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	<title>Work visas | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Work visas | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>Using FY 2027 appropriations to build a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline: House Republican appropriations legislation would expand H-2A and H-2B visa programs and cut farmworker pay</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/fy-2027-house-republican-appropriations-deportation-to-guestworker-pipeline/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2026 13:00:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328101</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of For H-2A, the bill Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 21px;"><strong>Key findings:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li>The House Appropriations Committee’s fiscal year (FY) 2027 funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security would make major changes to the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs and the H-2B program for low-wage jobs outside of agriculture.</li>
<li>For H-2A, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Open the program to year-round agricultural jobs, such as in greenhouses and on dairies, which employ over 400,000 U.S. farmworkers. Current regulations limit H-2A to temporary and seasonal work.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Allow employers to pay year-round H-2A farmworkers drastically lower wages, cutting pay by roughly $17,000 to $40,000 per year in key industries and states in 2027 and incentivizing farm operators to replace U.S. farmworker employees with much lower-paid H-2A workers.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>For H-2B, the bill would:
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Raise the annual cap to at least 270,000 visas in FY 2027 (more than doubling the current cap that includes supplemental H-2B visas) and 300,000 total workers.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Reward employers for applying for as many H-2B jobs as possible each year, since doing so increases their cap exemption for the following year, likely driving exponential growth in the program.</li>
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Move 10,000 amusement park, carnival, fair, and circus workers from H-2B to a newly created P-4 visa, which has no numerical cap and questionable worker protections—further expanding the pool of exploitable workers in H-2B industries.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>These changes would drastically lower pay for all farmworkers and degrade labor standards for U.S. workers on farms and in industries like landscaping, construction, and hospitality. Employers would gain an exploitable workforce they can control, made up of workers with no realistic path to a green card or U.S. citizenship.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h2>Introduction and summary</h2>
<p>In June 2026, Republican legislators in the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security—the subcommittee tasked with funding the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—proposed legislation to fund DHS for FY 2027, which was then considered by the full House Appropriations Committee. The bill includes several legislative riders that, if enacted into law, would make major changes to two temporary work visa programs, H-2A and H-2B. Those provisions would accelerate hiring and substantially expand the size and scope of the programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> The full House Appropriations Committee approved the bill on a party-line vote with 34 Republican members voting in favor of reporting the bill to the full House of Representatives.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Nearly identical riders were passed in the House FY 2026 DHS appropriations bill, but were not included in the final FY 2026 omnibus bill that funded the federal government.</p>
<p>H-2A allows farm employers to hire migrant workers for seasonal and temporary agricultural jobs, while H-2B allows employers to hire migrant workers for temporary jobs in low-wage occupations outside of agriculture (including in landscaping, construction, hospitality, food service, seafood processing, and traveling fairs and carnivals). Both programs represent a flawed employment model that restricts workers’ rights by giving employers control over their workers’ immigration status.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Both undercut U.S. wage standards, lack adequate regulations and enforcement to protect workplace rights, and fail to provide workers with a pathway to becoming lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens. If the House legislative provisions on H-2A and H-2B become law, they would greatly increase the number of workers in these programs and lower wages for hundreds of thousands of farmworkers by tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p>The Trump administration’s unrestrained and indiscriminate immigration enforcement efforts and bureaucratic slowdowns have caused net immigration levels in the United States to turn negative for the first time in half a century.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Given demographic projections and the fact that nearly all prime-age workforce growth in the past 30 years has come from immigration,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> it is becoming clearer that sustaining future economic and workforce growth will be difficult without policies that would expand pathways for immigrants. But those pathways must give workers full and equal rights in the workplace through immediate or eventual lawful permanent residence and a path to citizenship. Temporary work visa programs like H-2A and H-2B, often called “guestworker” programs, do not do that, and strong evidence shows they are degrading wages and working conditions for both migrant and U.S. workers.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>Efforts in Congress to expand H-2A and H-2B build on the Trump administration’s own use of executive authority to expand both programs. Meanwhile, DHS’s immigration enforcement agencies—Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—now have $270 billion at their disposal to detain, deport, and terrorize immigrants across the country,<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> and temporary protections that provide lawful work authorization, like parole and Temporary Protected Status, are being terminated en masse. ICE and CBP have gone far beyond what their mandates and statutes allow, acting as gestapo-like forces that racially profile people and disregard whether a person has a green card, a temporary protective status like DACA, or, in many cases, a U.S. passport.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> The result is a shrinking workforce. Are measures to expand H-2A and H-2B an attempt to replace some of the foreign-born workers the economy is losing?</p>
<p>This report examines the provisions in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation, which passed and was reported out of the House Appropriations Committee in June 2026, that would expand and modify the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, and estimates their impact. While the House Appropriations bill has not been voted on yet by the full House, with government funding set to expire on December 11, 2026, the bill is likely to be the starting point for negotiations on an omnibus bill to fund the government for the remaining 10 months of fiscal year 2027.</p>
<h2>Both the Trump administration and Congress are working to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline</h2>
<p>While this report focuses on congressional efforts to expand the H-2A and H-2B programs through the appropriations process, it is important to note that the Trump administration has already used its executive authority to expand the H-2A and H-2B visa programs: The Department of Labor (DOL) issued a regulation drastically cutting farmworker wages in October 2025 that the agency estimates will increase the size of the program from 383,000 to 515,000 jobs due to expanded hiring driven by lower labor costs for farm operators.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> One of the administration’s stated reasons for the DOL regulation is its own immigration enforcement. It expects to deport so many farmworkers that farm operators will lack sufficient employees to produce enough food, leading to higher prices for consumers, unless the deported workers are replaced with farmworkers hired from abroad through the H-2A program.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Then, in January 2026, after a lobbying push by H-2B employers, the Trump administration doubled the size of the H-2B program using discretionary authority Congress granted it in FY 2026 appropriations legislation.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>While the Trump administration and Republicans in Congress have embraced anti-immigrant rhetoric and adopted inhumane immigration policies, their efforts to expand work visa programs reveal that they recognize immigrant workers are an essential part of the U.S. labor market. The Trump administration is acknowledging that, without these workers, there will be negative consequences for the U.S. economy—many of which have already become evident, including a slowdown in employment and increased unemployment for U.S.-born workers.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> The administration and Congress are effectively creating a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline. Migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permits are left with only one viable way to work in the United States: as guestworkers. And as guestworkers, they have few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their status and ability to reside and work in the country.</p>
<h2>The H-2A program had 350,000 workers in 2025 and would be expanded to include 409,000 additional year-round jobs like dairy and livestock farming</h2>
<p>The H-2A program is a visa program that allows employers to hire farmworkers from abroad for seasonal and temporary farm jobs, ostensibly when they can show that a U.S. worker is unavailable. The H-2A program accounts for a significant share of the total farm workforce, between 11% and 16% of total farm employment, and is a lobbying priority for the agricultural industry. The estimated size of the H-2A program in 2025 was nearly 350,000 workers (see <strong>Figure A</strong>).</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-327466 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="327466" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/327466-36100-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The language adopted in Section 410 of the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill would allow H-2A workers to be employed in year-round jobs—which is currently prohibited—expanding the scope of the program and allowing employers to hire H-2A workers for jobs on dairy, livestock, and poultry and egg farms, as well as in nurseries and greenhouses and other nonseasonal agricultural jobs. This would be a major change to H-2A and has long been a priority of agribusiness. In fact, a nearly identical legislative rider was first proposed by the same House committee almost a decade ago.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> The Trump administration recently used sub-regulatory means to make a down payment on this change to H-2A, issuing a policy memorandum, which arguably stretches the bounds of the law: It instructs U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to begin approving petitions for H-2A workers who would be employed on dairies.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> The memorandum still requires employers to prove the dairy-related H-2A position is of a temporary or seasonal nature, however. The USCIS memo is susceptible to legal challenges, whereas a statutory change would be more durable, as some industry representatives have pointed out.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<p>Data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages show that there are approximately 409,000 year-round (full-time equivalent) jobs in agriculture. <strong>Table 1</strong> lists four of the major agricultural industries employing farmworkers year-round. The largest are greenhouse production and cattle ranching, which includes dairy jobs.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> However, the true scope of jobs that could become eligible for H-2A under the vague language of Section 410 is unknown and potentially larger. Representatives of the agricultural industry could argue, for instance, that if Section 410 becomes law, eligible job categories should now include meat and poultry packing and processing, logging, equine, and aquaculture jobs, as well as various nonfarming jobs “performed by workers on agricultural operations.” DOL and USCIS would ultimately decide how to implement their interpretation of the provision.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-323089 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323089" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323089-36101-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Expanding H-2A to include year-round occupations will dramatically lower wages for farmworkers</h2>
<p>As noted above, the Trump administration’s Interim Final Rule (IFR) from October 2025 set the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) methodology at dramatically lower rates than the previous one.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> Based on DOL’s own estimates, the 2026 H-2A AEWR will result in a $24 billion pay cut for H-2A farmworkers over 10 years and, by reducing H-2A labor costs, encourage employers to expand the H-2A program to 515,000 jobs a year.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> EPI has estimated that U.S. farmworkers will lose $2.7 to $3.3 billion in wages per year as a result of the Trump AEWR rule. In total, all farmworkers (U.S. farmworkers and H-2A farmworkers) will lose roughly $5 billion per year in wages thanks to this regulation from the Trump DOL.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<p>Under current regulations, H-2A farmworkers cannot be hired for year-round agricultural jobs.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> Because farmworkers in these jobs work year-round, rather than seasonally, they generally earn higher wages that can sometimes approach a living wage. But if the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill becomes law and allows employers to additionally use H-2A visas for year-round jobs instead of just seasonal and temporary ones, the required minimum wage employers would have to pay H-2A workers would be set by the same H-2A methodology used for seasonal crop farming jobs. As a result, farmworkers in year-round jobs would see significant pay cuts, to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars per year.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2</strong> shows a sample of some of the main year-round agricultural industries in major agricultural states, along with average annual employment in each (which together account for about 15% of the total year-round, full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture). Table 2 shows how much farmworkers earned annually on average in 2025 in those industries and states, and compares the annual earnings of farmworkers in 2025 with what H-2A workers would earn in 2026 or 2027 if they worked in the same jobs and were paid the corresponding 2026–2027 AEWR at Skill Level 1 for the entire year (40 hours per week for 52 weeks), minus the annualized amount that will be deducted from hourly wages for housing as permitted in the current AEWR methodology.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a></p>
<p>The final column in Table 2 shows a few examples that illustrate the difference between what U.S. farmworkers working year-round in the selected industries earned in 2025 and what H-2A workers at Skill Level 1 would earn if they were paid the annualized AEWR in 2026 or 2027. Table 2 shows that the reduction in wages for H-2A farmworkers in year-round jobs could range from an annual pay cut of $17,500 for mushroom farming in California to over $43,000 per year for employment on poultry and egg farms in Texas.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-323087 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="323087" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/323087-36102-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Outcomes such as these—in which farmworkers paid the 2026–2027 AEWR would earn tens of thousands of dollars less than what U.S. farmworkers earned in major year-round jobs in 2025—are in violation of the spirit and letter of the AEWR and the H-2A statute. Yet they would become legal if the year-round H-2A provision in the House appropriations bill becomes law. This would hurt some of the most vulnerable and lowest-paid workers in the U.S. labor market and give farm operators a strong incentive to replace their U.S. farmworkers with H-2A workers because the latter cannot easily change employers and have their rights restricted and wages restrained via H-2A program rules—which also have the effect of insulating employers from free market forces that would lead them to improve wages and working conditions in order to attract U.S. farmworkers.</p>
<h2>The size of the H-2B program would be set by a new methodology that will start at 270,000 in 2027 and grow exponentially</h2>
<p>The H-2B program currently has an annual numerical limit (or “cap”) of 66,000. Since FY 2016, Congress has passed amendments to annual appropriations bills that allow DHS to increase the number of visas available.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> In the past four fiscal years, both the Biden and Trump administrations have used the full authority granted to the executive branch in the legislative riders, raising the total H-2B annual limit to 130,716 during FY 2023–2026.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a></p>
<p>The FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations bill includes language in Section 409 that would establish a new methodology for setting the H-2B visa program’s annual numerical limit to further increase the cap beyond the 130,716 during FY 2023–2026. The language of the bill states that for every employer who has had any H-2B positions certified in the past five fiscal years (2022–2026), the highest number that they had certified in those years will be the number of H-2B workers they may hire who will not count against the annual cap of 66,000. In other words, if an employer had 10 jobs certified in 2022, 15 in 2023, 20 in 2024, 100 in 2025, and 50 in 2026, they would be allowed to hire 100 H-2B workers in 2027 without them counting against the 66,000 cap. As the analysis below explains, the provision would result in a cap of nearly 270,000 visas in FY 2027.</p>
<p><strong>Table 3</strong> shows an estimate using 2021–2025 H-2B data that serves as a proxy for the estimated number of new H-2B workers who would be exempted from the cap in 2027, and the number of new H-2B workers permitted under the regular annual cap of 66,000. Altogether, the regular cap plus the supplemental cap for H-2B in 2027 would permit at least 269,617 new H-2B workers if the House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law. That’s more than double the size of the total cap in 2023–2026, and a 309% increase relative to the original H-2B cap of 66,000.</p>
<p>The annual caps and total number of workers will grow rapidly if Congress reauthorizes the same language in the rider year after year, as it has done with past H-2B riders. The rider in Section 409 incentivizes employers to apply to DOL for labor certification for as many H-2B jobs as possible every year because that will increase the size of their exemption from the cap for the following year. The resulting growth is likely to be exponential.</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-326744 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326744" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326744-36105-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Total number of H-2B workers could reach 300,000 in 2027 if House Homeland appropriations legislation becomes law</h2>
<p>Despite the size of the H-2B annual cap, the total number of H-2B workers is always larger because some workers extend their status and some change jobs, but those workers are not counted against the annual cap. In FY 2025, when 64,716 supplemental H-2B visas were added to the statutory cap of 66,000 for the fiscal year, for a total cap of 130,716, there were a total of 166,823 H-2B workers (see <strong>Figure B</strong>).</p>
<p>This was up from 75,122 total H-2B workers just a decade earlier. The nearly 167,000 H-2B total in 2025 included 139,736 H-2B workers with newly issued visas from the State Department, and 4,137 H-2B workers who had their employment extended with the same employer. An additional 22,950 were H-2B workers who changed employers. (The final totals in FY 2026 are likely to be similar to those in FY 2025 given the same cap methodology was in place.)</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-326751 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326751" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326751-36104-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>To get a better sense of the total number of H-2B workers who would be employed in 2027 if Section 409 of the House Homeland appropriations legislation is enacted into law, I estimated that the same number of workers who extended their status or changed jobs in 2025 would also do so in 2027, and added that total to the FY 2027 total cap of 269,617 that would result from the new methodology in the legislation. This is also illustrated in Figure B, which shows the total number of H-2B workers from 2015 to 2025, and projections for 2026 and 2027. The annual cap plus the supplemental cap, together with H-2B extensions and job changes, would result in nearly 300,000 H-2B workers being employed in 2027—‎or 296,704&nbsp;to be exact—which is a 78% increase relative to the number of H-2B workers who were employed in 2025 or estimated to be employed in 2026.</p>
<h2>Close to 10,000 H-2B jobs would be moved to the P visa, a program with no worker protections and administered by DHS</h2>
<p>The other notable change to the H-2B program in the FY 2027 House Homeland appropriations legislation is in Section 411, which would move H-2B fair and carnival workers, such as those employed at amusement parks, carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses, to the P visa program. Section 411 would move those covered by the current P-4 visa—designated for spouses and minor children of P-1, P-2, and P-3 visa holders—to a new P-5 category and reassign the P-4 visa category to fair and carnival workers. The language in Section 411 appears to be a permanent statutory change, unlike Sections 409 and 410, which would only be in place during FY 2027 unless they are renewed in subsequent legislation for FY 2028 (and beyond). According to DOL, in FY 2025 there were 9,622 H-2B jobs certified in the “Amusement and Recreation Attendants” occupation, which is the most relevant occupation that would be moved to the P-4 visa. Unlike the H-2B program, there is no annual cap in the P visa program and the bill language does not apply the annual H-2B cap to the number of fair and carnival workers who could be employed with P-4 visas.</p>
<p>At present, the P visa is a little-known program intended for use by professional athletes and coaches, members of an internationally recognized entertainment group, or persons performing under a reciprocal exchange program or as part of a culturally unique program.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> The P visa program has no wage rules or worker protections and is administered exclusively by DHS, which has no dedicated staff or expertise on worker rights.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> This is extremely troubling, given that H-2B workers employed at fairs, amusement parks, and carnivals work grueling hours and in terrible conditions, making them some of the most exploited H-2B workers—as advocacy groups have pointed out.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> These workers are often paid below the minimum wage and are not paid for overtime hours. Yet it is unclear if DOL would have any formal oversight role to ensure they are protected as P-4 workers.</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 states that employers hiring H-2B fair and carnival workers through the P visa “shall be subject to the same program requirements that govern the admission” of H-2B workers, but it does not give clear authority to DOL to administer the P-4 visa program, nor explicitly state that post-entry H-2B worker protections will apply to P-4 workers. (The current H-2B program and rules are administered and enforced by DOL.) The legislation further directs DHS and DOL to each separately publish regulations to implement H-2B fair and carnival workers being moved to the P-4 visa program within 180 days and to finalize them within one year. But there is little direction from Congress in the legislation on how the H-2B program requirements will be implemented and enforced. Will DHS publish identical regulations to DOL’s H-2B rules and enforce them? Will DOL enforce the DHS regulations? Or will each play a role in enforcing the wage and worker protection regulations in the H-2B program? And will employers be allowed to begin hiring fair and carnival workers with P-4 visas before any regulations that include wage and worker protections are finalized?</p>
<p>The language in Section 411 reflects previously introduced legislation in the House and Senate during the 119th Congress: H.R. 2729, Carnivals are Real Entertainment Act (also known as the CARE Act), and a similar companion bill, S. 1281, <em>Restoring </em>Industry Development in Entertainment (RIDE) Act. However, the legislators on the House Appropriations Committee who support this amendment have provided no explanation or rationale for why it makes sense to create an entirely new process and set of regulations to move one of the biggest H-2B occupations from DOL into DHS—an agency that will be given primary responsibility over the P-4 visa and protecting fair and carnival workers, but that has no mandate or expertise on labor standards and employment laws. The most obvious explanation is that this legislative maneuver is simply a new way to expand the H-2B cap even beyond 270,000, in a way that gives fair and carnival employers an unlimited supply of workers who can be exploited and underpaid. It also generally seems absurd to put a low-paid traveling carnival worker into the same visa category—where there’s no labor oversight—as a professional baseball player coming from abroad to sign a multimillion-dollar contract with a major league team, or a world-famous singer, dancer, or painter.</p>
<h2>Republicans in Congress are using the appropriations process to avoid scrutiny and expand H-2A and H-2B, while the administration seeks to deport millions</h2>
<p>Finally, for over a decade at least, Congress has repeatedly changed policy on temporary work visa programs through an opaque process: riders attached to annual appropriations legislation, like the ones examined in this report.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Riders that make policy changes are much more likely to pass without much public notice, debate, or pushback relative to dedicated legislation, since they are smaller parts of larger, must-pass legislation to fund the entire U.S. government. The significant changes proposed or passed for H-2A and H-2B visas in riders over the past decade have all pushed the programs toward the same direction: expansion, deregulation, and the watering down of worker protections, which benefits employers at the expense of U.S. workers and hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who will continue to see reduced wages and poorer working conditions.</p>
<p>Employers have a particular urgency to see riders that expand and deregulate the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, as the Trump administration arrests and deports workers at a breakneck pace and cancels temporary immigration protections that provided work authorization to millions.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> Employers are making the case that H-2 visas are “a workforce issue, not immigration,” as well as an essential service that must continue to function even during a government shutdown.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> Given the FY 2026 and FY 2027 riders in the House Homeland appropriations bills, it’s clear that a number of lawmakers and the Trump administration agree.</p>
<p>In effect, these legislators aim to create a deportation-to-guestworker pipeline, one where migrant workers who are deported or lose their status and work permit are left with only one viable option to work in the United States: as temporary migrant workers with few workplace rights because their employer owns and controls their ability to live and work in the country. Perhaps the legislator who is the most emblematic of the push to combine mass deportations with expanded guestworker programs is Rep. Andy Harris of Maryland, a Republican member on the House Appropriations Committee. <em>Politico</em> recently profiled him for leading the charge on the H-2A and H-2B riders in recent appropriations bills, highlighting also his strong support for President Trump’s mass deportation efforts.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> Apparently, for Rep. Harris, there is no irony in supporting Trump’s removal of millions of employees who support the U.S. economy while simultaneously purporting to represent the interests of employers who say they don’t have enough workers, and tirelessly working to expand low-wage guestworker programs. It’s reasonable to ask whether the Harris strategy is to ensure that the only people from abroad who can work in the United States are those willing to be quasi-indentured to the employers that recruit them—and who accept that they will never become citizens able to fully participate in U.S. economic and political life.</p>
<h2><strong>The H-2A and H-2B programs need reform to improve labor protections and provide workers with a pathway to citizenship</strong></h2>
<p>The appropriations committees in the House and Senate should not use parliamentary tactics like provisions in appropriations bills to make changes to the H-2A and H-2B programs that would likely not pass in Congress through regular order. Instead, policymakers and the public must reject the harmful and unjustified proposals coming from Trump and Congress to expand programs that allow employers to underpay migrant workers and keep those workers indentured and controlled by employers.</p>
<p>Instead of pursuing a strategy that combines deportations with expanded guestworker programs, Congress should work with the executive branch to reform both the H-2A and H-2B visa programs in the following ways:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Provide green cards to undocumented farmworkers and a path to a green card for farmworkers recruited from abroad through the H-2A program</li>
<li>Rescind the October 2025 Adverse Effect Wage Rate and reinstitute the Farm Labor Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which was previously used to set H-2A wages</li>
<li>Prohibit H-2A visas, which are for temporary and seasonal jobs, from being used for year-round agricultural jobs like those on dairy and poultry farms and in greenhouses; workers from abroad who are recruited to fill year-round, permanent jobs must be granted a permanent status instead</li>
<li>Provide H-2A and H-2B workers with new protections from retaliation and allow them to more easily change jobs</li>
<li>Craft updated wage rules that protect U.S. wage standards for all workers in H-2B industries</li>
<li>Provide H-2B workers with a quick path to a green card after being in H-2B status for 18 months</li>
<li>Ensure U.S. workers seeking employment in H-2B occupations are adequately considered for open temporary and seasonal jobs by requiring employers to hire available U.S. workers and offer them housing and transportation</li>
<li>Prohibit lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-2A or H-2B programs by creating a screening and registration system</li>
</ul>
<p>In addition, the Trump administration has tacitly admitted and shown through policy actions described in this report that migrant workers are making important contributions to the U.S. economy in key industries. Rather than continue to harm the economy through immigration enforcement, it should end its mass deportation efforts and reinstate humanitarian protections like Temporary Protected Status and parole for persons who have been stripped of them and lost their work permits.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> For more background, see these two blog posts discussing the provisions on H-2A and H-2B that were passed in the FY 2026 House Homeland appropriations legislation: Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">Congressional Budget Amendment and New DOL Wage Rule Together Would Greatly Expand Work Visas for Farmworkers and Drastically Lower Their Wages</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 5, 2025; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/rider-in-the-house-homeland-security-appropriations-bill-would-increase-the-number-of-workers-in-the-h-2b-visa-program-by-113000/">Rider in the House Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Would Increase the Number of Workers in the H-2B Visa Program by 113,000</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), December 11, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> For the legislative text, see <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/9310/text">H.R.9310 &#8211; Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2027</a>, 119th Congress (2025-2026), placed on the Union Calendar on June 12, 2026. See also House Appropriations Chairman Tom Cole, “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-releases-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-bill">Committee Releases FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill</a>,” Press Release, June 4, 2026; “<a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy27-homeland-security-appropriations-act">Committee Approves FY27 Homeland Security Appropriations Act</a>,” Press Release, June 11, 2026; and for the roll call vote on the bill, see House of Representatives, Roll Call 15 in “<a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AP/AP00/20260609/119380/HMKP-119-AP00-20260609-SD008.pdf">Full Committee Votes</a>,” June 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> For more background on temporary work visas, their flaws, and proposed reforms, see Daniel Costa, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/">Temporary Work Visa Programs and the Need for Reform: A Briefing on Program Frameworks, Policy Issues and Fixes, and the Impact of COVID-19</a></em>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Laura Romero, “<a href="https://abcnews.com/US/us-1st-time-50-years-experienced-negative-net/story?id=129175522">US, for 1st Time in 50 Years, Experienced Negative Net Migration in 2025: Report</a>,” ABC News, January 13, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> William Frey, “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-immigration-may-shape-america-after-250/">America Is Turning 250. Here’s How Immigration May Shape Its Future</a>,” Brookings Institution, June 25, 2026; see question 6 in Daniel Costa et al., “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/immigrants-and-the-economy/">Immigrants and the Economy</a>,” in <em>Immigration FAQ</em>, Economic Policy Institute, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See, for example, Economic Policy Institute, <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/deportation-calculator/">The Cost of Deportations Calculator</a></em> (interactive tool), accessed October 25, 2026; AFL-CIO and ACLU, <a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/citizenship-and-affordability-agenda"><em>Citizenship and the Affordability Agenda: A Path to Better Jobs, Higher Wages, and Prosperity for All</em></a>, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See, for example, Nicole Foy et al., “<a href="https://projects.propublica.org/american-citizens-detained-dhs-civil-rights/">506 U.S. Citizens Detained</a>,” <em>ProPublica</em>, October 6, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/11/immigration-crackdown-food-prices/">Trump Administration Says Immigration Enforcement Threatens Higher Food Prices</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, October 11, 2025; David Dayen, “<a href="https://prospect.org/2025/10/08/trump-labor-department-says-his-immigration-raids-are-causing-a-food-crisis/">Trump Labor Department Says His Immigration Raids Are Causing a Food Crisis</a>,” <em>American Prospect</em>, October 8, 2025; Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Chris Cameron, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/30/us/politics/h2b-visas.html">Trump Officials Move to Double Number of H-2B Guest Visas This Year</a>,” <em>New York Times</em>, January 30, 2026. For more background on H-2B appropriations riders giving the executive branch authority to expand the program, see Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/">Unemployment Has Increased for U.S.-Born Workers in the Face of Mass Deportations: Trump’s Draconian Immigration Enforcement Is Harming All Workers</a>,” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), April 3, 2026; Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://bsky.app/profile/benzipperer.org/post/3muoyodo4wk26">Trump&#8217;s mass deportations were sold as a major jobs program, but they&#8217;re still failing to help U.S.-born workers</a>,” Bluesky, @benzipperer.org, September 4, 2026, 5:46 a.m.; Marcela Escobari, Ian Seyal, and Paul Beach, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/ice-enforcement-employment-effects-us-cities/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Shock, Awe, and Economic Fallout: The Employment Effects of ICE Enforcement in U.S. Cities</em></a>, Brookings Institution, May 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> For more background, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026; see also discussion in Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Lauren Kaori Gurley, Mariana Alfaro, and Jarrell Dillard, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/06/27/inside-trump-administrations-move-expand-immigrant-labor-dairy-farmers/">Trump Allows Dairy Farms a Path for Migrant Labor, Upsetting Anti-Immigration Camp</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, June 27, 2026. However, a statutory change made with an appropriations rider would presumably have to be renewed yearly. The H-2B riders that allow the executive branch to double the program with supplementary visas have been renewed every year since FY 2016, suggesting that once these riders make it into the bill, they are likely to be renewed as part of the yearly underlying bills.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> The industries listed do not include the many year-round (or nearly year-round) jobs that can be found on crop farms, including equipment operators and supervisors. It’s possible that up to one-third of the total 1.6 million full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture could be year-round.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> The AEWR IFR has been challenged in federal court and vacated on procedural grounds, but the court left the current AEWR in place for the time being, with an order issued to DOL to issue a new AEWR methodology by December 30, 2026. What will result from a new methodology is an open question, but the possibility remains that the new rule could be similar to the current rule, if DOL fulfills the procedural requirements. For more background, see, for example, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://flag.dol.gov/announcement/2026-09-02">OFLC Announces Updates to Implementation of the H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for Non-Range Occupations Interim Final Rule; Compliance with District Court Order</a>” (announcement), September 2, 2026, U.S. Department of Labor; Envoy Global, “<a href="https://www.envoyglobal.com/news-alert/federal-court-orders-dol-to-replace-h-2a-wage-methodology/">Federal Court Orders DOL to Replace H-2A Wage Methodology</a>,” updated October 5, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 7 in Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s New H-2A Wage Rule Will Radically Cut the Wages of All Farmworkers: New Estimates Show Farmworkers Stand to Lose $4.4 to $5.4 Billion Annually Under DOL’s Updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Except, arguably, for some positions in dairy as a result of the June 2026 USCIS memo; however, even employers hiring through that route must demonstrate that the need for the H-2A dairy worker is seasonal or temporary. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Policy Memorandum PM-602-0200, Subject: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/policy-alerts/PM-602-0200-H2APetitionsForDairying-20260617.pdf"><em>Guidance on Temporary or Seasonal Need for H-2A Petitions for Dairying</em></a>, June 17, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> The amounts have not been adjusted for inflation. The 2026 AEWR provides two “skill levels” for farmworkers, which are set at specific percentiles along the distribution of Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics wages surveyed. Skill Level 1 is the 17th percentile while Skill Level 2 is the median (50th percentile) of wages surveyed. For this calculation, I am only estimating the wage differentials for H-2A workers in year-round jobs who are classified by employers at Skill Level 1, which DOL estimates will account for 92% of all H-2A workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> For a discussion of the first instance of H-2B riders in the FY 2016 appropriations legislation, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> For more background, see discussion in Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services information pages for P visa subcategories: <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1a-athlete">P-1A Athlete</a>, last updated March 26, 2026; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1b-a-member-of-an-internationally-recognized-entertainment-group">P-1B A Member of an Internationally Recognized Entertainment Group</a>, last updated January 24, 2025; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-2-individual-performer-or-part-of-a-group-entering-to-perform-under-a-reciprocal-exchange-program">P-2 Individual Performer or Part of a Group Entering to Perform Under a Reciprocal Exchange Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-3-artist-or-entertainer-coming-to-be-part-of-a-culturally-unique-program">P-3 Artist or Entertainer Coming to Be Part of a Culturally Unique Program</a>, last updated February 24, 2021; U.S. Department of Homeland Security.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> While there is a requirement from USCIS that an appropriate labor organization be consulted and provide a written letter for a P visa petition, it is unlikely, but ultimately unclear, that this requirement will apply to the new P-4 category. Further, there is no DOL labor certification, no prevailing wage requirement, and no DOL enforcement of P visa program rules to protect workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> See, for example, Centro de los Derechos del Migrante and American University Washington College of Law Immigrant Justice Clinic, <a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Taken_Ride.pdf"><em>Taken for a Ride: Migrant Workers in the U.S. Fair and Carnival Industry</em></a>, February 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/"><em>The H-2B Temporary Foreign Worker Program: For Labor Shortages or Cheap, Temporary Labor?</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, January 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">The Substance and Impact of the H-2B Guestworker Program Appropriations Riders Some Members of Congress Are Trying to Renew</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), June 17, 2016; Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">Proposal to Change the H-2A Program via Appropriations Would Allow Agribusiness to Fill Hundreds of Thousands of Permanent, Year-Round Jobs with Temporary Guestworkers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 25, 2017; Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-2b-industries-and-wage-theft/"><em>As the H-2B Visa Program Grows, the Need for Reforms That Protect Workers Is Greater Than Ever: Employers Stole $1.8 Billion from Workers in the Industries That Employed Most H-2B Workers Over the Past Two Decades</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 2022; Daniel Costa and Josh Bivens, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/"><em>The H-2B Visa Program Has Ballooned Without Being Fixed. Expanding It to Year-Round Jobs Like Meatpacking Would Lower Wages and Revenue: A High-Road Employment Strategy That Includes Green Cards Would Raise Wages and Spur Investment Instead</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> See, for example, Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trump-attacks-on-temporary-immigration-protections-like-tps-hurt-the-economy-and-strip-millions-of-their-workplace-rights/">Trump Attacks on Temporary Immigration Protections Like TPS Hurt the Economy and Strip Millions of Their Workplace Rights</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> <em>Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), May 12, 2025; Carolyne Im and Mia Hennen, “<a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2026/08/12/second-trump-administration-has-ended-temporary-protected-status-for-most-immigrants-who-had-it/">Second Trump Administration Has Ended Temporary Protected Status for Most Immigrants Who Had It</a>,” <em>Short Reads</em> (Pew Research Center), August 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Andrew Kreighbaum, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/stalled-release-of-seasonal-h-2b-visas-puts-strain-on-employers">Stalled Release of Seasonal H-2B Visas Puts Strain on Employers</a>,” <em>Bloomberg Law</em>, March 26, 2025; Nick Niedzwiadek, “<a href="https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/10/dol-brings-back-immigration-staff-as-shutdown-drags-on-00631426">DOL Brings Back Visa-Processing Staff as Shutdown Drags On</a>,” <em>Politico Pro</em>, October 31, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Jennifer Scholtes, “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/04/10/andy-harris-immigration-foreign-workers-00867621">The Trump Ally Cracking Down on Immigration in Washington — and Bringing in Foreign Workers Back Home</a>,” <em>Politico</em>, April 12, 2026.</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DHS elimination of the 60-day grace period for workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1, and TN visa programs</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dhs-elimination-of-the-60-day-grace-period-for-workers-in-the-e-1-e-2-e-3-h-1b-h-1b1-l-1-o-1-and-tn-visa-programs/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 19:32:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328334</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Office of Policy and United States Citizenship and Immigration Service Department of Homeland Security 5900 Capital Gateway Camp Springs, MD Re: U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/11/2026-18631/eliminating-the-discretionary-60-day-grace-period"><em>Submitted via FederalRegister.gov</em></a></p>
<p>Office of Policy and Strategy<br />
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS)<br />
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)<br />
5900 Capital Gateway Drive<br />
Camp Springs, MD 20746&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Re: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/09/11/2026-18631/eliminating-the-discretionary-60-day-grace-period"><strong><em>Eliminating the Discretionary 60-Day Grace Period</em></strong></a><strong>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, </strong><strong>CIS No. 2858-26, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2026-0364,</strong><strong> RIN 1615-AD22, </strong><strong>91 Fed. Reg. 57807 (September 11, 2026).</strong></p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the elimination of the discretionary 60-day grace period for certain nonimmigrants in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 or TN classifications. EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the H-1B and L-1 programs, and other temporary work visa programs and green cards. EPI has published extensively on issues related to H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuse of H-1B and other visa programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p><strong>EPI opposes the proposed rule</strong> and believes it arbitrary and capricious, and will potentially harm over a million workers in nonimmigrants statuses, as well as U.S.-born workers who are similarly employed, and have significant negative economic impacts across numerous industries that have not been considered or calculated by DHS. The ultimate impact will be to grant employers with even more power to exploit H-1B and other visa programs for university-educated workers with impunity and to degrade standards generally for workers in professional occupations. Rather than eliminating the 60-day grace period established at 8 CFR § 214.1(l)(2), DHS should extend the grace period to 120 days.</p>
<h2>Over one million workers will be impacted by the proposed rule, many of whom are in the green card backlog.</h2>
<p>DHS does not attempt to estimate the total population of workers currently employed in the impacted visa classifications of E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 and TN. The Office of Homeland Security Statistics could likely have provided an estimate for the NPRM. The lack of an estimate prevents the public from understanding the size of the total stock of workers for whom the NPRM would strip of the ability to leave an abusive or lawbreaking employer, forcing them to risk their ability to reside and work in the United States, or to even have enough time to gather their belongings before they are considered out of status and at risk of detention and deportation.</p>
<p>We have provided a rough estimate shown below in <strong>Table 1 </strong>on the total stock of workers employed in the impacted classifications as of fiscal year (FY) 2019, which is just over one million. (a more recent year was not chosen because of data limitations in multiple classifications.) The vast majority are in the H-1B program with over 583,0000 workers employed, as well as the L-1 program with 200,000, and E-2 and TN where over 100,000 are employed in each.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-328259 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="328259" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/328259-36113-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Further, a significant share of workers in this population are on the path to lawful permanent residence (i.e., getting a green card), meaning their employer has submitted an I-140 petition to adjust their status. But because of annual numerical limits and country caps on green cards, there are significant wait times that can often last decades for applicants. In total, there are an estimated 1.2 million people in the employment-based green card backlog.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> While there is no official estimate of the shares in the different visa or status classifications, data on permanent labor certifications—the first step towards getting a green card for most H-1B workers—show that the vast majority are likely to be in H-1B status. In 2023, 64.3% of permanent labor certifications were for H-1B workers and 4.8% were for L-1 workers, accounting for a total of 69.1% of labor certifications in just those two classifications.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<h2>U.S. temporary work visa programs lack adequate regulation, worker protections, and labor standards enforcement.</h2>
<p>Through numerous reports, commentary, and testimony over many years, EPI has shown how temporary work visa programs—including the categories implicated by the proposed rule that allow employers to recruit and hire mostly university-educated workers from abroad—represent a flawed employment model that restricts workers’ rights by giving employers control over their workers’ immigration status.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> The H-1B program’s inadequate wage rules and worker protections, and lack of enforcement from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and the fact that the E-1, E-2, E-3, L-1, O-1 and TN programs have zero wage or worker protections, are directly contributing to the undercutting of U.S. labor standards.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> The programs lack adequate regulations and enforcement to protect workplace rights and fail to provide workers with a pathway to becoming lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens, leaving workers indentured for years and even decades. Given this reality, DHS should put in place measures—like grace periods, visa portability, and deferred action for workers with bona fide workplace complaints—that can act as safety valves for workers employed with nonimmigrant visas that need to leave an abusive and/or illegal employment situation. Instead, DHS is making conditions much worse for this cohort of workers by removing their freedom to walk away from an employer and seek employment elsewhere. It is exacerbating the already disastrous situation it has caused for workers when it rescinded the process established in 2023 that allowed workers the opportunity to apply for immigration protections when assisting a qualifying labor agency in conducting an employer investigation.</p>
<h2>The ability to leave an abusive employment situation is a fundamental worker right and DHS is proposing to eliminate it, which will degrade wages and working conditions.</h2>
<p>The vast majority of workers in the United States can leave an abusive employment situation—for example when they are not being paid the wages promised or when conditions are illegally hazardous—and seek alternative employment without a penalty. They are also able to report labor and employment law violations to the relevant state and local labor standards enforcement agencies without fear or any immediate penalty. This freedom to leave an employer acts as a check on the power of employers, so that they do not offer conditions that are unbearably and illegally poor. In short, workers who can change jobs or leave a lawbreaking employer without fear can bargain more effectively for fair and decent wages and seek career advancement opportunities they are qualified for. While this may seem like common sense, there is research to support it. For example, Mukhopadhyay and Oxborrow found that the wage gain associated with moving from an H-1B visa to an employment-based green card was $11,860 per year.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>Statutes and regulations in temporary work visa programs, however, put migrant workers in a nonimmigrant status into a much more precarious and dangerous situation. Such workers do not have equal rights: Most visa programs do not permit migrant workers to easily leave a job or permit them to change jobs, making it difficult for them to leave an abusive employment situation. In essence, these visa programs operate in practice to create a labor market monopsony for employers—awarding employers greater leverage over their workers<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a>—and growing research has shown that even modest amounts of employer monopsony power are utterly corrosive to workers’ ability to bargain for better wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> In the limited visa programs where workers may have the ability to change jobs, many find it difficult in practice, because the U.S. government has not created a sensible and holistic system allowing them to find new opportunities in a reasonable amount of time.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>In addition, many workers have invested thousands of dollars to recruiters to obtain their temporary job, often taking on significant amounts of debt to do so, whether it’s in the H-2A, H-2B, or H-1B programs, or for employment-based (EB) green cards. If leaving a job means sacrificing a valid immigration status and the opportunity to continue working in the United States and to earn back the investments made, then workers are much more likely to opt to remain in an abusive employment situation, which degrades wages and working conditions—not just for the migrant workers themselves, but also for U.S. workers who are similarly employed.</p>
<p>Migrant workers in the impacted classifications will be far less likely to file complaints when employers violate the law, if it means risking a retaliatory termination that would result in the worker’s immediate loss of status and investments and triggering the need to depart the United States. If an employer unlawfully retaliates against a worker, there would be insufficient time to file a complaint with the relevant government agency, whether seeking reinstatement or back pay for wage and hour violations—and if the worker is a union member, there would be insufficient time to file a grievance through any established mechanisms. In fact, there would be no time to do so, since the worker must depart immediately after their termination.</p>
<p>As we’ve stated on numerous occasions and in multiple publications, workers in H-1B and other nonimmigrant statuses at a disadvantage in the workplace vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts because they have significantly less job mobility based on their temporary and precarious immigration status. But with the 60-day grace period created in its 2016 regulation, DHS took a major step towards leveling the playing field between employers and workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1, and TN classifications. While nevertheless insufficient to remedy the known flaws in work visa programs, the grace period was supported broadly by unions and worker advocacy groups. By proposing to eliminate one of the few worker protections in the targeted visa programs—impacting over one million workers—DHS is taking a major step backwards when it comes to protecting labor standards for U.S. workers and migrant workers. Overnight, one million workers will become indentured to their employers. Those one million workers are employed in fields as diverse as information technology, artificial intelligence, health care and medicine, engineering, and finance. U.S. workers in those fields will also be impacted negatively by their colleagues lacking workplace rights.</p>
<h2>Many of the workers impacted by the rule have resided in the United States for over a decade and have spouses employed in the United States and U.S. citizen children.</h2>
<p>Many of the workers impacted by the rule have resided in the United States for over a decade and have U.S. citizen children, and have made long term economic investments, such as purchasing homes, and are well integrated into their local communities. Cutting off the ability for these workers to find alternative employment and in many cases to continue on the path to a green card if they are terminated or laid off at work, or because their employer has engaged in unethical or illegal behavior, and forcing them to immediately depart the country, is not justified by any of the arguments or evidence presented by DHS in the NPRM.</p>
