Since the second Trump administration swept into office in January 2025, it has undertaken a range of damaging and destabilizing actions that have weakened the economy, undermined workers, hurt businesses and consumers, and threatened core elements of our democracy. While Trump has targeted numerous Democratic-led states and cities, the Washington, D.C., region has faced acute and prolonged harms since day one. From the first set of executive actions signed on Inauguration Day, the Trump administration has attacked people and businesses in the capital region repeatedly and intensely. These initial actions announced the president’s dubious claims of authority to fire large segments of the federal workforce, eliminate long-standing federal agencies and programs, and begin a campaign of illegal and inhumane mass deportations.  

The Trump administration’s damaging actions have been enabled and abetted by Republican members of Congress. Their passage of H.R. 1, the bill that the White House has referred to as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (OBBBA), amplifies the administration’s mass deportation agenda and shreds critical health care and food supports for lower-income families to finance tax cuts for the wealthy. This funding bill will only cause more pain in the years ahead for Washington, D.C.-area households and throughout the country.

Congress also passed a federal spending bill that constrained the District of Columbia’s ability to spend its own tax revenue (Koma 2025) and a resolution that may force the district to adopt local tax code changes that match the OBBBA, whether the city wants to or not—changes that will jeopardize hundreds of millions of dollars for city programs (D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute 2026).

In this report, we assess the early indicators of the damage of Trump’s actions and their effects on the Washington, D.C., regional economy, with particular attention to effects on workers and the labor market. We focus on this region due to its prominence as an early target of the Trump administration, in part due to its large federal workforce. Additionally, the district’s unique status as a non-state means that its leaders have far less legal authority to resist Trump’s interference than other target areas do.

Throughout this report, unless otherwise indicated, the data describe economic conditions for the Washington, D.C., metropolitan statistical area (MSA), which includes the District of Columbia, four nearby counties in Maryland, six cities and 11 counties in northern Virginia, and one county in West Virginia. We also refer to this region as the DMV (Washington, D.C.; Maryland; and Virginia). While we do not yet have the requisite data to fully and precisely document all the effects of the administration’s actions, we can see clear signals that the regional economy is already struggling, with more severe impacts likely to register in the data soon.

We then explore some of the factors that make other regions particularly vulnerable to significant economic harm from the Trump administration’s agenda. These include counties with large concentrations of federal workers, areas where federal transfer income (such as Medicaid and Social Security) makes up a significant portion of the region’s economic base, and places with significant immigrant populations. Though Trump has largely targeted prominent, Democratic-led areas, many of the regions most susceptible to the harmful economic consequences of the administration’s actions are rural counties, frequently represented in Congress by Republicans.

Trump’s actions in Washington, D.C., have led to reduced employment and rising unemployment

The clearest sign of the harm that the Trump administration’s actions have done to the Washington, D.C., regional economy is the substantial drop in the region’s employment rate. Based on EPI analysis of Current Population Survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, from December 2024 to December 2025, the share of the regional working-age population with a job fell by 3.2 percentage points.1 As shown in Table 1, this compares with a decline of just 0.4 percentage points for the country over the same period. Among prime-age workers (those ages 25–54), the share employed in the DMV fell by 2.7 percentage points, compared with a decline of just 0.1 percentage points for the country overall.

This dramatic drop in regional employment is a direct result of the Trump administration’s relentless attacks on federal government workers, cuts to federal programs and agencies, and their cascading effects on connected regional industries. Prior to Trump’s taking office, federal employees made up 11.2% of the metro area’s total workforce (BLS-CES-SAE 2025).2 Between the end of 2024 and 2025, federal employment in the DMV region fell by more than 53,800 jobs (-14.2%) (BLS-CES-SAE 2026).3 These losses reverberated through the regional economy as affected households pulled back on spending, and many may have even opted to move, as data show the DMV region had the largest increase in home sale listings of any major metro last year (Brookings Institution 2026).

These significant cuts to federal employment, though highly damaging on their own, are only the first layer of the administration’s harm on the regional labor market. The DMV has a non-federal workforce of over three million people (BLS-CES-SAE 2026), many of whom work at firms that consult with, contract with, are funded by, or are otherwise connected to the government.4 The Trump administration has terminated thousands of grants to scientific research institutions (Kozlov, Tollefson, and Garisto 2026) and frozen or delayed funding for tens of thousands of nonprofit organizations, causing those targeted to limit operations or lay off staff (Tomasko et al. 2025). These cuts have also shrunk the funding pool for nonprofit groups, causing budget challenges even for those not previously receiving federal funding, as they must compete with groups previously funded through federal programs that are now scrambling to fill gaps with private support (Barrett 2025). The administration has also moved to cancel contracts with any company that maintains a commitment to DEI standards (Singh 2026). Although these cuts affect organizations everywhere, the DMV is disproportionately vulnerable to the economic harms of attacks on this sector as it has one of the highest concentrations of nonprofits in the country (Friesenhahn 2025). This is evident in the region’s slight dip (-0.3%) in private-sector employment from December 2024 to December 2025, a change from the consistent, albeit slowing, growth that had marked the years following the COVID-19 pandemic. At the national level, private-sector employment experienced slow but still positive change (0.5%) over the same period (BLS-CES-SAE 2026).5

The widespread impact of the administration’s actions can be seen in the breadth of employment declines across racial, ethnic, gender, and age groups in the region. As shown in Table 1, the employment rate fell by at least 2 percentage points for every demographic category of workers in the DMV. Notably, young workers under age 25 (-4.3 percentage points), workers age 55 and older (-3.3 percentage points), men (-3.5 percentage points), and Black workers (-5.9 percentage points) all experienced drops in their employment rates larger than the regional average. For older workers, the above-average decline likely reflects, at least in part, the firings and retirements of many federal employees, including many who had been near retirement age and opted into the so-called “Fork in the Road” deferred resignation program. For young workers, the administration’s funding and programmatic cuts directly reduced many traditional Beltway early-career opportunities (internships, fellowships), while weakness in the broader regional economy simultaneously forced area employers to pull back on entry-level positions.

Still, not all groups have been equally affected by Trump’s actions. As Table 1 shows, Black workers in the DMV region have suffered the largest employment declines, with the share employed falling by 5.9 percentage points in 2025. This is nearly triple the employment drop experienced by white workers (2.0 percentage points) in the region and, notably, more than seven times the employment drop of Black workers throughout the country overall (0.8 percentage points). Again, this is a direct consequence of the administration’s attacks on the federal workforce. Black workers have long tended to make up a larger share of the public sector than they do in the private sector—both in the DMV and across the country. This is because the public sector has historically been a pathway to the middle class for workers of color who face labor market discrimination in the private sector (Maye and Marvin 2025).

Trump’s massive cuts to federal employment have also rapidly undone what had been considerable progress in shrinking the regional Black-white employment gap. Figure A shows the employment rate of DMV workers, overall and by race/ethnicity, since the end of 2018. The rapid drop in the Black employment rate since the start of President Trump’s second term is striking, bringing the regional Black employment rate back down to its pandemic-era low. It is also notable that before that drop began, Black workers in the region were employed at essentially the same rate as their white counterparts—the only time in the last two decades when that occurred. These losses in employment will exacerbate existing racial and gender inequity across wages, poverty, and unemployment (Markoff and Zielinski 2026; Zielinski 2025; Busette and Elizondo 2022).

Recent increases in the DMV’s overall unemployment rate underscore the damage Trump is doing to the region. The non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rate jumped more than a full percentage point, from 3.1% in January 2025 to 4.4% in January 2026—more than four times the increase in the national figure. (Importantly, this increase understates the weakening of the area labor market, as the BLS estimates the DMV labor force shrank by 3% over the same period—meaning that many workers who would have been counted as unemployed simply left the area labor force.) For comparison, the national non-seasonally adjusted unemployment rate increased by less than half a percentage point, moving from 4.4% in January 2025 to 4.7% in January 2026 (BLS-LAUS 2026).

These numbers do not capture the full extent of the economic downturn in the DMV area, nor can they give us precise insight into where the pain has been most acutely felt. The administration’s violent deportation agenda, for example, will lead to a drop in immigrant and U.S.-born Hispanic workers’ employment, but resulting changes in Hispanic employment rates may be muted by the corresponding shrinking of the overall Hispanic population (Zipperer 2025). In other words, while the overall Hispanic population in the U.S. may fall dramatically in coming years, the ratio of remaining employed workers to remaining total population may stay somewhat consistent. This will mask the true scale of the economic and social harm being done to immigrant communities in the DMV and across the country.

It is also difficult to fully quantify how the deployment and continued presence of National Guard troops, violent immigration actions, and other authoritarian, fear-inducing tactics have impacted D.C.-area businesses, workers, and families, particularly in neighborhoods with predominately Black and Latino populations. Early data show regional declines in tourism, consumer spending, and foot traffic; harder to capture are the emotional and long-term economic consequences (Montgomery 2025; Hadden Loh and Haskins 2025; Sachs and Cocco 2025). Other recent analyses estimate similar economic harms in cities where targeted federal immigration enforcement actions have been aggressively deployed (Rosenthal and Sojourner 2026). A full accounting of the Trump administration’s harms on the Washington, D.C., region will take years to document.

Other localities should brace for similar consequences

Some of the Trump administration’s actions and their acute consequences are unique to the DMV, a function of the region’s high concentration of federal employees and government contractors, as well as the District of Columbia’s lack of statehood and full constitutional rights. However, the anti-government attacks the administration has unleashed on DMV-area households, workers, and businesses will have cascading consequences for communities throughout the country. The effects of the administration’s authoritarian attacks on the civil service, democratic institutions, and immigrants (Human Rights Watch 2026) that first registered across the DMV should be viewed as a preview of the consequences that will be felt in other regions. While no locality will be spared, regions particularly at risk include those with large shares of government workers (especially federal workers, but state and local government workers too), localities in which federal funding and social safety net programs make up a large portion of total area income, and those with large immigrant populations.

Trump’s attacks on the federal workforce will harm communities that rely on their employment

The day Trump returned to power in January 2025, he began attacking the federal workforce, first by moving to reclassify tens of thousands of federal employees to make it easier to fire and replace them with political loyalists (EPI 2026c), and then by stripping more than one million federal workers of their collective bargaining rights (EPI 2025a). The Trump White House subsequently worked feverishly to slash federal employment, attempting large and chaotic reductions in force, shuttering entire agencies, and coercing tens of thousands of staff to resign, among many other attacks (Poydock 2025). As of March 2026, the administration’s actions have reduced nationwide federal government employment by over 350,000 (11.7%) since January 2025 (Gould 2026).

Though federal workers make up a sizeable share of the DMV’s workforce, over 80% of federal workers live outside the region (Partnership for Public Service 2024). For instance, in Alaska, Hawaii, and New Mexico—states that are home to large swaths of federal and Native land, military bases, and federal research institutions—federal workers make up at least 4.5% of total employment (EPI 2025c). Within states, federal workers tend to be concentrated in specific localities. For instance, in Apache County, Arizona, which is largely made up of the Navajo Nation and the White Mountain Apache Reservations, lands that extend beyond county lines, the federal government employs 12% of the county’s workers, more than double the next most significant county for federal worker employment in the state (EPI 2025c). There are 22 U.S. counties, spread across the South, Midwest, and West Census regions, where federal workers comprise at least 10% of the county’s workforce (see Table 2).

In these counties and elsewhere, federal workers are the backbone of the regional economy, both through the essential services they provide and through their contributions to the local economy. Trump’s attacks simultaneously threaten federal workers’ livelihoods and the economic health of communities in which these workers’ spending on goods and services makes up a large share of economic activity in the region. In Apache County, Arizona, civilian government workers’ earnings comprise 11.7% of total economic activity in the county (see Table 3)—roughly the same as their share of overall county employment. However, in some counties, federal employees’ earnings are a disproportionate share of the regional economic base. For instance, in Leavenworth County, Kansas, where federal employees make up 10.0% of employment (Leavenworth has a large federal prison), federal civilian earnings comprise 22.1% of total income in the county.

The effects from lost federal jobs and income in these regions could be devastating. Some of these communities are places that have already faced historic disinvestment and in which there are few local employment opportunities that can match the quality of federal government jobs. These jobs are historically stable, good quality, union jobs that offer a pathway to the middle class, particularly for workers without a college education.6

Regions highly dependent on federal revenue will also suffer from a reduction in services and a loss of income

Beyond the harm to localities from reductions in the federal workforce, localities that are particularly reliant on federal government revenue and services will bear the consequences of Trump’s actions most acutely, though no locality will be spared from harm. For example, the Trump administration has announced or considered $23 billion in cuts to federal clean energy projects in nearly every state (CATF 2025) and $8 billion in cuts to colleges and universities that will impact every state’s economy (Bedekovics and Ragland 2025). Trump’s 2025 budget bill also made massive cuts to federal safety net programs that millions of low-income households rely on in order to finance tax cuts for the wealthiest households and corporations.

Funds from federal programs such as SNAP, Medicaid, and other social programs not only help struggling families make ends meet, they also comprise a significant share of a locality’s “economic base,” the amount of money circulating in that region, as shown by sociologist Robert Manduca in a recent working paper (2025). Indeed, an often-overlooked benefit of Medicaid coverage is its role as a source of income for low-income households (money they would have had to spend on medical care in the absence of Medicaid). For the bottom 20% of households in the U.S., Medicaid comprised 70% of their total money income, based on recent data from the Congressional Budget Office (Bivens, Wething, and Morrissey 2025). In fact, government transfers such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid collectively made up 40% of the economic base of U.S. regions in 2022 (Manduca 2025). Substantial cuts to government social programs that support low-income households could reduce the economic base of these localities, at a scale equivalent, in many cases, to the loss of entire private industries in those areas.

Without deliberate intervention by state lawmakers to offset lost federal revenues, localities in every state face dire economic losses, but states particularly reliant on government transfers will suffer most. For instance, take Clay County, West Virginia, which is represented in Congress by Rep. Carol Miller (R-WV01), who voted in support of Trump’s budget bill (Miller 2025). Clay County’s poverty rate is more than double the national rate, and its per capita income is half the national amount (U.S. Census 2024a). Of the 10 U.S. counties that rely most on each of the largest federal social insurance programs (Medicare, Medicaid, SNAP, and Social Security) as a share of their economic base, Clay is the only county in the country to show up three times (see Table 4). Federal government transfers in the form of Medicare, SNAP, and Social Security payments comprise 57% of Clay County’s economic base, 20 times the share comprised by the earnings of every private industry in the county combined. Alaska, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and West Virginia all have at least three counties that are ranked in the top 10 in the country for their reliance on a given social safety net program as a share of the county’s economic base (see Table 4).

Localities that have significant shares of federal workers and rely heavily on federal government transfers may face particularly significant consequences as a result of Trump’s attacks on the federal workforce and the Republican budget bill’s cuts to essential social safety net programs. For example, in Rio Arriba County, New Mexico, and Apache County, Arizona, federal government workers make up 16.1% and 12.0% of all workers in the county, respectively (EPI 2025b). At the same time, both counties are ranked in the top-10 counties most reliant on federal government transfers—Apache is #2 for Medicaid, and Rio Arriba is #10 for SNAP. In Apache County, federal government transfers account for three-quarters (76.9%) of the county’s economic base, and the earnings of federal government civilian workers account for 11.7%—the Navajo Nation Tribal Government is the county’s largest employer (NACOG 2023). Meanwhile, private earnings account for a mere 2.8% of the county’s economy. In Apache, Trump’s cuts to both the federal workforce and federal government programs mean that the federal government may be unable to fulfill its legal obligations to tribal communities (Brown 2025) that have faced decades of disinvestment and depressed economic outcomes resulting from historic land theft and forced assimilation. Apache County’s poverty rate of 31.2% (AZ Economics 2026) is nearly triple the national rate of 11.1% in 2023 (Shrider 2024).

Trump’s anti-immigrant crackdown and deportation agenda hurt localities with large immigrant populations

Trump has launched a campaign of terror against immigrant communities, communities of color, and those who stand with them. Last summer, Trump federalized local police and deployed thousands of federal troops to diverse cities with large immigrant populations (Kim 2025). Though Washington, D.C., may have experienced the most visible federal troop presence, a function of the district’s lack of statehood and the president’s unchecked authority to mobilize the National Guard there (Dallas 2025), Los Angeles was the first city Trump targeted after public opposition to aggressive immigration raids (Kim 2025). It was soon followed by Washington, D.C.; Memphis, Tennessee; Portland, Oregon; New Orleans, Louisiana; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Portland, Maine.

These attacks are characteristic of an authoritarian playbook that includes forcing the leaders of diverse, opposition-led communities to bend to the strongman government’s will (McManus, Benson, and Herman 2024). Minneapolis, home to a large immigrant population, was subjected to an unprecedented immigration crackdown that drew widespread protests (Boone 2026). During “Operation Metro Surge,” as it was called, federal immigration enforcement officials made 4,000 arrests and killed two U.S. citizens. Though the true toll of this violent operation may never be fully quantified, initial economic data show clear cause for concern. A recent analysis estimated that Trump’s immigration crackdown has led to a 2.9% decline in consumer spending in Minnesota over a single month—the equivalent of the state’s economy losing $626 million (Rosenthal and Sojourner 2026). Relative to overall consumer spending, the food and accommodation sector (which employs a large share of immigrant workers) saw the most significant decline in January 2026—3.8% or a $46 million reduction in economic activity. Researchers also estimated that nearly 3% of workers in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul region were unable to work during the occupation, resulting in a loss of over $100 million in wages (Sojourner and Rosenthal 2026).

Trump’s deportation agenda will continue to destabilize local communities and result in job losses for immigrant and U.S.-born residents alike (Zipperer 2025). Though immigrants live in counties across the U.S., coastal urban areas tend to have the largest shares of foreign-born residents. Counties with the largest foreign-born populations include Miami-Dade, Florida; Queens, New York; Aleutians, Alaska; and Hudson, New Jersey (see Table 5). Counties with relatively large shares of immigrants may see particularly acute harms from aggressive immigration enforcement.

Communities face overlapping economic threats from attacks on federal workers, the social safety net, and immigrants, but state and local lawmakers can resist them.

The Trump administration’s attacks on the federal workforce, the social safety net, and immigrant communities are designed to exacerbate economic precarity in many communities that are already struggling (Bivens 2026). The implementation of Trump’s authoritarian agenda in the DMV region may be the first, clearest, and in some cases most direct manifestation of its harms, but other localities across the country—particularly those with large federal workforces, those that are heavily dependent on federal revenue and those with sizeable immigrant populations—are far from immune, and many will suffer as much, if not more, from this agenda.

While state and local leaders cannot stop federal attacks, they do have the power to resist Trump’s agenda by improving state labor standards (EPI 2026b), advancing protections for immigrant workers (Díaz and Whitaker 2026), investing in the public-sector workforce (Bivens and Shierholz 2026), and using progressive tax policies (Austin and Davis 2025) to stabilize funding for critical social programs and other investments that workers, families, and communities need.

Notes

1. Throughout this report, unless explicitly noted, the source for all employment rate data is the authors’ analysis of Current Population Survey data (EPI 2026a). We compare an average of calendar year 2025 with calendar year 2024 in order to have adequate sample sizes for the noted demographic groups.

2. Employment level by industry and sector data come from the authors’ analysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Employment Statistics (CES) State and Metro Area (SAE) data.

3. These numbers are calculated using monthly totals rather than annual averages. A quarterly comparison of 2025Q4 to 2024Q4 finds roughly the same results—employment fell by 52,600 jobs (13.9%). The quarterly analysis omits October in both years to maintain an apples-to-apples comparison, accounting for missing data due to the government shutdown that began in October 2025 and the subsequent lapse in Bureau of Labor Statistics funding.

4. The non-federal workforce includes private sector workers as well as state and local government employees.

5. These numbers are calculated using monthly totals rather than annual averages. Quarterly comparisons of 2025 Q4 to 2024 Q4 produce similar results—private sector employment fell by 0.1% in the DMV and grew by 0.7% nationally. The quarterly analysis follows the methodology outlined in note 2.

