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	<title>Unemployment insurance | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Unemployment insurance | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>The economics of deficits, debt, and interest rates: Part 2: Structural deficits today are too large</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 13:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327691</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond.]]></description>
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<p><em>This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/deficits-debt-and-interest-rates-some-questions-answered/">part one here.</a>&nbsp;</em></p>
</div>
<p>The effects of deficits and debt on the broader economy are largely straightforward—with one big exception: They differ radically depending on whether the economy is operating near its productive potential or is instead operating well below it (which occurs most notably during recessions).<span id="more-327691"></span></p>
<p>The main economic effects of deficits in these two states of the world are essentially as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>Large deficits during times when the economy is operating near its productive potential (or during times of <em>full employment</em>) put upward pressure on either interest rates (more likely) or inflation (less likely).
<ul>
<li>The higher interest rates in turn can “crowd out” productive private-sector capital investments. If this happens chronically, this can shrink the size of the capital stock U.S. workers have available to them—with the capital stock being factories and other buildings, equipment, software, and research and development efforts. This smaller capital stock in turn reduces productivity, or the income generated in an average hour of work in the U.S. economy, hence shrinking the growth of potential living standards.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Large deficits when the economy is operating well below potential actually stabilize the economy and aid its return to potential.
<ul>
<li>Economies start operating below full employment when aggregate demand—spending by households, businesses, and governments—falls short of what is needed to fully employ productive resources. By increasing spending and lowering taxes (hence boosting private-sector disposable income that can be spent), higher deficits boost aggregate demand and push the economy closer to potential.</li>
<li>Because private-sector investment responds to income growth as well as interest rates, deficits run during times of less than full employment can actually “crowd in” productive private-sector investment.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong>The one noncontroversial effect of budget deficits: They raise aggregate demand</strong></h4>
<p>If there is one noncontroversial statement about budget deficits, it is that <em>they raise the economy’s aggregate demand</em>. Whether this increase in aggregate demand is good or bad depends on the broader economy.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is strong</strong></h5>
<p>When private-sector sources of demand are strong—consumers are buying a lot, businesses are demanding lots of new capital goods to undertake production, and imports and exports are roughly balanced—all available productive resources (like workers) are fully employed and the economy does not need the public sector to inject extra demand into circulation with larger deficits; additional increments to demand will not bring forth more output. Instead, additional demand sent into a full employment economy will bid up <em>prices </em>rather than cause more output to be produced.</p>
<p>If the Federal Reserve is determined to not let strong demand bid up prices and push inflation above its preferred 2% target, it will respond to this excess of demand by raising its short-term policy rates to try to tamp down private sources of demand. Higher interest rates <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Semiparametric%20Estimates%20of%20Monetary%20Policy-V2.pdf">are generally effective in reducing demand</a> through lower consumption, business investment, and larger trade deficits.</p>
<p>Besides the Fed’s response, higher deficits in a full employment economy can also put upward pressure on interest rates through financial crowding out. At full employment, the supply of savings available to be loaned to households or businesses looking to make long-lived investments is largely fixed. Federal deficits <em>by definition</em> mean that the government has to go into financial markets, where supplies of savings and demands for investment meet, and increase <em>its own</em> demand for a share of these savings. Deficits are financed by selling government bonds to households and businesses—that is, by convincing savers to lend their money to the government for a period of time. The extra demand for borrowing meets the fixed supply of savings and pushes up the price of loans, or interest rates.</p>
<p>Because most capital investment by businesses (building new factories and buildings, purchasing new equipment and software, and paying salaries of workers engaged in research and development) is financed by borrowing, higher interest rates stemming from large budget deficits in economies that are already strong will slow capital investment over time. As the price of something rises—in this case, the price of borrowing to finance new investment—less of it will be demanded.</p>
<p>This reduction in capital investment slows long-run economic growth. A key contributor to growth in productivity—the amount of income generated in an average hour of work in the economy—is how much capital workers have available to them to do their jobs. Construction workers today are far more productive than 50 years ago because they’re more likely to use mechanized earth movers rather than shovels for excavation.</p>
<p>If deficits crowd out capital investment, this can slow productivity growth. Productivity growth is the ceiling on how fast average living standards can rise in an economy. So when large deficits during full employment crowd out of investment, this can damage economic growth. A key point in this analysis is that it is higher interest rates that are the transmission mechanism for this damage: If interest rates do not rise, there is no damage being done.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is weak</strong></h5>
