states also have some of the lowest rates of labor force participation in the country, eliminating larger shares of their population from our working-class count. Since the Great Recession, the South has had the lowest labor force participation rate compared with other regions of the country, and people with less than a bachelor’s degree have much lower labor force participation rates than those with a bachelor’s or advanced degree (Childers 2024a; EPI 2026d).</p>
<p>On the other hand, when we use nonprofessional and nonmanagerial (all other) occupations as the filter, it narrows the sample to a group of people who are in the labor force, and working-class shares rise to over 80% in those four states. Mississippi, the state with the lowest median hourly wage and a working-class population share of just 59.8%, has the nation’s highest share of working class among nonprofessional and nonmanagerial workers (89.7%).</p>
<p>This look into state working-class population shares sheds light on some of the conditions that produce unique labor dynamics across regions and states. The long-standing anti-worker policies of the Southern economic development model not only shape the configuration of the working class in the South, including characteristically low wages, but low labor force participation also creates a sub-working class (Childers 2023; Childers 2024b). It also demonstrates the need for strong and comprehensive labor standards and workers’ rights protections nationwide to reduce such large interstate disparities.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>While there is no single, universally agreed-upon definition of working class, this report proposes that based on similarities in family income and labor force participation, membership may reasonably extend to more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than previously considered. The decline in the college-wage premium, the teacher pay gap, and growing racial and gender pay gaps among college graduates have each contributed to this trend over the last 10–20 years. At the same time, more than 40 years of policy decisions that suppressed wages and led to a sharp decline in union density have undercut traditional opportunities for noncollege graduates to make a decent living, as increasing shares of those in the working class have an hourly wage that falls below their state’s median. In comparing what it means to be working class across different states, we find that the Southern economic development model not only contributes to lower working-class wages in some Southern states but also creates a sub-working class through low labor force participation (Childers 2023).</p>
<p>Finally, this analysis also shows that the working class has long outgrown the old image narrowly represented by white tradesmen in hard hats. Rather, shifting trends in U.S. immigration and labor force participation over the last five decades have created a more racially diverse working class than ever before. In the face of the growing diversity and interconnectedness of the working class, the racist and anti-immigrant policies being pushed by the current administration stand to alienate a larger share of this group. Elected leaders seeking to win support from today’s working class should prioritize issues and policies that improve the lives of workers across race, ethnicity, immigration status, education, and occupation. Previous EPI research demonstrates that some effective strategies for accomplishing this include tripling union density, ending mass deportations, curbing employer misclassification of workers as independent contractors, and setting the federal minimum wage at two-thirds of the national median wage (Bivens et al. 2026; EPI 2026e; Cid-Martinez et al. 2026; Zipperer 2026).</p>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-325563 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325563" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325563-35947-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The term pink-collar is commonly used to refer to jobs that are predominantly done by women and pay less than more male-dominated occupations. Examples include many clerical, administrative, and service jobs as well as teaching, nursing and care work.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Family income is reported in bands in the monthly CPS, with $150,000 as the lower limit for the highest income band, and 73.9% of the 18–64-year-old population have a family income below that level.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Though not depicted in the report, the shares of each group that met our education-based definition of working class were AIAN (79.1%), Hispanic (78.8%), Black (71.6%), white (57.8%), and AAPI (39.4%). Shares based on nativity were foreign-born, not a U.S. citizen (68.5%); native-born (63.0%); and foreign-born, naturalized U.S. citizen (54.6%).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> We estimate that 36.4% of working-class managers and professionals in our sample are early career or under age 35.</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Abraham, Leanne, Emily Cochrane, and Jeff Adelson. 2026. “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2026/06/17/us/elections/redistricting-maps-black-voters-republicans.html">See How New Republican Maps Split Up Black Voters in 3 Southern States.</a>” <em>New York Times, </em>June 17, 2026.</p>
<p>Allegretto, Sylvia. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-teacher-pay-penalty-remained-high-in-2025-teachers-and-students-nationwide-are-still-paying-the-price-of-decades-of-neglect/"><em>The Teacher Pay Penalty Remained High in 2025</em>: <em>Teachers and Students Nationwide Are Still Paying the Price of Decades of Neglect</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2026.</p>
<p>Attewell, Paul, and Dirk Witteveen. 2023. “Occupational Marginalization, Underemployment, and Earnings Inequality Among College Graduates.” <em>Research in Social Stratification and Mobility </em>83, 100761. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2023.100761">https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2023.100761</a>.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh, Heidi Shierholz, Margaret Poydock, Ben Zipperer, Celine McNicholas, and Jennifer Sherer. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/"><em>The Case for Tripling Union Membership: How Rebuilding Union Power Would Strengthen Workers, the Economy, and Our Democracy</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, July 2026.</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2023. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-in-racism/"><em>Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: The Failed Southern Economic Development Model</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, October 2023.</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2024a. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-racism-part2/"><em>Breaking Down the South’s Economic Underperformance: Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation, Part Two</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, June 2024.</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2024b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-racism-part3/#epi-toc-2"><em>Southern Policymakers Leave Workers with Lower Wages and a Fraying Safety Net: Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: Part Three</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.</p>
<p>Cid-Martinez, Ismael, Nina Mast, Margaret Poydock, and Valerie Wilson. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Costly for Workers and Social Insurance Systems</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, <a href="https://microdata.epi.org">https://microdata.epi.org</a>.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. “<a href="https://data.epi.org/labor_force/labor_force_emp/line/year/national/percent_emp/age_group?timeStart=2018-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2025-01-01&amp;dateString=2019-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=age_25_54">Employment by Demographics—Employment-to-Population Ratio</a>,” <em>State of Working America Data Library. </em>Accessed October 20, 2026.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026c. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/resources/budget/">Family Budget Calculator</a>” (web page). Last modified March 2026.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026d. “<a href="https://data.epi.org/labor_force/labor_force_lf/line/year/national/percent_lf/gender?timeStart=1979-01-01&amp;timeEnd=2025-01-01&amp;dateString=2000-01-01&amp;highlightedLines=gender_male&amp;highlightedLines=gender_female">Labor Force Participation—Labor Force Participation Rate</a>,”<em> State of Working America Data Library. </em>Accessed October 20, 2026.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026e. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/event/mass-deportations-an-anti-worker-agenda-that-harms-everyone/">Mass Deportations—an Anti-Worker Agenda That Harms Everyone</a>.” Webinar panel discussion, October 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Fast, Joe, and Elise Gould. 2026. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/class-of-2026-young-college-graduates-face-a-weaker-labor-market-but-a-more-mixed-picture-than-the-headlines-suggest/">Young College Graduates Face a Weaker Labor Market—but a More Mixed Picture Than the Headlines Suggest</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), May 7, 2026.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise, and Katherine deCourcy. 2024. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/swa-wages-2023/"><em>Fastest Wage Growth over the Last Four Years Among Historically Disadvantaged Groups: Low-Wage Workers’ Wages Surged After Decades of Slow Growth</em></a> . Economic Policy Institute, March 2024.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise, Sarah Jane Glynn, Hilary Wething, and Josh Bivens. 2025<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/good-news-and-bad-news-about-u-s-labor-force-participation-many-headwinds-from-the-2010s-are-gone-but-were-not-investing-enough-in-the-future/"><em>.</em><em> Good News and Bad News About U.S. Labor Force Participation: Many Headwinds from the 2010s Are Gone, but We’re Not Investing Enough in the Future</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise, and Hilary Wething. 2026<em>. </em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-suppression-in-10-charts/"><em>Wage Suppression in 10 Charts</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, September 2026.</p>
<p>Kramer, Stephanie, and Jeffrey S. Passel. 2025. “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2025/08/21/key-findings-about-us-immigrants/">What the Data Says About Immigrants in the U.S.</a>” <em>Pew Research Center</em>, August 21, 2025.</p>
<p>Migration Policy Institute (MPI). 2025. “<a href="https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data-tool/largest-us-immigrant-groups">Top Ten Largest U.S. Immigrant Groups, 1960–2024</a>” (web page). Accessed October 20, 2026.</p>
<p>Mora, Marie T., and Alberto Dávila. 2018. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-hispanic-white-wage-gap-has-remained-wide-and-relatively-steady-examining-hispanic-white-gaps-in-wages-unemployment-labor-force-participation-and-education-by-gender-immigrant/"><em>The Hispanic–White Wage Gap Has Remained Wide and Relatively Steady: Examining Hispanic–White Gaps in Wages, Unemployment, Labor Force Participation, and Education by Gender, Immigration Status, and Other Subpopulations</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, July 2018.</p>
<p>Quadlin, Natasha, Ton VanHeuvelen, and Caitlin E. Ahearn. 2023. “<a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37061326/">Higher Education and High-Wage Gender Inequality.</a>” <em>Social Science Research</em> 112, 102873. DOI: <a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2023.102873" target="_blank" rel="noopener">10.1016/j.ssresearch.2023.102873</a>.</p>
<p>Rotondaro, Vinnie. 2026. “<a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/213121/democratic-socialists-america-problem-middle-class-socialism">The Problem with Middle-Class Socialism</a>.” <em>New Republic,</em> July 23, 2026.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., Valerie Wilson, Jori Kandra, and Daniel Perez. 2022. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/"><em>Botched Policy Responses to Globalization Have Decimated Manufacturing Employment with Often Overlooked Costs for Black, Brown, and Other Workers of Color: Investing in Infrastructure and Rebalancing Trade Can Create Good Jobs for All</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2022.</p>
<p>Stimpfel, Amy Witkoski, Kathryn Leep-Lazar, Maile Mercer, and Kathleen DeMarco. 2025. “‘Scheduling Is Everything’: A Qualitative Descriptive Study of Job and Schedule Satisfaction of Staff Nurses and Nurse Managers.” <em>Western Journal of Nursing Research</em> 47, no. 10: 912–923. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280">https://doi.org/10.1177/01939459251330280</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>United States Census Bureau (Census). 2022. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/visualizations/time-series/demo/fig_6.png">Figure 6: Percent of Population 25 Years and Over, and 25 to 29 Years Old, with Bachelor&#8217;s Degree or Higher by Sex: 1947–2021</a>,” [chart image], <em>CPS Historical Time Series Visualizations. </em>Published February 24, 2022.</p>
<p>Williams, Jhacova, and Valerie Wilson. 2019. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-racial-disparities-in-employment/"><em>Black Workers Endure Persistent Racial Disparities in Employment Outcomes</em></a><em>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, August 2019.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016a. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/african-americans-are-paid-less-than-whites-at-every-education-level/"><em>African Americans Are Paid Less Than Whites at Every Education Level</em></a> (economic snapshot). Economic Policy Institute, October 2016.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2016b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-changing-demographics-of-americas-working-class/"><em>People of Color Will Be a Majority of the American Working Class in 2032: What This Means for the Effort to Grow Wages and Reduce Inequality</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, June 2016.</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage: Raising the Wage to Two-Thirds of the National Median Wage Would Lift Pay for Nearly 40 Million Workers</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Misclassification: State solutions to the U.S. worker rights crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:00:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nina Mast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327039</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[What do federal laws say about employee status and worker Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>What do federal laws say about employee status and worker misclassification?</h2>
<p>Misclassification occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor. This problem is pervasive and widespread: As many as <a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/">10–30% of employers</a> misclassify their workers.</p>
<p>The way a worker is classified has serious implications for their labor rights and economic security. Federal, state, and local labor laws provide extensive protections for employees that are not available to independent contractors. Workers misclassified as independent contractors:</p>
<ul>
<li>Are not protected by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which ensures workers are paid at least the federal minimum wage and receive overtime pay (150% of their regular pay rate for work in excess of 40 hours per week);</li>
<li>Are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which ensures workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively to improve their working conditions;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are not eligible for unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Do not qualify for paid sick or family leave, and are extremely unlikely to receive employer-provided health insurance or retirement benefits;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Are <a href="https://www.abetterbalance.org/state-leadership-on-anti-discrimination-protections-for-independent-contractors/">not covered</a> by antidiscrimination and sexual harassment protections in most states.</li>
</ul>
<p>Workers misclassified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split these costs evenly with their employer.</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>How is employee status determined? Legal tests and their nuances</h3>
<p>There are various legal tests for determining employee status for the purpose of coverage under federal worker protection laws, such as the FLSA and NLRA, as well as tax laws. Likewise, states have adopted a range of their own definitions and tests for determining employee status under various state worker protection and tax policies.</p>
<p>At the federal level, interpretations of these tests have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">varied across different presidential administrations</a>. The Democratic Obama and Biden administrations defined “employee” more broadly under both the FLSA and NLRA, while Trump’s first-term Department of Labor (DOL) and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) appointees applied a more restrictive definition that denied more workers the protections afforded by employee status. The current Trump DOL recently issued a final rule that formally rescinds Biden-era guidance and makes it easier for employers to misclassify workers as independent contractors.</p>
<p>The three most common tests are (1) the “common law” test, (2) the “economic realities” test, and (3) the “ABC test,” though some jurisdictions combine elements of multiple tests.</p>
<p><strong>Common law test: </strong>Derived from court decisions over the years, the common law test uses a long list of factors for evaluating whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor. There are several versions of this test, including the <a href="https://udel.edu/~pollack/Acct351/handouts/definititions%20in%20restatement%202d%20law%20of%20agency.htm">“Restatement (Second) of Agency”</a> and the Internal Revenue Service’s <a href="https://www.valdosta.edu/administration/finance-admin/human-resources/documents/IRSFactorTest_000.pdf">20-factor test</a>. Typically, a test that includes a long list of factors is a version of common law. The common law test is primarily concerned with the &#8220;right to control&#8221; how the work is performed and has been <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2015/03/LegalLandscapeUS.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">criticized</a> for being insufficiently protective, overly subjective, and open to manipulation.&nbsp;However, it is the most prominently applied test at the state level, and it is also used by the NLRB to determine whether a worker is eligible for organizing and collective bargaining rights under the National Labor Relations Act.</p>
<p><strong>Economic realities test: </strong>A broader six-factor<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> test used to determine employee status, derived from the Fair Labor Standards Act definition of “employ,” which is “to suffer or permit to work.” Under this definition, most workers are considered employees. U.S. DOL has typically utilized this test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections.</p>
<p><strong>ABC test:</strong> The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining independent contractor status, offering more protections than either the Biden-era version of the economic realities test or the common law test. Unlike weaker standards, the ABC test establishes a presumption that an individual performing services for an employer is an employee—not an independent contractor—unless the employer can establish each of three factors:</p>
<ul>
<li>The work is done without the direction and control of the employer (“absence of control”);</li>
<li>The work is performed outside the usual course of the employer’s business (“outside usual course of business”); and</li>
<li>The work is done by someone who has their own independent business or trade doing that kind of work (“customarily engaged”).</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>What are the threats to existing protections against illegal worker misclassification?</strong></h2>
<p>Current federal threats include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>A weaker federal interpretation for determining employee status</strong>: The Trump administration is conducting its final review of an independent contractor rule that will expand misclassification and formally rescind&nbsp;the Biden administration’s 2024 <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/01/10/2024-00067/employee-or-independent-contractor-classification-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act">final rule</a>, which provided a strong interpretation of the legal test for determining independent contractor status. The proposed version of Trump’s rule was <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/">estimated to cost workers</a> over $3.7 billion annually and to rob federal and state social insurance funds of at least $357 million annually. Even before finalizing the rule, Trump’s DOL had instructed its staff to stop utilizing the 2024 rule.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Legislation to weaken the definition of “employee” under federal law: </strong>A <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/1319/all-actions">bill before Congress</a> proposes changing the FLSA and NLRA definitions of “employee” to exclude more workers from protections under these laws by making it easier to classify them as independent contractors.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Attacks on immigrant workers: </strong>The Trump administration’s mass deportation agenda has terrorized communities, and past research suggests that anti-immigrant attacks sow fear in workplaces, leading to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/">increased labor abuses</a> in industries where immigrants tend to work and where misclassification is already rampant (e.g., construction, landscaping, and cleaning). Trump has also eliminated <a href="https://bettzedek.org/bloomberg-law-uscis-quietly-ends-program-to-shield-workers-reporting-abuse/">deferred action for workers who report labor abuses</a>, removing safeguards against retaliation that were intended to enable workers to come forward and report violations (including misclassification) without fear, regardless of their immigration status.</li>
<li><strong>Diminished resources for federal enforcement</strong>: Trump has <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-trump-has-dismantled-the-federal-workforce-in-his-first-100-days/">gutted</a> the federal workforce, including at DOL agencies that enforce workers’ rights, such as the Wage and Hour Division (WHD), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Mine Safety and Health Administration. And his budget bill proposed cutting <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/republican-budget-exacerbates-underfunding-of-worker-protection-agencies/">$72 million</a> from WHD and OSHA despite both agencies already being understaffed and underfunded. Trump’s budget bill also slashed <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/medicaid-and-snap-cuts-will-harm-students-and-local-economies/">federal</a> <a href="https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-administration-has-cut-or-frozen-177-billion-in-grants-across-every-state-analysis-shows">funding</a> to states. New DOL <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pJlcv9vmjFjx88AqJ6tAEsCPBRNR1-mF/view">enforcement guidance</a> instructs agency staff to take a more permissive approach to enforcement and instead focus on &#8220;compliance assistance.” A <a href="https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-general-counsel-issues-case-handling-guidance">memo</a> issued earlier this year by the NLRB general counsel urges investigators not to pursue “enhanced remedies” against employers that commit unfair labor practices and to prioritize settlement over litigation of such cases. Trump’s recently confirmed secretary of labor has <a href="https://www.hrdive.com/news/sonderling-trump-DOL-EEOC-AI/824138/">voiced support</a> for more business-friendly regulations and employer self-audits.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Ongoing industry attempts to erode labor standards:</strong> Industry groups representing employers that especially benefit from misclassifying workers as independent contractors—such as gig work and construction employers—have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">relentlessly attacked</a> state-level ABC tests<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> and sought to weaken the legal definition of “employment” to permanently exclude their workers from federal and state protections not available to independent contractors.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>
<ul>
<li>One of the latest manifestations of this agenda is the push by app-based companies—which classify their workers as independent contractors to avoid providing benefits—for “portable benefits” schemes (i.e., savings accounts that can be used for health care and other expenses). Portable benefits legislation has proliferated in at least 11 states in the past two years,<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> offering <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/why-workers-need-real-portable-benefits/">limited benefits to few workers</a> while allowing platform companies to keep avoiding providing workers legitimate employment benefits.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>Federal legal frameworks for protecting against worker misclassification are limited in their applicability to begin with, and now even these limited protections are under threat. The FLSA and NLRA apply legal tests to determine employee status under these two laws, while many other protections and benefits workers may be eligible for are determined at the state level.</p>
<h2><strong>How can states maintain and strengthen labor standards and enforcement?</strong></h2>
<p>The erosion of employee classification standards has serious consequences for states. Misclassification not only hurts workers but also deprives federal and state social insurance funds of the revenue needed to support injured, unemployed, and older workers. At a time when states are facing budgetary shortfalls prompted by the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-radical-republican-budget-bill-steals-from-the-poor-to-give-tax-cuts-to-the-rich/">massive tax cuts</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/100-days-100-ways-trump-hurt-workers/">its gutting of the federal workforce</a> and federal programs, lost revenue from misclassification will constrain them even further. To safeguard workers’ right to proper classification under state wage and hour laws, states should, at a minimum: analyze the costs of misclassification, meaningfully enforce their existing standards, and—where possible—seek to enshrine in state law the interpretation of the six-factor economic realities test adopted by the Biden administration. Ideally, states should endeavor to go further and implement the even stronger ABC test for determining employee status. States should also pair a strong ABC test with additional protections against misclassification and robust enforcement.</p>
<p>Addressing misclassification will ensure that workers are paid at least the minimum wage for their work and made eligible for benefits to which they are legally entitled. It will also ensure that states receive the necessary revenue to support workers and state agencies charged with enforcing worker protections.&nbsp;</p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h3>Getting started: Key questions to investigate how your state treats misclassification</h3>
<p>Legal standards on employee classification (and mechanisms for enforcing these standards) vary considerably across and even within states. For example, a state may have a strong legal standard for determining employee status for the purposes of unemployment insurance benefits but not for protections under state wage and hour laws. Additionally, misclassification is typically addressed by amending state statutes through the legislative process, but some states have also used the administrative rulemaking process to clarify state agencies’ interpretation of existing legal standards, depending on the underlying statute and scope of state agencies’ authority.</p>
<p>Here are some key questions to investigate the legal landscape in your state:</p>
<ul>
<li>How is the term “employee” defined in relevant state laws, including the laws governing workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, and wage and hour protections? Within your state’s wage and hour laws, are there any industry-specific provisions related to misclassification, such as in construction?</li>
<li>What are the legal tests used to determine whether a worker is an employee for the purposes of coverage under each law? Different interpretations may apply to different laws, and the test may not be spelled out in statute. You may need to search your state’s labor agency website.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, Wisconsin applies a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/wisconsin/chapter-108/section-108-02/">two-part test</a> to unemployment insurance but applies the economic realities test to wage and hour laws (the economic realities test is <a href="https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/worker-classification/er/laborstandards/employers.htm">not in statute</a> but is instead based on an interpretation of common law).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>In addition to statutory tests, does your state have administrative rules and regulations that provide guidance when interpreting legal tests?
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, New Jersey has a statutory ABC test covering six state statutes—including unemployment compensation, wage and hour, and earned sick leave—and <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">recently adopted new regulations</a> to codify the state’s longstanding interpretation of the test and provide more detailed regulatory guidance on how the ABC test applies.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>What remedies are available to illegally misclassified workers under state law? These remedies may be covered in a standalone section of a state’s employment statute.