<p>Although no official count is available, there are hundreds of thousands of spouses of H-1B, L-1, and O-1 principal nonimmigrants who are likely employed and will also be impacted by elimination of the 60-day grace period. They will lose their employment and their employers will abruptly lose employees who will be forced to immediately depart the United States, disrupting the economy and labor market. Tens to hundreds of thousands of children—some share of whom are in a nonimmigrants status, and some share of whom are U.S. citizens—will also be impacted. Those children will have their education severely disrupted and interrupted, as parents will have no time to formally withdraw them from school and get their records in order, or to find another school in the country of origin.</p>
<p>The significant equities accrued, especially by long-term nonimmigrant workers, and the interest and well-being of the families who rely on them, significantly outweighs the administrative burdens which DHS overstates and primarily cites as their justification for eliminating the 60-day grace period.</p>
<h2>DHS has not calculated the economic impact of stripping over one million workers of an essential component of their workplace rights.</h2>
<p>DHS has failed to consider or estimate the significant costs that will be incurred not just by the more than one million nonimmigrant workers themselves, but also U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and other workers with employment authorization documents due to the increased restriction on worker mobility in these visa programs. In fact, various economic studies have shown that limiting worker mobility has a direct negative effect on the wages of all workers in a labor market, even those not subject to those limitations.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Eliminating the 60-day grace period will ultimately result in one million workers being indentured to their employers in numerous critical industries.</p>
<h2>Conclusion: DHS should rescind the proposed rule and instead increase the grace period to 120 days.</h2>
<p>As discussed above, a grace period of only 60 days is insufficient to permit workers in the E-1, E-2, E-3, H-1B, H-1B1, L-1, O-1 and TN classifications—who have been recruited from abroad and hired to participate and contribute to the U.S. labor market—to get their affairs in order, which may require selling a home and pulling children out of school. It is irrational, cruel, and arbitrary, and capricious to require such workers to depart the United States immediately, solely due to the whims of U.S. employers. Such workers should be permitted an adequate amount of time to find alternative employment in the United States, as well as to get their affairs in order if they choose to depart the country. Their spouses who are legally employed should also be permitted to benefit from an adequate grace period, which will benefit not just them, but the U.S. employers who hire them, who are provided with an opportunity to seek a replacement with a grace period, rather than having an employee who is required to depart the country immediately when their spouse’s employment is terminated.</p>
<p>DHS should rescind the NPRM, but as noted above, the 60-day grace period status quo, and the portability provisions in the implicated classifications, are inadequate to protect workers and labor standards. Instead, DHS should issue a new proposed rule to increase the grace period to 120 days. If deemed necessary, DHS could determine a shorter grace period for nonimmigrant workers who have resided in the United States for shorter periods. For example, a worker employed in nonimmigrant status for over three years could be entitled to a 120 day grace period, while a worker employed for fewer than three years could be entitled to a shorter period of at least 90 days.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Daniel Costa, Esq.<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> National Foundation for American Policy, <a href="https://nfap.com/research/new-nfap-policy-brief-employment-based-immigration-backlogs-and-waiting-times/"><em>Employment-Based Immigration Backlogs and Waiting Times</em></a>, NFAP Policy Brief, August 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Office of Foreign Labor Certification, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/PERM_Selected_Statistics_FY2023_Q4.pdf">Permanent Employment Program – Selected Statistics, Fiscal Year (FY) 2023</a>,” Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> For more background on temporary work visas, their flaws, and proposed reforms, see Daniel Costa,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-work-visa-reform/"><em>Temporary Work Visa Programs and the Need for Reform: A Briefing on Program Frameworks, Policy Issues and Fixes, and the Impact of COVID-19</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021; Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmpvb/analysis-claims-migrant-tech-workers-have-been-underpaid-by-tens-of-millions">Analysis Claims Migrant Tech Workers Have Been Underpaid by Tens of Millions</a>,” Vice News, December 9, 2021; Centro de los Derechos del Migrante, <a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Coerced-under-NAFTA_-Abuses-of-Migrant-Workers-in-TN-Visa-Program.pdf"><em>Coerced under NAFTA: Abuses of Migrant Workers in the TN Visa Program and Recommendations for Reform</em></a>, 2017; George Avalos, “<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2014/10/22/workers-paid-1-21-an-hour-to-install-fremont-tech-companys-computers/">Workers Paid $1.21 an Hour to Install Fremont Tech Company’s Computers</a>.”&nbsp;<em>The Mercury News</em>, October 22, 2014; Farah Stockman, “<a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/editorials/2013/06/11/your-child-teacher-victim-human-trafficking/dQz2fYPwg6Xkgt1aV6HaiL/story.html">Teacher Trafficking: The Strange Saga of Filipino Workers, American Schools, and H-1B Visas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Boston Globe</em>, June 12, 2013; Maria Perez, “American farms recruit Mexican veterinarians for jobs as animal scientists — but the real work is milking cows and cleaning pens for low pay,” <em>Milwaukee Journal Sentinel</em>, December 4, 2019 (updated Feb. 18, 2020).</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Sankar Mukhopadhyay and David Oxborrow,&nbsp;“<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13524-011-0079-3">The Value of an Employment-Based Green Card</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Demography</em>&nbsp;49: 219–237, February 2012.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Bivens and Shierholz broadly define “monopsony power” as “the leverage enjoyed by employers to set their workers’ pay.” See Josh Bivens and Heidi Shierholz,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/what-labor-market-changes-have-generated-inequality-and-wage-suppression-employer-power-is-significant-but-largely-constant-whereas-workers-power-has-been-eroded-by-policy-actions/"><em>What Labor Market Changes Have Generated Inequality and Wage Suppression?: Employer Power Is Significant but Largely Constant, Whereas Workers’ Power Has Been Eroded by Policy Actions</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, Dec. 12, 2018.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Eric M. Gibbons et al., “<a href="http://ftp.iza.org/dp12096.pdf">Monopsony Power and Guest Worker Programs</a>,” IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Discussion Paper no. 12096, January 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> For a discussion about H-1B and TN visa portability in practice, see Daniel Costa, “Is portability a panacea? Changing employers in US temporary migration programmes,” chapter 8 in Christiane Kuptsch and Fabiola Mieres (eds.),&nbsp;<a href="https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/new-ilo-publication-explores-path-social-justice-migrant-workers"><em>Temporary labour migration: Towards social justice?</em></a>&nbsp;edited volume, International Labour Organization, February 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> See for example, the economic literature on noncompete clauses, including, Evan Starr, “<a href="https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.20251457">The Economics of Noncompete Clauses</a>,” <em>Journal of Economic Perspectives</em> 40, no. 1 (2026): 139-166;, Matthew Johnson, Kurt Lavetti, and Michael Lipsitz, “<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3455381">The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker Mobility</a>,” available at SSRN, June 6, 2020.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on ICE proposed rule to create a new fee for the Optional Practical Training program</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-ice-proposed-rule-to-create-a-new-fee-for-the-optional-practical-training-program/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 15:44:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=328287</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted electronically via the Federal Office of the Principal Legal Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department of Homeland Security 500 12th St Washington, DC Re: Optional Practical Training Fees (Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/08/2026-20660/optional-practical-training-fees"><em>Submitted electronically via </em><em>the Federal Register</em></a></p>
<p>Office of the Principal Legal Advisor<br />
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)<br />
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)<br />
500 12th St SW<br />
Washington, DC 20536</p>
<p><strong>Re: </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/10/08/2026-20660/optional-practical-training-fees"><strong><em>Optional Practical Training Fees</em></strong></a><strong> (Docket No. ICEB-2026-0100; RIN 1653-AB01), Notice of proposed rulemaking, 91 Fed. Reg. 64566 (October 8, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding new fees that will be imposed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on universities for students and graduates seeking to participate in the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program. EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the OPT and H-1B programs—including on H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuses of H-1B.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> (Significant numbers of H-1B workers were first employed in the United States through OPT program, so much so that OPT can reasonably be viewed as an H-1B program with fewer rules and worker protections.)</p>
<p>Educating foreign students is a long-standing and laudable feature of the U.S. higher education system. By any measure, the U.S. remains the most attractive place for the international students looking to study outside of their home countries. The United States attracts the most, and more importantly the best and brightest students, from all corners of the globe. The principal reason for this is the massive long-term investment U.S. taxpayers have made in the higher education system; equipping university laboratories with state-of-the-art research equipment and attracting the best faculty. But through funding cuts for research and attacks on universities, the current administration has put all of this at risk for current and future generations of students—both U.S.-born and foreign-born—jeopardizing scientific discoveries and innovations that benefit the U.S. economy.</p>
<p>A separate but related issue is that the U.S. employment-based immigration system has serious flaws when it comes to protecting workers and labor standards, and major reforms are long overdue. One especially flawed component of the system is the OPT program, through which U.S. employers hire and employ hundreds of thousands of student workers and recent university graduates every year.</p>
<p>We believe that U.S. policy should seek to attract and retain the best and brightest students from around the globe. Those who are eventually allowed to work in U.S. labor market, however, should be paid according to U.S. wage standards, and before being hired, employers should be required to test the labor market to ensure that no U.S. workers already present in the United States are available. Recent foreign graduates of U.S. universities who meet certain qualifications should then also be allowed to quickly obtain lawful permanent resident status (a green card), so that they are not bonded to employers by virtue a precarious immigration status, and so they can fully integrate into economic and political life in the United States. Those general principles should guide our labor migration policy to ensure that foreign students entering the U.S. labor market will fill demonstrated labor shortages and not be exploitable and underpaid “guestworkers.” Otherwise employers will be allowed to hijack the immigration system in a way that puts downward pressure on the wages of all workers in the United States and overlooks local workers seeking employment opportunities.</p>
<p>One of the best ways to achieve this with respect to the student workers and recent graduates who work in OPT would be for ICE and DHS to support regulatory and statutory changes that will ensure workers can exercise their labor and employment rights free of employer retaliation or coercion. To that end, EPI urges the administration to support and work with Congress for passage of the Keep STEM Talent Act, bipartisan legislation that enables talented graduates from U.S. colleges and universities to continue contributing to the U.S. economy while ensuring that they are paid fairly and that U.S.-born professional workers are not overlooked for entry-level positions. Under this legislation, international graduates who earn advanced STEM degrees from U.S. universities would be exempt from the annual numerical caps on green cards if their employers receive approved labor certifications and pay them at least the local median wage level for their specific occupation. The Keep STEM Talent Act would offer in-demand graduates a high-road alternative to precarious temporary work visas, while enhancing America’s global leadership.</p>
<p><strong><u>EPI opposes the proposed rule.</u></strong></p>
<p>Sadly, the proposed rule does not represent a true reform of the OPT program. Rather, it is an attempt to discourage usage of the program by penalizing both host universities and the students and graduates who will be prohibited from entry-level training and job opportunities. Therefore, EPI opposes the proposed rule and urges ICE/DHS to withdraw it: Requiring a fee of $70,000 for initial OPT applications and $30,000 for any subsequent OPT is arbitrary and capricious, and does not serve the interests of workers in the United States. EPI proposes that DHS consider alternative, more holistic reforms, which are outlined herein.</p>
<h2><strong>ICE’s claim that the proposed OPT fees are needed to administer the program and fight fraud is not credible given ICE cannot use those funds.</strong></h2>
<p>ICE in the NPRM cites rapid growth in the program and serious instances of fraud. Both are valid concerns in a program that has no real worker protections that can be enforced to protect labor standards and hold lawbreaking employers accountable. However, ICE has so far chosen not to create worker protections or seriously combat fraud, while now claiming that “without the fees proposed in this rule, it cannot operate OPT consistent with its focus on preventing fraud and may shut down the program entirely.” There is an obvious problem with this rationale, which ICE admits in the proposed rule, when stating that ICE does not have authority to maintain or use these excessive new fees. In fact, the proposed rule explains that the fees would be deposited in the U.S. Treasury as a “miscellaneous receipt” and that the funds would not be able to be used for any aspect of the OPT program without Congressional action. Thus, the fees will be used to fund government activities that are unrelated to OPT. In addition, given the level of appropriations ICE has received since fiscal year (FY) 2025, which total over $116 billion that can be used through FY 2029,<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> it is likely that ICE could find already appropriated funding that it could redirect and use for administering the OPT program and combatting fraud. This maneuver would be subject to congressional limits on ICE funding but should be explored considering the exorbitant amounts of funding that ICE has already received.</p>
<h2>Rather than a new proposed fee, ICE should consider alternative reforms to the OPT program that would protect wages and working conditions for all workers.</h2>
<p>In the proposed rule, ICE has failed to consider a range of alternatives that could improve the OPT program and more effectively achieve its purported goals of reducing fraud and helping U.S. workers. For example, ICE could require that employers pay OPT workers at prevailing wages and recruit U.S. workers before hiring OPT workers. ICE could prevent employers that engage in fraud or violate wage and hour and labor laws from employing student workers through the OPT program. ICE could also require transparency in the OPT program by including public disclosure of all employers and the wages paid to OPT workers and their occupations. ICE could ban the use of OPT by outsourcing, staffing, and placement agencies. ICE could also support universities and labor organizations to provide educational materials to student workers about their workplace rights and provide immigration status protections for student workers who report labor violations. Some of these proposed reforms are discussed in the following subsections.</p>
<h4><strong>a) The OPT program lacks adequate wage rules that would protect against undercutting U.S. wage standards and the exploitation and underpayment of F-1 OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>The large size of the OPT program—with more initial approvals every year than the number of new H-1B petitions since at least FY 2015<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a>—means it is a large and significant pathway into the U.S. labor market. As such, there should be adequate wage safeguards to protect both U.S. workers and F-1 OPT workers, as well as labor standards more generally. They do not exist. ICE should thus implement a new and enforceable wage rule for OPT.</p>
<p>Regulatory language that governs the STEM OPT extension at 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(8) purports to protect wage standards through an employer attestation on the required training plans. That section reads:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><strong><em>Duties, hours, and compensation for training.</em></strong>&nbsp;The terms and conditions of a STEM practical training opportunity during the period of the 24-month OPT extension, including duties, hours, and compensation, must be commensurate with terms and conditions applicable to the employer&#8217;s similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment… If the employer does not employ and has not recently employed more than two similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment, the employer nevertheless remains obligated to attest that the terms and conditions of a STEM practical training opportunity are commensurate with the terms and conditions of employment for other similarly situated U.S. workers in the area of employment. “Similarly situated U.S. workers” includes U.S. workers performing similar duties subject to similar supervision and with similar educational backgrounds, industry expertise, employment experience, levels of responsibility, and skill sets as the student. The duties, hours, and compensation of such students are “commensurate” with those offered to U.S. workers employed by the employer in the same area of employment when the employer can show that the duties, hours, and compensation are consistent with the range of such terms and conditions the employer has offered or would offer to similarly situated U.S. employees. The student must disclose his or her compensation, including any adjustments, as agreed to with the employer, on the Form I-983 or successor form.</p>
<p>The provisions in this section are overly vague and deferential to employers and allow them to attest, such that they are virtually unenforceable in practice in any meaningful way. Has ICE ever found an employer to have violated these provisions, or enforced these provisions? And if so, how?</p>
<p>The current rule essentially allows employers to decide what the commensurate wage is for a U.S. worker who is “similarly situated” to the STEM OPT worker, and attest that they believe this is true. Under this rule the STEM OPT worker is then responsible for reporting the wage/salary information on their Mentoring and Training Plan.</p>
<p>There are two main problems with this. First, the employer should not be allowed to set the STEM OPT worker’s wage. The employer is not an uninterested party with the goal of ensuring fairness to U.S.-born and foreign-born workers. Employers are driven by a profit motive, and have a vested interest in, and derive profit from, paying employees the lowest wage possible (without losing the worker or violating the law). Instead, the wages paid to all OPT workers, including those on a STEM OPT extension, should be set according to data maintained by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) which show the average wages earned by workers in every region of the United States by occupation and local area.</p>
<p>A new rule that expanded the training plan requirement that includes the STEM OPT wage attestation to all OPT workers, for example, would not be sufficient. What’s needed is a simple and effective rule that would protect against the undercutting of U.S. wage standards by requiring that employers pay OPT workers the prevailing wage according to an existing and reliable wage data source, such as the DOL’s the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics survey, which is used to set H-1B wage levels. This makes sense considering the number of H-1B workers who are likely to have been employed in OPT immediately before changing to H-1B status. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ (USCIS) annual H-1B Characteristics report for FY 2024 reported that 37% of all new H-1B petitions were approved for someone in F status<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> and USCIS also posted on X.com that, for FY 2027, “An overwhelming 71.5% of selected aliens [for new employment in H-1B] hold a U.S. master’s degree or higher, compared to 57% last year.”<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Most of those selected petitions were likely for persons who were previously employed in OPT, thus, having a similar wage rule to H-1B and using the same data set used to set H-1B wages, could be a rational and sensible approach—so long as H-1B prevailing wage rates end up being set at reasonable levels in the methodology rule that is currently being finalized at DOL.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>In addition, the only clear statutory authority that has ever existed for an OPT-like program was a three-year pilot program created by section 221 of the 1990&nbsp;Immigration and Nationality Act<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> that allowed foreign graduates to work in fields unrelated to their degree. That pilot program&nbsp;required employers to pay workers the actual wage paid to similarly situated workers or a prevailing wage, as well as recruit U.S. workers for 60 days. While that program was later allowed to sunset, congressional direction about wages and employment opportunities for U.S. workers should inform ICE’s decision to mandate a clear, appropriate wage level for OPT participants who become employed after graduation.</p>
<p>Also, the OPT program does not contain an outright ban on employers who hire OPT employees as unpaid interns or volunteers, although volunteer work is not permitted for the STEM OPT extension. To prevent employers from hiring recent graduates and paying them nothing, ICE should propose a regulation that prohibits employers from hiring any OPT workers as unpaid interns or paying them only a non-salary “stipend” for their work.</p>
<h4><strong>b) The OPT program should require that employers advertise job openings to U.S. workers before hiring OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>Well over 200,000 F-1 nonimmigrants are employed in the United States every year through the OPT program. However, employers are not required to first advertise jobs filled by OPT workers for a set period of time. That means that U.S. workers—especially recent young college graduates looking for entry level opportunities, who are currently experiencing recession-level unemployment rates—may miss out on a chance to apply for these positions. In order to ensure that U.S. born and lawful permanent residents are not overlooked for entry level jobs in the United States, employers should have to advertise OPT job opportunities on an electronic public database for at least 60 days, and be required to hire any equally or better qualified U.S. workers who apply for those positions.</p>
<p>Employer attestation of the need for a worker, as permitted in the H-1B program, is an insufficient means of assessing real labor market needs and is an inadequate measure to protect the U.S. labor market. The OPT program does not even have that. The only related protective measure is a required employer attestation for STEM OPT employers, who are required to attest that their STEM OPT employee will not replace a full- or part-time, temporary, or permanent U.S. worker (see 8 § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(10)(ii)).</p>
<p>A more meaningful system that includes a labor certification requirement must be put in place for OPT, as well as all other visa programs that lack one. It is essential to prevent employer practices that exploit visa programs to undercut or displace an existing local workforce. Given the already substantial size of the OPT program, and the fact that it is uncapped, the potential for adverse effects is real unless more meaningful measures—such as those proposed here—are implemented to ensure that local candidates are given fair consideration for all relevant job opportunities.</p>
<p>Finally, independent of whether a training plan is created, a requirement similar to 8 CFR § 214.2(f)(10)(ii)(C)(10)(ii) should be applied to the entire OPT program, and rewritten to more broadly prohibit an employer from employing an OPT worker where it has laid off any similarly employed U.S. worker in the occupation within the period beginning 120 calendar days before the date the OPT worker is to begin employment. In addition, during the term of employment, employers should be required to lay off any OPT worker before laying off any similarly employed U.S. worker, as is already required in other employment-based visa programs.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> The entire OPT program should also include a prohibition on employers employing an OPT worker when there is a strike or lockout at any of the employer’s worksites within the area of intended employment of the OPT worker, as again is already required in other employment-based visa programs.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<h4><strong>c) ICE should end the tax loophole that incentivizes employers to hire OPT workers over U.S. workers.</strong></h4>
<p>As discussed in the previous section, employers should be required to pay OPT workers (and all employees hired through temporary visa programs) at the same rate they would pay local workers in the same occupations. As long as regulations allow visa-contingent workers to be paid less than their local counterparts for the same work, there are clear and inappropriate incentives for employers to prefer to hire through those programs. In the case of the OPT program, the fact that employers of OPT workers are not required to pay federal payroll taxes is a serious problem which disadvantages U.S. workers seeking entry-level professional jobs. Even at the same rate of pay, the cost savings associated with employing OPT workers instead of U.S. workers distorts the labor market to the detriment of U.S. workers. While ICE is aware of the existence of this tax loophole that benefits employers of OPT workers and mentions it in the proposed rule, ICE’s proposed rule does not address it in any meaningful way, other than by attempting to reduce demand in the OPT program. To combat the potential discrimination this will result in against U.S. workers, ICE should work with other appropriate federal agencies to require employers of OPT workers to begin paying payroll taxes, or create a system for employers to pay an amount equal to the payroll taxes they would have been required to pay if they had hired a U.S. worker, into a new fund to encourage employment of entry-level professional workers, or at the very least, to the U.S. Treasury.</p>
<h4><strong>d) ICE should prohibit employment placement agencies and staffing/outsourcing firms that send workers to third-party employers from hiring OPT workers.</strong></h4>
<p>The 2015 proposed rule establishing the STEM OPT extension stated that “DHS does not envision that . . . ‘temp’ agencies will generally be able to provide eligible opportunities under the proposed STEM OPT extension” because they cannot comply with proposed mentoring requirements.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> In EPI’s comment on the proposed rule we agreed that temporary employment agencies, especially those that would outsource and outplace F-1 nonimmigrant workers in STEM OPT, would not be able to comply with proposed duties, hours, and compensation requirements.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> We asked DHS to therefore include language in the final rule that would explicitly disqualify temporary employment agencies from employing STEM OPT workers. DHS opted not to include such a prohibition for STEM OPT, and the result is that eight years later, a review of the top employers reveals that thousands of workers hired through STEM OPT are in fact employed by firms with a staffing and outsourcing business model.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Thousands of OPT workers are employed by outsourcing firms as well.</p>
<p>In 2015, when we shared our concern with DHS and urged further regulatory action to end the use of the OPT program by temp agencies, our ask was substantiated by non-public DHS data on OPT employers that we had reviewed at the time. At least 500 STEM OPT participants had already in fact been employed by temporary employment/staffing companies, which furthermore have a business model that facilitates the outsourcing and offshoring of professional jobs. The OPT program should not be allowed to facilitate outsourcing and offshoring, which is often done for the purpose of earning profits at the cost of U.S. jobs; an activity that is not consistent with ICE’s stated goals for the OPT program. Outsourcing firms have also been associated with paying the lowest wages allowed by law, numerous and egregious legal violations, and have been found to have replaced thousands of U.S. workers, sometimes forcing them to train their own replacements employed through an H-1B or L-1 visa.</p>
<h4><strong>e) ICE should create a screening program to prevent employers with a record of violating labor and employment laws from hiring through OPT.</strong></h4>
<p>We have previously recommended that DOL should create a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers hiring through the H-1B program, and that those found to have violated certain laws in the previous five years be prohibited from using the program.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> We have made similar arguments in the H-2A and H-2B context.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> A similar process is required to prevent lawbreaking employers from hiring through the OPT program.</p>
<p>We recommended that ICE/DHS to take steps to exclude lawbreaking employers that violate labor, employment, and immigration laws from OPT hiring. ICE should consult with DOL to develop a list of key applicable laws and operate the system jointly with DOL, with employers being required to attest that they have not violated those laws, and with DOL screening employer records.</p>
<p>We believe DHS should consider similar provisions for employers seeking to hire through the H-1B program, as we have recommended previously, because there have been numerous credible accusations of lawbreaking against H-1B employers, as well as investigations and litigation, finding that H-1B employers and recruiters that have been guilty of wage theft, financial bondage, and even human trafficking. Given that many of the biggest OPT employers are also H-1B employers, and that OPT is the main feeder program of workers into H-1B, such a mechanism is reasonable for OPT. The reality is ICE/DHS have very limited staffing and expertise to investigate the labor and workplace violations of OPT employers, and it is difficult in practice for OPT workers to come forward and complain themselves about employer lawbreaking—because they could face retaliation and lose their status, and possibly the opportunity to become H-1B workers and eventually lawful permanent residents. Thus, at a minimum, to act as a backstop and keep lawbreaking employers out of the program, ICE/DHS should have its own list of legal violations and deny any OPT application for employment with a firm that has violated any of the laws or regulations on the list in the preceding five years.</p>
<h2><strong>DOL should play a primary role in managing the OPT program, or at least partner with ICE in managing the aspects related to wages and working conditions.</strong></h2>
<p>In general, it is important to note that the OPT and STEM OPT programs are large temporary labor migration programs—and should be managed as such, with the necessary measures to protect workers and labor standards. The appropriate agency that should primarily be responsible for the management of all temporary work visa programs is DOL, based on its staff expertise and mandate to protect the wages and working conditions of all workers in the United States, not to mention its role in workforce training.</p>
<p>More specifically, ICE does not have expertise in labor and employment law, or in determining what adequate wages and working conditions are for OPT workers. The fact that the ICE included some language in the 2016 STEM OPT regulation requiring that employers attest that their OPT workers will be paid a “commensurate” wage was a step forward relative to the OPT program and the 2008 STEM OPT rule, both of which did not require that <em>any</em> minimum or commensurate wage be paid.</p>
<p>But even for STEM OPT, the attestation requirement is inadequate and flawed, as we noted in our 2015 comment on the proposed rule. Instead, just as DOL’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification reviews applications for other employment-based visas, so should they certify that employers hiring through the OPT program are paying market wages and have not displaced local workers. We realize that it would be illogical and ineffective for ICE to be the agency that reviews and assesses such information. ICE has neither the expertise nor the mandate to ensure fair wage rates or prevent worker exploitation. Protection of labor standards is the central work of the DOL, and the agency must have an oversight role in a program with the size and scope of the OPT program and the STEM OPT extension. DOL’s role in overseeing the program should include authority to initiate investigations of potential fraud and abuse and must be adequately funded to ensure that the agency has the staff and resources to provide effective oversight. In addition, it would be more appropriate and beneficial for workers if DOL conducted worksite visits or on-site reviews (such as those introduced in the 2016 STEM OPT regulation), to ensure employer compliance with program requirements, rather than sending ICE agents whose primary function is to enforce immigration laws, rather than labor standards.</p>
<p>While we realize this would require a new coordinated interagency effort, we also believe that DOL involvement is the only realistic way to ensure the protection of wages and working conditions in the OPT program.</p>
<h2><strong>ICE should help the public better understand the impact of the OPT program by increasing transparency and annually publishing key data on its usage.</strong></h2>
<p>In order to improve oversight and understanding of our legal immigration system, relevant agencies should always publish timely online information for each visa category and subcategory, as well as any other work programs created by federal regulations or federal agency guidance, including OPT and STEM OPT. Nonimmigrant visa programs continue to be plagued with fraud and abuse, including violations of wage and hour, anti-trafficking, and anti-discrimination laws by employers. Transparency is a critical tool to keep the public and policymakers informed, as well as to empower advocates to ensure fair treatment and high standards within these visa programs.</p>
<p>The possibility for worker abuse in a program like OPT that has no worker protections, and which is administered by ICE—an agency with no mandate or expertise on protecting labor standards—is high and concerning. In fact, a 2014 review by the Government Accountability Office found that ICE had not developed adequate monitoring mechanisms to ensure basic compliance with OPT regulations.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> Since the year that review was completed, the program has nearly tripled in size, and ICE notes in the proposed rule that “the use of OPT and related fraudulent activities in OPT have expanded significantly” since 2016.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a></p>
<p>Rather than increasing transparency in OPT, ICE has instead opted to prevent the public from accessing vital information on the OPT program and STEM OPT extension. The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) Data Library on ICE’s website publishes some data on OPT and STEM OPT usage dating back to 2017.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> However, ICE has stopped publishing OPT and STEM OPT data since 2024. And the data that are available are mostly general summaries published on PDFs, rather than micro data with key detailed information about OPT positions, such as geographic locations, occupations, and wages paid to OPT workers.&nbsp;</p>
<p>ICE should restart publishing annual data on the SEVP Data Library and begin publishing new information that includes the underlying raw data gathered from the I-938 and I-765 forms used in the OPT and STEM OPT programs, including any other relevant information such as the full list of employer names and locations, and the occupations, wages, and work locations of all OPT and STEM OPT workers, as well as their gender, age, country of origin, level of training, field of training, and institution(s) of higher education.</p>
<p>We consider public disclosure to be an essential element of a more effective accountability system and urge ICE to consider this request.</p>
<h2><strong>Students and recent graduates will ultimately end up paying the news fees, leading to exploitation and debt bondage.</strong></h2>
<p>ICE’s proposed rule will effectively eliminate OPT for all but the very richest universities, employers, and students, and disproportionately impact those who come from poorer families, cutting off critical opportunities for them to make significant contributions in their fields based on an inability to pay the exorbitant fees. The fees reflect a pay-to-play approach to the immigration system that the current administration has taken. In addition, the proposed fee will do nothing to improve working conditions for young professional workers and recent graduates. ICE claims in the proposed rule, without evidence, that the new fees will increase university scrutiny and result in only the most promising students participating in OPT.</p>
<p>At page 64575 of the proposed rule, “DHS acknowledges that the schools may pass the financial obligation of this proposed fee onto F-1 nonimmigrant students, all students, or employers.” DHS goes on to state—again without evidence—that allowing students and employers to pay the fee “would further discourage misuse of OPT.” We find this prediction and its reasoning to be unconvincing. In practice, what’s more likely is that the proposed rule will shift fee costs onto OPT workers themselves in most cases, because of an unwillingness and in many cases inability of universities to pay the exorbitant fee. Universities that consider paying the fee may respond by increasing tuition costs, which would negatively impact both students who are U.S.-born and foreign-born.</p>
<p>Employers are also unlikely to pay the large fee because of the relatively short-term nature of OPT employment and the uncertainty of the H-1B lottery. Employers that do pay the fee are likely to respond by lowering salaries for OPT workers or by treating the fee payment as a loan—leaving OPT workers indebted to their employers—and by deducting a share of the OPT worker’s salary to pay back the fee. As a general principle, workers should never be allowed to pay a fee in order to access a job. This is enshrined in both international law and domestic law, including in the H-2A and H-2B visa programs.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> ICE does not prohibit fee payment by OPT workers in the proposed rule, and in fact, the OPT fee acts as a de facto recruitment fee charged by the federal government. In effect, rather than requiring payment of fair wages to skilled workers, the proposed fee will give employers significant leverage to underpay and exploit OPT workers; perhaps even turning employers into de facto loan sharks. In turn, the fee will additionally degrade standards for similarly situated U.S.-born student workers and recent graduates as well.</p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>As noted in the introduction, we oppose the imposition of the $70,000 and $30,000 fees for participation in the OPT program and urge ICE to abandon this rulemaking. The OPT program has numerous flaws and we urge separate rulemakings that are intended to protect the foreign students and recent graduates who participate in the OPT program, and the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed, especially young professional jobseekers and recent graduates of U.S. universities.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Daniel Costa, Esq.<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<hr>
<h3>Endnotes&nbsp;</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> National Priorities Project, <a href="https://media.nationalpriorities.org/uploads/publications/july_2026_federal_spending_for_mass_deportation_and_detention.pdf"><em>Federal Spending for Immigration Enforcement</em></a>, Institute for Policy Studies, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/btn/2024/TotalNumberAnnualOPT_STEM_OPT_CPT_AuthorizationsWithEmpStartDatesDuringIndicatedCY2007_2024.pdf">2007 to 2024 Annual Growth in OPT, STEM OPT, and CPT Authorizations and Employment Authorization Documents (EAD) Issuances</a>,” SEVP Data Library, accessed November 7, 2026. See also, Rachel Rosenthal “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2021-opinion-optional-practical-training-problems-stem-graduates-deserve-better-jobs-opportunities/">The STEM Graduate System Is Broken. Here’s How to Fix It</a>.” <em>Bloomberg</em>, March 10, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/ola_signed_h1b_characteristics_congressional_report_FY24.pdf"><em>Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers</em></a>, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report to Congress, October 1, 2023 – September 30, 2024, April 29, 2025</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> USCIS, <a href="https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339">post on X.com on May 21, 2026 at 1:37 PM</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> For our discussion and recommendations on the DOL H-1B prevailing wage methodology, see Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/">EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</a>,” Public Comments, May 26, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Sec. 221. Off-Campus Work Authorization for Students (F Nonimmigrants), Pub. L. 101-649, 104 STAT. 4978.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See for example, 29 C.F.R. § 503.16(v).</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See for example, 29 C.F.R. § 503.16(u).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> 80 Fed. Reg. 63390 (October 19, 2015).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> See also, 80 Fed. Reg. at 63395 (“DHS assumed that most temporary agencies would not be able to comply with the requirements of the Mentoring and Training Plan.”).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See the list of employers and the final column in the table showing the number of students participating in STEM OPT in 2024, in Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/btn/2024/2024_Top200_Employers_OPT_STEM_OPT_Students.pdf">2024 Top 200 Employers for OPT and STEM-OPT Students</a>,” SEVP Data Library, accessed November 7, 2026. For an example of firms that we consider to have an outsourcing and offshoring business model, see Table 1 in Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/tech-and-outsourcing-companies-continue-to-exploit-the-h-1b-visa-program-at-a-time-of-mass-layoffs-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-hired-34000-new-h-1b-workers-in-2022-and-laid-off-at-least-85000-workers/">Tech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs: The top 30 H-1B employers hired 34,000 new H-1B workers in 2022 and laid off at least 85,000 workers in 2022 and early 2023</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 11, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/">EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, May 26, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-improving-protections-for-workers-in-temporary-agricultural-employment-in-the-united-states/">EPI comments on DOL’s proposed rule on ‘Improving Protections for Workers in Temporary Agricultural Employment in the United States</a>,’” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Government Accountability Office, <a href="http://gao.gov/products/GAO-14-356"><em>STUDENT AND EXCHANGE VISITOR PROGRAM: DHS Needs to Assess Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Foreign Students with Employment Authorization</em></a>, GAO-14-356, February 27, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 64572.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Student and Exchange Visitor Program, “<a href="https://www.ice.gov/sevis/whats-new#sevpData">SEVP Data Library</a>,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, accessed November 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See for example, International Labour Organization, “Is a migrant worker required to pay fees to agencies or levies to the government for recruitment?” in <a href="https://www.ilo.org/ilo-helpdesk-questions-and-answers-business-and-labour-migration"><em>ILO Helpdesk: Questions and answers on business and labour migration</em></a>, last visited November 7, 2026, citing ILO, <a href="https://www.ilo.org/publications/general-principles-and-operational-guidelines-fair-recruitment-and"><em>General principles and operational guidelines for fair recruitment and definition of recruitment fees and related costs</em></a>, May 22, 2019; and <a href="https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/nrmlx_en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312326"><em>Private Employment Agencies Convention</em></a> (No. 191), Article 7, adopted June 19, 1997. For the prohibition in the H-2A program, see for example, 20 CFR § 655.135(k) and for H-2B, see for example, 20 CFR § 655.20 and 29 CFR § 503.16.</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DOL proposed rule to update the prevailing wage methodology for the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dol-proposed-rule-to-update-the-prevailing-wage-methodology-for-the-h-1b-h-1b1-and-e-3-visa-programs-and-eb-2-and-eb-3-green-cards/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 May 2026 17:12:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa, Ron Hira]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=322162</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via&#160;FederalRegister.gov at Brian D. Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Employment and Training Department of Room 200 Constitution Avenue Washington, DC RE: Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DOL Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via&nbsp;FederalRegister.gov at </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals"><em>https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals</em></a></p>
<p>Brian D. Pasternak,<br />
Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Certification<br />
Employment and Training Administration<br />
Department of Labor<br />
Room N-5311<br />
200 Constitution Avenue NW<br />
Washington, DC 20210</p>
<p><strong>RE:</strong> <strong>Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/27/2026-06017/improving-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-foreign-nationals"><strong><em>Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States</em></strong></a><strong>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DOL Docket No. ETA-2026-0001, RIN 1205-AC30 (March 27, 2026)</strong></p>
<p>Dear Brian Pasternak:</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments on the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the updated four-tiered wage structure for H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 nonimmigrant workers and DOL permanent labor certifications for employment-based permanent immigrant visas (i.e. green cards) in the second and third employment-based preference categories (EB-2 and EB-3). EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular, the H-1B program and other temporary work visa programs and green cards. EPI has published extensively on H-1B wage levels and employer usage and abuse of H-1B and other visa programs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>EPI generally supports the main substance of the NPRM and believes it is an improvement as compared to the status quo for the current four-tiered wage structure for H-1B, and will also improve H-1B1 and E-3 nonimmigrant visas, and permanent labor certifications in EB-2 and EB-3, because the NPRM will make incremental progress towards ensuring that the wages of U.S. workers are safeguarded and that the Labor Condition Application (LCA) and PERM programs are not hijacked by employers as a loophole to underpay migrant workers according to U.S. wage standards. The proposal will also help disincentivize firms from using H-1B visas as a primary tool to outsource professional jobs and send them overseas.</p>
<p>However, as we will detail in this comment, we believe DOL should go beyond what the NPRM proposes by setting the wage floor—i.e. the Level I wage—at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile so that no H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, or EB-3 jobs are ever certified at a wage that is below the local median wage for the occupation. If DOL implements such a rule in the final version of the regulation, the rule would address a major critique EPI has long held about the program, and which Members of Congress from both major parties have attempted to address through repeatedly proposed legislation that was first introduced nearly two decades ago.</p>
<p>It must also be noted at the outset of these comments that recent actions taken by DOL with respect to wages for migrant workers in temporary work visa programs have been inconsistent and confusing. While DOL is considering action proposed in this NPRM that will raise wage rates closer to true market rates for migrant workers in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, as well as those with labor certifications for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards, it is important to note that in October of 2025, DOL issued a new wage rule for the H-2A program that will cut wages dramatically for the migrant farmworkers in that program and unfairly charge them for lodging<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a>—which, as EPI has estimated—will lead to a pay cut of roughly $2 billion for H-2A farmworkers and $3 billion for U.S. farmworkers per year.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> DOL should issue regulations that lead to improved labor standards and fair wages for all work visa programs, and not treat workers differently based on their education levels, occupations, and nationalities. All temporary migrant workers deserve to be paid fairly for their work, and no work visa programs should operate as loopholes that allow employers to legally underpay migrant workers.</p>
<h2>The NPRM is an improvement on the status quo but DOL should amend the proposal to better protect workers</h2>
<p>In general, the NPRM improves upon the current wage structure but should be further enhanced to better protect workers and align the program with congressional intent and the goals of the H-1B statute. The principal change made by the NPRM is to update the four prevailing wage levels required in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs—temporary work visa programs for college-educated migrant workers—setting levels at higher percentiles in the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) survey distribution of wages, in order to more adequately reflect market wage rates in the U.S. labor market. The NPRM also applies the new wage rates/percentiles to the permanent labor certification requirements for employment-based (EB) green cards in the EB-2 and EB-3 preference categories (sometimes referred to as the PERM process).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a></p>
<p>The current and newly proposed wage level percentiles are as follows:</p>


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<p>As we have detailed in published research,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> the two lowest wage levels in the current wage computation method are below the local median wage according to the occupation and local area based on DOL wage survey data in the OEWS, allowing employers to undercut U.S. wage standards. The NPRM sets the lowest wage level at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, previously the Level II wage, thereby continuing to permit employers to pay H-1B workers at below-market wage rates—but not at the absurdly low levels allowed by the current Level I wage at the 17<sup>th</sup> percentile.</p>
<p>DOL’s faulty prevailing wage computation has cost foreign-born workers at least $6.56 billion annually (see NPRM Exhibit 1). Even that is likely to be a serious underestimate for two reasons. First, it does not account for the losses suffered by U.S. workers and students who have had their wages, job opportunities, and career development suppressed and undermined as a result of the current wage methodology. Second, it does not estimate the costs incurred due to foreign-born workers’ weakened bargaining power vis-à-vis their employment through nonimmigrant visa programs. Employers exert much more control over visa workers than U.S. workers and permanent residents. Foreign-born workers on nonimmigrant visas have less opportunity to, and are far less likely to, switch jobs. Switching jobs, or the threat of switching jobs, is fundamental to any worker’s ability to demand higher wages and better working conditions. Professor George Borjas estimates that, in fiscal year (FY) 2024, visa holders had an annual separation rate of 9.4%, less than half of comparable U.S. workers.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Workers also face dire circumstances should they be terminated. They must find a new job within 60 days or else leave the United States. All these conditions place foreign-born workers in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs in a much weaker position than similarly situated U.S. counterparts when bargaining for wages and working conditions. Simply put, foreign-born visa workers have fewer employment rights than U.S. citizens and permanent residents, and employers rationally take advantage of their relatively weak position when setting employment terms. Further, the agency has never enforced the Labor Condition Application’s (LCA) <em>Working Conditions</em> attestation, where employers promise to “not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed,” so employers disregard it.</p>
<p>In addition, the ability of H-1B workers to become lawful permanent residents and remain in the United States is entirely up to the whims of their employers. Even after working for an employer for six years in H-1B status, the employer has the power to decide if an H-1B worker can remain in the country—in many cases after an H-1B worker has established firm roots in the United States. That power keeps H-1B workers from complaining and asserting their employment rights. That leaves H-1B workers in a difficult position where they might decide, rationally, to abandon any demands for higher wages and better working conditions in exchange for the possibility of being sponsored for lawful permanent residence.</p>
<p>Prevailing wages must be raised sufficiently to compensate for this government-created labor market distortion, to protect both foreign-born workers with nonimmigrant visas and U.S. workers who already reside in the United States.&nbsp;</p>
<p>DOL’s proposal to increase the wage-level percentiles is the best approach. It is straightforward and understandable to implement. The effects are easily modeled. Employers can respond to it predictably and effectively. It will improve the quality and skill mix of the pool of workers who are issued visas, pay those workers fairer salaries, and have fewer adverse impacts on the domestic workforce and labor supply. Recent results reported by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), from the fiscal year (FY) 2027 H-1B lottery, the first to use the new wage-level weighting process, show that a large majority of H-1B registrations selected met at least the 34th percentile threshold, 82%, while also increasing the share of F-1 advanced degree graduates selected from 57% to 71.5%.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> The latter demonstrates that concerns about this proposal shutting off the foreign student pipeline are overblown and misguided.</p>
<p>However, as noted above, the increases don’t go far enough. We believe that the Level I wage should be set no lower than the median (50th percentile) to effectively adjust for the non-compensated effects of limited job-switching, an absent or ineffective labor market test, weaker bargaining position, and non-enforcement of the actual wage requirement. Recent college graduates, especially those earning degrees in computer science and computer engineering, are facing the highest unemployment rates amongst all majors according to analysis by the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and the worst job market in recent memory according to dozens of media accounts.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a><a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> Most analysts and executives predict that artificial intelligence (AI) will only make that labor market segment even worse. Major firms have laid off thousands of workers, citing AI the reason they need fewer workers. Many of those same firms employ thousands of H-1B workers. AI is predicted to reduce labor demand especially of recent graduates, the very U.S. workers competing for Level I jobs. The rules should ensure that workers assigned at Level I wages have truly special skills and will not undercut opportunities for recent university graduates.</p>
<h2>Analysis of the NPRM: “Improving Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Foreign Nationals in the United States”</h2>