<p>When private spending is too low to fully employ all available productive resources, the boost to aggregate demand from large deficits actually helps to employ these resources and move the economy closer to its productive potential.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy closer to its productive potential during downturns <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62568">happen automatically</a>. Spending rises on safety net programs like unemployment insurance, and this supports private consumption. Tax collections fall as private incomes fall, buffering disposable incomes from the full fall in pre-tax incomes.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy back to its potential come from discretionary legislation passed by Congress in direct response to the downturn—relief packages like the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/cea_8th_arra_report_final_draft.pdf">American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009</a> and the <a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/insight/research-summary/cares-impact-on-welfare/">CARES Act of 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Weak private spending places sharp downward pressure on inflation and interest rates as it generates idle resources (like rising unemployment). Given this, a boost to demand from larger deficits tends to <em>not</em> manifest as faster inflation or higher interest rates. A boost to demand when there are idle resources mostly causes output, not prices, to rise. And the higher output and income generated by higher deficits <em>create</em> savings that keep interest rates from rising in response to greater demand for investment.</p>
<p>Because this scenario sees no rise in interest rates, and because investment responds positively to output growth, larger deficits that boost economic activity <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2012a_delong.pdf">almost certainly “crowd in” private investment</a>, leading to more investment and higher productivity than would have occurred had deficits not been allowed to rise.</p>
<h4><strong>Excessive structural deficits are hurting the U.S. economy today</strong></h4>
<p>The upshot is that deficits can hurt if they’re too large when the economy is already near full employment, and that the data signature for this damage is rising interest rates. For decades, large budget deficits have not been accompanied by higher interest rates, making it very hard to argue that the economy’s long-run growth prospects were being damaged by crowded out private investment.</p>
<p>Over the past year, however, interest rates have risen noticeably. In fact, as of September 2026, 10-year Treasury rates have reached their highest levels since the early 2000s (though still far below highs reached between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s when—among other things—inflation expectations were much higher). Because inflation is a bit higher now than in the early 2000s, real (inflation-adjusted) rates have not risen quite as fast, but they are always noticeably higher than the average of the past 20 years. Between this and the fact that unemployment is likely not too far above full employment at the moment and the fact that inflation remains above the Fed’s 2% target level, it seems clear that too large U.S. deficits are putting unwelcome pressure on the larger economy.</p>
<p><iframe style="overflow: hidden; width: 540px; height: 433px;" src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=20dZ0&amp;width=540&amp;height=383" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p>Too large U.S. deficits are not the only driver of recent interest rate increases. Another contributor is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21102026-cp">larger deficits being run by many European countries</a>. Many of these countries have <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/08/council-activates-flexibility-in-eu-fiscal-rules-for-15-member-states-to-increase-defence-spending/">loosened fiscal rules to spend more on the military</a> in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Japanese economy is also stronger than it has been in decades, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/business/japan-interest-rates.html">interest rates there are rising</a> for the first time in decades. Finally, there has been a huge surge in <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">private investment demand</a> driven by the race between AI companies to dominate the market.</p>
<p>On the one hand, it seems hard to worry that higher interest rates are crowding out private-sector investment if it is precisely strong private investment contributing to higher rates. But the investment in AI is clearly not interest-sensitive (at least so far). It is driven by exogenous events and factors: Now just happens to be the time that the technology has reached tipping points where scalability and profitability seem possible, hence sparking a race between private companies to be the first to capitalize on this. Additionally, investment in sectors in the U.S. not being pulled along by the AI boom is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">notably weak in 2026</a>, posting negative growth. If U.S. fiscal deficits were lower and this led to lower interest rates, this would help <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">investment in non-AI sectors</a>.</p>
<p>Noting that too large structural deficits are likely slowing U.S. growth today does not map directly onto policy solutions. It’s not the case that the damage from too large deficits right now is so overwhelming that anything that reduces deficits should be done in response. In a later post, I will walk through the considerations about how policymakers should optimally respond to too high structural deficits. They definitely should do <em>something—</em>but it’s not the case that they should just do <em>anything</em>.</p>
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		<title>A pro-worker AI policy playbook: Strengthening unemployment insurance and building a better safety net</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/a-pro-worker-ai-policy-playbook-strengthening-unemployment-insurance-and-building-a-better-safety-net/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 21 Oct 2026 09:00:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mary Beech]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=326852</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Policymakers can act now to reduce the harm to workers of losing a job for any reason, by strengthening the safety net to support them until they find another.