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">For example, in Minnesota, remedies available to misclassified workers are not covered under “Payment of Wages” but under a separate “Misclassification of Employees” section.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Has your state already conducted research regarding the cost of misclassification to workers and the state? If so, that analysis may provide useful statistics for advocating for better enforcement or a stronger legal test.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h3>Step I: Enforce existing standards, assess costs, and ensure legal test is at least as strong as 2024 Biden rule</h3>
<h4><strong>Vigorously enforce existing standards and take note of their weaknesses</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>While state laws defining employee status vary considerably, a legal test is only as strong as its enforcement. Regardless of a state’s particular test, strong enforcement of the law is essential. (Specific recommendations for robust enforcement are covered in Step II.) For example, though Minnesota does not have an ABC test, <a href="https://www.littler.com/news-analysis/asap/effective-july-1-minnesota-employers-face-increased-scrutiny-and-possible">lawmakers</a>, the <a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/business/employment-practices/intergovernmental-misclassification-enforcement-and-education">labor agency</a>, and the <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/">attorney general</a> have taken significant steps to address misclassification and expand remedies for workers subject to illegal misclassification. In <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/minnesota/chapters-175-187/chapter-181/section-181-722/" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">Minnesota</a>, employers who misclassify workers can be penalized for the violation and required to pay back wages, overtime, and other compensation workers lost as a result. Workers can also <a href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">sue their employer directly</a> to enforce their right to proper classification.</p>
<h4><strong>Investigate the costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds</strong></h4>
<p>If their state has not already done so, lawmakers can propose legislation creating a task force to study the impact of illegal misclassification and then make policy recommendations to the legislature. Given the high costs of misclassification to workers and social insurance funds, these studies can help create a sense of urgency and build support for further action on misclassification protections among lawmakers who may not otherwise see it as a priority.</p>
<p>These task forces can be created by legislation, executive order, or existing agency authority. For example, in 2020, Louisiana lawmakers passed a <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://dam.ldr.la.gov/miscellaneous/SR%2022.pdf">resolution</a> requesting that the Department of Revenue establish a Misclassification of Employees Task Force to study the costs of misclassification and recommend ways for the legislature to address them. In 2008, Iowa Governor Chet Culver initiated a misclassification task force to study the issue and report its findings to him. And in 2023, Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison formed an Advisory Task Force on Worker Misclassification; its <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Taskforce/Misclassification/Meetings/20241220/AdoptedRecommendations.pdf">policy recommendations</a> formed the basis of <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2024/05/20_EmployerMisclassification.asp">2024 legislation</a> that made it easier for workers to report misclassification, established a private right of action to recoup denied wages, increased penalties for violations, and improved government coordination on misclassification investigations.</p>
<p>Task forces to study the impact of misclassification can also lead to more cross-agency coordination to crack down on misclassification and other violations that often occur alongside it (see Step III for more on interagency coordination). By vigorously enforcing their existing standards and investigating the costs of misclassification, states can still address harm and deter violations, regardless of how strong those standards are.</p>
<h4><strong>Adopt the economic realities test in common law states</strong>&nbsp;</h4>
<p>States can ensure that their employment laws include a test for determining independent contractor status that is at least as strong as the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20240109-1">six-factor economic realities rule issued to apply to the FLSA</a> during the Biden administration. The six-factor economic realities test is stronger than the common law test and overly simplistic “right to control” tests used by many states because it determines independent contractor status by asking whether the worker is in fact in business for themselves. For example, while one 2026 proposed bill in Kentucky (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) would enshrine an ABC test in the state&#8217;s wage and hour code, a narrower and less ambitious but perhaps more feasible bill (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/sb117.html">SB 117</a>) would prohibit misclassification on publicly funded construction projects—excluding workers in all other industries—and would use the six-factor economic realities test instead of an ABC test to determine whether a worker was misclassified. The economic realities test may be an option for lawmakers to consider in states where adopting an ABC test is not immediately feasible.</p>
<h3>Step II: Establish a strong ABC test and pair it with robust enforcement</h3>
<p>A strong legal test for determining employee status is fundamental to asserting workers’ right to proper classification and provides a strong basis for enforcement. The ABC test is the strongest standard for determining employee status. It differs from <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">other tests of employee status</a> (such as the common law test used under the NLRA and by the IRS, and the economic realities test used under the FLSA) because the ABC test presumes that workers are employees, places the burden on the employer to prove otherwise, and provides a clear, narrow definition of independent contractor status. The test seeks to determine whether an individual is truly in business for themselves, which reduces the likelihood that workers are misclassified and lose protections they should be guaranteed under the law as employees. States should adopt the ABC test in as many of their labor protection statutes as possible.</p>
<p>The ABC test has not yet been adopted at the federal level, though legislation has been proposed. For example, the federal Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act would enshrine the ABC test in at least one federal law (the National Labor Relations Act) for purposes of determining workers’ organizing and bargaining rights but has not yet passed both chambers of Congress. Even if the ABC test were someday widely adopted at the federal level, state ABC tests would still be needed to address exclusions from federal protections and ensure adequate enforcement.</p>
<p>Eighteen states and the District of Columbia currently use the ABC test for determining employee status for certain workplace laws, but the strength of states’ classification standards varies widely (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). Even within states with ABC tests, some apply the test only to workers in certain industries, and most of these states have adopted the test only for the purpose of determining unemployment insurance eligibility—and not for wage and hour protections or workers’ compensation. Most states do not have ABC tests and apply weaker tests to determine employee status or have implemented components of an ABC test that fall short of the full test (see Figure A), and almost no state has made progress on advancing ABC tests in the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">past three years</a>.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327198 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327198" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327198-36051-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Some states have recently taken action to implement an ABC test or strengthen their existing one. For example, in addition to pursuing strong, innovative <a href="https://www.nelp.org/new-jerseys-worker-classification-crackdown-could-have-broad-impact/">enforcement strategies</a> to combat misclassification, New Jersey’s labor department proposed a <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260505_ABC.shtml">new administrative rule</a> in 2025 to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-new-jerseys-proposed-regulation-codifying-its-interpretation-of-the-states-statutory-abc-test/">codify into state law</a> the agency’s existing interpretation of the state&#8217;s ABC test for preventing independent contractor misclassification. And in 2026, lawmakers in <a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">Kentucky</a> proposed establishing a new ABC test in state wage and hour law.</p>
<p>States should seek to apply ABC tests to as many worker protection statutes as possible and limit carveouts that exclude certain workers based on their industry or occupation—the goal is to protect all workers with the simplest, most effective standard possible. However, focusing on a particular problem industry may be more politically feasible and can ensure some of the most vulnerable workers are protected while advocates build pressure to expand the test’s coverage. For example, several states have implemented an ABC test for the construction industry—long known for its <a href="https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2022/11/erlich_ilrr_final_article_11.28.20.pdf">reliance on illegal misclassification</a>—covering all relevant standards, including wage and hour laws, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and income tax.</p>
<p>Lawmakers and advocates should also beware of legislation intended to weaken existing ABC tests or undermine the ABC test’s presumption that a worker is an employee <em>unless the employer can prove otherwise</em>. For example, a <a href="https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2026/A1184">2026 bill</a> introduced on the heels of New Jersey’s new misclassification rule proposes eliminating the B and C factors in the state’s ABC test, effectively replacing the ABC test with a much weaker, single-factor “right to control” test. Additionally, a 2026 West Virginia bill (<a href="https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4571%20intr.htm&amp;yr=2026&amp;sesstype=RS&amp;i=4571">HB 4571</a>) proposes establishing an ABC test designed to prevent the state from being deprived of income tax revenue, but the test presumes a worker is an independent contractor <em>unless</em> the employer demonstrates that the worker is in fact an employee (a true ABC test requires employers to prove a worker is an independent contractor, not an employee).</p>
<p>For states with no existing ABC test, lawmakers can propose legislation to establish a standard and provide remedies for misclassified workers within a single proposal. For example, the 2026 Kentucky bill mentioned above (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/26rs/hb449.html">HB 449</a>) proposed enshrining an ABC test in state wage and hour code and proposed new remedies for misclassified workers, including back wages, liquidated damages, and the right to pursue legal action against their employer.</p>
<p>A strong legal standard must be paired with action to enforce the law, and there are numerous policy options to strengthen workers’ rights and improve the enforcement of the state’s misclassification standards. Lawmakers can:</p>
<ul>
<li>Establish specific penalties for misclassification and make them sufficiently high to deter violations. Under the FLSA, the act of misclassification carries no penalty. Instead, aggrieved workers are limited to remedies for minimum wage and overtime violations uncovered during an investigation. States can address this gap in federal law by making misclassification a standalone violation and establishing penalties for misclassification, as Minnesota does. Lawmakers can also amend their statutes to direct penalties toward enforcement, as <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/generalmisclassification.shtml">New Jersey</a> does.</li>
<li>Increase the remedies for workers, including by making aggrieved workers eligible for compensatory damages in addition to back wages, and establishing a private right of action for workers to pursue legal action against offending employers, as Minnesota does.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Encourage workers to report labor abuses by extending the timeframe for filing wage and misclassification claims and by establishing anti-retaliation protections that include a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Rather than putting the onus on workers to prove they faced retaliation, a “rebuttable presumption” of retaliation assumes adverse action taken shortly after protected activity was retaliatory unless the employer can prove otherwise (see Pennsylvania’s <a href="https://codes.findlaw.com/pa/title-43-ps-labor/pa-st-sect-43-933-10.html">Construction Workplace Misclassification Act</a>).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Where state law authorizes these approaches, use “stop work” orders and “hot goods” provisions to prohibit employers from continuing work or profiting from the shipment of goods produced using illegally misclassified workers.
<ul>
<li>New Jersey&#8217;s <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/wageandhour/tools-resources/laws/conindindependentcontractoract.shtml">Construction Industry Independent Contractor Act</a> was recently used to <a href="https://www.nj.gov/labor/lwdhome/press/2026/20260807_Stop_Work.shtml">stop work</a> by four subcontractors after investigators found wage theft and multiple labor law violations affecting 15 workers. In 2026, the New York Senate <a href="https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2025/S1514">passed a bill</a> that would permit “stop work” orders to be implemented for willful misclassification in any industry.</li>
<li>In the spirit of a “hot goods” provision, California’s labor code pertaining to the <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/california/code-lab/division-2/part-11/chapter-2/section-2680/">garment industry</a> requires manufacturers to be registered with the state; if apparel is manufactured without registration, state labor enforcers may confiscate the garments and destroy or dispose of them.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Require employers to provide workers with transparent statements of their employment status and a justification for their classification, as was <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3178">proposed</a> in the 2011 Employee Misclassification Prevention Act.</li>
</ul>
<p>In the past two years, at least 15 states have proposed legislation or administrative rules to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification and state agencies’ enforcement of misclassification laws (see<strong> Appendix Table 1</strong>).</p>
<h3>Step III: Implement innovative strategies to strengthen workers’ right to proper classification</h3>
<p>Beyond the remedies described in Step II, which focus on holding employers accountable and expanding worker protections, state lawmakers and agencies can implement the below actions to more effectively combat misclassification and prevent misclassification from happening in the first place:</p>
<h4><strong>Establish interagency coordination and enforce protections against misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>Misclassification is pervasive across many industries, but often states and cities lack the resources to address the issue comprehensively. States across the country have created <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/public-task-forces-take-on-employee-misclassification-best-practices/">interagency task forces</a> with dedicated resources, staff, and <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/Toolbox_Tool12_Intro_to_Co-enforcement_final.pdf">partnerships with worker organizations</a>, enabling them to more effectively crack down on misclassification in targeted industries. These task forces allow the state to pool efforts and expertise and use its limited resources more efficiently to address misclassification as well as other labor violations that frequently occur alongside misclassification. For example, last year, Washington’s attorney general <a href="https://www.atg.wa.gov/news/news-releases/ag-nick-brown-launches-worker-rights-unit-enforce-protections-fight-exploitation">established a worker rights unit</a> to combat wage theft and misclassification through strategic litigation, increased collaboration with state agencies, and partnerships with legislators to advance new worker protections. Interagency misclassification enforcement task forces have delivered significant results for workers and the state. For example, in 2018, in a one-year period Tennessee’s Employee Misclassification Education and Enforcement Fund and Uninsured Employers Fund unit found <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/workforce/documents/injuries/2019ComplianceAnnualReport.pdf">over 250 workers’ compensation and misclassification violations</a> and assessed nearly $6 million in penalties for the violations. The programs also helped over 1,250 employees gain workers’ compensation coverage for work-related illnesses and injuries. The same year, audits conducted by Oregon’s interagency task force on misclassification discovered over <a style="font-family: inherit; font-size: inherit; font-style: inherit; font-variant-ligatures: inherit; font-variant-caps: inherit; font-weight: inherit; background-color: #ffffff;" href="https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/citizen_engagement/Reports/2019-ICN-Interagency-Compliance-Network-Report.pdf">$73 million</a> in unreported payroll and resulted in the reclassification of nearly 7,000 workers.</p>
<h4><strong>Create a presumption of employee status for workers</strong></h4>
<p>One simple and effective way to deter misclassification in states without an ABC test is to create a presumption of employee status, meaning that workers are presumed to be employees unless proven otherwise. For example, New Mexico does not apply an ABC test to determine eligibility for wage and hour protections, but the state does apply a <a href="https://law.justia.com/codes/new-mexico/chapter-60/article-13/section-60-13-3-1/">presumption of employee status</a> to workers in the construction industry. Construction contractors that improperly report employees as independent contractors are subject to criminal penalties.</p>
<h2>Additional recommended resources</h2>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</a> [full report] and <a href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet/">state fact sheets</a> (Economic Policy Institute)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Policy-Brief-Public-Task-Forces-Take-on-Employee-Misclassification-Updated-August-2020.pdf">Public Task Forces Take on Employee Misclassification: Best Practices</a> (National Employment Law Project)</li>
<li><a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/347871314_Misclassification_in_Construction_The_Original_Gig_Economy">Misclassification in Construction: The Original Gig Economy</a> (Cornell University Industrial &amp; Labor Relations Review)</li>
</ul>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The author is grateful to EPI Senior Fellow Lynn Rhinehart for her expertise and guidance.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break">&nbsp;</div>
<h2>Appendix</h2>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-327055 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327055" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327055-36036-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<div class="pdf-page-break">&nbsp;</div>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The six factors are: (1) opportunity for profit or loss depending on managerial skill; (2) investments by the worker and the potential employer; (3) degree of permanence of the work relationship; (4) nature and degree of control; (5) extent to which the work performed is an integral part of the potential employer’s business; and (6) skill and initiative.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See, for example, New Jersey A1184 (failed in 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> See, for example, Nebraska LB 229 (enacted in 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> See Alabama SB 86 (2025), Georgia HB 987 (2026), Idaho H 645 (2026), Kentucky HB 732 (2026), Louisiana HB 301 (2026), Massachusetts HB 1108 (2026), Nebraska LR 414 (2026), Rhode Island H 7365 (2026), West Virginia SB 269 (2025) and HB 4009 (2026), Wisconsin SB 269 (2025), and Wyoming SF 41 (2026).</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>AI and the economy: Your questions, answered</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/ai-and-the-economy-your-questions-answered/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327528</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span class="dropped">T</span></strong>his FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise. But we&nbsp;do&nbsp;have considerable expertise regarding AI’s potential effect on labor markets and the broader impacts of technological change on the economy.</p>
<p>Further, many of AI’s potential effects on the economy are largely distinct from its consequences in these other areas, making the economic effects amenable to separate, granular analysis. For example, if poorly regulated and recklessly deployed AI systems lead to disruptive cybersecurity incidents, this could obviously have some economic effects (imagine a large bank suffering a cyberattack and depositors’ funds being frozen or inaccessible for a time). But regulatory failures and irresponsible management of AI systems that lead to cyberattacks do not really signal anything about the economic potential for AI tools to replace human labor at large scale or about how a rapid evaporation of AI investment or stock market gains would ripple through the economy. Nor does the right policy to mitigate possible cybersecurity or disinformation problems exacerbated by AI have much at all to do with the optimal policy to ensure working families’ prosperity and economic security in an age of AI.</p>
<p>Across all realms of AI policy, much attention has been paid to regulations that are specifically tailored to AI. This might be appropriate in some fields. However, we suggest that not enough attention has been paid to simply applying protections, norms, and institutions that predate AI to its uses. For example, tort law already makes it possible to hold companies liable for harms their products create. While the application of these existing legal remedies to AI hacking incidents could potentially be clarified, it doesn’t seem to require a huge new field of law or legislation to make this possible. Further, we should significantly <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/">strengthen</a> the application and enforcement of existing protections for workers. For example, employers should be held liable when they discriminate against workers, rather than being able to evade accountability because the discriminatory impact stemmed from their use of an algorithm or other automated system.</p>
<p>This notion that existing best practices, policies, and ideas are likely to be the best solutions to the problems AI may cause holds particularly true when it comes to its economic effects. The single largest concern expressed in this realm is AI’s potential to permanently displace very large amounts of human labor in a short period of time, causing economy-wide joblessness and wage declines. This FAQ will examine the economic evidence surrounding many of these concerns, but one key conclusion to state here is that even if such a scenario seemed plausible, it is highly unlikely that policies tailored specifically to AI tools’ potential uses in workplaces could ever keep up with, let alone proactively block, the ways that millions of private-sector firms are adopting these tools. What would reduce the most harm in such scenarios is implementing ideas already firmly on the policy agenda for many: keep the macroeconomy well managed and unemployment rates very low; provide effective protection for workers’ rights to form unions and bargain in the workplace over issues like how technology is implemented; offer a more protective social safety net that makes spells of joblessness less devastating for workers experiencing them; and implement progressive taxes—particularly higher tax rates on income derived from capital.</p>
<p>It is understandable that people are anxious about what AI could do to workers’ jobs and wages in coming years; the U.S. labor market has been rigged by policy for decades to make most workers insecure and keep their wages suppressed. AI deployed into this rigged labor market, as is happening currently, is unlikely to provide much benefit to most workers and could inject more churn and uncertainty. But making the policy changes noted above and deploying AI in a high-road economy where policy forces labor markets to perform better could allay many of these worries. In fact, if power were rebalanced in our economy to ensure workers are protected and empowered, AI might deliver real tangible benefits to most workers in the form of faster wage growth.</p>
<p>To be clear, arguing that broad, pre-existing ideas for how to unrig labor markets and generate shared prosperity are the best response to the economic concerns of AI does not mean we’re not taking AI “seriously” or recognizing its potential harms across many other realms. Instead, our recommendation stems from granular analysis of how AI might affect the economy and labor markets.</p>
<a name='1'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>How should we think about AI&#8217;s likely effects on jobs and wages?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>The effect of AI on the wages and employment of typical U.S. workers will, like most technological advances, hinge almost entirely on the broader economic, social, and political context. Crucially, the U.S. labor market has been largely rigged by policy to suppress wages and opportunities for most workers. In this context, there is little upside for U.S. workers from widespread deployment of AI tools. There are also widespread fears that AI might threaten jobs and wages on a large scale. But were the labor market substantially unrigged, AI tools could well raise the living standards of working people. Nothing inherent to AI lets us forecast its potential effects on U.S. workers, for good or bad. This will be determined by policy.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>Being relatively agnostic about the direct effect of technology and AI on labor markets does not imply that we think labor markets have been working well for U.S. workers. On the contrary, unemployment has been too high and wage growth too low for <em>most</em> years in recent decades. But the roots of labor market dysfunction—both past and future—have very little to do with technological changes. Instead, this dysfunction is driven by the concerted policy push to exacerbate the extreme imbalance of power between typical workers and the corporate managers and capital owners who hire and supervise them.</p>
<p>It is important to get the facts and analysis right on the questions of why labor markets have not delivered enough jobs or acceptable wage growth, and what the real threats are to decent jobs in the future. The current fixation on AI—and the resulting pressures to respond with policies that wrap tightly around AI-specific parameters—distracts from the more fundamental problem of imbalanced power in labor markets, pulling policy in less useful directions.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='2'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>What’s AI’s most immediate threat to the U.S. economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>AI-related spending accounts for roughly half of U.S. growth in recent quarters—a narrow and fragile base for economic growth. That spending comes from two sources: (1) tangible investment in data centers, hardware, and research, and (2) consumption financed by the AI-driven stock bubble. Both spending flows could reverse quickly if expectations change about the future profitability of AI tools. If this reversal happens, the economy may well enter recession unless policymakers react nimbly and smartly.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>There are two main spending flows associated with the race to develop and sell AI tools for mass-market use. The first is tangible business investment—what we’ll call capital expenditures, or <em>capex</em>. Many firms are hoping to be in the first wave of companies whose AI products are adopted, so they are currently investing heavily in data centers, servers, racks, and research. This wave of AI-related spending is driving demand for land, hardware and software components, construction materials, and the labor needed to build data centers, develop the models, and market them.</p>
<p>The other spending flow comes from the sharp rise in the market valuation of AI-related companies, which has driven a stock market boom—or, likely, bubble—in recent years. Part of households’ annual consumption spending comes from wealth (not just income). According to <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/jep.14.2.99.pdf">general estimates</a>, $1 in increased stock market wealth leads to around 3 cents in additional consumption spending. To the degree AI is driving above-normal valuations of the stock market relative to current fundamentals, the extra consumption spending out of this “excess” wealth can be attributed to AI.</p>
<p>To measure the AI effect on capex, macroeconomic observers have looked at the categories of business investment where the AI build-out is concentrated—data centers, information processing equipment, software, and R&amp;D—and calculated how much these categories are contributing to GDP growth over and above historical norms. This excess contribution has recently reached roughly 0.7% of GDP. In an economy where growth runs at roughly 2%, this would constitute roughly a third of all <em>increases</em> in GDP. That said, some portion of this capex spending—likely a third to a half—probably stems from increased imports, which are then subtracted out of the contribution to domestic growth. Very roughly, we estimate that the AI capex build-out has likely contributed 0.5% to GDP growth in the past year.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-325901 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325901" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325901-36060-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>For the consumption effect associated with AI, we look at today’s ratio of price to earnings (P/E ratio) in the overall stock market (the S&amp;P 500 specifically). This measures how expensive it is to buy a dollar’s worth of earnings. Today, it is more expensive than in any period in history except the very late 1990s–2000, an unambiguous bubble that was also driven by wild enthusiasm about tech and saw a very large correction. Today’s P/E ratio is close to 40. A more normal ratio—though still high in historical terms—would be 30. If the stock market fell from a P/E ratio of 40 to one of 30 in a relatively short period of time, that would constitute a 25% decline in household wealth in corporate equities. That decline in wealth would imply a consumption reduction of about $200 billion, or roughly 0.7% of GDP.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326134 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326134" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326134-36061-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>Combined, the contributions of these two AI-related spending flows to GDP growth likely exceed 1% of GDP. Since the first quarter of 2025, growth <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1XYEd">has averaged roughly 2%</a>, which implies that over half of all growth in the past year was being propelled by AI-related spending.</p>
<p>But this AI-related spending is a narrow and fragile base for overall growth. A genuinely healthy economy should be able to generate enough demand to keep unemployment low and stable without a stock market bubble. And both the stock market valuations and the determination to keep spending heavily on data centers and other capex hinge on the belief among companies and investors that AI companies’ eventual profits will justify them.</p>
<p>If the potential profitability of this investment in AI ever appears lower than expected, this could lead to a sharp deflation of the current stock market bubble. A drop in the market value of AI companies would almost surely also convince at least a few of the big capex spenders that their investments will not pay off, and they will likely cut back. All this means that the AI contribution to GDP growth could evaporate quickly if just one or two dominoes fall.</p>
<p>This would leave a large hole in aggregate demand (spending by households, businesses, and governments) that would cause a recession unless policymakers reacted nimbly to fill it. This could largely be accomplished with <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">standard recession-fighting monetary and fiscal policy</a>. But there would still be pain. And if political obstacles prevented the quick deployment of standard recession-fighting policy, the recession could linger and cause lasting damage.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='3'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>Is the current fixation on AI the first time a technology-driven stock market bubble has threatened the broader economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Today’s AI boom bears striking parallels to the internet build-out and stock market bubble of the late 1990s. That episode clearly led to a stock market bubble, and the resulting deflation of that bubble led to a very stubborn recession. But the late 1990s boom also gave the U.S. labor market four to five very strong years before the bubble burst—something the current AI frenzy has largely failed to do.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>The parallels between today’s AI frenzy and the late 1990s build-out of the internet are striking. The late 1990s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">boost to GDP from tech-related capex</a> was even larger than today’s, and by a significant amount. The late 1990s stock market bubble (measured by P/E ratios) was the only one in history larger than today’s AI bubble, and it was even more <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/unpacking-us-tech-valuations-agnostic-assessment">concentrated</a> in tech-related stocks than today’s is.</p>
<p>Taken together, the productivity boost delivered by the internet boom from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s was very large—roughly in line with the more optimistic projections of how much AI could boost productivity growth in the decades ahead. By 2005, the economy was <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c11074/c11074.pdf">about 15% larger</a> than projecting forward from the early 1990s would have suggested.</p>