6. On average, federal workers with advanced degrees typically earn less in wages and total compensation than their private-sector counterparts. Federal workers without an advanced degree typically earn more than their private-sector counterparts and have access to retirement benefits that have become less common in the private sector (CBO 2024).

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Discrimination in the workplace—either in employment, promotion, job assignments, pay, benefits, discipline, discharge, and layoffs—is illegal in the United States. Research shows that actions taken to reduce discrimination not only improve equity but also support economic growth. Federal law defines workplace discrimination on the basis of a worker’s membership in designated protected classes, with the rationale that disparate treatment violates the law when it would not have happened to an individual “but for” that aspect of their identity. These protected classes are enshrined by legislation and include the following:

• Race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity), and national origin (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)
• Age (Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967)
• Disability (Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990)
• Genetic information (Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008)

The extent to which these protected classes can be expanded is subject to legal interpretation. For example, over time, the definition of “sex discrimination” has been amended to explicitly include disparate treatment related to pregnancy and childbirth with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, as well as sexual orientation and gender identity following Supreme Court decisions in 2020.

In addition to protection from unjust unequal treatment, federal law also protects workers from retaliation for filing discrimination claims or from beginning the process of filing a discrimination claim. These federal laws cover most employees whether they work full time or part time and irrespective of citizenship status. Employers with 20 or more employees are required to comply with all nondiscrimination laws at the federal level; employers with less than 20 employees are still subject to many nondiscrimination standards, though standards are less stringent.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the independent federal agency responsible for investigating claims of employment discrimination at the federal level and for enforcing federal workplace nondiscrimination law. The EEOC does this both by fielding discrimination claims against employers and by requiring annual reports from employers on employment outcomes by protected class characteristics to assess potential patterns of discrimination.

What are the threats to federal workplace nondiscrimination protections?

Current threats to workplace nondiscrimination protections include:

• Executive actions constraining EEOC’s mission and functions: Since taking office, Trump has undermined or limited key functions of the EEOC by:
  • Illegally firing two of the three commissioners and the general counsel, leaving the Commission unable to alter policy or vote on rulemaking for several months. In October 2025, the Senate confirmed Brittany Panuccio as an EEOC commissioner, establishing a three-person quorum. With a quorum in place, the EEOC will likely rescind their 2024–2028 strategic enforcement plan, guidance on arrest and conviction records, and EEO-1 reporting requirements. Additionally, the agency will likely move forward with announced plans to significantly revise its Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Rule and Harassment Guidance.  
  • Imposing new limits on the collection of data necessary to accurately assess discriminatory impact by shortening annual reporting periods and removing nonbinary gender reporting entirely from forms used to collect demographic data from private employers and federal contractors.
  • Directing the EEOC to focus more on so-called “DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination and anti-American national origin bias and discrimination.”
• Politicizing the EEOC and constraining independent state and local agencies: EEOC Chair Andrea Lucas has repeatedly affirmed her commitment to restructuring the EEOC’s priorities toward those of the administration, rather than enforcing anti-discrimination law as an independent federal agency. In an effort to impose the administration’s agenda on state and local enforcement agencies, Lucas has proposed changes that would weaponize the funding relationship between those agencies and the EEOC. While state and local agencies operate independently, they receive funding from the EEOC in the form of reimbursements for jointly filed cases they take on behalf of the federal agency. With the exception of a few large states, such as New York or California, most states significantly rely on this funding to cover their operational costs. Since serving as acting chair, Lucas has reversed course on the EEOC’s enforcement of disparate impact and sex discrimination cases by:
  • Withholding funding for state and local Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) that choose to take on cases concerning gender identity discrimination.
  • Threatening to decertify state and local FEPAs that draw conclusions on gender identity and disparate impact charges that differ from those of the EEOC.
  • Instructing the agency to close charges that solely concern disparate impact by September 30, 2025, without developing them for litigation or for conciliation.
• Diminished EEOC enforcement capacity: The extent to which workers are protected from workplace discrimination at the federal level is dependent on the EEOC’s capacity to monitor employment practices, investigate claims of workplace discrimination, and reliably enforce sanctions against employers who violate nondiscrimination law. But for decades, inadequate funding and staffing has limited the EEOC’s capacity to investigate and resolve charges in a timely manner. Actions of the second Trump administration further exacerbate these problems:
  • In March 2025, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) announced plans to close and consolidate EEOC field offices. Once the EEOC reestablishes a quorum, the agency may begin these closures, which threaten the job security of EEOC field staff and further constrain their enforcement capacity.
  • The EEOC plans to break up its data analytics office, signaling that robust data collection and analysis—critical tools for enforcement and assessing charges—will be less of a priority for the agency. Rolling back data collection is a step toward the Project 2025 prescribed goal of ending EEO-1 data collection.
• Executive actions attacking nondiscrimination law: The Trump administration has prohibited the consideration of disparate impact liability in discrimination claims, making it more difficult to hold employers accountable for unfair employment practices and outcomes without being able to prove that employers explicitly intended to discriminate (including efforts to hold companies accountable for AI-driven algorithmic bias).  

While many threats are coming directly from the federal level, workplace nondiscrimination protections are also under threat in states that have chosen to follow the lead of the White House in passing anti-diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) laws. Many states have already closed DEI-related offices and initiatives, cut funding to programs, and restricted the use of language and consideration of protected classes in higher education. While these actions do not remove existing workplace nondiscrimination laws, workers in those states could be left without recourse if legislative trends continue and federal nondiscrimination protections continue to deteriorate.

How can states maintain and strengthen workplace nondiscrimination protections?

States have legal authority to establish their own employment discrimination laws that provide more expansive coverage than federal law. States can provide legal protections for more traits or characteristics, lower the minimum employment threshold required to file a discrimination claim, and extend the window of time employees have to file a claim after the alleged discriminatory incident occurred.

Many states and local governments have Fair Employment Practices Agencies{{1}} that investigate workplace discrimination claims in accordance with state and local nondiscrimination law, often in concert with field offices of the federal EEOC. FEPAs may have authority to enforce state or local standards for nondiscrimination that exceed those laid out by the federal government. Workers who believe they have been discriminated against can file a claim with the EEOC and/or their state or local FEPA, depending on the standards being violated, the types of relief available to victims, the deadlines for filing charges, or other factors related to the claim. The Trump administration is actively working to undermine the independence of FEPAs by weaponizing their funding arrangement, particularly on enforcement of disparate impact and gender identity discrimination protections. For state agencies that rely on federal funding for a significant share of their operating budget, these changes present serious challenges to their ability to properly maintain and expand enforcement capacity.

Step I: Update state statutes to lock in current federal protections 

Most states have passed state-level employment discrimination laws that codify employment discrimination protections for at least the same protected classes that are federally protected. Today, 24 states and Washington, D.C., have discrimination laws that cover a more expansive range of protected traits than federal law. However, 19 states, including Idaho, Louisiana, and Oklahoma, offer less protection than federal laws. Alabama’s employment discrimination law is by far the least comprehensive, as it only protects against age discrimination from 40 years of age.  

Other states have enacted certain discrimination laws that only protect public employees. For example, Georgia’s discrimination laws have mixed levels of protection based on the sector of employment. Protections for discrimination against race, color, religion, pregnancy, sexual orientation, and gender identity are only extended to public-sector employees. Private-sector employees are provided protections for disability and equal pay discrimination. Similarly, Mississippi’s employment discrimination laws only apply to public employees.  

States typically have a commission or division dedicated to enforcing state nondiscrimination laws. Alabama, Arkansas, and Mississippi do not have their own state agency and solely rely on the EEOC for anti-discrimination enforcement. Additionally, North Carolina does not have an agency where private employees can file discrimination claims.

As the Trump administration makes it easier for employers to discriminate by weakening the federal EEOC, failure to cover private employers under state law and a lack of state level enforcement capacity will leave even more workers in those states without recourse. States can—and should—act to plug these gaps by, at a minimum:

• Ensuring their state code includes at least all the protected classes covered in federal nondiscrimination law;
• Ensuring state nondiscrimination laws cover all workers (in both public and private sectors) and mirror federal employment minimum thresholds for coverage; and
• Establishing and adequately funding a state commission or division with enforcement authority that, at minimum, mirrors federal policies for filing deadlines.

Step II: Include additional protections already implemented in other states 

• Extend protections to additional traits: Most states have extended protections for marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression. While states may be financially disincentivized to pursue cases concerning gender identity discrimination, there is currently no threat to simply extending legal protections. Some states have also incorporated additional traits such as reproductive health decision-making, medical conditions, status as a victim of domestic violence, housing status, arrest/court/conviction record, and military or veteran status as protected traits (see Figure A). Additionally, several states including New York and Oregon and D.C. have lowered the age limit to be considered for age discrimination.  
• Codify inclusive definitions for protected traits to fortify employment nondiscrimination protections: Many states include definitions of protected traits that better encompass the types of discrimination employees may face. For example, since 2019, the CROWN Act has been adopted by states across the nation to include hair discrimination as a form of racial discrimination. More than half of U.S. states have passed the CROWN Act and eight states have defined race-based discrimination to include discrimination based on traits associated with race in their state code. 

Figure A

Step III: Modernize nondiscrimination policies by extending and locking in coverage across classes of workers and collecting comprehensive data

• Extend coverage to contract workers: Independent contractors are not considered employees, so they may not be inherently covered by employment discrimination laws. As of 2019, only four states (Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Island) protect independent contractors from discrimination protection, while 24 states and D.C. explicitly exclude them. Extending discrimination protections to independent contractors is important as they have significantly less labor protections than employees. Additionally, states could explicitly enforce anti-discrimination and equal employment opportunity laws for state contract workers to ensure fair employment practices among private employers that conduct business with the state. In a climate with increased hostility against those who are not white, male, heterosexual, and cisgender, it is imperative that the classification of a worker does not dictate the rights they have to protect themselves from discrimination.
• Emphasize protections for workers regardless of their citizenship and immigration status: Federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin, and employees are protected by Equal Employment Opportunity statutes regardless of citizenship or immigration status. Given changing federal treatment of immigrants, states should emphasize and enforce fair treatment regardless of documentation status to ensure workers remain protected. They should also strengthen anti-retaliation protections and practices.  
• Collect employment and pay data at the state level: Federally, the EEOC requires employers with more than 100 employees to submit an annual report (the EEO-1 form) providing critical workforce demographic data. With the future of federal data collection at risk, states should seek to collect their own equal employment data, including pay data, to support anti-discrimination enforcement mechanisms. Currently, only three (California, Illinois, Massachusetts) states require employers to submit this data.

Additional recommended resources 

• Trump is making it easier for employers to discriminate. This stifles equity and hurts economic growth. (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Trump-led attacks on equity are setting the stage for our next public health crisis (Economic Policy Institute) 
• Trump’s assault on independent agencies endangers us all (Economic Policy Institute and The Century Foundation) 

Editor’s note: This piece was revised on October 24, 2025, to add an “Additional recommended resources” section and include updates on federal and state policy developments that took place after initial publication

{{1.}} These agencies are often referred to as commissions on civil rights, human rights, human relations, etc. See a list of agencies here: University of Minnesota Human Rights Library.

Summary:

• From 1916–1970, 6 million Black Americans fled the violence and economic oppression of the rural South. Among the legacies of this Great Migration is the concentration of Black Americans in urban areas.
• Today, 10 metro areas—New York, Atlanta, D.C., Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Philadelphia, Miami, Los Angeles, and Detroit—have the largest Black populations in the country and are home to 38.6% of the Black labor force.
• This analysis finds evidence of relative economic prosperity and hardship across and within these 10 metro areas, demonstrating huge stakes associated with federal budget and job cuts, anti-equity backlash, and growing concerns of a self-inflicted recession.
• Since taking office, Trump has pushed an anti-equity agenda that rolls back the clock on hard-won federal policies establishing equal employment and core labor standards and protections for Black workers. The passage of those laws was pivotal in expanding rights and opportunities sought across the decades of the Great Migration and Civil Rights Movement.
• Mass firings of federal employees and budget cuts will have harmful consequences for Black Americans across class lines.
  • Given the large share of the state’s federal workers in metro Atlanta (51% of GA total), D.C. (60% of combined D.C., MD, VA & WV total) and New York (63% of combined NY & NJ total), Trump’s attack on the public sector threatens what has historically been a pathway to better, more equitable jobs for Black Americans—thanks to robust anti-discrimination policies and public-sector collective bargaining.
  • Although these cities anchor metro areas with some of the highest Black median household incomes in the nation, federal grant funds provide critical support to under-resourced inner-city communities. Many of those federal investments in low-income and working-class communities were cut in the Republican-led budget reconciliation bill.
• In addition to his attacks on equity and workers’ rights, Trump’s policy path leads straight to recession—jeopardizing Black workers’ labor market gains in recent years, including historically low unemployment and faster wage growth.
• Based on 2023 estimates from the American Community Survey, metro area Black unemployment was lower than the Black national average in Atlanta, D.C., Dallas, Miami, and Philadelphia.
• While overall real median household income declined 1.1% between 2019 and 2023, Black median household income grew by 2.8%.
• In 2023, Black median household income exceeded the national median of $53,927 in all but two (Chicago and Detroit) of the metros observed. It was highest in the D.C. ($89,912) and Atlanta ($70,969) metro areas.
• In the face of federal rollbacks of civil and worker’s rights and growing concerns about recession, state and local governments should act to maintain and strengthen basic protections, like minimum wage and unemployment insurance, while continuing local efforts to advance racial equity and justice. However, local leaders in red states, like Florida and Texas, face state-imposed obstacles to passing progressive economic and racial justice policies. 

The concentration of Black Americans in urban areas is one of the legacies of the Great Migration—the period between 1916 and 1970 when 6 million Black Americans fled the violence and economic oppression of the rural South in search of safety and better job opportunities in cities throughout the Northeast, Midwest, and West. But even in non-Southern U.S. cities, many continued to face poor working conditions as well as employment and pay discrimination, leaving them just marginally better off than in the places they fled. Rather, significant gains in economic status only became possible through sweeping changes to federal labor and civil rights laws born from years of protest and political pressure during the decades of the Great Migration and beyond. While landmark federal labor laws passed during the 1930s improved working conditions for most white workers, many Black workers were initially excluded from the right to organize unions under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, or minimum wage and overtime pay protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The steady demand for equal protection under these and other laws led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting segregation at all places of public accommodation and discrimination by employers and labor unions based on race, color, religion, or national origin. These federal labor and civil rights laws set a national standard for fair working conditions and equal treatment that some state and local governments have enhanced to varying degrees based on local political and economic conditions. In many cities with large Black populations, policy decisions and local economic conditions yield both positive and negative results for Black Americans.

The diverse experiences of Black people across metro areas{{1}} exemplify the notion that Black America is not a monolith. The unique political and economic dynamics in each place produce relative economic prosperity and hardship that make up the collective economic experience of Black Americans. However, even areas once sought as places of refuge and economic opportunity are now contending with a president whose actions undermine federal laws establishing equal employment and other civil rights, as well as core labor standards and protections.

Since taking office, Trump has pushed a revisionist version of history that erases any acknowledgement of the racism, violence, and oppression that created persistent racial inequities and forever changed the demographic composition of U.S. cities. This includes issuing a barrage of executive orders that roll back the clock on hard-won federal policies that have helped Black Americans attain many of the opportunities sought through the Great Migration and Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Instead, Trump’s anti-diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) rhetoric centers white men as the primary victims of discrimination and calls into question the “merit” or qualifications of almost anyone else. He has used those false narratives to justify eliminating the use of disparate impact liability and redirecting enforcement priorities at the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs—severely weakening the two agencies responsible for making sure employers comply with anti-discrimination law. Trump’s anti-equity agenda—along with efforts to decimate the federal workforce, cut services and programs that working families and low-income communities rely on, and attacks on labor standards and workers’ union and collective bargaining rights—are just some of the many harmful actions that hurt workers and put the economy at risk (McNicholas et al. 2025).

As a benchmark for assessing what’s at stake under Trump’s harmful economic policies and anti-equity agenda, we explore economic conditions for Black Americans in 10 U.S. metro areas with the largest Black populations. This list includes nine of the country’s largest metros overall—anchored by the principal cities of New York, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Philadelphia, Miami, and Los Angeles—as well as Detroit. Today, these 10 metro areas, including four in Southern states, are home to 38.6% of the Black labor force and 26.9% of the total labor force. Each of these metro areas account for at least one-third of their respective state’s Black labor force. Additionally, Black Americans are the largest demographic group in the principal cities of Detroit (75.9%), Atlanta (46.4%), Washington, D.C. (40.9%), and Philadelphia (39.5%) and represent over one-fifth of the population in all but Los Angeles (8.5%) and Miami (14.1%).

We examine unemployment rates, median household income, the size of the federal workforce, and federal grant dollars awarded to these places in 2023. Our analysis compares economic outcomes for Black Americans across metro areas and relative to national and state averages and considers some of the factors contributing to those differences. This cross-metro analysis allows us to go beyond a simple categorization of economic conditions as good versus bad or equal versus unequal. Instead, it raises important questions about why conditions are better in some places and worse in others. Finally, we explore the potential for state and local policy to provide a buffer against damaging federal actions that increase the risk of recession, harm workers, and exacerbate racial inequities.

Metro area unemployment rates and income reveal relative economic prosperity and hardship among Black Americans

The chaotic and harmful actions of the second Trump administration have raised the risk of recession for the otherwise strong and resilient labor market Trump inherited. One of the greatest casualties of a completely self-inflicted recession would be the labor market gains experienced by Black workers in recent years, including historically low unemployment and faster wage growth (Cid-Martinez, Maye, and Marvin 2025).

According to official estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the average annual Black unemployment rate in 2023 was a record low (5.5%), compared with an overall national unemployment rate of 3.6%. This analysis compares estimates of national, metro, principal city, and state unemployment rates for Black workers using data from the American Community Survey (ACS). ACS provides better coverage of metro area and principal city Black unemployment rates, but 2023 national estimates are higher than those reported by BLS due to differences in the survey reference periods.{{2}}

As shown in Figure A, in 2023, five of the 10 metro areas—Washington, D.C., Miami, Atlanta, Dallas, and Philadelphia—each outperformed the ACS-estimated national average of 7.2% for Black Americans. Across all 10 metro areas, Black unemployment ranged from a low of 5.6% in metro Atlanta to a high of 10.4% in the Chicago metro area.

Figure A

Figure B reveals that metro area Black median household income exceeded the national median of $53,927 in all but two of the metros observed. The exceptions were the Midwestern metro areas of Chicago and Detroit—the same places where Black unemployment was highest in 2023. Although incomes of Black residents in metro Chicago and Detroit were lower relative to the national median and other metros, their incomes were higher than the median Black household in the states of Illinois and Michigan. Median Black household incomes in those states were also the lowest among the states observed for this analysis.

Figure B

At the opposite end of the scale, Black median household income was highest in the D.C. ($89,912) and Atlanta ($70,969) metro areas. Notably, metro D.C.’s Black median household income was also significantly higher than the overall national median of $77,719. Black households in the New York ($65,758) and Dallas ($63,376) metro areas also had substantially higher median incomes than the typical Black household nationwide.

Relatively higher incomes and lower unemployment in metro D.C. and Atlanta are consistent with the fact that these places also had the largest shares of highly educated Black workers. The share of Black college graduates in the D.C. (40.8%) and Atlanta (36.2%) metro areas is well above the share of Black college graduates nationally (26.2%) and at least as high as the share of all college graduates nationwide. In contrast, the Detroit metro area had the lowest share of Black college graduates (20.8%). As we will discuss later, the high concentration of federal employment and related professional job opportunities in metro D.C. is a likely factor in attracting Black college graduates to the area.

The strength of the 2023 labor market and rise in employment among Black Americans also contributed to the growth in median Black household income. As shown in Figure C, while overall real median household income declined 1.1% between 2019 and 2023, Black median household income grew by 2.8%. The spike in inflation during this period generally muted real income growth; however, increased employment of Black workers managed to counteract the negative impact of inflation on income (Moore and Maye 2023). Black median income growth also outpaced total income growth in six of the 10 observed metro areas—Miami, Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Dallas. In places where real incomes declined, the decline was smaller among Black Americans.