&#160;]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/EPI-Workshop_WeBuild-Cobrand-2.png" width="430"></p>
<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong><span style="font-size: 18px; font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #1372ae;">Key takeaways</span></strong></h4>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Policy choices will determine whether AI helps or harms workers.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Given that, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers to meet any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">To strengthen the unemployment insurance system that provides funds to workers who have lost their jobs, we should do the following:&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">increase the amounts and duration of unemployment benefits&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">center delivery on worker needs and power</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">build stronger data infrastructure to support workers while they are searching for new jobs</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><span style="font-size: 14px;">Establishing a stand-alone unemployment program solely focused on AI raises important considerations. These include program design, stakeholder roles, eligibility criteria challenges, the resources needed to be effective, and vulnerability to reauthorization hurdles in Congress.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><i>This is the first brief in a series exploring comprehensive federal policy recommendations around AI and workers.</i></p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid the seemingly endless predictions about AI, one point is essential to remember: How this plays out is not predetermined. Policy choices determine whether workers are helped or harmed by technological change. Even without AI, many workers already face harmful disruptions. Every year, 20 million workers are laid off in the U.S. economy<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a>—due to employer mismanagement, once-profitable products becoming less so, offshoring, automation, and other factors. For individual workers, losing a job fo<em>r any reason</em> and for <em>any period of time</em> is traumatic and damaging in large part because we lack adequate social insurance programs to smooth those transitions.</p>
<p>As lawmakers debate how to best regulate AI deployment in our workplaces, today’s priority should be to strengthen the safety net for workers in any scenario and to acknowledge how AI is already affecting workers’ rights, protections, and livelihoods. Decades of underinvestment, coupled with attacks on unions and other labor supports, have left workers without an adequate safety net.</p>
<p>We can improve our current systems to better provide livable benefits for workers who lose their jobs because of large-scale economic shocks that are not their fault and outside their control. We can also learn from other periods of workforce disruption—the COVID-19 pandemic, trade-related shocks, and the 2008 recession—about which policy choices were effective and which fell short.</p>
<p>When workers lose their jobs due to factors outside their control, they are considered “displaced” or “dislocated.” If they meet certain requirements, these workers are eligible for unemployment insurance (UI). To strengthen outcomes for workers, this brief will provide recommendations to:</p>
<ul>
<li>increase UI benefit amount and duration</li>
<li>expand and standardize eligibility to receive benefits</li>
<li>align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</li>
<li>center worker needs and power</li>
<li>strengthen data infrastructure to support workers</li>
</ul>
<p>These recommendations should be considered amid conversations focused on creating a stand-alone unemployment program geared toward AI-driven job loss. These discussions should weigh considerations and potential pitfalls, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>a blank slate for program design</li>
<li>relevant roles for key stakeholders</li>
<li>eligibility criteria challenges</li>
<li>the allocation of resources, time, and awareness to be effective</li>
<li>reauthorization vulnerability</li>
</ul>
<p>If policymakers are serious about easing the impact of AI-related job transitions for workers, the priority solution should be strengthening already existing social insurance programs to reduce the economic consequences of losing any job and to provide adequate support to workers while they seek other employment.</p>
<p>Changes to the current system or establishing a new program will require robust resources, including time, money, and expertise. This investment can help all workers, regardless of their risk of AI-based displacement. With a strong safety net, workers who lose their jobs can get the assistance they need, including the opportunity to find work that is well suited to their skills and experiences, and businesses are more inclined to improve their practices because they know workers aren&#8217;t trapped in their current jobs by economic necessity.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This moment presents an opportunity to strengthen the labor market for everyone and to ensure workers have the safety net they deserve.</p>
<h2>How to strengthen our current system</h2>
<p>Any effective approach to fixing the UI system must be comprehensive and should apply regardless of whether a worker is displaced due to AI. Numerous experts have weighed in on the best approach—including the National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) Unemployment Insurance Taskforce,<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> the National Employment Law Project (NELP),<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a>,<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> and The Century Foundation,<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> among others. This brief draws from those recommendations to strengthen outcomes for workers. Other important issues, such as modernizing UI system technology and infrastructure, fraud detection and prevention, and the use of AI in benefit determinations and delivery, also shape worker outcomes but fall outside this brief&#8217;s scope.</p>
<h3>Increase benefit amount and duration</h3>
<p>First and foremost, UI should be designed to ensure that workers can afford housing, food, and other essentials during their period of joblessness. The percentage of wages that UI replaces for workers has declined over time and has not kept pace with inflation.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> In 2025, national average UI benefits replaced well under half of national average wages.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> This gap leaves workers across the income spectrum unable to maintain their standard of living and can push those whose earnings were close to the minimum wage into poverty.</p>
<h4>Ensure benefit amounts are consistent across states</h4>
<p>Benefit amounts vary across states. In Arizona and Florida, UI benefits replace less than 15% of average weekly wages.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> In some states, the weekly benefit amount is just $222 per week.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> While state variation in benefit amounts hurts all workers in stingy states, it weighs especially heavily on Black and Hispanic workers.</p>