<h3><strong>1. </strong><strong>Raising wages for H-1B workers and permanent labor certifications will benefit migrant workers and protect wage standards for U.S. workers</strong></h3>
<p>For years, H-1B employers have been allowed to pay their H-1B workers at wage rates that do not reflect local market rates, by having an option to pay them at the two lowest permitted wage levels. Our 2020 report discusses the available data, the mechanics of the current rule, and why it is important to modify the H-1B wage levels to adequately reflect market wages and ensure that H-1B workers are paid fairly, and to preserve U.S. wage standards.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> In the report, we recommend that DOL prohibit any H-1B job from being certified at a wage that is below the local median for the occupation and region. In that respect, by proposing to set the lowest wage level (Level I) at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, DOL’s NPRM fails to do enough to protect wage standards in H-1B jobs. In the report we also recommend that DOL prohibit downward pressure on wages at the national level by requiring that every H-1B job be certified at a wage that is no lower than the national median wage for the occupation.</p>
<p>Many commentators on this NPRM, especially from the business community, including universities, are likely to claim that raising wages for migrant workers and safeguarding U.S. wage standards will harm the U.S. economy. When the misleading rhetoric is stripped away, the employers who oppose higher wage percentiles for H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visas, and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards, are simply claiming, in essence, that employers will only hire workers in the LCA and PERM programs if they are underpaid relative to similarly situated U.S. workers, and portray higher wages as an obstacle to migration or to the hiring of adequate talent that will prevent them from being successful and innovating.</p>
<p>Accepting this argument leads to a race to the bottom in terms of labor standards and excuses the co-optation of the immigration system in order to pad corporate profits. And such a line of argumentation is not supported by the available evidence. In fact, many advocates on all sides of the current H-1B debate now agree that the current H-1B wage rules are undercutting U.S. wage standards and should be updated. Even previous staunch defenders of the status quo, such as those representing or funded by the tech industry, as well as representatives of major employer associations, now admit that U.S. wages and U.S. workers are being undercut via the current prevailing wage rule.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>Adequate labor standards are never a barrier to migration or economic success—instead, they are a prerequisite to fair treatment for the migrant workers who are recruited by employers into the U.S. labor market and similarly situated U.S. workers.</p>
<p>Under the current rule, the wages of H-1B workers are being kept artificially low. The higher wage levels in DOL’s NPRM are more reasonable and closer to reflecting market wages in particular occupations and specific geographic regions. In other words, DOL’s proposal will push wage levels <em>toward</em> market wages, meaning it will <em>increase </em>labor market efficiency. It will also improve the quality and skill mix of the pool of foreign-born workers who are hired, increasing the productivity and innovation spillovers that skilled immigration promises.</p>
<h3><strong>2. </strong><strong>DOL should raise the wage percentiles so that Level I is set no lower than the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of total wages surveyed in an occupation and region and prohibit any LCA or PERM approval for a wage that is lower than the national average for the occupation</strong></h3>
<p>The purpose of the H-1B and related programs is to “help employers who cannot otherwise obtain needed business skills and abilities from the U.S. workforce.”<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a>&nbsp;Specialized skills should command high wages; such skills are typically a function of inherent capability, education level, and experience. It would be reasonable to expect that these workers should receive wages higher than the local median wage. One would therefore expect most H-1B positions to be assigned as Level IV (the only current wage level above the median), but as DOL and USCIS data show, H-1B employers as a whole assign only a very small minority of H-1B positions as Level IV, usually roughly 15% or less in recent fiscal years, while as DOL notes in the NPRM, 63% of H-1B positions were assigned at Levels I and II. For all LCA programs, DOL notes in the NPRM that in FY 2024, 16% of all LCA positions were certified at Level IV. At the USCIS petition level, Level IV wages are even less common: data disclosed by USCIS shows that in 2019 and 2020, only 4% of approved petitions for new employment under the regular cap were assigned at Level IV and only 2% of approved new H-1B petitions under the advanced degree exemption cap were assigned at Level IV.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> We also know from more recent data from DHS that the five-year average of H-1B registrations at Level IV was just 5% over the FY 2020 to 2024 period.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<p>The data presented in our reports over the past decade and a half and more recently, the data reported by USCIS on the distribution of H-1B petitions by wage level, all point to the obvious fact that nearly all H-1B employers, but especially the largest employers, use the H-1B program&nbsp;<em>either</em>&nbsp;to hire relatively lower-wage workers (relative to the wages paid to other workers in their occupation) who possess ordinary skills&nbsp;<em>or</em>&nbsp;to hire skilled workers and pay them less than the true market value of their work. Either possibility raises important policy questions about the use and allocation of H-1B visas.</p>
<p>By setting two of the H-1B prevailing wage levels so low relative to the median and not requiring that firms pay at least market wages to H-1B workers, DOL has incentivized firms to earn extraordinary profits by legally hiring much-lower-paid H-1B workers instead of workers earning at least the local median wage. The fact that firms earn those profits through poorly crafted wage rules and by underpaying H-1B workers—instead of by offering a better or more innovative product or service—means DOL has, in effect, made wage arbitrage a feature of the H-1B program. And as the wage-level data we have reported on and cited here clearly shows, nearly all H-1B employers are exploiting these H-1B wage rules in order to pay below-median wages.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> We believe the evidence is clear that these firms are not using the H-1B program sparingly to hire truly specialized workers, nor are they using it only when U.S. workers are unavailable. Given the business models and occupations, it is likely that the H-1B1 and E-3 programs are being abused similarly.</p>
<p>So how should DOL set a wage rule that guards against this and complies with the statutory requirement to prevent adverse effects on wages and working conditions?</p>
<p>The existing statutory language that sets out the H-1B prevailing wage requires four H-1B wage levels, but it does not prescribe specific percentiles, and no law requires DOL to set any of these prevailing wage levels below the local median wage. To ensure that H-1B workers possess specialized skills and are fairly paid, and to protect local wage standards and eliminate wage arbitrage as a feature of the H-1B program, <strong>DOL should issue a final rule that sets the lowest (Level I) wage for the LCA programs and EB-2 and EB-3 green cards at the 50th percentile for the occupation and local area, at least, and require that wage offers to workers in the LCA and EB-2 and EB-3 programs never be lower than the national median wage for the occupation, in order to prevent downward pressure on wages nationwide. </strong></p>
<p>Requiring and enforcing above-median wages for H-1B and other LCA and PERM program workers would disincentivize the hiring of workers with nonimmigrant visas and green cards as a money-saving exercise, ensuring that companies will use the program as intended—i.e., to bring in workers who have special skills—instead of using them as a way to hire underpaid indentured workers for jobs that require at least a college degree.</p>
<h3><strong>3. </strong><strong>DOL should set the updated wage percentiles at the 50<sup>th</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles according to the total surveyed wages for the occupation and local area in the OEWS</strong></h3>
<p>As noted and discussed above, the lowest wage level, Level I, should be set no lower than at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile. Instead of the proposed four wage levels in the NPRM, DOL should set the lowest wage level, Level I, at the median wage (at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile), Level II at the 62<sup>nd</sup> percentile, Level III at the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile, and Level IV at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile—according to the overall distribution of OEWS wages for each occupation and region. (See table below.)</p>


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<p>These levels would ensure that no LCA or EB-2 or EB-3 positions are certified at a wage that is below the overall local median wage for an occupation, which in turn will prevent downward pressure on U.S. wage rates in such occupations. An additional benefit of using the 50<sup>th</sup>, 62<sup>nd</sup>, 75<sup>th</sup>, and 90<sup>th</sup> percentiles, as DOL points out, is “that they are close to dividing the upper half of the distribution equally.”<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a></p>
<h3><strong>4. </strong><strong>DOL’s experience benchmarking proposal is inferior to the NPRM’s core proposal on wage levels and should not be implemented</strong></h3>
<p>The NPRM requests comments on ‘experience benchmarking’ as an alternative computational method to the core proposal of Level I at the 34<sup>th</sup> percentile, Level II at the 52<sup>nd</sup>, Level III at the 70<sup>th</sup>, and Level IV at the 88<sup>th</sup> percentile, based on the overall OEWS wages by occupation and region. <strong>We believe that this experience benchmarking alternative is significantly inferior to the core proposal and urge DOL to reject it for four main reasons.</strong> First, the methodological description is insufficient to evaluate, with just two pages of text. This is especially troublesome since it is an entirely novel method of setting prevailing wages that has never been rigorously tested or examined. It will impact literally millions of workers and hundreds of thousands of employers. To our knowledge, Mincer equations have never been used to this large an extent for setting wages in any government program. Second, the data necessary to calculate prevailing wages do not exist; they must be synthesized through estimation procedures after marrying two distinct surveys that were never designed for these purposes. Are the sample sizes sufficient? There’s no exploration of these potential flaws in the NPRM. Third, the method biases against women. The method does not directly measure experience; instead, it estimates experience by the age of the candidate. Women are more likely than men to have gaps in their labor force participation. The agency does not provide a method for adjusting the calculations based on gender. Fourth, this method would surely fuel age discrimination by allowing firms to legally pay younger H-1B workers less than U.S. workers doing the same job. Professor Norman Matloff, one of the leading scholars of the H-1B program, has repeatedly expressed concerns that firms prefer to hire H-1B workers because they are younger, and therefore lower-paid, than equivalent Americans.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> The government would be endorsing such behavior by adopting experience benchmarking.</p>
<p>More broadly, adopting benchmarking to set prevailing wages rests on the assumption that labor markets are highly segregated by age and educational attainment. Is it true that a 28-year-old does not compete with a 35-year-old? Is it true that someone with a master’s degree does not compete with someone with a bachelor’s degree? The DOL provides no evidence to test this hypothesis with a single occupation or example, let alone whether it would hold across the roughly 400 occupations eligible for visa programs covered by this NPRM.</p>
<p>The example provided in the NPRM, of an accountant working in Dayton, Ohio, illustrates the difficulty for anyone to assess the accuracy of the procedure.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">If ACS data and Mincer wage equation estimated that U.S. accountants with 10 years of experience and a master’s degree typically earn 20 percent more than the median accountant nationwide, the Experienced Benchmarked ratio for that education-experience combination in accounting would be expressed as a wage premia factor of 1.2. Then, to compute the Level I prevailing wage for an employer seeking visa labor certification to employ an alien worker as an accountant in Dayton, Ohio, with 10 years of experience and a master’s degree, the Department would take the OEWS 50th percentile for accountants in the Dayton MSA (currently $78,710) and multiply it by 1.2, yielding an experience-benchmarked Level I prevailing wage of $94,452. The Level II prevailing wage would apply the same 1.2 ratio to the OEWS 62nd percentile; Level III to the 75th percentile; and Level IV to the 90th percentile.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>This hypothetical example presents several shortcomings.</p>
<p>First, we encounter problems with identifying the data. The NPRM reports the OEWS 50<sup>th</sup> percentile wage in Dayton MSA of $78,710. We are unable to validate this wage using the OFLC Wage Search page.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a> The OEWS 50<sup>th</sup> percentile wage (current Level III) for the occupation is shown below, with the results listed for three different years of data available in the database:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Occupations: <em>SOC 13-2011.00 – Accountants and Auditors<br />
</em>Location: <em>Dayton OH BLS Areas Montgomery County<br />
</em>Series: <em>All Industries</em></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>7/2023-6/2024 Level III Wage: <strong>$77,251.00<br />
</strong></em><em>7/2024-6/2025 Level III Wage: <strong>$82,576.00<br />
</strong></em><em>7/2025-6/2026 Level III Wage: <strong>$86,403.00</strong></em></p>
<p>Further, based on the absence of data and sparse description of the methodology, there’s no way for us, or anyone else, to test or examine the method used to calculate the wage premia/discount using the Mincer equations. The “hypothetical” example claims a premia of 20%, but it is unclear whether this result comes from real calculation or if it’s a fabrication created to illustrate a point. If it is the latter, that raises serious questions about the agency’s ability to implement experience benchmarking across hundreds of occupations, thousands of locations, four skill levels, and a half-dozen educational levels.</p>
<p>More importantly, is the example, and its wage outcomes, representative of the universe of covered workers and the U.S. workers they compete with? The evidence shows that this hypothetical example is neither typical of H-1B workers nor their U.S. counterparts. The description of experience benchmarking does not investigate its implications, but such testing is fundamental to validating the method across occupations, locations, and skill levels. The hypothetical worker has 10 years of experience, which, if they had no gaps in labor force participation, would put them at 34 years old. A 34-year-old worker is older than most new H-1B workers approved for initial employment, ranking near the 68<sup>th</sup> percentile by age.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> We also know that this worker is not typical of U.S. accountants. Most practicing accountants hold no more than a bachelor’s degree, 59%, and are older—with a median age of 45—than this candidate.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> The example raises many more questions than it answers.</p>
<p>The median age of all H-1B workers approved for initial employment is approximately 31, whereas the median age of an American worker in an H-1B eligible occupation is approximately 40, even in STEM occupations.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> H-1B workers are generally significantly younger than the typical U.S. worker with whom they compete. Experience benchmarking would favor H-1B workers by offering them a significant wage discount, based on the Mincer method, over the U.S. workers with whom they compete. The upshot is that experience benchmarking would surely fuel age discrimination in these labor markets.</p>
<p>It is likely that experience benchmarking would yield substantial wage discounts (premia ratios &lt;1.0) for H-1B workers, compared with the NPRM’s core approach. But we simply do not know because DOL has not compared the wage outcomes between experience benchmarking and raising the wage level percentiles. DOL has not published experience benchmarking wage tables for every occupation, geography, skill level, experience, and education.</p>
<p>One think tank, the Institute for Progress (IFP), a supporter of the experience benchmarking alternative, attempted to simulate the method using FY 2024 approved petitions and found that experience benchmarking wages for most H-1B workers are substantially lower than the NPRM’s core proposal. <strong>Contrary to IFP, we believe experience benchmarking should be rejected, in part for that reason.</strong> See its report, specifically the scatterplot chart “Blind Benchmarking misses underpaid H-1B workers” on page 20, where the number of red dots (i.e., experience benchmarking yields a lower prevailing wage than NPRM core proposal) far outnumbers the green dots (i.e., experience benchmarking yields a higher prevailing wage than NPRM core proposal).<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Even these analysts admit they don’t know whether their calculations are consistent with DOL’s sparse description of experience benchmarking. If this think tank’s analysis is roughly correct or on the right track, then experience benchmarking will yield much lower prevailing wages than the core NPRM proposal. If this is true, then the experience benchmarking method undermines the goals of this rulemaking.</p>
<p>In its justification for considering experience benchmarking, the NPRM states that “the methodology employed under the current rule may allow positions to be classified at wage levels that are less comparable to the actual education and experience of the alien worker.” Experience benchmarking, on the other hand, would “address this limitation by comparing the sponsored alien worker’s wage to the wages earned by U.S. workers with comparable education and experience…”<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a></p>
<p>But elsewhere, the NPRM undermines the case for experience benchmarking by noting that educational attainment is often a poor determinant of wages:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">an examination of the top end of the wage distribution within the H–1B program shows that, for H–1B nonimmigrants with graduate and bachelor’s degrees, the association between education and income level begins to break down to some extent. An analysis of the highest earners within the H–1B program reveals that H–1B workers—particularly those with bachelor’s and graduate degrees—can be among the most skilled and capable in their fields. Interestingly, at this top end of the wage distribution, the typical link between education level and income begins to weaken. <em>Among the most highly compensated H–1B workers, the higher the income level, the more likely the alien worker only has a bachelor’s degree.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> </em>(Emphasis added.)</p>
<p>While skill-level misclassification is a major problem, experience benchmarking is the wrong solution because it creates new, unnecessary loopholes. Instead, as we describe below, we recommend that you require employers document their Prevailing Wage Determination (PWD) aligned with the National Prevailing Wage Center (NPWC) guidance and provide it for inspection.</p>
<p>The NPRM’s core proposal—the 34<sup>th</sup>, 52<sup>nd</sup>, 70<sup>th</sup>, and 88<sup>th</sup> percentiles based on the overall OEWS wages by occupation and region—coupled with skill classification oversight and accountability, better achieves the program goals than the experience benchmarking proposal discussed in the NPRM.</p>
<h3><strong>5. </strong><strong>DOL should calculate an additional amount of compensation based on available data on the cost of benefits for workers in private industry and add a reasonable amount to the required prevailing wage</strong></h3>
<p>While we believe utilizing the OEWS data set and wage percentiles within the distribution is reasonable and preferable to other data sources and methods, the OEWS falls very short in terms of providing a holistic and realistic picture of what U.S. workers earn in H-1B occupations, as well as those in other LCA programs and PERM programs, by virtue of not including fringe benefits. We urge that DOL also calculate an additional amount of compensation based on available data on the cost of benefits for workers in private industry. If employers do not have to provide fringe benefits to the college-educated migrant workers they recruit or reasonable compensation that accounts for those fringe benefits, that will result in employers underpaying or undercompensating workers with visas vis-à-vis their U.S. worker counterparts, thereby causing adverse effects on workers in occupations covered by H-1B and the other LCA programs. The fissuring of the U.S. workforce has been abetted in part by employers practicing benefits’ arbitrage—in other words, employers seeking a workforce they do not need to provide benefits for—the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, and EB-3 program should not facilitate it.</p>
<p>Davis Bacon and Service Contract Act wage determinations—which are both valid wage sources for determining H-1B wage rates under current H-1B rules—include an additional hourly monetary value that is owed to the worker in “fringe benefits.” Under both Acts, the employer must pay the fringe benefits either in the form of a permissible fringe benefit listed by the applicable Act, or any combination of benefits thereof, or with an equivalent cash payment.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> The lack of any fringe benefits in OEWS prevailing wage determinations<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> constitutes a severe deficiency in the OEWS wage data that conflicts with and undermines the statutory requirement that the H-1B prevailing wage will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Reliance on the OEWS to determine prevailing wages—without an adjustment for fringe benefits—is not an adequate method to set prevailing wages for LCA and PERM programs. If the prevailing wages and benefits for a particular occupation in a particular Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) are, for example, $30 per hour plus $10 per hour in leave, pension, and health benefit costs, but DOL determines the prevailing wage to be simply $30, U.S. workers will be adversely impacted.&nbsp;Employers will be encouraged to hire H-1B workers instead of U.S. workers, saving themselves $10 in benefit costs per hour and putting downward pressure on the locally prevailing compensation.&nbsp;Hiring H-1B workers at $30 an hour for example, with no benefits, would allow employers to underprice labor by 30%—which is the average benefit share of total compensation costs for private industry workers<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a>—and it could encourage employers to replace U.S. workers with H-1B workers, or hire H-1B workers instead of U.S. workers, since employers are not required to recruit and hire U.S. workers before hiring H-1B workers. H-1B workers and those employed through other LCA programs cannot be expected to complain about this or have the bargaining power to negotiate adequate fringe benefits, because their employers control and have near-total power over their immigration status, and some workers will be also willing to accept the lower compensation, because it will likely be far more than they could earn in their country of origin.</p>
<p>BLS already collects the necessary data to determine the appropriate amount of fringe benefits that should be required as a supplement to the OEWS wages used to set a prevailing wage.&nbsp;The <em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation</em> (ECEC) report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) “provides the average employer cost for wages and salaries as well as benefits per employee hour worked” for workers in the civilian economy.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> The ECEC reports the total average wages and benefits paid by employers and lists these data as they correspond to broad occupational employment categories. These data are also differentiated according to the average amount paid for the major categories of fringe benefits: paid leave, supplemental pay, insurance, retirement and savings and legally required benefits. The ECEC also reports the average total compensation, wages and salaries, and total costs of fringe benefits paid by employers, broken down by geographic region, census division, and locality.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a></p>
<p>Using the aforementioned data sets from the ECEC, DOL can determine the appropriate level of fringe benefits that must be offered and paid to LCA and PERM program workers. The ECEC provides data on health and retirement benefits, and wages and wage-related pay such as paid leave and supplemental pay. The wages reflected in the OEWS survey capture the wages and wage-related parts of total compensation. Employers paying wages will already be paying the ‘legally required’ payroll taxes. Therefore, the compensation missing from the OEWS wage rates is the cost of retirement and health benefits, which are about 11% of private sector compensation. The amount of pay reflecting these benefits that employers of LCA and PERM program workers should pay can easily be determined by taking the ratio of the sum of health and retirement benefits to the wages paid (the sum of wages, paid leave and supplemental pay). This can be determined for a broad occupational grouping and perhaps done at a regional level as well. This ratio when multiplied by the OEWS wage shows the amount of benefits that would be comparable to that earned in the private sector or civilian sector.</p>
<p>Although the occupational groups and geographic areas listed and reported in the ECEC are not as numerous and detailed as those in the OEWS’s occupational categories and geographical areas, this should not deter the DOL from utilizing these data to calculate the percentage of wages that should be added on as fringe benefits to the OEWS wage. Only a percentage to be added on must be determined – not an exact dollar amount.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus, the ECEC data are sufficient to provide DOL–by region and broad occupational group–an average level of insurance and retirement benefits received by employees in that job and in that area. Following precedent from the DBA and SCA, the fringe benefits could be paid by the employer through any combination of a variety of options, such as paid leave, health and life insurance, retirement and savings accounts, etc., or the employer could simply pay the benefits in cash.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, there is very little transparency regarding whether employers using the H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and EB-2 and EB-3 programs are offering fringe benefits, or to what extent. A requirement that these fringe benefits be offered to LCA and PERM program workers would ensure that the wages and working conditions of similarly employed workers are not adversely impacted.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The current DOL compliance guidance on benefits for H-1B workers encourages benefits arbitrage through outsourcing and fissuring. The Wage and Hour Division fact sheet on the subject (#62L) reads, “The employer must offer benefits to H-1B workers on the same basis, and in accordance with the same criteria, as the benefits the employer provides to similarly employed U.S. workers.”<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a> By defining <em>similarly employed</em> workers as restricted only to those directly employed by the H-1B employer, DOL is encouraging benefits arbitrage by outsourcing firms, which can offer substandard benefits to all its employees and still comply with this interpretation of the H-1B rules.</p>
<h3>6. <strong>DOL should prohibit employer-provided private wage surveys from being used as alternative sources of wage data to set prevailing wages </strong></h3>
<p>Under the main H-1B prevailing wage regulation language at 20 C.F.R. §655.731, an employer has a number of options at their disposal to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA. In other words, the OEWS wage levels are just one of the available options. The employer may use one of the following sources to establish a prevailing wage: the OEWS wage, the wage set in an applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, an applicable wage set by the Davis-Bacon Act or McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act, an Office of Foreign Labor Certification National Processing Center prevailing wage determination, or a wage set by an independent authoritative source or another legitimate source of wage data. However, if the employer is paying a higher wage to similarly situated U.S. workers that it already employs, then it must pay the H-1B worker same higher “actual wage,” that it is paying the U.S. worker. (Specifically defined as “the wage rate paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question.”)</p>
<p>Therefore, employers do not need to use the OFLC’s calculated levels from OEWS data to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA or permanent labor certification application. The NPRM would improve the longstanding problems in how the prevailing wage is determined when using the OFLC-generated OEWS wage rates, but in the NPRM, DOL states that it considered whether to prohibit—but ultimately decided to permit—the continued use of an independent authoritative source or another legitimate source of wage data, which includes private wage surveys provided by employers and accepted by DOL. Standards for such alternative sources of wage data are described in 20 CFR § 655.731. In our 2020 report, we showed in Table 1 that in 2019, at least 9% of all certified wages for H-1B positions on LCAs were set by a private wage survey or other source accepted by the OFLC as legitimate.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a></p>
<p>We strongly urge DOL to eliminate the use of private wage surveys provided by employers for setting wage rates in the LCA programs or for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards. While the share of LCAs approved with wages set by private wages surveys is relatively small at the moment, it is likely that the use, and abuse, of private wage surveys will expand substantially after publication of a final rule that is consistent with the wage level percentiles proposed in the NPRM. This will occur because employers will be motivated to use private surveys as a loophole to avoid paying the new higher wage percentiles.</p>
<p>DOL’s justification for continuing to allow private wage surveys is based on an analysis that is confusing. On the one hand, the agency claims that private surveys yield a wage 20% higher on average than the OEWS equivalent, but also says that wage surveys are necessary for niche or very specialized markets where, “occupations [are] not well represented in OEWS datasets.”<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> The two claims are in contradiction. If a private wage survey is used to establish a wage in a niche job market, presumably not covered by the OEWS, then how can DOL feasibly calculate the differences? Footnote 211 in the NPRM does not provide sufficient detail to test this claim.</p>
<p>If DOL does not immediately eliminate the use of private surveys, it should at least ensure that usage of such surveys are rare and approved in only exceptional cases. Employers should be required to provide extensive documentation and justification for why the OEWS is an inadequate data source for determining the prevailing wage.</p>
<p>The recent history of the use of private wage surveys to set wages in the H-2B visa program—a temporary work visa program for lower-wage jobs outside of agriculture including in landscaping, forestry, hospitality, and construction—is instructive and should inform DOL’s review of wage surveys and other sources of wage data for setting H-1B wages. The evidence is clear in the H-2B context that when employers use private wages surveys, they primarily use them to pay lower wages than would otherwise be required.</p>
<p>In 2013 when DOL raised the minimum H-2B prevailing wage from the 17<sup>th</sup> wage percentile to the mean wage for the occupation and local area, H-2B employers immediately and en masse, shifted their business model to use private wage surveys to set H-2B wage rates at below-average wage rates. Evidence revealed in federal litigation clearly suggests that the shift to the use of private wage surveys was a systematic response to higher wage rates, and one that was clearly successful. Specifically, in the nine months beginning soon after the H-2B wage rule was updated—between July 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014—employers increased their submissions of private wage surveys for H-2B prevailing wage determinations by 3,182%, as compared with the 12 months leading up to the federal court decision that invalidated the previous H-2B wage rule. In 21.1% of those prevailing wage determinations set by private wage surveys, the certified H-2B wage was lower than the previous prevailing wage system where the Level I H-2B prevailing wage was set at the 17th percentile wage by occupation and local area, according to OFLC-generated OEWS wage survey data, and 94.4% of the determinations were for a wage that was lower than the Level II wage, at the 34th percentile.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Despite the fact that the H-2B prevailing wage has been set at the local average wage and DOL restricted the use of private wage surveys in 2015, they are still commonly used and successful at lowering wages for H-2B workers. One clear example of this which has been detailed, is a group of H-2B workers employed as crabpickers in Maryland—they earned roughly 25% less per hour than they should have been paid according to the local corresponding OEWS wage.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>The downside risk of continuing to allow private wage surveys—creating loopholes and administrative burdens—outweighs the risk to workers that the OEWS prevailing wage results in lower wages. If DOL’s calculations are accurate, employers should welcome the elimination of private wage surveys because the OEWS provides lower wage requirements and reduced costs in terms of purchasing survey data and/or conducting entirely new surveys.</p>
<h3><strong>7. </strong><strong>If DOL considers permitting the use of employer provided private wage surveys, it should first conduct a detailed analysis of their usage and impact on H-1B wage rates, make the findings public, and issue a separate NPRM focused solely on private wage surveys</strong></h3>
<p>In order to promote transparency and comport with the statutory requirement that H-1B employers “will provide working conditions for [H-1B workers] that will not adversely affect the working conditions of workers similarly employed,”<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> DOL should immediately prohibit the use of private wages surveys. However if DOL wishes to still consider their usage, DOL should conduct a study to benchmark the use of alternative wage data and especially private wage surveys against the OFLC-generated OEWS prevailing wages, to identify whether there are any systematic biases in such sources. If such biases are found, DOL could propose a new NPRM with additional guidance and safeguards to ensure that the alternative wage sources are not undermining U.S. wage standards. DOL should also conduct an analysis on the occupations that have been approved for wage setting with private wages surveys, to examine which occupations employers are claiming to be so unique that they do not fit within the definitions of over 800 occupations available in BLS’s Standard Occupational Codes, as well as analyze whether private wage surveys have negatively impacted conditions for H-1B workers and similarly situated workers.</p>
<p>It is important to note that, while in the aggregate, the use of private wage surveys is roughly 6.5% according to the NPRM, we know from our own reviews of LCA disclosure data that some firms rely on private wage surveys extensively. DOL should examine how private wage surveys vary across firms, industries, and occupations. Firms that rely on private wage surveys for more than 3% of the positions in their LCAs should be scrutinized and audited to ensure they are not being utilized to undercut the standards set by OEWS wage data.&nbsp;</p>
<h3><strong>8. </strong><strong>DOL must put measures in place that would prevent employer misclassification of H-1B workers at the wrong wage levels</strong></h3>
<p>As noted earlier, the NPRM requires that minimum H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, EB-2, and EB-3 salaries are set at more realistic wage rates that reflect the local market rates for the jobs they fill. While each wage level is intended to correspond to the position description, in practice the employer has substantial discretion choosing the skill level and DOL does not verify that a prevailing wage is appropriate unless a lawsuit or a complaint is filed by a worker. Such complaints are unlikely since it would require a migrant worker to blow the whistle on their own employer, the same employer that controls the worker’s visa status and ability to remain in the United States. We are unaware of any cases in which DOL has investigated an LCA-stage misclassification of an H-1B wage level, but there have been reports of, for example, H-1B employers receiving approval for LCAs that certify they will pay employees at the same prevailing wage level despite having job titles that clearly warrant different wage levels.</p>
<p>Simply put, employer selection of skill levels should be anchored to the actual duties of the position and verified by DOL and USCIS. There is no reason to allow employers to identify a skill level on a whim. If DOL does not fix this obvious problem, then the NPRM’s core objective of eliminating wage arbitrage will be undermined.</p>
<p>Skill level misclassification and inconsistencies undermine good governance of the H-1B program. Even a cursory examination of the LCA and I-129 data shows that such misclassifications, whether purposeful or inadvertent, are common. For example, positions with job titles leading with ‘senior’ are frequently misclassified as Level I. And even within the same employer, identical job titles are classified under different skill levels.</p>
<p>Yet the effectiveness of this NPRM hinges on ensuring that employers properly and consistently classify their positions at the correct skill level. DOL should take two actions. First, it should update and expand the NPWC’s Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> Second, it must hold employers accountable for their skill level selections.</p>
<p>The policy guidance should be rewritten and expanded so that it not only serves PWD adjudicators but also all employers, whether they use the OEWS or a private wage survey to determine the prevailing wage. The document should clarify skill level classification and serve as compliance guidance for all employers. The most recent NPWC policy guidance, published in 2009, is obviously inadequate and outdated. Employers are not effectively or consistently interpreting and identifying skill levels. The description of each skill level, Levels I through IV, consists of a single paragraph of ambiguous language. For example, how many years of experience should Level II consist of? Can an employer’s position that requires two to three years of experience ever be classified as Level I (Entry-Level)? If a worker with a master’s degree is filling a position that typically requires only a bachelor’s degree, can they be bumped up in skill level?</p>
<p>All employers should be required to follow the five-step Prevailing Wage Determination process outlined on pages 9 through 13 to identify the position’s skill level. Employers should be required to document and retain those records for inspection by USCIS when the I-129 petition for the LCA is filed. This will ensure consistent skill level identification within and across companies whether the firm uses the OEWS, private wage survey, a CBA, or requests a PWD.</p>
<p>Then USCIS should ensure that the worker being placed in the position is not overqualified in terms of education and experience for the position&#8217;s skill level.</p>
<p>Consider this example: A well-known firm received approval for two different LCAs at the same wage level (Level II), even though one LCA had the job title&nbsp;<em>Senior Software Engineer</em>&nbsp;and the other had the job title&nbsp;<em>Software Engineer</em>.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> The firm, a major employer of H-1B workers, is not accounting for differences in skill levels as evident from its own job titles when selecting the wage level for the LCA. Both engineers and senior engineers are receiving the exact same salary and wage level, and they are approved by DOL with zero scrutiny. Using the DOL Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, the LCAs in this case should be instantly flagged by identifying keywords such as&nbsp;senior, head, chief, and lead&nbsp;in job titles, and should be checked to determine whether the prevailing wage levels are appropriate. This example underscores a broader need for DOL to create a more robust compliance system to ensure employers do not misclassify workers at inappropriate wage levels. Our own cursory review has found hundreds of similar examples.</p>
<p>As a result, the LCA and petition process should be updated so that DOL reviews the qualifications of individual workers before USCIS approves a petition, to ensure that wage levels match up with the age, education, and experience of the workers being hired through the LCA and PERM programs. While USCIS currently performs this role to some extent, its adjudicators lack expertise in wage-and-hour issues and do not have the same mandate to protect labor standards as DOL staff. Therefore, these functions should be undertaken by the proper agency. DOL and USCIS already have a mandate to cooperate on H-1B applications and enforcement; a memorandum of understanding between the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Labor could detail a process where DOL plays a prominent role in ensuring that H-1B workers are classified at the appropriate wage levels. Published guidance from DOL on skill levels that is more detailed, clearer, and more realistic would also be helpful for everyone involved—employers and adjudicators alike.</p>
<h3><strong>9. </strong><strong>DOL has failed to enforce the “actual wage” component of the H-1B prevailing wage rule and should begin enforcing it immediately</strong></h3>
<p>Under the prevailing wage statute, although an employer has several options at their disposal to determine a prevailing wage for an LCA, they must offer the higher of either the prevailing wage or the “actual wage,” which the corresponding regulation at 20 C.F.R. §655.731 defines as “the wage rate paid by the employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications for the specific employment in question.”</p>
<p>DOL has not exercised its authority to enforce the actual wage requirement. This is a wasted opportunity for one of the most important tools DOL has at its disposal to hold employers accountable for required wages. In order to ensure that H-1B employers are not undercutting the wage rates they pay H-1B workers, DOL should immediately begin enforcing this requirement.</p>
<p>In late 2021, we published a report detailing how thousands of skilled migrants with H-1B visas working as subcontractors at well-known corporations like Disney, FedEx, Google, and others appear to have been underpaid by one firm to the tune of at least $95 million in one single year.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a> The victims likely included not only the H-1B workers but also the U.S. workers who were either displaced or whose wages and working conditions were degraded when employers were allowed to underpay skilled migrant workers with impunity. The workers in question were employed by HCL Technologies, an India-based IT staffing firm that earned $11 billion in revenue in 2020. HCL is consistently one of the top 20 H-1B employers and appears to have engaged in the systematic and strategic wage theft of its H-1B workers by exploiting the lax to nonexistent enforcement of the actual wage requirement. According to its own internal documents, HCL targeted its new H-1B hires expressly based on the spread between what it paid its own U.S. employees versus what it pays its own H-1B workers.</p>
<p>The report discusses our analysis of an internal HCL document, released as part of a whistleblower lawsuit against the firm. The document suggests that HCL—and perhaps other firms with similar business models—are not paying the legally required amount that corresponds to what is being paid to U.S. worker employees at HCL. The HCL document revealed that the large-scale illegal underpayment of H-1B workers that appears to be occurring is a core part of the HCL’s competitive strategy, and likely facilitated $95 million in stolen wages from HCL’s H-1B employees in just one year. Such abuses are surely widespread among H-1B employers because DOL has done virtually nothing to ensure program integrity by enforcing the H-1B wage rules, in particular the actual wage rule.</p>
<p>DOL could easily begin enforcing the actual wage provision by requiring H-1B employers to submit evidence documenting the wage rates paid to U.S. workers who are similarly employed in occupations for which the employer is also hiring H-1B workers. Employers must already “keep records for how they calculate the actual wages.” To our knowledge, DOL has never initiated an investigation regarding compliance with the “actual wage” provision of the law. The DOL Secretary should exercise their authority to inspect the actual wages paid by H-1B employers. The Secretary can do so without a complaint from a worker, under their authority to certify investigations, and should do so if presented with credible evidence of violations. DOL should provide clear compliance guidance for the actual wage provision and then require that H-1B employers attest to the wage rates they pay similarly situated U.S. workers and include them in the LCA documentation, and DOL should conduct audits of employers on a regular basis to ensure compliance. The audits could begin with the employers that hire large numbers of H-1B workers, for example, those that employ more than 25 H-1B workers, as well as H-1B dependent firms.</p>
<p>Secondary employers should also be required to submit LCAs and evidence documenting the wage rates paid to U.S. workers in the occupations that H-1B workers will be hired for through an outsourcing firm. Otherwise, some H-1B outsourcing firms—which almost exclusively pay H-1B workers at the two lowest wage levels, and employ H-1B and L-1 workers almost exclusively—will be able to game the system by using the actual wage paid to their own employees to meet the requirement, and not the employees of the secondary employer, where the H-1B workers will be placed—and where wages paid to the U.S. workforce are likely to be higher.</p>
<h3><strong>10.</strong><strong> DOL should require secondary employers of H-1B workers to attest that they will not adversely affect wages and working conditions</strong></h3>
<p>Outsourcing companies are using the H-1B program to underpay H-1B workers, replace U.S. workers, and send tech jobs abroad. Typically, in this scenario, H-1B workers do computer and engineering work at the office of a U.S. employer but are employed by an outsourcing company, some of which are based abroad or have major operations abroad.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> The many reported cases of U.S. workers being laid off and replaced by H-1B workers have all been facilitated by this arrangement. In multiple incidents, the H-1B workers have been hired with annual wages&nbsp;of around $30,000 to $40,000 less than the workers they have replaced. Before they are laid off, the U.S. workers are often forced to train their own H-1B replacements as a condition of their severance packages; this is euphemistically known as “knowledge transfer.” Major, profitable U.S. employers like Disney and Toys “R” Us—as well as public employers and institutions like the University of California and Southern California Edison—have laid off thousands of U.S. workers who were forced to train their own replacements. Eventually, many of the outsourced jobs filled by H-1B workers get moved offshore.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>Contrary to the popular narrative proffered by corporations that support expanding and deregulating the H-1B visa program—the staffing firms that use H-1B visas are not using them to keep technology jobs in the United States—instead they are using them precisely to facilitate the offshoring of as many of those jobs as they can. That is in fact, the business model of those firms. News reports, including from the <em>New York Times</em> and <em>Bloomberg</em>, have shown that outsourcing companies “game the system” in order to obtain a high share of H-1B visas, which leaves fewer available for the firms that directly employ H-1B workers.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a></p>
<p>The outsourcing/staffing model of employment generally may increase the incidence of labor and employment law violations by separating the main beneficiary of the labor provided by H-1B workers—the third-party firm that hires the outsourcing firm, i.e. the “lead” employer—from the H-1B workers who perform the work. Firms that rely on outsourced H-1B workers are a textbook example of what former DOL Wage and Hour administrator David Weil calls a “fissured” workplace, where the relationship between the worker and the lead employer is fissured, or broken, via the use of a temp agency or subcontractor<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> (in this case the temp agency or subcontractors are the H-1B outsourcing firms). Research shows that fissuring leads to a wage penalty for workers who are subcontracted, employed as temps, and work for staffing firms,<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> in part because the subcontractor keeps a percentage of the wages earned by the workers. It is also common knowledge that employers use this model to avoid paying for benefits like health care, retirement funds, and to avoid liability for labor violations. Because the staffing and outsourcing model contributes to the fissuring of the labor market, it should not be allowed as part of the U.S. immigration system—not in H-1B or in any other temporary or permanent immigration programs.</p>
<p>One way to address the abuses of the outsourcing/staffing firms, which operate as secondary employers, would be to issue policy guidance and update the appropriate DOL ETA application forms so that secondary employers to which H-1B workers are outsourced will be required to file Labor Condition Applications with DOL. Such&nbsp;guidance, which was considered in 2021 but then abandoned,<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a> would close the loophole that allows firms like Disney and Southern California Edison to&nbsp;replace&nbsp;its U.S. employees with H-1B workers by employing them through an outsourcing firm.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Using Disney as an example, implementing this rule would require client firms like Disney—that benefit and profit from hiring outsourcers—to acknowledge their employment relationship with H-1B workers who are employed by outsourcers like Infosys and Tata, by requiring Disney to file its own LCA. By doing so, Disney would attest that hiring the H-1B worker through the outsourcer is not adversely affecting the wages and working conditions of the Disney workforce.</p>
<h3><strong>11.</strong><strong> DOL should publish Labor Condition Application and permanent labor certification data in real-time on a central database</strong></h3>
<p>DOL publishes detailed LCA and permanent labor certification (PERM) disclosure data, but it is typically lagged by at least one quarter, and often much longer. The agency should publish LCA and PERM public access file applications in real-time to enable U.S. workers to apply for these positions. This would enhance the integrity of the programs and better align them to their purposes by ensuring that workers hired with temporary visas and green cards are filling true labor shortages.</p>
<p>U.S. workers have long complained loudly that employers hide job openings from them, reserving them for visa holders and PERM applicants. Even when those jobs are advertised, as is required by the PERM labor certification process, they are often placed in obscure locations. Workers call such job advertisements “fake job postings.” A recent ProPublica investigation has referred to the practice as “The Tech Recruitment Ruse.”<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>The agency already collects the data and publishes it regularly on the OFLC disclosure data. But even a one-quarter year lag time renders it useless for job seekers. Publishing it in real-time would unlock enormous value for workers at little or no cost to the government or employers.</p>
<h3><strong>12.</strong><strong> DOL had the requisite legal authority to update the H-1B prevailing wage levels</strong></h3>
<p>As discussed in detail in our 2020 report, DOL has the requisite legal authority to change the H-1B prevailing wage levels to an appropriate rate that protects wage standards and prevents adverse effects on U.S. workers in H-1B occupations. No analyst or commentator has credibly argued otherwise. For far too long, the H-1B wage levels have been set at an artificially low level that undercuts U.S. wage standards, therefore, it is reasonable for DOL to increase the minimum wage levels so that Level I is no lower than the local median wage.</p>
<h3><strong>13.</strong><strong> DOL should expand the LCA process to include a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers; those that have violated certain laws in the previous five years should be prohibited from hiring through the H-1B program</strong></h3>
<p>In a previous comment to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), regarding the 2023 H-1B “modernization” rule,<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> we recommended that DHS should expand the H-1B Registration System to include a front-end screening process that reviews the labor and employment law records of employers. If employers have violated certain laws, they should be prohibited from hiring through the H-1B program. We further recommended that DHS should consult with DOL to develop a list of key applicable laws and operate the system jointly with DOL, and ideally, also operate the updated registration process jointly, with DOL screening employer records through the LCA process. We reiterate that recommendation here and urge DOL to take steps to exclude lawbreaking employers that violate labor, employment, and immigration laws. <em>While we realize our comment will only be read by DOL, we nevertheless include our discussion about DHS’s role in this process because we believe DOL and DHS should work in tandem to reduce labor and employment violations in the H-1B program.</em></p>
<p>In the 2023 proposed rule, <em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections,<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a></em> DHS proposed to create or expand several additional bars to approval of new petitions filed by H-2 petitioners who have previously committed legal violations related to the H-2 programs. EPI submitted comments generally supporting the proposed changes, which were adopted as a final rule.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a> Although they fail to go far enough on their own, if adequately implemented the provisions will help curb abusive employers’ exploitation of the H-2 programs and will level the playing field for employers that obey the law. EPI additionally commented that employers that commit serious violations repeatedly should be permanently banned from the H-2 programs, as they have demonstrated their inability or unwillingness to comply with the programs’ requirements.</p>
<p>In those comments EPI further recommended that the DHS strengthen section 214.2(h)(10)(iii)(3), which addresses violations of “any applicable employment-related laws and regulations” by expanding it to include a number of other violations and making denial of petitions mandatory—rather than discretionary—if employers have violated any of those laws in the preceding five years.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>We believe DHS should consider similar provisions for employers seeking to hire through the H-1B program because there have been numerous credible accusations of lawbreaking against H-1B employers, as well as investigations and litigation, finding that H-1B employers and recruiters that have been guilty of wage theft, financial bondage, and even human trafficking. The reality is that DOL has limited resources and has interpreted its authority to investigate H-1B employers as constrained, and it is difficult in practice for H-1B workers to come forward and complain themselves about employer lawbreaking—because they could face retaliation and lose their status, and possibly the opportunity to become lawful permanent residents—which means DOL likely receives fewer complaints than they otherwise would. And even when DOL does receive complaints, as numerous reports have shown, DOL often lacks the resources to investigate and take action against lawbreaking employers.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a></p>
<p>Thus, at a minimum, to keep lawbreaking employers out of the H-1B program, DHS should have its own list of legal violations and deny any petition for an employer that has violated any of the laws on the list in the preceding five years. That would act as a backstop to prevent lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-1B program. At present, as DHS rightly points out in the November 2023 Modernizing H-2 Program NPRM, even some of the worst violators of the law are allowed to recruit and hire H-2 workers. We know that this is also the case in the H-1B program. In fact, in the H-1B program, some of the biggest users of the program are also the most egregious violators, receiving thousands of H-1B petition approvals per year. And then after they violate the law, H-1B employees are afraid to complain to authorities because their immigration status is tied to their employer, and even if they are brave enough to lodge a complaint, as noted above, DOL may lack the resources to investigate violations and hold the employer accountable.</p>