<p>In short, the introduction of the internet was a huge economic story. We don’t think of it that way for the same reason that fish don’t notice water: It’s now so fundamental to daily life that it no longer registers. But it was a mammoth change with measurable, obvious economic effects.</p>
<p>One important difference, however, is that the internet boom lifted the labor market broadly. The late 1990s saw large reductions in unemployment relative to the previous five (or 10) years, and inflation-adjusted wages grew strongly up and down the wage distribution <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">for the first time in a generation</a>.</p>
<p>The AI boom has not benefited the broader labor market in the same way. Since late 2022, when ChatGPT was first introduced, the U.S. labor market <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">has clearly softened</a>, and wage growth has decelerated, most sharply for the bottom half of the wage distribution. The AI boom began with lower unemployment and tighter labor markets than the internet boom did, so it is striking that it has not been associated with a stronger—or even an equally strong—labor market.</p>
<p>Part of the reason is policy—not AI-specific policy but broader policy decisions. Many <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">policy choices over this year slowed growth</a> in the large parts of the economy outside the AI boom. For example, in normal times, much of the Trump administration’s agenda in 2025 would have been seen as very bad for business investment. Its tariff policy was extreme and chaotic; its mass deportation policy threatened to weigh heavily on both the labor supply and the customer base of very specific industries; the large deficit increases locked in by the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill (even with the large spending cuts) seemed likely to keep upward pressure on interest rates; and the administration’s historically unprecedented meddling with the Fed’s policy independence also put upward pressure on rates and increased uncertainty.</p>
<p>AI-related investment has been strong in recent years even in the face of these poor broader policy choices simply because this happened to be the historical moment when the technology matured enough for firms to race to deploy it.</p>
<p>But non-AI-related investment—over half of all business investment—has clearly been hurt by the policy trajectory of the past year and a half. This non-AI investment decelerated through 2025 and then turned firmly negative by year-end. In short, the policy headwinds for investment really do seem to be binding on all areas of the economy not being swept along by the AI build-out.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-325965 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325965" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325965-36062-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='4'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>Is AI inevitably bad for the jobs and wages of typical workers over the longer run?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>There’s no obvious reason to think so. Economists’ best summary measure of how rapidly technological change is moving forward is the pace of <em>productivity growth</em>—growth in the average output and income created in an hour of work. Throughout history, periods of fast productivity growth (that is, periods of rapid technological advance) have been <em>good</em>, not bad, for the wages and jobs of typical workers. What has overwhelmingly determined how workers fare is <em>policy</em>, not the pace or nature of technological change, and there is no sign yet that AI will break that pattern. Current policy is notably bad for workers’ jobs and wages and should be fixed, but that poor policy environment predates AI by decades.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>U.S. labor markets have performed poorly for most workers for decades. But the root of this poor performance has largely <em>not</em> been technological change that displaced workers or made their skills obsolete. Instead, the main drivers of dysfunctional labor market performance for most U.S. workers have been intentional policy changes meant to tilt the balance of bargaining power in labor markets away from typical workers and toward the owners and managers of corporate business. These policy changes tore down institutions (like the minimum wage and unions) that had supported workers’ leverage and bargaining power in earlier decades and introduced new institutions (like <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/">noncompete agreements</a>) that further eroded workers’ ability to win pay increases that matched overall economic growth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/">Too slow wage growth for the bottom 80% of workers</a>—and the rise in inequality that came with it—began in the late 1970s and accelerated through the 1980s and 1990s. The early conventional wisdom about this inequality, especially among economists, was that labor markets are generally competitive and efficient, so inequality must stem from deep market forces shifting the relative demand and supply for different types of workers—things like technology and the pace of educational attainment. According to this view, policy institutions like the minimum wage and unions could affect only the small sliver of workers they touched directly, and any such effect introduced its own costly distortions. If one believed this, then the 30-year period of equal and fast wage growth after World War II could not have been driven by distortionary institutions like unions and a robust minimum wage, and the attack on unions and minimum wages could not be a convincing explanation of why inequality increased after 1979.</p>
<p>A tide of <a href="https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/57/s/s1">cutting-edge labor market research</a> has overturned most of this conventional wisdom and shown that while technology—including AI—is a prime determinant of how fast the overall economy grows, how that growth is <em>distributed</em> as jobs and wages is mostly a function of <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/home/">policies and institutions</a>. Like any technology, AI will help set the pace of growth, but whether typical workers share in it or whether today’s inequality widens even further will be decided by the policies and institutions that govern workers’ wages and labor market power.</p>
<p>The political and economic implications of this shift in understanding can hardly be overstated. If inequality were simply the product of rapid technological changes interacting with competitive and efficient markets, then it would be regrettable but essentially nobody’s fault, and little could be done about it. That is a very convenient story for the powerful. But it does not fit the historical record or economic evidence. Instead, across history, rapid technological progress has generally been <em>good</em> for workers, not bad: Periods of fast productivity growth have been periods of lower unemployment and slower growing inequality.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-325933 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325933" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325933-36063-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>Whether U.S. workers thrive in an era of AI remains mostly a policy question. The decisions that will determine it have to do with the level of labor market power available to typical workers through policies like the level of minimum wages, the determination of macroeconomic policymakers to sustain full employment, the effectiveness of labor law in allowing workers to unionize and bargain collectively, and how robust the U.S. welfare state is.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='5'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>Won’t AI automate many jobs away?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>AI will likely destroy some <em>specific jobs</em> through automation—but it is also highly likely to create jobs more broadly over time by boosting incomes for those in the non-automated sectors. How much any particular group of workers suffers when displaced from their jobs will be determined by policy decisions. Throughout U.S. history, we have generally been terrible at managing these transitions in worker-friendly ways. It would obviously be better if we changed that and put in place the policy supports workers need to get through them.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>Rapid technological change concentrated in any one sector can reduce employment <em>in that sector</em>. So perhaps AI really will, say, reduce the number of software coding jobs.</p>
<p>But if this technological change allows the same output to be produced with fewer hours of work, it raises incomes across the economy. Sticking with software coders, if the price of software design stays the same as its productivity rises, incomes within the sector will rise, and the workers and capital owners within the sector will have higher incomes they can use to buy <em>other</em> sectors’ goods and services. More likely, competition pushes the price of software design down, and those who purchase software design services (including purchasing indirectly as consumers buying goods and services from other businesses) will see their real (inflation-adjusted) incomes rise.</p>
<p>This increased demand stemming from these productivity gains means that job losses within the AI-using sector can be counterbalanced (or more than counterbalanced) by expanding employment in other sectors <em>as long as aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) is maintained.</em></p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-automation-labor-displacing-productivity-growth-employment-and-the-labor-share/">Autor and Salomons (2018)</a> analyzed these cross-cutting effects of technological changes within particular economic sectors. They found that the <em>own-effect</em> of a positive productivity shock—its effect on jobs within the sector where it happens—is indeed negative: Fewer hours of work are needed to produce the sector’s output, and rising demand for that now less expensive output doesn’t fully make up the difference. However, the <em>cross-effect</em>—the boost that sector’s productivity growth gives to employment <em>in other sectors</em>—is strongly positive and generally large enough to outweigh the negative own-effect for total employment.</p>
<p>This offset is not always automatic. Market mechanisms could fail, at least in part, to channel higher incomes driven by technological advance into higher demand elsewhere in the economy. If the initial large income gains in the AI-using sector flow to already wealthy households, for example, these households are unlikely to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/inequalitys-drag-on-aggregate-demand/">spend rather than save all of these gains</a>. That is why policymakers should keep aggregate demand high enough to keep unemployment low. They have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">ample tools to do it</a>, from lower interest rates set by the Federal Reserve to redistributive fiscal policy that funds more generous public benefits out of progressive taxes.</p>
<p>In reality, however, market mechanisms likely will do much of the work in terms of maintaining aggregate demand in the face of productivity increases. Recessions and damagingly high increases in unemployment rates are overwhelmingly <em>not</em> caused by bursts of productivity growth. Instead, as the economy’s productivity potential grows year after year, those gains tend to translate relatively smoothly into growth in demand. When demand does falter, it is usually because of an outside shock, like an asset bubble popping or central bankers deliberately slowing the economy to forestall inflation.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='6'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>If AI can both create and destroy jobs, does this mean policymakers can totally ignore its effects?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>No. If anything, the opposite is true: Policymakers should be doing far more to protect working families from the hardship and uncertainty of earning a living in labor markets that are volatile and offer little protection. If AI-induced technological change turns out to be large and causes significant job displacement, it will hit a U.S. labor market with few worker protections and create real pockets of concentrated harm—as every other economic change of the past several decades has. But the main driver of this harm is the weakness of U.S. labor market protections, not the specifics of the technology.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>To understand the scale, start with how much churn the labor market already absorbs. About 1.5 million workers involuntarily <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">lose their jobs <em>every single month</em></a> in the U.S. economy—about 18 million jobs lost involuntarily each year. If AI raised the growth of productivity by 0.5 percentage points over the next decade <em>and</em> there were no countervailing job creation from increased incomes, this would very roughly translate into another 700,000 jobs each year being shed, with workers in those jobs needing to find alternative employment. Compared with the 18 million separations the economy already churns through, that is a real but manageable increase.</p>
<p>Even so, many individual workers may suffer from sector-specific job displacements due to AI, even in years when overall unemployment is low. The harm these displacements cause is real and significant: The labor market is not frictionless, and it can be a painful stretch of time before a displaced worker finds comparable work elsewhere. Some workers (particularly older workers) may never find a specific job as good as the one they lost.</p>
<p>But, again, most of this suffering is <em>not an AI-specific problem</em>. The <em>vast majority</em> of painful, forced job separations are not about AI currently and likely won’t be in the future. <em>Workers displaced for reasons not due to AI deserve protection too.</em> The solution is not a search for novel AI-specific policies but the broad, labor market-wide policies that help in every case: stronger social insurance, more widespread collective bargaining, and sustained high-pressure labor markets. These policies are all highly desirable regardless of the pace of technological change.</p>
<p>It is the absence of these broad-based labor market and social insurance policies that makes losing a <em>specific job</em> so damaging for some U.S. workers. Because the guaranteed baseline of job quality and social protection is so low for U.S. workers, a job that does provide some of those things is rare, and workers know it will be hard to replace. This imparts a strong sense of <em>rational</em> loss aversion for workers who happen to hold a high-quality job.</p>
<p>One reason specific jobs are occasionally highly valued in the U.S. labor market is that they come bundled with nonwage compensation—like health and retirement benefits, which are not universally available. Making those benefits universal through more protective social insurance would make losing any particular job far less damaging. Another key social insurance system—unemployment insurance (UI)—is too stingy in the U.S., imposing large income losses while workers search for alternative employment after a layoff. Making UI more generous would directly reduce the pain of a layoff.</p>
<p>Another reason some specific jobs can be highly valued in the U.S. economy is that they are unionized. Union jobs should be much more common than they currently are, but decades of employer hostility and policy indifference have made large-scale organizing in newly created jobs incredibly challenging. The sectors that remain unionized do so largely because of a historical legacy that saw their unions formed decades ago, so a worker separated from one today has little chance of finding another union job elsewhere. <em>Anything</em> that destroys today’s union jobs, technological progress included, will leave their former holders worse off. If policy changed to make it more likely for newly created jobs to be unionized, much of the damage from loss of union jobs spurred by technological churn could be ameliorated.</p>
<p>Additionally, the U.S. economy has spent much of the past four decades <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">with excessively high unemployment</a>, which radically increases the cost of losing a job. When unemployment is low and vacancies are high, a laid-off worker can find a new job quickly, putting employers under constant pressure to keep job quality high enough to retain and attract new employees.</p>
<p>If U.S. policymakers built a more protective social insurance system, restored the effective right to organize unions, and maintained high-pressure labor markets with low unemployment, then a large part of the damage done by <em>any</em> job displacements—including any driven by AI—would disappear.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='7'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>Will AI lead to mass unemployment across the U.S. economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Almost surely not. The historical evidence is clear that business cycles with faster productivity growth see <em>lower</em> unemployment, not higher. And the ease with which AI or any capital investment can substitute for human labor at scale is often overstated.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>Throughout modern history in advanced economies, mass unemployment has never been caused by technological advances that accelerate productivity growth. Unemployment crises are instead caused by a shortfall in aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments). Within a given business cycle, faster productivity growth is accompanied by lower, not higher, unemployment.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-325935 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="325935" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/325935-36069-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>It is worth stepping back from this historical evidence to think through <em>why</em> technological advance has never led to mass unemployment. The rest of this answer walks through some of that logic. We offer these illustrations to take the current fears of mass unemployment seriously, not to suggest that any of these scenarios are likely or have characterized the real economic history of the U.S.</p>
<p>One important economic reason why AI or any technological change is unlikely to cause mass unemployment is simply that technology is not free. Firms will replace labor with capital (including AI tools) only when the costs of doing so are less than the savings. But while shedding labor saves firms money, investing in new capital <em>costs</em> money.</p>
<p>And if the demand for AI tools rises rapidly as businesses across the economy try to replace large swathes of their workforce, the price of these tools will rise, and eventually (or even quickly) the price of investing in AI tools will exceed the benefits to firms.</p>
<p>Because so much of what is called “technological change” in recent years has occurred in online spaces that seem unconstrained by capital costs, it is easy to underestimate how costly AI tools will likely be if a broad swathe of U.S. employers try to buy them at scale to economize on labor costs. But AI tools require vast amounts of capital, labor, and energy to build and maintain (see <strong>Figure A</strong> about the scale of investments being made to build up AI capacity and enter the race to try to sell AI tools across the U.S. economy).</p>
<p>Further, if AI opened up historically large-scale possibilities for the replacement of human labor in the future, this would radically raise economy-wide productivity <em>and</em> reduce the <em>relative</em> cost of labor, as unemployment reduced workers’ leverage to demand wage growth that keeps pace with productivity. This reduction in the relative cost of labor would provide some businesses a large incentive to figure out how to profitably employ some of the now-jobless workers—who, again, are now quite a bit cheaper relative to other inputs into production (i.e., AI tools).</p>
<p>In short, mass unemployment due to technological change is highly unlikely to be an <em>equilibrium</em> in the economy—a place the economy remains at for long periods—unless policymakers completely fail at keeping aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) stable. Have policymakers failed in the past at this fundamental part of their jobs, allowing excess unemployment to linger far longer than necessary? Definitely. But that had nothing to do with AI, and the toleration of mass unemployment that might occur due to an AI-driven acceleration of productivity would be a failure of these policymakers, not an inevitability of the technology.</p>
<p>Also, this scenario—where AI generates extremely rapid productivity growth and the <em>relative</em> price of labor must fall to keep unemployment in check in the face of this AI-biased technological change—does not imply <em>absolute</em> reductions in wages. Instead, it only implies wages fall further behind productivity growth. But if productivity growth is supercharged by AI (and that’s the entire root of this scenario), workers’ wages and living standards could still grow in absolute terms, even more rapidly than they have in the recent past. Only wages <em>relative</em> to capital costs have to fall. To be clear, this isn’t a particularly happy scenario: Rising inequality is objectively bad, even if all incomes see some absolute gains. But it’s not a purely pessimistic scenario either.</p>
<p>Finally, much of the discourse that seems to assume a very easy replacement of human labor with AI tools underappreciates the complexity of most jobs in the economy. <em>Jobs</em> are a bundle of specific <em>tasks</em> that are often hard to clearly describe (let alone fully replace). AI will replace many tasks, but this will often just allow workers to focus more time and attention on the other tasks their jobs entail. Many of the tasks of modern jobs are extremely hard to define in binary terms that would allow easy automation. This difficulty in crisply describing many job tasks often leads to sneering about the alleged worthlessness of “<a href="https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/ai-isnt-management-try-explaining">middle managers</a>” or “<a href="https://substack.jurgenappelo.com/p/how-ai-will-achieve-peak-bullshit-work">bullshit jobs</a>” (to borrow anthropologist David Graeber’s term), but it stems from the fact that we have an amazingly complex economy built on ever-finer divisions of labor and information across workers and functions. Just because any single person has <a href="https://messyjobs.ai/">almost no idea what the key tasks</a> are for most of the workforce <em>doesn’t mean these tasks are unimportant or easy to replace</em>. It just means the economy is complex.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<a name='8'></a>
<div class="shadow-box immi-faq-shadowbox">
<h2>How much might AI boost productivity growth—and has the U.S. labor market ever absorbed that fast a productivity acceleration before?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Most credible estimates project that AI could boost productivity growth over the next decade by an average of 0.5–1.5 percentage points per year. Even at the high end of 1.5 percentage points per year, that implies an acceleration of productivity growth that the U.S. economy has easily absorbed in the past with no labor market distress. In fact, periods of productivity acceleration have been good for U.S. workers; it is productivity slowdowns that have coincided with bad outcomes.</p>
</div>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>The effect AI will have in boosting productivity growth is still genuinely unclear. There are clear reasons to think it could run faster for a stretch as AI is incorporated into firms’ workflow, but as with all technological innovations, the pace and the ultimate depth of that penetration remain highly uncertain.</p>
<p>As of the first quarter of 2026, there is very little reason to think AI has contributed anything measurable to U.S. productivity growth. Since the last business cycle peak (the last quarter of 2019), productivity growth has averaged 1.96%. Looking only at the period since the third quarter of 2022 (when ChatGPT was introduced to the public), productivity growth has averaged 2.08%—a small acceleration in a very noisy data series. The pre-2022 numbers also include the large productivity declines stemming from the supply chain bottlenecks caused by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early 2020s. <strong>Figure F</strong> shows the simple level of productivity over time, along with an extrapolated trend for recent years that shows what the level of productivity would be today if the 2017–2019 productivity trend held after the rollout of ChatGPT. Two things stand out: the large drop in the level of productivity as the early 2020s supply chain snarls formed, and the fact that as of the first quarter of 2026, the level of productivity is only about 0.2% higher than what would have been extrapolated from it following its immediate pre-Covid trend.</p>
<p>Further, even this small edge over projection is entirely driven by the first quarters of 2023—the gap between actual productivity and trend productivity has actually declined in the past two years. None of this looks like evidence of a large technological innovation that is diffusing rapidly across ever-larger shares of the U.S. economy.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326014 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326014" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326014-36070-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>Finally, even the quite optimistic projections of how much AI might add to U.S. productivity growth in the coming decade do not imply a pace of productivity growth the U.S. labor market has never successfully absorbed before. <strong>Figure G</strong> shows a range of projections of how much AI could raise productivity growth over the next decade and compares the implied acceleration with past episodes of rising and falling productivity growth in the U.S. economy. We intentionally choose historical periods that have seen sharp changes in productivity growth to compare with projections of AI-driven productivity growth.</p>
<p>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326010 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326010" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326010-36071-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->

</p>
<p>U.S. history has clearly seen sharp changes in productivity growth roughly as large as the more optimistic projections of AI’s effect on productivity. Importantly, the historical period that saw a rapid acceleration of productivity growth—the late 1990s and early 2000s—was an unusually strong period in the U.S. labor market, with lower unemployment and faster, broader wage growth than had been seen in a generation. The beginning of wage suppression, in contrast, followed the sharp productivity slowdown of 1973–1979. The other sharp productivity slowdown, from 2007 to 2019, was also a long period of extreme dysfunction in U.S. labor markets, with extended periods of excess unemployment and many years of near-stagnant wage growth.</p>
<p>In short, the actual history of the U.S. economy and credible projections of AI’s effect on productivity do not warrant extreme concern about AI-caused labor displacement.</p>
</div></div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Using FY 2027 appropriations to build a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline: House Republican appropriations legislation would expand H-2A and H-2B visa programs and cut farmworker pay</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/fy-2027-house-republican-appropriations-deportation-to-guestworker-pipeline/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 13:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328101</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of For H-2A, the bill Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key findings:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of agriculture.</li>
<li>For H-2A, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S. farmworkers. Current regulations limit H-2A to temporary and seasonal work.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Allow employers to pay year-round H-2A farmworkers drastically lower wages, cutting pay by roughly $17,000 to $40,000 per year in key industries and states in 2027 and incentivizing farm operators to replace U.S. farmworker employees with much lower-paid H-2A workers.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>For H-2B, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Raise the annual cap to at least 270,000 visas in FY 2027 (more than doubling the current cap that includes supplemental H-2B visas) and 300,000 total workers.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Reward employers for applying for as many H-2B jobs as possible each year, since doing so increases their cap exemption for the following year, likely driving exponential growth in the program.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Move 10,000 amusement park, carnival, fair, and circus workers from H-2B to a newly created P-4 visa, which has no numerical cap and questionable worker protections—further expanding the pool of exploitable workers in H-2B industries.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>These changes would drastically lower pay for all farmworkers and degrade labor standards for U.S. workers on farms and in industries like landscaping, construction, and hospitality. Employers would gain an exploitable workforce they can control, made up of workers with no realistic path to a green card or U.S. citizenship.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>Introduction and summary</h2>
<p>In June 2026, Republican legislators in the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security—the subcommittee tasked with funding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—proposed legislation to fund DHS for FY 2027, which was then considered by the full House Appropriations Committee. The bill includes several legislative riders that, if enacted into law, would make major changes to two temporary work visa programs, H-2A and H-2B. Those provisions would accelerate hiring and substantially expand the size and scope of the programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> The full House Appropriations Committee approved the bill on a party-line vote with 34 Republican members voting in favor of reporting the bill to the full House of Representatives.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Nearly identical riders were passed in the House FY 2026 DHS appropriations bill, but were not included in the final FY 2026 omnibus bill that funded the federal government.</p>
<p>H-2A allows farm employers to hire migrant workers for seasonal and temporary agricultural jobs, while H-2B allows employers to hire migrant workers for temporary jobs in low-wage occupations outside of agriculture (including in landscaping, construction, hospitality, food service, seafood processing, and traveling fairs and carnivals). Both programs represent a flawed employment model that restricts workers’ rights by giving employers control over their workers’ immigration status.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Both undercut U.S. wage standards, lack adequate regulations and enforcement to protect workplace rights, and fail to provide workers with a pathway to becoming lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens. If the House legislative provisions on H-2A and H-2B become law, they would greatly increase the number of workers in these programs and lower wages for hundreds of thousands of farmworkers by tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s unrestrained and indiscriminate immigration enforcement efforts and bureaucratic slowdowns have caused net immigration levels in the United States to turn negative for the first time in half a century.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Given demographic projections and the fact that nearly all prime-age workforce growth in the past 30 years has come from immigration,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> it is becoming clearer that sustaining future economic and workforce growth will be difficult without policies that would expand pathways for immigrants. But those pathways must give workers full and equal rights in the workplace through immediate or eventual lawful permanent residence and a path to citizenship. Temporary work visa programs like H-2A and H-2B, often called “guestworker” programs, do not do that, and strong evidence shows they are degrading wages and working conditions for both migrant and U.S. workers.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>Efforts in Congress to expand H-2A and H-2B build on the Trump administration’s own use of executive authority to expand both programs. Meanwhile, DHS’s immigration enforcement agencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—now have $270 billion at their disposal to detain, deport, and terrorize immigrants across the country,<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> and temporary protections that provide lawful work authorization, like parole and Temporary Protected Status, are being terminated en masse. ICE and CBP have gone far beyond what their mandates and statutes allow, acting as gestapo-like forces that racially profile people and disregard whether a person has a green card, a temporary protective status like DACA, or, in many cases, a U.S. passport.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> The result is a shrinking workforce. Are measures to expand H-2A and H-2B an attempt to replace some of the foreign-born workers the economy is losing?</p>
<p>This report examines the provisions in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation, which passed and was reported out of the House Appropriations Committee in June 2026, that would expand and modify the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, and estimates their impact. While the House Appropriations bill has not been voted on yet by the full House, with government funding set to expire on December 11, 2026, the bill is likely to be the starting point for negotiations on an omnibus bill to fund the government for the remaining 10 months of fiscal year 2027.</p>
<h2>Both the Trump administration and Congress are working to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline</h2>