<p>One recent study finds that differences in state rules cause the wage replacement rate for Black workers to be meaningfully lower than the rate for white workers, and that the discrepancies harm overall well-being.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a> These disparities compound. Even among those likely eligible, Black workers are less likely than white workers to receive UI benefits—a gap explained primarily by structural factors, not a difference in eligibility, that has held steady for three decades.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a></p>
<p>Wage replacement rates should be consistent across states. A recent federal bill has proposed changes to increase the replacement rate to 75% and provide additional weekly funding for dependents.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> Given growing wage inequality, the rate also should vary by income level. In one proposal, the lowest earners would receive benefits that represent 85% of their wages.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a></p>
<h4>Extend the duration of benefits across states</h4>
<p>The duration of benefits also varies greatly from state to state. Until 15 years ago, eligible workers across the country had access to 26 weeks of benefits, a generally agreed-upon standard.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a> After the Great Recession however, federal law barred states from cutting benefit amounts, so many states instead cut the duration of unemployment benefits to stabilize their trust funds and lower tax rates for employers.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Some states now only provide 12 weeks of benefits, a short bridge to find a new job well-matched to workers’ skills and experiences.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> A minimum of at least 26 weeks of benefits should be a uniform requirement across states.</p>
<p>Workers cannot currently depend on the Extended Benefits program, which was intended to provide support during economic downturns by providing additional weeks of benefits during periods of high and rising unemployment. The triggers for Extended Benefits have not been effective, leaving workers to wonder if they are available. In their absence, workers must rely on temporary programs funded by Congress, which depend on political priorities.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a> More reliable triggers, higher wage replacement levels, and a longer duration of benefits would make the Extended Benefits program more effective.<a href="#_note19" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='19' id="_ref19">19</a></p>
<h3>Expand and standardize eligibility for benefits</h3>
<p>Only certain workers are eligible for UI, leaving others stranded without benefits if they lose their jobs. Eligibility criteria and the base period used to calculate benefits are set by state law, rather than federal statute. This state-by-state variation can make it difficult for workers to know whether they qualify for assistance and plan accordingly.</p>
<p>Generally, the group of workers ineligible for benefits includes independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and those who have exhausted their benefits. Some employers have incorrectly classified many workers as independent contractors, and this misclassification prevents those workers from requesting access to the UI benefits to which they would otherwise be legally entitled.<a href="#_note20" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='20' id="_ref20">20</a></p>
<p>UI should cover a broader range of workers, including part-time workers, independent contractors, job seekers who have not been recently employed, and seasonal and temporary workers. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress tasked states with implementing new UI programs for gig and platform workers who fell outside of the usual verification system, creating significant challenges.<a href="#_note21" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='21' id="_ref21">21</a> Barring changes to account for the unique situation of these workers, these same issues will arise again.<a href="#_note22" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='22' id="_ref22">22</a> By incorporating these workers into the UI system now, instead of waiting for a crisis, future challenges can be mitigated.</p>
<p>Policymakers should also consider stronger presumptive eligibility standards, under which workers are presumed eligible for benefits and paid promptly, with the burden placed on employers or the state to prove otherwise. Lowering the barriers for workers to receive benefits could meaningfully increase uptake among workers who currently go without benefits.</p>
<h3>Align employer incentives with worker access to benefits</h3>
<p>All eligible workers should be able to access UI benefits if they want them. State UI programs are generally financed through employer experience rating: Employers pay more taxes when they lay off more workers who are eligible for UI.<a href="#_note23" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='23' id="_ref23">23</a> Therefore, the system’s setup incentivizes employers to limit their tax liability by restricting eligibility for the program in different ways. This can include not hiring certain workers as employees, not proactively informing workers about their eligibility, attempting to reclassify workers as independent contractors, and other forms of suppressing UI program access.</p>
<p>A Bureau of Labor Statistics survey found that only about a quarter of workers who were unemployed in 2022 applied for benefits.<a href="#_note24" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='24' id="_ref24">24</a> Further, a recent survey found that 19% of recently unemployed workers encountered actions from an employer that were meant to deter them from applying, in addition to a quarter of all UI filers who said that their employer contested their benefits.<a href="#_note25" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='25' id="_ref25">25</a> Low-income workers more frequently reported employer contestations , and workers who reported contestations of their claims by employers were less likely to receive benefits and to experience greater material and psychological burdens during the filing process.<a href="#_note26" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='26' id="_ref26">26</a> There is a real opportunity to better align employer incentives to support workers in accessing UI benefits.</p>
<p>Presumptive eligibility, discussed above, would address some of these access barriers by shifting the burden of proof away from workers, but it would not resolve the underlying incentive employers have to minimize their tax liability. There have been many proposals for how to address this issue: broadening the tax base, payroll contributions from employees to UI, or increasing state taxes to fund programs.<a href="#_note27" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='27' id="_ref27">27</a> Most basically, employers could pay taxes based on the total number of workers they lay off, not just those eligible for UI.<a href="#_note28" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='28' id="_ref28">28</a> These questions are tied to broader considerations about how to finance a more effective program.</p>
<h3>Center on worker needs and power</h3>