Figure C

Echoes of the Great Migration

Across all the observed metro areas, there is a clear distinction in the average economic status of Black Americans in the principal city compared with the broader metro area, which includes surrounding suburbs. We characterize these consistent place-based differences as echoes of the Great Migration. One of the factors contributing to these differences was “white flight”—the mass relocation of white people from urban centers to suburbs in response to the rising Black population in cities during the Great Migration. More than just a demographic shift, white flight initiated a draining of economic resources away from cities that continued as more affluent Black families moved to suburbs following the passage and enforcement of fair housing laws.

Across all 10 metro areas, Black unemployment was higher in principal cities compared with the broader metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and the state. Referring again to Figure A, in 2023, Black unemployment in the city of Atlanta (8.4%) was 2.8 percentage points higher than metro Atlanta where Black unemployment was lowest and closest to the overall national average. Similarly, the Black unemployment rate was more than 3 percentage points higher in the cities of Washington, D.C. (9.9%) and Miami (9.7%), relative to the respective metro areas. In Chicago (12.3%) and Detroit (11.7%), Black unemployment was nearly 2 percentage points above metro area rates that were already at least 2 percentage points above the Black national average. Recession-level Black unemployment rates in the Midwestern cities of Chicago and Detroit are also reflected at the state level for Illinois and Michigan. For Detroit, in particular, a second wave of white flight followed the post-1980s decline in manufacturing jobs and union density, once critical sources of Black economic mobility in the region (Scott et al. 2022). 

Similarly, Black median household income was substantially lower in principal cities than the metro area and the state. Figure B shows that across all 10 metro areas, Black median household income was at least $6,400 lower in the principal city than in the metro area. The largest gap was in the D.C. metro area, where there was a difference of nearly $30,000 between Black median household income in the principal city of Washington, D.C., and the broader metro area. In other metro areas with relatively high Black median incomes, like metro Atlanta and Dallas, the difference was $17,066 and $14,849, respectively. However, even in the Detroit metro area where Black incomes were lowest, there was a gap of more than $10,000 between households in the principal city and those in the broader metro area.

Federal grants are critical to filling resource gaps in urban areas

Federal grants are critical to filling the resource gaps in principal cities since those funds are often directed toward poorly resourced communities. Table 1 provides a summary of federal grant dollars flowing to each city in recent years based on data available at USAspending.gov.{{3}} The grant amounts include funds from block, formula, project, and cooperative agreement grant obligations, and encompass COVID-19-related obligations from the American Recovery Plan Act.

As shown in Table 1, D.C. and New York received the most in federal grant funds (an annual average of more than $6 billion each over fiscal years 2022–2024) followed by Atlanta. However, when adjusted for population size, D.C. and Atlanta had the highest per capita averages ($9,158 and $6,769 per person, respectively).

Although these cities anchor metro areas with some of the highest Black median household incomes in the nation, federal grant funds are directed toward the needs of less advantaged residents. For example, over the last three years, Atlanta’s largest federal grants were from the Department of Education to support students from low-income families in Title I schools. The largest federal grants to Washington, D.C., were from the Environmental Protection Agency, authorized through the Inflation Reduction Act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and other pollutants and to bring green projects to low-income and disadvantaged communities. Most of the federal grant dollars going to the city of New York were from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to support public housing.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) was a major source of federal grants awarded in nine of the 10 cities. While the agency is most often associated with Medicaid funding for states, HHS funds programs like Head Start, HIV emergency relief, cancer treatment, and children’s hospitals at the city level. Across all 10 cities, the Departments of HHS, HUD, and Transportation were commonly among the top three awarding agencies, representing critical investments in health and well-being, housing, and transportation infrastructure in urban areas.

Table 1

However, due to the upside-down priorities of the current Congress, many federal investments in low-income and working-class communities have been cut to give tax cuts that overwhelmingly benefit the wealthy. In July 2025, Congress passed the Republican-led Budget Reconciliation Bill (or H.R. 1) which guts Medicaid and slashes the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), while also eliminating clean energy tax credits established under the Inflation Reduction Act, potentially putting over half a million jobs at risk (Seeburger et al. 2025). The bill results in 16 million fewer people having health coverage through 2034 and places approximately 11 million individuals at risk of losing SNAP benefits. Medicaid cuts alone could depress local spending enough to force the loss of 850,000 jobs (Bivens 2025). Overall, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that annual income for households in the lowest decile would decline by about $1,600—highlighting the devastating impact this bill will have on vulnerable families and the added strain it would place on state and local budgets (CBO 2025).

The city of Washington, D.C., was placed in a uniquely precarious position when the House’s reconciliation bill reverted D.C. to its 2024 budget. That decision slashed the city’s 2025 budget by more than $1 billion, an impossible deficit to close without laying off many city employees and severely cutting public programs and services. At of the time of this report’s publication, the House had yet to vote on an unanimously passed Senate fix that would reverse the budget cuts, needlessly placing the city’s budget in limbo. In response to House’s inaction, the mayor of D.C. proposed a 2025 supplemental budget that cuts services and freezes hiring to cover the budget gap while avoiding layoffs. Combined with federal job cuts, these actions represent a major blow to the area’s economic base and fiscal autonomy that would be especially tragic for Black Americans across class lines in the D.C. metro area.

Federal jobs cuts threaten relative economic security for the Black middle class

For Black Americans, public-sector employment has historically been a pathway to better, more equitable job opportunities. Through executive actions and legislation introduced in the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government once led in adopting anti-discrimination and affirmative action practices that increased the number of Black workers in the federal government. In the decades that followed, federal jobs have provided stable employment, excellent benefits, and opportunities for career advancement that supported a robust Black middle class. Public-sector collective bargaining has also helped to maintain the quality of these jobs through labor contracts that foster transparency through clearly defined policies and pay structures. This plays a critical role in reducing discrimination and providing workers with critical protections and recourse against other forms of exploitation or mistreatment.

That history stands in sharp contrast to the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle the public sector, beginning with workers in DEI departments within federal agencies. Trump’s attacks on the federal workforce also include attempts to limit the approval of collective bargaining agreements with federal workers. The targets of such actions include skilled and often highly educated Black workers who typically experience less employment volatility, even during economic downturns. Nationally, Black federal workers average 12.3 years of service and 45.3% hold at least a bachelor’s degree (compared with 26.2% overall) (Maye and Marvin 2025).

While federal jobs losses will obviously have an impact in the D.C. metro area, over 90% of federal workers are employed outside the nation’s capital (McNicholas and Oakford 2025). The ripple effects from large-scale job cuts are expected to show up in higher unemployment and the disruption of critical public services and government functions throughout the nation. Table 2 shows the number of federal workers who live in each of the 10 metro areas, as well as the metro’s share of total federal jobs in the state. For metro areas that cross state lines, including metro D.C., Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia, we calculate metro area jobs as a share of the combined state totals. Over 300,000 federal workers reside in the D.C. metro area, accounting for 60% of all federal workers in the District of Columbia and surrounding states of Virginia, Maryland, and West Virginia. The second largest number of federal workers (over 100,000) are in the New York metro area, representing 63% of all federal workers in New York and New Jersey. Among the single state metro areas, Atlanta is home to over half (51%) of Georgia’s federal workforce and 47% of Michigan’s federal workers are in metro Detroit.

Table 2

While metro-level federal employment numbers by race are unavailable, EPI analysis of state-level data from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reveals that 43.8% of Georgia’s federal workers are Black—the largest share in the country (Wilson 2025). The District of Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia each have larger numbers of federal workers than Georgia, and Black workers are just over one-fourth of the federal workforce in each those states—28.8% in D.C., 27.9% in Maryland, and 26% in Virginia.

Between January and July of 2025, BLS reported a loss of 84,000 net federal jobs but the full impact and consequences of those job losses are yet to be revealed. Though thousands of fired federal workers were reinstated by court orders in February 2025, the Supreme Court later sided with the Trump administration when it lifted a lower court’s block on mass federal layoffs, clearing the way for the Trump administration to proceed with planned large-scale cuts to the federal workforce. However, DOGE’s lack of transparency and the Trump administration’s broader data erasure efforts make it difficult to keep track of whether job cuts fall disproportionately on certain groups of workers.{{4}}

Troubling changes at the EEOC stifle equity and would be harmful to economic growth

As a large independent federal agency, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is relatively small compared with many cabinet level agencies experiencing job cuts. Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the EEOC operates 53 district and field offices across the country,{{5}} including locations in each of our 10 featured cities with large Black populations. For 60 years, the EEOC has been integral to the enforcement of U.S. anti-discrimination laws—efforts that helped reduce employment discrimination and boost average living standards by an estimated $493 to $1,233 per person since 1960 (Maye and Wilson 2025). However, troubling changes to the structure and priorities of the agency paralyze some of the commission’s key functions and weaken enforcement against racial and gender discrimination—the most common types of discrimination claims filed (Mark, Gurley, and Rein 2025).

Instead, the Trump administration has redirected the EEOC’s priorities to focus more on investigating so-called DEI-motivated race and sex discrimination and anti-American national origin bias and discrimination (DOJ 2025; EEOC 2025). Trump also issued an executive order designed to end the use of disparate impact liability, a legal standard that works to prevent otherwise “race-neutral” policies and practices from perpetuating racial inequities (EPI 2025b). This restructuring of priorities threatens to turn the mission of the EEOC on its head by framing equity efforts intended to remedy decades of documented employment discrimination as discriminatory.

Just as the presence of EEOC offices in these cities signaled the federal government’s nationwide vigilance over employment discrimination, efforts to undermine the agency signal that employment discrimination—particularly against racial, ethnic, sexual, or religious minorities—will go unchecked. The impact of those changes extends beyond the millions of Black Americans working in and around these 10 cities alone and erodes workplace equity writ large.

State and local policy levers

As the Trump administration pushes the federal government toward a more anti-worker and anti-equity stance, decisions made by state and local policymakers will determine what kinds of protections workers in their states and cities will retain. Table 3 presents a sample of state and local policy positions related to workers’ rights for the ten metro areas featured in this analysis. These positions represent the relative progressivity of those state and local governments which could indicate their propensity to provide some buffer against harmful federal actions that raise the risk of recession, weaken labor standards, and exacerbate racial inequities. These policies include unemployment insurance (UI), minimum wage, paid leave, state preemption of local minimum wage or paid leave policies, and right-to-work laws. As a measure of the likelihood that state and local leaders will fight to maintain or strengthen equity efforts, we also include the number of Black mayors elected in each city and the existence of state or local reparations initiatives.

A basic scan of state and local policies reveals that while there is some variation in the generosity of UI benefits across states, the need for expanded federal support will once again be essential for recovery from the next recession. The scan also shows that local leaders in red states face state-imposed obstacles to passing progressive economic and racial justice policies.  

Table 3

Unemployment insurance

Unemployment insurance benefits are among the most efficient sources of support to families and the economy during a recession. Since they are targeted at individuals whose income falls due to a job loss, UI benefits provide direct income support to eligible unemployed workers while also helping to stabilize aggregate demand, the largest driver of economic growth. Estimates suggest that each dollar in UI benefits can generate nearly $2 in local spending (Evermore 2024). Despite the efficiency of UI benefits, they are often the target of austerity politics fueled by exaggerated and frequently debunked claims that overly generous benefits suppress employment (Martinez Hickey and Cooper 2021). 

While adequate federal action and support for expanding UI during a recession are critical to a quick recovery, state policymakers have some flexibility in determining how their UI programs are structured and resisting the austerity impulse. As a joint state and federal program, each state can adjust its own eligibility requirements, length of time for available benefits, and maximum weekly benefits in coordination with federal guidelines. Among the states represented in Table 3, Florida and Michigan are the only two that currently cap the number of weeks benefits can be received at less than 26 weeks. However, the maximum weekly benefit for unemployed individuals varies from a high of $605 per week in Pennsylvania (Philadelphia) to a low of $365 per week in Georgia (Atlanta).

The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the potential for major federal reforms to boost UI as a macroeconomic stabilizer by enhancing the duration, generosity, and eligibility of UI benefits (Bivens and Banerjee 2021). The pandemic also exposed administrative and fiscal inadequacies in state UI systems. Federal funds were allocated by the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) to improve UI systems administration, prevent fraud, and increase equitable access (DOL n.d.). However, few states took steps to strengthen severely underfunded state UI systems long term by increasing their taxable wage base (Sawo and Sherer 2022). UI reform advocates recommend increasing the taxable wage base to half of the taxable maximum for Social Security (Bivens et al. 2021). The increase would result in employers paying state unemployment taxes on a larger percentage of higher wage earners’ pay, generating more revenue and sustaining more fairness, equity, and administrative efficiency over time. Among the states considered, only New York and Illinois have a taxable wage base above $10,000, but still far below the much higher recommended base of $88,500 needed to address underfunding.{{6}}

In red states, a city’s ability to enact pro-worker policies is often at the mercy of state preemption

Several states and localities across the country have established minimum wage ordinances that exceed the federal standard. Since the federal minimum wage has remained stuck at $7.25 for over 15 years, failing to keep up with rising costs and inflation, this is a critical policy lever for supporting workers and their families’ right to a livable wage (Payne-Patterson and Maye 2023). Rasing the minimum wage supports all workers, but especially Black workers who are overrepresented in low-wage occupations.

Currently, 19 states and Washington, D.C., have passed laws raising their own minimum wage to at least $15 an hour by 2027, including several cities listed in Table 3 with local minimum wages well above the federal minimum (Hickey 2024; EPI 2025a). Washington, D.C., New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago all have a minimum wage standard of at least $15 an hour and Detroit’s minimum wage increased to $12.48 in 2025.

Sadly, four cities with large Black populations—Atlanta, Dallas, Houston, and Philadelphia—have not raised their minimum wage above the federal level. In June, the Pennsylvania state House passed a bill that would raise Philadelphia’s minimum wage to $15 an hour after years of failed attempts to increase the state’s minimum wage to that level (Huangpu 2025). The House proposal now awaits approval by the state Senate. For relatively progressive cities that also happen to be in red states, state preemption laws are a major barrier to passing a higher local minimum wage. In Atlanta, workers not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act are paid a minimum of $5.15 an hour—$2.10 below the already insufficient federal minimum wage (GDOL n.d.). While local governments are prohibited in establishing a higher city-wide minimum wage, Dallas, Houston, and Atlanta have each passed increases for city, county, or contract workers (Cooper 2024; Barrera and Heilman 2025). Apart from preemption, right-to-work laws in these states also present barriers that limit workers’ collective bargaining rights, resulting in lower wages and benefits for all workers.

While raising the minimum wage can raise living standards for low-wage hourly workers, paid family leave enables workers to avoid the difficult tradeoff between income stability and caring for family. There is no federal law that guarantees paid family or medical leave to workers; up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave are available to eligible employees under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). However, as of 2025, 13 states and Washington, D.C., have passed their own paid family leave laws (Williamson 2024). Of the states listed in Table 3, only California, New York, and the District of Columbia currently have paid leave policies on the books. In D.C. and New York, eligible employees receive up to 12 weeks of paid leave (DCPFL n.d., NYSPFL n.d.). In California, eligible employees receive up to eight weeks of paid time off (EDD n.d.). All three policies allow workers to use this leave for caring for a loved one, bonding with a child, or military assistance. In New York, employees taking paid family leave receive 67% of their average weekly wage, while in California, workers can receive about 70–90% of wages earned five to 18 months before the claim start date. D.C. Paid Family Leave provides wage replacement of 90% of wages up to 1.5 times D.C.’s minimum wage and 50% of wages above 1.5 times D.C.’s minimum wage (DCPFL n.d.).

Will local steps toward racial reckoning withstand the rising tide of federal and state anti-equity backlash?

Every city and town in the United States has its own complicated racial history to reckon with. That history is infused in local policy and politics and shapes social and economic outcomes. As is true at the national level, decisions made by local elected leaders can either widen or narrow racial disparities. Leadership also reflects and sets the tone for how a city acknowledges, confronts, and seeks to resolve current and historic racial injustice. As measures of perceived racial progressivity, we consider the number of Black mayors elected in the principal city for each metro area and whether any local reparations initiatives have been introduced since 2020. While these are admittedly imperfect metrics, we interpret them as signals of the local political will to advance racial equity and defend current efforts. However, it is uncertain how much local efforts will be jeopardized by legal challenges triggered by aggressive federal and state anti-equity policies.

Table 3 shows that among the 10 cities observed, all except Miami have elected at least two Black mayors. The cities with the longest history of Black leadership are Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, having had seven and six Black mayors, respectively. Five Black Americans have served as mayor of Detroit. Since Black Americans are the largest demographic group in each of these cities, the larger number of Black mayors elected in these cities reflects city demographics and perhaps the degree of influence Black Americans wield in local elections. A more comprehensive analysis of city management and the policy priorities of individual mayors would be needed to assess their direct impact on Black economic outcomes or racial equity.

While little progress has been made to advance the issue of reparations at the federal level, since 2020, several state and local governments have taken initiative in addressing their own histories of racial and economic injustice against Black Americans. Reparations initiatives exist in all except the three cities in red states whose governors have aggressively pushed anti-DEI legislation: Miami in Florida, and Dallas and Houston in Texas. In most places where a reparations initiative exists, activity has been at the city or county level. However, both city- and state-level initiatives exist in California and New York. Current state and local reparations efforts range from the appointment of a task force to study the issue, to exploring plan options, approving legislation, and implementing a plan. While there are open questions about whether local plans are truly reparative or will have any measurable economic effect on closing the racial wealth gap, they are at least a signal of willingness to confront and seriously consider government accountability for eliminating racial inequities (Moore 2023).{{7}}

Conclusion

The strong and stable economy Trump inherited withstood months of his administration’s harmful and chaotic policy actions before clear signs of a softening labor market became evident in the July jobs report. Large downward revisions to May and June payroll employment estimates signaled a weaker labor market than originally reported, bringing average three-month job growth down to just 35,000 net new jobs compared with 127,000 over the preceding three months. Rather than taking this sobering news as a sign that he should reconsider the current policy path, Trump misrepresented the news as a politically motivated personal attack and fired BLS Commissioner Erika McEntarfer. Such careless actions unjustifiably erode confidence in one of the world’s most respected statistical agencies and endangers sound economic decision-making.

If the Trump administration and Congress continue along the current path, there is a very real risk of a recession in the coming months—and a lot at stake for Black Americans who typically suffer higher rates of unemployment and take longer to recover lost jobs and income from a downturn. In recent years there have been economic gains that should be protected and expanded. Five metro areas in this analysis had Black unemployment rates below the national average in 2023 and the median Black household income was above the national median in eight metros. At the same time, there is evidence of persistent inequities and economic hardship that demand a commitment to long-term solutions and investment in underserved communities. Two metro areas were below national measures of Black unemployment and income, but across all 10 metro areas, principal city residents had higher unemployment and lower incomes compared with the broader metro area which includes surrounding suburbs. Trump’s anti-equity, anti-worker agenda undermines both of those objectives by decimating the federal workforce and attacking public sector unions; cutting the federal budget for Medicaid, SNAP, and other programs that benefit low-income families; weaponizing civil rights enforcement to discourage diversity, equity and inclusion; and weakening core labor standards and protections.

State and local governments have some policy levers at their disposal for improving worker protections, but the effect those policies can have on the economic well-being of Black Americans varies by place, and in some cases is conditional on federal or state actions. For example, while cities and states have some capacity to increase their minimum wage or pass paid leave policies, preemption is a major barrier for local leaders seeking to pursue more progressive policies in red states. The law allows states some flexibility to adjust the duration and amount of unemployment insurance benefits, one of the most efficient sources of income support during a recession. Yet severe underfunding of state systems due to a far too low state taxable wage base starves their capacity to make substantial improvements in the fairness, equity, or generosity of benefits without federal funding. Moreover, in a recession, there is little any state can do to expand benefits and speed recovery without increased federal support—a step we can’t assume to be a priority of the current Congress or president. Finally, while many of cities we observe could be considered more racially progressive than the country as a whole, federally led anti-DEI backlash raises the possibility of legal challenges against local policies in support of equity and racial justice.