<p>While this report focuses on congressional efforts to expand the H-2A and H-2B programs through the appropriations process, it is important to note that the Trump administration has already used its executive authority to expand the H-2A and H-2B visa programs: The Department of Labor (DOL) issued a regulation drastically cutting farmworker wages in October 2025 that the agency estimates will increase the size of the program from 383,000 to 515,000 jobs due to expanded hiring driven by lower labor costs for farm operators.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> One of the administration’s stated reasons for the DOL regulation is its own immigration enforcement. It expects to deport so many farmworkers that farm operators will lack sufficient employees to produce enough food, leading to higher prices for consumers, unless the deported workers are replaced with farmworkers hired from abroad through the H-2A program.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Then, in January 2026, after a lobbying push by H-2B employers, the Trump administration doubled the size of the H-2B program using discretionary authority Congress granted it in FY 2026 appropriations legislation.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>While the Trump administration and Republicans in Congress have embraced anti-immigrant rhetoric and adopted inhumane immigration policies, their efforts to expand work visa programs reveal that they recognize immigrant workers are an essential part of the U.S. labor market. The Trump administration is acknowledging that, without these workers, there will be negative consequences for the U.S. economy—many of which have already become evident, including a slowdown in employment and increased unemployment for U.S.-born workers.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> The administration and Congress are effectively creating a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline. Migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permits are left with only one viable way to work in the United States: as guestworkers. And as guestworkers, they have few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their status and ability to reside and work in the country.</p>
<h2>The H-2A program had 350,000 workers in 2025 and would be expanded to include 409,000 additional year-round jobs like dairy and livestock farming</h2>
<p>The H-2A program is a visa program that allows employers to hire farmworkers from abroad for seasonal and temporary farm jobs, ostensibly when they can show that a U.S. worker is unavailable. The H-2A program accounts for a significant share of the total farm workforce, between 11% and 16% of total farm employment, and is a lobbying priority for the agricultural industry. The estimated size of the H-2A program in 2025 was nearly 350,000 workers (see <strong>Figure A</strong>).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327466 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327466" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327466-36100-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>The language adopted in Section 410 of the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill would allow H-2A workers to be employed in year-round jobs—which is currently prohibited—expanding the scope of the program and allowing employers to hire H-2A workers for jobs on dairy, livestock, and poultry and egg farms, as well as in nurseries and greenhouses and other nonseasonal agricultural jobs. This would be a major change to H-2A and has long been a priority of agribusiness. In fact, a nearly identical legislative rider was first proposed by the same House committee almost a decade ago.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> The Trump administration recently used sub-regulatory means to make a down payment on this change to H-2A, issuing a policy memorandum, which arguably stretches the bounds of the law: It instructs U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to begin approving petitions for H-2A workers who would be employed on dairies.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> The memorandum still requires employers to prove the dairy-related H-2A position is of a temporary or seasonal nature, however. The USCIS memo is susceptible to legal challenges, whereas a statutory change would be more durable, as some industry representatives have pointed out.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<p>Data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages show that there are approximately 409,000 year-round (full-time equivalent) jobs in agriculture. <strong>Table 1</strong> lists four of the major agricultural industries employing farmworkers year-round. The largest are greenhouse production and cattle ranching, which includes dairy jobs.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> However, the true scope of jobs that could become eligible for H-2A under the vague language of Section 410 is unknown and potentially larger. Representatives of the agricultural industry could argue, for instance, that if Section 410 becomes law, eligible job categories should now include meat and poultry packing and processing, logging, equine, and aquaculture jobs, as well as various nonfarming jobs “performed by workers on agricultural operations.” DOL and USCIS would ultimately decide how to implement their interpretation of the provision.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-323089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323089" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323089-36101-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h2>Expanding H-2A to include year-round occupations will dramatically lower wages for farmworkers</h2>
<p>As noted above, the Trump administration’s Interim Final Rule (IFR) from October 2025 set the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) methodology at dramatically lower rates than the previous one.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> Based on DOL’s own estimates, the 2026 H-2A AEWR will result in a $24 billion pay cut for H-2A farmworkers over 10 years and, by reducing H-2A labor costs, encourage employers to expand the H-2A program to 515,000 jobs a year.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> EPI has estimated that U.S. farmworkers will lose $2.7 to $3.3 billion in wages per year as a result of the Trump AEWR rule. In total, all farmworkers (U.S. farmworkers and H-2A farmworkers) will lose roughly $5 billion per year in wages thanks to this regulation from the Trump DOL.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<p>Under current regulations, H-2A farmworkers cannot be hired for year-round agricultural jobs.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> Because farmworkers in these jobs work year-round, rather than seasonally, they generally earn higher wages that can sometimes approach a living wage. But if the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill becomes law and allows employers to additionally use H-2A visas for year-round jobs instead of just seasonal and temporary ones, the required minimum wage employers would have to pay H-2A workers would be set by the same H-2A methodology used for seasonal crop farming jobs. As a result, farmworkers in year-round jobs would see significant pay cuts, to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2</strong> shows a sample of some of the main year-round agricultural industries in major agricultural states, along with average annual employment in each (which together account for about 15% of the total year-round, full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture). Table 2 shows how much farmworkers earned annually on average in 2025 in those industries and states, and compares the annual earnings of farmworkers in 2025 with what H-2A workers would earn in 2026 or 2027 if they worked in the same jobs and were paid the corresponding 2026–2027 AEWR at Skill Level 1 for the entire year (40 hours per week for 52 weeks), minus the annualized amount that will be deducted from hourly wages for housing as permitted in the current AEWR methodology.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a></p>
<p>The final column in Table 2 shows a few examples that illustrate the difference between what U.S. farmworkers working year-round in the selected industries earned in 2025 and what H-2A workers at Skill Level 1 would earn if they were paid the annualized AEWR in 2026 or 2027. Table 2 shows that the reduction in wages for H-2A farmworkers in year-round jobs could range from an annual pay cut of $17,500 for mushroom farming in California to over $43,000 per year for employment on poultry and egg farms in Texas.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-323087 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323087" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323087-36102-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Outcomes such as these—in which farmworkers paid the 2026–2027 AEWR would earn tens of thousands of dollars less than what U.S. farmworkers earned in major year-round jobs in 2025—are in violation of the spirit and letter of the AEWR and the H-2A statute. Yet they would become legal if the year-round H-2A provision in the House appropriations bill becomes law. This would hurt some of the most vulnerable and lowest-paid workers in the U.S. labor market and give farm operators a strong incentive to replace their U.S. farmworkers with H-2A workers because the latter cannot easily change employers and have their rights restricted and wages restrained via H-2A program rules—which also have the effect of insulating employers from free market forces that would lead them to improve wages and working conditions in order to attract U.S. farmworkers.</p>
<h2>The size of the H-2B program would be set by a new methodology that will start at 270,000 in 2027 and grow exponentially</h2>
<p>The H-2B program currently has an annual numerical limit (or “cap”) of 66,000. Since FY 2016, Congress has passed amendments to annual appropriations bills that allow DHS to increase the number of visas available.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> In the past four fiscal years, both the Biden and Trump administrations have used the full authority granted to the executive branch in the legislative riders, raising the total H-2B annual limit to 130,716 during FY 2023–2026.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a></p>
<p>The FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill includes language in Section 409 that would establish a new methodology for setting the H-2B visa program’s annual numerical limit to further increase the cap beyond the 130,716 during FY 2023–2026. The language of the bill states that for every employer who has had any H-2B positions certified in the past five fiscal years (2022–2026), the highest number that they had certified in those years will be the number of H-2B workers they may hire who will not count against the annual cap of 66,000. In other words, if an employer had 10 jobs certified in 2022, 15 in 2023, 20 in 2024, 100 in 2025, and 50 in 2026, they would be allowed to hire 100 H-2B workers in 2027 without them counting against the 66,000 cap. As the analysis below explains, the provision would result in a cap of nearly 270,000 visas in FY 2027.</p>
<p><strong>Table 3</strong> shows an estimate using 2021–2025 H-2B data that serves as a proxy for the estimated number of new H-2B workers who would be exempted from the cap in 2027, and the number of new H-2B workers permitted under the regular annual cap of 66,000. Altogether, the regular cap plus the supplemental cap for H-2B in 2027 would permit at least 269,617 new H-2B workers if the House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law. That’s more than double the size of the total cap in 2023–2026, and a 309% increase relative to the original H-2B cap of 66,000.</p>
<p>The annual caps and total number of workers will grow rapidly if Congress reauthorizes the same language in the rider year after year, as it has done with past H-2B riders. The rider in Section 409 incentivizes employers to apply to DOL for labor certification for as many H-2B jobs as possible every year because that will increase the size of their exemption from the cap for the following year. The resulting growth is likely to be exponential.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-326744 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326744" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326744-36105-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h2>Total number of H-2B workers could reach 300,000 in 2027 if House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law</h2>
<p>Despite the size of the H-2B annual cap, the total number of H-2B workers is always larger because some workers extend their status and some change jobs, but those workers are not counted against the annual cap. In FY 2025, when 64,716 supplemental H-2B visas were added to the statutory cap of 66,000 for the fiscal year, for a total cap of 130,716, there were a total of 166,823 H-2B workers (see <strong>Figure B</strong>).</p>
<p>This was up from 75,122 total H-2B workers just a decade earlier. The nearly 167,000 H-2B total in 2025 included 139,736 H-2B workers with newly issued visas from the State Department, and 4,137 H-2B workers who had their employment extended with the same employer. An additional 22,950 were H-2B workers who changed employers. (The final totals in FY 2026 are likely to be similar to those in FY 2025 given the same cap methodology was in place.)</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326751 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326751" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326751-36104-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>To get a better sense of the total number of H-2B workers who would be employed in 2027 if Section 409 of the House Homeland appropriations legislation is enacted into law, I estimated that the same number of workers who extended their status or changed jobs in 2025 would also do so in 2027, and added that total to the FY 2027 total cap of 269,617 that would result from the new methodology in the legislation. This is also illustrated in Figure B, which shows the total number of H-2B workers from 2015 to 2025, and projections for 2026 and 2027. The annual cap plus the supplemental cap, together with H-2B extensions and job changes, would result in nearly 300,000 H-2B workers being employed in 2027—‎or 296,704&nbsp;to be exact—which is a 78% increase relative to the number of H-2B workers who were employed in 2025 or estimated to be employed in 2026.</p>
<h2>Close to 10,000 H-2B jobs would be moved to the P visa, a program with no worker protections and administered by DHS</h2>
<p>The other notable change to the H-2B program in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation is in Section 411, which would move H-2B fair and carnival workers, such as those employed at amusement parks, carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses, to the P visa program. Section 411 would move those covered by the current P-4 visa—designated for spouses and minor children of P-1, P-2, and P-3 visa holders—to a new P-5 category and reassign the P-4 visa category to fair and carnival workers. The language in Section 411 appears to be a permanent statutory change, unlike Sections 409 and 410, which would only be in place during FY 2027 unless they are renewed in subsequent legislation for FY 2028 (and beyond). According to DOL, in FY 2025 there were 9,622 H-2B jobs certified in the “Amusement and Recreation Attendants” occupation, which is the most relevant occupation that would be moved to the P-4 visa. Unlike the H-2B program, there is no annual cap in the P visa program and the bill language does not apply the annual H-2B cap to the number of fair and carnival workers who could be employed with P-4 visas.</p>
<p>At present, the P visa is a little-known program intended for use by professional athletes and coaches, members of an internationally recognized entertainment group, or persons performing under a reciprocal exchange program or as part of a culturally unique program.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> The P visa program has no wage rules or worker protections and is administered exclusively by DHS, which has no dedicated staff or expertise on worker rights.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> This is extremely troubling, given that H-2B workers employed at fairs, amusement parks, and carnivals work grueling hours and in terrible conditions, making them some of the most exploited H-2B workers—as advocacy groups have pointed out.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> These workers are often paid below the minimum wage and are not paid for overtime hours. Yet it is unclear if DOL would have any formal oversight role to ensure they are protected as P-4 workers.</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 states that employers hiring H-2B fair and carnival workers through the P visa “shall be subject to the same program requirements that govern the admission” of H-2B workers, but it does not give clear authority to DOL to administer the P-4 visa program, nor explicitly state that post-entry H-2B worker protections will apply to P-4 workers. (The current H-2B program and rules are administered and enforced by DOL.) The legislation further directs DHS and DOL to each separately publish regulations to implement H-2B fair and carnival workers being moved to the P-4 visa program within 180 days and to finalize them within one year. But there is little direction from Congress in the legislation on how the H-2B program requirements will be implemented and enforced. Will DHS publish identical regulations to DOL’s H-2B rules and enforce them? Will DOL enforce the DHS regulations? Or will each play a role in enforcing the wage and worker protection regulations in the H-2B program? And will employers be allowed to begin hiring fair and carnival workers with P-4 visas before any regulations that include wage and worker protections are finalized?</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 reflects previously introduced legislation in the House and Senate during the 119th Congress: H.R. 2729, Carnivals are Real Entertainment Act (also known as the CARE Act), and a similar companion bill, S. 1281, <em>Restoring </em>Industry Development in Entertainment (RIDE) Act. However, the legislators on the House Appropriations Committee who support this amendment have provided no explanation or rationale for why it makes sense to create an entirely new process and set of regulations to move one of the biggest H-2B occupations from DOL into DHS—an agency that will be given primary responsibility over the P-4 visa and protecting fair and carnival workers, but that has no mandate or expertise on labor standards and employment laws. The most obvious explanation is that this legislative maneuver is simply a new way to expand the H-2B cap even beyond 270,000, in a way that gives fair and carnival employers an unlimited supply of workers who can be exploited and underpaid. It also generally seems absurd to put a low-paid traveling carnival worker into the same visa category—where there’s no labor oversight—as a professional baseball player coming from abroad to sign a multimillion-dollar contract with a major league team, or a world-famous singer, dancer, or painter.</p>
<h2>Republicans in Congress are using the appropriations process to avoid scrutiny and expand H-2A and H-2B, while the administration seeks to deport millions</h2>
<p>Finally, for over a decade at least, Congress has repeatedly changed policy on temporary work visa programs through an opaque process: riders attached to annual appropriations legislation, like the ones examined in this report.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Riders that make policy changes are much more likely to pass without much public notice, debate, or pushback relative to dedicated legislation, since they are smaller parts of larger, must-pass legislation to fund the entire U.S. government. The significant changes proposed or passed for H-2A and H-2B visas in riders over the past decade have all pushed the programs toward the same direction: expansion, deregulation, and the watering down of worker protections, which benefits employers at the expense of U.S. workers and hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who will continue to see reduced wages and poorer working conditions.</p>
<p>Employers have a particular urgency to see riders that expand and deregulate the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, as the Trump administration arrests and deports workers at a breakneck pace and cancels temporary immigration protections that provided work authorization to millions.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> Employers are making the case that H-2 visas are “a workforce issue, not immigration,” as well as an essential service that must continue to function even during a government shutdown.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> Given the FY 2026 and FY 2027 riders in the House Homeland appropriations bills, it’s clear that a number of lawmakers and the Trump administration agree.</p>
<p>In effect, these legislators aim to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline, one where migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permit are left with only one viable option to work in the United States: as temporary migrant workers with few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their ability to live and work in the country. Perhaps the legislator who is the most emblematic of the push to combine mass deportations with expanded guestworker programs is Rep. Andy Harris of Maryland, a Republican member on the House Appropriations Committee. <em>Politico</em> recently profiled him for leading the charge on the H-2A and H-2B riders in recent appropriations bills, highlighting also his strong support for President Trump’s mass deportation efforts.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> Apparently, for Rep. Harris, there is no irony in supporting Trump’s removal of millions of employees who support the U.S. economy while simultaneously purporting to represent the interests of employers who say they don’t have enough workers, and tirelessly working to expand low-wage guestworker programs. It’s reasonable to ask whether the Harris strategy is to ensure that the only people from abroad who can work in the United States are those willing to be quasi-indentured to the employers that recruit them—and who accept that they will never become citizens able to fully participate in U.S. economic and political life.</p>
<h2><strong>The H-2A and H-2B programs need reform to improve labor protections and provide workers with a pathway to citizenship</strong></h2>
<p>The appropriations committees in the House and Senate should not use parliamentary tactics like provisions in appropriations bills to make changes to the H-2A and H-2B programs that would likely not pass in Congress through regular order. Instead, policymakers and the public must reject the harmful and unjustified proposals coming from Trump and Congress to expand programs that allow employers to underpay migrant workers and keep those workers indentured and controlled by employers.</p>
<p>Instead of pursuing a strategy that combines deportations with expanded guestworker programs, Congress should work with the executive branch to reform both the H-2A and H-2B visa programs in the following ways:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Provide green cards to undocumented farmworkers and a path to a green card for farmworkers recruited from abroad through the H-2A program</li>
<li>Rescind the October 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate and reinstitute the Farm Labor Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was previously used to set H-2A wages</li>
<li>Prohibit H-2A visas, which are for temporary and seasonal jobs, from being used for year-round agricultural jobs like those on dairy and poultry farms and in greenhouses; workers from abroad who are recruited to fill year-round, permanent jobs must be granted a permanent status instead</li>
<li>Provide H-2A and H-2B workers with new protections from retaliation and allow them to more easily change jobs</li>
<li>Craft updated wage rules that protect U.S. wage standards for all workers in H-2B industries</li>
<li>Provide H-2B workers with a quick path to a green card after being in H-2B status for 18 months</li>
<li>Ensure U.S. workers seeking employment in H-2B occupations are adequately considered for open temporary and seasonal jobs by requiring employers to hire available U.S. workers and offer them housing and transportation</li>
<li>Prohibit lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-2A or H-2B programs by creating a screening and registration system</li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, the Trump administration has tacitly admitted and shown through policy actions described in this report that migrant workers are making important contributions to the U.S. economy in key industries. Rather than continue to harm the economy through immigration enforcement, it should end its mass deportation efforts and reinstate humanitarian protections like Temporary Protected Status and parole for persons who have been stripped of them and lost their work permits.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> For more background, see these two blog posts discussing the provisions on H-2A and H-2B that were passed in the FY 2026 House Homeland appropriations legislation: Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">Congressional Budget Amendment and New DOL Wage Rule Together Would Greatly Expand Work Visas for Farmworkers and Drastically Lower Their Wages</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 5, 2025; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/rider-in-the-house-homeland-security-appropriations-bill-would-increase-the-number-of-workers-in-the-h-2b-visa-program-by-113000/">Rider in the House Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Would Increase the Number of Workers in the H-2B Visa Program by 113,000</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 11, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> For the legislative text, see <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/9310/text">H.R.9310 &#8211; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027</a>, 119th Congress (2025-2026), placed on the Union Calendar on June 12, 2026. See also House Appropriations Chairman Tom Cole, “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-releases-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-bill">Committee Releases FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill</a>,” Press Release, June 4, 2026; “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-act">Committee Approves FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Act</a>,” Press Release, June 11, 2026; and for the roll call vote on the bill, see House of Representatives, Roll Call 15 in “<a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP00/20260609/119380/HMKP-119-AP00-20260609-SD008.pdf">Full Committee Votes</a>,” June 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> For more background on temporary work visas, their flaws, and proposed reforms, see Daniel Costa, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/">Temporary Work Visa Programs and the Need for Reform: A Briefing on Program Frameworks, Policy Issues and Fixes, and the Impact of COVID-19</a></em>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Laura Romero, “<a href="https://abcnews.com/US/us-1st-time-50-years-experienced-negative-net/story?id=129175522">US, for 1st Time in 50 Years, Experienced Negative Net Migration in 2025: Report</a>,” ABC News, January 13, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> William Frey, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-immigration-may-shape-america-after-250/">America Is Turning 250. Here’s How Immigration May Shape Its Future</a>,” Brookings Institution, June 25, 2026; see question 6 in Daniel Costa et al., “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/immigrants-and-the-economy/">Immigrants and the Economy</a>,” in <em>Immigration FAQ</em>, Economic Policy Institute, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See, for example, Economic Policy Institute, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/deportation-calculator/">The Cost of Deportations Calculator</a></em> (interactive tool), accessed October 25, 2026; AFL-CIO and ACLU, <a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/citizenship-and-affordability-agenda"><em>Citizenship and the Affordability Agenda: A Path to Better Jobs, Higher Wages, and Prosperity for All</em></a>, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See, for example, Nicole Foy et al., “<a href="https://projects.propublica.org/american-citizens-detained-dhs-civil-rights/">506 U.S. Citizens Detained</a>,” <em>ProPublica</em>, October 6, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/11/immigration-crackdown-food-prices/">Trump Administration Says Immigration Enforcement Threatens Higher Food Prices</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, October 11, 2025; David Dayen, “<a href="https://prospect.org/2025/10/08/trump-labor-department-says-his-immigration-raids-are-causing-a-food-crisis/">Trump Labor Department Says His Immigration Raids Are Causing a Food Crisis</a>,” <em>American Prospect</em>, October 8, 2025; Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Chris Cameron, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/us/politics/h2b-visas.html">Trump Officials Move to Double Number of H-2B Guest Visas This Year</a>,” <em>New York Times</em>, January 30, 2026. For more background on H-2B appropriations riders giving the executive branch authority to expand the program, see Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/">Unemployment Has Increased for U.S.-Born Workers in the Face of Mass Deportations: Trump’s Draconian Immigration Enforcement Is Harming All Workers</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), April 3, 2026; Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/benzipperer.org/post/3muoyodo4wk26">Trump&#8217;s mass deportations were sold as a major jobs program, but they&#8217;re still failing to help U.S.-born workers</a>,” Bluesky, @benzipperer.org, September 4, 2026, 5:46 a.m.; Marcela Escobari, Ian Seyal, and Paul Beach, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ice-enforcement-employment-effects-us-cities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Shock, Awe, and Economic Fallout: The Employment Effects of ICE Enforcement in U.S. Cities</em></a>, Brookings Institution, May 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> For more background, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026; see also discussion in Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026. However, a statutory change made with an appropriations rider would presumably have to be renewed yearly. The H-2B riders that allow the executive branch to double the program with supplementary visas have been renewed every year since FY 2016, suggesting that once these riders make it into the bill, they are likely to be renewed as part of the yearly underlying bills.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> The industries listed do not include the many year-round (or nearly year-round) jobs that can be found on crop farms, including equipment operators and supervisors. It’s possible that up to one-third of the total 1.6 million full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture could be year-round.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> The AEWR IFR has been challenged in federal court and vacated on procedural grounds, but the court left the current AEWR in place for the time being, with an order issued to DOL to issue a new AEWR methodology by December 30, 2026. What will result from a new methodology is an open question, but the possibility remains that the new rule could be similar to the current rule, if DOL fulfills the procedural requirements. For more background, see, for example, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://flag.dol.gov/announcement/2026-09-02">OFLC Announces Updates to Implementation of the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Non-Range Occupations Interim Final Rule; Compliance with District Court Order</a>” (announcement), September 2, 2026, U.S. Department of Labor; Envoy Global, “<a href="https://www.envoyglobal.com/news-alert/federal-court-orders-dol-to-replace-h-2a-wage-methodology/">Federal Court Orders DOL to Replace H-2A Wage Methodology</a>,” updated October 5, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Except, arguably, for some positions in dairy as a result of the June 2026 USCIS memo; however, even employers hiring through that route must demonstrate that the need for the H-2A dairy worker is seasonal or temporary. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> The amounts have not been adjusted for inflation. The 2026 AEWR provides two “skill levels” for farmworkers, which are set at specific percentiles along the distribution of Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics wages surveyed. Skill Level 1 is the 17th percentile while Skill Level 2 is the median (50th percentile) of wages surveyed. For this calculation, I am only estimating the wage differentials for H-2A workers in year-round jobs who are classified by employers at Skill Level 1, which DOL estimates will account for 92% of all H-2A workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> For a discussion of the first instance of H-2B riders in the FY 2016 appropriations legislation, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> For more background, see discussion in Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services information pages for P visa subcategories: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1a-athlete">P-1A Athlete</a>, last updated March 26, 2026; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1b-a-member-of-an-internationally-recognized-entertainment-group">P-1B A Member of an Internationally Recognized Entertainment Group</a>, last updated January 24, 2025; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-2-individual-performer-or-part-of-a-group-entering-to-perform-under-a-reciprocal-exchange-program">P-2 Individual Performer or Part of a Group Entering to Perform Under a Reciprocal Exchange Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-3-artist-or-entertainer-coming-to-be-part-of-a-culturally-unique-program">P-3 Artist or Entertainer Coming to Be Part of a Culturally Unique Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; U.S. Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> While there is a requirement from USCIS that an appropriate labor organization be consulted and provide a written letter for a P visa petition, it is unlikely, but ultimately unclear, that this requirement will apply to the new P-4 category. Further, there is no DOL labor certification, no prevailing wage requirement, and no DOL enforcement of P visa program rules to protect workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> See, for example, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante and American University Washington College of Law Immigrant Justice Clinic, <a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Taken_Ride.pdf"><em>Taken for a Ride: Migrant Workers in the U.S. Fair and Carnival Industry</em></a>, February 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/"><em>The H-2B Temporary Foreign Worker Program: For Labor Shortages or Cheap, Temporary Labor?</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, January 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017; Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-2b-industries-and-wage-theft/"><em>As the H-2B Visa Program Grows, the Need for Reforms That Protect Workers Is Greater Than Ever: Employers Stole $1.8 Billion from Workers in the Industries That Employed Most H-2B Workers Over the Past Two Decades</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2022; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trump-attacks-on-temporary-immigration-protections-like-tps-hurt-the-economy-and-strip-millions-of-their-workplace-rights/">Trump Attacks on Temporary Immigration Protections Like TPS Hurt the Economy and Strip Millions of Their Workplace Rights</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), May 12, 2025; Carolyne Im and Mia Hennen, “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/08/12/second-trump-administration-has-ended-temporary-protected-status-for-most-immigrants-who-had-it/">Second Trump Administration Has Ended Temporary Protected Status for Most Immigrants Who Had It</a>,” <em>Short Reads</em> (Pew Research Center), August 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Andrew Kreighbaum, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/stalled-release-of-seasonal-h-2b-visas-puts-strain-on-employers">Stalled Release of Seasonal H-2B Visas Puts Strain on Employers</a>,” <em>Bloomberg Law</em>, March 26, 2025; Nick Niedzwiadek, “<a href="https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/10/dol-brings-back-immigration-staff-as-shutdown-drags-on-00631426">DOL Brings Back Visa-Processing Staff as Shutdown Drags On</a>,” <em>Politico Pro</em>, October 31, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Jennifer Scholtes, “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/10/andy-harris-immigration-foreign-workers-00867621">The Trump Ally Cracking Down on Immigration in Washington — and Bringing in Foreign Workers Back Home</a>,” <em>Politico</em>, April 12, 2026.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>EPI comment on DHS elimination of the 60-day grace period for workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1, and TN visa programs</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dhs-elimination-of-the-60-day-grace-period-for-workers-in-the-e-1-e-2-e-3-h-1b-h-1b1-l-1-o-1-and-tn-visa-programs/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:32:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328334</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Office of Policy and United States Citizenship and Immigration Service Department of Homeland Security 5900 Capital Gateway Camp Springs, MD Re: U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/11/2026-18631/eliminating-the-discretionary-60-day-grace-period"><em>Submitted via FederalRegister.gov</em></a></p>