<p>The UI system should be structured around ensuring that workers have the support they need as they seek reemployment. This requires a real investment in active labor market policy, including communicating with workers and unions about their needs in order to align training and placement. Congress should allocate funds to revitalize the Employment Service in the U.S. Department of Labor, which once played a key role in supporting reemployment.<a href="#_note29" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='29' id="_ref29">29</a> For example, in a 1986 New Jersey pilot program, job search assistance measurably helped dislocated workers return to work sooner and increased their earnings.<a href="#_note30" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='30' id="_ref30">30</a> A well-resourced and staffed U.S. Employment Service can leverage state labor market information—frequently used by employers—to help job seekers find opportunities aligned with their skill sets.<a href="#_note31" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='31' id="_ref31">31</a></p>
<p>Worker organizations can also play an important role in the delivery of benefits, including facilitating training and connections to job search assistance.<a href="#_note32" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='32' id="_ref32">32</a> In 2022, unemployed people who were members of a union were twice as likely to apply for UI benefits, and among applicants, 30 percentage points more likely to receive those benefits.<a href="#_note33" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='33' id="_ref33">33</a> This sizable gap suggests that when workers have organizational support navigating the UI system, they are far more likely to receive the benefits they are entitled to, reinforcing the case for involving worker organizations directly in UI outreach, filing assistance, and perhaps even delivery. Furthermore, unions routinely negotiate with employers, both in collective bargaining agreements and when bargaining before layoffs, to secure agreements that employers will not contest workers’ applications for UI benefits.</p>
<p>In some Northern European countries, unions are responsible for administering unemployment benefits, and scholars have found that this system leads to stronger unions and worker voice in the economy.<a href="#_note34" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='34' id="_ref34">34</a> Policymakers in the United States should consider how unions and other worker organizations could deliver unemployment benefits to workers.</p>
<h3>Strengthen data infrastructure to improve outcomes</h3>
<p>State workforce agencies collect quarterly wage records from employers to facilitate UI administration to gauge eligibility for benefits as well as benefit levels. States share wage records with the federal Census Bureau, and these data are included in longitudinal data sets that can follow workers over time. These data are used for both research and the administration of other policies (such as facilitating child support payments or tracking the performance of job training programs). Wage records provide an important but limited set of information that varies by state. A growing number of states have expanded their wage records to include additional information such as job titles, total hours worked, and job location.<a href="#_note35" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='35' id="_ref35">35</a></p>
<p>State-level data are a valuable source of information about what is happening to workers, but the lack of standardization across states makes it difficult to gain a clearer picture of employment. To remedy this, lawmakers should create standardized requirements for enhanced wage records to analyze who is losing their job and where workers are finding new opportunities.</p>
<p>The enhanced information coming from states would be especially useful with the advent of AI since no single federal data source can reliably track how AI adoption is reshaping demand for specific occupations in real time or identify when firms are reducing jobs through attrition. Further, workers would benefit from better information about opportunities that align with their skill set.<a href="#_note36" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='36' id="_ref36">36</a> Better integration with job posting data—including the National Labor Exchange—and reemployment systems would help workers navigate the job-search process.</p>
<h2>Considerations for a stand-alone program</h2>
<p>The UI system should be improved regardless of how AI affects employment and job opportunities. Additionally, some policymakers have suggested creating a stand-alone program geared toward AI-driven job loss. There is precedent for this approach. Congress has acted nine times since 1958 to create temporary, additional UI benefits, most recently during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note37" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='37' id="_ref37">37</a> There is much to be learned from successes and challenges of these previous programs.</p>
<p>Some of these programs also included benefits or services beyond unemployment insurance for workers. For example, Trade Adjustment Assistance has, at various points, included relocation assistance, training programs, a health coverage tax credit, and wage insurance for older workers who took a lower-paying job.<a href="#_note38" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='38' id="_ref38">38</a> A new stand-alone program could similarly go beyond cash benefits, offering workers support to develop new skills, cover the costs of a transition, or find new opportunities.</p>
<h3>Blank slate for program design</h3>
<p>A new program can address the key structural issues with the current system discussed in the previous section. Any new program should be uniform across states so that benefit levels, duration, and eligibility are consistent for every worker regardless of where they live. A new program also presents the opportunity to build in the other improvements outlined above, including benefit levels set to a livable amount, expanded eligibility, and stronger data infrastructure. A new program could also adopt more fundamental changes to the claims process, such as the presumptive eligibility standards that Michigan moved toward during the COVID-19 pandemic.<a href="#_note39" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='39' id="_ref39">39</a></p>
<p>As discussed in the worker power section, a new program should be explicitly structured around building worker power, for example, by involving worker organizations in program administration or benefit delivery. Further, a new program can focus on effective job placement by leveraging relationships between employers, unions, and other worker organizations.</p>
<p>Finally, a new program should also be designed to avoid UI&#8217;s employer-financing structure, which—as discussed—in most states, disincentivizes employers from making sure workers get the benefits they are due. Left unaddressed, that same structure would allow employers to game or underreport AI-related job loss in a new program.</p>
<h3>Relevant roles for key stakeholders</h3>
<p>A successful program requires effective coordination among stakeholders. As with UI and previous stand-alone programs, states would likely retain a central role in delivering benefits and services, given their existing infrastructure and more direct knowledge of local labor market conditions. Local agencies can provide labor market information to workers, worker organizations, and employers to facilitate job placement. Any program should carefully consider how to balance flexibility for states to tailor the program to meet local needs, while maintaining strong, uniform standards across states.</p>