<p>As EPI also recommended in the H-2 NPRM, DHS should go further to implement this by also cooperating with DOL to develop a front-end screening process that takes place at the labor condition application (LCA) stage, to vet the labor and employment law records of employers before they can be allowed to hire through the H-1B program. In multiple EPI reports and in comments in response to NPRMs, EPI has made a similar proposal—namely, that a front-end screening process should be created to prohibit employers with track records of wage and hour, labor, immigration, and other legal violations from hiring through the H visa programs.</p>
<p>To make a front-end screening process a reality, ideally, DOL should require employers to register for eligibility to use the H-1B program at the LCA stage, so employer records on compliance with labor and employment laws can be screened up front, before getting to the registration or petition stage. DOL could set up a registration process in which employers list basic information about their business and the purported need for H-1B workers (as is already done via the DOL temporary labor certification forms). As part of that new process, employers could be required to attest, under penalty of perjury and of being banned from hiring through the H-1B and other visa programs, that they have not been found to have violated any of the listed labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, or anti-discrimination laws during the past five years. DOL could then attempt to verify by cross-referencing enforcement data and other relevant records—and could cooperate with other worker protection agencies like the NLRB and EEOC—and ultimately certify employers that have not violated the applicable laws.</p>
<p>To break established patterns of abuse, employers that have violated any labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking or anti-discrimination laws should be prohibited from submitting an LCA (or having their LCA approved) and ultimately not be allowed to hire H-1B workers. Employers that have clean records and an LCA approved by DOL could then continue on with the petition process at USCIS.</p>
<p>Given the present and likely future reality that WHD and other worker protection agencies will continue to be vastly underfunded and understaffed,<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a>&nbsp;such a screening process on the front end of the H-1B application process could act as a useful and efficient tool to prevent legal violations without WHD having to go through lengthy and costly investigations on the back end, after workers have arrived in the United States and been robbed or otherwise exploited.</p>
<p>At the petition level, if a new screening process at DOL is not created that takes place before or as part of the LCA process, DHS should, at a minimum and as noted above, build on proposed section 8 C.F.R. 214.2(h)(10)(iii)(B) for H-2 petitions by creating a list of key labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, and anti-discrimination laws, the violation of which would establish strong evidence that an employer does not treat their employees well and is unlikely to follow employment and immigration laws with respect to their H-1B employees. Although this would work best in tandem with a front-end screening process at the LCA stage, DHS could make significant progress in keeping lawbreaking employers out of the H-1B programs by mandating that any employer that has violated any of the listed laws will be prohibited from having a petition approved for hiring H-1B workers.</p>
<p>Another option would be for DHS to modify the existing H-1B Registration System so that it also screens the records of employers. That way DHS could use it to both manage the annual cap and to assess and certify whether employers are eligible to hire through H-1B based on their past legal violations. Employers could be required to attest, under penalty of perjury and of being banned from hiring through the H-1B and other visa programs, that they have not been found to have violated any of the listed labor, employment, wage and hour, immigration, civil rights, disability, anti-trafficking, or anti-discrimination laws during the past five years. USCIS could work to verify the employer attestation, although ideally DOL should partner with to do this, by cross-referencing DOL enforcement data and other relevant records—preferably also in partnership with other worker protection agencies like the NLRB and EEOC—and would then ultimately certify employers that have not violated the applicable laws, allowing them to continue with the registration process.</p>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>The H-1B visa program is the largest temporary work visa program in the United States and an important pathway into the U.S. labor market for skilled migrants from around the world—but a pathway that has serious deficiencies when it comes to the workplace rights of migrant workers and for preserving U.S. labor standards. While less is known about the other LCA programs, H-1B1 and E-3, they have even fewer applicable rules in place to protect workers, which likely means they are having similar impacts on worker rights and labor standards. By issuing this NPRM, DOL has taken an important first step towards reversing decades of artificially depressed wage rates for H-1B workers, and for making the prevailing wage methodology rules consistent across the other LCA programs and for EB-2 and EB-3 green cards. This will benefit other similarly situated workers and simplify and streamline the prevailing wage determination process. Nevertheless, as our comment recommends, more must be done—in this rulemaking and other executive actions—to improve the effectiveness of the updated prevailing wage rates and on enforcement in the LCA and PERM programs, in order to safeguard U.S. wages and labor standards.</p>
<p>Daniel Costa<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute<br />
Washington, DC</p>
<p>Ron Hira, Ph.D., P.E.<br />
Associate Professor<br />
Department of Political Science<br />
Howard University</p>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, Interim Final Rule, request for comments, U.S. Department of Labor, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s new H-2A wage rule will radically cut the wages of all farmworkers: New estimates show farmworkers stand to lose $4.4 to $5.4 billion annually under DOL’s updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics </em>blog (Economic Policy Institute) November 26, 2025; for additional discussion and background, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-2025-interim-final-rule-modifying-the-aewr-methodology-for-h-2a-farmworkers/">EPI comment on DOL’s 2025 Interim Final Rule modifying the AEWR methodology for H-2A farmworkers</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, December 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> PERM stands for Program Electronic Management Review, and is the first step for employers who wish to sponsor an employee for permanent residence in the United States through the EB-2 and EB-3 categories.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> George Borjas, <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w34793/w34793.pdf"><em>The H-1B Wage Gap, Visa Fees, and Employer Demand</em></a>, NBER working paper 34793, March 2026. See pages 3-4.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> USCIS, X.com post, May 21, 2026 at 1:37 PM, <a href="https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339">https://x.com/USCIS/status/2057561453373399339</a></p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> <a href="https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market#--:explore:outcomes-by-major">https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/college-labor-market#&#8211;:explore:outcomes-by-major</a></p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Here are just a sample of some of the recent news accounts in major media outlets: Katherine Bindley, “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/lifestyle/careers/tech-jobs-hiring-artifical-intelligence-35cd66b0?mod=Searchresults_pos15&amp;page=1">The ‘Great Hesitation’ That’s Making It Harder to Get a Tech Job</a>,” <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, May 18, 2025; Christopher Rugaber, “<a href="https://apnews.com/article/college-graduates-job-market-unemployment-c5e881d0a5c069de08085a47fa58f90f?utm_source=copy&amp;utm_medium=share">Unemployment among young college graduates outpaces overall US joblessness rate</a>,” <em>Associated Press</em>, June 26, 2025; Sydney Ember, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/24/business/economy/college-graduates-job-market-hiring.html">Young Graduates Face the Grimmest Job Market in Years</a>,” <em>NY Times</em>, March 24, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> See for example, Connor O&#8217;Brien, Jeremy Neufeld, and Amy Nice, <a href="https://ifp.org/prevailing-wage-benchmarking/"><em>A Prescription for Fixing the Prevailing Wage System: Replacing Blind Benchmarking with Experience Benchmarking</em></a>, Institute for Progress, March 27, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See Overview section in Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b">H-1B Program</a>,” web page on the U.S. Department of Labor website.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/08/2021-00183/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions"><em>Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, 86 Fed. Reg. 1676, at 1720, Table 7, June 8, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> See Table 12 in Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H–1B</em></a><em> Petitions</em>, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS Docket No. 2820-25, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0040, RIN: 1615-AD01 (September 24, 2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B Visas and Prevailing Wage Levels: A Majority of H-1B Employers—Including Major U.S. Tech Firms—Use the Program to Pay Migrant Workers Well Below Market Wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Norman Matloff, “<a href="https://www.compactmag.com/article/h-1b-visas-are-transforming-america/">H-1B Visas Are Transforming America</a>,” <em>Compact</em>, October 8, 2025; Norman Matloff, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp356-foreign-students-best-brightest-immigration-policy/"><em>Are foreign students the ‘best and brightest’? Data and implications for immigration policy</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #356, February 28, 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://flag.dol.gov/wage-data/wage-search">OFLC Wage Search</a>, last visited on May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/ola_signed_h1b_characteristics_congressional_report_FY24.pdf"><em>Characteristics of H-1B Specialty Occupation Workers</em></a>, Fiscal Year 2024 Annual Report to Congress, October 1, 2023 – September 30, 2024, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, April 29, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/emp/tables/educational-attainment.htm">Table 5.3 Educational attainment for workers 25 years and older by detailed occupation, 2022–23 (Percent)</a>, Employment Projections, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm">Table 11b. Employed people by detailed occupation and age</a>, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11b.htm">Table 11b. Employed people by detailed occupation and age</a>, Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. Department of Labor, retrieved May 23, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Connor O&#8217;Brien, Jeremy Neufeld, and Amy Nice, <a href="https://ifp.org/prevailing-wage-benchmarking/"><em>A Prescription for Fixing the Prevailing Wage System: Replacing Blind Benchmarking with Experience Benchmarking</em></a>, Institute for Progress, March 27, 2026. PDF available here: <a href="https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/IFP_Prevailing_Wage_Experience_Benchmarking_.pdf">https://ifp.org/wp-content/uploads/IFP_Prevailing_Wage_Experience_Benchmarking_.pdf</a></p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> NPRM at 15490.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> NPRM at 15474.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> For the Davis-Bacon Act, see 40 USC §3141(2); and the Service Contract Act at 41 USC §351(a)(2).</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_ques.htm"><em>Occupational Employment Wage Statistics, Frequently Asked Questions</em></a>, at Section C, Number 8.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> See tables, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ecec.pdf"><em>Employer Costs for Employee Compensation – December 2025</em></a>, March 20, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/62l-h1b-benefits">Fact Sheet #62L: What benefits must be offered to H-1B workers</a>,” U.S. Department of Labor, Revised July 2008.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> NPRM at 15479.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> See discussion of the 2013 Interim Final Rule setting the H-2B prevailing wage methodology in Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/"><em>The H-2B temporary foreign worker program: For labor shortages or cheap, temporary labor?</em></a> Economic Policy Institute, January 19, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/h-2b-crabpickers-maryland-seafood-industry-paid-less-than-average/">H-2B crabpickers are so important to the Maryland seafood industry that they get paid $3 less per hour than the state or local average wage</a>,” <em>Working Economics </em>(Economic Policy Institute blog), May 26, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2016-title8/html/USCODE-2016-title8-chap12-subchapII-partII-sec1182.htm">8 U.S.C. 1182 (n)(1)(A)(i)(II)</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf"><em>Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance, Nonagricultural Immigration Programs</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Revised November 2009.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Ethan Baron, “<a href="https://www.mercurynews.com/2019/10/17/h-1b-uber-snatches-up-more-foreign-worker-visas-as-it-lays-off-hundreds-of-employees/">H-1B: Uber snatches up more foreign-worker visas as it lays off hundreds of employees</a>,” <em>Mercury News</em>, October 17, 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Ron Hira and Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/new-evidence-widespread-wage-theft-in-the-h-1b-program/"><em>New evidence of widespread wage theft in the H-1B visa program: Corporate document reveals how tech firms ignore the law and systematically rob migrant workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 9, 2021. See also, news coverage of our report, for example, Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmpvb/analysis-claims-migrant-tech-workers-have-been-underpaid-by-tens-of-millions">Analysis Claims Migrant Tech Workers Have Been Underpaid by Tens of Millions</a>,” Vice News, December 9, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> See for example, Senator Richard Durbin, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2dR4Z6dRIo">How American Jobs are Outsourced</a>,” YouTube.com video, April 16, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> See for example, Stef Kight, “<a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-att-outsourcing-h1b-visa-foreign-workers-1f26cd20-664a-4b5f-a2e3-361c8d2af502.html">U.S. companies are forcing workers to train their own foreign replacements</a>,” <em>Axios</em>, December 29, 2019; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2kkTUZu">Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, June 3, 2015; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2jINcfX">Toys ‘R’ Us Brings Temporary Foreign Workers to U.S. to Move Jobs Overseas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, September 29, 2015;&nbsp;Michael Hiltzik, “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-uc-visas-20170108-story.html">How the University of California Exploited a Visa Loophole to Move Tech Jobs to India</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Los Angeles Times</em>, January 6, 2017;&nbsp;Patrick Thibodeau, “<a href="https://www.computerworld.com/article/2879083/it-outsourcing/southern-california-edison-it-workers-beyond-furious-over-h-1b-replacements.html">Southern California Edison IT Workers ‘Beyond Furious’ over H-1B Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Computerworld</em>, February 5, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?terminal=1">How thousands of middlemen are gaming the H-1B program</a>,” <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/large-companies-game-h-1b-visa-program-leaving-smaller-ones-in-the-cold.html">Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs</a>,” <em>New York Times</em>, November 10, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> David Weil, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975446&amp;content=reviews"><em>The Fissured Workplace: How Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It</em></a>, Harvard, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> A number of studies show a wage penalty for subcontracted/outsourced workers. For example, see Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300206">Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards</a>,” Cornell University ILR Review. January 1, 2010); Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmieder, “<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v132y2017i3p1165-1217..html">The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure</a>,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), 2017, pages 1165-1217; Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, and Benjamin Schoefer “<a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/schoefer_files/Temp_Argentina_Sept_2020.pdf">Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data</a>,” Econometrics Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, September 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/eta/eta20210115-2">U.S. Department of Labor revises interpretation, issues new guidance clarifying filing, compliance requirements in H-1B visa program</a>,” Press Release Number 21-97-NAT, January 15, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julia Preston, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/us/last-task-after-layoff-at-disney-train-foreign-replacements.html">Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, June 3, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Alec MacGillis, “<a href="https://www.propublica.org/article/trump-immigration-h1b-visas-perm-tech-jobs-recruitment">The Tech Recruitment Ruse That Has Avoided Trump’s Crackdown on Immigration</a>,” ProPublica, June 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dhss-proposed-rule-on-modernizing-h-1b-requirements-providing-flexibility-in-the-f-1-program-and-program-improvements-affecting-other-nonimmigrant-workers/#epi-toc-18">EPI comments on DHS’s “Modernizing H-1B” proposed rule</a>,” Public Comments, Economic Policy Institute, December 22, 2023; commenting on U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/23/2023-23381/modernizing-h-1b-requirements-providing-flexibility-in-the-f-1-program-and-program-improvements"><em>Modernizing H-1B Requirements, Providing Flexibility in the F-1 Program, and Program Improvements Affecting Other Nonimmigrant Workers</em></a>, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS No. 2745-23, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0005, RIN: 1615-AC70, 88 Fed. Reg. 72870 (October 23, 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/09/20/2023-20123/modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections"><em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections</em></a>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CIS No. 2740-23 and DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0012, RIN: 1615-AC76, 88 Fed. Reg. 65040 (September 20, 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/12/18/2024-29353/modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections"><em>Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections</em></a>, Final Rule, CIS No. 2740-23; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2023-0012, RIN 1615-AC76, 89 Fed Reg. 103202 (December 18, 2024).</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> See EPI comment on the H-2 programs in the comment submitted to DHS in November 2023; Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dhs-proposed-rule-on-modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections/"><em>EPI comments on DHS’s proposed rule on “Modernizing H-2 Program Requirements, Oversight, and Worker Protections,”</em></a> Economic Policy Institute, November 20, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> See for example, Rebecca Rainey, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/inadequate-labor-department-resources-stymie-enforcement-efforts">Inadequate Labor Department Resources Stymie Enforcement Efforts</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Bloomberg Law</em>, November 7, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> See for example, AFL-CIO, <a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/workers-rights-iced-out"><em>Workers’ Rights Ice’d Out</em></a>, February 25, 2026; Rebecca Rainey, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employment/trumps-federal-workforce-cuts-hit-labor-department-enforcement">Trump’s Federal Workforce Cuts Hit Labor Department Enforcement</a>,” Bloomberg Law, Feb. 24, 2025; Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-benefits-from-immigration/#epi-toc-20"><em>The U.S. benefits from immigration but policy reforms needed to maximize gains: Recommendations and a review of key issues to ensure fair wages and labor standards for all workers</em></a>, October 4, 2024 (see Figure J); Daniel Costa and Philip Martin, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/"><em>Record-low number of federal wage and hour investigations of farms in 2022: Congress must increase funding for labor standards enforcement to protect farmworkers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2023; Ihna Mangundayao, Celine McNicholas, and Margaret Poydock, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/worker-protection-agencies-need-more-funding-to-enforce-labor-laws-and-protect-workers/">Worker protection agencies need more funding to enforce labor laws and protect workers</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), July 29, 2021.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
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		<item>
		<title>Rider in the House Homeland Security appropriations bill would increase the number of workers in the H-2B visa program by 113,000</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/rider-in-the-house-homeland-security-appropriations-bill-would-increase-the-number-of-workers-in-the-h-2b-visa-program-by-113000/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 14:45:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=315083</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part 2 of a two-part series analyzing the impact of an amendment to the House Homeland appropriations bill on the H-2A and H-2B visa programs.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 2 of </em><em>a two-part series analyzing the impact of </em><em>a</em><em>n amendment to the</em> <em>House Homeland appropriations bill on</em> <em>the H-2A and H-2B visa programs. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">part 1 here</a></em><em>.</em></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 18px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The government funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may include a rider amendment that would establish a new methodology for setting the H-2B visa program’s annual numerical limit. This amendment (originally known as Amendment #1 but later dubbed the Bipartisan Visa En Bloc amendment) would result in a cap of at least 252,000 visas in fiscal year (FY) 2026.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">H-2B visa extensions and job changes are not counted against the annual cap, but after adding them to the updated cap of 252,000, the total number of H-2B workers employed in FY 2026 would be 282,000, which is almost 113,000 greater than the total number of workers in 2024 and 2025.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The rider would move 12,000 H-2B workers employed at carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses to the P visa, which lacks any numerical limit on the number of visas, further expanding the number of exploitable workers in H-2B industries.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The rider would restrict the already limited ability of H-2A and H-2B workers to change employers, leaving them more exploitable and vulnerable to workplace violations.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">This amendment in Congress would mainly benefit employers by allowing them to gradually hire an exponentially higher number of workers they can control, while undercutting labor standards for all workers.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>In <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">part 1</a> of this two-part blog post series, I provided background and discussion on a rider amendment that the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee proposed and passed over the summer. Originally known as Amendment #1 but later dubbed the <a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy26-homeland-security-appropriations-act">Bipartisan Visa En Bloc amendment</a>, it would make major changes to the H-2A and H-2B visa programs through the appropriations process, while completely circumventing the committees that should have subject matter jurisdiction in the House and Senate. <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/">Part 1</a> focuses on the changes and impacts in the H-2A program; this post will briefly explain the components of the rider that would make changes to the H-2B visa program and the impact of those changes, as well as one change that would affect both programs.</p>
<p><span id="more-315083"></span></p>
<h4><strong><em>The H-2B program has been expanded through appropriations riders every year since fiscal year 2016</em></strong></h4>
<p>Two of my <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-2b-industries-and-wage-theft/">previous</a> <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/">reports</a> provide a fuller explanation of the background on the size of the H-2B program and a history of the legislative riders in appropriations bills that have been used to expand the size of the H-2B program. A quick recap here is warranted. In fiscal year 2016, Congress authorized a “returning worker” exemption through appropriations legislation to fund the operation of the U.S. government. The legislation exempted H-2B workers from the annual H-2B cap of 66,000 that is set in law, for fiscal year 2016, if the workers hired were previously in H-2B status in any of the preceding three fiscal years. There was no cap on the number of returning H-2B workers under the exemption.</p>
<p>In each year since FY 2017, Congress has, through appropriations riders, given the executive branch the discretionary legal authority to roughly double the number of H-2B visas available. Rather than specify the level of increase for the H-2B program, appropriators have passed the buck instead to the executive branch—perhaps because they didn’t want the responsibility or criticism that may come from setting a specific number—by directing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in consultation with the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), to determine how many additional H-2B visas are appropriate, if any. DHS has interpreted the rider language as allowing them to issue up to 64,716 “supplemental” visas in the corresponding fiscal year. In total, it has been 10 years (FY 2016–2025) since Congress first permitted increases to the size of the H-2B program through an appropriations rider. The Biden administration in 2023, 2024, and 2025 used the full authority granted to the executive branch in the legislative riders, raising the total H-2B annual limit to 130,716.</p>
<h4><strong><em>The appropriations rider would create a new methodology to expand the H-2B cap by at least 100,000</em></strong></h4>
<p>The rider takes a different approach to allowing a higher number of H-2B visas to be issued in FY 2026. The language of the amendment states that for every employer who has had any H-2B positions certified in the past five fiscal years (2021–2025), the highest number that they had certified in those years will be the number of H-2B workers they may hire who will not count against the annual cap of 66,000. In other words, if an employer had 10 jobs certified in 2021, 15 in 2022, 20 in 2023, 100 in 2024, and 50 in 2025, they would be allowed to hire 100 H-2B workers in 2026 without them counting against the 66,000 cap.</p>
<p>To calculate how many workers could be hired in 2026 under this formula, a colleague and I matched employer records from DOL and identified the employers who had at least one approved H-2B job in each of the years between 2020 to 2024. (Full year data for 2025 were not available at the time of writing, so 2020–2024 are used as a proxy.) Altogether, 186,342 H-2B workers would have been exempted from the annual cap under this formula. This is almost certainly a low-end estimate because the number of H-2B jobs certified in 2020 was lower than normal because of the bureaucratic shutdowns and slowdowns caused by the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p><strong>Table 1</strong> shows an estimate for 2020–2024 that serves as a proxy for our estimate on the number of new H-2B workers who will be exempted from the cap in 2026 and also lists the number of new H-2B workers who will be permitted under the regular annual cap of 66,000. Altogether, the regular cap plus the supplemental cap for H-2B in 2026 would permit at least 252,342 new workers if the language in the rider becomes law. That’s an increase of almost 100%, relative to the total cap in 2023–2025, and a 282% increase, relative to the original H-2B cap of 66,000.</p>
<p>It’s also important to note that the annual caps and total number of workers will grow exponentially in the following years after 2026 if Congress reauthorizes the same language in the rider year after year, as they’ve done with past H-2B riders. This will occur because employers will have an incentive to apply to DOL for labor certification for as many H-2B jobs as possible because that will increase the size of their exemption from the cap for the following year.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-311461 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="311461" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311461-35262-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong><em>Total number of H-2B workers would reach 282,000 in 2026 if the rider becomes law</em></strong></h4>
<p>In a recent <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/">report</a>, I showed that in 2024, when 64,716 supplemental H-2B visas were added to the statutory cap of 66,000, for a total cap of 130,716, there were a total of 169,177 H-2B workers. This was up from 75,122 total H-2B workers just a decade earlier. The nearly 170,000 total in 2024 included 139,541 H-2B workers with newly issued visas from the State Department, and 4,580 H-2B workers who had their employment extended with the same employer. An additional 25,056 were H-2B workers who changed employers. Workers who extend their H-2B status or change jobs are not counted against the annual cap. (In 2025 the cap was identical to the previous year; thus, final numbers for 2025 are likely to be very similar to 2024.)</p>
<p>To get a better sense of the total number of H-2B workers who would be employed in 2026 if the rider became law, I estimated that the same number of workers who extended their status or changed jobs in 2024 would also do so in 2026, and added that total to the 2026 total cap that would result from the rider. This is illustrated in <strong>Figure A</strong>, which shows the total number of H-2B workers from 2017 to 2024, and projections for 2025 and 2026. The annual cap plus the supplemental cap, together with H-2B extensions and job changes, will result in nearly 282,000 H-2B workers being employed in 2026—almost 113,000 more workers than were employed in 2024 and 2025.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-311480 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="311480" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311480-35267-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong><em>The rider would move 12,000 H-2B jobs to the P visa, which is not administered by the Department of Labor </em></strong></h4>
<p>The other notable change in the rider when it comes to the H-2B program is that H-2B workers employed at carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses would be moved to the P visa program. According to DOL, in FY 2024 there were <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/H-2B_Selected_Statistics_FY2024_Q4.pdf">12,398</a> H-2B jobs certified in the “Amusement and Recreation Attendants” occupation, which is the relevant occupation that would be moved to the P visa. There would be no annual cap on the number of amusement and carnival workers who could be employed in the P visa program.</p>
<p>At present, the P visa is a little-known program intended for use by <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1a-athlete">professional athletes and coaches</a>, members of an <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-1b-a-member-of-an-internationally-recognized-entertainment-group">internationally recognized entertainment group</a>, or persons performing under a <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-2-individual-performer-or-part-of-a-group-entering-to-perform-under-a-reciprocal-exchange-program">reciprocal exchange program</a> or as part of a <a href="https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-workers/p-3-artist-or-entertainer-coming-to-be-part-of-a-culturally-unique-program">culturally unique program</a>. At present, the P visa program has no wage rules or worker protections and is administered exclusively by DHS, which has no staff or expertise on worker rights. This is extremely troubling, given that H-2B workers employed at carnivals and traveling fairs work grueling hours and in terrible conditions, making them some of the most exploited H-2B workers—<a href="https://cdmigrante.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Taken_Ride.pdf">as advocacy groups have pointed out</a>. These workers are often paid below the minimum wage and are not paid for overtime hours. Yet DOL would no longer have any formal oversight role to ensure they are protected.</p>
<p>The rider language says that employers hiring H-2B carnival workers through the P visa “shall be subject to the same program requirements” of the H-2B program, which are administered by DOL. It also directs DHS and DOL to each separately publish regulations to implement H-2B carnival workers being moved to the P visa program within 180 days and finalize them within one year.</p>
<p>The legislators who support this amendment have provided no explanation or rationale for why it makes sense to create an entirely new process and set of regulations to move one of the biggest H-2B occupations from DOL into DHS—an agency that will be given primary responsibility over the P visa and protecting carnival workers, but which has no mandate or expertise on labor standards and employment laws. The most obvious explanation is that this legislative maneuver is simply a new way to expand the H-2B cap even beyond 252,000, in a way that gives carnival employers an unlimited supply of workers who can be exploited and underpaid. It also seems absurd to put a low-paid traveling carnival worker into the same visa category—where there’s no labor oversight—as a professional baseball player coming from abroad to sign a multimillion-dollar contract with a major league team, or a world-famous singer, dancer, or painter.</p>
<h4><strong><em>House Homeland Security appropriations rider would defund the H-2 modernization rule, restricting the ability of H-2 workers to change jobs and leave abusive employment situations</em></strong></h4>
<p>One other notable section in the rider that impacts both the H-2A and H-2B programs would prohibit DHS from spending funds to implement a regulation that took effect in January 2024—often referred to as the <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/09/20/2023-20123/modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections">H-2 modernization rule</a>. The rule, among other things, requires additional scrutiny of applications from employers that have violated the law, makes it easier for H-2 workers to be eligible for green cards through existing pathways, and expands the ability of H-2A and H-2B workers to change employers (this is referred to as visa “portability”), making it easier to leave an abusive employment situation. The regulation is far from perfect. As <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dhs-proposed-rule-on-modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections/">EPI</a> and <a href="https://migrationthatworks.org/2023/11/20/mtws-comment-on-dhss-proposed-rule-modernizing-h-2-program-requirements-oversight-and-worker-protections/">other advocates</a> have pointed out, the portability provisions require additional measures to make visa portability a more practical reality, rather than just a right that exists on paper and one that can be hijacked by employers seeking to circumvent the annual cap.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, these three provisions in the H-2 modernization rule can undoubtedly help some workers, reducing the indentured nature of the visa programs by tilting the balance of power ever so slightly in the direction of workers. And that’s likely the exact reason that the employers and legislators pushing for the rider included this provision to defund the rule.</p>
<h4><strong><em>The H-2B program needs reforms to improve labor protections and provide H-2B workers with a pathway to citizenship </em></strong></h4>
<p>The appropriations committees in the House and Senate should not continue using parliamentary tactics to make changes to the H-2B program that would likely not pass in Congress through regular order. Instead, Congress should work with the executive branch to reform the H-2B program in the following ways:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>ensure U.S. workers are considered for open temporary and seasonal jobs&nbsp;</li>
<li>craft updated wage rules that protect U.S. wage standards for all workers in H-2B industries</li>
<li>provide migrant workers with new protections and allow them to more easily change jobs</li>
<li>provide migrant workers with a quick path to a green card and citizenship</li>
<li>prohibit lawbreaking employers from hiring through the H-2B program</li>
</ul>
<p>As EPI and other advocates have long said, these genuine reforms are the only way to ensure that the workers playing vital roles in the U.S. economy are not being exploited and underpaid and that their employers are not able to use visa programs as an employment law loophole that ultimately erodes job quality for all.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Congressional budget amendment and new DOL wage rule together would greatly expand work visas for farmworkers and drastically lower their wages</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/congressional-budget-amendment-and-new-dol-wage-rule-together-would-greatly-expand-work-visas-for-farmworkers-and-drastically-lower-their-wages/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 19:45:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=314931</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part 1 of a two-part series analyzing the impact of an amendment to the House Homeland appropriations bill on the H-2A and H-2B visa programs.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>This is part 1 of a two-part series analyzing the impact of an amendment to the House Homeland appropriations bill on the H-2A and H-2B visa programs. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/rider-in-the-house-homeland-security-appropriations-bill-would-increase-the-number-of-workers-in-the-h-2b-visa-program-by-113000/">part 2 here</a>.</em></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-family: proxima-nova, 'Proxima Nova', sans-serif; font-size: 18px;"><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The government funding bill for the Department of Homeland Security may include a rider amendment that would expand the H-2A visa program for seasonal farm jobs. This amendment (originally known as Amendment #1 but later dubbed the Bipartisan Visa En Bloc amendment) proposes to open the H-2A visa program to year-round occupations.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">There were 410,000 year-round jobs in agriculture and 353,000 seasonal H-2A workers in 2024.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The Trump Department of Labor has issued a new 2026 H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) to set H-2A wages. Based on their own estimates, the 2026 H-2A AEWR will result in a <span style="text-decoration: underline;">$24 billion pay cut</span> for H-2A farmworkers over 10 years and incentivize growth in the H-2A program to 500,000 jobs a year. EPI has estimated that U.S. farmworkers will lose $2.7 to 3.3 billion in wages per year.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">If employers are allowed to use H-2A visas for year-round jobs via the House Homeland appropriations rider, farmworkers in those jobs will see massive pay cuts of roughly $20,000 to $40,000 per year, starting in 2026.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The Trump DOL wage reductions <span style="text-decoration: underline;">combined</span> with H-2A visas for year-round jobs could expand the H-2A program to 900,000 workers in 2034, meaning that workers on temporary visas would account for 42% of average annual employment in agriculture.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">This rider in Congress and the proposed regulation at DOL would only benefit farm employers, allowing them to hire workers they can control for as little pay as possible. These changes would drastically lower pay for all farmworkers and lead to job losses for U.S. workers, a complete reversal from the Trump administration’s original claims that U.S. workers would fill the farm jobs left open due to deportations.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>For well over a decade now—<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/">time</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-substance-impact-h-2b-guestworker-program-appropriations-riders/">time</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/proposal-to-change-the-h-2a-program-via-appropriations-would-allow-agribusiness-to-fill-hundreds-of-thousands-of-permanent-year-round-jobs-with-temporary-guestworkers/">time</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-h-2b-visa-program-has-ballooned-without-being-fixed-expanding-it-to-year-round-jobs-like-meatpacking-would-lower-wages-and-revenue/">time</a> again—Congress has been making policy changes to temporary work visa programs <em>not</em> through the normal process of debating and passing legislation, but through a backdoor process. This involves amendments to annual appropriations legislation (known as “riders”) that fund the U.S. government. Riders that make policy changes are much more likely to pass without much public notice, debate, or pushback relative to dedicated legislation, since they are smaller parts of larger, must-pass legislation to fund the whole U.S. government. The significant changes proposed or passed in riders over the past decade have all pushed temporary work visa programs in the same direction: expanding and deregulating the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, which benefits employers at the expense of U.S. workers and hundreds of thousands of migrant workers who will continue to see reduced wages and poorer working conditions. It&#8217;s already clear that low-wage work visa programs won’t be improved during the Trump administration; instead, they’ll be made much worse.</p>
<p>This fiscal year, there is a particular urgency around the riders to expand and deregulate the H-2A and H-2B visa programs, in light of the Trump administration’s mass deportation effort that is arresting and deporting workers at a breakneck pace, as well as <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trump-attacks-on-temporary-immigration-protections-like-tps-hurt-the-economy-and-strip-millions-of-their-workplace-rights/">canceling temporary immigration protections</a> that provided work authorization to millions. The Trump administration got the ball rolling on this effort with a new proposed <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range">H-2A wage regulation</a> issued by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) on October 2, 2025. This proposed regulation contains a stunning admission: <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/11/immigration-crackdown-food-prices/">The administration’s mass deportation effort is likely to raise food prices</a>. DOL’s solution to this problem of the administration’s own creation is an irrational and anti-worker solution. Instead of pushing the administration from within to stop their campaign of mass deportation, DOL proposes to lower farmworker wages by $24 billion over the next 10 years.</p>
<p><span id="more-314931"></span></p>
<p>Having seen this proposed rule, employers who are heavily reliant on migrant laborers—especially those in the hospitality, construction, and agricultural industries—can now be confident they have a friendly administration willing to dismantle labor standards and are lobbying furiously for more work visas that allow them to employ a vulnerable workforce. Employers are <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/stalled-release-of-seasonal-h-2b-visas-puts-strain-on-employers">making the case</a> that H-2 visas are “a workforce issue, not immigration,” as well as an essential service <a href="https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/10/dol-brings-back-immigration-staff-as-shutdown-drags-on-00631426">that must continue to function even during the recent government shutdown</a>. A number of lawmakers and the Trump administration seem to agree.</p>
<p>The latest legislative vehicle that has a chance at furthering these goals is a rider that the Homeland Security subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee proposed and passed. It was originally known as Amendment #1 but was later dubbed the <a href="https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/committee-approves-fy26-homeland-security-appropriations-act">Bipartisan Visa En Bloc amendment</a>. As <a href="https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/2025/06/house-appropriators-unite-around-major-visa-changes-to-grow-h-2a-h-2b-workforce-00421211"><em>Politico Pro</em> reported</a>, “House appropriators from both parties came together…to back big changes to visa policies that would boost the number of seasonal workers who can come to the United States.” The rider was cosponsored by three Republicans and one Democrat (but the Democrat was Henry Cuellar (D-Texas), the recent <a href="https://apnews.com/article/trump-pardon-cuellar-45a47bc329bec820cd19c087b20fca19">recipient of a pardon</a> from Trump for federal bribery charges). However, it’s worth noting that because rider passed by a voice vote, there is no on-the-record vote tally showing who voted for it.</p>
<p>The rider still has a long way to go before becoming law and will also depend on whether an omnibus government spending bill is ultimately passed for fiscal year 2026. As of the time of publication, the Senate has not yet released their version of a Homeland Security appropriations bill. To become law, the Senate would also have to adopt the same rider provision for it to become part of the broader omnibus appropriations legislation. Nevertheless, the rider is a statement of intent from legislators who are willing to go to bat for employers seeking new exploitable and underpaid migrant workers to replace their long-term immigrant workers who have been deported or lost status.</p>
<p>Below is a summary of the four major changes that the Bipartisan Visa En Bloc rider amendment would make to the H-2A and H-2B visa programs. Only the first major change is discussed in this explainer, but a follow-up to this blog post will discuss the other three changes. Under the rider:</p>
<ul>
<li>Employers would be permitted to hire H-2A farmworkers to fill year-round jobs.</li>
<li>The H-2B visa program would be expanded by at least 100,000 workers relative to its size in 2024.</li>
<li>H-2B workers employed at carnivals, traveling fairs, and circuses would be moved to the P visa program, a program that has no wage rules or worker protections and over which DOL has no formal oversight role.</li>
<li>DHS would not be permitted to spend funds to implement the January 2024 regulation that incrementally improves rights and protections for H-2A and H-2B workers. This regulation allows them to be eligible for green cards through existing pathways and helps them more easily change employers, reducing the indentured nature of the visa programs, and requires additional scrutiny on employer applications if they’ve committed certain violations.</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong><em>The H-2A program has expanded rapidly and is rife with abuse</em></strong></h4>
<p>Employers use the H-2A visa program to fill seasonal and temporary jobs in agriculture, after employers go through a (mostly <em>pro forma</em>) process to prove that they could not find an available U.S. worker to hire. There is no annual limit on the number of H-2A workers that can be hired, and H-2A has in recent years been the fastest-growing U.S. work visa program, tripling over the past decade. <strong>Figure A</strong> shows the three available data sets on H-2A job certifications, petitions, and visas, as well as an estimate of the total number of H-2A workers between 2015 and 2024, with 352,682 H-2A workers estimated to have been employed in the United States last year. The vast majority of H-2A workers are employed on crop farms, picking fruits and vegetables, and the average duration of an H-2A job is roughly six months.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-308680 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="308680" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/308680-35137-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>There have been countless exposés from journalists and advocates that reveal how H-2A farmworkers are indentured to their employers, frequently <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/">robbed</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1COm0C73CKw">exploited</a>, <a href="https://prismreports.org/2025/09/24/women-h2a-visa-farm-workers-migrant/">victimized</a>, and <a href="https://polarisproject.org/resources/labor-trafficking-on-specific-temporary-work-visas-report/">trafficked</a>, and how the main source of wage and hour violations on farms comes from <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/">employers breaking H-2A rules</a>.</p>
<p>The rider adopted in the House would allow H-2A workers to be employed in year-round jobs—which is currently prohibited—expanding the scope of the program and allowing H-2A workers to fill jobs on dairy, livestock, and poultry and egg farms, as well as in nurseries and greenhouses and other nonseasonal agricultural occupations. This would be a major change to H-2A, and it has long been a demand of agribusiness.</p>
<p>Making H-2A year-round raises three key questions:</p>
<ul>
<li>How many permanent, year-round jobs might be impacted?</li>
<li>How will farmworker wages be impacted?</li>
<li>How much will the H-2A program expand?</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong><em>There are 410,000 year-round jobs in agriculture</em></strong></h4>
<p>For an answer to the first question, see <strong>Table 1</strong>, which lists four of the major agricultural industries employing farmworkers year-round, the largest of which are greenhouse and dairy jobs. Together they total nearly 410,000 full-time equivalent jobs. The industries listed do not include the many year-round (or nearly year-round) jobs that can be found on crop farms, including equipment operators and supervisors. In total, it’s possible that up to one-third of the total <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cew/publications/employment-and-wages-annual-averages/current/home.htm#exclusions">1.6 million</a> full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture could be year-round.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-311448 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="311448" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311448-35260-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong><em>DOL’s new Adverse Effect Wage Rate will result in a pay cut for H-2A workers and U.S. workers that will line the pockets of employers by billions</em></strong></h4>
<p>Next, let’s consider what would happen to the wages of farmworkers in year-round occupations if the H-2A visa program were expanded to include them.</p>
<p>The wages of nearly all H-2A farmworkers are set by the&nbsp;<a href="https://flag.dol.gov/wage-data/adverse-effect-wage-rates">Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a> (AEWR), unless the federal, state, or local hourly minimum wages are higher, or if there is an applicable local prevailing wage or collective bargaining agreement in place. The purpose of the AEWR is to ensure that H-2A workers are paid a wage that is consistent with U.S. wage standards and prevent adverse impacts of H-2A employment on the wages of farmworkers in the United States.</p>
<p>On October 2, 2025, DOL issued an <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range">interim final rule</a> laying out a new AEWR methodology. A recent <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">EPI post</a> describes in detail how the new Trump AEWR will cut wage rates dramatically by using an inferior data set for agriculture and creating two artificial “skill levels,” which set H-2A wages at the 17th percentile of wages surveyed for farm occupations (skill level 1) and at the 50th percentile, which is the median of wages surveyed (skill level 2). <span class="TextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0">EPI has also </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0">submitted</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0"> a detailed </span><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-2025-interim-final-rule-modifying-the-aewr-methodology-for-h-2a-farmworkers/"><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW119227646 BCX0">comment </span></a><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW119227646 BCX0">to DOL </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0">critiquing the new Trump AEWR </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0">methodology</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW119227646 BCX0">.</span></span><span class="EOP SCXW119227646 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}'>&nbsp;</span></p>
<p>In the new AEWR, the Trump DOL also removes the previous H-2A program requirement that employers pay for 100% of housing costs for H-2A workers. In its stead, the new AEWR deducts a set amount out of every hour of an H-2A worker’s pay, to compensate the employer for H-2A housing costs. This shifts housing costs to H-2A workers who will have the added burden of paying for housing costs out of the already-low wages they earn. The housing deduction is subtracted from the AEWR—lowering a low wage even further—so low that in many states, the state minimum wage will be higher and become the <em>de facto</em> AEWR.</p>
<p>In total, DOL estimates that over $1.7 billion will be transferred from H-2A workers’ pockets back to farm employers under the new wage rule in 2026, amounting to $24 billion over the next 10 years as the program grows to over 500,000 jobs. <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">EPI’s own estimates</a> are that H-2A workers will see a wage cut of between $1.7 billion and $2.1 billion in 2026, depending on how state minimum wage laws are enforced. Reducing the AEWR for H-2A workers will also lower wages for U.S. farmworkers—one-third of whom are U.S.-born citizens, according to the latest <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf">DOL survey</a>. A fall in the H-2A wage will increase demand for H-2A workers, since employers can save significantly on labor costs if they hire them. As a result, it will become <em>relatively</em> more expensive to hire non-H-2A U.S. farmworkers. Employers will therefore reduce demand for U.S. farmworkers, putting downward pressure on their wages, with U.S. farmworkers seeing wage reduction of $2.7 to $3.3 billion in annual pay.</p>
<p>This would represent a shocking upward redistribution of income away from some of the country’s most underpaid and essential workers for the food system.</p>
<h4><strong><em>Under the new AEWR, H-2A farmworkers in year-round jobs would be paid tens of thousands of dollars less annually compared with what U.S. farmworkers earn now</em></strong></h4>
<p>The wage cuts from the AEWR described above currently apply only to H-2A farmworkers, who can only be employed in seasonal jobs. However, if the rider to make H-2A year-round goes into effect, farmworkers in year-round jobs will see the biggest pay cuts.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2</strong>&nbsp;lists a sample of some of the main year-round agricultural industries in major agricultural states, along with average annual employment, which together accounts for about 15% of the total year-round full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture. Table 2 shows how much farmworkers earned annually, on average in 2024 in those industries and states, and compares the annual earnings of farmworkers in 2024 with what H-2A workers would earn in 2026 if they had worked in the same jobs and had been paid the corresponding 2026 AEWR&nbsp;at skill level 1 for the entire year (40 hours per week for 52 weeks), minus the annualized amount that will be deducted from hourly wages for housing according to the 2026 AEWR.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>The final column in Table 2 shows a few examples that illustrate the difference between what year-round U.S. farmworkers in the selected industries earned in 2024 and what H-2A workers at skill level 1 would earn if they were paid the annualized AEWR in 2026. Table 2 shows that the reduction in wages for H-2A farmworkers in year-round jobs could range from an annual pay cut of nearly $19,000 for farmworkers on dairy farms in Wisconsin to a pay cut of over $44,000 for farmworkers on poultry and egg farms in Texas.</p>
<p>Outcomes such as these—in which farmworkers paid the 2026 AEWR would earn tens of thousands of dollars less than what U.S. farmworkers earned in major year-round jobs in 2024—are egregious and in violation of the spirit and letter of the AEWR and the H-2A statute, but will be the norm and allowed if the year-round H-2A provision in the rider becomes law. This would hurt some of the most vulnerable and lowest-paid workers in the U.S. labor market and create an almost unstoppable incentive for employers to replace their current farmworkers who now fill year-round jobs with H-2A workers who can’t easily switch employers or effectively complain when their wages are stolen and when they’re forced to work in unsafe conditions.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-312420 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="312420" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/312420-35297-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><strong><em>The year-round H-2A rider with the new AEWR rule could triple the current size of the H-2A program and cause wages to drop sharply for farmworkers </em></strong></h4>