<p>Office of Policy and Strategy<br />
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)<br />
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)<br />
5900 Capital Gateway Drive<br />
Camp Springs, MD 20746&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Re: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/11/2026-18631/eliminating-the-discretionary-60-day-grace-period"><strong><em>Eliminating the Discretionary 60-Day Grace Period</em></strong></a><strong>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, </strong><strong>CIS No. 2858-26, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2026-0364,</strong><strong> RIN 1615-AD22, </strong><strong>91 Fed. Reg. 57807 (September 11, 2026).</strong></p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the elimination of the discretionary 60-day grace period for certain nonimmigrants in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 or TN classifications. EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the H-1B and L-1 programs, and other temporary work visa programs and green cards. EPI has published extensively on issues related to H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuse of H-1B and other visa programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p><strong>EPI opposes the proposed rule</strong> and believes it arbitrary and capricious, and will potentially harm over a million workers in nonimmigrants statuses, as well as U.S.-born workers who are similarly employed, and have significant negative economic impacts across numerous industries that have not been considered or calculated by DHS. The ultimate impact will be to grant employers with even more power to exploit H-1B and other visa programs for university-educated workers with impunity and to degrade standards generally for workers in professional occupations. Rather than eliminating the 60-day grace period established at 8 CFR § 214.1(l)(2), DHS should extend the grace period to 120 days.</p>
<h2>Over one million workers will be impacted by the proposed rule, many of whom are in the green card backlog.</h2>
<p>DHS does not attempt to estimate the total population of workers currently employed in the impacted visa classifications of E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 and TN. The Office of Homeland Security Statistics could likely have provided an estimate for the NPRM. The lack of an estimate prevents the public from understanding the size of the total stock of workers for whom the NPRM would strip of the ability to leave an abusive or lawbreaking employer, forcing them to risk their ability to reside and work in the United States, or to even have enough time to gather their belongings before they are considered out of status and at risk of detention and deportation.</p>
<p>We have provided a rough estimate shown below in <strong>Table 1 </strong>on the total stock of workers employed in the impacted classifications as of fiscal year (FY) 2019, which is just over one million. (a more recent year was not chosen because of data limitations in multiple classifications.) The vast majority are in the H-1B program with over 583,0000 workers employed, as well as the L-1 program with 200,000, and E-2 and TN where over 100,000 are employed in each.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-328259 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="328259" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/328259-36113-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Further, a significant share of workers in this population are on the path to lawful permanent residence (i.e., getting a green card), meaning their employer has submitted an I-140 petition to adjust their status. But because of annual numerical limits and country caps on green cards, there are significant wait times that can often last decades for applicants. In total, there are an estimated 1.2 million people in the employment-based green card backlog.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> While there is no official estimate of the shares in the different visa or status classifications, data on permanent labor certifications—the first step towards getting a green card for most H-1B workers—show that the vast majority are likely to be in H-1B status. In 2023, 64.3% of permanent labor certifications were for H-1B workers and 4.8% were for L-1 workers, accounting for a total of 69.1% of labor certifications in just those two classifications.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<h2>U.S. temporary work visa programs lack adequate regulation, worker protections, and labor standards enforcement.</h2>
<p>Through numerous reports, commentary, and testimony over many years, EPI has shown how temporary work visa programs—including the categories implicated by the proposed rule that allow employers to recruit and hire mostly university-educated workers from abroad—represent a flawed employment model that restricts workers’ rights by giving employers control over their workers’ immigration status.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> The H-1B program’s inadequate wage rules and worker protections, and lack of enforcement from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and the fact that the E-1, E-2, E-3, L-1, O-1 and TN programs have zero wage or worker protections, are directly contributing to the undercutting of U.S. labor standards.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> The programs lack adequate regulations and enforcement to protect workplace rights and fail to provide workers with a pathway to becoming lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens, leaving workers indentured for years and even decades. Given this reality, DHS should put in place measures—like grace periods, visa portability, and deferred action for workers with bona fide workplace complaints—that can act as safety valves for workers employed with nonimmigrant visas that need to leave an abusive and/or illegal employment situation. Instead, DHS is making conditions much worse for this cohort of workers by removing their freedom to walk away from an employer and seek employment elsewhere. It is exacerbating the already disastrous situation it has caused for workers when it rescinded the process established in 2023 that allowed workers the opportunity to apply for immigration protections when assisting a qualifying labor agency in conducting an employer investigation.</p>
<h2>The ability to leave an abusive employment situation is a fundamental worker right and DHS is proposing to eliminate it, which will degrade wages and working conditions.</h2>
<p>The vast majority of workers in the United States can leave an abusive employment situation—for example when they are not being paid the wages promised or when conditions are illegally hazardous—and seek alternative employment without a penalty. They are also able to report labor and employment law violations to the relevant state and local labor standards enforcement agencies without fear or any immediate penalty. This freedom to leave an employer acts as a check on the power of employers, so that they do not offer conditions that are unbearably and illegally poor. In short, workers who can change jobs or leave a lawbreaking employer without fear can bargain more effectively for fair and decent wages and seek career advancement opportunities they are qualified for. While this may seem like common sense, there is research to support it. For example, Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow found that the wage gain associated with moving from an H-1B visa to an employment-based green card was $11,860 per year.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>Statutes and regulations in temporary work visa programs, however, put migrant workers in a nonimmigrant status into a much more precarious and dangerous situation. Such workers do not have equal rights: Most visa programs do not permit migrant workers to easily leave a job or permit them to change jobs, making it difficult for them to leave an abusive employment situation. In essence, these visa programs operate in practice to create a labor market monopsony for employers—awarding employers greater leverage over their workers<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a>—and growing research has shown that even modest amounts of employer monopsony power are utterly corrosive to workers’ ability to bargain for better wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> In the limited visa programs where workers may have the ability to change jobs, many find it difficult in practice, because the U.S. government has not created a sensible and holistic system allowing them to find new opportunities in a reasonable amount of time.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>In addition, many workers have invested thousands of dollars to recruiters to obtain their temporary job, often taking on significant amounts of debt to do so, whether it’s in the H-2A, H-2B, or H-1B programs, or for employment-based (EB) green cards. If leaving a job means sacrificing a valid immigration status and the opportunity to continue working in the United States and to earn back the investments made, then workers are much more likely to opt to remain in an abusive employment situation, which degrades wages and working conditions—not just for the migrant workers themselves, but also for U.S. workers who are similarly employed.</p>
<p>Migrant workers in the impacted classifications will be far less likely to file complaints when employers violate the law, if it means risking a retaliatory termination that would result in the worker’s immediate loss of status and investments and triggering the need to depart the United States. If an employer unlawfully retaliates against a worker, there would be insufficient time to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, whether seeking reinstatement or back pay for wage and hour violations—and if the worker is a union member, there would be insufficient time to file a grievance through any established mechanisms. In fact, there would be no time to do so, since the worker must depart immediately after their termination.</p>
<p>As we’ve stated on numerous occasions and in multiple publications, workers in H-1B and other nonimmigrant statuses at a disadvantage in the workplace vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts because they have significantly less job mobility based on their temporary and precarious immigration status. But with the 60-day grace period created in its 2016 regulation, DHS took a major step towards leveling the playing field between employers and workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1, and TN classifications. While nevertheless insufficient to remedy the known flaws in work visa programs, the grace period was supported broadly by unions and worker advocacy groups. By proposing to eliminate one of the few worker protections in the targeted visa programs—impacting over one million workers—DHS is taking a major step backwards when it comes to protecting labor standards for U.S. workers and migrant workers. Overnight, one million workers will become indentured to their employers. Those one million workers are employed in fields as diverse as information technology, artificial intelligence, health care and medicine, engineering, and finance. U.S. workers in those fields will also be impacted negatively by their colleagues lacking workplace rights.</p>
<h2>Many of the workers impacted by the rule have resided in the United States for over a decade and have spouses employed in the United States and U.S. citizen children.</h2>
<p>Many of the workers impacted by the rule have resided in the United States for over a decade and have U.S. citizen children, and have made long term economic investments, such as purchasing homes, and are well integrated into their local communities. Cutting off the ability for these workers to find alternative employment and in many cases to continue on the path to a green card if they are terminated or laid off at work, or because their employer has engaged in unethical or illegal behavior, and forcing them to immediately depart the country, is not justified by any of the arguments or evidence presented by DHS in the NPRM.</p>
<p>Although no official count is available, there are hundreds of thousands of spouses of H-1B, L-1, and O-1 principal nonimmigrants who are likely employed and will also be impacted by elimination of the 60-day grace period. They will lose their employment and their employers will abruptly lose employees who will be forced to immediately depart the United States, disrupting the economy and labor market. Tens to hundreds of thousands of children—some share of whom are in a nonimmigrants status, and some share of whom are U.S. citizens—will also be impacted. Those children will have their education severely disrupted and interrupted, as parents will have no time to formally withdraw them from school and get their records in order, or to find another school in the country of origin.</p>
<p>The significant equities accrued, especially by long-term nonimmigrant workers, and the interest and well-being of the families who rely on them, significantly outweighs the administrative burdens which DHS overstates and primarily cites as their justification for eliminating the 60-day grace period.</p>
<h2>DHS has not calculated the economic impact of stripping over one million workers of an essential component of their workplace rights.</h2>
<p>DHS has failed to consider or estimate the significant costs that will be incurred not just by the more than one million nonimmigrant workers themselves, but also U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and other workers with employment authorization documents due to the increased restriction on worker mobility in these visa programs. In fact, various economic studies have shown that limiting worker mobility has a direct negative effect on the wages of all workers in a labor market, even those not subject to those limitations.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Eliminating the 60-day grace period will ultimately result in one million workers being indentured to their employers in numerous critical industries.</p>
<h2>Conclusion: DHS should rescind the proposed rule and instead increase the grace period to 120 days.</h2>
<p>As discussed above, a grace period of only 60 days is insufficient to permit workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 and TN classifications—who have been recruited from abroad and hired to participate and contribute to the U.S. labor market—to get their affairs in order, which may require selling a home and pulling children out of school. It is irrational, cruel, and arbitrary, and capricious to require such workers to depart the United States immediately, solely due to the whims of U.S. employers. Such workers should be permitted an adequate amount of time to find alternative employment in the United States, as well as to get their affairs in order if they choose to depart the country. Their spouses who are legally employed should also be permitted to benefit from an adequate grace period, which will benefit not just them, but the U.S. employers who hire them, who are provided with an opportunity to seek a replacement with a grace period, rather than having an employee who is required to depart the country immediately when their spouse’s employment is terminated.</p>
<p>DHS should rescind the NPRM, but as noted above, the 60-day grace period status quo, and the portability provisions in the implicated classifications, are inadequate to protect workers and labor standards. Instead, DHS should issue a new proposed rule to increase the grace period to 120 days. If deemed necessary, DHS could determine a shorter grace period for nonimmigrant workers who have resided in the United States for shorter periods. For example, a worker employed in nonimmigrant status for over three years could be entitled to a 120 day grace period, while a worker employed for fewer than three years could be entitled to a shorter period of at least 90 days.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Daniel Costa, Esq.<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> National Foundation for American Policy, <a href="https://nfap.com/research/new-nfap-policy-brief-employment-based-immigration-backlogs-and-waiting-times/"><em>Employment-Based Immigration Backlogs and Waiting Times</em></a>, NFAP Policy Brief, August 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/PERM_Selected_Statistics_FY2023_Q4.pdf">Permanent Employment Program – Selected Statistics, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023</a>,” Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> For more background on temporary work visas, their flaws, and proposed reforms, see Daniel Costa,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/"><em>Temporary Work Visa Programs and the Need for Reform: A Briefing on Program Frameworks, Policy Issues and Fixes, and the Impact of COVID-19</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021; Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmpvb/analysis-claims-migrant-tech-workers-have-been-underpaid-by-tens-of-millions">Analysis Claims Migrant Tech Workers Have Been Underpaid by Tens of Millions</a>,” Vice News, December 9, 2021; Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, <a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Coerced-under-NAFTA_-Abuses-of-Migrant-Workers-in-TN-Visa-Program.pdf"><em>Coerced under NAFTA: Abuses of Migrant Workers in the TN Visa Program and Recommendations for Reform</em></a>, 2017; George Avalos, “<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/10/22/workers-paid-1-21-an-hour-to-install-fremont-tech-companys-computers/">Workers Paid $1.21 an Hour to Install Fremont Tech Company’s Computers</a>.”&nbsp;<em>The Mercury News</em>, October 22, 2014; Farah Stockman, “<a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/editorials/2013/06/11/your-child-teacher-victim-human-trafficking/dQz2fYPwg6Xkgt1aV6HaiL/story.html">Teacher Trafficking: The Strange Saga of Filipino Workers, American Schools, and H-1B Visas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Boston Globe</em>, June 12, 2013; Maria Perez, “American farms recruit Mexican veterinarians for jobs as animal scientists — but the real work is milking cows and cleaning pens for low pay,” <em>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</em>, December 4, 2019 (updated Feb. 18, 2020).</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Sankar Mukhopadhyay and David Oxborrow,&nbsp;“<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-011-0079-3">The Value of an Employment-Based Green Card</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Demography</em>&nbsp;49: 219–237, February 2012.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Bivens and Shierholz broadly define “monopsony power” as “the leverage enjoyed by employers to set their workers’ pay.” See Josh Bivens and Heidi Shierholz,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/what-labor-market-changes-have-generated-inequality-and-wage-suppression-employer-power-is-significant-but-largely-constant-whereas-workers-power-has-been-eroded-by-policy-actions/"><em>What Labor Market Changes Have Generated Inequality and Wage Suppression?: Employer Power Is Significant but Largely Constant, Whereas Workers’ Power Has Been Eroded by Policy Actions</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, Dec. 12, 2018.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Eric M. Gibbons et al., “<a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp12096.pdf">Monopsony Power and Guest Worker Programs</a>,” IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper no. 12096, January 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> For a discussion about H-1B and TN visa portability in practice, see Daniel Costa, “Is portability a panacea? Changing employers in US temporary migration programmes,” chapter 8 in Christiane Kuptsch and Fabiola Mieres (eds.),&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/new-ilo-publication-explores-path-social-justice-migrant-workers"><em>Temporary labour migration: Towards social justice?</em></a>&nbsp;edited volume, International Labour Organization, February 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See for example, the economic literature on noncompete clauses, including, Evan Starr, “<a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.20251457">The Economics of Noncompete Clauses</a>,” <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives</em> 40, no. 1 (2026): 139-166;, Matthew Johnson, Kurt Lavetti, and Michael Lipsitz, “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455381">The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility</a>,” available at SSRN, June 6, 2020.&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>Nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/nearly-1-billion-in-stolen-wages-was-recovered-for-workers-in-2025/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 13:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, Matthew Wich, Samantha Sanders]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327812</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for Affordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>Wage theft—which happens when employers fail to pay workers the full wages they are legally owed—is widespread across sectors and affects millions of workers every year.</li>
<li>Enforcement efforts at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as class action settlements, recovered nearly $1 billion in stolen wages for workers in 2025.</li>
<li>These recovered wages represent a small fraction of the total amount stolen every year; we estimate that employers rob low-wage workers of more than $50 billion annually.</li>
<li>Policymakers can combat wage theft by strengthening the right to form unions, establishing greater wage payment transparency, bolstering enforcement capacities, and increasing penalties for perpetrators.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p><span class="dropped">A</span>ffordability—or the lack thereof—has dominated the recent political debate in the U.S. Much of the affordability debate has focused narrowly on prices. But the true underlying driver of today’s affordability squeeze is suppressed pay—the result of decades of policy decisions that have weakened workers’ bargaining power. Weakened bargaining power not only suppresses workers’ wages but also makes workers more vulnerable to exploitation. Among the most pervasive forms is wage theft, which robs millions of workers of billions of dollars each year (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Poydock and Zhang 2024). Wage theft occurs anytime an employer fails to pay a worker the amount they are legally owed for their labor. This can take many forms, including not paying overtime to eligible workers, not providing meal breaks as required by law, or paying workers less than the minimum wage. Existing laws enable workers to recoup these stolen wages through government enforcement, individual wage claims, and class action lawsuits.</p>
<p>Our survey of all states and review of federal data find that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025. This figure significantly understates the scale of wage theft, as it only accounts for recovered wages. Further, the Trump administration has pursued policies that make it easier for employers to minimize their liability for wage and hour violations and harder for workers to recoup money they are owed. The report highlights wage theft recovery efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), by state agencies, and via class action litigation. Finally, the report provides policy recommendations at both the federal and state levels to combat the pervasive practice of wage theft across the United States.</p>
<div class="box">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>What is wage theft?</strong></span></p>
<p>Wage theft is the failure to pay workers the full wages to which they are legally entitled. It can take many forms, including but not limited to:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Paying workers less than the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Overtime violations:&nbsp;</strong>Failing to pay nonexempt employees time and a half for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week</li>
<li><strong>Off-the-clock violations:&nbsp;</strong>Requiring employees to work off the clock before or after their shifts</li>
<li><strong>Meal break violations:&nbsp;</strong>Denying workers their legal meal breaks</li>
<li><strong>Illegal deductions:&nbsp;</strong>Taking illegal deductions from wages for business expenses such as uniforms or use of equipment</li>
<li><strong>Tipped minimum wage violations:&nbsp;</strong>Confiscating tips from workers, or failing to pay tipped workers the difference between their tips and the legal minimum wage</li>
<li><strong>Employee misclassification violations:&nbsp;</strong>Misclassifying employees as independent contractors to pay a wage lower than the legal minimum or avoid paying overtime&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2><strong>The scale and cost of wage theft</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a costly and widespread problem that affects millions of workers each year. Research by Cooper and Kroeger (2017) estimates that workers lose $15 billion annually in minimum wage violations alone. This does not account for other forms of wage theft, such as overtime pay violations, off-the-clock violations, or the denial of legal meal breaks. To put that into perspective, Cooper and Kroeger’s (2017) estimate of minimum wage violations alone exceeds the value of any form of property crime reported in Federal Bureau of Investigation data in the last year, including stolen value from all currency ($10.96 billion) and locally stolen motor vehicles ($8.22 billion).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>Wage theft occurs in all industries and impacts all workers, but workers in low-wage industries are significantly more likely to experience wage theft. A 2008 survey of workers in low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City found that two-thirds (68%) of these workers experienced at least one pay-related violation in any given week, robbing these workers of nearly $3 billion in wages each year (Bernhardt et al. 2009). Applying these rates to the national workforce, EPI estimates that low-wage workers in the U.S. lost $52.5 billion to all forms of wage theft in 2025 (Shierholz and Sanders 2026). According to DOL, low-wage workers in construction, food service, health care, and retail experience high rates of wage theft (WHD 2026a).</p>
<p>Wage theft is costly not only to the workers whose wages are stolen but also to taxpayers and the communities those workers live in. Failing to pay workers, particularly low-wage workers, the wages they are owed can cause them to fall into poverty. This increases reliance on public assistance, effectively shifting the costs of paying workers away from employers and onto taxpayers. When employers do not pay wages owed, they also suppress consumer demand in local economies because workers have less money to spend, which can hurt small businesses.</p>
<p>In this report, we present findings about the amount of <em>recovered</em> wages, which is only a small percentage of the total stolen from workers every year. Previous EPI reports found that between 2017 and 2020, $3.24 billion was recovered, and between 2021 and 2023, $1.5 billion was recovered (Mangundayao et al. 2021; Poydock and Zhang 2024).</p>
<h2><strong>Findings and analysis</strong></h2>
<p>In this report, we aggregated available data on stolen wages that were recovered across the United States. To be as comprehensive as possible, we reviewed current U.S. DOL wage enforcement data, surveyed state labor departments and attorneys general, and analyzed data on the largest class action wage and hour settlements.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Our analysis shows that nearly $1 billion in stolen wages was recovered for workers in 2025 through the U.S. Department of Labor, state agencies, and class action lawsuits. Importantly, as stated above, this figure does not account for all wage theft in the United States. Our analysis focused only on wages recovered, not total wages stolen, which we expect to be much greater. Whether it be out of fear of retaliation or a lack of knowledge about their rights, many workers never file a claim to recover stolen wages.</p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery by the U.S. Department of Labor</strong></h3>
<p>According to Wage and Hour Division (WHD) enforcement data, U.S. DOL recovered $259 million in fiscal year 2025, as shown in <strong>Table 1</strong>. These wages were recovered on behalf of 176,957 workers, which equates to $1,465.30 per worker on average.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-322767 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322767" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322767-36078-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Breaking down those aggregate numbers by specific violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), we find that overtime violations accounted for the largest share (79%) of total back wages recovered in 2025, as shown in <strong>Figure A</strong>. Minimum wage violations had the second-largest share at 15%, followed by tip-related violations (5%) and retaliation violations (under 1%).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-322810 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322810" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322810-36079-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<h3><strong>Wage recovery by state departments of labor and attorneys general</strong></h3>
<p>During the summer of 2026, EPI contacted state departments of labor and attorneys general via phone and email to compile data on their wage recovery efforts. We collected data, summarized in <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>, from 39 states and the District of Columbia. The remaining 11 states either did not recover wages for workers, did not respond to our request, did not track the requested data, or were unable to provide the requested data.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a></p>
<p>According to our analysis, state departments of labor and attorneys general in 39 states and the District of Columbia recovered $267 million in 2025.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<h3><strong>Wage recovery through class action settlements</strong></h3>
<p>Class action lawsuits, brought by workers themselves, can be an effective way for workers to recoup stolen wages. In <strong>Figure B</strong>, we present data collected by two law firms, Seyfarth Shaw LLP and Duane Morris LLP, that totals the value of the 10 largest class action lawsuits over the last decade. According to Duane Morris LLP, the value of large class action lawsuits totaled $434 million in 2025.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-322760 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322760" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322760-36080-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>One of the largest class action wage settlements in recent years was settled in 2025, with Disney agreeing to pay out more than $233 million to over 50,000 current and former employees of the Disneyland Park (Palm 2025). In 2018, voters in Anaheim, California, passed Measure L—legislation that required resorts in the area to raise the minimum wage to $15 per hour if they receive tax rebates from the city. Disney argued for several years that it was not covered by the new law. Though the trial court ruled in favor of Disney, the appellate court and California Supreme Court disagreed, and Disney ultimately settled—a massive win for Disneyland employees which demonstrates the power of workers joining together to hold employers accountable.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
As illustrated above, class action lawsuits are an effective strategy for recovering wages. However, many workers are barred from joining class action cases because they are subject to forced arbitration agreements. According to Colvin (2018), 56.2% of private-sector, nonunion workers are subject to forced arbitration agreements, which typically recover much lower awards for workers than class action lawsuits. For example, Stone and Colvin (2015) find the typical award per worker in forced arbitration ($36,500) is only 21% of the median award in a class action lawsuit in the federal courts ($176,426).</p>
<h2><strong>Case studies</strong></h2>
<p>The case studies presented below highlight the important work of federal, state, and local enforcement agencies and the power of workers who stand up against their employers to fight for the wages owed to them.</p>
<h3>U.S. Department of Labor</h3>
<p>In July 2026, the U.S. Department of Labor recovered over $500,000 in back wages and damages for six deli workers in San Diego, California (DOL 2026). Chau Deli was found to have failed to pay workers minimum wage for regular hours and overtime pay for hours worked over 40 per workweek. DOL determined that the employer was paying workers a flat rate of $100 per day, despite the workers averaging 11-hour days. The investigation resulted in each worker being paid approximately $83,000 in back wages.&nbsp;</p>
<h3>New York: NYC Department of Consumer and Worker Protection</h3>
<p>In January 2026, New York City secured a $5.2 million settlement with three delivery app companies—Uber Eats, Fantuan, and HungryPanda—to pay approximately 50,000 workers who were denied pay for deliveries that customers canceled (NYC 2026). The city’s minimum wage law requires companies to pay delivery workers for the time they spent on the delivery regardless of whether the customer cancels the order.</p>
<h3>Minnesota: Department of Labor and Industry</h3>