Black America is not a monolith. That statement is an assertion of the right to self-determination and individual expression that racism denies Black Americans. It is also a reflection of the varied experiences shaped by differences in local policy, economic conditions, political influence, and culture. Still, history shows that the pursuit of collective freedom, justice, and equity for Black Americans has always required decisive national actions that raise the standards for fair and equal treatment of all people in this country. The Trump administration’s denial of that history and lowering of those standards is not just several steps backwards for Black Americans, but moves all of the United States in the wrong direction.

Notes

{{1.}} A metro area is a region that includes a principal city and surrounding cities and towns with economic and social ties to the urban core.

{{2.}} The labor market statistics produced by BLS are based on data collected in the Current Population Survey (CPS). CPS interviews are conducted in a single designated week each month and annual averages align with the calendar year, whereas respondents answer the ACS at times that vary throughout the month and year and annual figures are averaged over the prior 12 months.

{{3.}} USAspending.gov is the official open data source of federal spending information, including information about federal awards such as contracts, grants, and loans. Since annual grant totals can change as data are updated on a rolling basis, we use a three-year average to minimize the sometimes substantial effect updates can have on a single year’s grant total. A downloaded transaction summary as it existed at the time of our analysis is available upon request.

{{4.}} The OPM data used to report the share of Black federal workers are no longer publicly available.

{{5.}} Workers can call or visit EEOC field offices to ask questions about potential employment discrimination or to directly file an individual complaint. Field offices may also recommend charges for EEOC Commissioners to pursue against specific employers.

{{6.}} The $88,500 corresponds to half of the 2025 taxable wage limit for Social Security, which was $176,100, up from $168,600 in 2024.

{{7.}} In May 2025, FirstRepair and Decolonizing Wealth Project launched a mapping tool that documents state and local reparations initiatives across the United States. See: FirstRepair and Decolonizing Wealth Project, “Mapping the U.S. Reparations Movement” (web page), https://www.reparationsresources.com/.

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The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes a “floor under wages” mandating that employers pay covered employees no less than a minimum hourly rate for all hours worked, whether they are paid on an hourly or salaried basis. The current federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour—a rate set in 2009. FLSA minimum wage rules apply to all private businesses with annual revenue of at least $500,000, as well as hospitals, care centers, schools, and public agencies. 

The FLSA exempts a variety of specific occupations from the minimum wage, such as newspaper delivery workers, seasonal farm workers, workers in commercial fisheries and canneries, private investigators, and babysitters. It allows workers under 20-years-old to be paid as little as $4.25 per hour for their first 90 days of employment. The FLSA also allows employers who have been granted a certificate from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to pay less than the minimum wage to employees with disabilities. It also allows employers to pay workers who customarily receive tips as little as $2.13 per hour, so long as the tips they receive over the course of a workweek bring them to an average hourly combined wage (tips plus base wage) of at least the minimum wage.

What are the threats to federal minimum wage protections?

• Allowing the value of the minimum wage to continue to erode: Since the federal minimum wage was last raised in June 2009, its value has declined by 30%. At its 1968 high point in inflation-adjusted terms, the federal minimum wage was worth roughly $12 in 2024 dollars. In 2019, the U.S. House passed a bill to gradually raise the federal minimum wage to $15 and then automatically update it for inflation every year thereafter; however, the Senate never took up the bill. Every year it remains unchanged, the purchasing power of the minimum wage erodes, undermining wage growth for millions of low-wage workers, including many earning wages above the minimum. Moreover, without an increase, the gap between the current minimum wage and what would constitute a true living wage gets larger—making any eventual effort to reach a living wage more challenging.
• Continuing to subject tipped workers to a lower and difficult-to-enforce subminimum wage: The subminimum wage for tipped workers was set in 1991 at $2.13 per hour and has not been raised since. At such a low level, many tipped workers effectively receive no pay from their employers; their take-home pay comes entirely from what they receive in tips. Consequently, tipped workers’ income is volatile and unpredictable, and they can be subject to abuse by customers and employers who, in every shift and transaction, hold power over tipped workers’ pay. Although the FLSA requires that employers must “top off” workers’ paychecks if their tips do not make up the difference between the tipped minimum and full minimum wage, this requirement is notoriously hard to enforce.
• Denying minimum wage coverage to some groups of workers: The Trump administration has already taken initial steps to roll back existing DOL rules that ensure minimum wage coverage for direct care workers (home health aides) and has withdrawn a proposed rule that would have phased out programs allowing payment of subminimum wages to workers with disabilities. Proposals laid out in Project 2025 recommend altering the FLSA to allow states to seek waivers to core FLSA provisions—which could open the door to exclusions of additional groups of workers from coverage.
• Increasing likelihood of underpayment: Failure to pay the minimum wage is one of the most common forms of wage theft and diminished DOL capacity to enforce federal wage and hour laws will exacerbate this problem.

How can states maintain and strengthen minimum wage protections?

States have legal authority to establish their own minimum wages that are higher and more expansive in coverage than the federal minimum. Given the very real risk that aspects of FLSA minimum wage protections could be eliminated (or will go unenforced), it is important for states to at least lock in existing FLSA minimum wage protections. However, states should seek to go beyond the current floor, as the federal minimum wage is far too low and does not cover all workers.

Step I: Update state statutes to lock in current federal protections

Because updates to the federal minimum wage have been infrequent and inadequate over the last 40 years, many states—though not all—have established their own minimum wages. The strength of these laws varies greatly. For example:

• 30 states and the District of Columbia have set minimum wages higher than the federal minimum, ranging from $8.75 in West Virginia, to $16.66 in Washington, and $17.50 in the District of Columbia.
• Five states (Tennessee, South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama) have no state minimum wage. Two states (Georgia and Wyoming) have state minimum wages below the federal minimum. The federal minimum wage applies in these states to all workers covered by the minimum wage under the FLSA.
• Some states (such as New Hampshire, Idaho, North Carolina, and Texas) set the state minimum to explicitly equal the federal minimum (whatever it may be), while others have set it specifically at $7.25.

To lock in current federal minimum wage protections, states should:

1. Guarantee a strong state minimum wage floor: States without a minimum wage or with one lower than the federal minimum should enact one that is at least as strong as the federal minimum wage—and ideally stronger. States should codify that the state minimum wage always equals the greater of the federal minimum wage or whatever higher explicit value state lawmakers or voters (in the case of a ballot measure) set.
2. Ensure the state minimum wage covers at least those workers covered by the FLSA: Most states, though not all, link coverage of their state minimum wage to the coverage definitions in the FLSA. States should consider spelling out coverage definitions in state code so that currently covered workers remain covered if federal coverage definitions are eroded to exclude certain groups or occupations in the future.
3. Ensure state agencies have authority and capacity to enforce minimum wage laws: Many states rely, at least in part, on federal enforcement of wage and hour laws. Florida, for example, will have a $15 minimum wage in 2026, yet has no state-level wage and hour enforcement body.

State minimum wage rules are typically part of state labor and employment or wage and hour statutes. In some cases, they are set in state constitutions—the result of citizen-initiated ballot measures. Policymakers and advocates should review their state’s labor laws to assess whether their state minimum wage laws codify at least the same level of protection currently provided under the FLSA, and to ensure that the state has the power to enforce its own minimum wage laws without relying on the federal government.

Step II: Raise the minimum wage to an adequate level, set it for automatic annual increases going forward, and eliminate harmful exemptions

While the FLSA sets an important floor for minimum pay, the current level is woefully inadequate and there remain notable gaps in coverage that state policymakers should close. Priority steps states can take to update the minimum wage include:

1. Gradually raise the minimum wage to at least $17 per hour by 2028: Today, there is no county in the country where a single, childless worker can achieve a modest, but adequate standard of living on a wage of less than $15. By targeting at least $17 by 2028, states can raise their minimum wages to an adequate level allowing for any inflation that may occur as the new wage floor is gradually phased in.
2. Gradually raise and eliminate the subminimum wage for tipped workers: There are currently seven states where tipped workers are paid the regular minimum wage, regardless of tips. In these states, tipped worker wages are higher, poverty rates are lower, and the restaurant industry thrives. States should gradually increase the minimum wage that applies to tipped workers (or reduce any “tip credit” employers can claim against their minimum wage obligation) so that eventually all workers are paid the full minimum wage regardless of any tip income.
3. Index the minimum wage for inflation: States should establish that once the minimum wage has reached at least $17 per hour, it must be automatically updated each year to account for any growth in prices over the preceding year. There are 20 states and D.C. that already have automatic inflation-adjustment built into their state minimum wage laws. Most require that the minimum wage be raised the same percentage as any change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) over a preceding 12-month period, rounded to the nearest 5 cents. If the CPI-U decreases, the minimum wage should not be lowered.
4. Codify minimum wage coverage for direct care workers: As noted above, the 2013 FLSA rule that clarified minimum wage and overtime coverage for home care companions who provide direct care services for seniors and persons with disabilities is under attack in the courts, and the Trump DOL has taken initial steps to reconsider it. To protect such workers from losing these key protections, states should ensure that their wage and hour laws clearly cover them. In states where they are exempted or where state coverage of such workers depends on FLSA coverage (such as Connecticut), state laws should be updated to clearly cover such workers, regardless of what happens to the federal rule.
5. Eliminate harmful minimum wage exemptions: Agricultural workers are not covered by the FLSA, a racist holdover from when the act was initially passed in 1938. Other exceptions apply to smaller categories of workers. States have it in their power to eliminate these exemptions. For example, several states—including California, Washington, and Colorado—cover agricultural workers under the state minimum wage. Also, many states have a “training wage” allowing workers—often only those under age 20 or in school—to be paid less than the full minimum wage. Lawmakers should consider whether these training wages are necessary, and if they are maintained, they should be limited to a short period (e.g., 30 days) after a worker’s initial hiring.
6. Ensure localities can establish their own minimum wages above the state minimum: There are nine states in which a city or a county has established a local minimum wage that exceeds the state minimum—with nearly 60 local minimum wages now in effect. Because costs of living can vary considerably within a state, local governments should be able to establish higher wage standards if the people in those localities deem that the state wage floor is inadequate. There are 25 states where state law currently prohibits local wage minimum wages. Lawmakers in those states should reverse that prohibition.

Step III: Modernize minimum wage policies by establishing stronger mechanisms to adjust the level of the minimum wage over time

In addition to codifying FLSA minimum wage rules, setting an adequate minimum wage level, and closing coverage gaps, there are other steps state lawmakers can take to ensure all workers can afford a decent life and benefit from a growing economy.

1. Set the minimum wage to automatically adjust each year based on growth in prices or median wages—whichever is greatest: Indexing the minimum wage to changes in prices ensures that low-wage workers can buy the same amount of goods and services year after year. But as the economy grows and productivity rises, low-wage workers’ standard of living should improve, not just stay the same. Instead of indexing the minimum wage to price changes, lawmakers can index the minimum wage to changes in the median wage.
   • Linking the minimum wage to the median wage ensures that the gap between the lowest paid job and a “middle-class” job never grows; as a middle-class worker’s pay rises, so would pay for a minimum wage worker.
   • Over the long run, wage growth should outpace price growth, but on a year-over-year basis, that may not be true and in some years, median wages could decline. The law should be written such that the minimum wage never goes down and is raised at least as much as any increase in prices—and more when wage growth exceeds price growth.
2. Establish wage boards to periodically evaluate the strength of the minimum wage overall and for specific industries: In some countries—such as the United Kingdom— minimum wage levels are set by boards or commissions (composed of nonpartisan analysts, worker representatives, and members of the business community) that periodically review the level of the minimum wage and recommend changes. In some states—such as in New York and California—there are wage boards for individual industries, such as fast food, that set minimum wages (and potentially other workplace standards) for all workers in that industry. Policymakers should consider establishing or creating mechanisms allowing for such boards to periodically review whether the state minimum wage level is adequate for workers overall, and/or for those in industries with large numbers of low-wage workers.

Additional recommended resources 

• Why the U.S. needs at least a $17 minimum wage (Economic Policy Institute) 

• The impact of the Raise the Wage Act of 2023 (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Minimum Wage Tracker (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Most minimum wage studies have found little or no job loss (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Minimum Wage for Agricultural Workers (The National Agriculture Law Center) 

• Low Wage Workforce Tracker (Economic Policy Institute) 

Editor’s note: This piece was revised on October 23, 2025, to add an “Additional recommended resources” section.

The 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) sets guidelines for the hours and nonhazardous jobs for which employers can hire minors under 16. The FLSA also empowers the Secretary of Labor to prohibit all minor employment in occupations that are particularly dangerous through “hazardous occupations orders.” It covers employers that conduct at least $500,000 in annual sales or any employees engaged in interstate commerce (this coverage is interpreted broadly with respect to child labor—if a firm engages in any form of interstate commerce, its minor workers are covered). Federal law sets an important but limited and increasingly outdated floor for child labor standards. For example, federal child labor standards in agriculture are much weaker than in nonagricultural employment, hazardous occupations orders have not been updated in decades, and there are no work hours protections for minors over the age of 15 (see Table 1).

Table 1

What are the threats to federal child labor standards?

Threats to federal child labor standards include federal proposals to weaken child labor protections and ongoing state-level efforts to erode the FLSA by proposing or enacting state child labor legislation that conflicts with federal law:

• Project 2025, the anti-worker policy roadmap being implemented by the Trump administration, proposes:
  1.  Eliminating federal hazardous occupations orders, which protect minors from employment in particularly dangerous jobs, like mining and roofing; and
  2. Allowing states to obtain waivers from the FLSA—including provisions that prevent harmful forms of child labor.

• In recent years, a coordinated, industry-backed campaign to erode child labor standards has generated proposals in dozens of states to weaken or eliminate state standards exceeding the minimal federal “floor” for child labor protections. Some state lawmakers have gone even further, proposing or enacting bills that directly conflict with federal minimum standards, while stating intent to build pressure for the eventual relaxation or elimination of FLSA standards for the whole country. Common targets for these attacks on state child labor standards include:
  • Eliminating youth work permits
  • Eliminating hours of work guidelines for 16- and 17-year-olds
  • Eliminating meal or rest break requirements for minors
  • Expanding employers’ ability to hire minors for previously prohibited hazardous jobs
  • Lowering the age at which minors can serve alcohol and/or work in establishments serving alcohol
  • Establishing or expanding laws that allow employers to pay students or other youth a subminimum wage
  • Creating new exemptions from state child labor protections, for example for homeschooled youth or youth in certain occupations
  • Creating new systems—such as unregulated “internship” or “work-based learning” programs—that allow employers to skirt child labor laws or hire minors for otherwise prohibited hazardous work

By repeatedly proposing—and in some cases implementing—standards that conflict with federal law, these states are chipping away at the already fragile federal floor for workplace protections.

How can states maintain and strengthen child labor protections?

States have legal authority to establish their own child labor standards; the FLSA sets a floor above which states can adopt and enforce their own stronger standards.

States have historically played a prominent role in setting child labor standards—some states have protections in place that predate the FLSA, and many have long legislated above federal law. Other states maintain standards that generally mirror the FLSA, with few additional protections, and some states have standards that are significantly weaker than the FLSA. In many cases, a state’s standards are stronger than the FLSA in some areas and weaker in others. When a state standard is weaker than the FLSA, federal law applies. However, since only federal agencies can enforce federal laws, state laws that fall short of federal law increase the risk of federal violations while shifting the enforcement burden to already-overburdened federal agencies. Amid Trump administration attacks, federal agencies are now facing even more pronounced staffing shortages that will further limit their enforcement capacity.

In response to increasing child labor violations, many states are already taking action to strengthen state child labor standards and enforcement. Given the very real risk that aspects of FLSA child labor protections could be eliminated (or will go unenforced), all states should at a minimum lock in existing FLSA standards and ensure state capacity to enforce them. Beyond this, states have critical opportunities and responsibilities to modernize child labor standards beyond the minimal, outdated FLSA floor to ensure that minors who must work or choose to work can access safe work experiences that don’t harm their health or education. Fortunately, state lawmakers have an array of options to consider and tested legislative models to use as a guide.

Step I: Update state statutes to lock in current federal protections.

State standards should be at least as strong as those in the FLSA. Ensuring that state standards mirror FLSA minimums protects both employers and children from the risks and confusion that arise when state standards contradict federal law. For example, after a Utah employer was fined for violating federal child labor law for incorrectly following state child labor guidelines that were weaker than FLSA standards, Utah enacted a bill to align state guidelines on hours of work for minors under 16 with FLSA standards.

Weaker standards often appear in areas of state code covering work hours or prohibited hazardous occupations. For example:

• Idaho allows employers to schedule 14–15-year-olds up to nine hours a day or 54 hours per week. Federal law allows employers to schedule 14–15-year-olds up to three hours a day or 18 hours per week in a school week and up to eight hours per day and 40 hours per week in a nonschool week.
• Iowa allows employers to hire 14-year-olds in industrial laundries and 15-year-olds in light assembly work, among other weaker standards. Federal law does not permit 14–15-year-olds to work in these settings.
• West Virginia allows employers to hire 16–17-year-olds enrolled in a “youth apprenticeship program” for all 17 hazardous occupations prohibited for minors under federal law. Federal law allows 16–17-year-olds to perform certain types of intermittent work in only seven of these occupations when enrolled in a bona fide registered apprenticeship program meeting certain stringent standards.

State policymakers should review their child labor statutes alongside federal child labor laws to identify areas of weakness. At a minimum, states should ensure that their guidelines for hours of work and hazardous occupations orders are at least as protective as the FLSA.