<p>The ultimate result of the new H-2A wage rule combined with making the H-2A program year-round would be a likely tripling of the size of the H-2A program to about 900,000 workers, which includes the complete decimation of job quality for the 410,000 jobs in agriculture that can provide stable year-round employment and sometimes a living wage for U.S. farmworkers.</p>
<p>How would this occur? The Trump DOL’s new wage rule estimates that the lower pay for farmworkers it institutes will encourage farms to rapidly increase hiring through the H-2A program, estimating that 515,000 H-2A workers will be employed in 2034. If those low wages remain in effect and the year-round H-2A rider becomes law and is renewed yearly (as the H-2B riders have been every year), employers are likely to ramp up hiring for year-round jobs until nearly all are filled by H-2A workers who can be paid extremely low wages and, because of their precarious immigration status, have little bargaining power or the ability to complain in the face of employer lawbreaking.</p>
<p>For context, the 410,000 H-2A workers in year-round jobs plus the estimated 257,500 year-round equivalent jobs done by H-2A workers in seasonal jobs (i.e., 515,000 H-2A workers employed in 2034 for six months out of the year), would equal 667,500 full-time equivalent jobs in agriculture, or roughly 42% of all annual average employment in agriculture.</p>
<h4><strong><em>Instead of ballooning the H-2A program, policymakers should create a pathway to citizenship for farmworkers to ensure their rights on the job </em></strong></h4>
<p>Policymakers and the public must reject the harmful and unjustified proposals coming from Trump and Congress to pay less to farmworkers who already live on the margins of society, and to keep more of them indentured through the H-2A program. This rider is another example that reveals the truth about the Trump administration’s immigration agenda: They have no real interest in protecting jobs or pay for American or “native-born” workers, only in giving employers what they demand.</p>
<p>Using H-2A, a problematic temporary work visa program—in which workers are&nbsp;<a href="https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jessicagarrison/the-new-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-foreign-workers-f">virtually indentured</a>&nbsp;to their employers and that accounts for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/">most of the wage and hour violations that take place on farms</a>—to fill permanent, year-round jobs should give pause to all members of Congress. It makes no sense, unless the goal is to keep the workers employed in those jobs from having equal rights and fair pay. If migrant workers are filling true labor shortages in <em>permanent</em>, year-round jobs, then those workers should always get lawful <em>permanent</em> residence (i.e., green cards) that puts them on a path to citizenship.</p>
<p>If members of Congress want a reliable, healthy, and stable farm labor force that can continue to produce food domestically for Americans, they should pass legislation that legalizes undocumented farmworkers and reforms the H-2A program so that all migrant farmworkers have equal rights, fair wages, and a quick path to permanent residence and citizenship. That’s the only way to ensure that the workers who sustain the food supply chain will be treated with the dignity and respect they deserve and that honors their contributions to the U.S. economy.</p>
<hr>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> The amounts have not been adjusted for inflation. The 2026 AEWR provides two “skill levels” for farmworkers—which are set at specific percentiles along the distribution of OEWS wages surveyed. Skill level 1 is the 17th percentile while skill level 2 is the median of wages surveyed, which is also the 50th percentile. For this calculation, I am only calculating the wage differentials for H-2A workers in year-round jobs who are classified by employers at skill level 1, which DOL estimates will account for 92% of all H-2A workers.</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DHS Interim Final Rule eliminating automatic extensions of Employment Authorization Documents</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dhs-interim-final-rule-eliminating-automatic-extensions-of-employment-authorization-documents/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 20:00:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=315299</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19702/removal-of-the-automatic-extension-of-employment-authorization-documents  
December 1, Paul Chief, Business and Foreign Workers Office of Policy and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Department of Homeland 5900 Capital Gateway Camp Springs, MD Re: Removal of the Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documents, CIS No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19702/removal-of-the-automatic-extension-of-employment-authorization-documents"><em>https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19702/removal-of-the-automatic-extension-of-employment-authorization-documents</em></a> <u> </u></p>
<p>December 1, 2025</p>
<p>Paul Buono<br />
Chief, Business and Foreign Workers Division<br />
Office of Policy and Strategy<br />
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services<br />
Department of Homeland Security<br />
5900 Capital Gateway Drive<br />
Camp Springs, MD 20746</p>
<p><strong>Re: </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/30/2025-19702/removal-of-the-automatic-extension-of-employment-authorization-documents"><strong><em>Removal of the Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documents</em></strong></a><strong>, CIS No. 2826-25; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0271, RIN 1615-AD05 (October 30, 2025)</strong></p>
<p>Chief Buono:</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) submits this comment strongly <strong><u>opposing</u></strong> the October 30, 2025 Interim Final Rule (IFR) eliminating automatic extensions of Employment Authorization Documents (EADs). The 2025 IFR unlawfully reverses DHS’s nearly decade-long policy choice of providing automatic EAD extensions; ignores ongoing adjudication delays and economic evidence; disregards reliance interests that DHS itself recognized less than a year ago; rejects feasible alternatives; and relies solely on an unsupported security rationale all while unlawfully bypassing notice-and-comment procedures as required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The result is a rule that will strip employees of their workplace rights, destabilize the workforce, disrupt employer operations by creating gaps in employment authorization with unknown durations, and inflict severe harm on workers and their ability to provide for their families solely due to the government’s bureaucratic processing delays. We urge DHS to withdraw the IFR in full.</p>
<p><strong>EPI fully supports and endorses the written comments and recommendations submitted by the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP), which includes a number of examples of the IFR’s impact on ASAP members. </strong></p>
<h2>About EPI and organizational interest</h2>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes policies that protect and improve economic conditions and raise labor standards for low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.</p>
<p>EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including on temporary immigration protections and EADs, and on labor standards enforcement for both the low-wage and professional workforce. EPI has also provided expert testimony about the U.S. immigration system to both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, as well as state legislatures.</p>
<h2>The worker rights of millions are protected by EADs</h2>
<p>For workers who lack a permanent or more durable immigration status, obtaining a temporary EAD can mean having enforceable workplace rights that an individual would otherwise not have. While all workers have some labor and workplace rights under U.S. law—regardless of immigration status—enforcing them in practice becomes virtually impossible because of the threat of deportation, which prevents workers who lack an immigration status or an EAD from calling out lawbreaking employers and demanding that they comply with the law, or from reporting workplace violations to labor enforcement agencies. But having protection from deportation through temporary administrative immigration protections like parole, Temporary Protected Status, deferred action—accompanied by an EAD—means that, in practice, workers can report workplace violations to government officials without fear of retaliation that can lead to deportation. It also means that a worker with an EAD can be employed by just about any employer and change jobs or employers, unlike migrant workers employed with temporary visas who can only be employed by the sponsor of their visa.</p>
<p>Altogether, nearly 5.6 million people in the U.S. held a temporary but precarious immigration status in 2024, including over 2 million people who are asylum-seekers. (see&nbsp;<strong>Table 1 </strong>below).</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-301548 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="301548" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/301548-34789-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>While these statuses and protections are only a band-aid for&nbsp;a flawed immigration system that is deeply in need of reform,<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> they have been shown to protect millions of workers from some of the worst forms of employer lawbreaking. Employers also greatly benefit from workers having a protective status and a work permit because it allows them to lawfully employ millions of people who would otherwise not be eligible to work, leading to billions in economic contributions to the U.S. economy and generating demand that stimulates growth.</p>
<p>While comprehensive data are limited, we know, for example, that in 2017 the&nbsp;top five industries&nbsp;for TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti were construction, restaurants and food services, landscaping, child day care services, and grocery stores.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Employers in these industries and many others are in danger of losing their current workforce and will be prohibited from legally recruiting millions of other workers. Just one example is the&nbsp;GE Appliance Park in Louisville, Kentucky, a unionized plant where nearly 200 employees received a letter from the administration terminating their status and work authorization.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Overnight, GE lost 200 employees.</p>
<h2><strong>DHS ignores the value and impact of work authorization on the workforce</strong></h2>
<p>In the IFR, DHS does not estimate and consider the value and impact that EADs have on the workforce and economy. There are examples of existing research showing the important economic contributions that hundreds of thousands of migrants with temporary protections and EADs are able to make thanks to being work-authorized. For example, when the TPS population was approximately 354,000 in 2021, the American Immigration Council estimated that “TPS holders contributed more than $2.2 billion in taxes, including almost $1 billion to state and local governments,” as well as “held $8 billion in spending power.”<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Another estimate by Moriarty found that TPS-eligible individuals “annually contribute some $31 billion in wages to the national GDP.”<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a></p>
<p>Research has also quantified some of the contributions made by persons who have qualified for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). DACA was created by DHS in 2012, and recipients are eligible for protections from deportation and EADs that are valid for two years and renewable. More than 835,000 persons have benefitted from DACA, and more than 500,000 were enrolled as of 2024.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Svajlenka and Truong found that DACA recipient households “pay $6.2 billion in federal taxes and $3.3 billion in state and local taxes each year,” and “after taxes, these households hold $25.3 billion in spending power,” and that DACA recipient families “own 68,000 homes, making $760 million in mortgage payments and $2.5 billion in rental payments annually.”<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a></p>
<p>When it comes to measuring the workplace impact and economic benefits of being issued an EAD for the workers themselves, there are limited examples, but three are worth citing here. One is an annual survey of DACA recipients that was conducted in 2024 for the ninth time. The most recent survey, conducted by Wong et al. and published by the Center for American Progress, showed that DACA has been an essential tool to improve the economic and educational outcomes of recipients.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> In terms of the impact that deferred action and an EAD have had on the employment of DACA recipients: 59.1% of respondents moved to a job with better pay; 47.3% moved to a job with better working conditions; 47.5% moved to a job that “better fits [their] education and training”; 49.6% moved to a job that “better fits [their] long-term career goals”; 57.3% moved to a job with health insurance or other benefits; and 19.6% of respondents obtained professional licenses.</p>
<p>Wong et al. also measured the impact of DACA and EADs on wages, finding that “[d]ata from the past nine years show that DACA has had a significant and positive effect on wages: Recipients’ average hourly wage more than doubled from $11.92 to $31.52 per hour—an increase of 164.4 percent—after receiving DACA.” These significant wage increases are no doubt a result of the labor and workplace rights and stability that DACA recipients gain from having an EAD.</p>
<p>Orrenius and Zavodny examined the wage and employment impact of TPS<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a>—which allows those who are eligible to also be granted an EAD. They looked specifically at migrants from El Salvador, finding that having TPS increased employment rates, and that less-educated Salvadoran men who were employed earned 13% more if they had TPS. They note that “As a whole, the results suggest that less-educated Salvadoran men who receive TPS are able to move into better jobs and become more selective about the jobs they hold, increasing their earnings but also their job search and unemployment incidence.”</p>
<p>One other analysis that assesses the wage impact of being issued an EAD comes from Kallick, which looks specifically at asylum seekers in New York and nationwide.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Relying on previous methodologies for measuring the impact of a lawful immigration status being granted to unauthorized immigrants, Kallick estimates that asylum seekers who are granted EADs increase their wages by 10%.</p>
<p>While the relative benefits of precarious and temporary immigration protections and EADs to migrant workers and the broader economy are clear, it is important to note here that the protections and EADs are only temporary and will end if renewals are not approved, or if renewals are delayed. Thus, DHS through this IFR will intentionally hurt the economy and eliminate the economic benefits for workers and employers that EADs create, a fact that the IFR does not grapple with or address.</p>
<p>An alternative to the path that DHS has chosen of terminating temporary statuses and EADs would be if Congress provided these workers with a permanent immigration status like a green card—and the rights that accompany it—allowing them to have full, equal, and permanent workplace rights and to exercise them in practice. That, in turn, would lead to even&nbsp;higher wages and improved labor standards for all workers,<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> not just those who newly obtain green cards. However, the current administration so far has shown no appetite for supporting Congress in the creation of even one new green card.</p>
<p>But in the meantime, EADs through tools like TPS, parole, and DACA can mean the difference between having rights on the job or being extraordinarily vulnerable to the worst abuses by employers. While the current administration has&nbsp;claimed&nbsp;they want to help U.S. workers, actions like the mass detention and deportation of millions of workers and canceling protections like TPS and parole, reveal they are willing to degrade conditions and standards for all workers, as well as kill jobs and shrink the economy, in order to carry out their extreme immigration enforcement agenda.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>If the IFR is not withdrawn, millions of workers will be more easily exploited by their bosses and driven into the informal economy. That, in turn, will reduce their&nbsp;tax contributions that support the social safety net and lower their wages significantly<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a>—ultimately hurting U.S workers in low-wage industries and the U.S. economy writ large by driving down demand for goods and services. It will also leave employers without millions of reliable employees in industries like construction, hospitality, childcare, agriculture, food processing and production, and more.</p>
<h2>DHS ignores significant reliance interests</h2>
<p>The 2025 IFR also disregards the significant reliance interests that DHS itself reaffirmed less than a year ago when it issued a permanent 540-day automatic extension, and which have existed since the agency’s issuance of the 2016 Final Rule. For nearly a decade, USCIS has automatically provided an extension of some length to some groups of workers with expiring EADs.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> In the 2024 Final Rule, DHS invited stakeholders to rely on a permanent 540-day extension and explicitly sought comment on making the extension permanent to provide regulatory certainty and workforce stability.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> Employers and workers reasonably structured hiring, staffing, payroll planning, and employee retention around that assurance.</p>
<p>Additionally, the only reliance interests DHS barely acknowledges—but does not meaningfully consider—are those of migrants and their employers. Yet, DHS entirely failed to consider the reliance interests of other stakeholders who rely on regulatory stability preventing immigrant communities from suffering government-caused lapses in employment authorization. These other stakeholders include state, city, and local governments; entire regional economies; educational institutions; healthcare providers; legal and social service providers; and the broader public, among others.</p>
<p>DHS cannot now abruptly withdraw the permanent 540-day automatic extension without addressing these significant reliance interests. Doing so violates core administrative law principles.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> In short, DHS invited workers, employers, families, schools, service providers, and communities to rely on regulatory stability, then pulled the rug out from under them without explanation. DHS failed to properly consider these significant reliance interests when issuing the 2025 IFR.</p>
<h2>DHS fails to consider feasible alternatives as required by the APA</h2>
<p>DHS fails to meaningfully consider feasible, less disruptive alternatives, in violation of the APA.&nbsp;</p>
<p><u>Consecutive EADs</u>. For instance, DHS claims that “proper planning” by renewal applicants could ensure no lapses in work authorization, yet this fails to recognize that DHS does not issue consecutive EADs. When individuals file well in advance of expiration, USCIS routinely issues overlapping validity periods rather than tacking the new approval onto the end of the existing authorization. As a result, early filers lose usable work-authorization time, forcing them into an ever-accelerating renewal cycle where they must apply earlier and earlier at significant personal and financial cost merely to maintain continuous work authorization. Filing fees, legal fees, time off work to prepare filings, and the emotional and economic strain of constant renewal planning make this approach untenable. If DHS truly believed early filing was the solution, it was required to consider—and explain why it rejected—the obvious alternative of issuing consecutive EAD validity periods so that applicants could file early without losing work authorization time and money. This straightforward fix would allow individuals to apply far in advance, provide USCIS a longer adjudication window, and preserve the full period of authorized employment. DHS’s failure even to address this option underscores the inadequacy of its “proper planning” rationale and confirms that the agency did not meaningfully consider reasonable, less disruptive alternatives.</p>
<p><u>Concurrent vetting</u>. Nor does DHS explain why it cannot simply continue to conduct vetting during the renewal process and deny renewal of employment authorization if “potential hits of derogatory information” arise—a process it already uses.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> With or without the automatic extension, the individual remains in the United States; the only question is whether they are forced out of lawful employment while being vetted. In other words, DHS already has a system that protects security while letting people keep working, and it has not explained why it cannot keep using it.</p>
<p><u>Secure paper</u>. DHS’s concern that its own receipt notices are printed on “non-secure” or “plain” paper ignores an obvious solution: printing the extension notices on secure paper.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> Rejecting straightforward, commonsense solutions in favor of a rule that causes sweeping economic harm and predictable worker displacement is the definition of arbitrary and capricious decision-making.</p>
<h2>DHS’s use of an Interim Final Rule violates APA requirements</h2>
<p>DHS made the 2025 IFR effective immediately, without providing the notice or opportunity to comment required by the APA. Thus the agency’s use of an interim final rule was unlawful.</p>
<p>First, DHS has not satisfied the “meticulous and demanding” standard for invoking the APA’s “good cause” exception.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a> That narrow exception allows an agency to bypass notice and comment only where it “for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a> While DHS claims that notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, it relies almost entirely on the unsupported security rationale discussed above, along with stating it is “self-evident” that more workers would “rush” to apply for EAD renewals before the rule took effect.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> Again, DHS has not provided evidence of any security risks caused by automatic extensions.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> DHS therefore cannot satisfy the good cause exception to avoid notice-and-comment rulemaking.</p>
<p>Second, the 2025 IFR improperly relies on the exception for normal rulemaking involving the “foreign affairs function of the United States.”<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> This exception, too, comes with a “high bar.”<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> In particular, courts have warned against “[t]he dangers of an expansive reading of the foreign affairs exception” in the immigration context, where inevitable “incidental foreign affairs effects” would “eliminate[] public participation in this entire area of administrative law.”<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> DHS cannot meet that high bar here, as the potential effects on international relations that it puts forward are all speculative, tenuous, or otherwise reliant on unsupported claims of security risks.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a></p>
<h2>Conclusion and recommended action</h2>
<p>For all of these reasons, DHS should withdraw the 2025 IFR in its entirety and reinstate the permanent 540-day automatic extension. The IFR contradicts DHS’s statutory mandate, its own 2016 and 2024 Final Rules, and the factual and economic record. It rests on speculation, ignores constitutional concerns, and will cause predictable, major harm to worker rights and workers themselves, as well as families, employers, and the broader economy—all due to bureaucratic processing delays caused by the government alone.</p>
<p>Comment submitted by:</p>
<p>Daniel Costa|<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<h2>Endnotes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-benefits-from-immigration/#epi-toc-20"><em>The U.S. benefits from immigration but policy reforms needed to maximize gains: Recommendations and a review of key issues to ensure fair wages and labor standards for all workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, October 4, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Robert Warren and Donald Kerwin, <a href="https://cmsny.org/publications/jmhs-tps-elsalvador-honduras-haiti/"><em>A Statistical and Demographic Profile of the US Temporary Protected Status Populations from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti</em></a>, Center for Migration Studies, 2017</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Keely Doll, “<a href="https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/2025/04/04/louisville-ge-appliance-park-workers-chnv-visas-revoked-immigration-crackdown/82761540007/">Letters warn nearly 200 GE Appliances workers to leave U.S. as immigration program ends</a>,” Louisville Courier Journal, April 4, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> American Immigration Council, <a href="https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/contributions-temporary-protected-status-holders-us-economy"><em>The Contributions of Temporary Protected Status Holders to the U.S. Economy </em></a>(fact sheet), September 19, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Andrew Moriarty, “<a href="https://www.fwd.us/news/temporary-protected-status-tps-5-things-to-know/">Temporary Protected Status (TPS): 5 Things to Know</a>,” Policy Brief, FWD.US, February 29, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> President’s Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration (President’s Alliance), <a href="https://www.presidentsalliance.org/breakdown-of-dreamer-with-and-without-daca/">Breakdown of Dreamer Populations—Both with and Without DACA</a>, Updated May 23, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a>, Nicole Svajlenka and Trinh Q. Truong, “<a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-demographic-and-economic-impacts-of-daca-recipients-fall-2021-edition/">The Demographic and Economic Impacts of DACA Recipients: Fall 2021 Edition</a>,” Center for American Progress, November 24, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Tom Wong, Ignacia Rodriguez Kmec, Diana Pliego, Karen Fierro Ruiz, Silva Mathema, Trinh Q. Truong, and Rosa Barrientos-Ferrer, <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/2023-survey-of-daca-recipients-highlights-economic-advancement-continued-uncertainty-amid-legal-limbo/"><em>2023 Survey of DACA Recipients Highlights Economic Advancement, Continued Uncertainty amid Legal Limbo</em></a>, Center for American Progress, March 25, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Pia Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny, “<a href="https://www.dallasfed.org/-/media/documents/research/papers/2014/wp1415.pdf">The Impact of Temporary Protected Status on Immigrants’ Labor Market Outcomes</a>,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper no. 1415, December 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> David Dyssegaard Kallick, “’<a href="https://immresearch.org/publications/let-us-work-the-wage-gain-when-asylum-seekers-gain-work-authorization/">Let Us Work’: The Wage Gain When Asylum Seekers Gain Work Authorization</a>,” Immigration Research Initiative, September 7, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-benefits-from-immigration/#epi-toc-20"><em>The U.S. benefits from immigration but policy reforms needed to maximize gains: Recommendations and a review of key issues to ensure fair wages and labor standards for all workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, October 4, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> See for example, Ben Zipperer, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trumps-deportation-agenda-will-destroy-millions-of-jobs-both-immigrants-and-u-s-born-workers-would-suffer-job-losses-particularly-in-construction-and-child-care/"><em>Trump’s deportation agenda will destroy millions of jobs: Both immigrants and U.S.-born workers would suffer job losses, particularly in construction and child care</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, July 10, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> See for example, Carl Davis, Marco Guzman, and Emma Sifre. 2024<em>. </em><a href="https://itep.org/undocumented-immigrants-taxes-2024/"><em>Tax Payments by Undocumented Immigrants</em></a>, Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, July 30, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> <em>See </em>2016 Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 82,455.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> 2024 Final Rule, 89 Fed. Reg. at 101,230.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> <em>Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.</em>, 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020) (agency must meaningfully consider reliance interests when abandoning prior policy).</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> 2025 IFR, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48,804 (“If the application is denied, the automatically extended employment authorization and/or EAD generally is terminated on the day of the denial.”); <em>id. </em>at 48,806, 48,808–10 (citing concerns about “potential hits of derogatory information”).</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> <em>See </em>2025 IFR, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48,809–10, 48,817 (concerns about automatic extension being memorialized on “non-secure” paper).</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> <em>Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC</em>, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> 2025 IFR, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48,813. <em>&nbsp;</em></p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> <em>Cap. Area Immigrants’ Rts. Coal. v. Trump</em>, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25, 46 (D.D.C. 2020) (good cause exception not satisfied where agencies only provided a single example of potential adverse consequences and “offer[ed] no other data or information that persuasively supports their prediction of a surge” in border crossings before rule took effect).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> <em>Cap. Area Immigrants’ Rts. Coal. v. Trump</em>, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25, 55 (D.D.C. 2020).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> <em>City of New York v. Permanent Mission of India to United Nations</em>, 618 F.3d 172, 202 (2d Cir. 2010).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> 2025 IFR, 90 Fed. Reg. at 48,814.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DOL&#8217;s 2025 Interim Final Rule modifying the AEWR methodology for H-2A farmworkers</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-2025-interim-final-rule-modifying-the-aewr-methodology-for-h-2a-farmworkers/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Dec 2025 17:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=314725</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted electronically on December 1, 2025 via TO: Brian Pasternak, Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Employment and Training Department of 200 Constitution Avenue Room Washington, DC RE: Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States, Interim Final Rule, request for comments, Employment and Training Administration, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted electronically on December 1, 2025 via </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range</em></a></p>
<p>TO: Brian Pasternak, Administrator, Office of Foreign Labor Certification</p>
<p>Employment and Training Administration<br />
Department of Labor<br />
200 Constitution Avenue NW<br />
Room N-5311<br />
Washington, DC 20210</p>
<p><strong>RE: </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><strong><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></strong></a><strong>, Interim Final Rule, request for comments, Employment and Training Administration, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No. ETA-2025-0008, RIN 1205-AC24 (October 2, 2025)</strong></p>
<p>Dear Administrator Pasternak:</p>
<p>This document in submitted in response to the Department of Labor’s (DOL) Employment and Training Administration (ETA) request for public comment on its Interim Final Rule (IFR) entitled “Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States,” which proposes to amend the methodology for setting the Adverse Effect Wages Rate (AEWR) for the H-2A temporary agricultural worker visa program.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) strongly <u>opposes</u> the IFR and urges DOL to rescind the IFR and revert back to the previous AEWR methodology, or make amendments to the methodology as described herein. </strong>We believe the updated AEWR methodology and the housing deduction in the IFR will negatively impact both U.S. farmworkers and migrant farmworkers recruited through the H-2A program, and worsen conditions in the farm labor market.</p>
<p><strong>EPI fully supports and endorses the written comments and recommendations submitted by Farmworker Justice, on behalf of a multitude of organizations that represent migrant and seasonal farmworkers, including H-2A workers.</strong> EPI is a signatory listed on the comments submitted by Farmworker Justice and incorporates those comments and recommendations by reference into this comment. The comments submitted herein should be considered an addendum to those comments, which provide additional analysis to support the opposition of DOL&#8217;s updated AEWR methodology.</p>
<p><strong>EPI also supports and endorses the written comments and recommendations submitted by the <em>Migration that Works</em> coalition, which EPI is a founding member of.</strong></p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">About EPI</span></h3>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes policies that protect and improve economic conditions and raise labor standards for low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.</p>
<p>EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular the H-2A and H-2B programs and other temporary work visa programs, as well as on farm labor issues, including labor standards enforcement in agriculture. EPI has also provided expert testimony about work visa programs and farm labor to both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, as well as state legislatures.</p>
<p>Given the numerous reports from advocates, news investigations, and even government audits over the years that have revealed how deeply flawed the H-2A program is when it comes to protecting the rights of both migrant farmworkers and U.S. farmworkers, EPI is concerned that DOL would take such an audacious action to lower wages for H-2A farmworkers and U.S. farmworkers, who are already some of the lowest-paid workers in the entire U.S. economy.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">Farmworkers earned some of the lowest wage rates in the entire U.S. labor market in 2024</span></h3>
<p>Before discussing the details of DOL’s new AEWR methodology in the IFR, it is important to discuss and contextualize the wages of the 2.2 million farmworkers in the United States—something DOL fails to adequately do.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> Roughly 350,000 of them are crop farmworkers employed through the H-2A visa program.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> DOL’s National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) shows that two-thirds of non-H-2A crop farmworkers are foreign-born, and that one-third are U.S.-born citizens, all of whom have a significant stake in the IFR.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<p>The agricultural industry has made numerous claims about skyrocketing and unsustainable wage growth for farmworkers, some of which DOL echoes in the IFR, and the industry has lobbied for federal actions by the executive branch and Congress to artificially restrain wage growth in the industry. As this comment will discuss, most of these claims are not supported by the available evidence.</p>
<p>The most reliable data on farmworker earnings comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), which conducts the Farm Labor Survey (FLS), the results of which were, until recently, published twice a year in USDA’s Farm Labor report series, with data reported for reference weeks in January, April, July, and October.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> On August 28, 2025, USDA announced that it would discontinue its data collection program and reports, including the FLS,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> thus making 2024 the final full year for which FLS data are available. Before October 2025, FLS data was used by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to set the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) for most migrant farmworkers hired in the H-2A program. DOL based the AEWR on the average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory field and livestock workers, as reported by farm operators and by region. DOL used the FLS data to set H-2A wages so they reflect current real-world trends in the farm labor market.</p>
<p>The FLS data up to 2024 data show that while there have been some documented real increases over the past three decades, they have not been unreasonably large increases, and they have occurred in a broader context where the wages of farmworkers are extremely low by any measure, even when compared with the hourly earnings of comparable <em>non</em>-farm workers, as well as when compared with average wages for all workers in the United States, and workers with the lowest levels of education (see&nbsp;<strong>Figure A</strong>).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-311004 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="311004" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/311004-35215-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In 2024, the average earnings of all nonsupervisory farmworkers (i.e., combined field and livestock workers in the FLS) was&nbsp;$18.12 per hour. The average farmworker hourly wage in 2024 was just half (52%) of the average hourly wage for all workers in the United States in 2024, which was $34.27&nbsp;per hour.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>The average hourly wage for production and nonsupervisory&nbsp;<em>non</em>-farm workers—the most appropriate cohort of nonagricultural workers to compare with farmworkers—was $27.56, according to the Current Employment Statistics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In other words, farmworkers earned just under 60% of what production and nonsupervisory workers outside of agriculture earned, or three-fifths.&nbsp;In 2024, the farmworker wage gap remained substantial and virtually unchanged from the previous three years. USDA’s ERS shows that between 1990 and 2023, the gap slowly narrowed from 50% to 60% and has described the wage gap between farmworker and nonfarm worker wages as “still substantial, but it is slowly shrinking.”<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Farmworkers have very low levels of educational attainment and their wages are comparable to workers in other industries with similar educational attainment.&nbsp;According to the NAWS, 27% completed the 10th, 11th, or 12th grade, and only 16% completed some education beyond high school.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a>&nbsp;Farmworkers earn the same or less than the two groups of nonfarm workers with the lowest levels of education in the United States: Nonsupervisory farmworkers earned 10 cents an hour more than the average wage earned by workers without a high school diploma ($18.02), but earned $5.61 less per hour than the average wage earned by workers with only a high school diploma ($23.73).</p>
<p>The AEWR paid to H-2A workers varies by state. In 2024, it ranged from $14.53 to $19.75 per hour. That means that for many H-2A workers, including in some of the biggest states for H-2A employment, the wage they earned was even lower than the national average wage for all nonsupervisory farmworkers in 2024—meaning the gap between what many H-2A farmworkers and non-farm workers earn is even wider.</p>
<p>The AEWR was higher than the national average farmworker wage of $18.12 in 14 states, but in the other 35 states for which DOL published an AEWR, it was lower than the national average. In Florida and Georgia—the top two states for H-2A employment, and where nearly a quarter of all&nbsp;H-2A jobs&nbsp;were located in 2024, workers were paid much less than the national average wage. The AEWR in Florida was $14.77 per hour, $3.35 less than the national average farmworker wage. And Georgia was tied with South Carolina for the second-lowest overall state AEWR, at $14.68 per hour, which was $3.44 less than the national average wage.</p>
<p>To reiterate, the nearly one-quarter of all H-2A farmworkers employed in Florida and Georgia in 2024 were paid at least $3.35 less per hour than the national average wage for farmworkers. And H-2A farmworkers in most other states were also paid less than the national average wage for farmworkers. None of the H-2A wages rates, not even those with the highest AEWRs, are exorbitant salaries that can be cut without harming farmworkers and their livelihoods, contrary to what some agribusiness representatives want the public&nbsp;and lawmakers to believe.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">DOL’s claim about the increase in the AEWR to justify cutting wages ignores the fact that AEWR wage growth over the past 20 years has been almost identical to wage growth for other low wage workers</span></h3>
<p>The value and the rate of increase of the AEWR has become a hot-button issue and many claims about its impact have been made over the years by representatives of industry. For example, the American Farm Bureau has called the previous AEWR methodology “a blow to growers” and AmericanHort said the AEWRs were “steep.”<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>Many of the claims by industry advocates and even DOL about year-to-year AEWR increases often do not adjust for inflation, which overstates the actual increase in terms of its dollar value. This is a basic mistake that misleads—and it misleads particularly during times of relatively rapid inflation, like the post-pandemic period. DOL echoes these misleading claims from industry advocates and makes their own in the preamble to the October 2025 IFR, making the year-over-year increases in the AEWR seem greater than they truly are. DOL notes that the national average AEWR has more than doubled in nominal terms over 20 years from $8.56 in 2005 to $17.74 in 2025.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> But DOL’s own CPI Inflation Calculator adjusts the value of $8.56 in September 2005 to $13.99 in September 2025, resulting in a real increase of just over one quarter over two decades, at 26.8%, which over that period averages out to just 1.2% per year.</p>
<p>If we examine the same period for other low-wage workers in nominal terms, we also see that wage growth for farmworkers paid the AEWR is in line with—nearly identical to—nominal wage growth for other low wage workers in the United States. <strong>Figure B</strong> shows annualized wage growth for workers paid at the 20<sup>th</sup> percentile wage, as well as the median wage for workers with less than a high school education—both of which are good measures for typical low-wage workers. Both saw annual nominal wage growth that was at 3.5% between 2005-2025, the period that DOL identifies. Farmworkers earning the AEWR over that same period saw annualized wage growth of 3.7%, nearly identical to other typical low-wage workers. Thus, DOL’s main example of runaway wage growth for farmworkers does not hold water.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-314179 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="314179" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/314179-35401-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The 1% to 2% real annual wage growth of the AEWR over the past 15 years is solid but not unsustainable, and still making up for lost ground</span></h3>
<p>This section examines the real value of the AEWR over the past 15 years. We do not suggest that we know exactly what the appropriate AEWR for each state should be or suggest that changes in the AEWR have no impact on farmers, or make any other bold claims about the AEWR. This section is simply an evidence-based look at the value of the AEWR over time, as a response to claims by industry and DOL that the AEWR has risen quickly and too sharply.</p>
<p>As noted in the previous section, alarmist claims about wage growth for the AEWR are numerous. See this comment from Craig Regelbrugge from AmericanHort, who noted that “growers in Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania will take the biggest hit, with a 9.6% increase” in the AEWR from 2021 to 2022, with California’s increasing “more than 8%.”<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> Regelbrugge calculates these increases in nominal terms—but what do the increases look like after one adjusts for inflation?</p>
<p>While the percentage increase from 2021 to 2022 was in fact the largest in the states of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, after adjusting for inflation, the increase was just 2.3% in those states. A year-over-year real hourly average wage increase of 2.3% is not even large enough to be consistent with the wage gains that could be reasonably expected for an occupation where employers have argued that severe labor shortage exist. If there are in fact labor shortages, it is reasonable to expect wages to rise; that’s simply Economics 101. And a shortage means by definition that the wage increase must be significantly more rapid than would be sustainable and expected in the long-run. Over the pandemic business cycle (between 2019 and 2024) economy-wide productivity growth has averaged 2.1% per year—and this should be the benchmark for real wage growth that is sustainable in the long-run. A raise of 2.3% for a given sector is hardly one that unambiguously signals a severe labor shortage, especially considering how low H-2A wages are relative to other occupations, and how underpaid farmworkers have been for decades.</p>
<p>It would take literally decades of AEWR increases exceeding productivity growth by this amount before H-2A workers had made up the amount these wages had lagged economy-wide average wage growth in recent decades. And in California, what did the “more than 8%” AEWR increase that Regelbrugge cites amount to after adjusting for inflation? H-2A farmworkers in California only saw a real increase of less than one percent (0.9%) in 2022.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Compare this to food inflation, which was 9.95% in 2022.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> Arguably, the food sector generally was seeing potential income gains to easily cover the AEWR increases. Not all of the income gains went to the farm operators that employ farmworkers, of course, but presumably they received enough of a share that would have covered a wage increase of 1% to 2%.</p>
<p>Now let’s turn to the AEWRs in all states over the past 15 years up to 2025. <strong>Table 1</strong> shows the Adverse Effect Wage Rates for H-2A farmworkers in all states with an AEWR between 2011 and 2025, in values that have been adjusted to constant 2025 dollars, and shows the calculated total real change in terms of dollar value, as well as the real total percentage change, and the annualized real percentage change per year, from 2011 to 2025. The AEWRs listed are ranked by number of H-2A workers, using the number of workers certified from DOL as a proxy for the number of workers.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-313917 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313917" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313917-35371-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The top five states for H-2A employment together account for half of all H-2A employment nationwide (49.9%). The table shows that in Florida, the biggest state for H-2A farmworkers—where 12.3% of H-2A farmworkers are employed—the value of the AEWR increased by a total of $3.07 between 2011 and 2025 (in constant 2025 dollars); that’s a total increase in value of 23.4% over 15 years. The average annual growth was 1.5% over the 2011-25 period. In Georgia, the second-biggest state for H-2A employment—where 11.3% of H-2A farmworkers are employed, the value of the AEWR increased by $3.45 over the past 15 years, averaging an increase of 1.7% per year.</p>
<p>The largest increase in the value of the AEWR (in constant 2025 dollars) was in California, which accounts for nearly 10% of H-2A employment. In California, the total real value of the AEWR increased by $5.69 over the past 15 years; a total percentage increase of 39.9%, which amounts to annualized percentage increase of 2.4% per year.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Washington, the next biggest state for H-2A employment, was one of 10 states that saw wage growth that was above 2% per year for 2011-25, growing at 2.2% per year. The fifth biggest H-2A state, North Carolina, increased by $3.28 over the last 15 years, a total increase of 25.5%, growing annually at an average of just 1.6% per year.</p>
<p>For the increases that occurred in the Pacific states, it is likely that those larger increases were driven by increases in the states’ minimum wage laws, which then fed into the FLS. The state minimum wages in California and Washington are more than double the minimum wage of $7.25 in Georgia and more than $2 more than the state minimum wage in Florida.</p>
<p>In total, as the table shows, there were 39 states where the annual average real increase in the AEWR was less than 2%. There were 10 states where annual real wage growth was 1.6% to 1.9%, 14 states had annual wage growth that was 1.5%, and in 15 states, wage growth was 1.2% to 1.4%. The average yearly real percentage increase for each state over the 15-year period was 1.6%, and if weighted by the number of H-2A workers in the state, 1.7%.</p>
<p>The annual average real wage growth of 1.2% to 2.2%, with a weighted average of 1.7%, as Table 1 shows—as well as the 1.9% annual real wage growth in the national farmworker wage over the past decade according to USDA survey data which DOL cites<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> —represents decent wage growth for farmworkers and suggests a relatively tight labor market for farmworkers. However, it represents little progress for farmworkers who are in an occupation where they are exempted from key labor laws and wage and hour standards, and where they have earned 50% to 60% of the wage earned by comparable nonsupervisory workers outside of agriculture (see Figure A and discussion above). It would take many more years of faster wage growth for farmworkers to begin to approach even three-fourths of what nonsupervisory workers earn outside of agriculture.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The IFR violates the APA because there is no emergency and DOL did not consider alternative policies, methodologies, and key stakeholders</span></h3>
<p>DOL has violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) with this IFR, both because (1) it has unjustifiably asserted an emergency that necessitates the issuance of an IFR, rather than the usual APA process of issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking, receiving comments from the public, and then considering public input before publishing a final rule; and (2) because DOL did not consider alternative policies and methodologies or assess their impact, or adequately discuss the impact on key stakeholders other than farm employers.</p>
<p>DOL has bypassed the APA’s requirements by claiming that there is good cause to do so. An agency may only bypass the APA’s procedural requirements only if it “for good cause finds … that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest,”<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> and “the good-cause inquiry is “meticulous and demanding.”<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Courts have “repeatedly made clear that the good cause exception ‘is to be narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.’”<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a></p>
<p>DOL claims that there is an emergency labor shortage in agriculture that threatens the American food supply, and that without the IFR, farm operators will be harmed and food prices will spike. However it is clear that DOL could have considered alternative AEWR methodologies that could have been implemented quickly and kept farm wages stable, rather than issuing an IFR that leads to the massive wage cuts for H-2A farmworkers that DOL estimates will result. Even if we accept DOL’s claim that there is good cause for an emergency IFR—to the extent that one might exist—it would be an emergency that is entirely of the administration’s own making. DOL notes that the administration’s immigration enforcement efforts will remove many farmworkers, leaving farm operators with a shortage of available workers, which will cause food prices to spike. Did the administration consider slowing down or ending immigration enforcement efforts on farms, in order to prevent food prices from surging and to avoid reducing the supply of available labor? Did the administration consider providing work authorization to current farmworkers who lack an Employment Authorization Document (EAD), or restoring and expanding temporary immigration protections like parole, Temporary Protected Status, and deferred action, as current law permits, to maintain or even increase the supply of U.S. farmworkers? (While these measures would be the purview of DHS, DOL could consult with DHS and the White House on these measures.)</p>
<p>Another fact DOL has pointed to, to justify the emergency nature of the IFR, is the discontinuation of USDA’s Farm Labor Survey (FLS). Again, this is an emergency of the administration’s own making and could have been avoided. Ending the FLS was abrupt, ill advised, and no legitimate justification was provided for it. But even in the face USDA discontinuing the FLS, DOL could have continued to use the 2025 AEWR rates while it crafted a new AEWR methodology and notice of proposed rulemaking to take input from stakeholders. Or it could have adjusted the 2025 AEWRs upward by the estimated amount that the Congressional Budget Office expects for inflation from 2025 to 2026, or the average AEWR inflation over the last five or ten years.</p>
<p>DOL also fails to adequately consider the true costs of driving down wages and working conditions for U.S. farmworkers standards. Not only will the IFR hurt the ability of U.S. farmworkers to feed themselves and their families, it will hurt rural communities in both Democratic and Republican-controlled states, negatively impact economic activity, and drive down wages and working conditions for low-wage workers in a wide range of occupations. It will also impose costs on labor unions by making it harder to organize and bargain, and make more difficult for advocacy groups to assist both migrant and U.S.-born farmworkers to assert their workplace rights. These costs must be estimated and considered by DOL before implementing the new AEWR methodology and the massive wage cuts it will impose.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The new AEWR methodology violates the H-2A statute because it ignores the adverse impacts that will result for U.S. farmworkers</span></h3>
<p>DOL notes in the IFR, in the section titled “Need for Regulation,” that “With illegal border crossings at record lows—agricultural employers, who have historically been incentivized to rely on [unauthorized immigrant farmworkers] because of high AEWRs mandated to use the H-2A program, will experience economic harm caused by mounting labor shortages.” This is the main justification offered to justify the substance of the updated AEWR methodology.</p>
<p>In the IFR’s introduction, DOL cites 8 U.S.C. §1188(a)(1), the statutory section stating that before the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can approve a petition for an H-2A workers, DOL must assess and certify that:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>(A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved in the petition, and</em></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>(B) the employment of the alien in such labor or services will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.</em></p>
<p>However, subsection (A) is ignored via DOL’s blanket and evidence-free assertion that not enough U.S. workers will apply for farm jobs, and nowhere in the IFR does DOL discuss subsection (B), by assessing or estimating whether the IFR will “adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” In fact, U.S. farmworkers are not treated as stakeholders in the IFR and the impact on their wages and working conditions are entirely ignored.</p>
<p>These omissions alone invalidate the IFR and justify that it be canceled and rescinded.</p>
<p>DOL does not explain how lowering wages for H-2A workers and significantly expanding the program—as DOL estimates will occur, to the tune of wage transfers of $24 billion from workers to employers and an increase of 132,000 H-2A workers in the H-2A program—will not adversely affect U.S. farmworkers. In fact, it is clear and obvious that lowering wages for 10% to 15% of the crop workforce comprised of H-2A workers to far below current average wage rates will put downward pressure on the wages of all farmworkers, including U.S. farmworkers, and make farm jobs less attractive to available U.S. workers. Instead of grappling with this basic reality, DOL makes a blanket statement that “qualified and eligible U.S. workers will not make themselves available in sufficient numbers.” Perhaps DOL is attempting to discourage U.S. farmworkers from applying for farm jobs by lowering overall wage rates—and that will in fact be the result of the new AEWR methodology in the IFR. However, there is little evidence to support the assertion that there are not sufficient U.S. workers to fill seasonal farm jobs. In fact, the vast majority of the 2.2 million agricultural workers hired by farm operators reside in the United States, and one-third of crop farmworkers are U.S.-born citizens according to DOL’s own estimates in the NAWS.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>Statements from other agencies in the administration also undermine DOL’s claim. In June, USDA Secretary Brooke Rollins went so far as to say that despite the “mass deportations” which DOL predicts in the IFR will result in too few U.S. workers available to fill seasonal farm jobs, Rollins said that the administration would “move the [farm] workforce towards automation and 100 percent American participation,”<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a> adding that:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>There’s been a lot of noise in the last few days and a lot of questions about where the president stands and his vision for farm labor… There are plenty of workers in America.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></em></p>