<p>In 2019, Minnesota labor officials began investigating two construction companies, Advantage Construction and Property Maintenance &amp; Construction, for committing wage violations at several construction sites. In 2026, the companies settled and agreed to pay $1.28 million to 26 workers on 19 different projects (Minnesota DLI 2026). This settlement is particularly noteworthy because when construction companies compete for contracts, companies that break the law by underpaying their employees have a competitive advantage. Holding employers accountable for wage theft is pivotal to ensure competition for contracts is based on quality and not exploitation.</p>
<h2><strong>Policy recommendations</strong></h2>
<h3>Federal solutions</h3>
<p>As illustrated in this report, wage theft is a costly and pervasive problem for workers in the United States. The Trump administration has only exacerbated this issue by reinstating the “Payroll Audit Independent Determination” (PAID) program, which permits employers who have stolen workers’ wages to confess their violations up front in order to avoid applicable penalties, essentially allowing employers to steal their workers’ wages without facing the full legal consequence (FPW 2025). Further, the Trump administration has proposed policies that would allow large corporations to minimize their liability for FLSA violations. In 2026, the Department of Labor proposed changes to independent contractor status and the joint employer standard under the FLSA. According to EPI analysis, the Trump administration’s proposed joint employer rule would cost workers more than $225.6 million each year in additional stolen wages (Shierholz and Sanders 2026).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Policymakers should enact policies that protect workers against wage theft and, more generally, build worker power. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>One of the best ways to combat wage theft is to strengthen the right to form unions and bargain collectively. Wage theft is exceedingly rare in unionized workplaces because union contracts typically provide covered workers with full transparency and legally binding employer commitments regarding work hours, pay periods, and pay rates (including rules on overtime and premium pay). Union contracts typically have grievance procedures that can quickly resolve any pay-related violations of the contract, ensuring that workers are paid what they are owed in a timely manner and without fear of retaliation.</p>
<p>It is also imperative that Congress increase funding for the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division. Beginning in 2020, the WHD has seen a decline in inflation-adjusted allocation each year (<strong>Figure C</strong>). The number of full-time employees at the WHD has also decreased consistently over time. Increased funding and investigators will help the WHD recover more stolen wages, investigate additional instances of wage theft, and better enforce the FLSA.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-322773 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="322773" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/322773-36081-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Finally, providing workers with greater transparency in their terms and conditions of employment is another key tool for protecting them against wage theft. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would require employers to provide disclosures, regular pay stubs, and final payments, which would help workers identify when they have not been paid what they are owed. Increasing the penalties to make wage theft more costly for employers would also help curb the practice. The Wage Theft Prevention and Wage Recovery Act would increase such penalties significantly. The Don’t Stand for Taking Employed Americans’ Livings (Don’t STEAL) Act would do the same by increasing penalties and fines and elevating the most severe violations to possible felony charges.</p>
<h3><strong>State and local efforts</strong></h3>
<p>As we demonstrate in this report, state and local agencies play an important role in enforcing wage theft laws and recovering stolen wages for workers (Sherer 2025).</p>
<p>While federal legislation combating wage theft has made little progress, many states have taken important action to fill gaps in federal law, such as 1) requiring written pay stubs, 2) ensuring timely pay on scheduled paydays, 3) regulating forms of pay and employer uses of third-party payroll vendors or electronic pay cards, 4) preventing unauthorized paycheck deductions, and 5) mandating prompt payment of final paychecks when a worker’s employment ends.</p>
<p>At a minimum, states can ensure workers greater transparency about their terms and conditions of employment. For example, 44 states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring pay stubs from employers (ADP 2026). This empowers workers to verify if they are being compensated correctly. States can also adopt explicit codes that prohibit payroll deductions without worker authorization, as New York has.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Additionally, states like Minnesota require employers to provide a written notice with terms of employment at the time of hire (Sherer 2025). Both the initial notice and pay stub documentation can deter unauthorized deductions from paychecks.</p>
<p>Timeliness of payment is another concern that states have the capability to address. States should more widely adopt codes that set consistent, predictable payday intervals. Nevada and others have also taken steps to address prompt payment of a final paycheck.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> To address forms of wage theft related to the growing employer use of third-party payroll services or electronic bank cards to deposit workers’ pay, many states like Arkansas have laws to require their employers to provide the option of receiving wages via check and set standards for the use of pay cards in order to ensure workers receive their full, entitled pay (ADP 2020).</p>
<p>Finally, many states have passed legislation strengthening enforcement of wage theft violations by increasing fines and allowing for enforcement against certain wage payment violations under criminal statutes. Colorado and Connecticut, among several other states, classify wage theft as a felony if certain circumstances are met, which can result in jail time.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In March 2026, Washington state passed a law which strengthens penalties for repeat offenders and creates a Wage Recovery Account to help unpaid workers receive some of the wages they are owed while cases are ongoing.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<h2><strong>The work of ending wage theft continues</strong></h2>
<p>Wage theft is a pervasive epidemic that cheats many workers, families, and communities out of billions of dollars each year. Federal, state, and local enforcement efforts win back some of the stolen wages, but those efforts only recover a small fraction of the total wages stolen. Our report finds that through efforts conducted by the U.S. Department of Labor, by state agencies, and through class action lawsuits, <span style="background-color: #9bd8c9;">nearly $1 billion</span> was recovered for workers. Although strong examples of recovery efforts exist, much more is necessary to ensure workers are paid what they are rightfully owed, including greater wage transparency for workers, bolstered enforcement capacities by agencies, and meaningful penalties for perpetrators.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The authors would like to thank Mallory Miller, Christina Ayon, and Salma Abdi for their research assistance in this report.</p>
<h2><strong>Appendix</strong></h2>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-326588 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326588" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326588-36082-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Authors’ analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Data Explorer data (FBI-CDE 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Seven states defer to the federal government for recovery efforts: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Note that 2025 total includes some data from 2024 or 2026, as some states tracked wage recovery efforts by fiscal year instead of calendar year.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> EPI conservatively estimates workers will lose roughly one billion dollars ($997.6 million) annually as a result of this rule if it is finalized: more than $772.0 million lost by workers as a result of the rule due to an increase in workplace fissuring and more than $225.6 million in losses by workers as a result of wage theft.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> NY Lab L § 193 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> NV Rev Stat § 608.040 (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> CO Rev Stat § 8-4-114 (2025) and CT Gen Stat § 31-71g (2025)</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> HB 2479 &#8211; 2025-26</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>ADP. 2020. <a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/employer_paycard_wp.pdf?rev=731797839037413386e2aaad33dcff78&amp;hash=871BCF8EC1C49EBAC5BD9992BF99E5F2"><em>Employer Pay Cards: Staying on the Right Side of Compliance: A Guide to Federal and State Employer Pay Card Compliance Requirements</em></a>.</p>
<p>ADP. 2026. “<a href="https://www.adp.com/-/media/adp/resourcehub/pdf/pay_statement_requirements_chart.pdf">Pay Statement Requirements</a>” (web page). Last updated October 6, 2026.</p>
<p>Bernhardt, Annette, Ruth Milkman, Nik Theodore, Douglas Heckathorn, Mirabai Auer, James DeFilippis, Ana Luz González, Victor Narro, Jason Perelshteyn, Diana Polson, and Michael Spiller. 2009. <a href="http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf?nocdn=1"><em>Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, 2009</em></a>. Center for Urban Economic Development, National Employment Law Project, and UCLA Institute for Research on Labor and Employment.</p>
<p>Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 2026. “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/laus.t01.htm">Table 1. Civilian Labor Force and Unemployment by State, Seasonally Adjusted</a>.” Local Area Unemployment Statistics. Last modified September 18, 2026.&nbsp; &nbsp;</p>
<p>Cooper, David, and Teresa Kroeger. 2017. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year/"><em>Employers Steal Billions from Workers’ Paychecks Each Year</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 2017.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20260717">U.S. Department of Labor Recovers More Than $500K in Back Wages from San Diego Deli for 6 Workers</a>” (news release). July 17, 2026.</p>
<p>Duane Morris LLP. 2026. <a href="https://www.duanemorris.com/pressreleases/duane_morris_publishes_wage_hour_class_collective_review_0126.html"><em>Wage &amp; Hour Class and Collective Review</em></a>. January 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime Data Explorer (FBI-CDE). 2026. “<a href="https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#/pages/explorer/crime/property-crime">Expanded Property Reported in United States</a>” (web page). Last updated September 15, 2026.</p>
<p>Federal Policy Watch (FPW). 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/department-of-labor-restarts-employer-friendly-self-audit-compliance-program-on-wage-and-hour-laws/">Department of Labor Restarts Employer-Friendly &#8216;Self-Audit&#8217; Compliance Program on Wage and Hour Laws</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, July 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Iowa Department of Inspections, Appeals, and Licensing (Iowa DIAL). 2025. <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/docs/publications/DF/1544407.pdf"><em>SFY25 DIAL Annual Report</em></a>.</p>
<p>Mangundayao, Ihna, Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Ali Sait. 2021. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021/"><em>More Than $3 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2017 and 2020</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2021.</p>
<p>Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (Minnesota DLI). 2026. “<a href="https://www.dli.mn.gov/news/dli-recovers-128-million-back-wages-and-liquidated-damages-construction-workers">DLI Recovers $1.28 Million in Back Wages and Liquidated Damages for Construction Workers</a>” (news release). April 27, 2026.</p>
<p>New York City, Office of the Mayor (NYC). 2026. “<a href="https://www.nyc.gov/mayors-office/news/2026/01/mayor-mamdani-announces--5-million-settlement--reinstatement-of-">Mayor Mamdani Announces $5 Million Settlement, Reinstatement of as Many as 10,000 Wrongfully Deactivated Food Delivery Workers</a>” (news release). January 30, 2026.</p>
<p>New York Department of Labor (NY DOL). 2026. “<a href="https://dol.ny.gov/wage-theft-dashboard">Wage Theft Investigation Dashboard</a>” (web page). Accessed&nbsp; October 8, 2026.</p>
<p>Palm, Iman. 2025. “<a href="https://ktla.com/news/theme-parks/disneyland/unionized-disneyland-workers-say-233m-settlement-validates-years-of-organizing/?link_id=4&amp;can_id=ab0184786856562d7c97b3a362f2fb49&amp;source=email-daily-brief-sept-xx-2025-21&amp;email_referrer=email_2908984&amp;email_subject=daily-brief-sept-29-2025&amp;&amp;">Unionized Disneyland Workers Say $233M Settlement Validates Years of Organizing</a>.” KTLA, September 25, 2025.</p>
<p>Poydock, Margaret, and Jiayi (Sonia) Zhang. 2024. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-2021-23"><em>More Than $1.5 Billion in Stolen Wages Recovered for Workers Between 2021 and 2023</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, December 2024.</p>
<p>Seyfarth Shaw LLP. 2022. <a href="https://www.content.seyfarth.com/publications/Workplace-Class-Action-Report-2022/i/"><em>18th Annual Workplace Class Action Litigation Report</em></a>. January 2022.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-payment-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/"><em>Wage Payment: State Solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 30, 2025.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi, and Samantha Sanders. 2026. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-joint-employer-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act/">EPI Comment on DOL’s Proposed Rule on &#8216;Joint Employer Status&#8217; Under the Fair Labor Standards Act</a>.” Economic Policy Institute, June 22, 2026.</p>
<p>Utah Labor Commission. 2025. <a href="https://laborcommission.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/Annual.Report25-copy-6-1.pdf"><em>Utah Labor Commission Annual Report: For the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2025</em></a>.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026a. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/low-wage-high-violation-industries">Low Wage, High Violation Industries</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026b. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/all-acts">All Acts</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026c. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/fair-labor-standards-act">Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)</a>” (web page). Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>Wage and Hour Division (WHD). 2026d. <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/general/budget/2027/CBJ-2027-V2-09.pdf"><em>FY 2027 Congressional Budget Justification: Wage and Hour Division</em></a>. Accessed September 30, 2026.</p>
<p>West Virginia Division of Labor (WV DOL). 2025. <a href="https://labor.wv.gov/index.php/media/261/download?inline"><em>FY 2025</em></a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>EPI comment on ICE proposed rule to create a new fee for the Optional Practical Training program</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-ice-proposed-rule-to-create-a-new-fee-for-the-optional-practical-training-program/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 15:44:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328287</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted electronically via the Federal Office of the Principal Legal Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security 500 12th St Washington, DC Re: Optional Practical Training Fees (Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/08/2026-20660/optional-practical-training-fees"><em>Submitted electronically via </em><em>the Federal Register</em></a></p>
<p>Office of the Principal Legal Advisor<br />
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)<br />
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)<br />
500 12th St SW<br />
Washington, DC 20536</p>
<p><strong>Re: </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/08/2026-20660/optional-practical-training-fees"><strong><em>Optional Practical Training Fees</em></strong></a><strong> (Docket No. ICEB-2026-0100; RIN 1653-AB01), Notice of proposed rulemaking, 91 Fed. Reg. 64566 (October 8, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding new fees that will be imposed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on universities for students and graduates seeking to participate in the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program. EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the OPT and H-1B programs—including on H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuses of H-1B.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> (Significant numbers of H-1B workers were first employed in the United States through OPT program, so much so that OPT can reasonably be viewed as an H-1B program with fewer rules and worker protections.)</p>
<p>Educating foreign students is a long-standing and laudable feature of the U.S. higher education system. By any measure, the U.S. remains the most attractive place for the international students looking to study outside of their home countries. The United States attracts the most, and more importantly the best and brightest students, from all corners of the globe. The principal reason for this is the massive long-term investment U.S. taxpayers have made in the higher education system; equipping university laboratories with state-of-the-art research equipment and attracting the best faculty. But through funding cuts for research and attacks on universities, the current administration has put all of this at risk for current and future generations of students—both U.S.-born and foreign-born—jeopardizing scientific discoveries and innovations that benefit the U.S. economy.</p>
<p>A separate but related issue is that the U.S. employment-based immigration system has serious flaws when it comes to protecting workers and labor standards, and major reforms are long overdue. One especially flawed component of the system is the OPT program, through which U.S. employers hire and employ hundreds of thousands of student workers and recent university graduates every year.</p>
<p>We believe that U.S. policy should seek to attract and retain the best and brightest students from around the globe. Those who are eventually allowed to work in U.S. labor market, however, should be paid according to U.S. wage standards, and before being hired, employers should be required to test the labor market to ensure that no U.S. workers already present in the United States are available. Recent foreign graduates of U.S. universities who meet certain qualifications should then also be allowed to quickly obtain lawful permanent resident status (a green card), so that they are not bonded to employers by virtue a precarious immigration status, and so they can fully integrate into economic and political life in the United States. Those general principles should guide our labor migration policy to ensure that foreign students entering the U.S. labor market will fill demonstrated labor shortages and not be exploitable and underpaid “guestworkers.” Otherwise employers will be allowed to hijack the immigration system in a way that puts downward pressure on the wages of all workers in the United States and overlooks local workers seeking employment opportunities.</p>
<p>One of the best ways to achieve this with respect to the student workers and recent graduates who work in OPT would be for ICE and DHS to support regulatory and statutory changes that will ensure workers can exercise their labor and employment rights free of employer retaliation or coercion. To that end, EPI urges the administration to support and work with Congress for passage of the Keep STEM Talent Act, bipartisan legislation that enables talented graduates from U.S. colleges and universities to continue contributing to the U.S. economy while ensuring that they are paid fairly and that U.S.-born professional workers are not overlooked for entry-level positions. Under this legislation, international graduates who earn advanced STEM degrees from U.S. universities would be exempt from the annual numerical caps on green cards if their employers receive approved labor certifications and pay them at least the local median wage level for their specific occupation. The Keep STEM Talent Act would offer in-demand graduates a high-road alternative to precarious temporary work visas, while enhancing America’s global leadership.</p>
<p><strong><u>EPI opposes the proposed rule.</u></strong></p>
<p>Sadly, the proposed rule does not represent a true reform of the OPT program. Rather, it is an attempt to discourage usage of the program by penalizing both host universities and the students and graduates who will be prohibited from entry-level training and job opportunities. Therefore, EPI opposes the proposed rule and urges ICE/DHS to withdraw it: Requiring a fee of $70,000 for initial OPT applications and $30,000 for any subsequent OPT is arbitrary and capricious, and does not serve the interests of workers in the United States. EPI proposes that DHS consider alternative, more holistic reforms, which are outlined herein.</p>
<h2><strong>ICE’s claim that the proposed OPT fees are needed to administer the program and fight fraud is not credible given ICE cannot use those funds.</strong></h2>
<p>ICE in the NPRM cites rapid growth in the program and serious instances of fraud. Both are valid concerns in a program that has no real worker protections that can be enforced to protect labor standards and hold lawbreaking employers accountable. However, ICE has so far chosen not to create worker protections or seriously combat fraud, while now claiming that “without the fees proposed in this rule, it cannot operate OPT consistent with its focus on preventing fraud and may shut down the program entirely.” There is an obvious problem with this rationale, which ICE admits in the proposed rule, when stating that ICE does not have authority to maintain or use these excessive new fees. In fact, the proposed rule explains that the fees would be deposited in the U.S. Treasury as a “miscellaneous receipt” and that the funds would not be able to be used for any aspect of the OPT program without Congressional action. Thus, the fees will be used to fund government activities that are unrelated to OPT. In addition, given the level of appropriations ICE has received since fiscal year (FY) 2025, which total over $116 billion that can be used through FY 2029,<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> it is likely that ICE could find already appropriated funding that it could redirect and use for administering the OPT program and combatting fraud. This maneuver would be subject to congressional limits on ICE funding but should be explored considering the exorbitant amounts of funding that ICE has already received.</p>
<h2>Rather than a new proposed fee, ICE should consider alternative reforms to the OPT program that would protect wages and working conditions for all workers.</h2>
<p>In the proposed rule, ICE has failed to consider a range of alternatives that could improve the OPT program and more effectively achieve its purported goals of reducing fraud and helping U.S. workers. For example, ICE could require that employers pay OPT workers at prevailing wages and recruit U.S. workers before hiring OPT workers. ICE could prevent employers that engage in fraud or violate wage and hour and labor laws from employing student workers through the OPT program. ICE could also require transparency in the OPT program by including public disclosure of all employers and the wages paid to OPT workers and their occupations. ICE could ban the use of OPT by outsourcing, staffing, and placement agencies. ICE could also support universities and labor organizations to provide educational materials to student workers about their workplace rights and provide immigration status protections for student workers who report labor violations. Some of these proposed reforms are discussed in the following subsections.</p>
<h4><strong>a) The OPT program lacks adequate wage rules that would protect against undercutting U.S. wage standards and the exploitation and underpayment of F-1 OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>The large size of the OPT program—with more initial approvals every year than the number of new H-1B petitions since at least FY 2015<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>—means it is a large and significant pathway into the U.S. labor market. As such, there should be adequate wage safeguards to protect both U.S. workers and F-1 OPT workers, as well as labor standards more generally. They do not exist. ICE should thus implement a new and enforceable wage rule for OPT.</p>
<p>Regulatory language that governs the STEM OPT extension at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(8) purports to protect wage standards through an employer attestation on the required training plans. That section reads:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><strong><em>Duties, hours, and compensation for training.</em></strong>&nbsp;The terms and conditions of a STEM practical training opportunity during the period of the 24-month OPT extension, including duties, hours, and compensation, must be commensurate with terms and conditions applicable to the employer&#8217;s similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment… If the employer does not employ and has not recently employed more than two similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment, the employer nevertheless remains obligated to attest that the terms and conditions of a STEM practical training opportunity are commensurate with the terms and conditions of employment for other similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment. “Similarly situated U.S. workers” includes U.S. workers performing similar duties subject to similar supervision and with similar educational backgrounds, industry expertise, employment experience, levels of responsibility, and skill sets as the student. The duties, hours, and compensation of such students are “commensurate” with those offered to U.S. workers employed by the employer in the same area of employment when the employer can show that the duties, hours, and compensation are consistent with the range of such terms and conditions the employer has offered or would offer to similarly situated U.S. employees. The student must disclose his or her compensation, including any adjustments, as agreed to with the employer, on the Form I-983 or successor form.</p>
<p>The provisions in this section are overly vague and deferential to employers and allow them to attest, such that they are virtually unenforceable in practice in any meaningful way. Has ICE ever found an employer to have violated these provisions, or enforced these provisions? And if so, how?</p>
<p>The current rule essentially allows employers to decide what the commensurate wage is for a U.S. worker who is “similarly situated” to the STEM OPT worker, and attest that they believe this is true. Under this rule the STEM OPT worker is then responsible for reporting the wage/salary information on their Mentoring and Training Plan.</p>
<p>There are two main problems with this. First, the employer should not be allowed to set the STEM OPT worker’s wage. The employer is not an uninterested party with the goal of ensuring fairness to U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. Employers are driven by a profit motive, and have a vested interest in, and derive profit from, paying employees the lowest wage possible (without losing the worker or violating the law). Instead, the wages paid to all OPT workers, including those on a STEM OPT extension, should be set according to data maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) which show the average wages earned by workers in every region of the United States by occupation and local area.</p>
<p>A new rule that expanded the training plan requirement that includes the STEM OPT wage attestation to all OPT workers, for example, would not be sufficient. What’s needed is a simple and effective rule that would protect against the undercutting of U.S. wage standards by requiring that employers pay OPT workers the prevailing wage according to an existing and reliable wage data source, such as the DOL’s the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics survey, which is used to set H-1B wage levels. This makes sense considering the number of H-1B workers who are likely to have been employed in OPT immediately before changing to H-1B status. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) annual H-1B Characteristics report for FY 2024 reported that 37% of all new H-1B petitions were approved for someone in F status<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> and USCIS also posted on X.com that, for FY 2027, “An overwhelming 71.5% of selected aliens [for new employment in H-1B] hold a U.S. master’s degree or higher, compared to 57% last year.”<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Most of those selected petitions were likely for persons who were previously employed in OPT, thus, having a similar wage rule to H-1B and using the same data set used to set H-1B wages, could be a rational and sensible approach—so long as H-1B prevailing wage rates end up being set at reasonable levels in the methodology rule that is currently being finalized at DOL.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>In addition, the only clear statutory authority that has ever existed for an OPT-like program was a three-year pilot program created by section 221 of the 1990&nbsp;Immigration and Nationality Act<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> that allowed foreign graduates to work in fields unrelated to their degree. That pilot program&nbsp;required employers to pay workers the actual wage paid to similarly situated workers or a prevailing wage, as well as recruit U.S. workers for 60 days. While that program was later allowed to sunset, congressional direction about wages and employment opportunities for U.S. workers should inform ICE’s decision to mandate a clear, appropriate wage level for OPT participants who become employed after graduation.</p>
<p>Also, the OPT program does not contain an outright ban on employers who hire OPT employees as unpaid interns or volunteers, although volunteer work is not permitted for the STEM OPT extension. To prevent employers from hiring recent graduates and paying them nothing, ICE should propose a regulation that prohibits employers from hiring any OPT workers as unpaid interns or paying them only a non-salary “stipend” for their work.</p>
<h4><strong>b) The OPT program should require that employers advertise job openings to U.S. workers before hiring OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>Well over 200,000 F-1 nonimmigrants are employed in the United States every year through the OPT program. However, employers are not required to first advertise jobs filled by OPT workers for a set period of time. That means that U.S. workers—especially recent young college graduates looking for entry level opportunities, who are currently experiencing recession-level unemployment rates—may miss out on a chance to apply for these positions. In order to ensure that U.S. born and lawful permanent residents are not overlooked for entry level jobs in the United States, employers should have to advertise OPT job opportunities on an electronic public database for at least 60 days, and be required to hire any equally or better qualified U.S. workers who apply for those positions.</p>
<p>Employer attestation of the need for a worker, as permitted in the H-1B program, is an insufficient means of assessing real labor market needs and is an inadequate measure to protect the U.S. labor market. The OPT program does not even have that. The only related protective measure is a required employer attestation for STEM OPT employers, who are required to attest that their STEM OPT employee will not replace a full- or part-time, temporary, or permanent U.S. worker (see 8 § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(10)(ii)).</p>
<p>A more meaningful system that includes a labor certification requirement must be put in place for OPT, as well as all other visa programs that lack one. It is essential to prevent employer practices that exploit visa programs to undercut or displace an existing local workforce. Given the already substantial size of the OPT program, and the fact that it is uncapped, the potential for adverse effects is real unless more meaningful measures—such as those proposed here—are implemented to ensure that local candidates are given fair consideration for all relevant job opportunities.</p>
<p>Finally, independent of whether a training plan is created, a requirement similar to 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(10)(ii) should be applied to the entire OPT program, and rewritten to more broadly prohibit an employer from employing an OPT worker where it has laid off any similarly employed U.S. worker in the occupation within the period beginning 120 calendar days before the date the OPT worker is to begin employment. In addition, during the term of employment, employers should be required to lay off any OPT worker before laying off any similarly employed U.S. worker, as is already required in other employment-based visa programs.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> The entire OPT program should also include a prohibition on employers employing an OPT worker when there is a strike or lockout at any of the employer’s worksites within the area of intended employment of the OPT worker, as again is already required in other employment-based visa programs.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<h4><strong>c) ICE should end the tax loophole that incentivizes employers to hire OPT workers over U.S. workers.</strong></h4>
<p>As discussed in the previous section, employers should be required to pay OPT workers (and all employees hired through temporary visa programs) at the same rate they would pay local workers in the same occupations. As long as regulations allow visa-contingent workers to be paid less than their local counterparts for the same work, there are clear and inappropriate incentives for employers to prefer to hire through those programs. In the case of the OPT program, the fact that employers of OPT workers are not required to pay federal payroll taxes is a serious problem which disadvantages U.S. workers seeking entry-level professional jobs. Even at the same rate of pay, the cost savings associated with employing OPT workers instead of U.S. workers distorts the labor market to the detriment of U.S. workers. While ICE is aware of the existence of this tax loophole that benefits employers of OPT workers and mentions it in the proposed rule, ICE’s proposed rule does not address it in any meaningful way, other than by attempting to reduce demand in the OPT program. To combat the potential discrimination this will result in against U.S. workers, ICE should work with other appropriate federal agencies to require employers of OPT workers to begin paying payroll taxes, or create a system for employers to pay an amount equal to the payroll taxes they would have been required to pay if they had hired a U.S. worker, into a new fund to encourage employment of entry-level professional workers, or at the very least, to the U.S. Treasury.</p>