<p>As discussed, worker organizations and unions can play a central role in program administration. Worker organizations can support workers in accessing relevant benefits and training opportunities, ensuring that worker needs and outcomes are central to programmatic strategy and implementation.</p>
<p>Employers bear significant responsibility for the program&#8217;s success. They are often the first to know a layoff is coming and should proactively connect workers to available services, for example, by supporting on-site services when requested by state or local Rapid Response teams. Employers can proactively share specific information about their talent and skills needs with labor agencies and worker organizations, and hire workers during or after relevant training.</p>
<h3>Eligibility criteria challenges</h3>
<p>Creating clear and consistent eligibility criteria will be a significant challenge in establishing a stand-alone program for workers affected by AI-related job displacement. For instance, a program to compensate Department of Energy workers harmed by nuclear materials has faced significant challenges determining eligibility, including the complexity of reconstructing historical exposure to nuclear materials to establish causation.<a href="#_note40" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='40' id="_ref40">40</a> Challenges in establishing causation have also been an enormous barrier to worker relief through the Trade Adjustment Assistance program.<a href="#_note41" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='41' id="_ref41">41</a></p>
<p>In another example, some pandemic unemployment assistance benefits are still hung up over eligibility disputes years later.<a href="#_note42" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='42' id="_ref42">42</a> And from the start of the pandemic, there have been hotly contested debates about who should receive benefits.<a href="#_note43" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='43' id="_ref43">43</a> Moreover, concerns about fraud can also complicate eligibility determinations. In the wake of fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic, many states adopted stricter verification requirements to confirm eligibility.<a href="#_note44" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='44' id="_ref44">44</a> A new program focused on AI-driven job loss would need to balance similar integrity concerns against the risk of preventing eligible workers from receiving the benefits they are due.<a href="#_note45" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='45' id="_ref45">45</a></p>
<p>It is virtually impossible to systematically link job loss with AI adoption. In many instances, AI’s effects on a worker or industry may be indirect. For example, workers may lose their jobs in part due to AI adoption months or years earlier or because of broader economic disruption caused by AI’s impact on different industries. Even setting aside these implementation challenges, restricting eligibility to AI-driven job loss raises a separate concern: fairness. AI is not the only source of economic disruption. Global trade (including offshoring and outsourcing) and the green energy transition continue to displace workers across industries.</p>
<p>Other workers should be entitled to the same benefits as those directly displaced by AI. Drawing arbitrary boundaries around a single cause of job loss will create inequities, a risk compounded if states must independently interpret what counts as AI-driven job loss, therefore creating inconsistent standards nationwide.</p>
<h3>Resources, time, and awareness to be effective</h3>
<p>Standing up a new program will take significant time and resources. In addition to providing benefits, this includes making meaningful investment in technological systems and program administration, a particular challenge in light of years of underinvestment in modernizing UI systems.<a href="#_note46" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='46' id="_ref46">46</a> Federal and state governments need adequate resources for user experience testing, efficient application determinations, coordination with relevant partners, data collection and analysis, and programmatic evaluation. The challenges of implementing relief programs during COVID-19 are instructive. Slow initial payments, overwhelming caseloads that strained public servants, technological breakdowns, and significant confusion about eligibility requirements demonstrated the need to proactively develop systems that can respond more nimbly in times of crisis.<a href="#_note47" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='47' id="_ref47">47</a></p>
<p>Starting a new program also requires sustained public outreach, as new and stand-alone programs have historically struggled because of a lack of public familiarity. For example, over half of workers did not know they had access to emergency sick leave during COVID-19.<a href="#_note48" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='48' id="_ref48">48</a> In another example, when the Reagan administration made changes to the Trade Adjustment Assistance program, applications plummeted, perhaps because many workers believed the program had been abolished.<a href="#_note49" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='49' id="_ref49">49</a> Further, most workers did not know that other services including training, job counseling, and relocation assistance were available through the program.<a href="#_note50" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='50' id="_ref50">50</a></p>
<p>A stand-alone program could also come at the expense of the existing UI system, which the vast majority of states say is underfunded.<a href="#_note51" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='51' id="_ref51">51</a> From 1999 to 2019, federal funding for UI administration declined by 30% on an inflation-adjusted basis.<a href="#_note52" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='52' id="_ref52">52</a> If policymakers decide to divert resources that would otherwise go to the existing UI system, the system’s further deterioration could harm workers served by that system in both the short and long term.</p>
<h3>Reauthorization vulnerability in Congress</h3>
<p>If an AI-specific UI program requires congressional reauthorization, it will be vulnerable to the difficulty of coordinating bipartisan action in Congress. Several previous programs have been subject to a sunset date, requiring periodic reauthorization to continue accepting new claims. Sunsets and other reauthorization requirements leave workers vulnerable to congressional inaction, especially if the impacts of AI on the workforce play out over an extended time period.</p>
<p>For an example of a program caught up in this type of reauthorization limbo, Trade Adjustment Assistance lapsed multiple times, including most recently in 2022, leaving additional workers without access to the program. Another example is The Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, which was created in 2008 and lapsed five times between 2010 and 2013, before expiring for good at the end of that year.<a href="#_note53" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='53' id="_ref53">53</a> This immediately cut off benefits for 1.3 million workers and for more than 3.6 million workers by the following September.<a href="#_note54" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='54' id="_ref54">54</a></p>
<h2>Financing and the path forward</h2>