Step II: Close coverage gaps and address weaknesses in FLSA minimum protections

States can address many longstanding limitations and gaps in federal child labor protections. Examples of priority actions for state lawmakers to consider include:

1. Maintain effective youth work permit systems: Youth work permits have been shown to reduce child labor violations and aid in enforcement. The FLSA suggests—but does not require—that employers maintain certificates confirming the age of minors they employ. It also does not require minors to receive a permit as a condition of employment. Instead, youth work permit policies have historically been left to states. Most states already have some sort of permit system in place. Youth work permits are often simple, one-page forms that engage employers, parents, youth, and sometimes educators, in ensuring a child’s employment is legal, safe, and age-appropriate. Permits remind employers of existing child labor laws, inform parents of their child’s rights and affirm their consent, and aid state agencies in investigations of potential violations. States without work permit systems should implement them and states with existing work permit systems should assess and modernize their systems, as recently done in Illinois and New York and proposed in California.
2. Implement or expand work hour guidelines for 16- and 17-year-olds: The FLSA sets standards to protect children from excessive hours of work, especially during the school year. However, the FLSA was passed at a time when fewer than half of students completed high school, and its hours of work guidelines have never been updated to cover older minors (16- and 17-year-olds). In the absence of state standards, older teens can be scheduled to work unlimited hours per day or per week, including during school weeks. Some states have already adopted standards to address this gap, but fewer than half of states have hours guidelines in place for older teens. States should set maximum daily and weekly work hours for 16–17-year-olds and prohibit overnight work during the school week. Minimum standards should include limiting employers to scheduling 16–17-year-olds for no more than 32 hours in a school week, as nine states already do,{{1}} and prohibiting employers from scheduling 16–17-year-olds to work after 10 p.m. or before 6 a.m. (or similar), as 20 states and D.C. already do.{{2}}
3. Update prohibitions on hazardous child labor: The FLSA prohibits minors under 18 from working in a list of 17 nonagricultural occupations and 11 agricultural occupations that have been found to be particularly hazardous for minors. Many of these hazardous occupations orders have never been updated. And new orders have not been created to account for new forms of hazards in our modern economy, particularly in agriculture. Moreover, the FLSA opens the door to dangerous exemptions from some hazardous orders,{{3}} with language that allows student apprentices and learners enrolled in approved training programs to do certain types of hazardous work under close supervision. State lawmakers can update prohibitions on hazardous child labor by expanding existing hazardous orders, creating new orders to cover hazardous occupations not covered under federal law, and ending student learner and apprentice exemptions. Lawmakers can use the 2002 National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health recommendations to the U.S. Department of Labor as a guide for revising state hazardous orders. For example, Illinois recently updated and clarified state law to prohibit employment of minors in hazardous workplaces not covered under federal law, such as gun ranges and establishments primarily involved in the sale of tobacco or alcohol.
4. Extend equal protections to children working in agricultural occupations: Agriculture is the most dangerous sector of employment for minors, yet federal child labor standards remain much weaker in agriculture than in nonagricultural industries. State lawmakers can address this longstanding gap in federal law by aligning agricultural child labor standards for work hours and hazardous work with standards for nonfarm work. For example, in 2025, New Jersey lawmakers introduced a bill to raise the minimum age for agricultural employment to 14 and align work hours and hazardous work protections in agriculture with nonagricultural standards, among other updates to protections for farmworkers of all ages.
5. Increase civil penalties to deter violations and update them based on inflation: Under most existing state penalty structures, civil monetary penalties for child labor violations are very limited and, in some cases, nonexistent. Some states levy no civil penalties at all, and many states have not reviewed or updated penalty amounts in decades. In Indiana, for example, penalties range from a warning letter for an initial violation to a maximum of only $400 for a fourth violation within two years. Low or nonexistent penalties that can easily be absorbed as a “cost of doing business” do not deter employer violations and leave state enforcement agencies with few tools for ensuring compliance by bad actors. To ensure penalties serve as effective deterrents and enforcement tools, state lawmakers should set meaningful minimum penalties for first offenses and very high maximum penalties for serious or repeat offenses, as Illinois did in 2024. States can use federal civil penalties and annual adjustments as a benchmark; for example, current federal maximum civil penalties for a child labor violation range from $16,035 to $145,752, and rates are adjusted for inflation each year.
6. Strengthen state enforcement capacity and authority: Ensuring adequate state enforcement of child labor laws will become particularly important as federal enforcement capacity is diminished.
   • States should ensure funding for dedicated child labor enforcement staff so as not to take resources away from other wage and hour investigations. For example, a Virginia lawmaker recently requested an increased budget appropriation for child labor enforcement.
   • States should grant labor agencies sufficient authority to fulfill enforcement goals. For example, Nebraska recently enacted a bill that gives its labor agency power to subpoena records from employers suspected of violating the law.
7. Eliminate youth subminimum wages: The FLSA allows workers under age 20 to be paid as little as $4.25 per hour for their first 90 days of employment and allows employers to pay a lower minimum wage to full-time students in certain occupations, student learners, and apprentices. In recent years, some states have taken action to close these gaps so that all workers—regardless of their age—have a right to the minimum wage. All states should follow suit.

Step III: Modernize child labor standards to protect children’s health and wellbeing, safeguard their right to education, and improve their career prospects

The most effective child labor laws implement evidence-based guardrails to prevent excessive and hazardous work—as discussed above—alongside innovative policies to empower youth workers, deter violations, and provide meaningful redress and support to victims if violations occur. State lawmakers need not be bound by traditional areas of policy covered by the FLSA and can also:

1. Require workers’ rights education: If young workers do not know their rights, they will be less likely to report unsafe or illegal working conditions. States can invest in labor education to address this information gap. For example, California mandated that high schools annually teach students about workplace rights and the labor movement following a curriculum developed by the UC Berkeley Labor Center.
2. Mandate employer training on child labor laws and commitment to following the law: For example, Washington requires businesses who hire minors to obtain a special endorsement on their business license affirming compliance with child labor laws.
3. Encourage reporting by protecting whistleblowers and victims: Most labor investigations depend on worker reporting. Because young workers lack experience and knowledge about workplace rights and may fear employer retaliation, loss of wages, or immigration enforcement, many workplace abuses go unreported and uninvestigated. To address these enforcement challenges, state lawmakers should:
   1. Provide multiple avenues for child labor victims to be made whole after they report violations and risk losing their job. In most states, civil penalties for child labor violations are deposited into the state’s General Fund, and minors receive no compensation in the form of damages owed by the employer. Moreover, when a child is injured or killed on the job while employed illegally, they (or their family members in the event of the child’s death) are generally limited to the workers’ compensation system as their sole source of financial compensation. However, several states have enacted or proposed bills to make aggrieved minors eligible for additional compensation in the form of damages; for example, Colorado recently made it possible for minors who are injured while employed under illegal conditions to pursue private legal action and receive monetary damages.
   2. Enact whistleblower and anti-retaliation protections to protect workers who report labor abuses, as recently done in Minnesota.
   3. Remove provisions of state law that may discourage reporting of violations, such as those holding parents criminally responsible for allowing a child to be employed under illegal conditions, as Colorado recently did.
   4. Provide wraparound services to victims of illegal child labor to address root causes of excessive or hazardous work. For example, unaccompanied migrant youth should be provided with legal services, assistance in securing safe and age-appropriate work, and connections to community-based organizations or local government agencies that can provide additional supportive services.
4. Use innovative enforcement strategies to meaningfully hold employers accountable: Civil monetary penalties are a necessary but insufficient deterrent. State lawmakers should take a holistic approach to changing employer behavior and significantly increase the financial and reputational costs associated with breaking the law. They should:
   1. Use “hot goods” provisions and “stop work” orders to immediately disrupt the normal business of employers who are actively violating the law. “Hot goods” provisions allow courts to stop the flow of goods produced using illegal child labor and are currently in place federally. “Stop work” orders allow labor agencies to require the cessation of business until child labor violations are addressed, increasing the cost of violating the law. New Jersey permits such orders to be used when minimum wage violations are occurring.
   2. Bar violators from receiving public funding as proposed in Alabama, and implement other penalties, like revoking an employer’s permission to hire minors when they violate the law, as enacted in Washington.
   3. Create lead corporation accountability, so corporations are held jointly responsible for violations committed by their subcontractors or staffing agencies as proposed in a federal bill.
   4. Make employer violations data more accessible to the public—as recently mandated in Colorado—or publicly shame companies that violate the law by posting about violations on the state labor agency’s website—similar to New Jersey and New York.
   5. You can read more about these and other policies to address and deter violations here: Policies for states and localities to fight oppressive child labor.

Additional recommended resources 

• Child labor state legislation tracker (Economic Policy Institute) 

• Campaign to End US Child Labor 

• Child Labor Coalition at the National Consumers League 

• Federal child labor regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act  

• State child labor laws (U.S. Department of Labor; note that this page may not reflect all recent state legislative changes) 

• How states can stop the corporate campaign to roll back child labor protections (State Innovation Exchange and Economic Policy Institute) 

Editor’s note: This piece was revised on October 24, 2025, to add an “Additional recommended resources” section. 

{{1.}} Connecticut (32 hours), Florida (30), Kentucky (30), Maine (24), Michigan (24), New Hampshire (30), New York (28), Pennsylvania (28), Washington (20). See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor.

{{2.}} Alabama (10 p.m. to 5 a.m.), Arkansas (11 p.m. to 6 a.m.), California (10 p.m. to 5 a.m.), Connecticut (10 or 11 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Florida (11 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.), Indiana (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Kentucky (11 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Louisiana (11 p.m. or 12 a.m. to 5 a.m.), Maine (10:15 a.m. to 7 a.m.), Massachusetts (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Michigan (11:30 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Minnesota (11 p.m. to 5 a.m.), New Jersey (11 p.m. to 6 a.m.), New York (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), North Carolina (11 p.m. to 5 a.m.), Ohio (11 p.m. to 7 a.m.), Pennsylvania (12 a.m. to 6 a.m.), Rhode Island (11:30 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Tennessee (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), Washington (10 p.m. to 7 a.m.), and D.C. (10 p.m. to 6 a.m.). See https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/child-labor.

{{3.}} Hazardous occupation (HO) 5. Power-driven woodworking machines; HO 8. Power-driven metal-forming, punching and shearing machines; HO 10. Power-driven meat-processing machines, slaughtering and meat packing plants; HO 12. Balers, compactors, and power-driven paper-products machines; HO 14. Power-driven circular saws, band saws, guillotine shears, chain saws, reciprocating saws, wood chippers, and abrasive cutting discs; HO 16. Roofing operations and work performed on or about a roof; HO 17. Trenching and excavation operations.

All children deserve to attend welcoming and well-funded schools where they can learn and grow, regardless of race, disability, or income. But funding for public schools, where nearly 90% of all U.S. students learn, is at a near crisis point. The Trump administration’s goals, which are taken right out of Project 2025, seem to be to defund public education to the point that it doesn’t work, then offer private school vouchers as a solution to a manufactured problem. In this post, we highlight five ways public education is on fire in the United States and the damage this will do to students’ abilities to learn and thrive. Instead of cutting funds, lawmakers should invest in public schools, one of the best tools we still have to build a prosperous, equitable country.

Alarm level 1: COVID-19 relief funding for public schools is winding down. In some cases, the administration is ending it prematurely

This academic year (2024–2025) marks the end of the financial support schools were receiving to address the impacts of the COVID-19 crisis, the Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief III funds (ESSER III). The COVID-19 pandemic, and the changing learning environments that ensued, meant that schools needed funds to address the significant academic, social, emotional, physical, and mental health needs of their students. This funding was distributed in recent years with the last distribution, ESSER III, worth a total of $122 billion allocated to districts around the country. Many students, especially those living in poverty, have not recovered from pandemic-related learning loss. The end of this funding means that districts will now have fewer resources to help students get back on track. Rigorous research has demonstrated that this federal aid to public schools was highly successful, with measurable improvements to student outcomes in states and districts where more aid was spent. Taking the educational challenges imposed by the pandemic seriously would mean recognizing the high value this aid has provided.

However, in late March, the Trump administration canceled extensions that had been granted to states to spend remaining ESSER funds. Effectively, districts are losing out on the funding allocated to them in the form of COVID-19 relief funds. Canceled extensions represent almost $3 billion in lost funding that had already been committed to tutoring services, reading interventions, building improvements, and more. Clawing back these funds jeopardizes improved academic outcomes for many students and their ability to learn in healthy and safe environments. The administration’s refusal to reimburse school districts for funding that has already been spent could force them to cut teaching and other staff positions to make up the cost, ultimately harming students.

Alarm level 2: The administration is lawlessly dismantling the Department of Education and attacking inclusive schools

The winding down and clawing back of ESSER funding are simultaneously occurring at a time when President Trump signed executive orders to (1) dismantle the Department of Education and “return the funding to the states” and (2) regulate curriculum taught in the more than 13,000 public schools in the country.

One order directed Secretary of Education Linda McMahon to shut down several functions of the Department of Education (ED) and send them back to the states. Prior to this order, the White House had directed the ED to lay off 1,300 employees, a directive that is currently in litigation. The other order resulted in a “Dear Colleague letter” from Secretary McMahon demanding that states certify that they will not engage in “illegal DEI practices” as a condition of receiving the federal funds (This order is also currently in litigation.). As it stands, much of the Department of Education funding goes directly to state and local school systems. The ED provides targeted funding to public schools for special education through the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and supports high-poverty districts through Title I grants. These grants make up for shortfalls in funding that high-poverty districts experience when they get funding from local sources.

To be clear, closing the Department of Education, and reappropriating major funding programs requires an act of Congress, and it is local school districts who have control over what is taught in schools—not federal regulators. Thus, while these executive orders have the potential to inflict a lot of damage, it’s unclear whether these orders can proceed without running afoul of federal laws. If these orders result in delays in funding distributions or outright cuts, students could experience declines in academic achievement, exacerbating existing racial and income disparities and limiting students’ long-term opportunities. If President Trump acts outside of his authority to slash the agencies’ work, the guardrails will essentially be pulled off this funding, which is extremely effective at redistributing funds based on district need. President Trump says he’ll return money to states for them to distribute it, potentially creating a situation where states have to compete for funds. This would create a patchwork in public funding for public schools, one in which some districts risk falling even further behind.

Alarm level 3: Lawmakers are pushing a mounting wave of voucher programs, an increasingly large cost to state-funded education

While many school districts struggle to maintain basic education funding, school privatization efforts are continuing throughout the country, and states like Arizona, Florida, and Ohio are notorious for the budget-breaking cost of universal voucher programs.

Figure A shows the current cost of voucher programs as a share of K–12 education funding in states where over 5% of the budget is currently going to school voucher programs. In the current school year (fiscal year 2025), voucher costs make up anywhere from 5% for states with early voucher programs to upwards of 25% of the entire public education budget for states with mature programs.

Figure A

Because statewide private school voucher programs are funded with state dollars, voucher spending is shown as a proportion of state education funding rather than state and local funding. On average, about 46% of funding for K–12 schools comes from state revenue sources. In states with voucher programs, private schools divert state dollars that could otherwise be available to public schools. For now, local funding for public schools is protected from diversion to voucher programs, although some states with voucher programs are also threatening this source of public school funding by cutting or eliminating property taxes.

Vouchers degrade the quality of education for students who use them

Time and time again research has shown that vouchers harm academic outcomes. Causal studies across three states and Washington, D.C., demonstrate negative effects on test scores for students who use a voucher to switch from public to private school. These test score declines can persist over two years or more and are comparable or worse than declines due to COVID-19 and Hurricane Katrina. Meanwhile, students who leave private schools and return to public schools have experienced increased academic achievement. While some may argue that test scores from the National Assessment of Educational Progress indicate that private school students fare better academically than their public school peers, this is more a reflection of the parents’ socioeconomic status and education level than the impact of private schooling on students. Research also suggests vouchers do not reliably improve high school graduation and college attendance rates. Because of these reasons, lawmakers looking to improve student outcomes should not pursue vouchers.

School vouchers have costs for students who remain in public school

In addition to the direct costs that the state incurs for school vouchers, school districts experience an additional cost when they lose students to private school: the cost of providing the same level of education for fewer students in public education. This cost is entirely borne by the students who remain in public education, even though they affirmatively did not make the choice to take up vouchers. When students leave public schools with a voucher, the school districts must still pay the same amount for costs that can’t immediately adjust to declines in enrollment, such as cooling/heating and utilities. These required payments for a district’s fixed costs mean that districts will have even less to spend on the costs that can adjust due to changes in enrollment. What this means is that public school students who remain in public school will have less funding allocated to them for adjustable costs like teaching, curriculum development, and pupil support services due to other students taking up voucher programs. (To calculate this cost for your district, see EPI’s fiscal externality calculator).

Alarm level 4: National voucher proposals threaten public schools throughout the country

Beyond state voucher programs, Congress is considering national voucher proposals. This would enlarge the scope of vouchers beyond Republican-controlled states. The Educational Choice for Children Act, or ECCA, (H.R. 817, S.292) is a proposal to create a national voucher program. The program would divert over $10 billion per year in tax dollars to private schools and families who homeschool. The bill would do this by establishing a new dollar-for-dollar tax credit for individuals and corporations that make charitable contributions to organizations that give scholarships— or vouchers—for students to attend private schools. Donors who give corporate stocks would receive more back in tax cuts than the after-tax value of the stocks if they had sold them. 

Beyond vouchers harming student educational outcomes, the program itself would be extremely expensive. The bill proposes that Congress allocate $10 billion in tax credits for the voucher programs. But that doesn’t even account for the cost of voucher programs to public schools. The sponsors of the bill estimate that ECCA would provide vouchers for 2 million students. Given that at least two-thirds of students who take up vouchers previously attended private school, we can estimate that 666,667 voucher recipients will come from public school, which is about 1.4% of total public school students. Using our fiscal externality calculator, we estimate that students who remain in public schools would lose an average of $151 per pupil, and public school systems would lose a total of $6.225 billion dollars due to a national voucher scheme.

Alarm level 5: Tax cuts reduce available revenue for public schools

Many states are following a recent trend of reducing revenue available for schools through sweeping tax cuts. Corporate and personal income tax revenue represents about half of state tax revenue, which, in turn, funds about half of K–12 education budgets. From 2021 through 2024, 28 states passed personal or corporate income tax cuts, which will result in hundreds of billions of dollars in lost revenue by 2028, and more states are considering or have passed income tax cuts in 2025. At the same time, some states are cutting and attempting to eliminate property taxes, which account for over a third of revenue for K–12 education on average. States that want to invest in opportunity and long-term economic prosperity and to help their students continue recovering from pandemic-related learning loss should reverse this harmful trend.

Conclusion: What would happen if we boosted public school funding instead?

Given the real and damaging threats to public school funding, we conclude by asking what students actually need to succeed. Growing evidence over the last decade shows that public schooling in the United States simply needs more resources to deliver even better student achievement—not some radical disruption in how it is delivered and by what institutions.

For example, research has shown that school finance reforms between 1972 and 2010 led to a 10% increase in school spending for 12 years, which increased high school graduation rates, wages and family incomes in adulthood for children from districts with the spending increase. Others have similarly found that a $1,000 increase in per-pupil spending for low-income districts would reduce the test score gap between low- and high-income school districts within a state by nearly 40% of the baseline gap.

Increasing funding, rather than withholding federal aid or using public dollars to pay for private schooling, is the path forward for public schools. Public schools have fallen short in many communities because of lawmakers’ choices to underfund them. But the only education system that can fulfill the promise of equal opportunity for all children, regardless of race, disability, or income, is a fully funded system of public schools. Lawmakers interested in building prosperous communities should invest in public schools rather than defunding and privatizing them.

In reality, this economic development model is fundamentally flawed as a strategy for improving living conditions for most Southerners. In fact, the Southern economic development strategy was never designed to help the vast majority of working Southerners; rather, it reflects efforts to ensure continued access to the cheap labor of Black people following emancipation, and that of Black and brown people more generally today. 

In this report, we describe the Southern economic development model in detail and document the historical evolution of various components of the model. We show how politicians and the wealthy across the South have used racism and drawn on notions of white supremacy to divide the population along racial, ethnic, nativist, and economic lines. This has prevented Southerners from coming together in solidarity to demand policies that would uplift everyone in the region.

Many Southern politicians try to obscure and distort the historical record on race and the origins and purposes of many of their policies. They point to population growth over the last 50 years and the increasing number of businesses—primarily in manufacturing—that have located in some Southern states to try to sell their deceptive narrative. In this report, and in the companion reports and fact sheets in this series, we will scrutinize such claims and draw on empirical data to illustrate how the Southern economic development model has failed most workers and families across the U.S. South.

This project exposes the exploitative policies and practices that impoverish Southerners across demographic groups and highlights their complex connections to the prevailing power structure in the South. This report begins with a detailed description of the Southern economic development model. What follows is a brief history of the origins of the model, which developed as a way for wealthy and powerful people to ensure continued access to the labor of Black people following the Civil War and to that of Black and brown Southerners today, for little or no compensation. Finally, the report emphasizes that civil rights for Black and brown Americans are intimately intertwined with the rights of workers, independent of race. This reality is recognized by many conservative economic and political leaders and has led to their vociferous opposition to unions, an institution that can create cross-racial solidarity, empower workers, and undermine the racial hierarchy across the region.

Figure A

What is the Southern economic development model?

The Southern economic development model is designed to enable businesses to extract labor from large pools of workers as cheaply as possible. Businesses in the South have particularly sought the labor of Black and brown Southerners. For over 300 years, these laborers have been used to cultivate cotton and tobacco, produce the food we eat, care for our children and the elderly, build the nation’s infrastructure, and perform many other critical jobs—often for little or no compensation. The labor provided by enslaved men and women was overwhelmingly unpaid.{{1}} After emancipation, many Black men and women—who faced limited employment opportunities—were often forced into sharecropping. They worked the land and grew crops on plantations owned by former enslavers who typically took half or more of the value of their crops (Bode 2020; USDA 2003). It was also common for Black men and women to work as porters and maids on Pullman railcars, where they were forced to rely on tips for most, if not all, of their income (Hasso 2021; Trotter Jr. 2019; Tye 2005). Today, incarcerated workers can be required to work without pay and they often are (ACLU and GHRC 2022; Mast forthcoming a).