<p>Congress sought specifically to protect U.S. farmworkers from adverse effects when establishing the H-2A program and DOL cannot ignore them. The H-2A statute does not give DOL flexibility to make a blanket determination that U.S. workers will no longer be interested in farm jobs and therefore disregard the impact that the H-2A program will have on wages of similarly employed U.S. workers. The rule is therefore inconsistent with the law and should be rescinded.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The new AEWR methodology violates the H-2A statute because it will adversely impact the wages and working conditions of farmworkers, including U.S. farmworkers</span></h3>
<p>Between 2010 and September 30, 2025, the AEWR was based on a survey of farm operators conducted by USDA, commonly referred to as the Farm Labor Survey (FLS) which set AEWR wage rates for each state based on the regions surveyed by the FLS. While far from perfect, it was the best data set available on the wages of directly hired farmworkers in the United States. On August 28, 2025, USDA abruptly announced that it was discontinuing the FLS.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> A month later, on October 2, 2025, DOL issued the IFR laying out a new AEWR based on data from a different data set, the DOL’s Occupational Employment and Wages Statistics (OEWS) survey. In short, the OEWS is an inferior data set for agriculture and is not a valid survey for setting farmworkers’ wages, in part because it only surveys nonfarm employers—meaning farm labor contractors and other staffing firms that send farmworkers to different farms and pay them roughly only three-fourths of what farmworkers are paid when they are directly hired by farm operators.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a></p>
<p>The updated AEWR cuts wage rates dramatically and creates two artificial “skill levels” for each state which set H-2A wages at the 17<sup>th</sup> percentile of wages surveyed (skill level 1) and at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile (skill level 2), which is the median of wages surveyed, based on five combined occupations DOL has determined are relevant in the OEWS. DOL estimates that 92% of H-2A workers will be paid at skill level 1 and 8% at skill level 2. DOL’s IFR is fairly explicit about its desire to lower wages for H-2A farmworkers in order to benefit farm employers and increase H-2A hiring, and the administration’s move to eliminate the FLS and DOL’s move to substitute it with the OEWS appears to be a key action taken to achieve that.</p>
<p>In addition, DOL eliminates the previous requirement that employers pay for 100% of housing costs for H-2A workers. Currently, H-2A employers are required to provide housing for workers if they would not reasonably be able to return to their residences on a daily basis. This is an important requirement of the program given that H-2A workers are so low-paid that they cannot reasonably be expected to pay for their own housing, and that many farms where H-2A workers are employed are in remote areas, and not located close enough to a supply of affordable, accessible housing that still allow workers to report for duty for long hours in the fields. For years, news reports and worker advocates have documented many of the substandard conditions in employer-provided housing for farmworkers.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> However, instead of improving these problems, the AEWR would no longer require employers to pay for 100% of housing costs and implements a new deduction to let farm owners take deductions for housing out of H-2A workers’ paychecks—sometimes as much as nearly one-third of their hourly pay (up to 30%).&nbsp;This will harm farmworkers and reverberate across the industry.</p>
<p>In total, between wage cuts and housing deductions, DOL estimates that over $1.7 billion will be transferred from H-2A workers’ pockets back to farm employers under the new wage rule in 2026, amounting to $24 billion over the next ten years as the program grows to over 500,000 jobs, as DOL predicts will occur. This would represent a shocking upward redistribution of income away from some of the country’s most essential workers for the food system and its most underpaid.&nbsp;All of these impacts clearly violate the H-2A statute’s prohibition on “adversely affect[ing] the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed,” and the lower wage rates will make it impossible for DOL to determine whether or not there are sufficient U.S. farmworkers “who are able, willing, and qualified, and who will be available at the time and place needed, to perform the labor or services involved” in H-2A job orders.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">New AEWR based on OEWS data will result in $4.4 to $5.4 billion in wages being transferred annually from farmworkers to farm operators at the current size of the H-2A program</span></h3>
<p>We believe the DOL’s estimates are incomplete because they fail to fully consider the wage impacts of the new AEWR, by not considering alternative methodologies and other scenarios that may result. For instance, DOL did not consider the impact on state minimum wage rates and whether the AEWR housing deduction may conflict with state laws, and DOL did not estimate the impact that a massive wage cut for H-2A farmworkers will have on U.S. farmworkers. In this section we present new estimates that we hope will inform the public and DOL as to the true impact of the October 2025 AEWR. They should be considered low-end estimates because the IFR also permits farm operators to pay H-2A workers the AEWR for duties associated with higher-paying non-farm jobs for up to 50% of their work hours. This will put downward pressure on a number of occupations like construction and truck driving, but we have not attempted to calculate those losses to workers, and neither has DOL.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The IFR will significantly reduce the wages paid to H-2A workers. Weighted across their total weeks worked by state according to 2024 H-2A disclosure data from DOL’s Office of Foreign Labor Certification,<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> the average AEWR set for 2025 was $17.43. The rule, however, proposes a two-tiered wage structure with far lower wages for 2026. The average skill level 1 and skill level 2 wages would be $13.70 and $17.22, respectively, even without housing deductions. With housing deductions, the average level 1 and level 2 wages would be $11.78 and $15.30.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In many cases, the new state AEWR wages are low enough to fall below the wage rates set by state minimum wage laws, with the housing deduction lowering it even further, and in some states, the AEWRs will fall below the state minimum wage only after housing deductions are subtracted. In all those cases, the state minimum wage becomes the AEWR. As of yet, it is unclear how states will react to workers being paid below the state minimum after the housing deduction, and what guidance the federal government will provide with respect to it. For example, in Connecticut, the 2026 skill level 1 H-2A wage is $15.93, but the 2026 state minimum wage will be $16.94. If the state fully enforces its minimum wage and prohibits pay rates from falling below the state minimum, regardless of the Connecticut housing deduction of $2.06, then the lowest wage an H-2A worker would be paid legally is $16.94. But if Connecticut or federal guidance allows the AEWR minus the housing deduction paid to workers to go below the state minimum wage, then an H-2A worker in Connecticut could be paid as low as $14.88 per hour (i.e. the state minimum wage minus the housing deduction).&nbsp;</p>
<p>It is possible that some states will take the position that the hourly wage rates paid to H-2A workers may not go below the state minimum after subtracting the housing deduction, while some states may allow the deduction, arguing that the federal regulation setting the AEWR supersedes the state minimum wage law. The agricultural industry is likely to argue the latter, and the issue may end up in multiple state and federal courts. As a result of this uncertainty, our estimates consider both state minimum wage scenarios.</p>
<p>The first row of <strong>Table 2</strong> estimates the annual pay losses for H-2A workers in 2026 under the IFR, assuming, as DOL does, that 92% of H-2A workers would be paid the skill level 1 wage. If state minimum wages were fully enforced and do not permit the hourly AEWR paid to workers to go below the state minimum wage, then H-2A annual wages would fall by $1.7 billion in 2026, or 25.8%. If state minimum wages were not fully enforced and the housing deduction drops the AEWR below the state minimum wage rates, the losses would be larger: a $2.1 billion or 31.5% annual pay loss. Different states may treat the AEWR and state minimum wage differently; if some states prohibit and some permit the housing deduction to be less that the state minimum wage, then the total amount of annual pay losses would fall somewhere in between those two amounts.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-314719 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="314719" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/314719-35431-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Reducing the AEWR for H-2A workers will also lower wages for U.S. farmworkers—one-third of whom are U.S-born citizens, according to DOL’s latest NAWS survey.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> A fall in the H-2A wage will increase demand for H-2A workers, since employers can save significantly on labor costs if they hire them. As a result, it will become <em>relatively</em> more expensive to hire non-H-2A U.S. farmworkers. Employers will therefore reduce demand for U.S. farmworkers, putting downward pressure on their wages.</p>
<p>This is not hypothetical: Rutledge et al. found that a 10% increase in the AEWR caused an almost 2.8% increase in the wages of U.S. farmworkers.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> With those estimates, the authors estimated that a one-year AEWR wage freeze would reduce annual U.S. farmworker wages by $475 million. Using a similar methodology, we estimate the likely wage reductions for U.S. farmworkers due to the new rule.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a></p>
<p>The H-2A wage reduction under a fully enforced minimum wage is 25.8%. Based on the responsiveness of U.S farmworker wages to H-2A wage rates from Rutledge et al., the second row of Table 1 shows that the new rule could reduce U.S. farmworker wages by 7.1%, or $2.7 billion in annual pay. The wage losses are again larger if states allow the housing deduction to push pay below the state minimum. In that case, U.S. farmworkers in 2026 would experience an annual pay cut of $3.3 billion, or 8.7%.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>This means that farmworkers in total will see annual pay cuts of about $4.4 billion to $5.4 billion, depending on the enforcement of state minimum wage laws (9.9% to 12.1%). This amounts to a massive pay cut for farmworkers who are already some of the lowest-paid employees in the entire U.S. labor market, while working in one of the most difficult and dangerous jobs in the economy.</p>
<h4><em>Estimates for alternative scenarios for wage transfers from H-2A farmworkers to farm operators</em></h4>
<p>In this subsection we discuss alternative skill level scenarios that could result and one that DOL could have considered. The scenario that DOL predicts will result, with 92% of H-2A farmworkers being paid the skill level 1 wage and 8% being paid the skill level 2 wage, is an arguably reasonable estimate given certified wage rates in DOL disclosure data and employer behavior under a similar wage rule in the H-2B program<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a>—a sister visa program of H-2A for workers in occupations outside of agriculture—which was implemented by the George W. Bush administration.</p>
<p>The first possible alternative scenario, which we believe is reasonable given employer savings and the growth that is likely to occur in the H-2A program, is one where 100% of H-2A workers are paid at the skill level 1 wage (or closer to 100% than 92%). Thus we have calculated what the wage losses would look like in that case, shown in <strong>Table 3</strong>. If state minimum wages were fully enforced and do not permit the hourly AEWR paid to workers to go below the state minimum wage, then H-2A annual wages would fall by $1.8 billion in 2026, or 26.8%. If state minimum wages were not fully enforced and the housing deduction drops wage rates below the state minimum wage rates, the losses would be larger: a $2.2 billion or 32.9% annual pay loss. Both result in a pay cut that is $100 million greater relative to the 92/8 scenario.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-314116 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="314116" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/314116-35397-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Another possible scenario could result if DOL updated and amended the IFR to require the minimum AEWR to be set at the skill level 2 wage, which is the median wage (i.e. the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile wage), for the five OEWS occupations DOL uses to calculate the state AEWRs. This is not a likely scenario without a change to the IFR because unless they are forced to do otherwise, employers are likely to opt for the lower pay rates, as DOL also predicts. But setting the AEWR at the median would be a slightly more reasonable methodology for setting the AEWR—since it would at least arguably prohibit employers from undercutting H-2A wage rates relative to the median OEWS wages. (The H-2B program for example, sets the prevailing (minimum) wage rate at the local average wage for the occupation according to the OEWS.) Nevertheless this would still not be a methodology we believe is justified and we would not support it. Table 3 shows that even under this slightly more defensible formulation of the AEWR, H-2A workers would still see a pay cut of roughly $1 billion per year under both state minimum wage enforcement scenarios.</p>
<h4><em>The median wage under the OEWS is still far too low</em></h4>
<p>This significant wage cut for H-2A farmworkers, even if they are paid at the median wage according to OEWS data, reveals the inferiority of the OEWS data set for setting the wages of farmworkers. The OEWS does not directly survey farm employers, rather nonfarm employers that act as subcontractors and pay farmworkers much less on average—thus the OEWS is not an accurate representation of the farm labor market and should not be used to set the state AEWRs. DOL notes in the interim final rule that the OEWS will begin surveying farm employers in May 2026 and that the May 2027 release of the OEWS will be the first to include those survey data. However, it will take a number of additional years for the OEWS to have a robust data sample from farm employers as compared to a dedicated farm employment survey like the USDA’s FLS—three at least, given three-year cycle under which the OEWS operates under—and in the meantime, the wages of both H-2A and U.S. farmworkers will be undercut by billions each year.</p>
<h4><em>Estimates for alternative scenarios for wage transfers from U.S. farmworkers to farm operators</em></h4>
<p>Similarly to the alternative scenarios discussed in the previous section, we have calculated the wage losses to U.S. farmworkers where 100% of H-2A workers are paid the skill level 1 wage and where 100% are paid the skill level 2 wage. <strong>Table 4</strong> shows that if state minimum wages were fully enforced and do not permit the hourly AEWR paid to workers to go below the state minimum wage, then annual wages for U.S. farmworkers would fall by $2.8 billion in 2026, or 7.4%. If state minimum wages were not fully enforced and the housing deduction drops wage rates below the state minimum wage rates, the losses would be larger: a $3.4 billion or 9% annual pay loss. Both result in a pay cut that is $100 million greater relative to the 92/8 scenario.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Table 4 also shows that under the 100% skill level 2 scenario, U.S. farmworkers would see a pay cut of $1.4 billion or $1.6 billion, depending on enforcement of the state minimum wage laws. As noted earlier, different states may treat the AEWR and state minimum wage differently, so the total amount of annual pay losses would fall somewhere in between the amounts in each of the scenarios.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-4"></a><div class="figure chart-314119 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="314119" data-anchor="Table-4"><div class="figLabel">Table 4</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/314119-35399-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h4><em>Estimates for alternative scenarios for wage transfers from H-2A and U.S. farmworkers</em></h4>
<p>The final table shows the estimates of wage losses under the same alternative skill and state minimum wage enforcement scenarios, but for all farmworkers (U.S. + H-2A) farmworkers. <strong>Table 5</strong> shows that if state minimum wages were fully enforced and do not permit the hourly AEWR paid to workers to go below the state minimum wage, then annual wages for all farmworkers would fall by $4.6 billion in 2026, or 10.3%. If state minimum wages were not fully enforced and the housing deduction drops wage rates below the state minimum wage rates, the losses would be larger: $5.6 billion, which is a 12.6% annual pay loss. Both result in a pay cut that is $200 million greater relative to the 92/8 scenario.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-5"></a><div class="figure chart-314185 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="314185" data-anchor="Table-5"><div class="figLabel">Table 5</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/314185-35402-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 5" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Table 5 shows that under the 100% skill level 2 scenario, all farmworkers would see a pay cut of $2.3 billion or 5.1% if state minimum wages were fully enforced, or $2.6 billion or 5.8% if they are not. Different states may treat the AEWR and state minimum wage differently, and in that case, the total amount of annual pay losses would fall somewhere in between those amounts.&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The IFR’s new housing deduction from H-2A wages will harm H-2A workers and adversely impact U.S. farmworkers because farm operators will prefer to hire underpaid H-2A workers</span></h3>
<p>The IFR creates a new housing deduction that H-2A workers must pay out of the wages of each hour they work—which DOL refers erroneously refers to as a “housing adjustment.” In an Orwellian passage, DOL attempts to justify the housing deduction as promoting fairness for U.S. farmworkers who do not receive “additional non-wage compensation in the form of free housing.”<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> The opposite is true: the housing deduction will harm both H-2A workers and U.S. workers.</p>
<p>H-2A workers are scarcely “benefitting” from employer-provided housing. H-2A housing is in fact, primarily for the benefit of the employer. The employer benefits by having a worker remain on or near the worksite, reducing travel time. Employers also benefit by exerting additional control over their workers whose lodging they own and control; workers have few options if they wish to reside elsewhere, and employers sometimes restrict the ability of workers to invite guests, which could include labor organizers or nonprofit groups that could inform H-2A workers of their rights.</p>
<p>H-2A workers also cannot reasonably be expected to afford housing in the United States on the low wages paid to H-2A workers. Even if they could afford housing—it could be nearly impossible to find temporary housing in a remote rural area, or to navigate the rental process if they don’t speak English, or have U.S. identification, or significant sums of money to pay for a down payment up front. H-2A workers also leave their families behind in their countries of origin and most are likely paying to maintain a residence there. Reducing the wages paid to H-2A workers by up to 30% as the IFR does, will only benefit employers by padding their profits by almost $880 billion in 2026, as DOL estimates.<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a></p>
<p>The housing deduction will also harm U.S. farmworkers, not help them. H-2A rules before the IFR required employers to offer no-cost housing to U.S. farmworkers if they were in corresponding employment with H-2A workers, thus they were entitled to the same benefit if they needed housing. But the massive reduction in wages that H-2A workers will see from the housing deduction will greatly reduce labor costs for employers who hire H-2A workers as compared to U.S. farmworkers—undercutting U.S. wages and incentivizing employers to hire H-2A workers and bypass U.S. farmworkers—which will unquestionably “adversely affect” the wages and working conditions of U.S. farmworkers.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">The updated AEWR methodology and the housing deduction will conflict with many state minimum wage laws and DOL has not provided guidance on how to resolve them</span></h3>
<p>The extremely low AEWRs that DOL has set in the IFR through the use of OEWS data and the creation of two skill levels has rendered the state AEWRs so low that many are now below the state minimum wage—or go below the state minimum wage after the housing deduction has been subtracted. Under the previous AEWR methodology, the AEWR was in all cases higher than the state minimum wage. While the state minimum wage will set the AEWR in states where the state minimum wage is higher than the AEWR, DOL has provided no guidance as to how H-2A employers should treat the housing deduction.</p>
<p>For example, in Florida, the biggest state for H-2A employment, the skill level 1 wage is $12.47 and the Florida state minimum wage will be $14.00 per hour in 2026. The AEWR methodology mandates that the higher state minimum wage of $14.00 per hour will set the H-2A wage. But when the housing deduction is subtracted from the state minimum wage, the H-2A wage falls to $12.00 per hour, violating the state minimum wage law. There are numerous states where this scenario plays out, but the IFR fails to mention or even contemplate this reality, or to suggest what the appropriate H-2A wage would be in such situations.</p>
<p>It is unclear how states will react to workers being certified at and/or paid an H-2A wage that is below the state minimum after the housing deduction, or if DOL will provide any guidance with respect to it. It is possible that some states will take the position that the hourly wage rates paid to H-2A workers may not go below the state minimum regardless of the housing deduction—essentially outlawing the deduction—while some states may allow the deduction, arguing that the federal AEWR regulation supersedes the state minimum wage law. The agricultural industry is likely to argue the latter, and the issue is almost certain to end up in multiple state and federal courts.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 24px; font-weight: bold;">OEWS survey data are inadequate for setting the wage rates of H-2A farmworkers because they do not accurately represent the farm labor market</span></h3>
<p>Since 1910, USDA has satisfied a statutory mandate to procure and preserve information concerning agriculture, including “by the collection of statistics” and “any other appropriate means within his power”<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> by conducting the Agricultural Labor Survey, commonly referred to as the Farm Labor Survey (FLS).<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> For decades the FLS has been the best and most reliable survey detailing conditions in the farm labor market—a fact DOL has acknowledged in multiple previous rulemakings on H-2A.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a></p>
<p>USDA abruptly discontinued the FLS in late August of this year, before the final installment of the FLS could be completed for 2025. Arguably, this has left DOL without a viable survey with which to determine and set wage levels for H-2A workers that will prevent adverse effects on the wages of U.S. farmworkers. However, using the OEWS is not an adequate or rational alternative for setting H-2A wages given the inherent weaknesses in the OEWS data set.</p>
<p>First, as DOL notes, the OEWS only surveys non-farm employers—meaning farm labor contractors (FLCs) and other staffing firms that send farmworkers to different farms. However, nationwide, a majority of farmworkers are employed directly.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a> As noted earlier, farmworkers employed by FLCs are paid only roughly only three-fourths of what farmworkers are paid when they are directly hired directly by farm employers.<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a>&nbsp;This is because FLCs are use a fissured subcontracting employment model, and research shows that subcontracted workers earn lower wages on average, in part because the FLC makes profits by taking a portion of workers’ wages and by lowering costs.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> EPI research also shows that FLCs account for the largest share of wage and hour violations in agriculture—roughly a quarter nationwide and half in two of the largest farm states, California and Florida.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> Thus, DOL is relying on a survey that is overrepresented by FLCs that pay farmworkers significantly less and violate the law at higher rates, while entirely excluding the vast majority of farmworkers who are directly employed and paid more.</p>
<p>Second, while DOL states that it will take action to revise the OEWS to cover agricultural employers to begin use in the May 2026 survey, with data first being available for the May 2027 edition of the OEWS, the reality is that OEWS data on agricultural employers will not be a reasonably adequate representation of the farm labor market until years after that. This is in part because the OEWS estimates are created by averaging wage rates across a span of three years. To be adequate, OEWS would need to collect data from farm operators in 2026, 2027, and 2028, with the data being first published and available at the earliest in 2029. In the meantime, the AEWRs set by OEWS wage data will be artificially low and adversely impacting the wages of H-2A workers and U.S. workers.</p>
<p>Another problematic aspect of using the OEWS is that the data being used by DOL for the 2026 AEWRs are from 2024, thus already two years behind, and DOL has made no upward adjustment for inflation so that the AEWRs reflect a more realistic snapshot of wage rates in the current farm labor market. It is irrational and harmful to both H-2A and U.S. farmworkers for DOL to use wages that are both representative of only non-farm employers and of wages that were paid to workers who were employed by FLCs two years ago.</p>
<p>The FLS was problematic in a similar way, with the average field and livestock worker wage in one year setting the AEWR for the following year, and DOL should have adjusted the FLS wages upward with an estimate for inflation, perhaps by using the Employment Cost Index (ECI) projection from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for private-sector wage growth,<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a> or the average annual wage increase for farmworkers for the past five or ten years. But at least the FLS was a reasonable representation of what employers were paying farmworkers, even if one year behind.</p>
<p>Third, OEWS data also fail to reflect the seasonal nature of the farm jobs filled by H-2A workers. By only collecting data in May and November, it will fail to capture wages during peak harvest season in the summer,<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> when farm employment peaks and wages may be higher due to increased hiring. The FLS on the other hand, more adequately captures seasonal peaks in farmworker employment and wages by measuring wages at four points during the year, in January, April, July, and October.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Seen in this light, the move to use the OEWS seems like an intentional move by DOL to lower the wages of farmworkers as much as possible while ostensibly retaining some connection to available data sets. This is not the first time DOL attempted to set the AEWRs with a data set that would result in lower wages. In 2008, the Department temporarily stopped relying on the FLS and also implemented multiple skill levels, which led to a “precipitous drop” in farmworker wages.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a> Thus DOL was aware that moving from the FLS to the OEWS would drastically lower wages for farmworkers.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">Using multiple skill levels akin to those in the H-1B program is inappropriate and DOL has rejected such a methodology for other low-wage jobs in the H-2B program</span></h3>
<p>DOL’s decision in the IFR to adopt a multi-tiered prevailing wage structure, which DOL notes reflects the one created for the H-1B program in the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004,<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a> and to require its application to prevailing wage determinations in the H-2A program, was irrational, arbitrary, and not adequately justified by the DOL—similarly to when DOL created multiple skill levels for the H-2B program in 2008.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> The four wage levels for each occupation superimposed on the OEWS prevailing wage data were designed to apply to the H-1B visa category—a visa category where the vast majority of beneficiaries possess at least a bachelors, masters, or doctoral degree (the minimum requirement is a bachelor’s or its equivalent). The four wage levels are intended to be “commensurate with” the workers’ “experience, education, and the level of supervision.”<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> In the IFR, DOL has created two skill levels, setting the first, skill level 1, at the 17<sup>th</sup> wage percentile of wages surveyed in the OEWS, mirroring the level 1 prevailing wage in the H-1B program. The second is the at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile (the median wage), mirroring the level 3 wage in the H-1B’s four-tiered structure.</p>
<p>If crafted smartly and enforced adequately, four wage levels could arguably make sense in the H-1B context, if for no other reason than to account for the variation in levels of educational attainment amongst the beneficiaries who are granted an H-1B visa. However, as EPI research has shown, the wage levels are not scientifically linked to degrees of education and experience, they are simply chosen points along the distribution of surveyed wages by DOL, and as Ron Hira and I have argued, DOL has set the two lowest wage levels far too low to protect U.S. wage standards.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a> In addition, in the H-1B program it is clear that in practice the employer gets to choose the wage level and the government doesn’t verify that a prevailing wage is appropriate unless a lawsuit or a complaint is filed by a worker,<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> which is rare, and it seems that very little enforcement has ever been conducted by DOL to prevent underpaying and misclassifying workers at inappropriate wage levels. It is thus reasonable to expect the results will be similar with regard to the use of skill levels in the H-2A context.</p>
<p>DOL’s use of skill levels for H-2A is akin to how it applied the four H-1B wage levels to the H-2B program—another visa program used for temporary low-wage jobs outside of agriculture—and its subsequent rejection of them for H-2B is instructive and worth recalling. In a 2010 notice of proposed rulemaking, DOL observed that “[t]he types of jobs found in the H-2B program involve few if any skill differentials necessitating tiered wage levels.”<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a> This is because the occupations filled by H-2B workers generally require little or no formal education or training—if some training is required, it can often be learned quickly and on the job (e.g., in the case of janitors, landscapers, amusement park and hotel staff)—and such positions offer little in the way of career advancement. As a result, employers hiring under the H-2B rule with multiple skill levels would routinely hire H-2B workers at the lowest prevailing wage level, because they are in fact searching for workers with only the most basic skills and no formal education. This had an obvious impact on wages, as DOL observed, finding that “in about 96 percent of the cases, the H-2B wage is lower than the mean of the OES wage rates for the same occupation.”<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> [The OEWS was formerly known as the OES, which stands for Occupational Employment Statistics.] Using skill levels in the H-2A context will necessarily result in lowered wages for U.S. workers in farm occupations because they will be forced to compete with H-2A workers who are paid at the 17<sup>th</sup> percentile for skill level 1, far less than the going rate for a U.S. farmworker.</p>
<p>DOL in its proposed H-2B wage methodology in 2010 also noted that “even if skill-based wage tiers were desirable as a theoretical matter, neither the OES nor any other comprehensive data series that we are aware of attempts to capture such variations.”<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> The OEWS wage data do not differentiate the types of skills that would justify one particular wage level or tier over another, because, as DOL explained, “the actual OES survey instrument does not solicit data concerning the skill level of the workers whose wages are being reported.”<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a> In other words, there is no scientific correlation between the range of experience and skill level within an occupation and the wage tiers superimposed on the OEWS wage data.</p>
<p>Any prevailing wage structure that permits H-2A workers to be paid below the mean or the median wage is flawed and should be rejected by DOL. The H-2A statute’s mandate to ensure U.S. workers are recruited for farm jobs and to guard against adverse impacts on the wages of U.S. farmworkers cannot be complied with if employers are allowed to pay their H-2A employees at wages that are below the mean or median. By definition, any employer who is allowed to pay their H-2A employee a wage that is below the mean or median will be putting downward pressure on “wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” And U.S. workers will be reluctant to apply for jobs that are being advertised at wage rates that are far below the mean or median.</p>
<p>The mean or median wage alone as defined by the OEWS however, would still be too low of a wage, given the flaws inherent in the OEWS that render it an inadequate data set for setting H-2A wages, as discussed earlier. This is illustrated by the findings in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows that even if all H-2A workers were paid at skill level 2, the median wage according to the OEWS, H-2A farmworkers would still see annual wage loses of $0.9 to $1.0 billion, and Table 4 shows that even if H-2A farmworkers are paid the median, U.S. farmworkers would see wage losses of $1.4 billion to $1.6 billion. To ensure that employers do not put downward pressure on the wages of U.S. farmworkers, DOL should amend the IFR to rely on FLS wages for 2024 or the latest release for 2025, which was published in May 2025 and had results for the January and April reference weeks. Those wage rates could then be adjusted upward with an estimate for inflation, perhaps by using the Employment Cost Index (ECI) projection from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for private-sector wage growth,<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a> or the average annual wage increase for farmworkers for the past five or ten years.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Congress directed DOL through the H-1B statute to set four wage level tiers for the H-1B program, but Congress was silent when it came to wage levels in the H-2A program, which is strong evidence that they intended for the H-2A program to <em>not use</em> wage tiers. The H-2A statute states simply that the wages and working conditions of U.S. farmworkers should not be adversely impacted, and it is obvious that creating a new skill level that allows employers to pay farmworkers below the median or mean farmworker wage will undercut wage rates in agriculture and violate the plain language of the statute.</p>
<p>There is no question that creating a skill level that is below the median wage in the new AEWR methodology is inappropriate for farm jobs and will lead to adverse impacts on the wages and working conditions of U.S. farmworkers, and as a result, DOL should rescind the AEWR methodology in the IFR. But even skill level 2, which the IFR sets at the median wage, contradicts the H-2A statute because it is based on OEWS data which are inappropriate given the aforementioned flaws of the survey (only surveying farm labor contractors etc.) that lead to much lower wage rates than the FLS.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">DOL did not consider or estimate the impact of the 50% rule, which will undercut the wages of workers outside of agriculture and circumvent the H-2B annual cap</span></h3>
<p>The IFR permits farm operators to pay H-2A workers the state AEWR for duties associated with higher-paying occupational codes that fall outside of the main farmworker SOCs, for up to 50% of their workdays, as long as the duties that fall outside of the main farmworker occupations do not make up a majority of the workdays. In other words, H-2A workers could be employed doing construction work or truck driving for up to 50% of their workdays while being paid the AEWR—as long as they did not engage in those non-farmworker/non-agricultural duties for a majority of their workdays. While DOL is right to point out that many H-2A workers perform tasks associated with higher-paying occupations outside of agriculture, the IFR does not create adequate safeguards to protect workers and the result will be downward pressure on a number of occupations like construction and truck driving. DOL does not seem to have considered these impacts in the IFR nor has DOL attempted to estimate the impacts on U.S. workers, and the relevant provisions in the IFR do not appear to have been crafted carefully. DOL should rescind these provisions, estimate the impacts, and go back to the drawing board and solicit public input from the public, unions, and worker groups, whose interests appear to have been entirely ignored.</p>
<p>The IFR states that :</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><em>For all other occupations… The occupational classification and applicable Adverse Effect Wage Rate shall be determined based on the majority (meaning more than 50 percent) of the workdays during the contract period the worker will spend performing the agricultural labor or services, including duties that are closely and directly related, and the qualifications on the job order.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a></em></p>
<p>Many of the terms in this passage are not defined clearly and it will be difficult for certifying officers (COs) and State Workforce Agencies (SWAs) to interpret in practice. For example the IFR uses a “workdays” standard for this provision to determine if a worker is performing job duties associated with agricultural labor, but workdays are not defined. How much time engaging in a particular task constitutes a “workday”? Why didn’t DOL use work hours instead?</p>
<p>DOL expects that adjudicators, COs, and SWAs will review the job duties on a job order and determine which duties will be performed for a majority of workdays, and then choose the applicable SOC code or codes and AEWRs, whether it be the AEWR for the main farmworker occupations or a separate non-farm occupation or occupations. But what are “closely and directly related” duties? Is the construction of a building on a farm closely and directly related to agricultural labor because it occurs on a farm? Would DOL certify a position that permits an H-2A worker to work for 60%, 80%, or 100% of their work hours doing work that should be classified in the construction laborer SOC code, since it takes place on a farm? And would DOL require that worker to be paid the AEWR rate rather than the higher construction laborer wage rate since it may believe that construction duties are closely and directly related to agricultural work, because it takes place on a farm?</p>
<p>Clarity is lacking and DOL’s language in the IFR creates a massive loophole that will lead to farmworkers being underpaid when they engage in non-agricultural tasks and U.S. workers in non-farm occupations will be undercut when they have to compete with underpaid H-2A workers who have few rights or other options, or the power to negotiate a higher wage with their employer. DOL’s lack of emphasis that H-2A jobs should be agricultural in nature and it’s broad and undefined closely and directly related standard, are not enough to prevent H-2A workers from being underpaid at the AEWR for higher-paying job duties.</p>
<p>The wage savings for employers who take advantage of the loophole created by the IFR are significant—creating a strong incentive to underpay H-2A workers. For example, DOL’s AEWR spreadsheet shows that the construction laborers occupation, Standard Occupational Code (SOC) 47-2061, in California has a median wage of $31.50 an hour (i.e. the skill level 2 wage for U.S. workers). The median wage can be considered the going rate for construction workers in California; if an employer wanted to hire a construction laborer, $31.50 is roughly the wage workers would expect to be paid, and that an employer recruiting a worker would have to advertise the job at. Compare the construction laborer median wage to the combined farmworker occupations AEWR for skill level 1 in California, which will be $16.90 in 2026, as set by the higher state minimum wage. The California AEWR will be just 54% of the statewide median wage for construction laborers—leading to a massive savings for farm employers who pay the AEWR for construction work.</p>
<p>In the southeast, in Georgia, it’s a similar story. According to DOL’s AEWR spreadsheet, the median (skill level 2) wage for U.S. workers in the construction laborers occupation is $19.43 per hour. The skill level 1 AEWR in Georgia, after the housing deduction is subtracted, is $8.77 an hour. That’s just 45% of the median wage for construction work—again giving employers a massive incentive to use H-2A labor to undercut wage standards in construction.</p>
<p>While DOL has now published applicable AEWR rates at two skill levels for occupations outside of the five main combined farmworker occupations, it is unlikely that employers will ever draft job orders in a manner that leads an adjudicator to select the higher wage to be paid to an H-2A worker, or that DOL will ever judge that the higher wage should be paid, given the broad and undefined standards for adjudication in the IFR. Since the H-2A the program is uncapped, employers who actually adhere to the standard in the IFR will still be able to get around the IFR’s requirements by hiring additional H-2A workers and having them work half their workdays doing non-farm duties while being paid the lower wage</p>
<p>A major open question is how much scrutiny and oversight will be applied to job orders that list job duties outside of the main farmworker occupations. Will each job order be reviewed by COs, SWAs, and staff at the Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) at DOL to prevent misclassification? Funding at OFLC has been flat while the workload has increased significantly,<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a> making additional scrutiny of 380,000 to over 500,000 job orders unrealistic. What about oversight after H-2A workers are already employed in the United States? Given that the number of Wage and Hour Division investigations of agricultural employers dropped to a record low of 659 in 2024<a href="#_note54" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='54' id="_ref54">54</a> and that the number of investigators is also at a record low in 2025,<a href="#_note55" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='55' id="_ref55">55</a> and the fact that already, far fewer than 1% of agricultural employers are inspected in a given year,<a href="#_note56" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='56' id="_ref56">56</a> it is unlikely that employer abuse of this provision in the IFR will ever be discovered, allowing employers to operate with impunity and underpay H-2A workers.</p>
<p>DOL should take a strong stance that it will not certify any positions where a majority of the work hours will consist of duties outside of the main farmworker occupations. Such positions—like construction laborers, light truck drivers, and heavy and tractor-trailer truck drivers—are more appropriate for the H-2B program, where DOL sets the minimum wage at the local average wage according to the OEWS. If H-2A workers are allowed to continue to engage in tasks and duties outside of the main farmworker occupations that should be paid at the higher wage for the occupation, DOL should cap the number of work hours in the non-farm occupation at 20%, and not certify any jobs where H-2A workers will spend more than 20% of their work hours performing those duties. And if H-2A workers are in fact performing tasks and duties outside of the major farmworker occupations, they should be paid the higher non-farm SOC’s wage—at the median, skill level 2 wage—for 100% of their work hours. In addition, if it is higher, they should be paid at the local average wage according to the occupation in the OEWS, which is DOL’s H-2B wage methodology, in order to prevent undercutting the wages of H-2B workers and U.S. workers similarly employed.</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">Recommendations</span></h3>
<p>This section provides a brief summary of the recommendations, most of which are discussed in more detail in the earlier sections of this comment.</p>
<h4><em>The White House should direct USDA to reinstate the Farm Labor Survey to set the AEWRs</em></h4>
<p>The FLS has been the best and most reliable survey detailing conditions in the farm labor market—a fact DOL has acknowledged in multiple previous rulemakings on H-2A.<a href="#_note57" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='57' id="_ref57">57</a> USDA abruptly discontinued the FLS in late August of this year, before the final installment of the FLS could be completed for 2025. This has left DOL without a viable survey with which to determine and set wage levels for H-2A workers that will prevent adverse effects on the wages of U.S. farmworkers. While DOL is not responsible for USDA’s discontinuation of the FLS, in order to have an adequate data set with which to set the AEWRs, DOL should urge USDA and the White House that the FLS should be reinstated as quickly as possible in order to comport with 8 U.S.C. §1188(a)(1)’s requirement that H-2A employment “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”</p>
<h4><em>The OEWS is inadequate and inappropriate for setting the AEWR because it does not reflect an accurate picture of the farm labor market, and DOL’s improvements will take years to implement</em></h4>
<p>In multiple previous formal comments to DOL, we have discussed the inadequacies of the OEWS data set, including for its use to set agricultural wages,<a href="#_note58" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='58' id="_ref58">58</a> and have done so again here. Thus, until and unless DOL makes significant investments in, and improvements to, the OEWS data, they will continue to be inadequate as a substitute for the FLS. The OEWS’s reliance on wage data collected exclusively by farm labor contractors with a fissured business model and lower wages will significantly lower the AEWRs—as the results of the new AEWRs set in the IFR make clear. DOL notes that it is taking steps to improve the collection of farmworker wage and earnings data in the OEWS; for example, by expanding the population surveyed by the OEWS to include farm operators. However, while DOL says the first updated OEWS data will be available for the May 2027 edition of the OEWS, the reality is that OEWS data on agricultural employers will not be a reasonably adequate representation of the farm labor market until years after that. This is in part because the OEWS estimates are created by averaging wage rates across a span of three years. To be adequate, OEWS would need to collect data from farm operators in 2026, 2027, and 2028, with the data being first published and available at the earliest in 2029. In the meantime, the AEWRs set by OEWS wage data will be artificially low and adversely impacting the wages of H-2A workers and U.S. workers.</p>
<p>In addition, the OEWS data being used by DOL for the 2026 AEWRs are from 2024, thus already two years behind, and DOL has made no upward adjustment for inflation so that the AEWRs reflect a more realistic snapshot of wage rates in the current farm labor market. It is irrational and harmful to both H-2A and U.S. farmworkers for DOL to use wages that are both representative of only non-farm employers and of wages that were paid to workers who were employed by FLCs two years ago.</p>
<h4><em>DOL should eliminate the use of artificial skill levels to set the AEWRs</em></h4>
<p>DOL’s decision in the IFR to adopt a multi-tiered prevailing wage structure, which DOL notes reflects the one created for the H-1B program in the H-1B Visa Reform Act of 2004,<a href="#_note59" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='59' id="_ref59">59</a> and to require its application to prevailing wage determinations in the H-2A program, was irrational, arbitrary, and not adequately justified by the DOL—similarly to when DOL created multiple skill levels for the H-2B program which were later invalidated by a federal court and which DOL ultimately rejected. DOL notes at 90 Fed. Reg. 47933 that it has:</p>
<p><em>conclude[d] employers seeking temporary nonimmigrant workers under the H-2A visa classification should receive an AEWR determination that also takes into account the qualifications of the employer&#8217;s job offer to better effectuate the requirement to, protect the wages of U.S. workers similarly employed and more closely align the wage standard in the H-2A program with the wage standards in other employment-based immigration programs which use skill-based wage levels.</em></p>
<p>This reasoning fails for the reasons cited earlier, namely that unlike with the H-2A program, the four H-1B prevailing wage levels are mandated by statute, and are intended to differentiate between workers with different levels of education and experience in a work visa program where the minimum requirement is a bachelor’s degree. In addition, any prevailing wage structure that permits H-2A workers to be paid below the mean or the median wage is flawed and should be rejected by DOL because it fails to guard against adverse impacts on the wages of U.S. farmworkers as the H-2A statute’s mandate requires. By definition, any employer who is allowed to pay their H-2A employee a wage that is below the mean or median will be putting downward pressure on “wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.” The mean or median wage as defined by the OEWS however, would not suffice, given the flaws inherent in the OEWS that render it an inadequate data set for setting H-2A wages, as discussed earlier, and as illustrated by the findings for skill level 2 wage impacts in Tables 3 and 4.</p>
<h4><em>DOL should base the 2026 AEWR on the most recent FLS survey data available</em></h4>
<p>Even if the FLS is not reinstated, to ensure that employers do not put downward pressure on the wages of U.S. farmworkers through H-2A employment, the IFR should be rescinded and DOL should rely on the most recent FLS data available to set the 2026 AEWR. This would mean using either the FLS annual wage data for 2024 (which set the 2025 AEWRs) or the latest release for 2025, which was published in May 2025 and had results for the January and April reference weeks. Those wage rates could then be adjusted upward with an estimate for inflation for 2026, by using the Employment Cost Index (ECI) projection from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for private-sector wage growth,<a href="#_note60" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='60' id="_ref60">60</a> or the average annual wage increase for field and livestock workers in the FLS for the past five or ten years.</p>
<p>DOL in fact proposed a similar methodology in its 2020 AEWR Final Rule.<a href="#_note61" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='61' id="_ref61">61</a> That methodology would have abandoned the FLS, frozen worker wages for two years, and then adjusted the AEWR annually based on the Employment Cost Index for wages and salaries for the preceding 12 months. Freezing wages for two years would have been disastrous for workers, and DOL was rightly enjoined by a federal court from enforcing the 2020 AEWR Rule partly for that reason—but adjusting the FLS-based AEWR for inflation was a reasonable response to updated FLS data no longer being available.</p>
<h4><em>H-2A employers should not be permitted to have their H-2A employees engage in non-agricultural tasks like construction for more than a small share of their work hours; never more than 20%</em></h4>
<p>As discussed above, under the IFR farm operators will be permitted to employ H-2A workers who are paid at the combined farmworker occupations AEWR wage rates even when their job duties consist of non-agricultural tasks that would command much higher wages under the OEWS, for up to 50% of their workdays; so long as those job duties do not account for a majority of workdays. This will allow the employers of H-2A workers to undercut U.S. wage standards for occupations like construction and truck driving. Farm operators who primarily wish to hire construction workers, truck drivers, or workers in other non-agricultural occupations outside of the main farmworker (i.e. field and livestock worker combined) SOCs codes are eligible to utilize the H-2B program—which Congress created to fill labor shortages in occupations <em>outside</em> of agriculture—and should do so. Instead, DOL in the IFR has created a scheme that is rife with loopholes and that will be easily gamed by farm operators who can save on labor costs by hiring H-2A workers instead of U.S. construction workers and truck drivers, etc., who would command much higher wage rates than the combined farmworker SOC AEWRs. While it is understandable that H-2A workers in some cases will be required to carry out job duties that do not fall entirely under the main farmworker occupations—as DOL has acknowledged in the IFR by creating AEWRs by SOC codes for non-farm occupations—permitting anything beyond small share of an H-2A worker’s work hours to be dedicated to non-agricultural tasks risks undermining the statutory protections for workers in the H-2A program as well as the H-2B’s statutory protections and annual numerical limit. When certifying officers and State Workforce Agencies identify more than one SOC code for an occupation, they should require the employer to certify that the employee will not be engaged in duties that fall outside the definition of agriculture and the main combined farmworker SOC codes for more the 20% of the total work hours.</p>
<h4><em>H-2A employers should be required to pay H-2A workers who engage in non-farm tasks at the higher non-farm wage for the occupation for 100% of their work hours, at skill level 2 or at the local average OEWS wage, whichever is higher</em></h4>
<p>As discussed in the previous subsection, H-2A employers should not be permitted to have their H-2A employees engage in non-agricultural tasks like construction for more than a small share of their work hours; never more than 20%. If COs and SWAs identify more than one SOC code, including one that is outside of the main combined farmworker SOC codes (i.e. field and livestock worker combined), and where the worker will spend up to 20% of their work hours engaged in non-agricultural tasks and duties, then the H-2A worker should be paid the SOC code with the higher wage for 100% of the worker’s work hours. But skill level 1, because it is so far below the true market rate or the local median or average for both farm and non-farm occupations, should never set the AEWR for a non-agricultural occupation/SOC code. Instead, H-2A workers who are paid for 100% of their work hours for a non-agricultural occupation should be paid either the state median wage for the SOC—which is the skill level 2 AEWR—or the local average wage according to the occupation in the OEWS, if it is higher. The local average wage (i.e. the mean wage in the region or metropolitan statistical area, etc., as defined by the OEWS) is DOL’s H-2B wage methodology. The H-2B prevailing wage formulation should be included because H-2A workers performing duties in non-agricultural SOC codes will be doing work that would normally require an employer to hire an H-2B worker. Thus the same wage methodology must be utilized in order to prevent undercutting the wages of H-2B workers and U.S. workers similarly employed.</p>
<p>Paying workers for 100% of work hours at the highest wage rate for an applicable SOC code outside of the combined farmworker SOC codes is similar to DOL’s 2023 AEWR rule.<a href="#_note62" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='62' id="_ref62">62</a> In that rule, if the job duties on the H-2A application (including the job order) did not fall within a single occupational classification, and the occupations involved were subject to different AEWRs, the applicable AEWR would be the occupation with the highest wage for the applicable occupational classifications, and the worker would be paid for 100% of their work hours at that wage. The 2023 AEWR was vastly superior to the AEWR methodology in the IFR; EPI supported that proposed and final rule, with a key recommendation being that when the OEWS was used to set an AEWR, DOL should use the highest of the local or statewide OEWS wages. Agribusiness interests and employers filed multiple lawsuits that ultimately led to the 2023 rule being vacated recently, but only after the current administration ceased to defend the rule in court.<a href="#_note63" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='63' id="_ref63">63</a></p>
<h4><em>If OEWS data are utilized to set wages, they should be set at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage for the state</em></h4>
<p>The statutory mandate to ensure that U.S. workers are adequately recruited and that the employment of H-2A workers does “not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed,” can only be met if the wage that employers must offer to U.S. workers to test the labor market is high enough to attract them and to prevent downward pressure on wages and standards in agriculture. Setting the wage at the new AEWRs according to the OEWS, a data set that is not appropriate for agricultural workers, will be far too low to attract available U.S. workers to work on farms. While DOL should not use the OEWS, if it continues to do so, DOL should not set the AEWR at percentiles (like the 17<sup>th</sup>) that will put downward pressure on the wages of farmworkers. DOL could instead more adequately test the labor market and protect wages standards in agriculture by setting the AEWR at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage.</p>