<h4><strong>d) ICE should prohibit employment placement agencies and staffing/outsourcing firms that send workers to third-party employers from hiring OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>The 2015 proposed rule establishing the STEM OPT extension stated that “DHS does not envision that . . . ‘temp’ agencies will generally be able to provide eligible opportunities under the proposed STEM OPT extension” because they cannot comply with proposed mentoring requirements.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> In EPI’s comment on the proposed rule we agreed that temporary employment agencies, especially those that would outsource and outplace F-1 nonimmigrant workers in STEM OPT, would not be able to comply with proposed duties, hours, and compensation requirements.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> We asked DHS to therefore include language in the final rule that would explicitly disqualify temporary employment agencies from employing STEM OPT workers. DHS opted not to include such a prohibition for STEM OPT, and the result is that eight years later, a review of the top employers reveals that thousands of workers hired through STEM OPT are in fact employed by firms with a staffing and outsourcing business model.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Thousands of OPT workers are employed by outsourcing firms as well.</p>
<p>In 2015, when we shared our concern with DHS and urged further regulatory action to end the use of the OPT program by temp agencies, our ask was substantiated by non-public DHS data on OPT employers that we had reviewed at the time. At least 500 STEM OPT participants had already in fact been employed by temporary employment/staffing companies, which furthermore have a business model that facilitates the outsourcing and offshoring of professional jobs. The OPT program should not be allowed to facilitate outsourcing and offshoring, which is often done for the purpose of earning profits at the cost of U.S. jobs; an activity that is not consistent with ICE’s stated goals for the OPT program. Outsourcing firms have also been associated with paying the lowest wages allowed by law, numerous and egregious legal violations, and have been found to have replaced thousands of U.S. workers, sometimes forcing them to train their own replacements employed through an H-1B or L-1 visa.</p>
<h4><strong>e) ICE should create a screening program to prevent employers with a record of violating labor and employment laws from hiring through OPT.</strong></h4>
<p>We have previously recommended that DOL should create a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers hiring through the H-1B program, and that those found to have violated certain laws in the previous five years be prohibited from using the program.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> We have made similar arguments in the H-2A and H-2B context.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> A similar process is required to prevent lawbreaking employers from hiring through the OPT program.</p>
<p>We recommended that ICE/DHS to take steps to exclude lawbreaking employers that violate labor, employment, and immigration laws from OPT hiring. ICE should consult with DOL to develop a list of key applicable laws and operate the system jointly with DOL, with employers being required to attest that they have not violated those laws, and with DOL screening employer records.</p>
<p>We believe DHS should consider similar provisions for employers seeking to hire through the H-1B program, as we have recommended previously, because there have been numerous credible accusations of lawbreaking against H-1B employers, as well as investigations and litigation, finding that H-1B employers and recruiters that have been guilty of wage theft, financial bondage, and even human trafficking. Given that many of the biggest OPT employers are also H-1B employers, and that OPT is the main feeder program of workers into H-1B, such a mechanism is reasonable for OPT. The reality is ICE/DHS have very limited staffing and expertise to investigate the labor and workplace violations of OPT employers, and it is difficult in practice for OPT workers to come forward and complain themselves about employer lawbreaking—because they could face retaliation and lose their status, and possibly the opportunity to become H-1B workers and eventually lawful permanent residents. Thus, at a minimum, to act as a backstop and keep lawbreaking employers out of the program, ICE/DHS should have its own list of legal violations and deny any OPT application for employment with a firm that has violated any of the laws or regulations on the list in the preceding five years.</p>
<h2><strong>DOL should play a primary role in managing the OPT program, or at least partner with ICE in managing the aspects related to wages and working conditions.</strong></h2>
<p>In general, it is important to note that the OPT and STEM OPT programs are large temporary labor migration programs—and should be managed as such, with the necessary measures to protect workers and labor standards. The appropriate agency that should primarily be responsible for the management of all temporary work visa programs is DOL, based on its staff expertise and mandate to protect the wages and working conditions of all workers in the United States, not to mention its role in workforce training.</p>
<p>More specifically, ICE does not have expertise in labor and employment law, or in determining what adequate wages and working conditions are for OPT workers. The fact that the ICE included some language in the 2016 STEM OPT regulation requiring that employers attest that their OPT workers will be paid a “commensurate” wage was a step forward relative to the OPT program and the 2008 STEM OPT rule, both of which did not require that <em>any</em> minimum or commensurate wage be paid.</p>
<p>But even for STEM OPT, the attestation requirement is inadequate and flawed, as we noted in our 2015 comment on the proposed rule. Instead, just as DOL’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification reviews applications for other employment-based visas, so should they certify that employers hiring through the OPT program are paying market wages and have not displaced local workers. We realize that it would be illogical and ineffective for ICE to be the agency that reviews and assesses such information. ICE has neither the expertise nor the mandate to ensure fair wage rates or prevent worker exploitation. Protection of labor standards is the central work of the DOL, and the agency must have an oversight role in a program with the size and scope of the OPT program and the STEM OPT extension. DOL’s role in overseeing the program should include authority to initiate investigations of potential fraud and abuse and must be adequately funded to ensure that the agency has the staff and resources to provide effective oversight. In addition, it would be more appropriate and beneficial for workers if DOL conducted worksite visits or on-site reviews (such as those introduced in the 2016 STEM OPT regulation), to ensure employer compliance with program requirements, rather than sending ICE agents whose primary function is to enforce immigration laws, rather than labor standards.</p>
<p>While we realize this would require a new coordinated interagency effort, we also believe that DOL involvement is the only realistic way to ensure the protection of wages and working conditions in the OPT program.</p>
<h2><strong>ICE should help the public better understand the impact of the OPT program by increasing transparency and annually publishing key data on its usage.</strong></h2>
<p>In order to improve oversight and understanding of our legal immigration system, relevant agencies should always publish timely online information for each visa category and subcategory, as well as any other work programs created by federal regulations or federal agency guidance, including OPT and STEM OPT. Nonimmigrant visa programs continue to be plagued with fraud and abuse, including violations of wage and hour, anti-trafficking, and anti-discrimination laws by employers. Transparency is a critical tool to keep the public and policymakers informed, as well as to empower advocates to ensure fair treatment and high standards within these visa programs.</p>
<p>The possibility for worker abuse in a program like OPT that has no worker protections, and which is administered by ICE—an agency with no mandate or expertise on protecting labor standards—is high and concerning. In fact, a 2014 review by the Government Accountability Office found that ICE had not developed adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure basic compliance with OPT regulations.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> Since the year that review was completed, the program has nearly tripled in size, and ICE notes in the proposed rule that “the use of OPT and related fraudulent activities in OPT have expanded significantly” since 2016.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a></p>
<p>Rather than increasing transparency in OPT, ICE has instead opted to prevent the public from accessing vital information on the OPT program and STEM OPT extension. The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) Data Library on ICE’s website publishes some data on OPT and STEM OPT usage dating back to 2017.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> However, ICE has stopped publishing OPT and STEM OPT data since 2024. And the data that are available are mostly general summaries published on PDFs, rather than micro data with key detailed information about OPT positions, such as geographic locations, occupations, and wages paid to OPT workers.&nbsp;</p>
<p>ICE should restart publishing annual data on the SEVP Data Library and begin publishing new information that includes the underlying raw data gathered from the I-938 and I-765 forms used in the OPT and STEM OPT programs, including any other relevant information such as the full list of employer names and locations, and the occupations, wages, and work locations of all OPT and STEM OPT workers, as well as their gender, age, country of origin, level of training, field of training, and institution(s) of higher education.</p>
<p>We consider public disclosure to be an essential element of a more effective accountability system and urge ICE to consider this request.</p>
<h2><strong>Students and recent graduates will ultimately end up paying the news fees, leading to exploitation and debt bondage.</strong></h2>
<p>ICE’s proposed rule will effectively eliminate OPT for all but the very richest universities, employers, and students, and disproportionately impact those who come from poorer families, cutting off critical opportunities for them to make significant contributions in their fields based on an inability to pay the exorbitant fees. The fees reflect a pay-to-play approach to the immigration system that the current administration has taken. In addition, the proposed fee will do nothing to improve working conditions for young professional workers and recent graduates. ICE claims in the proposed rule, without evidence, that the new fees will increase university scrutiny and result in only the most promising students participating in OPT.</p>
<p>At page 64575 of the proposed rule, “DHS acknowledges that the schools may pass the financial obligation of this proposed fee onto F-1 nonimmigrant students, all students, or employers.” DHS goes on to state—again without evidence—that allowing students and employers to pay the fee “would further discourage misuse of OPT.” We find this prediction and its reasoning to be unconvincing. In practice, what’s more likely is that the proposed rule will shift fee costs onto OPT workers themselves in most cases, because of an unwillingness and in many cases inability of universities to pay the exorbitant fee. Universities that consider paying the fee may respond by increasing tuition costs, which would negatively impact both students who are U.S.-born and foreign-born.</p>
<p>Employers are also unlikely to pay the large fee because of the relatively short-term nature of OPT employment and the uncertainty of the H-1B lottery. Employers that do pay the fee are likely to respond by lowering salaries for OPT workers or by treating the fee payment as a loan—leaving OPT workers indebted to their employers—and by deducting a share of the OPT worker’s salary to pay back the fee. As a general principle, workers should never be allowed to pay a fee in order to access a job. This is enshrined in both international law and domestic law, including in the H-2A and H-2B visa programs.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> ICE does not prohibit fee payment by OPT workers in the proposed rule, and in fact, the OPT fee acts as a de facto recruitment fee charged by the federal government. In effect, rather than requiring payment of fair wages to skilled workers, the proposed fee will give employers significant leverage to underpay and exploit OPT workers; perhaps even turning employers into de facto loan sharks. In turn, the fee will additionally degrade standards for similarly situated U.S.-born student workers and recent graduates as well.</p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>As noted in the introduction, we oppose the imposition of the $70,000 and $30,000 fees for participation in the OPT program and urge ICE to abandon this rulemaking. The OPT program has numerous flaws and we urge separate rulemakings that are intended to protect the foreign students and recent graduates who participate in the OPT program, and the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed, especially young professional jobseekers and recent graduates of U.S. universities.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Daniel Costa, Esq.<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<h3>Endnotes&nbsp;</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> National Priorities Project, <a href="https://media.nationalpriorities.org/uploads/publications/july_2026_federal_spending_for_mass_deportation_and_detention.pdf"><em>Federal Spending for Immigration Enforcement</em></a>, Institute for Policy Studies, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/btn/2024/TotalNumberAnnualOPT_STEM_OPT_CPT_AuthorizationsWithEmpStartDatesDuringIndicatedCY2007_2024.pdf">2007 to 2024 Annual Growth in OPT, STEM OPT, and CPT Authorizations and Employment Authorization Documents (EAD) Issuances</a>,” SEVP Data Library, accessed November 7, 2026. See also, Rachel Rosenthal “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-opinion-optional-practical-training-problems-stem-graduates-deserve-better-jobs-opportunities/">The STEM Graduate System Is Broken. Here’s How to Fix It</a>.” <em>Bloomberg</em>, March 10, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/ola_signed_h1b_characteristics_congressional_report_FY24.pdf"><em>Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers</em></a>, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report to Congress, October 1, 2023 – September 30, 2024, April 29, 2025</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> USCIS, <a href="https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339">post on X.com on May 21, 2026 at 1:37 PM</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> For our discussion and recommendations on the DOL H-1B prevailing wage methodology, see Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/">EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</a>,” Public Comments, May 26, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Sec. 221. Off-Campus Work Authorization for Students (F Nonimmigrants), Pub. L. 101-649, 104 STAT. 4978.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See for example, 29 C.F.R. § 503.16(v).</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See for example, 29 C.F.R. § 503.16(u).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> 80 Fed. Reg. 63390 (October 19, 2015).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> See also, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63395 (“DHS assumed that most temporary agencies would not be able to comply with the requirements of the Mentoring and Training Plan.”).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See the list of employers and the final column in the table showing the number of students participating in STEM OPT in 2024, in Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/btn/2024/2024_Top200_Employers_OPT_STEM_OPT_Students.pdf">2024 Top 200 Employers for OPT and STEM-OPT Students</a>,” SEVP Data Library, accessed November 7, 2026. For an example of firms that we consider to have an outsourcing and offshoring business model, see Table 1 in Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/tech-and-outsourcing-companies-continue-to-exploit-the-h-1b-visa-program-at-a-time-of-mass-layoffs-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-hired-34000-new-h-1b-workers-in-2022-and-laid-off-at-least-85000-workers/">Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs: The top 30 H-1B employers hired 34,000 new H-1B workers in 2022 and laid off at least 85,000 workers in 2022 and early 2023</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 11, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/">EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, May 26, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-improving-protections-for-workers-in-temporary-agricultural-employment-in-the-united-states/">EPI comments on DOL’s proposed rule on ‘Improving Protections for Workers in Temporary Agricultural Employment in the United States</a>,’” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Government Accountability Office, <a href="http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-356"><em>STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM: DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students with Employment Authorization</em></a>, GAO-14-356, February 27, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 64572.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Student and Exchange Visitor Program, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/sevis/whats-new#sevpData">SEVP Data Library</a>,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, accessed November 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See for example, International Labour Organization, “Is a migrant worker required to pay fees to agencies or levies to the government for recruitment?” in <a href="https://www.ilo.org/ilo-helpdesk-questions-and-answers-business-and-labour-migration"><em>ILO Helpdesk: Questions and answers on business and labour migration</em></a>, last visited November 7, 2026, citing ILO, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/publications/general-principles-and-operational-guidelines-fair-recruitment-and"><em>General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment and definition of recruitment fees and related costs</em></a>, May 22, 2019; and <a href="https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312326"><em>Private Employment Agencies Convention</em></a> (No. 191), Article 7, adopted June 19, 1997. For the prohibition in the H-2A program, see for example, 20 CFR § 655.135(k) and for H-2B, see for example, 20 CFR § 655.20 and 29 CFR § 503.16.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>EPI comment on the Census Bureau&#8217;s proposed changes to the residence criteria and demographic items for the 2030 Census</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-the-census-bureaus-proposed-changes-to-the-residence-criteria-and-demographic-items-for-the-2030-census/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 14:08:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327926</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Daniel Deputy General Counsel for Economic, Statistical, and Regulatory Office of the General U.S. Department of Washington, DC Re: Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions (FR Doc.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/10/2026-18481/decennial-census-of-the-population-of-americans-proposed-residence-criteria-and-proposed-regulations">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/10/2026-18481/decennial-census-of-the-population-of-americans-proposed-residence-criteria-and-proposed-regulations</a></em></p>
<p>Daniel Sweeney<br />
Deputy General Counsel for Economic, Statistical, and Regulatory Affairs<br />
Office of the General Counsel<br />
U.S. Department of Commerce<br />
Washington, DC 20230</p>
<p>Re: Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions (FR Doc. 2026-18481, RIN 0607-AA75)</p>
<p>Dear Mr. Sweeney:</p>
<p>On behalf of the Economic Policy Institute (EPI), I am writing to comment on the proposed rule “Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions” (FDMS Docket Number USBC-2026-0628, published September 10, 2026). We strongly oppose the proposed rule’s changes to the residence criteria and demographic items for the 2030 Census.</p>
<p>EPI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. Federal and state policymakers trust and rely on research conducted by experts at EPI and other institutions to make informed, effective, evidence-based policy decisions that will address the real challenges low- and middle-income workers face in the labor market. That is only possible through accurate, comprehensive census data.</p>
<p>The initial 33-day comment period for this proposed rule, ending on October 13, 2026, was wholly inadequate. While we support the recent extension of the public comment period until November 2, 2026<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>, 53 days is still not sufficient for the public to review and provide input on this rule given the scope of the proposed changes and the devastating effect they would have on census data.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Moreover, given the Secretary of Commerce’s termination of the Census Bureau’s advisory committees<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>, ensuring ample opportunity for the public to respond to the proposed changes is essential for promoting public trust in the census. To allow the public, including researchers and policy advocates, sufficient time to evaluate and comment on these changes, the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau immediately publish a <em>Federal Register</em> notice further extending the comment period until at least December 10, 2026.</p>
<p>We are extremely concerned that the proposed residence criteria and changes to demographic questions would undermine the accuracy, integrity, and usefulness of census data. We are particularly concerned about the following issues:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Eliminating census race and ethnicity data collection is unprecedented, violates statutes, and severely undermines the utility of census data for a range of critical purposes.</strong> Since the first census in 1790, every single decennial census has collected race and ethnicity data in some form. Census race and ethnicity data underpin many other critical federal datasets and serve as an irreplaceable benchmark for nearly every population-based survey and study in the U.S., ensuring that our research is reliable and leads to better outcomes for all of us. Race and ethnicity data are necessary to enforce civil rights laws and ensure equal opportunity for all Americans, helping to ensure fairness and strengthen the U.S. economy. Race and ethnicity data also help local governments and nonprofits target services more efficiently.
<p>EPI relies on census race and ethnicity data to provide timely and reliable analysis of the economic conditions facing low- and middle-income workers – a disproportionate share of whom are people of color – and to evaluate how those conditions are shaped by economic policies. Accurate, comprehensive census data is foundational to the population weights applied to the Current Population Survey (CPS); the data set most used in our research. Those weights make it possible to convert survey responses from a sample of just over 100,000 individuals into results that more closely represent the actual composition of the entire U.S. population. Since economic outcomes can vary significantly by race and ethnicity, even among individuals who share other characteristics in common, accurate and comprehensive Census counts by race and ethnicity are essential to the precision of aggregate economic indicators and the policy decisions those indicators help to inform. For example, EPI research demonstrating the persistence of large racial disparities<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> in unemployment and how tight, high pressure labor markets<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> narrow those gaps and deliver faster wage growth to all low- and middle-income workers helped to make an important point about there being more room for flexibility in the Federal Reserve Board’s policymaking targets and goals<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a>. The Fed’s willingness to consider more data-dependent macroeconomic policymaking over fixed targets and predictions after the Great Recession resulted in one of the longest economic recoveries in U.S. history without triggering a corresponding spike in inflation. Such critical decisions about maximum employment for the whole of the U.S. economy were informed by a more complete understanding of economic outcomes for different demographic groups, as supported by a comprehensive and accurate census count.</li>
<li><strong>Excluding noncitizens without lawful permanent residence from census apportionment data is unconstitutional and would deprive our communities of their fair share of resources and representation.</strong> The Constitution, statutes, and settled law clearly provide that all persons residing in the United States must be counted for the apportionment of Congressional seats. Research has also shown that adding a question on citizenship to the decennial census form would have a chilling effect on census participation. If the census does not count <em>all</em> residents, communities all over the United States will lose resources to support their schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, emergency services, and more. In addition to EPI’s focus on national economic policy, we also work in partnership with a nationwide network of 56 research, policy and advocacy organizations representing 43 states and the District of Columbia to fight for an economy that works for everyone. Significant undercounting would harm some of the most vulnerable communities in those states because schools that urgently need funding to meet all students’ needs would no longer get the appropriate funding under Title I and IDEA.
<p>Like the concerns raised in point #1 above, excluding select groups of noncitizens from the census count would also undermine the accuracy of population weights used in the CPS. Since 1994, the CPS has collected data on the nativity of respondents, including foreign-born noncitizens, but without disclosure of their specific immigration status. The ability to estimate labor force growth by nativity is critical to accurate economic projections because the pace of overall GDP growth rises and falls almost one-for-one with the pace of labor force growth<a href='#_note7' class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a>. As the pace of U.S.-born labor force growth continues to slow with an aging population, developing reliable national and state projections of economic growth will require a complete and accurate accounting of everyone who participates in the U.S. labor force and contributes to the U.S. economy.</li>
</ol>
<p>Accurate and reliable data is foundational to a strong democracy, good economic decision-making, and to the enforcement of everyone’s civil and workers’ rights. For these reasons, we strongly oppose the changes proposed in this rule. We call on the Census Bureau and Department of Commerce to:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Continue collecting race and ethnicity data and implement the 2024 OMB SPD 15 standards. </strong>Census race and ethnicity data are essential for important research across many sectors, for upholding civil rights, and for growing the economy. Extensive Census Bureau research and engagement with expert stakeholders shows that implementing the modernized 2024 OMB SPD 15 standards for race and ethnicity data collection will yield data that more accurately represent the nation’s increasingly diverse population.&nbsp;</li>
</ol>
<ol start="2">
<li><strong>Count all people residing in the United States in the 2030 Census, without regard to immigration status.</strong> Excluding noncitizens from census apportionment data violates the constitution and established legal precedent. It would suppress the count of many communities, effectively erasing them from critical datasets and depriving them of resources and Congressional representation.</li>
</ol>
<p>We appreciate your consideration of these comments.</p>
<p>Sincerely,</p>
<p>Valerie Wilson, PhD<br />
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity and the Economy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> U.S. Census Bureau. (2026, October 5). <em>Decennial Census of the population of Americans; Proposed residence criteria and proposed regulations for demographic questions; Extension of comment period </em>[Proposed rule].<em> Federal Register</em>. https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2026-20328.pdf</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See <a href="https://civilrights.org/resource/request-for-extension/">Request for Extension of Comment Period for Proposed Rule: “Decennial Census of the Population of Americans; Proposed Residence Criteria and Proposed Regulations for Demographic Questions”</a> for an in-depth discussion about the insufficient comment period and the need for an extension.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights. (2025, May 7). <em>Letter regarding the termination of the 2030 Census Advisory Committee, Census Scientific Advisory Committee, and National Advisory Committee on Racial, Ethnic, and Other Populations</em> [Letter]. <u>https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Updated-Final-LCCHR-Census-Advisory-Committee-Letter-.pdf</u></p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/labor-markets-racial-disparities/">Tight labor markets are essential to reducing racial disparities and within the purview of the Fed’s dual mandate</a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Josh Bivens and Ben Zipperer, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-importance-of-locking-in-full-employment-for-the-long-haul/">The importance of locking in full employment for the long haul</a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2018.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-reserve-fact-sheet/">How the Federal Reserve Can Help or Hurt the Economy</a>, July 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-u-s-born-labor-force-will-shrink-over-the-next-decade-achieving-historically-normal-gdp-growth-rates-will-be-impossible-unless-immigration-flows-are-sustained/#epi-toc-6">The U.S.-born labor force will shrink over the next decade</a>, October 2025.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>The working class is more diverse than ever before</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/the-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-before/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 13:40:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327793</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Regardless of the definition you use, today’s working class is diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The working class is a concept that carries tremendous political weight. But there is no official definition of what it is, and popular views of a mostly white working class are out of date.</p>
<p>Over the past 50 years, increases in women’s participation in the labor force and immigration have resulted in more women, Hispanics, and Asian Americans in the workforce. <strong>New data below from a forthcoming <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/todays-working-class-is-more-diverse-than-ever-a-new-picture-emerges-as-demographic-change-and-economic-inequality-challenge-old-perceptions/">EPI report</a></strong> show that the working class is more diverse than ever before—no matter how you define it.</p>
<h4><strong>When defined by education, the working class is nearly half workers of color </strong></h4>
<p>The traditional definition of the working class comprises workers with less than a bachelor’s degree. Under this definition, in 1979, the working class was over 80% white. Today, workers of color collectively account for nearly <em>half</em> of the working class.</p>
<h5><strong>Working class by race and ethnicity</strong></h5>
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>52% white</li>
<li>26.8% Hispanic</li>
<li>15.1% Black</li>
<li>4.7% AAPI</li>
<li>1.4% Native American</li>
</ul>
<h5><strong>Working class by gender</strong></h5>
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>56.4% men</li>
<li>43.6% women</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong>When defined by income, the working class is similarly diverse</strong></h4>
<p>The working class could reasonably include more college graduates and traditional “white-collar workers” than were previously considered. That’s because the wage boost from getting a college degree is lower than it used to be, and underemployment—along with racial and gender pay disparities—can mean the economic status of graduates of color and women is more like some nongraduates.</p>
<p>By this broader measure, the working class can be considered the bottom 75% of U.S. households, regardless of education level or job type. This works out to a family income of below $150,000 per year.</p>
<p>Under this definition, the working class remains similarly diverse in terms of race and ethnicity. While men are still a majority of the working class, a larger share of women fit within this definition of working class, given lower pay in jobs predominantly held by college-educated women.</p>
<h5><strong>Working class by race and ethnicity</strong></h5>
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>53.1% white</li>
<li>24% Hispanic</li>
<li>15.2% Black</li>
<li>6.5% AAPI</li>
<li>1.2% Native American</li>
</ul>
<h5><strong>Working class by gender</strong></h5>
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>52.5% men</li>
<li>47.5% women</li>
</ul>
<p>However you define it, today’s working class is diverse by race, ethnicity, and gender. Improving economic conditions for today’s working class requires policies that meet the needs of <em>all</em> these workers. &nbsp;</p>
<p><em><strong>Source:</strong> Author&#8217;s analysis of pooled 2024–2025 Current Population Survey basic monthly microdata from EPI Microdata Extracts, Version 2026.8.13, </em><em><a href="https://microdata.epi.org/">https://microdata.epi.org</a>.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
		<item>
		<title>A pro-worker AI policy playbook: Strengthening unemployment insurance and building a better safety net</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/a-pro-worker-ai-policy-playbook-strengthening-unemployment-insurance-and-building-a-better-safety-net/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mary Beech]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=326852</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Policymakers can act now to reduce the harm to workers of losing a job for any reason, by strengthening the safety net to support them until they find another.