<p>The current worker safety net has failed to expand enough to cover the basic realities of today&#8217;s labor market, and inadequate benefit levels, incomplete coverage, and diminished worker representation are persistent problems. Deployment of AI and related technologies in the workplace adds urgency to addressing these issues.</p>
<p>Implementing the recommendations in this issue brief requires a significant investment that should be considered, along with program parameters and design. As AI drives up stock prices and generates wealth for a select few, policymakers are considering how the public should share in these gains. Ideas include increasing taxes for wealthy individuals, closing the gap between labor and capital tax rates, taxing AI use, and taxing data center development, with the proceeds from these new taxes financing programs that redistribute income more broadly across the economy. Considerations for potential taxation approaches will be discussed in a forthcoming brief.</p>
<p>This moment requires big thinking and corresponding action. While AI drives changes to the economy, improvements to the worker safety net are long overdue. We can learn from the past to improve the labor market for everyone.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>Angela Hanks, Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Ben Zipperer, Gillian Gutierrez, Jacob Leibenluft, Janelle Jones, Josh Bivens, Michele Evermore, Patrick Oakford, Raj Nayak, and Stephen Nuñez.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Layoffs and Discharges: Total Nonfarm” [JTSLDL]. Accessed from <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis</a>, October 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Patrick Oakford, Josh Bivens, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/"><em>Federal AI Legislation: An Evaluation of Existing Proposals and a Road Map Forward</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, September 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>Unemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Amy Traub, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/boosting-economic-resilience-seven-ways-states-can-support-more-workers-with-unemployment-insurance/"><em>Boosting Economic Resilience: Seven Ways States Can Support More Workers with Unemployment Insurance</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, July 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2023/11/Policy-Advocacy-Brief-Benefit-Amounts-11-2023.pdf."><em>Policy Advocacy Brief: Benefit Amounts</em></a>, November 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, “<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp">UI Replacement Rates Report</a>,” Benefit Accuracy Measurement data. Public data prepared by the OUI Division of Performance Management, Accessed August 7, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Megan Rivera, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/why-unemployment-insurance-alone-is-not-enough-in-the-ai-era/"><em>Why Unemployment Insurance Alone Is Not Enough in the AI Era</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Daphné Skandalis, Ioana Marinescu, and Maxim Massenkoff, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/racial-inequality-in-the-u-s-unemployment-insurance-system/"><em>Racial Inequality in the U.S. Unemployment Insurance System</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth Working Paper, July 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Elira Kuka and Bryan A. Stuart, <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w29595"><em>Racial Inequality in Unemployment Insurance Receipt and Take-Up</em></a>, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 29595, December 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Office of U.S. Senator Michael Bennet, “<a href="https://www.bennet.senate.gov/2025/07/16/bennet-wyden-beyer-reintroduce-bicameral-bill-to-overhaul-unemployment-insurance/">Bennet, Wyden, Beyer Reintroduce Bicameral Bill to Overhaul Unemployment Insurance</a>” (press release), July 16, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf"><em>U</em><em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, Unemployment Insurance Task Force, <a href="https://www.nasi.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Unemployment-Insurance-Task-Force-Final-Report.pdf">U<em>nemployment Insurance Task Force Final Report</em></a>, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='19'><a href="#_ref19" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note19">19. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='20'><a href="#_ref20" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note20">20. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez, Nina Mast, Margaret Poydock, and Valerie Wilson, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Costly for Workers and Social Insurance Systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='21'><a href="#_ref21" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note21">21. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a>&nbsp;The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='22'><a href="#_ref22" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note22">22. </a> Adam Grundy and Lucie Alleyne, “<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2025/07/nes-gig-economy.html">Nonemployer Businesses Are Key Contributors to Gig Activities and Economic Growth Nationally</a>” (blog post), U.S. Census Bureau website, July 1, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='23'><a href="#_ref23" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note23">23. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024</p>
<p data-note_number='24'><a href="#_ref24" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note24">24. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2023/most-unemployed-people-in-2022-did-not-apply-for-unemployment-insurance-benefits.htm">Most Unemployed People in 2022 Did Not Apply for Unemployment Insurance Benefits</a>” (blog post), <em>The Economics Daily (TED)</em>, April 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='25'><a href="#_ref25" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note25">25. </a> Amy Traub, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and Sanjay Pinto, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/the-unemployed-worker-study/"><em>The Unemployed Worker Study</em></a>, National Employment Law Project, April 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='26'><a href="#_ref26" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note26">26. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Alix Gould-Werth, &#8220;<a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/739410">Employer Contestations and Access to Unemployment Insurance: Implications for Benefit Receipt, Material Hardship, and Administrative Burden</a>,&#8221; <em>Social Service Review</em> 100, no. 1 (March 2026): 38–68.</p>