The racist roots of this model have been obscured in favor of a more acceptable “pro-business” narrative. The pro-business narrative suggests that low wages, low taxes, anti-union policies, a weak safety net, and limited regulation on businesses creates a “rising tide that lifts all boats.”

Below we examine the key features of the Southern economic development model in detail. We then trace the development of this model over time, highlighting the ways civil rights for Black and brown Southerners are necessary for ensuring that all workers are empowered.

Low wages

Many states across the South promote low wages for many workers by the policies they implement or, in many cases, the policies they choose not to implement. For example, five Southern states—Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, and South Carolina—have no state minimum wage at all. Georgia has a minimum wage set at $5.15 per hour. Because the federal minimum wage is set at $7.25 per hour and $2.13 per hour for tipped workers, all workers across the South are supposed to be paid at least these minimums (EPI 2023).

Fewer than half of the Southern states (six states plus D.C.) have a minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. In every other region, most states have minimum wages higher than $7.25 (EPI 2023). In fact, of the 20 states where the federal minimum wage applies, 10 are in the South.

Many Southern states have weak, if any, labor law enforcement. This means that workers in the South, who are already receiving low minimum wages, are particularly vulnerable to wage theft. This is especially true in industries such as food and drink services, agriculture, and retail (Cooper and Kroeger 2017).

Cooper and Kroeger (2017) analyze data on the share of workers who have experienced minimum wage violations—i.e., were paid less than the applicable minimum wage—in the 10 most populous U.S. states. They find that large shares of low-wage workers in Florida (24.9%), North Carolina (12.3%), Texas (10.8%), and Georgia (9.4%) have experienced minimum wage violations.

Failing to pay the minimum wage is just one of the ways employers cheat workers out of their earnings.{{2}} Employers who commit wage theft are rarely punished (Cooper and Kroeger 2017). In Florida, for example, there is no state Department of Labor to enforce wage standards; all of the state’s wage and hour enforcement is deferred to federal authorities. While Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are states which technically do have Departments of Labor (DOLs), their DOLs do not make any concrete effort to recover wages that are stolen by employers (Mangundayao et al. 2021).

Wage theft victims can technically pursue action against an unscrupulous employer by submitting claims with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division. However, in the absence of in-state enforcement, businesses face little risk of being held accountable if they cheat their employees.

Notably, some Southern states have actively fought against federal government efforts to raise wages in their states. In 2022, the attorneys general of Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi sued the federal government to prevent an increase in the wages of federal contractors (Texas v. Biden 2022).

It is important to understand that federal standards governing minimum wages, overtime, and even what activities are to be included in the number of hours worked were designed to keep wages low in the South. When the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was enacted in 1938 establishing these rules, large categories of workers—primarily agricultural workers, domestic workers, tipped workers, and public-sector workers—were excluded from its protections.

Agricultural workers, domestic workers, and tipped workers were excluded specifically because the formerly enslaved were limited almost entirely to these lines of work across the South; Southern lawmakers would not agree to vote for the legislation without these exclusions (Dixon 2021; Perea 2011). The practice of using tips to compensate service workers in the United States in fact proliferated in the 19th century after the end of slavery; it allowed businesses to hire the formerly enslaved without having to pay them, instead forcing them to rely on tips (Dixon 2021; Tye 2005).

When the FLSA was amended in 1966 to include service workers—among other coverage expansions—a special “tip credit” was created that allowed employers to count tips received by staff against a portion of the minimum wage the employer was required to pay, effectively creating a separate, lower minimum wage (Allegretto and Cooper 2014). Today, Southern tipped workers continue to rely heavily on their tips. The federal minimum wage for tipped workers, which applies in most Southern states, is only $2.13 per hour—a level that has remained unchanged since 1991 (Schweitzer 2021).

We continue to see the influence of racism and sexism in the low wages and lack of protections offered to workers in jobs that were historically held by enslaved people. Domestic work, for example, has historically been—and continues to be—performed by Black, brown, and immigrant women. These women work as nursing, psychiatric, and home health aides; personal and home care aides; and nursing assistants in private households. Across the South, Black women make up 43% of home health care workers, followed by Hispanic women at 17% (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022). Workers in these jobs remain undercompensated despite the clear value of this work—providing care that allows families to work and that allows elderly and disabled Southerners to age in their homes (Childers, Sawo, and Worker 2022; Robertson, Sawo, and Cooper 2022).

Minimal levels of regulation

Another key component of the Southern economic development model is regulating businesses as little as possible. As noted in the previous section, this means lack of regulation or enforcement around labor laws such as federal minimum wage laws, overtime laws, and safety standards for workers (Cooper and Kroeger 2017; Fleischman and Franklin 2017; FPI 2022; Terrell and St. Julien 2023; Waldman 2017). It also includes minimal regulation of business activities that pollute the air, water, and soil, which disproportionately impact Black and brown communities.

In Louisiana, there is a roughly 130-mile-long area between Baton Rouge and New Orleans running along the Mississippi River that is known as “Cancer Alley.” Cancer Alley has a heavy concentration of 200 or more oil refineries and petrochemical plants spewing toxic chemicals into the air, elevating cancer and other health risks among the area’s predominantly Black residents (Laughland 2023; Terrell and St. Julien 2022). Terrell and St. Julien (2023) found that lax permitting processes in the state have resulted in Black and brown communities across Louisiana having a seven to 21 times greater exposure to air pollutants—especially those from chemical manufacturers—compared with white communities.{{3}}

Younes et al. (2021) mapped the spread of cancer-causing chemicals in air pollution across the country that moves into residential neighborhoods and exposes residents. They identified places across the country where residents were exposed to hazardous chemicals, with or without their knowledge. Younes et al.’s study found that almost all states with the highest levels of exposure are Southern states, with Texas and Louisiana being the states whose residents have the greatest excess exposure. In Texas, for example, one of the largest refineries globally has put millions of pounds of toxic chemicals in the air over the years. The result is an excess risk of cancer in these areas of three to six times what is considered acceptable by the EPA (Younes et al. 2021).

These communities are exposed to these dangerous chemicals because of the lax regulations of policymakers in Southern states. For example, in Louisiana, land use plans which label many majority-Black districts as “industrial” or “future industrial” have been approved despite these being residential communities (Laughland 2023). And according to a lawsuit by residents of these communities, every request by these large industrial corporations to locate in predominantly Black communities is approved by local governments (Laughland 2023).

Instead of expanding their staffing for pollution control, states with the worst environmental exposures have actually cut funding to state environmental agencies. In Texas and Louisiana, the states whose residents face the highest rate of exposure to toxic chemicals, funding for state environmental agencies was cut by 35.2% and 34.8% respectively between 2008 and 2018. Funding was down by 33.7% in North Carolina, 32.8% in Delaware, 20.8% in Georgia, 20.3% in Tennessee, and 10% in Alabama. But not all Southern states cut their operational funding for state environmental agencies: Maryland, South Carolina, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Florida, and West Virginia increased their funding (EIP 2019).

Low income and corporate taxes

Next, the Southern economic development model seeks to severely limit corporate and personal income taxes, particularly any that would increase the tax burden on higher-income households and individuals.

The roots of the South’s tax structure

To understand public attitudes toward taxes across the South, it is important to consider the roots of the current stance on taxes in the Southern economic development model. Before the Civil War, taxes on enslaved people were paid primarily by wealthy plantation owners and constituted a significant source of revenue for states across the South (Hill et al. 2019; Lyman 2017).

After slavery was abolished, plantation owners represented themselves as “concerned taxpayers” who opposed compensating for lost state revenue from taxes on enslaved people with rising property taxes. They were joined by poor white farmers who would now also be subject to rising property taxes raised by newly—and temporarily—empowered Black political leaders.

These leaders were raising taxes to provide basic services such as public education and to rebuild infrastructure after the devastation of the Civil War. But wealthy Southerners stoked racial animus to divide poor and working-class Southerners along the lines of race and ensure majority support to implement highly regressive tax policies (Williamson 2021; Young 2023).

Low corporate and income taxes force reliance on regressive sales taxes

Today, Southern politicians, business interests, and other wealthy Southerners continue to seek to eliminate or severely limit corporate and personal income taxes. For example, several Southern states used temporary budget surpluses—surpluses resulting from the distribution of federal dollars to states intended to address COVID-19 and the associated recession—as an excuse to further cut already low income-tax rates (Das 2022b).

Corporate and personal income taxes tend to be progressive, meaning they are structured such that higher-income earners pay a larger share of their income in taxes, while lower-income earners pay a smaller share. But when collection of corporate and personal income taxes declines, states are forced to rely more heavily on sales and property taxes, which are regressive. When sales and property taxes are assessed, lower-income people end up paying a larger share of their income for those taxes than higher-income people do (Wiehe et al. 2018; Young 2023).

Texas, Florida, and Tennessee have no income tax. In other Southern states with income taxes, tax rates are so low that they fail to raise adequate revenue, requiring the state to rely on sales and property taxes and fees and fines to pay for many public services including education, public health, public safety, infrastructure, and other services.

In 2019, sales tax accounted for more than 40% of all state and local tax revenue in many Southern states. These included Tennessee (56.6%), Louisiana (53.3%), Florida (50.9%), Arkansas (49.6%), Alabama (48.0%), and Mississippi (45.5%). These shares are substantially higher than the 34.4% of state and local tax revenue that sales taxes account for nationally (Das 2022a).

To generate this revenue, these states had sales taxes ranging from 4.0% in Alabama to 7.0% in Mississippi and Tennessee. And while most states at least exempt food from sales taxes, as of January 2023, Mississippi, Alabama, and Oklahoma did not (Tax Policy Center 2023).{{4}}

This approach to taxes means that public services are underfunded in the South

Proponents of this tax model argue that it increases the incomes of all households by allowing them to keep more of their money. Further, they argue that it allows businesses to reinvest and grow their businesses, thereby increasing tax revenue. But this regressive approach to taxes simply means there is not sufficient revenue to properly fund education, health care, public transportation, water and sewer system maintenance, and the many other public services Southerners rely on (Das 2022b).

The lack of resources to provide services for ordinary Southerners is further exacerbated when state governments give huge subsidies to private companies. For example, Mississippi gave a $247 million subsidy to Steel Dynamics in 2022, and South Carolina spent $1.3 billion on a subsidy for Scout Motors in 2023 (Good Jobs First 2023a, 2023b). To illustrate how these subsidies harm South Carolinians specifically, we can consider the impact of abatements on public education. In fiscal year 2021, South Carolina public schools reported that they lost $534 million in property tax revenues to abatements, money that would have gone to funding school staff and providing services to students (Wen 2022). The districts that lost the most funding had a majority of students coming from low-income households that qualified for free or reduced-price lunches (Wen 2022). This harms students, families, and communities—with the harshest impacts on those facing the greatest hardships.

A weak safety net

The Southern economic development model is further characterized by a weak social safety net. Most Southern states offer relatively few and weak protections against hardship for individuals and families who suffer some kind of economic shock, such as the loss of a job, an illness, or the need to care for someone. This weak social safety net cements low-income Southerners’ precarity, further disempowering the labor force by making any economic shock all the more harmful. In this context, a Southern worker with little private savings is more likely to take or endure exploitive or underpaid work.

Southerners face greater insecurity when they lose their jobs

Unemployment insurance (UI) , is a crucial component of the social safety net, meant to ensure families have economic security in the face of a job loss by replacing some percentage of their prior earnings (Bivens and Banerjee 2021). During times of crisis, such as the COVID-19 recession, UI also helps stabilize the broader economy by enabling households to continue spending, which helps maintain overall consumer demand (Bivens et al. 2021). While the UI system is funded jointly by federal and state funds, it is the state that has primary control over who is eligible to receive benefits, the levels and duration of benefits, and how the system is financed (Bivens et al. 2021).

UI is also a system that, if properly designed, helps support workers’ bargaining power. By giving workers support when they lose a job, UI allows those workers to take the time necessary to find a job that matches their skills and that pays as well as the one they lost. Conversely, weak UI benefits force many workers to take the first available job—even if it suits their skills poorly or pays less than the job they lost.

While many states’ UI systems need reform, the level and ease of accessing benefits in many Southern states is particularly problematic. Data show that of the 10 states with the lowest maximum weekly UI benefit amounts, seven—Mississippi ($235), Alabama ($275), Florida ($275), Louisiana ($275), Tennessee ($275), South Carolina ($326), and North Carolina ($350)—are in the South (The Century Foundation 2023). Many Southern states also have particularly onerous requirements for accessing benefits, which are made available for incredibly short durations. For example, most states make standard UI benefits available for a maximum of 26 weeks. Only 13 states set their maximum number of weeks below 26, more than half of which are Southern states: Alabama (14 weeks), Arkansas (16), Florida (12), Georgia (14), Kentucky (12), North Carolina (12), South Carolina (20), and Oklahoma (16) (CBPP 2023b).

The fact that the states where most Black Americans live have the least accessible UI systems with the least generous benefits, shortest durations for receiving benefits, and some of the most onerous requirements is not a coincidence or an accident. The UI system as structured is rooted in a racist agenda: Southern Democrats agreed to support the New Deal only if states controlled access to UI and other social benefits. This allowed them to design systems that would limit Black workers’ access to benefits (Edwards 2020; Traub and Diehl 2022).

Southerners face barriers to health care access

Full participation in the economy—not to mention in one’s family and community—are much easier when one is healthy both physically and mentally. Unfortunately, far too many people in the United States lack access to quality, affordable health care. This problem is particularly salient across Southern states; Southerners are less likely to have access to health insurance than those living in other regions. In 2020, 7.7% of all children living in Southern states lacked health insurance coverage compared with 3.3% in the Northeast, 4.4% in the Midwest, and 4.9% in the West. For working age adults, the share was 16.4% in the South, 6.6% in the Northeast, 8.6% in the Midwest, and 11.3% in the West (Keisler-Starkey and Bunch 2021).

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) included an expansion of Medicaid eligibility to adults with incomes up to 138% of the official poverty line. While most states have adopted and implemented the expansion, 10 states have failed to adopt it, seven of which are in the South: Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, Florida, Tennessee, and Texas (KFF 2023).{{5}} This is one reason Southerners are less likely to have health insurance coverage, which is particularly concerning given high rates of illness and comorbidities across the South (Akinyemiju et al. 2016).

The failure to expand Medicaid creates additional challenges even for those who have insurance coverage but live in rural areas, denying increased revenue to many rural hospitals that were already facing closure (Levinson, Godwin, and Hulver 2023).

Southern states have some of the lowest levels of cash assistance for families with children

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), a cash assistance program for poor families with children, was established in 1935 as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).{{6}} In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) replaced AFDC with the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). TANF differs from AFDC in several important ways. Under AFDC, states could receive unlimited federal matching funds. Under TANF, federal support is distributed to states through a block grant. TANF also has five-year lifetime limits on the receipt of benefits and requires that states increase their work participation rates for TANF recipients (DHHS n.d.).

TANF is funded by the federal government, but states determine benefit levels, set income and resource limits, and administer or oversee administration of the program. They have a great deal of discretion in how they use TANF funds because the specific goals of the program are so broad. The stated goals of the program are to (1) assist families in need so children can be cared for in their own homes; (2) reduce parental dependence on government by promoting job training, work, and marriage; (3) prevent out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) encourage two-parent families (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.).

Under the first goal, states can provide direct cash assistance to families to provide for their children (CBPP 2022; DHHS n.d.). In 1997, 71% of TANF dollars were spent in direct cash assistance, but by 2020, this share had fallen to just 22% nationally (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022). There are, however, large variations in TANF spending by state. In 2021, 15 states spent 10% or less of TANF dollars to provide cash assistance to families. Almost half of these—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas—are in the South.{{7}} Alabama spent just 7% of their TANF dollars on general spending, most in cash dollars. They spent 1% of their TANF dollars on work supports, 11% on childcare, but 29% on “other” services (CBPP 2023a).{{8}} Mississippi spent 6% in general spending, with only 3% going to childcare, while 17% of spending fell under the “other” category (CBPP 2023c). Across the South, only the District of Columbia and Kentucky spent 30% or more of their TANF funds on direct assistance, and in Kentucky, more than half of those funds went to foster care for children fostered by relatives and adoption and guardianship subsidies (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

Despite spending millions of dollars on TANF-related activities, states had millions of unspent TANF dollars as of 2021.{{9}} For example, Alabama had $113 million in unspent TANF dollars in 2021—amounting to 122% of their $93 million block grant for the year (CBPP 2023a). At $98 million, Mississippi’s unspent TANF funds amounted to 113% of their $86 million grant for that year (CBPP 2023c). Texas and Oklahoma each had more than $300 million in unspent TANF funds (CBPP 2023d; CBPP 2023f). Tennessee was even worse, with $798 million in unspent funds (CBPP 2023e).

Compounding the impact of unspent TANF dollars are low benefit levels in many states, especially in the South. The maximum monthly benefit for a single mother with two children ranges from $204 in Arkansas to a high of $1,151 in New Hampshire. There are only four Southern jurisdictions with a benefit amount of $500 or more for a one adult three-person family: the District of Columbia ($665), Maryland ($727), Virginia ($587), and West Virginia ($542) (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).

The maximum nominal TANF benefit in 2022 is the same or lower than it was in 1996 in 16 states, seven of which—Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, North Carolina, and Oklahoma—are in the South. The result is that the inflation-adjusted value of TANF benefits in these states is 45% to 56% lower than it was in 1996 (Thompson, Azevedo-McCaffrey, and Carr 2023).{{10}}

The current structure of TANF in many Southern states reflect efforts of politicians to control the behavior and reproduction of Black women and compel their participation in the low-wage labor market (Floyd et al. 2021; King v. Smith 1968; CBPP 2022). Historically, states have used concepts of “deservingness,” “suitable homes,” and the “man in the house” to exclude Black families from the program.

To be deserving, a mother needed to be widowed, have her husband be unable to provide due to disability, or have been abandoned by the children’s father “through no fault of the mother.” A home was “unsuitable,” by definition, if the mother was unwed or engaged in sexual activity outside of marriage (Floyd et al. 2021; Floyd and Pavetti 2022). The “man in the house” rule denied mothers benefits if a man was found in the house or if the mother was found to be sexually active even if no man lived in the house with her and her children. These rules applied regardless of whether the man the mother was involved with was the children’s father (Floyd et al. 2021; King v. Smith 1968; O’Connor 1969). Today, states with larger Black populations—primarily Southern states where most of the Black population lives—tend to have more stringent requirements for accessing TANF benefits, and those benefits tend to be more meager (Shrivastava and Thompson 2022).

Anti-union policies

Crucially, advocates of the Southern economic development model vociferously oppose unions and other collective actions in which workers band together—especially across racial, ethnic, and immigration statuses. Research has shown that higher rates of unionization are associated with higher wages, better working conditions, less inequality, less racial animosity, greater economic mobility, and greater civic participation (Banerjee et al. 2021; Freeman et al. 2015; Frymer and Grumbach 2020; Mishel 2021; Mishel, Rhinehart, and Windham 2020). Given these effects, it is unsurprising that states across the South have adopted policies that hamstring workers’ ability to form unions, which pose a threat to the Southern economic development model.

First, unions threaten the Southern economic model because they have historically been the primary counterweight against businesses seeking to keep workers’ wages and benefits low. In this way, unions threaten the central economic goal of the Southern model, which is to keep labor costs as low as possible. Second, the labor movement in the U.S. today is one of the foremost institutions promoting cross-racial solidarity. Strong unions could potentially undermine the racial and class divisions that the wealthy and their political supporters have used to promote and preserve the Southern model. Third, they are a key driver of greater equity in the workplace; racial and gender wage and wealth gaps are smaller among unionized workers, and union contracts ensure that all workers receive negotiated benefits. Further, unions protect Black and brown workers from discriminatory, retaliatory, or other arbitrary firing with the “just cause” and “due process” protections they provide (Bivens et al. 2023; EPI 2021; Gould and McNicholas 2017). Finally, unions threaten the Southern economic development model because they educate and encourage civic engagement among union members. Unions shape how voters understand their interests by discussing issues and candidates. They also activate their members to actively engage in campaigns and to turn out voters (EPI 2021; Feigenbaum, Hertel-Fernandez, and Williamson 2018).