&#160;]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/EPI-Workshop_WeBuild-Cobrand-2.png" width="430"></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #1372ae;">Key takeaways</span></strong></h4>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Policy choices will determine whether AI helps or harms workers.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Given that, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers to meet any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">To strengthen the unemployment insurance system that provides funds to workers who have lost their jobs, we should do the following:&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">increase the amounts and duration of unemployment benefits&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">center delivery on worker needs and power</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">build stronger data infrastructure to support workers while they are searching for new jobs</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Establishing a stand-alone unemployment program solely focused on AI raises important considerations. These include program design, stakeholder roles, eligibility criteria challenges, the resources needed to be effective, and vulnerability to reauthorization hurdles in Congress.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i>This is the first brief in a series exploring comprehensive federal policy recommendations around AI and workers.</i></p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid the seemingly endless predictions about AI, one point is essential to remember: How this plays out is not predetermined. Policy choices determine whether workers are helped or harmed by technological change. Even without AI, many workers already face harmful disruptions. Every year, 20 million workers are laid off in the U.S. economy<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>—due to employer mismanagement, once-profitable products becoming less so, offshoring, automation, and other factors. For individual workers, losing a job fo<em>r any reason</em> and for <em>any period of time</em> is traumatic and damaging in large part because we lack adequate social insurance programs to smooth those transitions.</p>
<p>As lawmakers debate how to best regulate AI deployment in our workplaces, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers in any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods. Decades of underinvestment, coupled with attacks on unions and other labor supports, have left workers without an adequate safety net.</p>
<p>We can improve our current systems to better provide livable benefits for workers who lose their jobs because of large-scale economic shocks that are not their fault and outside their control. We can also learn from other periods of workforce disruption—the COVID-19 pandemic, trade-related shocks, and the 2008 recession—about which policy choices were effective and which fell short.</p>
<p>When workers lose their jobs due to factors outside their control, they are considered “displaced” or “dislocated.” If they meet certain requirements, these workers are eligible for unemployment insurance (UI). To strengthen outcomes for workers, this brief will provide recommendations to:</p>
<ul>
<li>increase UI benefit amount and duration</li>
<li>expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
<li>align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
<li>center worker needs and power</li>
<li>strengthen data infrastructure to support workers</li>
</ul>
<p>These recommendations should be considered amid conversations focused on creating a stand-alone unemployment program geared toward AI-driven job loss. These discussions should weigh considerations and potential pitfalls, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>a blank slate for program design</li>
<li>relevant roles for key stakeholders</li>
<li>eligibility criteria challenges</li>
<li>the allocation of resources, time, and awareness to be effective</li>
<li>reauthorization vulnerability</li>
</ul>
<p>If policymakers are serious about easing the impact of AI-related job transitions for workers, the priority solution should be strengthening already existing social insurance programs to reduce the economic consequences of losing any job and to provide adequate support to workers while they seek other employment.</p>
<p>Changes to the current system or establishing a new program will require robust resources, including time, money, and expertise. This investment can help all workers, regardless of their risk of AI-based displacement. With a strong safety net, workers who lose their jobs can get the assistance they need, including the opportunity to find work that is well suited to their skills and experiences, and businesses are more inclined to improve their practices because they know workers aren&#8217;t trapped in their current jobs by economic necessity.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This moment presents an opportunity to strengthen the labor market for everyone and to ensure workers have the safety net they deserve.</p>
<h2>How to strengthen our current system</h2>
<p>Any effective approach to fixing the UI system must be comprehensive and should apply regardless of whether a worker is displaced due to AI. Numerous experts have weighed in on the best approach—including the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) Unemployment Insurance Taskforce,<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> the National Employment Law Project (NELP),<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a>,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> and The Century Foundation,<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> among others. This brief draws from those recommendations to strengthen outcomes for workers. Other important issues, such as modernizing UI system technology and infrastructure, fraud detection and prevention, and the use of AI in benefit determinations and delivery, also shape worker outcomes but fall outside this brief&#8217;s scope.</p>
<h3>Increase benefit amount and duration</h3>
<p>First and foremost, UI should be designed to ensure that workers can afford housing, food, and other essentials during their period of joblessness. The percentage of wages that UI replaces for workers has declined over time and has not kept pace with inflation.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In 2025, national average UI benefits replaced well under half of national average wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> This gap leaves workers across the income spectrum unable to maintain their standard of living and can push those whose earnings were close to the minimum wage into poverty.</p>
<h4>Ensure benefit amounts are consistent across states</h4>
<p>Benefit amounts vary across states. In Arizona and Florida, UI benefits replace less than 15% of average weekly wages.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> In some states, the weekly benefit amount is just $222 per week.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> While state variation in benefit amounts hurts all workers in stingy states, it weighs especially heavily on Black and Hispanic workers.</p>
<p>One recent study finds that differences in state rules cause the wage replacement rate for Black workers to be meaningfully lower than the rate for white workers, and that the discrepancies harm overall well-being.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> These disparities compound. Even among those likely eligible, Black workers are less likely than white workers to receive UI benefits—a gap explained primarily by structural factors, not a difference in eligibility, that has held steady for three decades.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>Wage replacement rates should be consistent across states. A recent federal bill has proposed changes to increase the replacement rate to 75% and provide additional weekly funding for dependents.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> Given growing wage inequality, the rate also should vary by income level. In one proposal, the lowest earners would receive benefits that represent 85% of their wages.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<h4>Extend the duration of benefits across states</h4>
<p>The duration of benefits also varies greatly from state to state. Until 15 years ago, eligible workers across the country had access to 26 weeks of benefits, a generally agreed-upon standard.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> After the Great Recession however, federal law barred states from cutting benefit amounts, so many states instead cut the duration of unemployment benefits to stabilize their trust funds and lower tax rates for employers.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Some states now only provide 12 weeks of benefits, a short bridge to find a new job well-matched to workers’ skills and experiences.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> A minimum of at least 26 weeks of benefits should be a uniform requirement across states.</p>
<p>Workers cannot currently depend on the Extended Benefits program, which was intended to provide support during economic downturns by providing additional weeks of benefits during periods of high and rising unemployment. The triggers for Extended Benefits have not been effective, leaving workers to wonder if they are available. In their absence, workers must rely on temporary programs funded by Congress, which depend on political priorities.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> More reliable triggers, higher wage replacement levels, and a longer duration of benefits would make the Extended Benefits program more effective.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<h3>Expand and standardize eligibility for benefits</h3>
<p>Only certain workers are eligible for UI, leaving others stranded without benefits if they lose their jobs. Eligibility criteria and the base period used to calculate benefits are set by state law, rather than federal statute. This state-by-state variation can make it difficult for workers to know whether they qualify for assistance and plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Generally, the group of workers ineligible for benefits includes independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and those who have exhausted their benefits. Some employers have incorrectly classified many workers as independent contractors, and this misclassification prevents those workers from requesting access to the UI benefits to which they would otherwise be legally entitled.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></p>
<p>UI should cover a broader range of workers, including part-time workers, independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and seasonal and temporary workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress tasked states with implementing new UI programs for gig and platform workers who fell outside of the usual verification system, creating significant challenges.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> Barring changes to account for the unique situation of these workers, these same issues will arise again.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> By incorporating these workers into the UI system now, instead of waiting for a crisis, future challenges can be mitigated.</p>
<p>Policymakers should also consider stronger presumptive eligibility standards, under which workers are presumed eligible for benefits and paid promptly, with the burden placed on employers or the state to prove otherwise. Lowering the barriers for workers to receive benefits could meaningfully increase uptake among workers who currently go without benefits.</p>
<h3>Align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</h3>
<p>All eligible workers should be able to access UI benefits if they want them. State UI programs are generally financed through employer experience rating: Employers pay more taxes when they lay off more workers who are eligible for UI.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Therefore, the system’s setup incentivizes employers to limit their tax liability by restricting eligibility for the program in different ways. This can include not hiring certain workers as employees, not proactively informing workers about their eligibility, attempting to reclassify workers as independent contractors, and other forms of suppressing UI program access.</p>
<p>A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that only about a quarter of workers who were unemployed in 2022 applied for benefits.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> Further, a recent survey found that 19% of recently unemployed workers encountered actions from an employer that were meant to deter them from applying, in addition to a quarter of all UI filers who said that their employer contested their benefits.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> Low-income workers more frequently reported employer contestations , and workers who reported contestations of their claims by employers were less likely to receive benefits and to experience greater material and psychological burdens during the filing process.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> There is a real opportunity to better align employer incentives to support workers in accessing UI benefits.</p>
<p>Presumptive eligibility, discussed above, would address some of these access barriers by shifting the burden of proof away from workers, but it would not resolve the underlying incentive employers have to minimize their tax liability. There have been many proposals for how to address this issue: broadening the tax base, payroll contributions from employees to UI, or increasing state taxes to fund programs.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Most basically, employers could pay taxes based on the total number of workers they lay off, not just those eligible for UI.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> These questions are tied to broader considerations about how to finance a more effective program.</p>
<h3>Center on worker needs and power</h3>
<p>The UI system should be structured around ensuring that workers have the support they need as they seek reemployment. This requires a real investment in active labor market policy, including communicating with workers and unions about their needs in order to align training and placement. Congress should allocate funds to revitalize the Employment Service in the U.S. Department of Labor, which once played a key role in supporting reemployment.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> For example, in a 1986 New Jersey pilot program, job search assistance measurably helped dislocated workers return to work sooner and increased their earnings.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> A well-resourced and staffed U.S. Employment Service can leverage state labor market information—frequently used by employers—to help job seekers find opportunities aligned with their skill sets.<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a></p>
<p>Worker organizations can also play an important role in the delivery of benefits, including facilitating training and connections to job search assistance.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> In 2022, unemployed people who were members of a union were twice as likely to apply for UI benefits, and among applicants, 30 percentage points more likely to receive those benefits.<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> This sizable gap suggests that when workers have organizational support navigating the UI system, they are far more likely to receive the benefits they are entitled to, reinforcing the case for involving worker organizations directly in UI outreach, filing assistance, and perhaps even delivery. Furthermore, unions routinely negotiate with employers, both in collective bargaining agreements and when bargaining before layoffs, to secure agreements that employers will not contest workers’ applications for UI benefits.</p>
<p>In some Northern European countries, unions are responsible for administering unemployment benefits, and scholars have found that this system leads to stronger unions and worker voice in the economy.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Policymakers in the United States should consider how unions and other worker organizations could deliver unemployment benefits to workers.</p>
<h3>Strengthen data infrastructure to improve outcomes</h3>
<p>State workforce agencies collect quarterly wage records from employers to facilitate UI administration to gauge eligibility for benefits as well as benefit levels. States share wage records with the federal Census Bureau, and these data are included in longitudinal data sets that can follow workers over time. These data are used for both research and the administration of other policies (such as facilitating child support payments or tracking the performance of job training programs). Wage records provide an important but limited set of information that varies by state. A growing number of states have expanded their wage records to include additional information such as job titles, total hours worked, and job location.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>State-level data are a valuable source of information about what is happening to workers, but the lack of standardization across states makes it difficult to gain a clearer picture of employment. To remedy this, lawmakers should create standardized requirements for enhanced wage records to analyze who is losing their job and where workers are finding new opportunities.</p>
<p>The enhanced information coming from states would be especially useful with the advent of AI since no single federal data source can reliably track how AI adoption is reshaping demand for specific occupations in real time or identify when firms are reducing jobs through attrition. Further, workers would benefit from better information about opportunities that align with their skill set.<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> Better integration with job posting data—including the National Labor Exchange—and reemployment systems would help workers navigate the job-search process.</p>
<h2>Considerations for a stand-alone program</h2>
<p>The UI system should be improved regardless of how AI affects employment and job opportunities. Additionally, some policymakers have suggested creating a stand-alone program geared toward AI-driven job loss. There is precedent for this approach. Congress has acted nine times since 1958 to create temporary, additional UI benefits, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> There is much to be learned from successes and challenges of these previous programs.</p>
<p>Some of these programs also included benefits or services beyond unemployment insurance for workers. For example, Trade Adjustment Assistance has, at various points, included relocation assistance, training programs, a health coverage tax credit, and wage insurance for older workers who took a lower-paying job.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> A new stand-alone program could similarly go beyond cash benefits, offering workers support to develop new skills, cover the costs of a transition, or find new opportunities.</p>
<h3>Blank slate for program design</h3>
<p>A new program can address the key structural issues with the current system discussed in the previous section. Any new program should be uniform across states so that benefit levels, duration, and eligibility are consistent for every worker regardless of where they live. A new program also presents the opportunity to build in the other improvements outlined above, including benefit levels set to a livable amount, expanded eligibility, and stronger data infrastructure. A new program could also adopt more fundamental changes to the claims process, such as the presumptive eligibility standards that Michigan moved toward during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a></p>
<p>As discussed in the worker power section, a new program should be explicitly structured around building worker power, for example, by involving worker organizations in program administration or benefit delivery. Further, a new program can focus on effective job placement by leveraging relationships between employers, unions, and other worker organizations.</p>
<p>Finally, a new program should also be designed to avoid UI&#8217;s employer-financing structure, which—as discussed—in most states, disincentivizes employers from making sure workers get the benefits they are due. Left unaddressed, that same structure would allow employers to game or underreport AI-related job loss in a new program.</p>
<h3>Relevant roles for key stakeholders</h3>
<p>A successful program requires effective coordination among stakeholders. As with UI and previous stand-alone programs, states would likely retain a central role in delivering benefits and services, given their existing infrastructure and more direct knowledge of local labor market conditions. Local agencies can provide labor market information to workers, worker organizations, and employers to facilitate job placement. Any program should carefully consider how to balance flexibility for states to tailor the program to meet local needs, while maintaining strong, uniform standards across states.</p>
<p>As discussed, worker organizations and unions can play a central role in program administration. Worker organizations can support workers in accessing relevant benefits and training opportunities, ensuring that worker needs and outcomes are central to programmatic strategy and implementation.</p>
<p>Employers bear significant responsibility for the program&#8217;s success. They are often the first to know a layoff is coming and should proactively connect workers to available services, for example, by supporting on-site services when requested by state or local Rapid Response teams. Employers can proactively share specific information about their talent and skills needs with labor agencies and worker organizations, and hire workers during or after relevant training.</p>
<h3>Eligibility criteria challenges</h3>
<p>Creating clear and consistent eligibility criteria will be a significant challenge in establishing a stand-alone program for workers affected by AI-related job displacement. For instance, a program to compensate Department of Energy workers harmed by nuclear materials has faced significant challenges determining eligibility, including the complexity of reconstructing historical exposure to nuclear materials to establish causation.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> Challenges in establishing causation have also been an enormous barrier to worker relief through the Trade Adjustment Assistance program.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>In another example, some pandemic unemployment assistance benefits are still hung up over eligibility disputes years later.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a> And from the start of the pandemic, there have been hotly contested debates about who should receive benefits.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> Moreover, concerns about fraud can also complicate eligibility determinations. In the wake of fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic, many states adopted stricter verification requirements to confirm eligibility.<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> A new program focused on AI-driven job loss would need to balance similar integrity concerns against the risk of preventing eligible workers from receiving the benefits they are due.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a></p>
<p>It is virtually impossible to systematically link job loss with AI adoption. In many instances, AI’s effects on a worker or industry may be indirect. For example, workers may lose their jobs in part due to AI adoption months or years earlier or because of broader economic disruption caused by AI’s impact on different industries. Even setting aside these implementation challenges, restricting eligibility to AI-driven job loss raises a separate concern: fairness. AI is not the only source of economic disruption. Global trade (including offshoring and outsourcing) and the green energy transition continue to displace workers across industries.</p>
<p>Other workers should be entitled to the same benefits as those directly displaced by AI. Drawing arbitrary boundaries around a single cause of job loss will create inequities, a risk compounded if states must independently interpret what counts as AI-driven job loss, therefore creating inconsistent standards nationwide.</p>
<h3>Resources, time, and awareness to be effective</h3>
<p>Standing up a new program will take significant time and resources. In addition to providing benefits, this includes making meaningful investment in technological systems and program administration, a particular challenge in light of years of underinvestment in modernizing UI systems.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Federal and state governments need adequate resources for user experience testing, efficient application determinations, coordination with relevant partners, data collection and analysis, and programmatic evaluation. The challenges of implementing relief programs during COVID-19 are instructive. Slow initial payments, overwhelming caseloads that strained public servants, technological breakdowns, and significant confusion about eligibility requirements demonstrated the need to proactively develop systems that can respond more nimbly in times of crisis.<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>Starting a new program also requires sustained public outreach, as new and stand-alone programs have historically struggled because of a lack of public familiarity. For example, over half of workers did not know they had access to emergency sick leave during COVID-19.<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> In another example, when the Reagan administration made changes to the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, applications plummeted, perhaps because many workers believed the program had been abolished.<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> Further, most workers did not know that other services including training, job counseling, and relocation assistance were available through the program.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a></p>
<p>A stand-alone program could also come at the expense of the existing UI system, which the vast majority of states say is underfunded.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a> From 1999 to 2019, federal funding for UI administration declined by 30% on an inflation-adjusted basis.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a> If policymakers decide to divert resources that would otherwise go to the existing UI system, the system’s further deterioration could harm workers served by that system in both the short and long term.</p>
<h3>Reauthorization vulnerability in Congress</h3>
<p>If an AI-specific UI program requires congressional reauthorization, it will be vulnerable to the difficulty of coordinating bipartisan action in Congress. Several previous programs have been subject to a sunset date, requiring periodic reauthorization to continue accepting new claims. Sunsets and other reauthorization requirements leave workers vulnerable to congressional inaction, especially if the impacts of AI on the workforce play out over an extended time period.</p>
<p>For an example of a program caught up in this type of reauthorization limbo, Trade Adjustment Assistance lapsed multiple times, including most recently in 2022, leaving additional workers without access to the program. Another example is The Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, which was created in 2008 and lapsed five times between 2010 and 2013, before expiring for good at the end of that year.<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a> This immediately cut off benefits for 1.3 million workers and for more than 3.6 million workers by the following September.<a href="#_note54" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='54' id="_ref54">54</a></p>
<h2>Financing and the path forward</h2>
<p>The current worker safety net has failed to expand enough to cover the basic realities of today&#8217;s labor market, and inadequate benefit levels, incomplete coverage, and diminished worker representation are persistent problems. Deployment of AI and related technologies in the workplace adds urgency to addressing these issues.</p>
<p>Implementing the recommendations in this issue brief requires a significant investment that should be considered, along with program parameters and design. As AI drives up stock prices and generates wealth for a select few, policymakers are considering how the public should share in these gains. Ideas include increasing taxes for wealthy individuals, closing the gap between labor and capital tax rates, taxing AI use, and taxing data center development, with the proceeds from these new taxes financing programs that redistribute income more broadly across the economy. Considerations for potential taxation approaches will be discussed in a forthcoming brief.</p>
<p>This moment requires big thinking and corresponding action. While AI drives changes to the economy, improvements to the worker safety net are long overdue. We can learn from the past to improve the labor market for everyone.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>Angela Hanks, Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Ben Zipperer, Gillian Gutierrez, Jacob Leibenluft, Janelle Jones, Josh Bivens, Michele Evermore, Patrick Oakford, Raj Nayak, and Stephen Nuñez.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Layoffs and Discharges: Total Nonfarm” [JTSLDL]. Accessed from <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>, October 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Patrick Oakford, Josh Bivens, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/"><em>Federal AI Legislation: An Evaluation of Existing Proposals and a Road Map Forward</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>Unemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Amy Traub, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/boosting-economic-resilience-seven-ways-states-can-support-more-workers-with-unemployment-insurance/"><em>Boosting Economic Resilience: Seven Ways States Can Support More Workers with Unemployment Insurance</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, July 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2023/11/Policy-Advocacy-Brief-Benefit-Amounts-11-2023.pdf."><em>Policy Advocacy Brief: Benefit Amounts</em></a>, November 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp">UI Replacement Rates Report</a>,” Benefit Accuracy Measurement data. Public data prepared by the OUI Division of Performance Management, Accessed August 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Megan Rivera, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/why-unemployment-insurance-alone-is-not-enough-in-the-ai-era/"><em>Why Unemployment Insurance Alone Is Not Enough in the AI Era</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Daphné Skandalis, Ioana Marinescu, and Maxim Massenkoff, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/racial-inequality-in-the-u-s-unemployment-insurance-system/"><em>Racial Inequality in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance System</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper, July 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Elira Kuka and Bryan A. Stuart, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29595"><em>Racial Inequality in Unemployment Insurance Receipt and Take-Up</em></a>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 29595, December 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Office of U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, “<a href="https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2025/07/16/bennet-wyden-beyer-reintroduce-bicameral-bill-to-overhaul-unemployment-insurance/">Bennet, Wyden, Beyer Reintroduce Bicameral Bill to Overhaul Unemployment Insurance</a>” (press release), July 16, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>U</em><em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf">U<em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez, Nina Mast, Margaret Poydock, and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Costly for Workers and Social Insurance Systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a>&nbsp;The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> Adam Grundy and Lucie Alleyne, “<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2025/07/nes-gig-economy.html">Nonemployer Businesses Are Key Contributors to Gig Activities and Economic Growth Nationally</a>” (blog post), U.S. Census Bureau website, July 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2023/most-unemployed-people-in-2022-did-not-apply-for-unemployment-insurance-benefits.htm">Most Unemployed People in 2022 Did Not Apply for Unemployment Insurance Benefits</a>” (blog post), <em>The Economics Daily (TED)</em>, April 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> Amy Traub, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Sanjay Pinto, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/the-unemployed-worker-study/"><em>The Unemployed Worker Study</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Alix Gould-Werth, &#8220;<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739410">Employer Contestations and Access to Unemployment Insurance: Implications for Benefit Receipt, Material Hardship, and Administrative Burden</a>,&#8221; <em>Social Service Review</em> 100, no. 1 (March 2026): 38–68.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Stephen A. Wandner, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17848/9781441680389"><em>Solving the Reemployment Puzzle: From Research to Policy</em></a>, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 2010.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “<a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/solidarity-insurance-reimagining-unemployment-insurance-as-a-platform-for-worker-power/">Solidarity Insurance: Reimagining Unemployment Insurance as a Platform for Worker Power.</a>” (policy brief), Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/uisup_03292023.htm">Characteristics of Unemployment Insurance Applicants and Benefit Recipients—2022</a>” (economic news release), March 29, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> Bruce Western, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691010335/between-class-and-market"><em>Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies</em></a> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Michele Evermore and Will Raderman, <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>T</em></a><a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>he Case for Enhanced Wage Records: Lessons from States</em></a>, National Academy of Social Insurance and The Niskanen Center, January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10336">The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation</a>,” Congressional Research Service, IF10336, updated January 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/05/NELP-Michele-Evermore-Testimony-Michigan-UI-Processing-5-21-2020.pdf">Michigan Unemployment Claims Processing</a>,” testimony on behalf of National Employment Law Project to a hearing before the Michigan Legislature, Joint Select Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 21, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> U.S. Government Accountability Office, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-74"><em>Energy Employees Compensation: DOL Generally Followed Its Procedures to Process Claims but Could Strengthen Some Internal Controls</em></a>, GAO-16-74, March 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Julie Kay, “<a href="https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/north-carolina-unemployment-benefits-still-delayed-five-years-after-pandemic/275-5b6093e8-1e0f-46bc-811a-d446166114a3">‘No Accountability’: Pandemic-Era Unemployment Benefit Delays Persist, 5 Years Later</a>,” <em>WCNC Charlotte</em>, April 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> Annelies Goger, Tracy Hadden Loh, and Nicole Bateman, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debunking-myths-about-covid-19-reliefs-unemployment-insurance-on-steroids/"><em>Debunking Myths About COVID-19 Relief&#8217;s ‘Unemployment Insurance on Steroids,’</em></a> The Brookings Institution, May 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/id-verification/"><em>ID Verification</em></a>, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, “<a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Testimony of Michele Evermore, Senior Fellow, National Academy of </a><a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Social Insurance</a>,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Work and Welfare Subcommittee, March 5, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Emma Jelliffe, Paul Pangburn, Stefan Pichler, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth, “<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2107670118">Awareness and Use of (Emergency) Sick Leave: US Employees&#8217; Unaddressed Sick Leave Needs in a Global Pandemic</a>,” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 118, no. 29 (July 20, 2021): e2107670118.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42444"><em>Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration</em></a>, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Product Number R42444, August 11, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='54'><a href="#_ref54" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note54">54. </a> U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee Democrats, <a href="https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/hot-topics/unemployment-insurance"><em>Unemployment Insurance</em></a> (fact sheet), 2014.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
	
</channel>
</rss>