<p>The following is one example comparing the OEWS 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage to the 2025 AEWR: Take the Farmworkers and Laborers, Crop, Nursery, and Greenhouse (SOC 45-2092) occupation in the OEWS for 2024—which is the most common and relevant farmworker occupation in the OEWS for H-2A jobs—and compare it with the wage rates set in the 2025 AEWR, which DOL set with FLS data from 2024. The 2025 AEWR for California, which is based on FLS data <em>from 2024</em> (making it the more appropriate comparison year for 2024 OEWS wages) was $19.97. The 2024 OEWS 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage in California for SOC 45-2092 was $21.97 in 2024,<a href="#_note64" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='64' id="_ref64">64</a> about 10% percent more than the 2025 AEWR. The 2025 AEWR for Florida (based on 2024 FLS survey data) was $16.23, and the OEWS 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage for the occupation in 2024 was $17.81, just under 10% more than the FLS wage.</p>
<p>Since the OEWS already reports the 90th percentile wage, DOL would not have to do any complicated arithmetic when setting AEWRs. While still inadequate as compared to using FLS data, setting the AEWR at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage would help adjust for the fact that the OEWS only surveys non-farm employers that pay much lower wages to farmworkers and excludes directly-employed farmworkers. Setting the AEWR at the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile wage, with a roughly 10% increase that results relative to the FLS data set of the same year in the main OEWS farmworker occupation in these two significant examples, would also help adjust for the fact that fringe benefits are not included in OEWS data—and help compensate for DOL’s ill-advised housing deductions—in either case making it a fairer wage vis-à-vis U.S. farmworkers, and going further to ensure that U.S. workers are adequately recruited and do not suffer adverse impacts. The 90<sup>th</sup> percentile would also help protect the higher earners in farm occupations, rather than creating a de facto cap on H-2A earnings at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile (median) wage, which adversely impacts higher earners in the occupation. It must also be noted that 2024 OEWS wages are being used to set 2026 AEWRs in the IFR, despite being two years behind and not adjusted for inflation. If this recommendation is adopted, the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile AEWRs should also be adjusted for inflation using the CBO’s projections in the Employment Cost Index, or by the annual average real increase in farmworker wages for the past five or ten years, if the OEWS wage data used are from years prior to the year for which they will be used to set the AEWR. (In other words the 2024 OEWS-based AEWRs should be adjusted for inflation to their projected real value in 2026, etc.)</p>
<h3><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif;">Conclusion</span></h3>
<p>There is no evidence to suggest that farmworkers overall have been overpaid or that the AEWR rates that H-2A workers have been paid are too high and unsustainable for farm operators to earn a profit. In fact, the evidence presented in this comment shows the opposite is true—that farmworkers are underpaid according to a number of metrics and their wages have far to go before they can reach levels that would make them comparable to workers employed outside of the agricultural industry. In addition, as USDA has pointed out, the modest increases in farm wages have been “offset” by productivity and output prices, so that “labor costs as a share of gross cash farm income have not shown an upward trend for the sector (as a whole) over the past 20 years.”<a href="#_note65" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='65' id="_ref65">65</a> Farmers have virtually exponentially increased their use of the H-2A program under the previous AEWR methodology—in fact its use and popularity is at an all-time high—contradicting DOL’s claims that the program needs radical changes to be sustainable for farm operators. As a result, DOL has not shown an adequate justification for sharply cutting the wages of H-2A farmworkers—or for lowering wages and reducing opportunities for U.S. farmworkers, which will inevitably result if the IFR is allowed to stay in place. In addition, The Administrative Procedure Act requires DOL to provide more notice and an opportunity for the public to comment—and must devise additional analyses and estimates regarding impacted stakeholders—before it can make such a radical change to a program that will impact the entire agricultural industry.</p>
<p>We urge DOL to resist the pressure from agribusiness to intentionally degrade wages and standards in the agricultural industry. Instead, we urge DOL to rescind the IFR and focus its efforts on protecting labor, health, and safety standards and worker rights for farmworkers, regardless of their immigration status, by vigorously enforcing the labor and employment laws that are applicable to farm operators.</p>
<p>Daniel Costa<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<h3>Endnotes&nbsp;</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> As counted by the latest <a href="https://www.nass.usda.gov/AgCensus/">Census of Agriculture</a> from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2022.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a>&nbsp;See Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s new H-2A wage rule will radically cut the wages of all farmworkers: New estimates show farmworkers stand to lose $4.4 to $5.4 billion annually under DOL’s updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Wenson Fung, Kimberly Prado, Amanda Gold, Andrew Padovani, Daniel Carroll, and Emily Finchum-Mason,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf"><em>Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2021–2022: A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Crop Workers</em></a>, Research Report no. 17, JBS International for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. September 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> See National Agricultural Statistics Service, “<a href="https://www.nass.usda.gov/Surveys/Guide_to_NASS_Surveys/Farm_Labor/index.php">Agricultural (Farm) Labor</a>,” for more background and to access Farm Labor Reports, U.S. Department of Agriculture.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Federal Policy Watch, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/usda-ends-the-agricultural-farm-labor-survey-the-u-s-s-only-survey-of-agricultural-employers/">USDA ends the Agricultural (Farm) Labor Survey, the U.S.’s only survey of agricultural employers</a>,” Economic Policy Institute, September 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Economic Policy Institute, <a href="https://data.epi.org/">State of Working America Data Library</a>, &#8220;Hourly wage, average &#8211; Average real hourly wage (2024$),&#8221; 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Economic Research Service, “<a href="https://ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor#wages">Wages of Hired Farmworkers</a>” in “Farm Labor,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Updated November 18, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Wenson Fung, Kimberly Prado, Amanda Gold, Andrew Padovani, Daniel Carroll, and Emily Finchum-Mason,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf"><em>Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2021–2022: A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Crop Workers</em></a>, Research Report no. 17, JBS International for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. September 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Veronica Nigh, “<a href="https://www.fb.org/market-intel/aewr-methodology-change-a-blow-to-growers#:~:text=While%20the%20national%20average%20AEWR,effect%20on%20March%2030%2C%202023.">AEWR Methodology Change a Blow to Growers</a>,” Market Intel, American Farm Bureau, March 30, 2023; American Hort, “<a href="https://www.greenhousegrower.com/management/why-you-can-expect-steeps-h-2a-wage-increases-in-2022/">Why You Can Expect Steep H-2A Wage Increases in 2022</a>,” Greenhouse Grower, December 11, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range#citation-76-p47923"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, Interim Final Rule, 90 Fed. Reg. 47914, at 47923 (October 2, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Comments of Craig Regelbrugge in American Hort, “<a href="https://www.greenhousegrower.com/management/why-you-can-expect-steeps-h-2a-wage-increases-in-2022/">Why You Can Expect Steep H-2A Wage Increases in 2022</a>,” Greenhouse Grower, December 11, 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> EPI analysis of Adverse Effect Wage Rates for 2021 and 2022 for the listed states; AEWRs are from the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. All values have been adjusted to constant 2022 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI-U). See also discussion and tables in Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-prepared-for-the-u-s-senate-committee-on-the-judiciary-for-a-hearing-on-from-farm-to-table-immigrant-workers-get-the-job-done/">Testimony prepared for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary for a hearing on ‘From Farm to Table, Immigrant Workers Get the Job Done</a>,’” Economic Policy Institute, May 31, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIUFDSL,%20November%2028,%202025">Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: Food in U.S. City Average</a> [CPIUFDSL], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, last accessed November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Economic Research Service, “<a href="https://ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor#wages">Wages of Hired Farmworkers</a>” in “Farm Labor,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Updated November 18, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B)</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> <em>Sorenson Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC</em>, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2014).</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> <em>Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA</em>, 682 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 2012).</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Wenson Fung, Kimberly Prado, Amanda Gold, Andrew Padovani, Daniel Carroll, and Emily Finchum-Mason, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf"><em>Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2021–2022: A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Crop Workers</em></a>, Research Report no. 17, JBS International for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. September 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Jake Traylor, Myah Ward and Samuel Benson, “‘<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/07/10/trump-rollins-farmers-immigration-00446160">I really feel for her’: Brooke Rollins’ impossible Trump administration mandat</a>e,” <em>Politico</em>, July 10, 2025; Marcia Brown, “<a href="https://www.politico.com/live-updates/2025/07/08/congress/rollins-says-able-bodied-medicaid-recipients-should-replace-immigrant-farm-workforce-00442065">Ag secretary says able-bodied Medicaid recipients should replace immigrant farm workforce</a>,” <em>Politico</em>, July 8, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Joseph Gedeon, “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jul/09/trump-agriculture-medicaid-migrant-farm-workers#:~:text=Rollins%20also%20acknowledged%20that%20the%20administration%20must,promise%20of%20a%20%22100%25%20American%20workforce%20stands%22">US agriculture secretary says Medicaid recipients can replace deported farm workers</a>,” <em>The Guardian</em>, July 9, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> See National Agricultural Statistics Service, “<a href="https://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/Notices/2025/08-28-2025.php">NASS discontinues select data collection programs and reports</a>,” United States Department of Agriculture, August 28, 2025; for additional background see Federal Policy Watch, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/usda-ends-the-agricultural-farm-labor-survey-the-u-s-s-only-survey-of-agricultural-employers/">USDA ends the Agricultural (Farm) Labor Survey, the U.S.’s only survey of agricultural employers</a>,” Economic Policy Institute, September 2, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> See Rural Migration News, “<a href="https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/blog/post/?id=2614">California: FLC Employment Down and Wages Up in 2020</a>,” U.C. Davis, July 16, 2021. According to the latest data available from DOL’s <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cew/">Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages</a>, in 2024, directly hired crop farmworkers in California earned $905 per week, as compared to crop farmworkers employed by farm labor contractors (FLCs) who earned $649, or 72% of what directly-employed crop farmworkers earned. Nationwide in 2024, FLC employees earned 76% of what directly-employed crop farmworkers earned: $862 vs $655. See industry codes 111 (Crop production) and 115115 (Farm labor contractors and crew leaders).</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> See just one of many examples of reporting on this phenomenon: Felicia Mello and Wendy Fry, “<a href="https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2024/07/california-farmworker-housing/">State inspectors are supposed to visit all farmworker housing to ensure its safety. Sometimes they used FaceTime instead</a>,” July 1, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance">Performance Data</a>, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor [fiscal year <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/H-2A_Disclosure_Data_FY2024_Q4.xlsx">2024 data file for H-2A</a>], last accessed November 25, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> Wenson Fung, Kimberly Prado, Amanda Gold, Andrew Padovani, Daniel Carroll, and Emily Finchum-Mason,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf"><em>Findings from the National Agricultural Workers Survey (NAWS) 2021–2022: A Demographic and Employment Profile of United States Crop Workers</em></a>, Research Report no. 17, JBS International for the Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. September 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Zachariah Rutledge, Marcelo Castillo, Timothy J. Richards, Philip Martin, “<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajae.12557">H-2A Adverse Effect Wage Rates and U.S. farm wages</a>,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, first published June 9, 2025, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12557.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> For the full methodology, see the appendix in Daniel Costa and Ben Zipperer, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/">Trump’s new H-2A wage rule will radically cut the wages of all farmworkers: New estimates show farmworkers stand to lose $4.4 to $5.4 billion annually under DOL’s updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), November 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Given that U.S. workers typically do not experience nominal wage reductions, employers may implement the new lower pay rates for U.S. workers through wage freezes that are gradually eroded by inflation. At the same time, the high degree of churn and seasonality of farmworker jobs and the presence of a large contractor workforce may allow employers the opportunity to reduce U.S. wages more rapidly than would be the case in other sectors.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> See discussion in Daniel Costa, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h2b-temporary-foreign-worker-program-for-labor-shortages-or-cheap-temporary-labor/#epi-toc-13"><em>The H-2B temporary foreign worker program: For labor shortages or cheap, temporary labor?</em></a> Economic Policy Institute, January 19, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> 90 Fed. Reg. 47941.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> 90 Fed. Reg. 47955.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> 7 U.S.C. § 2204</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> USDA, Farm Employment Estimates, 1910 Census: Volume 5, Agriculture (1913).</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> See <em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em>, 86 Fed. Reg. at 68178; <em>Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States</em>, Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6898.</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> The most recent edition of the <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf">National Agricultural Workers Survey</a> showed that in 2021-22, 78% of non-H-2A crop farmworkers worked directly for a farm employer (see page 25).</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> See Rural Migration News, “<a href="https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/blog/post/?id=2614">California: FLC Employment Down and Wages Up in 2020</a>,” U.C. Davis, July 16, 2021. According to the latest data available from DOL’s <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cew/">Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages</a>, in 2024, directly hired crop farmworkers in California earned $905 per week, as compared to crop farmworkers employed by farm labor contractors (FLCs) who earned $649, or 72% of what directly-employed crop farmworkers earned. Nationwide in 2024, FLC employees earned 76% of what directly-employed crop farmworkers earned: $862 vs $655. See industry codes 111 (Crop production) and 115115 (Farm labor contractors and crew leaders).</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> A number of studies show a wage penalty for subcontracted/outsourced workers. For example, see Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300206">Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards</a>,” Cornell University ILR Review. January 1, 2010); Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmieder, “<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v132y2017i3p1165-1217..html">The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure</a>,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), 2017, pages 1165-1217; Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, and Benjamin Schoefer “<a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/schoefer_files/Temp_Argentina_Sept_2020.pdf">Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data</a>,” Econometrics Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, September 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Daniel Costa, Philip Martin, and Zachariah Rutledge,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-labor-standards-enforcement-in-agriculture-data-reveal-the-biggest-violators-and-raise-new-questions-about-how-to-improve-and-target-efforts-to-protect-farmworkers/"><em>Federal Labor Standards Enforcement in Agriculture:&nbsp;Data Reveal the Biggest Violators and Raise New Questions About How to Improve and Target Efforts to Protect Farmworkers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, December 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Congressional Budget Office, data supplement for CBO’s September 2025 report, <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61738"><em>CBO’s Current View of the Economy From 2025 to 2028</em></a>, available at <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx">https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx</a></p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> See Figure A in Daniel Costa and Philip Martin, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/coronavirus-and-farmworkers-h-2a/"><em>Coronavirus and farmworkers: Farm employment, safety issues, and the H-2A guestworker program</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, March 24, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> <em>Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States</em>, 74 Fed. Reg. 45905, 45911 (proposed Sept. 4, 2009).</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(p)(4).</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> See <em>CATA v Solis</em>, p. 36-37, AILA Infonet Doc No. 10100169. (Posted 10/01/10).</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(p)(4).</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> 75 Fed. Reg. 61580.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> 75 Fed. Reg. 61580, see n.2.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> 75 Fed. Reg. 61580.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> 75 Fed. Reg. 61580.</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> Congressional Budget Office, data supplement for CBO’s September 2025 report, <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61738"><em>CBO’s Current View of the Economy From 2025 to 2028</em></a>, available at <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx">https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx</a></p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> 90 Fed. Reg. 47963.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> See Figure B and discussion in Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-rfi-regarding-schedule-a/">EPI comment on DOL’s RFI regarding Schedule A modernization</a>,” Economic Policy Institute, Public Comments, May 13, 2024. Submitted online via https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/02/15/2024-03187/labor-certification-for-permanent-employment-of-foreign-workers-in-the-united-states-modernizing</p>
<p data-note_number='54'><a href="#_ref54" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note54">54. </a> See Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/data/charts/agriculture">Agriculture</a>” [data tables], U.S. Department of Labor, accessed November 2025, and discussion of previous years in Daniel Costa and Philip Martin, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/"><em>Record-low number of federal wage and hour investigations of farms in 2022: Congress must increase funding for labor standards enforcement to protect farmworkers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='55'><a href="#_ref55" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note55">55. </a> Jake Barnes, Janice Fine, Daniel J. Galvin, Jenn Round, Hana Shepherd, <em><a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/WJL_immigration_databrief_May2025.pdf">To Help U.S. Workers, We Need Labor Standards Enforcement, Not Mass Deportations</a></em>, Data Brief, Workplace Justice Lab, Rutgers University, May 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='56'><a href="#_ref56" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note56">56. </a> Daniel Costa and Philip Martin, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/"><em>Record-low number of federal wage and hour investigations of farms in 2022: Congress must increase funding for labor standards enforcement to protect farmworkers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, August 22, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='57'><a href="#_ref57" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note57">57. </a> See <em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em>, 86 Fed. Reg. at 68178; <em>Temporary Agricultural Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States</em>; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6898.</p>
<p data-note_number='58'><a href="#_ref58" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note58">58. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-prevailing-wage-levels-determination-for-h-1b-visas-and-permanent-labor-certifications-for-green-cards/">EPI comments on DOL Request for Information on determining prevailing wage levels for H-1B visas and permanent labor certifications for green cards</a>,” Economic Policy Institute, June 1, 2021, public comment submitted for <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/04/02/2021-06889/request-for-information-on-data-sources-and-methods-for-determining-prevailing-wage-levels-for-the"><em>Request for Information on Data Sources and Methods for Determining Prevailing Wage Levels for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Immigrants and Non-Immigrants in the United States</em></a>, Request for Information, DOL Docket No. ETA-2021-0003, RIN: 1205-AC00. Regarding the OEWS and agricultural wages, see Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dols-proposed-changes-to-the-adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-h-2a-visas-for-temporary-migrant-farmworkers/">EPI comments on DOL’s proposed changes to the Adverse Effect Wage Rate methodology for H-2A visas for temporary migrant farmworkers</a>,” Economic Policy Institute, January 31, 2022, public comment submitted for <em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em>, RIN: 1205-AC05, DOL Docket No. ETA-ETA-2021-0006.</p>
<p data-note_number='59'><a href="#_ref59" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note59">59. </a> Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(p)(4).</p>
<p data-note_number='60'><a href="#_ref60" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note60">60. </a> Congressional Budget Office, data supplement for CBO’s September 2025 report, <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/61738"><em>CBO’s Current View of the Economy From 2025 to 2028</em></a>, available at <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx">https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx</a></p>
<p data-note_number='61'><a href="#_ref61" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note61">61. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/05/2020-24544/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No. ETA-2019-0007, RIN 1205-AB89 (November 5, 2020).</p>
<p data-note_number='62'><a href="#_ref62" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note62">62. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/02/28/2023-03756/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, U.S. Department of Labor, final rule, 20 CFR Part 655, DOL Docket No. ETA-2021-0006, RIN 1205-AC05 (February 28, 2023).</p>
<p data-note_number='63'><a href="#_ref63" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note63">63. </a> Judgment, <em>Teche Vermilion Sugar Cane Growers Ass’n Inc. v. Su</em>, No. 6:23-cv-00831-RRS-CBW (W.D.La. Aug. 21, 2025), ECF No. 87.</p>
<p data-note_number='64'><a href="#_ref64" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note64">64. </a> OEWS data for 2024: <a href="https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/area/0600000">https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/area/0600000</a></p>
<p data-note_number='65'><a href="#_ref65" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note65">65. </a> Economic Research Service, “<a href="https://ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-labor#laborcostshare">Labor Cost Share of Total Gross Revenues</a>,” in “Farm Labor,” U.S. Department of Agriculture, Updated November 18, 2025.</p>
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		<title>Trump’s new H-2A wage rule will radically cut the wages of all farmworkers: New estimates show farmworkers stand to lose $4.4 to $5.4 billion annually under DOL’s updated Adverse Effect Wage Rate</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-new-h-2a-wage-rule-will-radically-cut-the-wages-of-all-farmworkers-new-estimates-show-farmworkers-stand-to-lose-4-4-to-5-4-billion-annually-under-dols-updated-adverse-effec/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 19:44:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Zipperer, Daniel Costa]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=314659</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[The Trump administration will cut the pay of all farmworkers by reducing the minimum wages paid to workers filling seasonal agricultural jobs in the H-2A visa program.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Trump administration will cut the pay of all farmworkers by reducing the minimum wages paid to workers filling seasonal agricultural jobs in the H-2A visa program. By lowering wage rates implemented by the Department of Labor (DOL), we estimate that over 350,000 H-2A farmworkers could see their annual wages cut by a total of $2 billion or more—between 26% to 32% of their wages. These significant wage cuts for H-2A workers will put downward pressure on the wages of U.S. farmworkers, reducing their total annual wages by about $3 billion—up to 9% of their total wages. Total losses in pay for all farmworkers will range from $4.4 to $5.4 billion—roughly 10% to 12% of their total wages—according to our estimates.</p>
<p>The farmworkers who toil in the fields do not deserve a pay cut—they deserve a raise. Instead of cutting wages, the Trump administration should restore the previous standards that required employers to pay H-2A workers no less than the average wage for field and livestock workers according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.</p>
<p><span id="more-314659"></span></p>
<h4><strong>Introduction to the H-2A visa program and the Adverse Effect Wage Rate (AEWR) </strong></h4>
<p>The H-2A visa program is used to fill seasonal and temporary jobs in agriculture, after employers go through a (mostly pro-forma) process to prove that they could not find an available U.S. worker to hire. With no annual limit on the number of workers that can be hired, H-2A has been the fastest-growing U.S. work visa program—nearly tripling over the past decade to 352,682 workers in 2024, according to our estimates (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). The vast majority of H-2A workers are employed on crop farms—picking fruits and vegetables—and the average duration of an H-2A job is roughly six months.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-308680 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="308680" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/308680-35137-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>It is well documented that the H-2A program is rife with abuse and workers are not adequately protected, in part because H-2A farmworkers are indentured to their employers through their visa status and due to lax government oversight. As a result, there have been countless exposés from journalists and advocates that reveal how H-2A farmworkers are frequently <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/">robbed</a>, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1COm0C73CKw">exploited</a>, <a href="https://prismreports.org/2025/09/24/women-h2a-visa-farm-workers-migrant/">victimized</a>, and <a href="https://polarisproject.org/resources/labor-trafficking-on-specific-temporary-work-visas-report/">trafficked</a>, and EPI has shown how most back wages stolen and employer penalties levied on farms come from <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/record-low-farm-investigations/">employers breaking H-2A rules</a>.</p>
<p>Some governance aspects of the H-2A program have long been a contentious policy fight, especially when it comes to worker rights and setting minimum wage rates for H-2A workers. The H-2A law <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/26f-wage-requirements-H-2A">requires</a> that H-2A workers be paid the highest of the local, state, or federal minimum wage, unless there is an applicable local prevailing wage or collective bargaining agreement—or the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.farmworkerjustice.org/sites/default/files/AEWR%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf">Adverse Effect Wage Rate</a>&nbsp;(AEWR) if it is higher, which is calculated and set by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) based on survey data. In fact, the vast majority of H-2A farmworkers have been paid the AEWR, since until now it was almost always higher than any of the otherwise applicable minimum wages. The purpose of the AEWR is to ensure that H-2A workers are paid a wage that is consistent with U.S. wage standards on farms and to prevent adverse impacts of H-2A employment on U.S. farmworkers’ wages. But the agricultural industry has pushed lawmakers and federal agencies to modify the AEWR methodology to push H-2A wages as low as possible.</p>
<p>Since 2010, the AEWR in each state has been based on a survey of farm operators conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), commonly referred to as the Farm Labor Survey (FLS). While far from perfect, it is the best data set available on the wages of directly hired farmworkers in the United States. However, in August, the Trump administration’s USDA abruptly <a href="https://www.nass.usda.gov/Newsroom/Notices/2025/08-28-2025.php">announced</a> that it was <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/usda-ends-the-agricultural-farm-labor-survey-the-u-s-s-only-survey-of-agricultural-employers/">discontinuing the FLS</a>. A month later, DOL issued an <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range">interim final rule</a> laying out a new AEWR based on data from a different data set, the <a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/">Occupational Employment and Wages Statistics</a> (OEWS) survey. OEWS is an inferior data set for agriculture and is not a valid survey for setting farmworkers’ wages, in part because it only surveys nonfarm employers—meaning farm labor contractors and other staffing firms. These nonfarm employers send farmworkers to different farms and <a href="https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/blog/post/?id=2614#:~:text=CA%20average%20crop%20support%20employment,first%20US%20jobs%20with%20FLCs.">pay them much less</a> on average than the majority of workers who are hired directly by farm employers.</p>
<h4><strong>The Trump administration’s new regulation will drastically lower wages for migrant farmworkers hired through the H-2A visa program</strong></h4>
<p>The new Trump AEWR cuts wage rates dramatically and creates two artificial “skill levels” for each state which set H-2A wages at the 17<sup>th</sup> percentile of wages surveyed (skill level 1) and at the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile (skill level 2) based on five occupations DOL has determined are relevant in the OEWS. DOL estimates that 92% of H-2A workers will be paid at skill level 1 and 8% at skill level 2. The Trump DOL, in the preamble to its <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range">interim final rule</a>, is fairly explicit about its desire to lower wages for H-2A farmworkers in order to benefit farm employers and increase H-2A hiring. And its move to eliminate the FLS and substitute it with the OEWS appears to be a key action taken to achieve that.</p>
<p>In addition, DOL has removed the previous requirement that employers pay for 100% of housing costs for H-2A workers. Currently, H-2A employers are <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/26g-housing-standards-for-rental-and-public-accommodations-H-2A">required</a> to provide housing for workers if they would not reasonably be able to return to their residences on a daily basis. This is important given that H-2A workers are so poorly paid that they cannot reasonably be expected to pay for their own housing. Further, H-2A workers are often employed on farms in remote areas that are not located close enough to a supply of affordable, accessible housing that still allows workers to report for duty for long hours in the fields. Reporter and worker advocates have <a href="https://calmatters.org/california-divide/2024/07/california-farmworker-housing/">documented</a> many of the substandard conditions in employer-provided housing for farmworkers. However, instead of improving these problems, the AEWR lets farm owners take new deductions for housing out of H-2A workers’ paychecks—sometimes as much as 30% of their hourly pay.</p>
<p>Between wage cuts and housing deductions, DOL estimates that H-2A workers would lose over $1.7 billion under the new wage rule in 2026, amounting to $24 billion over the next 10 years as the program grows to over 500,000 jobs, as DOL predicts will occur. This would represent a shocking redistribution of income away from some of the country’s most essential and underpaid workers in order to line the pockets of farm employers.</p>
<p>However, we believe DOL’s estimates are incomplete because they fail to fully consider the new AEWR’s wage impacts, by not considering alternative methodologies and other scenarios that may result. For instance, DOL did not consider the impact on state minimum wage rates and whether the AEWR housing deduction may conflict with state laws, and DOL did not estimate the impact that a massive wage cut for H-2A farmworkers will have on U.S. farmworkers. In this post, we present new estimates that we hope will inform the public and DOL as to the true impact of the October 2025 AEWR. They should be considered low-end estimates because the interim final rule also permits farm operators to pay H-2A workers the AEWR for duties associated with higher-paying non-farm jobs for up to 50% of their work hours. This will put downward pressure on a number of occupations like construction and truck driving, but we have not attempted to calculate those losses to workers, and neither has DOL.</p>
<h4><strong>Trump’s H-2A wage rule will lead to a total pay cut of $4.4 to $5.4 billion for H-2A farmworkers and U.S. farmworkers</strong></h4>
<p>The interim final rule will significantly reduce H-2A workers’ wages. The average AEWR set for 2025 was $17.43 per hour, weighted by total weeks worked by state in 2024. The rule, however, proposes a two-tiered wage structure with far lower wages for 2026. The average skill level 1 and skill level 2 hourly wages would be $13.70 and $17.22, respectively, even without housing deductions. With housing deductions, the average level 1 and level 2 hourly wages would be $11.78 and $15.30, respectively.</p>
<p>In many cases, the new state AEWR wages are low enough to fall below state minimum wage laws, with the housing deduction lowering it even further. In some states, the AEWRs will fall below the state minimum wage only after housing deductions are subtracted. In all those cases, the state minimum wage supersedes the AEWR and sets the minimum H-2A wage. Currently, it is unclear how states will react to workers being paid below the state minimum after the housing deduction, and what guidance the federal government will provide with respect to it. For example, in Connecticut, the 2026 skill level 1 H-2A wage will be $15.93, but the 2026 state minimum wage will be $16.94. If the state fully enforces its minimum wage and prohibits pay rates from falling below the state minimum, then the lowest wage an H-2A worker could be paid legally is $16.94, and no housing deduction will be permitted. But if Connecticut or federal guidance allows the housing deduction to take the H-2A wage below the state minimum wage, then an H-2A worker in Connecticut could be paid as low as $14.88 per hour (i.e., the state minimum wage minus the $2.06 housing deduction).</p>
<p>It is possible that some states will take the position that the hourly wage rates paid to H-2A workers may not go below the state minimum after subtracting the housing deduction, while some states may allow the deduction, arguing that the federal AEWR regulation supersedes the state minimum wage law. The agricultural industry is likely to argue the latter, and the issue may end up in multiple state and federal courts. As a result of this uncertainty, our estimates consider both state minimum wage scenarios.</p>
<p>The first row of <strong>Table 1</strong> estimates the annual pay losses for H-2A workers in 2026 under the interim final rule, assuming—as DOL does—that 92% of H-2A workers would be paid the skill level 1 wage. State minimum wage laws should not permit the hourly wage paid to H-2A workers to go below the state minimum wage; and in this scenario, H-2A annual wages would fall by $1.7 billion in 2026, or 25.8%. If state minimum wages are allowed to be undermined and the housing deduction drops the H-2A wage below the state minimum wage rates, the losses would be larger: a $2.1 billion or 31.5% annual pay loss. If some states prohibit and some permit the housing deduction to take the H-2A wage below the state minimum wage, then the total amount of annual pay losses would fall somewhere in between those two amounts.</p>


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<p>Reducing the AEWR for H-2A workers will also lower wages for U.S. farmworkers—one-third of whom are U.S-born citizens, according to the latest <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/naws/pdfs/NAWS%20Research%20Report%2017.pdf">DOL survey</a>. A fall in the H-2A wage will increase demand for H-2A workers, since employers can save significantly on labor costs if they hire them. As a result, it will become <em>relatively</em> more expensive to hire non-H-2A U.S. farmworkers. Employers will therefore reduce demand for U.S. farmworkers, putting downward pressure on their wages.</p>
<p>This is not hypothetical: Rutledge et al. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12557">found</a> that a 10% increase in the AEWR caused an almost 2.8% increase in the wages of U.S. farmworkers. With those estimates, the authors estimated that a one-year AEWR wage freeze would reduce annual U.S. farmworker wages by $475 million. Using a similar methodology, we estimate the likely wage reductions for U.S. farmworkers due to the new rule (see the appendix for methodological details).</p>
<p>As we showed earlier, the H-2A wage reduction under a fully enforced minimum wage would be 25.8%. Based on the responsiveness of U.S farmworker wages to H-2A wage rates from <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12557">Rutledge et al.</a>, the second row of Table 1 shows that the new rule could reduce U.S. farmworker annual wages by $2.7 billion, or 7.1%. The wage losses are again larger if states allow the housing deduction to push pay below the state minimum. In that case, U.S. farmworkers in 2026 would experience an annual pay cut of $3.3 billion, or 8.7%.</p>
<p>This means that farmworkers in total will see annual pay cuts of about $4.4 billion to $5.4 billion (9.9% to 12.1%), depending on the enforcement of state minimum wage laws. This amounts to a massive pay cut for farmworkers who are already some of the lowest-paid employees in the entire U.S. labor market, while working in one of the most difficult and dangerous jobs in the economy.</p>
<h4><strong>Conclusion and recommendations</strong></h4>
<p>Without question, the Trump DOL has established an AEWR that will lead to much lower pay for both U.S. farmworkers and those recruited from abroad through the H-2A program—and that appears to be its explicit intention. H-2A and U.S. farmworkers <a href="https://www.bls.gov/charts/census-of-fatal-occupational-injuries/number-and-rate-of-fatal-work-injuries-by-industry.htm">risk their lives</a> and health in dangerous conditions like extreme heat in order to put food on the tables of U.S. households. These workers do not deserve a pay cut—they deserve a raise.</p>
<p>The Trump DOL is <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range">accepting input from the public through the Federal Register</a> website on the AEWR interim final rule until December 1, 2025, which they are required by law to consider when crafting the final version of the rule. The Trump administration should reconsider its recent actions and listen to the many farmworker advocates and unions who have criticized the new AEWR for its negative impacts. However, the Trump administration has made clear it doesn’t care about the well-being of immigrant workers, or improving the quality of the jobs in which they’re overrepresented. In fact, Trump has expressed wanting to improve jobs and opportunities for native-born workers <em>through </em>the exclusion, deportation, or terrorizing of immigrant workers—something we know won’t work. The AEWR rule policy change, however, shows that the administration is still willing to help agribusiness more easily hire the most exploitable and underpaid labor possible—even if it decimates the jobs and wages of the one-third of farmworkers who are U.S.-born citizens.</p>
<p>Instead of taking money out of the pockets of U.S.-born and foreign-born farmworkers alike, the administration should at minimum:</p>
<ul>
<li>Reinstate the USDA Farm Labor Survey, which has been the best available source of government data on farmworkers’ wages and employment;</li>
<li>Issue an updated AEWR rule with a methodology that reverts back to the previous rule that requires employers to pay H-2A workers no less than the average wage for field and livestock workers as reported in the FLS; and</li>
<li>Prohibit farm employers from hiring H-2A workers for jobs where they will perform non-farm tasks like construction for more than a trivial portion of their work hours. Those workers should be hired through the H-2B program, or if they remain in the H-2A program, they should be paid the higher non-farm wage for the occupation for 100% of their work hours.</li>
</ul>
<div class="box clearfix  box" style="">
<p><strong>Appendix: Methodology</strong></p>
<p>To calculate counterfactual H-2A wage rates in 2026, we estimate what the AEWR would be in 2026 if the new rule was not in effect and assume that the 2025 AEWR grows by 3.416%, which is the Employment Cost Index (ECI) <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2025-09/51135-2025-09-Economic-Projections.xlsx">projection</a> from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for private-sector wage growth between 2025 and 2026.</p>
<p>For our estimate on the interim final rule, we assume that the 2026 H-2A wages are the wage rates at skill levels 1 and 2 as listed by DOL, subtracting the housing deduction. We also assume that H-2A labor is distributed across the two wage rates as DOL does (92% of workers in skill level 1, 8% in skill level 2), or we use another distribution as described in the text. We additionally examine the cases when state minimum wages are fully enforced so that H-2A wages can never fall below the state minimum, or the cases when state minimum wages are not fully enforced so that H-2A wages minus the housing deduction can fall below the state minimum wage.</p>
<p>To calculate the H-2A wage bill under the counterfactual and under the new rule, we use the H-2A wage rates described above, use H-2A cumulative weeks worked estimates by state from DOL disclosure data on labor certifications <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/H-2A_Disclosure_Data_FY2024_Q4.xlsx">for H-2A jobs</a>, and assume that H-2A workers were employed for 40.5 hours per week, which is the average amount of hours worked nationally by field and livestock workers according to the USDA’s <a href="https://esmis.nal.usda.gov/sites/default/release-files/x920fw89s/pn89g082z/05743k75q/fmla1124.pdf">Farm Labor Survey</a> for 2024. Depending on the distribution of labor across wage rates and depending on the enforcement of state minimum wages, these assumptions generate an estimate of the percent fall in H-2A wage rates and the total dollar fall in the annual wage bill. The total counterfactual H-2A wage bill in 2026 is about $6.9 billion.</p>
<p>To estimate the total counterfactual non-H-2A U.S. farmworker wage bill, we start with the 2024 annual wages reported in the <a href="https://www.bls.gov/cew/downloadable-data-files.htm">QCEW</a> from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for U.S. farmworkers in crop production (NAICS 111) and crop support services (NAICS 1151). These industries were also used by <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12557">Rutledge et al.</a> in their analysis. We convert those 2024 values to 2026 dollars assuming that nominal wages grow at the same rate as CBO (2025) projections for ECI, by 3.501% in 2024–2025 and 3.416% in 2025–2026. Depending on state unemployment insurance coverage rules, some states may include H-2A wages in QCEW data, and some may not; <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12979/IF12979.1.pdf">Handwerker</a> estimates that 35% of H-2A workers may have been included in QCEW payroll estimates. In the absence of better state-by-state data, we assume that 65% of the counterfactual H-2A wage bill is missing from QCEW data. The counterfactual total non-H-2A U.S. farmworker wage bill in those industries in 2026 is about $39.0 billion.</p>
<p>To calculate the effect of the new rule on non-H-2A U.S. farmworker wages, we rely on the estimates in <a href="https://doi.org/10.1111/ajae.12557">Rutledge et al.</a> showing that a 10% increase in the AEWR causes a 2.74% to 2.75% increase in domestic farm wage rates (see their Table 2, column 6, specifications A and B). Averaging these two estimates is our preferred elasticity of H-2A wages to non-H-2A wages. To estimate the percent fall in non-H-2A farmworker wages, we multiply the percent fall in H-2A wage rates by the preferred elasticity. We convert the 2026 dollar value estimates to 2025 dollars using CBO 2025 projections of the 2025–2026 CPI-U inflation rate. We multiply the percent fall in H-2A wage rates by the preferred elasticity.</p>
<p>We also want to note that given that U.S. workers typically do not experience nominal wage reductions, employers may implement the new lower pay rates for U.S. workers through wage freezes that are gradually eroded by inflation. At the same time, the high degree of churn and seasonality of farmworker jobs and the presence of a large contractor workforce may allow employers the opportunity to reduce U.S. wages more rapidly than would be the case in other sectors</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DHS weighted selection process for cap-subject H–1B petitions</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dhs-weighted-selection-process-for-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Oct 2025 15:51:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Costa, Ron Hira]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=313361</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted electronically via Business and Foreign Workers Office of Policy and Strategy, U.S. Department of Homeland 5900 Capital Gateway Camp Springs, MD RE: Department of Homeland Security, Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H–1B Petitions, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS Docket No.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted electronically via </em><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b</em></a></p>
<p>Business and Foreign Workers Division<br />
Office of Policy and Strategy, USCIS<br />
U.S. Department of Homeland Security<br />
5900 Capital Gateway Drive<br />
Camp Springs, MD 20746</p>
<p>RE: Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H–1B</em></a><em> Petitions</em>, Notice of proposed rulemaking, CIS Docket No. 2820-25, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0040, RIN: 1615-AD01</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank established in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers—regardless of immigration status—and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals. EPI submits these comments to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its subagency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), in response to their Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) regarding the visa allocation process for H-1B visas. The proposed rule takes the current equal weighting random allocation process —often referred to as the H-1B “lottery”— for visas when more petitions than the number of visas available are filed when the application window opens, and modifies it to allocate H-1B visas to employers based on a weighted selection process that would generally favor the allocation of H-1B visas to higher skilled and higher paid applicants.</p>
<p>EPI has researched, written, and commented extensively on the U.S. system for labor migration, including in particular the H-1B program and other temporary work visa programs. EPI published a lengthy piece of research detailing the need to improve the way the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) sets the H-1B wage levels,<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> which we coauthored and have annexed to this comment as a separate PDF file. The report, however, did not address the flawed manner in which H-1B visas are allocated; a problem that goes hand-in-hand with H-1B prevailing wage levels that have been set artificially low for many years.</p>
<p>In 2016, President Donald Trump campaigned on reforming the H-1B program and immediately promised to do so after becoming president-elect. Yet virtually no substantive action was taken until just weeks before the 2020 election. At that time, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) and USCIS/DHS issued three rules, a DOL Interim Final Rule (IFR) updating the H-1B prevailing wage levels,<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> a USCIS IFR modifying the definition of H-1B “specialty occupation,”<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> and an NPRM, on the H-1B allocation process by lottery.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> While DHS and DOL have the requisite legal authority to make these regulatory changes, the timing and process of their issuance made them susceptible to procedural legal challenges. On December 1, 2020, a federal court in California struck down both the DOL prevailing wage IFR and USCIS IFR.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> During his 2020 campaign, President Biden’s immigration plan stated he would “reform temporary visas to establish a wage-based allocation process and establish enforcement mechanisms to ensure they are aligned with the labor market and not used to undermine wages,”<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> but the Biden administration never took any steps to propose an updated allocation scheme for H-1B visas to implement that campaign promise.</p>
<p>EPI generally supports the main substance of this NPRM and believes it improves the current allocation process for H-1B visas, which is random and susceptible to companies that have learned how to “game the system” to unfairly obtain large numbers of H-1B visas at the expense of other companies seeking to hire H-1B workers. We do not believe that it is the best method for allocating visas because high shares of petitions will still be awarded to firms paying their H-1B workers at below-median wage rates, but it is reasonable and preferable to the status quo. If the NPRM or final rule issued pursuant to this NPRM is challenged in court based on DHS’s interpretation of the statute that establishes how H-1B visas are allocated, then DHS should consider alternate methods to achieve the same goal of allocating visas by wage levels. These comments will suggest one alternative way to do it.</p>
<p>This proposed rule will incentivize H-1B employers to pay their migrant worker employees at fairer wage rates that are commensurate with local U.S. wage standards and result in rewarding employers that recruit and hire higher-skilled workers and pay higher salaries with additional visas and workers. That in turn will improve the program by reducing the number of H-1B workers who are underpaid according to U.S. wage standards—but without reducing the overall number H-1B visas that are issued—and will also better protect the wages of similarly situated U.S. workers. The proposed rule will also increase the overall skill mix and quality of the pool of H-1B workers, thereby boosting the impact of the H-1B program on the U.S. economy. As a result, the proposed rule helps address a major critique EPI has long held about the program—that it is exploited by firms that use it to <em>legally</em> undercut U.S. wage standards—and which Members of Congress from both major parties have attempted to address through proposed bipartisan legislation to reform H-1B, which includes a preference allocation system for H-1B visas, one that is more detailed and includes additional factors based on other policy priorities, unlike the one in the proposed rule based on a weighting of wage levels).<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a></p>
<p>It must also be noted at the outset of these comments that actions taken both recently and in 2020 by federal agencies with respect to wages for migrant workers in temporary work visa programs have been inconsistent and confusing. While DOL took action with its 2020 proposal and IFR that—if it had not been struck down—would have raised wage rates for underpaid migrant workers in the H-1B, H-1B1, and E-3 visa programs, DOL almost simultaneously issued a new wage rule for the H-2A program that would have cut wages for the migrant farmworkers in that program.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> DOL has now in 2025 again issued another rule for H-2A visas that will drastically cut the wages of farmworkers and lead to billions of dollars in wages being transferred from poor farmworkers to farm owners and operators, and lead to reduced opportunities for U.S. farmworkers, including the 30% of farmworkers who are U.S.-born citizens.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> This is troubling and misguided, especially considering that DHS at the end of the first Trump administration had determined that farmworkers were part of the U.S.’s critical infrastructure workforce, and the Department of State has designated H-2A workers as “a national security priority”—because of their contribution to stabilizing the food supply chain during the Coronavirus pandemic.</p>
<p>Both DHS and DOL should issue regulations that lead to improved labor standards and higher wages for all work visa programs, and not treat workers differently based on their education levels, occupations, and nationalities. All temporary migrant workers deserve to be paid fairly for their labor and no work visa programs should operate essentially as employment law loopholes that permit employers to legally underpay migrant workers.</p>
<p><em>The first major section of these comments addresses the flaws in the current H-1B program, and the second section specifically addresses elements of the NPRM.</em></p>
<h2><strong>The H-1B program is an important avenue for attracting skilled, talented workers from abroad—but is deeply flawed and in desperate need of reform</strong></h2>
<p>The H-1B program provides temporary, nonimmigrant U.S. work visas for college-educated workers and fashion models from abroad. While no one can deny the importance of attracting skilled, talented workers to the United States, the reality is that some of the biggest beneficiaries&nbsp;of the H-1B program&nbsp;are outsourcing companies that have hijacked the system—using it to pay low wages, replace thousands of U.S. workers with much-lower-paid H-1B workers, and to send decent-paying technology jobs abroad.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a>&nbsp;Outsourcing companies, however, are not the only abusers of the system: The vast majority of employers who use H-1B visas are legally allowed to pay their H-1B workers at wage levels below the local median wage for the occupation.</p>
<p>The major structural, programmatic flaws in H-1B are the following:</p>
<h3><strong><em>U.S. employers do not have to recruit U.S. workers before hiring H-1B workers</em></strong></h3>
<p>Employers and corporate lobby groups claim that they use the H-1B primarily to bring in the “best and brightest” workers from abroad to fill labor shortages when they can’t find willing and available U.S. workers, especially in science, technology, engineering, and math fields (STEM), but the reality is that:</p>
<ul>
<li>Under current law, employers are not required to recruit and hire U.S. workers or prove they are experiencing a labor shortage before hiring H-1B workers.</li>
<li>“H-1B-dependent” employers—those filling 15% or more of their U.S. jobs with H-1B workers—are required to recruit U.S. workers first, but they all get around the requirement by exploiting a cheap and easy loophole: they can hire an H-1B worker without recruiting U.S. workers if the H-1B worker holds a master’s degree or receives an annual salary of over $60,000.