Race and the Southern economy

Historically, the economy of the American South was largely agrarian and heavily dependent on cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, and other labor-intensive agricultural products (Baptist 2014, Conlin 2018). The intense need for large pools of labor and the desire to retain the wealth generated from that labor lies at the heart of the economic policies implemented across the South since even before the colonies became the United Sates. This includes policies of enslaving African people, supporting child labor, opposing unions, and allowing corporations to pollute the environment and poison the air and water—all in the name of keeping costs low and profits high.

Even as workers have fought to improve working conditions, many Southern lawmakers have used their power to ensure employers in their states retain access to large numbers of workers at poverty-level wages. While the economy was predominantly agrarian in the past, today there are significantly more auto manufacturing, professional, technological, and business services jobs across the South. There remain many jobs in oil and gas production, animal slaughter and processing, and service jobs as well. Yet even as the industrial composition of the South has modernized, much of the region’s business practices, labor standards, and underlying political economy has not. Below is a brief historical overview of the battle to maintain a low-wage labor force, particularly one comprised of Black and brown workers.

Extracting cheap labor from indentured and enslaved people

Since before the founding of the United States, the states that would become the American South have relied on cheap labor to drive economic growth and generate the illusion of widespread prosperity. The colonies imported white indentured servants and African people to meet their labor needs. The African people would eventually shift from being indentured to becoming enslaved people (Bennett 1962; Hannah-Jones 2021). Their enslavement ensured a consistent source for Southern businesses and landowners labor needs, while minimizing the costs of that labor. Plantation owners in the South used as much cruelty as was necessary to drive ever-increasing productivity from those enslaved Africans who worked in the fields producing ever-higher yields (Baptist 2014). This not only benefited wealthy Southern planters, but also Northern industrialists, financiers, and universities. The cotton that was produced in the South was processed in Northern factories and financed by Northern banks, creating wealth for everyone except those whose labor produced the wealth (see Baptist 2014).

Little changed following emancipation

Following the Civil War, the South remained tied to an agricultural economy. Instead of relying on enslaved people to provide much of the backbreaking labor required, they shifted to a sharecropping and tenant-farmer model which still relied on “freed” Black men and women’s labor. Plantation owners would “lend” newly freed men and women resources for sharecropping, but they ensured the vast majority would never be paid enough to pay off their debts. This was a system known as debt peonage which effectively meant that most freed Black men and women were often forced to work on the same plantations and for the same wealthy white landowners who had enslaved them. This effectively tied sharecroppers to their employers and, for many Black sharecroppers, their conditions under this system were difficult to distinguish from bondage.

States across the South also employed many other ways of ensuring they could retain access to Black labor for little or no compensation. They passed sets of laws known as Black Codes. These codes were designed to closely control the actions of Black men and women and maintain the racial hierarchy. These laws made it illegal for Black people to drink from white water fountains, attend white schools, or have a supervisory position over white workers (Dewey 1952; Hill 1965). In fact, Black men and women were often limited to the same menial jobs they held before the Civil War and were often pushed out of skilled work they had previously performed (Hill 1965). And to ensure that Black people would have no other choice but to take these jobs, it was common to require proof of employment from Black men and women. If they could not prove they were employed, they could be arrested and “rented” out to work on plantations, to build railroads, or just to provide general unskilled labor. Black women were often forced back into the same domestic work roles in white homes or in agricultural work alongside Black men. These laws were justified using the constitutional loophole in the 13th Amendment that allows “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” as a punishment for crime (Alexander 2020; Mercer 2022).

Extracting cheap labor from Black and brown Southerners today

This loophole enables Southern states to incarcerate a disproportionate number of Americans. For every 100,000 people nationally in 2021, the U.S. had 664 people incarcerated in prisons, jails, and other forms of confinement. This rate far exceeds the incarceration rates of our peer nations, such as the United Kingdom (129 for every 100,000 people), Canada (104), France (93), and many other democratic nations (Widra and Herring 2021).

While the national U.S. incarceration rate dwarfs those of our peers, the prison and jail incarceration rates of 13 of the 16 Southern states and the District of Columbia exceed the national average, with Louisiana (1094), Mississippi (1031), Oklahoma (993), and Georgia (968) having the highest rates of incarceration (Mast forthcoming a; Widra and Herring 2021). Further, Black Americans are disproportionately represented among the prison populations. While Black people are just over 32% of the population in Louisiana, they are 66% of those incarcerated in prisons and 57% of those in jails (PPI 2021a). In Mississippi, they are 37% of the population but 61% of the prison and 49% of the jail population (PPI 2021b). In Oklahoma they are 7% of the population but are 27% of the prison population and 23% of those incarcerated in jails (PPI 2021c).

Of the 1.2 million state and federal prisoners in the U.S., nearly 800,000 are forced to work in the prisons themselves, in prison industries, for other state or local government agencies, or for private-sector businesses (ACLU and GHRC 2022; Mast forthcoming a, PPI 2017).{{11}} These prisoners, disproportionately Black men, are often paid very low wages, if they are paid at all—the vast majority of work done by prisoners in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas is unpaid (ACLU and GHRC 2022). In many instances, mass incarceration effectively reinstates the slave system (Alexander 2020).

Hispanic men and women, especially immigrant workers, also continue to face exploitation by wealthy business owners and corporations across the South. According to Gershon (2020), by the early 1960s, 95% of meatpacking workers outside the South were unionized with wages comparable to those of steel production workers. Meatpacking companies responded by moving operations to more rural areas, and, by the 1990s, they began seeking immigrant workers to keep wages low. Black workers make up the majority of meat processing workers in states across the South (56.4% in Maryland, 67.1% in South Carolina, and 73.1% in Mississippi) but the representation of immigrant and Hispanic workers in these grueling, low-wage jobs is high. Hispanic workers make up 25.8% of the South’s meat processing workers and 26.2% are foreign-born workers (Gershon 2020; Hickey forthcoming).{{12}}

The Southern economic development strategy helps maintain the racial hierarchy

Race and ethnicity have long been used by politicians and varied economic interests to divide Southerners along racial lines and increase animosity and distrust between groups (Haney López 2014; McGhee 2021). Southern politicians fearmonger about immigrants or Black and brown people receiving “unearned” benefits as the population of young Black and brown Southerners continues to increase. This is often achieved by drawing on stereotypes or racist tropes. One example is when politicians make receiving benefits (e.g., food stamps or Medicaid) conditional upon fulfilling work requirements or passing drug tests.{{13}} Such practices create deep divisions, which are likely among the key reasons why the South has not become more progressive—given that Black and brown communities generally favor more progressive policies and politicians—despite the increasing diversity of the population.

In the current political climate, it has become common, particularly among conservative politicians and commentators, to hear arguments that “American” voters are being disenfranchised by voters who vote “illegally” or who “cheat.” Typically, “American” appears to apply to white voters while “cheaters” and “illegal” voters seem to refer to Black and brown Americans who are simply casting their ballots legally. For example, the places where challenges and lawsuits were filed in the 2020 presidential election were primarily places with large Black and brown populations (Phillips 2020).

We also see that in many states across the country, with the South being well represented, there is a push to privatize public education and to push public dollars into privately run charter schools (Pierce 2021). Pierce (2021) writes that this move toward privatization was largely in response to the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education which ordered states to desegregate. In other words, the push towards privatizing education in the United States aimed to preserve the racial hierarchy. Similarly, it is not uncommon to hear arguments about immigrants coming to the United States and living on public benefits (Thomas 2020). The goal of these arguments is to make the broader white population feel that their tax dollars are going to people who are deemed “undeserving” and increase the white public’s support for policies that would exclude Black and brown Southerners.

Using dog whistles to divide

Politicians and other influential and powerful interests activate racism in ways that they and their supporters can deny by using dog whistles. A dog whistle in political speech refers to discourse that uses a code that specific segments of the population understand as racial but that gives people cover to deny that they are being racist to those who abhor racism. Haney López (2014) refers to the practice of dog whistles as “a steady drumbeat of subliminal racial grievances and appeals to color-coded solidarity” (3).

The development of the concept of the “taxpayer” provides one clear example of this practice. The common appeal to the “taxpayer” developed out of racism and white supremacy. During the Reconstruction period directly following the abolition of slavery, large Black populations in states like South Carolina were large enough, especially with the support of some poor whites, to elect Black leaders. Many poor white men voted in support of policies that required raising taxes on white landowners to fund things like schools, roads, and a basic safety net. Williamson (2021) reports that the wealthy white landowners developed the identity of the “taxpayer” as a means of dividing poor white landowners and Black freedmen. Since most Black freedmen lacked any substantial landholdings, wealthy landowners could engender hostility among poor white landowners toward Blacks, even if their material conditions were not dramatically different. This approach allowed powerful interests to oppose paying taxes for general welfare and encouraged poor white Southerners—especially poorer landowners who would also be taxed—to identify with the wealthy white landowners rather than with Black elected officials (Williamson 2021).

When the concept of “taxpayer” is invoked, it is used as a dog whistle to imply that “undeserving” people—particularly “undeserving” Black, Hispanic, and immigrant people—will take advantage of public resources paid for by hardworking white people who pay their own way and do not ask for “handouts.” This also instills the idea that asking for assistance is shameful, which further reinforces the status quo.

Meanwhile, poor, working- and middle-class workers of all racial backgrounds—especially Black and brown men and women who are disproportionately low-income—pay much larger shares of their incomes for sales, income, social security, and other taxes (see Mast forthcoming b).

The conservative strategy

While these dog whistles have been part of the conservative strategy at least since Reconstruction, they have been essential in convincing the majority to support racist, exploitative, and regressive politicians and policies. For example, John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs under then President Richard Nixon, admitted that the Nixon administration intentionally linked anti-war hippies and Black people with drug use and then proceeded to heavily criminalize drugs in order to “arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news” (Baum 2016). Campaigns based on “law and order” or appeals to increase criminal punishments for violence and/or drug use were thinly veiled racial appeals. This was especially the case following the tumultuous era of the Civil Rights Movement when Black Americans were demanding equality. Many white Americans opposed that equality, and Black rebellions—often called “riots”—broke out across the nation. These so-called riots were in response to police violence, high poverty rates, poor housing, and the many other inequities that Black communities were, and are, facing (Alexander 2020; Haney López 2014; Purnell and Hinton 2021).

When Ronald Reagan kicked off his presidential campaign, he began in the South, specifically in Philadelphia, Mississippi, which is known for the murders of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner for trying to register Black people to vote. Reagan used this first campaign stop to state his support for states’ rights, a signal to segregationists to support him (Sharon 2021). As his campaign moved forward, he became ever-more explicit in his racist appeals. He painted a picture of a “Chicago welfare queen,” who drove a Cadillac while using 80 different names to receive Medicaid, food stamps, and welfare totaling over $150,000 annually and of “a strapping young buck” buying T-bone steaks (presumably with food stamps) while the implied hardworking white person whose taxes provided the food stamps could only afford to buy hamburger for their family (Haney López 2014).

The key to the effectiveness of dog whistles is to deny that they have anything to do with race. It is common to hear political and economic leaders claim that it is in fact the people calling out the racism that are racist. Fortunately, we have the words of one of these conservative political leaders who was willing to admit this was indeed what they were doing. According to Lee Atwater, they had to adjust the way they used race in their electoral strategy:

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So, you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… (Perlstein 2012)

This shift can also be seen in the work of MacLean (2021). She describes how white supremacists—who wanted to maintain Jim Crow segregation in education and who had been explicitly using race to resist the Brown v. Board of Education decision—learned from Milton Friedman that they could make more progress by using more “neutral” language. They thus began saying “personal liberty,” “government failure,” and the “need for market competition” to move toward school vouchers and private schools to preserve Jim Crow segregation.

In many of the Southern states with the largest Black populations—such as Mississippi, Louisiana, and Georgia—state legislatures have been more likely to implement regressive policies that produce higher negative outcomes such as poverty, food insecurity, incarceration, reliance on fees and fines to fund government, high infant and maternal mortality, and a host of other negative outcomes. Although all low- and middle-income Southerners are negatively impacted by these policies, Black Southerners experience the worst outcomes.

Despite large and growing Black and brown populations in many Southern states, communities and workers of color still struggle to enact policy changes that would improve their economic conditions. One reason for this is state lawmakers—who are overwhelmingly white—enacting “preemption” laws to prevent elected officials in cities and counties from enacting their own local policies. Southern legislatures have preempted local governments from passing laws on everything from environmental protections and progressive taxes to minimum wages and paid sick day requirements (Blair et al. 2020). State lawmakers further interfere with these communities’ ability to improve economic conditions through restrictions on voting and practices such as gerrymandering legislative districts. Gerrymandering disempowers and dilutes the voting power of Black and brown communities, denying them greater representation in state legislatures. Yet the Black and brown populations of cities, counties, and states across the South will keep growing—even as state lawmakers continue their efforts to prevent them from deviating from the Southern economic development model.

Civil rights and labor rights

While the fight for civil rights is often discussed separately from the fight for workers’ rights, these movements have often been one and the same. Race and racism have been leveraged to weaken both movements. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., the face of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1950s and 1960s, was standing with striking sanitation workers in Memphis when he was assassinated. He was fighting for the poor and for workers and families independent of race and ethnicity.

Whenever civil rights and labor leaders have been able to bring Black and white workers together to fight to improve their working conditions, Southern elites wielded notions of white supremacy and implemented policies to undermine labor generally and labor unions specifically. This was designed to ensure permanent divisions along racial lines and maintain Jim Crow race and labor relations (Pierce 2017). While right-to-work laws were pushed across the country, they initially took root in the Southern states where—due to racial terrorism, poll taxes, literacy tests, and outright violence—most Black people (and many poor white people) could not vote. Working together would have empowered both Black and white workers, but it also would have undermined the racial order in the South.

According to Pierce (2017) and Griffith (1988), while unions like the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were organizing both Black and white workers, the Christian American Association was raising money from wealthy Southern planters and industrialists to get anti-union laws enacted. This same group was also enlisted to help fight against the New Deal. Similarly, when Black and white workers came together to form the Knights of Labor following the Civil War in Virginia, Black voters were disenfranchised once white politicians were able to regain control of state government and white workers were offered privileges not available to Black workers to maintain the racial hierarchy (Scribner 2021).

Opponents to interracial solidarity and union organizing warned:

White women and White men will be forced into organizations with Black African apes…whom they will have to call ‘brother’ or lose their jobs. (Pierce 2017)

Other material designed to maintain the racial divisions include Figure B, a flyer produced to motivate support for right-to-work in North Carolina, which highlights that George Benjamin, a Black man, would be in charge of organizing white workers.

Figure B. This flyer was an effort to mobilize racial prejudice against the CIO. The irony here is that, according to Griffith (1988), the Tobacco Workers International Union under criticism was an American Federation of Labor (AFL) affiliate, one which did not share the CIO’s progressive position on interracial organizing. (Photo by David Haberstich. Courtesy of Donald McKee, cited in Griffith 1988.)

In 1944, Arkansas and Florida became the first two states to adopt the anti-worker right-to-work laws. When the key leader of these efforts, Vance Muse, was called out for his use of racism to achieve his goals, he reportedly said “They call me anti-Jew and anti-nigger. Listen we like the nigger—in his place” (Pierce 2017).

Southern politicians and employers were not only interested in using their state and local policies to maintain the racial hierarchy; they also wielded power at the national level as well, threatening to oppose federal legislation that did not exclude Black workers and families from the protections and benefits of federal laws. The exclusion of Black workers was not explicit in the legislation. Testimony and debates over federal legislation leaves little doubt about their goals, however. For example, when the Fair Labor Standards Act was being debated, Southern Democrats threatened to tank the legislation if Black workers were included:

The organized Negro groups of the country are supporting [the FLSA] because it will, in destroying state sovereignty and local self-determination, render easier the elimination and disappearance of racial and social distinctions…. (Congressman Cox of Georgia, cited in Perea 2011)

Another congressman, Representative J. Mark Wilcox of Florida remarked:

There has always been a difference in the wage scale of white and colored labor. So long as Florida people are permitted to handle the matter, this delicate and perplexing problem can be adjusted; but the federal government knows no color line and of necessity it cannot make any distinction between the races. We may rest assured, therefore, that …it will prescribe the same wage for the Negro that it prescribes for the White man. …Those of us who know the true situation know that it just will not work in the South. You cannot put the Negro and the White man on the same basis and get away with it. (Perea 2011)

It was not just politicians; however, employers shared the same sentiments with one employer stating:

A Negro makes a much better workman and a much better citizen, insofar as the South is concerned, when he is not paid the highest wage. (Perea 2011)

These attitudes and threats to the passage of important legislation was not limited to the FLSA. The same threats were made to ensure the exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers—jobs primarily filled by Black men and women across the South—from the protections of the National Labor Relations Act. As noted above, racism and maintaining the racial hierarchy in the South was at the root of many policies including taxation, policing, and economic policies. In institution after institution, efforts were made to ensure that Black labor could be extracted as cheaply as possible. And while there was also a great desire to get white labor cheaply as well, there was a clear sense that white workers must always be above Black workers to maintain the racial hierarchy (Perea 2011; Dixon 2021).

The changing demography of the South is an opportunity to uplift everyone

The American South is a dynamic region of the country with a growing population that is increasingly diverse. Made up of 16 states and the District of Columbia—including Texas and Florida, two of the largest states in the country—the South is home to almost four in 10 Americans. These are Americans whose lives and livelihoods are heavily shaped by the state and local policies implemented across the region. Not only is the South the largest region of the country, but it is also the fastest growing. Figure C shows that over the last few decades the share of the population living in the South grew faster and larger than the population of any other region. In fact, the share of Americans living in the Midwest and the Northeast declined.

Figure C

This growth in the population of the South reflects a natural increase in the region—more births than deaths. It also reflects international immigration–especially across the Southern border from Mexico, Central and South America, and the Caribbean—as well as domestic migration to the region. While politicians point to population growth across the South to argue for the positive impacts of their policies, this increase tends to be concentrated in specific states and cities. For example, while Texas and Florida had the highest population growth from 2021 to 2022, Louisiana, West Virginia, Maryland, and Mississippi were in the top 10 for population decline (U.S. Census Bureau 2022).

Many of those moving to the South from other regions, including New York and California, are seeking cheaper housing (Henderson 2016). Land generally tends to be cheaper across the South, contributing to housing that is much more affordable than places like California and New York. Texas and Florida also benefit from immigration across the Southern border and the Caribbean.

The widespread use of air conditioning during the 1960s and 1970s further contributed to population growth across the region. The oppressive heat during summer months along with high humidity left many Southerners in misery. This has been fundamentally changed, however, by air conditioning in cars, homes, and businesses (Arsenault 1984). As Figure C shows, before 1980 the share of the population living in the South fluctuated around 30–31%. From 1980 onward, it has continued to increase in each subsequent decade.

This report highlights the true origins of key components of the failed Southern economic development strategy—the extraction of labor from Black Americans after the end of slavery and from Black and brown Americans today as cheaply as possible. The emphasis on low wages, lack of regulation, regressive taxation and giveaways to corporations has not, and cannot, produce broadly shared prosperity. It was never designed to do so.

The youthful and increasingly diverse population across the South, however, presents a great opportunity to shift the policy landscape across the region. While wealthy and powerful people across the region have fought long and hard to keep the people divided and to maintain the racial hierarchy that maintains these divisions, Southerners can choose a different way forward. Southerners can demand an economic strategy that raises wages, strengthens the safety net, implements fair and progressive taxation, and perhaps most importantly, empowers workers to act on their own behalf by unionizing. This approach can help eliminate the racial hierarchy that holds all Southerners back from an economically secure future. But, as long as the powerful can keep low- and middle-income Southerners focused on racial, political, and economic divisions, they can keep them from seeing what they have in common: They are all being exploited by those at the top.