<ul>
<li>For comparison, $60,000 per year is $56,810&nbsp;<em>less</em>&nbsp;than the national average wage for all workers employed in computer occupations.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> Analysis of the FY 2024 DOL Labor Condition Application disclosure data shows that employers exempt themselves from recruiting U.S. workers for effectively all of H-1B positions (over 99%).<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong><em>U.S. employers can legally underpay H-1B workers</em></strong></h3>
<p>For years, corporate lobbyists and other H-1B proponents have claimed that H-1B workers cannot be paid less than U.S. workers because employers must pay H-1B workers no less than the “prevailing wage.” That is true only as a tautology. The reality is:</p>
<ul>
<li>Employers have the option of paying the prevailing Level 1 “entry-level” wage or Level 2 wage, which are between 20-40% less than the local median wage (Level 3) that employers pay workers in the occupation in the local region.</li>
<li>As DHS notes in Table 12 of this draft rule, the five-year average of cap-subject beneficiaries who were paid at the two lowest wage levels—both of which are set below the local median wage—was 83% for fiscal years 2020-2024.</li>
<li>While the wage level is supposed to correspond to the H-1B worker’s education and experience, in practice the employer gets to choose the wage level and the government doesn’t verify whether the two reasonably correspond to each other.</li>
</ul>
<h3><strong><em>H-1B workers are often exploited and some arrive to the United States in debt after paying hefty recruitment fees</em></strong></h3>
<p>H-1B workers sometimes pay hefty fees to labor recruiters, which means that many arrive virtually indentured to their employer, fearing retaliation and termination if they speak out about workplace abuses or unpaid wages. And widespread abuses have been documented—even human trafficking and severe financial bondage.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<h3><strong><em>H-1B workers do not have sufficient job mobility between employers</em></strong></h3>
<p>The H-1B visa itself is owned and controlled by the employer; an H-1B worker who is fired or laid off for any reason becomes deportable unless they can find new employment within 60 days. This arrangement results in a form of&nbsp;indentured servitude.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> During waves of mass layoffs in the tech industry, numerous stories have been publicly reported about the precarious situations and impossible choices that thousands of H-1B workers are left to face.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> Thus, H-1B workers have good reason to fear retaliation and deportation if they speak up about wage theft, workplace abuses, or other working conditions like substandard health and safety procedures on the job. While H-1B workers have the ability to switch jobs if they can find another employer willing to petition for a new visa for them (sometimes referred to as “portability”), and have 60 days to find a new employer if they are fired, these avenues are not straightforward enough and inadequate to mitigate the power that employers have over the right of their H-1B workers to remain employed in the United States.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> These protections should be improved.</p>
<h3><strong><em>H-1B workers are not allowed to self-petition for lawful permanent residence</em></strong></h3>
<p>The ability of H-1B workers to become lawful permanent residents and remain in the United States is entirely at the whim of their employers. Even after working for an employer for six years in H-1B status, the employer has the power to decide if an H-1B worker can remain in the country—in many cases after an H-1B worker has established firm roots in the United States. That power keeps H-1B workers from complaining and asserting their employment rights. To remedy this wrong, H-1B workers should be allowed to petition on their own for permanent residence after a short provisional period—no longer than 18 months—and independent from their employer.</p>
<h3><strong><em>Outsourcing companies are using the H-1B program to underpay H-1B workers, replace U.S. workers, and send tech jobs abroad</em></strong></h3>
<p>As we have documented in the annexed report and numerous other commentaries and testimonies, roughly half of the top 30 employers of H-1B workers in most years are not innovative high-tech firms like Apple and Google.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> Some of the biggest users of the H-1B visa are staffing firms that specialize in information technology (IT) and accounting and that pay H-1B workers the lowest wages legally allowed, and outsource their H-1B employees to third-party firms. Some of those firms also have a business model dependent on sending jobs offshore where labor costs are lower.</p>
<p>Typically in this scenario, H-1B workers do computer and engineering work at the office of a U.S. employer but are employed by an outsourcing company, some of which are based abroad or have major operations abroad.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> The many reported cases of U.S. workers being laid off and replaced by H-1B workers have all been facilitated by this arrangement. In multiple incidents, the H-1B workers have been hired with annual wages&nbsp;of around $30,000 to $40,000 less than the workers they have replaced. Before they are laid off, the U.S. workers are often forced to train their own H-1B replacements as a condition of their severance packages; this is euphemistically known as “knowledge transfer.” Major, profitable U.S. employers like Disney and Toys “R” Us—as well as public employers and institutions like the University of California and regulated utilities like Southern California Edison and Northeast Utilities—have laid off thousands of U.S. workers who were forced to train their own replacements. Eventually, many of the outsourced jobs that are filled by H-1B workers get moved offshore.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<p>Contrary to the popular narrative proffered by corporations that support expanding and deregulating the H-1B visa program—the staffing firms that use H-1B visas are not using them to keep technology jobs in the United States—instead they are using them precisely to facilitate the offshoring of as many of those jobs as they can. That is in fact, the business model of those firms. News reports, including from <em>Bloomberg</em> and the <em>New York Times</em>, have shown that outsourcing companies “game the system” in order to obtain a high share of H-1B visas, which leaves fewer available for the firms that directly employ H-1B workers.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></p>
<h3><strong><em>Allowing outsourcing companies to hire H-1B workers lets employers utilize the immigration system to degrade labor standards for skilled workers—as a result, they should be barred from obtaining H-1B visas</em></strong></h3>
<p>The outsourcing/staffing model of employment generally may increase the incidence of employment law violations by separating the main beneficiary of the labor provided by H-1B workers—the third-party firm that hires the outsourcing firm, i.e. the “lead” employer—from the H-1B workers who perform the work. Firms that rely on outsourced H-1B workers are a textbook (if extreme) example of what former DOL Wage and Hour administrator David Weil calls a “fissured” workplace, where the relationship between the worker and the lead employer is fissured, or broken, via the use of a temp agency or subcontractor<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> (in this case the H-1B outsourcing firm). Research shows that fissuring leads to a wage penalty for workers who are subcontracted, employed as temps, and work for staffing firms,<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> in part because the subcontractor keeps a percentage of the wages earned by the workers. It is also common knowledge that employers use this model to avoid paying for benefits like health care, retirement funds, and to avoid liability for labor violations. Because the staffing and outsourcing model contributes to the fissuring of the labor market, it should not be allowed as part of the U.S. immigration system—not in H-1B or in any other temporary or permanent immigration programs.</p>
<h2>Analysis of the NPRM, “Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking to File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions”: Updating the H-1B lottery</h2>
<p>We now turn to the NPRM, which proposes to update the random lottery allocation system for cap-subject H-1B petitions. The H-1B statute at 8 USC §1184(g)(3) requires that H-1B visas or statuses “be issued … in the order in which petitions are filed for such visas or status.” However, the practical realities of the H-1B annual numerical limit or “cap” and the way that USCIS receives petitions for H-1B visas, renders this impossible to implement in practice—leaving USCIS little choice other than to propose a rational alternative that is consistent with the broader goals and intent of the H-1B statute.</p>
<h3><strong><em>There is no feasible way for USCIS to meet the statutory requirement of allocating H-1B visas “in the order in which petitions are filed.”</em></strong></h3>
<p>At present, when demand for H-1B visas immediately exceeds the annual limit of 65,000 for cap-subject petitions and annual limit of 20,000 visas reserved for foreign graduates of U.S. universities who have obtained at least a master’s degree—USCIS allocates the visas by a random lottery where each petition has an equal chance of being approved, regardless of occupation, region, or that salary that will be paid to the H-1B worker. This process is utilized because, since fiscal year 2014, USCIS has received far more H-1B petitions that are subject to the annual cap in the first five days of the eighteen-month application window, than the 85,000 available slots for that fiscal year. Since so many petitions are submitted to USCIS nearly simultaneously, it is impossible for USCIS to determine the order in which the petitions were filed, a necessary prerequisite to adequately comply with the H-1B statute’s requirement that H-1B visas or statuses be allocated to employers “in the order in which [those] petitions [were] filed for such visas or status.” Therefore, USCIS allocates them at random via an electronic lottery, which appears to be a choice of convenience and not a well-reasoned response to a phenomenon unanticipated by the statute. The process has been in place since FY 2008.</p>
<p>However, considering the ambiguity of 8 USC §1184(g)(3) and the fact that the letter of the statute cannot be adhered to in practical terms, other interpretations about how to allocate H-1B visas can be equally reasonable so long as they are consistent with the intent of the H-1B statute.</p>
<h3><strong><em>The prevailing wage and its enforcement is the most important protection for labor standards in the H-1B program</em></strong></h3>
<p>DHS should measure the merits of any allocation scheme based on how well it advances the administrative efforts to meet the H-1B program’s intent, “to help employers who cannot otherwise obtain needed business skills and abilities from the U.S. workforce.”<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> As we’ve described above, and elsewhere, one of the most effective ways for the H-1B program to meet this intent is to employ a labor market test that includes good faith recruitment from the U.S. domestic supply and a requirement that employers hire qualified applicants before an H-1B application is approved. Absent a labor market test, under current law, DHS and other agencies involved in H-1B governance, DOL, the State Department, and the Department of Justice (DOJ), should craft rules to move the program closer to fulfilling its intent.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The current allocation scheme, based on a random lottery, undermines the government&#8217;s efforts to fulfill the program’s intent. Replacing it with a better scheme, as proposed by the NPRM, would improve program outcomes: better addressing labor shortages and increasing the overall skills of the H-1B worker population.</p>
<p>As DHS drafts its final rule, the agency should consider and rank alternate allocation schemes based on how well their outcomes meet the program’s purpose. Allocation schemes that do a better job at filling pressing labor shortages should be ranked higher. Since there is no direct way to measure the severity of labor shortages, proxy measures must be used. The best proxy for this purpose is the migrant worker’s wage premium compared to comparable U.S. workers. The larger the wage premium, the more likely it is that the migrant worker brings specialized skills that cannot otherwise be obtained from the U.S. workforce. Migrant workers earning larger premiums are more likely to complement, rather than compete with, U.S. workers.</p>
<p>The prevailing wage is the most important worker protection in the H-1B program and its effective administration is essential. The H-1B program laws and rules specify that the prevailing wage for each position is calculated using three attributes: (1) <em>occupational classification</em>; (2) <em>worksite geography</em>; and (3) <em>level</em>. The employer selects these three variables based on the position description they are trying to fill, not the actual worker’s skills. In virtually all Labor Condition Application (LCA) filings, employers use the Office of Foreign Labor Certification (OFLC) Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) data or a private wage survey to determine the position’s prevailing wage, rather than requesting that one be provided by the National Prevailing Wage Center, as employers are permitted to do.</p>
<p>Allowing employers to interpret the key factors that determine the prevailing wage introduces errors. First, employers interpret the occupation and level differently, even in cases when they position is the same. Further, granting employers substantial front-end discretion over choices when they have significant conflicts of interest invites widespread non-compliance, which can only be remedied through strong back-end enforcement. But the government’s back-end enforcement has been nonexistent. DHS’ worksite visits and Requests for Evidence may have improved compliance with (2) worksite geography. However, no government agency ever ensures that the employer’s choice of (1) occupational classification and (3) level, accurately reflects the position being filled, or the H-1B worker’s actual activities in the position. Any employer that misclassifies the occupation or level, or both, significantly undermines program integrity, regardless of whether the misclassification is intentional or inadvertent. Public disclosure data indicate that some employers are likely exploiting these vulnerabilities on a mass scale, stealing wages from H-1B and U.S. workers alike.</p>
<p>Examples from existing H-1B data demonstrate the failure of the government’s prevailing wage regulations in achieving their raison d’être, which is protecting workers, labor standards, and the integrity of the labor market.</p>
<p>Take this first example which comes from one of Microsoft’s H-1B employees, which can be found at DOL LCA Case Number I-200-23087-882196, and which was selected and approved by USCIS for an H-1B visa in the FY 2024 lottery.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a></p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-313366 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313366" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313366-35337-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Microsoft, one of the top ten H-1B employers, placed a 35-year-old worker with a doctorate degree into a position it classified at Wage Level 1. Based on their age, the H-1B visa recipient likely has at least 7 years of experience in addition to holding a doctoral degree. Yet, they are filling an entry-level position, one that, according to DOL’s prevailing wage guidance, would be appropriate for an “internship” or a “worker in training.”<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> This appears to be an example of wage-level misclassification that can only be remedied through tighter rules and stronger enforcement.</p>
<p>The second example is for one of Deloitte’s H-1B positions, which can be found at DOL LCA Case Number I-200-23258-349652, which was certified by DOL in FY 2023.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a></p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-313373 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313373" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313373-35339-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Deloitte Consulting, another one of the top ten H-1B employers, classified its <em>Senior Consultant</em> job in Philadelphia as an entry-level position, one that, according to DOL’s prevailing wage guidance, would be appropriate for an “internship” or a “worker in training.” Classifying a Senior Consultant at Wage Level I directly conflicts with DOL guidance that states that job titles with “‘senior’ (e.g., senior programmer)” should be classified at Wage Level III. Yet, the DOL certified the LCA despite the employer’s apparent wage-level misclassification.</p>
<p>The Deloitte case also highlights problems with the wage surveys used to source prevailing wages. In this case, the corresponding prevailing wage for Standard Occupational Code (SOC) 15-1299.08 (Computer Systems Engineers/Architects) is extremely low by any benchmark. The National Association of Colleges and Employers (NACE), a professional association of university-based career services officers and business campus recruiters, conducts regular wage surveys of recent bachelor’s degree graduates across the country. For the class of 2024, the average starting salary for computer and information sciences majors was $88,907.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> The DOL H-1B prevailing wage of $61,838 is $27,000 less, offering Deloitte a 30% discount over the market rate for recent graduates.</p>
<p>This demonstrates how lax DOL oversight and guidance on employers&#8217; occupational code choices can lead to market distortions. Had Deloitte selected SOC 15-1252, Software Developers, which has a similar occupational profile, the prevailing wage rate it would have been required to pay was 30% higher.</p>
<p>Given these operational realities, DOL and DHS should make it a priority to implement a comprehensive back-end compliance system that includes random audits, to validate that the occupation and prevailing wage level accurately match the H-1B worker’s actual activities in the position. Given DOL’s expertise in labor standards enforcement and occupational duties, and the Wage and Hour Division’s (WHD) primary role in enforcing the promises made by employers on LCAs, DOL should take the lead on such compliance efforts, with DHS possibly partnering in support of DOL. Any enforcement of prevailing wage levels, including random audits, will require additional funding and staffing for DOL. As a result, the administration should make a request to Congress for new funds to hire additional WHD investigators. (A recent report shows that the number of WHD investigators is at 611, an all-time low,<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> likely due in part to the administration’s funding and staffing cuts at DOL.)</p>
<p>Accurately identifying prevailing wages is also critical to ensuring the effectiveness of the allocation scheme. The government has recently announced significant efforts, such as the forthcoming DOL proposed rule to update prevailing wage levels, as well as Project Firewall, an enforcement initiative, to improve program integrity. While we believe such initiatives may be a positive step, they remain only aspirational—and may be difficult to implement given significant DOL funding and staffing cuts, and we worry about DOL following through, given DOL’s actions on other fronts that we are critical of—thus our analysis is based on the current state of program implementation.</p>
<h3><strong><em>A successful H-1B allocation scheme depends on accurately identifying and labeling prevailing wage levels and occupations</em></strong></h3>
<p>The key factor for the allocation scheme is determining the foreign worker’s wage premium, which is calculated as the difference between the H-1B worker’s wage and that of a similarly situated U.S. worker. Identifying the H-1B wage is straightforward since the proposed rule requires employers to submit the proffered wage in their electronic registration, rather than just the wage level selected at the LCA level. The imprecision of the employer’s choice of both occupation and level makes benchmarking against similar U.S. workers problematic since the agency cannot ensure they are, in fact, similar.</p>
<p>The proposed rule requires employers to map their proffered wage to a wage level based on the SOC and geography. This step eliminates the most problematic element in the prevailing wage process, i.e. the employer&#8217;s interpretation of the position’s level. However, the employer’s interpretation of the occupation and the possibility of its misclassification remain problematic. The interpretation of occupations is non-standard, and different firms would likely map the same exact position to various occupations. For example, firms may interchange a relatively low wage six-digit level occupation, such as 15-1211 Computer Systems Analysts, which at the national level has a Level III wage of $103,790, with the higher wage of 15-1252 Software Developers, which has a Level III wage of $133,080 at the national level.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> An employer paying an H-1B worker $104,000 would be Wage Level III if they select the position of Computer Systems Analyst, but Level I if they identified the position as Software Developer.</p>
<p>The agency can mitigate the adverse effects of occupational misclassification on the proposed allocation scheme by having employers use a four-digit, instead of a six-digit, SOC to identify the wage level for registration purposes. Employers would select the six-digit occupation with the highest median wage within its four-digit SOC family, and then map their proffered wage to the corresponding wage level. For example, applications with any computer occupation (15-12XX) would map their wage levels to 15-1221, Computer and Information Research Scientists. Correcting occupational misclassification this way is analogous to the proposed rule’s handling of multiple worksite locations to, “prevent gaming of the weighted selection process…”<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a></p>
<h3><strong><em>Using a wage level prioritization allocation for H-1B visas is reasonable and consistent with the H-1B statute, and it should be the preferred method for allocation</em></strong></h3>
<p>The program statute states that the visa is open to any “specialty occupation” and that prevailing wages should be adjusted based on “the occupational classification in the area of employment.”<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a> Congress wrote this language in recognition that the wage structures of occupations vary, e.g., accountants are typically paid lower wages than software developers, and that the cost of living varies across geographies, e.g., the California Bay Area has a much higher cost of living than Cleveland, Ohio. The allocation scheme should favor registrations that offer the highest wage <em>premium</em>—as compared to the highest wage amount—measured after controlling for occupation and geography.</p>
<p>USCIS’s proposed rule in 2020 and final rule in 2021 would have achieved this by allocating H-1B petitions first to employers who file petitions that pay Level 4 wages—the highest H-1B wage level—and then to petitions with the lower wage levels in descending order (Level 3, Level 2, and then Level 1).<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> Since higher wages are a valid proxy for higher skills in this context,<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> the proposed allocation system by wage levels would have resulted in the highest-skilled and best paid applicants with in an occupation being selected for H-1B petitions from the available annual pool of petitions. In fact, this formulation continues to be our preferred allocation scheme for H-1B petitions, although we would modify it to include the requirements from the current NPRM that employers list the proffered wage level on their registration filing that would then be mapped to the appropriate wage level, and when a position is located in multiple geographic locations, using the lowest wage level among the locations as the proffered wage. Had it gone into effect, the rule would have resulted in the selected H-1B workers being paid at higher wage levels, and those higher wages would have helped safeguard U.S. wage standards in major H-1B occupations like information technology and other computer occupations. This is essential given that workers in those occupations have seen virtually no real wage growth since the late 1990s.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Wage levels are an appropriate proxy for skill since they account for wage variations by geographic location (higher versus lower cost areas) and occupation.</p>
<p>The statutory language at 8 USC §1184(g)(3) is ambiguous and silent as to how visas should be allocated if they cannot be issued in the order that they were filed, and it offers no additional insight into what Congress meant by “filed.” The filing of an H-1B petition is the most reasonable explanation of what “filed” means, but since allocating H-1B visas in the exact order in which they were filed is rendered impracticable by virtue hundreds of thousands of petitions being submitted in one day or over the course of a few days, creating an allocation scheme based on wage levels is more reasonable than creating a random lottery. In addition, a wage level-based allocation scheme is reasonable because it is consistent with the intent of the H-1B visa statute, which is to provide “American businesses” with “highly skilled, specially trained personnel to fill increasingly sophisticated jobs <em>for which domestic personnel cannot be found</em>”<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a> (emphasis added). Since employers are not required to test the labor market for available U.S. workers before hiring H-1B workers (as discussed in section I), prioritizing higher-skilled, higher-paid H-1B workers also ensures that the employers facing a true shortage of talent—as indicated by the higher wage levels they are willing to pay—have a better chance at obtaining an H-1B visa, which also furthers the goals set out in the statute.</p>
<h3><strong><em>The proposed weighted lottery is reasonable and an improvement from the status quo but will not achieve an ideal outcome</em></strong></h3>
<p>With all of that being said, including our preferred proposal for an allocation scheme discussed in the preceding section, we nevertheless generally support DHS’s proposed weighted allocation scheme because it is reasonable and a measurable improvement over the current scheme in meeting the H-1B program’s intent. It will shift the total number of H-1B petitions that are selected where employers will be required to pay wage rates that are higher than the local median wage for the occupation (i.e., Level 3 and Level 4 wages).</p>
<p>Under the current random allocation scheme, DHS shows in Table 13 of the NPRM that petitions at every wage level have a 29.59% probability of being selected. However, given that so many more petitions have wages promising to pay Level 1 and Level 2 wages, the random lottery results in an outcome where 83% of H-1B beneficiaries selected are at Level 1 and Level 2, as shown in Table 12, with only 17% selected at Level 3 or 4. DHS notes that moving to a weighted lottery would result in the probability of the wage levels being selected shifting towards an increasing the likelihood that petitions at Level 3 and Level 4 are selected: “15.29 percent [probability] for level [1], 30.58 percent for level [2], 45.87 percent for level [3], and 61.16 percent for level [4].”<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a></p>
<p>Assigning greater weight to petitions at Level 3 and Level 4 will bring implementation of the H-1B program closer to the intent of the original statute, while still retaining a high degree of randomness and permitting significant numbers of petitions at Level 1 and Level 2 to be selected. An allocation process that uses wage <em>levels</em>, rather than a prioritization scheme that uses individual salary levels, will also likely result in H-1B petitions being allocated among a broad mix of occupations and regions, which we believe is a preferred outcome—while also prioritizing petitions for the most highly-skilled workers in each of the occupations.</p>
<p>However, we believe DHS should consider and model other alternatives to H-1B petition allocation that they believe are reasonable, lawful, and help align the H-1B program with the intent and goals of the statute. Other allocation methodologies have also been proposed publicly by advocates; we would welcome discussion, modeling, and analysis of those proposals by DHS.</p>
<p>But given the information that we have available to us now, as noted in the preceding section, we believe that the wage level prioritization in DHS’s proposed rule in 2020 and final rule in 2021 would be preferable. By first allocating H-1B petitions to employers who file petitions that pay Level 4 wages and then to petitions with the lower wage levels in descending order, the result would be that the highest-skilled and best paid applicants within an occupation would be selected for H-1B petitions.</p>
<h3><strong><em>Proposals for a prioritization scheme based solely on compensation levels will favor a small number of occupations and regions, and should be rejected</em></strong></h3>
<p>Some advocates have called for an H-1B allocation proposal that ranks petitions by actual salary level—rather than a wage level that accounts for skill, occupation, and geography—with the latest being published in September 2025 by the Institute for Policy.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> The author of the proposal, Jeremy Neufeld, argues that DHS’s weighted lottery will result in IT outsourcing firms gaining 8% more H-1B visas, that F-1 visa graduates would receive 7% fewer visas, and that the H-1B median salary would increase by just 3%.</p>
<p>Given our understanding of Neufeld’s proposal and modeling, his analysis does not exactly match DHS’s current proposal, calling into question his results. Neufeld appears to have utilized the wage levels selected by employers at the LCA level—rather than what DHS proposes—which is to take the “proffered” wage; i.e. the actual salary that the employer intends to pay the beneficiary—and use that to determine the appropriate wage level listed on the registration that will be weighted, according to the OEWS wage levels for the occupation and region. We know from our own reviews of H-1B LCA and petition data that in many cases the <em>actual salary proffered</em> by employers would correspond to a higher <em>wage level</em> according to OEWS wage levels by occupation and region. (In other words, an employer may select Level 2 but pay a wage that actually corresponds to Level 3 or 4.) Why this occurs reveals how the administrative process is flawed, but the fact remains that any modeling of DHS’s weighted lottery would require mapping proffered wages to wage levels to achieve a reliable result.</p>
<p>We believe that Neufeld’s proposal based on actual salary levels would have certain consequences, not all of which are accounted for in his September 2025 publication or an earlier publication that discusses multiple proposals for an H-1B allocation scheme, including one based solely on “compensation ranking.”<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> In that report, Neufeld concedes that a compensation-based ranking of petitions would result in more H-1B petitions being awarded to employers in higher-cost regions of the United States. Those regions would mostly include the urban areas on both coasts of the United States, where the cost of living is higher.</p>
<p>The goal of the H-1B program is to fill labor shortages. Occupational shortages/surpluses are not measured by absolute wages, and a high absolute wage for a specific occupation is not a reliable indicator of a labor shortage. Instead, as a 2001 <a href="https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/9830/building-a-workforce-for-the-information-economy">National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine study</a> explains, shortages are observable: “When demand exceeds supply in a particular occupation, compensation tends to <em>rise</em> <em>relative</em> to compensation in other occupations that require similar education, effort, and working conditions” (emphasis added).<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a></p>
<p>In his analysis, Neufeld does not state explicitly that a larger share of H-1B petitions would go to certain occupations. We believe those are most likely to be computer and engineering occupations, which will crowd out petitions for H-1B workers who would be employed in occupations like teachers, attorneys, accountants, and doctors (especially doctors employed in rural areas). In other words, a compensation-based ranking would mostly benefit technology companies like Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Meta, that employ H-1B workers in computer occupations who reside on the coasts of the United States.</p>
<p>Ample evidence shows that computer occupations are not experiencing a labor shortage, so prioritizing their allocation would undermine rather than advance the H-1B program’s goals. Wage growth for computer occupations has been stagnant, technology firms have been laying off skilled software employees by the tens of thousands, and recent U.S. computer science graduates are facing the worst job market in a generation, with record levels of unemployment and underemployment, just as U.S. computer science students earn degrees in their highest numbers.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> The latter fact is especially salient since the vast majority of H-1B approvals, 83% according to Table 12 in the NPRM, are for Level 1 and 2 positions, the very jobs that the large surplus of computer scientists in the U.S. should fill. Neufeld’s proposed scheme would prioritize computer occupations—the very job market experiencing a labor surplus rather than a shortage.</p>
<p>Neufeld proposes accounting for the geographical outcome by “adjusting for regional price parity can address geographic heterogeneity without significantly reducing the economic benefits of compensation-based ranking,” and further suggests that DHS make age adjustments, because compensation-based ranking “may not account for the full future potential and lifetime contributions of younger workers who start at lower salaries but have high growth potential.” The age adjustment proposal is not expounded on further, so we are not sure how it would operate in practice.</p>
<p>We have two reactions to this. First, we believe that an allocation scheme solely based on compensation would be clearly inconsistent with the H-1B statute on its face, and thus require Congressional action (as opposed to a weighted or wage level lottery that can be implemented by DHS regulation). The H-1B statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(II) clearly states that the H-1B prevailing wage should take into consideration “the occupational classification in the area of employment,” unless it is based on a wage that is already being paid to an employer’s similarly situated U.S. (non-H-1B) employee. Using wage levels that reflect occupation and region are clearly consistent with the statute, and thus more likely to be upheld if challenged in court. A compensation-based ranking scheme reflects neither, and while Neufeld attempts to account for the “area of employment” language in the statute with a suggestion of “adjusting for regional price parity,” he does not explain how that would work in practice—and in any case, it would likely insert an additional and unnecessary layer of complexity to the H-1B registration and allocation process.</p>
<p>Second, we believe that an H-1B program that permits a broader range of occupations is preferable, rather than one that mostly awards H-1B petitions to tech companies. Employers in various industries need a viable pathway to hire skilled talent from abroad and should thus not be closed off from the U.S.’s main visa program that could allow them to do so. We believe that all occupations and contributions of workers have value—and that the H-1B program was designed to permit employers to hire the most skilled and talented workers within a broad range of occupations and industries—not simply as a “computer visa” that almost exclusively benefits tech and information technology companies.</p>
<h3><strong><em>Early career foreign graduates of U.S. universities should have a pathway to employment in the United States that leads directly to a green card</em></strong></h3>
<p>Numerous other commenters, including Neufeld, raise the concern about wage-level-based allocation schemes crowding out younger and early career migrant workers who are just starting their careers. We agree that skilled and talented younger and early career workers, including many of those who graduate from top U.S. universities, deserve a pathway to employment in the United States. However, the H-1B program was created to help employers fill labor shortages with skilled workers, not as an early career development program for foreign students that leaves them in an indentured status for years, if not decades.</p>
<p>There are better proposals that would allow employers to recruit and hire foreign graduates of U.S. universities, including the Keep STEM Talent Act, which would put foreign students on a direct path to a green card if they have a job offer from a U.S. employer that pays the local median wage.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a> Nevertheless, early-career workers are not excluded from the H-1B program and would have a legitimate opportunity for an H-1B visa under the weighted allocation, even if they were paid a Level 1 or Level 2 wage. Many early career graduates who are presently paid at Level 1 and Level 2 wages, especially those with advanced degrees, should be offered Level 3 and Level 4 wages, which would make them even more likely to be selected through a weighted allocation scheme. And employers who are currently underpaying their H-1B employees may also change their behavior and offer higher wages to increase their chances in the weighted lottery.</p>
<p>It should also be noted that advocates for more H-1B petitions being approved at below-median wage levels ignore current employment realities, wherein recent college graduates in computer occupations are experiencing unemployment rates that are “more than double the unemployment rate among recent biology and art history graduates, which is just 3 percent,” as the <em>NY Times</em> recently reported. The <em>Times</em> cited statistics from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York—noting that “[a]mong college graduates ages 22 to 27, computer science and computer engineering majors are facing some of the highest unemployment rates, 6.1 percent and 7.5 percent respectively”<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a>—and pointed to examples of skilled graduates applying to hundreds of jobs with little luck. Entry-level H-1B jobs at wage levels 1 and 2 are exactly the types of opportunities that should be available first to U.S. workers, including both U.S.-born citizens and permanent immigrants with green cards. Yet, the H-1B program undermines their opportunities by allowing employers to underpay temporary migrant workers with a precarious immigration status that employers can exert an extraordinary level of control over.</p>
<h3><strong><em>The H-1B random lottery benefits outsourcing companies that pay low wages and game the system, making it more difficult for start-up and direct-hire firms to hire H-1B workers</em></strong></h3>
<p>The current random lottery allocation may give each petition equal odds, but it does not give each firm equal odds. The main beneficiaries of the current random lottery allocation process have been H-1B employers that are staffing firms, which are more likely to pay H-1B workers at the lowest wage rates.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> The H-1B staffing firms use an outsourcing model to send their H-1B employers to third-party worksites, and earn their profits by undercutting local wage rates for college-educated workers. These companies, as Bloomberg and the <em>New York Times</em> reported, “have obtained many thousands of the visas — which are limited to 85,000 a year — by learning to game the H-1B system without breaking the rules.”<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> The “system” the <em>Times</em> is referring to here is the H-1B random lottery.</p>
<p>Real-world scenarios illustrate how the random lottery has favored outsourcing firms over those seeking truly skilled workers. The outsourcing firms have most of their workforce in low-cost countries such as India, and employ hundreds of thousands of workers. If an outsourcing firm seeks 1,000 approved H-1B petitions in any fiscal year, it will submit 3,000 petitions on behalf of its workers located in India. Since the odds have been roughly one-in-three, the random lottery rewards the outsourcing firm with the 1,000 approved petitions it sought. Since many of the workers the outsourcing firms seek to hire have relatively lower skills—as evidenced by being assigned wage rates that are almost exclusively at Level 1 and Level 2—they are largely interchangeable workers, and it matters little to the outsourcing firms which specific one thousand workers are selected. Compare this to a start-up firm seeking to hire a specific engineer with a truly special skill set that it is willing to pay a Level 4 wage to obtain; the start-up firm has only a 33% percent chance of winning the lottery. The outsourcing companies, on the other hand, flood the lottery with multiple applications to obtain thousands of visas per year, which crowds out start-up firms and employers with legitimate needs that employ workers directly and pay H-1B workers at higher wage levels.</p>
<p>It&#8217;s important to emphasize that the DHS rule that moved to a beneficiary-centric registration process to reduce lottery abuse perpetrated primarily by small IT staffing companies did nothing to eliminate the abuse described above by outsourcing firms. DHS must enforce the requirement that employers have a bona fide job for the prospective H-1B worker and begin rejecting and revoking petitions in cases where employers maintain large numbers of “travel-ready” and “visa-ready” workers for speculative positions.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a></p>
<h3><strong><em>USCIS should consider alternate approaches in case of a legal challenge.</em></strong></h3>
<p>Some commenters and critics of the proposed H-1B allocation process may contend that the statutory language at 8 USC §1184(g)(3) does not authorize DHS to update the H-1B allocation process by wage level as detailed in the proposed rule, because DHS would no longer be issuing H-1B visas in the order in which the petitions were filed. While we disagree with this assessment as discussed herein, DHS should nevertheless explore alternative methodologies for wage-based allocation that it can propose in a new rulemaking if the proposed rule is the subject of a successful statutory challenge in federal court.</p>
<p>One simple new methodology, for example, could consist of having staggered filing deadlines for petitions by wage levels. 8 USC §1184(g)(3) is silent as to whether there can only be one filing period or whether there can be multiple. Therefore, USCIS could have a first filing period, where only petitions with jobs paying Level 4 are considered. Once all the Level 4 petitions are submitted and approved, then a second filing period at a later date could be set to receive only petitions with jobs paying Level 3 wages. After those are collected and approved, if there are any visas remaining under the H-1B cap, then a filing period for Level 2 wages would be next, and finally a filing period for Level 1. With a process like this, the cap-subject H-1B petitions in a given fiscal year would not all be submitted at once, thereby allowing USCIS to adjudicate and allocate petitions “in the order in which” they were filed, as the statute requires. If there end up being more petitions than available H-1B slots during a filing period for a particular wage level, USCIS could conduct a “mini-lottery” in order to randomly allocate the petitions within that wage level.</p>
<h3><strong><em>Fixing the H-1B program requires improving the H-1B prevailing wage methodology</em></strong></h3>
<p>As we have discussed in this comment, a reasonable and fair H-1B prevailing wage methodology that truly reflects market rates for H-1B occupations is essential to reforming the H-1B program and must exist in tandem with any allocation process that can adequately safeguard wages and working conditions. At present, the H-1B prevailing wage methodology is neither reasonable nor fair.</p>
<p>Section 4 of President Trump’s recent proclamation directs the Secretary of Labor to initiate a rulemaking process to revise the H-1B prevailing wage levels.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> We hope to see DOL’s proposal soon. The current methodology sets H-1B wages based on DOL survey data by occupation and local area, setting them at specified percentile levels in the distribution of surveyed wages in the OEWS, which have ben chosen by DOL. The current wage levels are set at arbitrarily low levels (i.e. percentiles), leading to the vast majority of H-1B workers being paid at wage rates that are below the local median wage for the occupations they fill (as discussed at length in this comment). DOL in 2020 finalized a rule to amend the H-1B prevailing wage levels, but it was blocked in federal court on procedural grounds, and the Biden administration DOL considered proposing its own updated H-1B methodology soon thereafter, even soliciting comments from the public on it, but the Biden DOL ultimately never introduced its own proposed rule.&nbsp;</p>
<p>DOL has the requisite legal authority to attempt again to modify the H-1B prevailing wage levels to appropriate rates that protect U.S. wage standards and prevent adverse effects caused by the H-1B program. For far too long, the H-1B wage levels have been set at an artificially low level that undercuts U.S. wage standards—and we have called on both Republican and Democratic administrations to fix the problem using their executive authority. It is reasonable for DOL to do so now, and we call on DOL to update the prevailing wage levels so that Level 1 is no lower than the local median wage for the occupation, i.e. the current Level 3 wage.</p>
<h3><strong><em>Fixing the H-1B program requires increased and improved labor standards enforcement and adequate funding and staffing at worker protection agencies like DOL</em></strong></h3>
<p>As we have already noted, adequate reform of the H-1B program that improves wages and working conditions for all workers requires robust labor standards enforcement, in particular adequate oversight from the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) at DOL. Unfortunately, the current outlook for labor standards enforcement is bleak.</p>
<p>Federal budgets for the past decade at least have heavily prioritized immigration enforcement over labor standards enforcement, with nearly 14 times as much being appropriated for immigration enforcement ($30.2 billion) as compared to the amount appropriated for labor standards and worker protection agencies ($2.2 billion) in 2023.<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a> The 2025 budget bill passed by Republican legislators through reconciliation has dwarfed this disparity, giving $170 billion to the administration to carry out its immigration enforcement activities, while failing to appropriate even one additional cent to worker protection agencies. This, at a time when worker protection agencies are already underfunded and understaffed.</p>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong> shows that, in inflation-adjusted 2023 dollars, WHD—the primary agency responsible for enforcing the wage promises made by employers in H-1B LCA filings—had a budget in 2006 of $250 million, and in 2023, $260 million—an increase of just $10 million over nearly two decades. As Figure A also shows, this trend has been consistent with appropriations for two other key worker protection agencies, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). At both OSHA and the NLRB, inflation-adjusted appropriations were significantly lower in 2023 compared with 2006.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-313364 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313364" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313364-35336-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In addition to funding levels that have barely kept up with inflation at WHD—the primary agency tasked with protecting labor standards in the H-1B program—the number of WHD investigators that the agency employs is at an all-time low. Those investigators are also primarily responsible for ensuring that federal wage and hour laws are obeyed by employers across all 50 states and U.S. territories, and protecting the roughly 170 million workers in the U.S. labor market. <strong>Figure B</strong> shows that there were only 733 WHD investigators at the end of 2023 to enforce all federal wage and hour laws, 79 fewer than in 1973, the first year for which data are available, and 499 fewer than the peak year of 1978 when there were 1,232 WHD investigators. By May 2025, just four months into the Trump administration, the number of WHD investigators had dropped to 611, a new historic low. While the number of WHD investigators is now half of what it was at its peak in 1978, the number of workers those investigators have a mandate to protect has tripled, and the number of establishments subject to WHD enforcement has quadrupled.<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a></p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-313355 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313355" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313355-35335-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Having already cut at least half a billion dollars from DOL funding, requiring the agency to close regional offices that enforce wage and hour laws,<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> the administration is seeking even further decreases in labor standards enforcement funding and staffing, with a reported goal of cutting 30% of funding from DOL.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a> The administration has fired or forced out leaders and career staff at worker protection agencies and cut budgets almost indiscriminately, severely hampering the ability of federal agencies to protect wages and working conditions. And there is now a likely pause in labor and employment law enforcement because of the government shutdown.</p>
<p>If the administration is serious about creating new and improved rules for the H-1B program and enforcing them through new initiatives like Project Firewall, then they must allow DOL to play a lead role and have deconfliction measures in place with DHS to prioritize protecting worker interests over immigration enforcement goals. The administration must also call on Congress to drastically increase budgets for key worker protection agencies, reinstate staff at DOL that has been fired or laid off, and ramp up hiring of new staff. In addition, DHS should offer temporary immigration status protections coupled with work authorization to protect migrant workers who report their employers’ violations of labor and employment laws from retaliation, which will also encourage them to come forward and assist labor agencies in holding H-1B employers accountable when they break the law.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>For years, migrant worker advocates, unions, academics, and both Democratic and Republican lawmakers have pointed out the need to change employer incentives by shifting away from the H-1B random lottery towards a true prioritization process in which visas are issued to employers seeking to hire and retain skilled workers by paying them fair wages that reflect market rates. We have urged the Administration and the Congress to explore alternatives to the lottery system that would directly prioritize wages and skills, and thus we support this regulatory effort to implement this change via a weighted lottery.</p>
<p>The H-1B visa program is the largest temporary work visa program in the United States and an important pathway into the U.S. labor market for skilled migrants from around the world—but it is a pathway that has serious deficiencies when it comes to the labor and employment rights of migrant workers and preserving U.S. labor standards. By issuing this proposed rule, DHS has taken an important first step towards fixing a system that has rewarded low-road employers with a business model that hinges on underpaying migrant workers. But as these comments suggest, even more should be done to improve the regulations that should act as safeguards to protect H-1B workers and similarly situated U.S. workers. H-1B workers should be paid fairly, have equal rights, and have an opportunity to become lawful permanent residents within a reasonable period of time. The administration should also take further action on other visas and in other areas to lift wage standards and improve working conditions for all workers, regardless of immigration status.</p>
<p>Regards,</p>
<p>Daniel Costa, Esq.<br />
Director of Immigration Law and Policy Research<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<p>Ron Hira, Ph.D., P.E.<br />
Associate Professor<br />
Department of Political Science<br />
Howard University</p>
<hr>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> See, Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/08/2020-22132/strengthening-wage-protections-for-the-temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-aliens-in-the"><em>Strengthening Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Aliens in the United States</em></a>, Interim Final Rule DOL Docket No. ETA-2020-0006, RIN: 1205-AC00, October 8, 2020; see also Daniel Costa, “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-dol-wage-level-methodology-for-h-1b-visas-and-permanent-labor-certifications-for-green-cards/">EPI comments on DOL wage level methodology for H-1B visas and permanent labor certifications for green cards</a>,” Economic Policy Institute (public comments), November 9, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/10/08/2020-22347/strengthening-the-h-1b-nonimmigrant-visa-classification-program"><em>Strengthening the H-1B Nonimmigrant Visa Classification Program</em></a>, CIS Docket No. 2658-20, DHS Docket No. USCIS-2020-0018, RIN: 1615-AC13, October 8, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/02/2020-24259/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions"><em>Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, CIS No. 2674-20; DHS Docket No. USCIS-2020-0019, RIN 1615-AC61, 85 Fed.Reg. 69236 (November 2, 2025)/</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Michelle Hackman, “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-judge-strikes-down-trumps-h-1b-visa-rules-on-highly-skilled-foreign-workers-11606871592">Federal Judge Strikes Down Trump’s H-1B Visa Rules on Highly Skilled Foreign Workers</a>,” <em>Wall Street Journal</em>, December 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, immigration plan; previously available at <a href="https://joebiden.com/immigration/">https://joebiden.com/immigration/</a> (archived and on file with authors).</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See, Sec. 104. H-1B Visa Allocation in S. 2928, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/2928/text"><em>H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act</em></a>, 119th Congress (2025-2026) and H.R. 6993, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6993/text?r=9&amp;s=1"><em>H-1B and L-1 Visa Reform Act</em></a><em>, </em>116th Congress (2019-2020).</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Dave Jamieson, “<a href="https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-administration-freeze-wages-farmworkers_n_5fa96ef7c5b67c3259b18a59?ncid=engmodushpmg00000004">Trump is hoping to deliver a parting gift to the agriculture lobby: an effective wage cut for farmworkers</a>,” <em>Huffington Post</em>, November 9, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Employment and Training Administration, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/10/02/2025-19365/adverse-effect-wage-rate-methodology-for-the-temporary-employment-of-h-2a-nonimmigrants-in-non-range"><em>Adverse Effect Wage Rate Methodology for the Temporary Employment of H-2A Nonimmigrants in Non-Range Occupations in the United States</em></a>, Interim Final Rule, U.S. Department of Labor, 90 Fed. Reg. 19365 (October 2, 2025). See discussion in Lauren Kaori Gurley, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2025/10/11/immigration-crackdown-food-prices/">Trump administration says immigration enforcement threatens higher food prices</a>,” <em>Washington Post</em>, October 11, 2025; David Dayen, “<a href="https://prospect.org/2025/10/08/trump-labor-department-says-his-immigration-raids-are-causing-a-food-crisis/">Trump Labor Department Says His Immigration Raids Are Causing a Food Crisis</a>,” <em>The American Prospect</em>, October 8, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?embedded-checkout=true">How Thousands of Middlemen are Gaming the H-1B Program</a>,” The Big Take, <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes150000.htm">15-0000 Computer and Mathematical Occupations (Major Group)</a>,”Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics, May 2024, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Authors’ analysis of the LCA Programs disclosure data files for fiscal year 2024, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance">Performance Data</a>, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> See, for example, “<a href="https://www.revealnews.org/topic/visa-fraud/">Techsploitation</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Reveal News</em>, The Center for Investigative Reporting,&nbsp;and Farah Stockman, “<a href="https://www.bostonglobe.com/editorials/2013/06/11/your-child-teacher-victim-human-trafficking/dQz2fYPwg6Xkgt1aV6HaiL/story.html">Teacher Trafficking: The Strange Saga of Filipino Workers, American Schools, and H-1B Visas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Boston Globe</em>, June 12, 2013.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Christopher Lapinig, “<a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/06/immigration-law-modern-slavery/529446/">How U.S. Immigration Law Enables Modern Slavery</a>,”&nbsp;<em>The Atlantic</em>, June 7, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> See for example, Erika Werner, “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2023/02/24/temporary-visa-h1b-tech-layoffs/">High-skilled visa holders at risk of deportation amid tech layoffs</a>,” Washington Post, February 24, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> For a discussion about H-1B portability in practice, see Daniel Costa, “Is portability a panacea?&nbsp;Changing employers in US temporary migration programmes,” chapter 8 in Christiane Kuptsch and Fabiola Mieres (eds.), <a href="https://www.ilo.org/resource/news/new-ilo-publication-explores-path-social-justice-migrant-workers"><em>Temporary labour migration: Towards social justice?</em></a> edited volume, International Labour Organization, February 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> See for example, Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, “T<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/tech-and-outsourcing-companies-continue-to-exploit-the-h-1b-visa-program-at-a-time-of-mass-layoffs-the-top-30-h-1b-employers-hired-34000-new-h-1b-workers-in-2022-and-laid-off-at-least-85000-workers/">ech and outsourcing companies continue to exploit the H-1B visa program at a time of mass layoffs: The top 30 H-1B employers hired 34,000 new H-1B workers in 2022 and laid off at least 85,000 workers in 2022 and early 2023</a>,” <em>Working Economics</em> blog (Economic Policy Institute), April 11, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> See for example, Senator Richard Durbin, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z2dR4Z6dRIo">How American Jobs are Outsourced</a>,” YouTube.com video, April 16, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> See for example, Stef Kight, “<a href="https://www.axios.com/trump-att-outsourcing-h1b-visa-foreign-workers-1f26cd20-664a-4b5f-a2e3-361c8d2af502.html">U.S. companies are forcing workers to train their own foreign replacements</a>,” <em>Axios</em>, December 29, 2019; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2kkTUZu">Pink Slips at Disney. But First, Training Foreign Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, June 3, 2015; Julia Preston, “<a href="https://nyti.ms/2jINcfX">Toys ‘R’ Us Brings Temporary Foreign Workers to U.S. to Move Jobs Overseas</a>,”&nbsp;<em>New York Times</em>, September 29, 2015;&nbsp;Michael Hiltzik, “<a href="http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-uc-visas-20170108-story.html">How the University of California Exploited a Visa Loophole to Move Tech Jobs to India</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Los Angeles Times</em>, January 6, 2017;&nbsp;Patrick Thibodeau, “<a href="https://www.computerworld.com/article/2879083/it-outsourcing/southern-california-edison-it-workers-beyond-furious-over-h-1b-replacements.html">Southern California Edison IT Workers ‘Beyond Furious’ over H-1B Replacements</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Computerworld</em>, February 5, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> See for example, Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?embedded-checkout=true">How Thousands of Middlemen are Gaming the H-1B Program</a>,” The Big Take, <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024; Julia Preston, “Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs,” <em>New York Times</em>, November 10, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> David Weil, <a href="https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975446&amp;content=reviews"><em>The Fissured Workplace: How Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be Done to Improve It</em></a>, Harvard, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> A number of studies show a wage penalty for subcontracted/outsourced workers. For example, see Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/001979391006300206">Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards</a>,” Cornell University ILR Review. January 1, 2010); Deborah Goldschmidt and Johannes Schmieder, “<a href="https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/qjecon/v132y2017i3p1165-1217..html">The Rise of Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure</a>,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 132(3), 2017, pages 1165-1217; Andres Drenik, Simon Jäger, Pascuel Plotkin, and Benjamin Schoefer “<a href="https://eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/schoefer_files/Temp_Argentina_Sept_2020.pdf">Paying Outsourced Labor: Direct Evidence from Linked Temp Agency-Worker-Client Data</a>,” Econometrics Laboratory, University of California, Berkeley, September 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Wage and Hour Division, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/immigration/h1b">H-1B Program</a>,” U.S. Department of Labor, n.d. (last visited October 23, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> The source for this table is USCIS Form I-129 petition data obtained by Eric Fan, a reporter with <em>Bloomberg</em>; see <a href="https://github.com/BloombergGraphics/2024-h1b-immigration-data">BloombergGraphics / 2024-h1b-immigration-data</a> at GitHub, and the source for LCA data is LCA Programs disclosure data files for fiscal year 2024, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance">Performance Data</a>, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> See DOL prevailing wage guidance at Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ETA/oflc/pdfs/NPWHC_Guidance_Revised_11_2009.pdf">Prevailing Wage Determination Policy Guidance: Nonagricultural Immigration Programs</a>,” Revised November 2009, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Source for LCA data is LCA Programs disclosure data files for fiscal year 2023, Office of Foreign Labor Certification, <a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/eta/foreign-labor/performance">Performance Data</a>, Employment and Training Administration, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Kevin Gray, “<a href="https://www.naceweb.org/job-market/compensation/average-starting-salary-for-class-of-2024-shows-mild-gain">Average Starting Salary for Class of 2024 Shows Mild Gain</a>,” National Association of Colleges and Employers, August 26, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Jake Barnes, Janice Fine, Daniel J. Galvin, Jenn Round, Hana Shepherd, <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/WJL_immigration_databrief_May2025.pdf"><em>To Help U.S. Workers, We Need Labor Standards Enforcement, Not Mass Deportations</em></a>, Data Brief, Workplace Justice Lab, Rutgers University, May 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics, <a href="https://data.bls.gov/oes/#/industry/000000">15-1211 Computer Systems Analysts and 15-1252 Software Developers</a>, Industry: Cross-industry, Private, Federal, State, and Local Government, May 2024, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b#p-149">90 Fed. Reg. 45992-3</a> (September 24, 2025); see in particular this passage: “If the H-1B beneficiary would work in multiple locations, or in multiple positions if the registrant is an agent, the registrant would select the box for the lowest equivalent wage level among the corresponding wage levels for each of those locations or each of those positions and would list the location corresponding to that lowest equivalent wage level as the area of intended employment.”</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> S.358 &#8211; Immigration Act of 1990, U.S. Public Law 101-649.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/02/2020-24259/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions"><em>Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 85 Fed. Reg. 69236 (November 2, 2020); <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/08/2021-00183/modification-of-registration-requirement-for-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b-petitions"><em>Modification of Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, Final Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 1676 (January 8, 2021).</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> See Analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data by Hal Salzman and Khudodod Khudododov, “It Ain&#8217;t Pretty: Wage growth has been low or stagnant for many occupations. Coding skills offer little reprieve,” Figure published in Rachel Rosenthal, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-08-04/big-tech-wants-you-to-believe-america-has-a-skills-gap">Tech Companies Want You to Believe America Has a Skills Gap</a>,” <em>Bloomberg Opinion</em>, August 4, 2020; Hal Salzman, Daniel Kuehn, and B. Lindsay Lowell, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp359-guestworkers-high-skill-labor-market-analysis/"><em>Guestworkers in the high-skill U.S. labor market: An analysis of supply, employment, and wage trends</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, April 24, 2013; Ron Hira, “<a href="https://issues.org/stem-workforce-shortage-data-hira/">Is There Really a STEM Workforce Shortage</a>,” Issues in Science and Technology, Col XXXVIII, No. 4, Summer 2022.</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> 85 Fed. Reg. 69238, <em>citing</em> H.R. Rep. 101–723(I) (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6721 (stating ‘‘The U.S. labor market is now faced with two problems that immigration policy can help to correct. The first is the need of American business for highly skilled, specially trained personnel to fill increasingly sophisticated jobs for which domestic personnel cannot be found and the need for other workers to meet specific labor shortages’’).</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> U.S. Department of Homeland Security, <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/09/24/2025-18473/weighted-selection-process-for-registrants-and-petitioners-seeking-to-file-cap-subject-h-1b"><em>Weighted Selection Process for Registrants and Petitioners Seeking To File Cap-Subject H-1B Petitions</em></a>, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 90 Fed. Reg. 46006 (September 24, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Jeremy Neufeld, <a href="https://ifp.org/the-wage-level-mirage/"><em>The “Wage Level” Mirage: How DHS’s H-1B proposal could help outsourcers and hurt US-trained talent</em></a>, Institute for Policy, September 24, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Jeremy Neufeld, <a href="https://ifp.org/h1b/"><em>Talent Recruitment Roulette: Replacing the H-1B Lottery: We could almost double the economic value of the H-1B program without changing the number of visas</em></a>, Institute for Policy, January 17, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> National Research Council, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17226/9830"><em>Building a Workforce for the Information Economy</em></a>, The National Academies Press (Washington, DC).</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> For an examination of occupational shortages, see Ron Hira, “<a href="https://issues.org/stem-workforce-shortage-data-hira/">Is There Really a STEM Workforce Shortage</a>,” Issues in Science and Technology, Col XXXVIII, No. 4, Summer 2022. For technology layoffs, see <a href="https://layoffs.fyi/">Layoffs.fyi</a>, a website that tracks layoffs. For the state of the computer job market for recent graduates see, Natasha Singer, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/technology/coding-ai-jobs-students.html">Goodbye, $165,000 Tech Jobs. Student Coders Seek Work at Chipotle.</a>” <em>NY Times</em>, August 10, 2025. For trends in computer science bachelor’s degrees, see National Center for Education Statistics, <a href="https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d23/tables/dt23_322.10.asp">Table 322.10</a>, Bachelor&#8217;s degrees conferred by postsecondary institutions, by field of study: Selected academic years, 1970-71 through 2021-2, 2023 Digest of Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education. The vast majority, of computer science bachelor’s degrees, more than 90%, are earned by U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> S.1233 &#8211; <a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/1233/text">Keep STEM Talent Act of 2025</a>, 119th Congress (2025-2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Natasha Singer, “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/10/technology/coding-ai-jobs-students.html">Goodbye, $165,000 Tech Jobs. Student Coders Seek Work at Chipotle.</a>” NY Times, August 10, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> See for example; Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?embedded-checkout=true">How Thousands of Middlemen are Gaming the H-1B Program</a>,” The Big Take, <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024; Daniel Costa and Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/h-1b-visas-and-prevailing-wage-levels/"><em>H-1B visas and prevailing wage levels: A majority of H-1B employers—including major U.S. tech firms—use the program to pay migrant workers well below market wages</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, May 4, 2020; Ron Hira, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/congressional-testimony-the-impact-of-high-skilled-immigration-on-u-s-workers-4/"><em>Congressional Testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and the National Interest</em></a>, hearing on “The Impact of High-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Workers,” Economic Policy Institute, February 25, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> Eric Fan, Zachary Mider, Denise Lu, and Marie Patino, “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-staffing-firms-game-h1b-visa-lottery-system/?embedded-checkout=true">How Thousands of Middlemen are Gaming the H-1B Program</a>,” The Big Take, <em>Bloomberg</em>, July 31, 2024; Julia Preston, &#8220;<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/11/us/large-companies-game-h-1b-visa-program-leaving-smaller-ones-in-the-cold.html">Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program, Costing the U.S. Jobs</a>,&#8221; <em>New York Times</em>, November 10, 2015.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> For more details about visa-ready H-1B abuse by outsourcing firms, see Ronil Hira’s <a href="https://www.budget.senate.gov/download/ronil-testimony-913">testimony</a> before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Budget, “Unlocking America&#8217;s Potential: How Immigration Fuels Economic Growth and Our Competitive Advantage,” September 13, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> The White House, <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/09/restriction-on-entry-of-certain-nonimmigrant-workers/">Restriction on Entry of Certain Nonimmigrant Workers</a>, Presidential Proclamation, September 19, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Daniel Costa, Josh Bivens, Ben Zipperer, and Monique Morrissey, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/u-s-benefits-from-immigration/#epi-toc-20"><em>The U.S. benefits from immigration but policy reforms needed to maximize gains: Recommendations and a review of key issues to ensure fair wages and labor standards for all workers</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, October 4, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Jake Barnes, Janice Fine, Daniel J. Galvin, Jenn Round, Hana Shepherd, <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/WJL_immigration_databrief_May2025.pdf"><em>To Help U.S. Workers, We Need Labor Standards Enforcement, Not Mass Deportations</em></a>, Data Brief, Workplace Justice Lab, Rutgers University, May 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> Rebecca Rainey, “<a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/doges-455-million-in-labor-savings-carry-costs-for-us-workers">DOGE’s $455 Million in Labor Savings Carry Costs for US Workers</a>,” <em>Bloomberg Law</em>, April 2, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> Adam Cancryn and Jennifer Scholtes, “<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2025/05/02/trumps-budget-asks-congress-00323256">Trump sends a scorched-earth budget plan. GOP lawmakers hate it already.</a>” <em>Politico</em>, May 2, 2025.</p>
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