Notes

{{1.}} Enslaved men and women might be “hired out” to a third party if their labor was not immediately needed. In some instances, they might be allowed to retain a portion of the money generated (Butler 2022).

{{2.}} See Cooper and Kroeger 2017 for descriptions of other forms of wage theft.

{{3.}} While “Cancer Alley” is a high-profile area in the environmental racism literature, Terrell and St. Julien (2023) report that there are other industrial areas of the state with higher exposure to these toxins.

{{4.}} As of September 1, 2023, the sales tax on food in Alabama dropped from 4.0% to 3.0%. For more information, see Sell 2023.

{{5.}} North Carolina has adopted the expansion of Medicaid, but as of September 2023, it had not yet been implemented; implementation is dependent on the passage of the 2023–2024 budget. Virginia and Oklahoma adopted the Medicaid expansion in 2016 and 2021, respectively (KFF 2023).

{{6.}} ADC was changed to AFDC in 1962.

{{7.}} The remaining states spending 10% or less of funds in direct assistance were primarily in the Midwest, with two in the Northeast. The Midwestern states spending 10% or less are North Dakota, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas. The Northeastern states are Connecticut and New Jersey. See the complete map here.

{{8.}} “Other” includes a wide range of expenditures across states, but can include short-term benefits for families in crisis; transfers to the social services block grant; after school programs; pregnancy prevention; and programs promoting two-parent families (Azevedo-McCaffrey and Safawi 2022).

{{9.}} States can carry unspent federal TANF dollars over into future years.

{{10.}} To a see graphic representation of change in the real value of TANF benefits, see here.

{{11.}} Mast (forthcoming a) is a fact sheet focused on mass incarceration and how it continues the tradition of extracting cheap labor from primarily Black Americans in states across the South. It describes ways that Black Americans continue to have their labor extracted by the state or leased out to private companies.

{{12.}} Hickey forthcoming includes fact sheets that will address the experiences of immigrant workers and provide a deep dive on domestic workers and food processing workers, especially meat processing workers.

{{13.}} Arkansas Department of Human Services 2023 and Reuters Fact Check 2022 are examples of these dog whistles.

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Being forced to make this impossible choice threatens workers’ economic and health security. Further, when workers go to work with a contagious illness, they are likely to spread disease to their coworkers and customers. When they are forced to send a sick child to school, they send contagion with them. This means lack of paid sick leave is a threat not only to a worker’s (and their family’s) own health, but also to the health of their community.

Over the last decade, 15 states and the District of Columbia have expanded labor protections to require employers to allow workers to earn paid sick time. In areas of the country with these new laws, workers have seen significant increases in access to paid sick time. Expanded coverage has particularly benefited low-wage workers—who were least likely to have access to paid sick leave before these policies went into effect. 

Our research finds:

• Lack of paid sick days is a real problem, particularly for low-wage workers. Three-quarters (78%) of private-sector workers overall currently have access to paid sick days. However, only 39% of workers in the bottom 10% of the wage distribution do.
• Lack of paid sick days deprives workers of funds needed for basic necessities. Without the ability to earn paid sick days, workers must choose between going to work sick (or sending a child to school sick) and losing much-needed pay. For the average worker without access to paid sick days, the costs of taking unpaid sick time can make a painful dent in their monthly budget, making it hard to pay for groceries (five days of unpaid sick time), utilities (three days of unpaid sick time), or gas (two days of unpaid sick time).
• Over the last decade, state-level laws providing the right to paid sick days have had a significant impact on access to paid sick days across the country. Paid sick time increased dramatically in parts of the country with paid sick time mandates. The Pacific region saw the highest access rate, at 94%. Across the country, access for the lowest-wage workers nearly doubled between 2010 and 2023.
• Paid sick leave is a wise investment for businesses, workers, and communities. Studies have shown that offering paid sick time adds little or nothing to a business’s expenses. Moreover, increased access to paid sick leave can in fact benefit businesses and the wider community by increasing productivity and job stability as well as reducing illness and transmission rates of infectious diseases.

Low-wage workers are less likely to have access to paid sick days

Approximately 78% of private-sector American workers currently have access to paid sick days, but this topline number masks the unequal distribution of this access among workers (BLS 2023a). Higher-wage workers have better access to most benefits, including paid sick days, than lower-wage workers.

Among the 10% of private-sector workers with the highest wages, 96% have access to paid sick days (Figure A). By contrast, among the 10% of workers with the lowest wages, only 39% have access to paid sick days. This skewed distribution of paid sick days is particularly troubling since low-wage workers are least able to absorb lost wages when they or their family members are sick.

Figure A

Research from other sources also shows that disparities in access occur by demographic group. A report published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed that Hispanic workers are least likely to have access to paid sick leave compared with other racial/ethnic groups (Bartel et al. 2019).

Access to paid sick days also varies significantly by occupation, work hours, union status, and employer size. As noted above, 78% of private-sector employees nationwide have access to paid sick days; that means 22%—more than 1 in 5 workers—cannot earn paid sick days. But even fewer have access in some occupations: only 61% of workers in service occupations—which tend to be low-wage occupations—have access to paid sick days (BLS 2023a). Far more full-time workers have access to paid sick time compared with part-time workers—87% versus 51%. Union workers are more likely to have access (86%) compared with nonunion workers (77%). And 89% of workers in large establishments (500 or more workers) have access as opposed to 71% of workers in small establishments (fewer than 50 workers).

“Presenteeism,” or working while sick, not only results in decreased productivity and increased risk of injury, but also poses a public health risk (Asfaw, Pana-Cryan, and Rosa 2012). This is particularly true in service occupations, and especially in the food services industry. Almost half of all restaurant-related foodborne illness outbreaks are attributed to employees coming to work while ill (Norton et al. 2015). In a survey of women working in the fast-food industry, 70% reported that at some point during the prior year they had gone to work despite displaying symptoms of illness, including coughing, sneezing, fever, diarrhea, or vomiting (National Partnership for Women & Families 2016a).

Further, for many workers in service-based jobs, pay can be tied to the volume of people they interact with (e.g., jobs with tipped wages). This means service workers often not only feel pressure to show up for work because they lack paid sick days, but they are also incentivized by their pay structure to interact with people, regardless of their health condition.

Although workers may want to stay home when they are sick, a 2010 survey by the National Opinion Research Center highlighted how difficult it was to do so. Nearly one-third of workers reported being threatened with job loss or outright losing their job for leaving work when sick (Smith and Kim 2010). Unsurprisingly, a 2018 study shows a strong association between workers without paid sick leave and higher levels of psychological distress relative to workers with access to paid sick leave (Stoddard-Dare et al. 2018).

We shouldn’t make workers choose between going to work sick or going without pay

Expanding access to paid sick days will mean stronger, healthier families. Without paid sick days, working parents are often forced to make the difficult choice between staying home with a sick child—and losing income—or going to work and possibly compromising their child’s health. When parents cannot take off work, children are sometimes sent to school ill, diminishing their learning experience and exposing other students, teachers, and staff to infection.{{1}}

When employees go to work sick, they endanger their own health and the health of their colleagues. They also may jeopardize their own safety and the quality of their work. At the same time, staying home and putting one’s own health first can result in overdue bills and not having enough food to eat. Earned paid sick days allow workers to avoid an unfair choice between going to work sick or going without pay (and maybe even losing a job).

Many workers do not need to take much, if any, sick time in a given month or year. But when illness strikes them or their family members, that paid time off is a physical and economic lifeline. CDC guidelines recommend five days of isolation for even a mild bout of COVID (CDC 2023a). People with flu are most contagious for three to four days, while those infected with RSV are typically contagious for three to eight days (CDC 2022, 2023b). To be clear, that’s the contagious period; it may take longer to fully recover from those infectious diseases or other illnesses.

COVID, flu, and RSV outbreaks have become routine in communities across the country. Even the healthiest among us have a reasonably high chance of contracting one of these illnesses at some point or another. Given that context, the economic and health risks of workers lacking paid sick days are enormous.

To assess the value of sick days for workers, in Table 1 we show the number of unpaid sick days that correspond to each monthly expenditure in a family budget. These calculations are based on the average monthly household expenditures on a selected set of goods for a household earning between $50,000 and $69,999 per year (BLS 2023c). This expenditure band was chosen because the average wage of workers without access to paid sick time is $15.50, and we assume two full-time workers per household (DHHS AHRQ 2023).{{2}}

Table 1

If a worker needs to take off even a half day due to illness, the lost wages take away most of the household’s monthly spending for fruits and vegetables; lost wages from taking off five days is nearly their entire grocery budget for the month. Two days of unpaid sick time are more than the equivalent of a month’s worth of gas, making it difficult to get to work, while an additional day not worked is nearly equivalent to a monthly car insurance premium.

Three days of unpaid sick time translate into the household’s monthly utilities budget, potentially cutting off electricity or heat to the family’s home. Taking three days to recuperate or to care for a sick family member means the worker may have difficulty paying for health insurance or keeping up with medical bills. Cutting back on health care at a time when it is most needed puts the worker’s family at further risk in the future in terms of both health and economic security.

This tradeoff—reduced income and risk of losing a job because of a short-term illness—does not arise for workers with adequate paid sick time. Because paid sick leave is often job-protected, access to paid sick leave has long been associated with increased job stability, enhancing workers’ economic security (Hill 2013). A related but different issue arises when workers face a lengthier illness; paid family and medical leave could help fill in these larger gaps, but unfortunately workers across the board are even less likely to earn that benefit (Appelbaum 2016). Even with another wage earner at home working full time, a household could lose the necessary monthly income to pay for their entire rent or mortgage if one worker is forced to take just eight days of sick time for a longer illness or recovery.

Many states now require employers to provide paid sick time

During the pandemic, Congress authorized, for the first time ever, federal emergency sick leave through the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. The act required employers with fewer than 500 employees to provide up to two weeks of paid sick leave at full pay for illness, quarantine, or isolation related to COVID-19. Unfortunately, the tax credits used to reimburse employers for providing paid sick leave expired two years ago, and few policymakers seem intent on renewing it (DOL WHD 2021).

Some federal policymakers have repeatedly pushed for a national standard, such as the Healthy Families Act (National Partnership for Women & Families 2023b). The Healthy Families Act, first introduced in 2004, would (among other provisions) allow workers in workplaces with 15 or more employees to earn at least one hour of paid sick time per 30 hours worked, up to 56 hours or seven days of paid sick time per year (National Partnership for Women & Families 2023b). Despite repeated introductions of the Healthy Families Act, most recently in May 2023, federal policymakers in favor of it have so far not been successful in passing it. The lack of a national standard for paid sick leave places the United States behind its international peers (Heymann et al. 2020).

Fortunately, many state and local policymakers understand the economic costs of workers losing pay if they are sick, as well as the public health risk of workers showing up to work sick. Currently, 15 states and the District of Columbia require employers to allow workers to accrue some minimum number of paid sick days. Additionally, 17 cities and four counties have moved ahead to provide paid sick days to eligible workers.

States with paid sick leave laws include Arizona, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington (National Partnership for Women & Families 2023a). In addition, Minnesota enacted paid sick time protections in 2023, which will become effective in 2024 (National Partnership for Women & Families 2023a). In Missouri, a paid sick time initiative is expected to appear on the ballot in 2024 (Ballotpedia 2023).

While there is no federal paid sick leave law for workers in general, in 2016 federal contractors were mandated to provide paid sick leave to their employees. This impacted an estimated one million private-sector workers who were either newly eligible for paid sick leave or saw an increase in their sick leave allowance (Gould 2017).

More workers have access to paid sick time as states pass paid sick leave laws

Widespread advances in paid sick time protections in the states have corresponded with a dramatic increase in access. Since 2010, the share of private-sector workers in the U.S. with access to paid sick days has increased from 63% to 78%. Unsurprisingly, the gains in access were most pronounced in areas of the country where states mandated employers to provide those protections.

Figure B illustrates paid sick days access by Census division from 2010 to 2023.{{3}} The three blue lines indicate Census divisions where at least two-thirds of the division’s population live in states with paid sick leave laws.{{4}} The four lines in shades of red denote Census divisions where no state has a paid sick time provision.{{5}} Green lines denote Census divisions where some states have paid sick time laws but less than two-thirds of the division’s population are in those states.

The patterns in the figure are clear: Workers who live in the Census divisions marked by blue lines have the highest levels of access to paid sick days in 2023. The red-line Census divisions have the lowest levels of access, with the green-line divisions falling in the middle.

The Pacific division in particular saw a dramatic increase in access over the period from 2010 to 2023: The percentage of private-sector workers in that part of the country with access to paid sick days increased from 66% to 94%. Expansion in that division was a 42% increase from its base level. This is not surprising considering that division includes the paid sick provision states of California, Oregon, and Washington, and that those states represent the largest share of the population in that division.

The divisions identified with red lines—where no state-level paid sick time laws have been passed—experienced more modest gains between 2010 and 2023, if they experienced gains at all.

Notably, many state governments in the East South Central and West South Central Census divisions—the divisions with the lowest access rates—have passed preemption laws prohibiting local municipalities from passing paid leave and sick day policies (Policy Surveillance Program 2022). Those two divisions also have weak labor standards (e.g., low minimum wages; see EPI 2023). Further, low-wage workers and their families in those divisions are less likely to have access to public insurance (e.g., policymakers have refused to expand Medicaid; see KFF 2023).

Figure B

Low-wage workers particularly benefit from state sick leave laws

As mentioned earlier, this period of state expansions in paid sick leave laws translated into significant increases in overall access, from 63% to 78% between 2010 and 2023. But workers with lower wages, who generally are less likely to have access to paid sick days, have benefited disproportionately.

The first state-level paid sick days law was passed in Connecticut in 2011. In 2010, the year prior to its passage, 20% of workers in the bottom 10% of wage earners in the private-sector workforce nationwide had access to paid sick days (Figure C). That number stands at 39% today. That is an enormous gain, nearly doubling paid sick leave access for the lowest-wage workers.

Similarly, the share of workers in the bottom 25% with access to paid sick days increased from 33% in 2010 to 56% in 2023. In 2010, only one-third of workers in the bottom 25% had access; now over half do. This means significant gains in economic and health security for these workers and their families.

Figure C

Paid sick leave is a wise investment for businesses, workers, and communities

Often when a new labor standard is introduced, some people express concerns about the cost to businesses and potential employment losses. However, evidence among cities and states that have legislated paid sick leave laws shows that these concerns are not justified (National Partnership for Women & Families 2017).

In San Francisco, the first jurisdiction to set a paid sick days standard, employment grew twice as fast in the year following the law’s enactment as in neighboring counties that had no paid sick days policy (Miller and Towne 2011). San Francisco’s job growth was even faster in the food service and hospitality sector, which is dominated by small businesses and viewed as vulnerable to additional costs.

Further, studies of state and local paid sick leave laws show that the cost of the laws are negligible for businesses newly mandated to provide the benefit. For example, Pichler and Ziebarth (2018) examined the impact of paid sick leave laws on labor costs. In particular, they looked for evidence that the new policies were so costly that businesses passed down costs to their workers in the form of reduced earnings or employment loss. Pichler and Ziebarth found no evidence of this.

Businesses might also suggest that the added cost of paid sick leave would render them unable to provide other benefits, such as health insurance. But research has shown that paid sick leave policies are not so costly as to crowd out nonmandated fringe benefits such as health, dental, or disability benefits or paid vacation or holidays (Maclean, Pichler, and Ziebarth 2020).

Finally, employers may worry that workers might take paid sick leave when they are not actually sick. But evidence suggests this is not the case: Workers in states with new mandates take, on average, only two more sick days per year than workers in states without mandates (Maclean, Pichler, and Ziebarth 2020).

Case studies also reveal that paid sick leave makes economic sense. For example, a study of the 2011 Connecticut law (which went into effect in 2012) showed that the law brought paid sick days to a large number of workers, particularly part-time workers, at little to no cost to business (Appelbaum et al. 2014).

In a study of the 2013 New York City law (which took effect in 2014), Appelbaum and Milkman (2016) found that two years after the law was passed, 86% of employers surveyed supported the law. The law provided an additional 1.4 million workers with paid sick days, and almost 85% of employers surveyed reported the law had no effect on business costs.

Taken together, the evidence shows that paid sick leave does not hurt businesses. Instead, businesses, workers, and their communities all benefit from a more productive and healthier workforce (Drago and Lovell 2011). States and localities that have passed paid sick leave laws have reduced transmission rates for influenza-like illnesses (Pichler, Wen, and Ziebarth 2021). Where state policies are more generous and include more groups of workers, those states have seen a greater reduction in influenza-like-illness rates than states with less generous and less inclusive policies (Wething 2022). Moreover, evidence shows that workers in states with paid sick leave have a lower likelihood of working while sick (Schneider 2020; Callison and Pesko 2022).

More action is needed to protect all workers

The ability to earn paid sick leave stands to improve health outcomes of communities and reduce economic insecurity for workers while supporting businesses.

Access to earned paid sick leave means that workers do not have to go to work sick or risk their income security. The stress of an illness does not have to be compounded by worry about whether they will be able to pay their monthly bills. The economic security provided by paid sick leave is particularly critical for low-wage workers and their families, who may lack access to sufficient savings to cover an unexpected expense.

Businesses benefit from a healthy workforce—workers who show up at work sick are less likely to be productive and may be more prone to mistakes. Communities benefit, too. When workers can rest, get the health care they need, and fully recover from an illness before returning to work, transmission of diseases is reduced.

State and local measures have begun to provide a patchwork of solutions, corresponding to an increase in access to paid sick leave over the last decade. Localities have the potential to build momentum at the state level. For example, 13 cities in New Jersey passed paid sick leave laws in the years leading up to the passage of New Jersey’s 2018 state law (National Partnership for Women & Families 2016b). But the problem calls for national attention—especially given state attacks on the right of localities to legislate these protections (Policy Surveillance Program 2022). A lack of a national earned sick leave standard also means that there are inequalities in coverage, with the vast majority of low-wage workers still lacking access to paid sick time. 

As noted above, the Healthy Families Act of 2023 would allow workers to earn up to seven days of paid sick time per year, among other provisions (National Partnership for Women & Families 2023b). However, the act is not expected to advance in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives though bipartisan support for the Families First Coronavirus Response Act proved that there has been political will to pass these protections. Given the widespread success of state sick leave policies that have improved conditions for workers and communities without hurting employers’ bottom lines, it is disappointing that efforts at the national level to reach the overall workforce have yet to succeed. More action is needed to reach workers across the economy regardless of their wage levels, hours, or where their jobs are located.

Notes

{{1.}} See, for example, Cunha 2014.

{{2.}} Whereas the average wage of a worker with access to paid sick time is approximately $20.40 per hour, the average wage of a worker without access to paid sick time is $15.50 per hour. To the extent that we are overestimating actual work hours or wages, workers would have less to lose but also less in earnings to make ends meet in general.

{{3.}} For a full list of states by their respective Census divisions, see U.S. Census Bureau 2013.

{{4.}} For example, the Middle Atlantic Census division includes New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. New York and New Jersey have paid sick leave laws; Pennsylvania does not. In 2022, 29 million people lived in New York and New Jersey, and the total population of the Mid-Atlantic Census division population (population of all three states) was 42 million. That means 69% of people in the Mid-Atlantic Census division were covered by state paid sick leave laws.

{{5.}} There are some cities in those states with paid sick time policies, but they represent small populations compared with the Census division as a whole.

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This report is a joint project of EPI and the Jain Family Institute.

Key findings

• The decline in homeownership rates among young borrowers in D.C., from 22.1% in 2010 to 13.7% in 2022, is closely linked to the surge in student loan debt.
• Homeownership in D.C. is marred by racial and educational disparities, as majority-Black neighborhoods grapple with lower educational achievements and elevated mortgage denial rates.
• Young borrowers in D.C. not only have the highest levels of student debt in the United States but also face challenging debt-to-income ratios, exacerbating financial strain, particularly in majority-Black areas.
• The root causes of racial disparities in homeownership and mounting student debt in D.C. are systemic, necessitating multi-faceted federal policy for meaningful change.

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