<p data-note_number='27'><a href="#_ref27" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note27">27. </a> Michele Evermore and David Balducchi, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/a-roadmap-for-unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>A Roadmap for Unemployment Insurance Reform</em></a>, The Century Foundation, October 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='28'><a href="#_ref28" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note28">28. </a> Josh Bivens, Melissa Boteach, Rachel Deutsch, Francisco Díez, Rebecca Dixon, Brian Galle, Alix Gould-Werth, Nicole Marquez, Lily Roberts, Heidi Shierholz, William Spriggs, and Andrew Stettner, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/"><em>Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</em></a>, a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women&#8217;s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='29'><a href="#_ref29" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note29">29. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='30'><a href="#_ref30" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note30">30. </a> Stephen A. Wandner, <a href="https://doi.org/10.17848/9781441680389"><em>Solving the Reemployment Puzzle: From Research to Policy</em></a>, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, January 2010.</p>
<p data-note_number='31'><a href="#_ref31" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note31">31. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='32'><a href="#_ref32" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note32">32. </a> Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “<a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/solidarity-insurance-reimagining-unemployment-insurance-as-a-platform-for-worker-power/">Solidarity Insurance: Reimagining Unemployment Insurance as a Platform for Worker Power.</a>” (policy brief), Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst, July 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='33'><a href="#_ref33" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note33">33. </a> Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/uisup_03292023.htm">Characteristics of Unemployment Insurance Applicants and Benefit Recipients—2022</a>” (economic news release), March 29, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='34'><a href="#_ref34" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note34">34. </a> Bruce Western, <a href="https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691010335/between-class-and-market"><em>Between Class and Market: Postwar Unionization in the Capitalist Democracies</em></a> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='35'><a href="#_ref35" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note35">35. </a> Michele Evermore and Will Raderman, <a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>T</em></a><a href="https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/The-case-for-enhanced-wage-records.pdf"><em>he Case for Enhanced Wage Records: Lessons from States</em></a>, National Academy of Social Insurance and The Niskanen Center, January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='36'><a href="#_ref36" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note36">36. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/theres-a-growing-bipartisan-consensus-to-fix-unemployment-insurance/">There&#8217;s a Growing Bipartisan Consensus to Fix Unemployment Insurance</a>” (commentary), The Century Foundation website, July 17, 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='37'><a href="#_ref37" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note37">37. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, “<a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10336">The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation</a>,” Congressional Research Service, IF10336, updated January 12, 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='38'><a href="#_ref38" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note38">38. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='39'><a href="#_ref39" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note39">39. </a> Michele Evermore, “<a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2020/05/NELP-Michele-Evermore-Testimony-Michigan-UI-Processing-5-21-2020.pdf">Michigan Unemployment Claims Processing</a>,” testimony on behalf of National Employment Law Project to a hearing before the Michigan Legislature, Joint Select Committee on the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 21, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='40'><a href="#_ref40" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note40">40. </a> U.S. Government Accountability Office, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-16-74"><em>Energy Employees Compensation: DOL Generally Followed Its Procedures to Process Claims but Could Strengthen Some Internal Controls</em></a>, GAO-16-74, March 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='41'><a href="#_ref41" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note41">41. </a> Jacob Leibenluft, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/lessons-from-past-trade-adjustment-policies-to-support-displaced-workers-in-the-era-of-artificial-intelligence/"><em>Lessons from Past Trade Adjustment Policies to Support Displaced Workers in the Era of Artificial Intelligence</em></a><em>,</em> Washington Center for Equitable Growth, March 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='42'><a href="#_ref42" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note42">42. </a> Julie Kay, “<a href="https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/north-carolina-unemployment-benefits-still-delayed-five-years-after-pandemic/275-5b6093e8-1e0f-46bc-811a-d446166114a3">‘No Accountability’: Pandemic-Era Unemployment Benefit Delays Persist, 5 Years Later</a>,” <em>WCNC Charlotte</em>, April 3, 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='43'><a href="#_ref43" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note43">43. </a> Annelies Goger, Tracy Hadden Loh, and Nicole Bateman, <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/debunking-myths-about-covid-19-reliefs-unemployment-insurance-on-steroids/"><em>Debunking Myths About COVID-19 Relief&#8217;s ‘Unemployment Insurance on Steroids,’</em></a> The Brookings Institution, May 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='44'><a href="#_ref44" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note44">44. </a> National Employment Law Project, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/id-verification/"><em>ID Verification</em></a>, November 14, 2023.</p>
<p data-note_number='45'><a href="#_ref45" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note45">45. </a> National Academy of Social Insurance, “<a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Testimony of Michele Evermore, Senior Fellow, National Academy of </a><a href="https://waysandmeans.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Michele-Evermore-Testimony.pdf">Social Insurance</a>,” testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Work and Welfare Subcommittee, March 5, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='46'><a href="#_ref46" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note46">46. </a> Julie Su, Andrew Stettner, and Michele Evermore, <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/our-unemployment-system-needs-modernizing-trump-is-doing-the-opposite/"><em>Our Unemployment System Needs Modernizing</em>.<em> Trump Is Doing the Opposit</em>e.</a> The Century Foundation, September 2025.</p>
<p data-note_number='47'><a href="#_ref47" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note47">47. </a> Michele Evermore, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2026/08/Policy-Brief-AI-is-New-The-Challenge-of-Mass-Unemployment-Isnt.pdf"><em>AI Is New. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment Isn&#8217;t</em>.</a> National Employment Law Project, September 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='48'><a href="#_ref48" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note48">48. </a> Emma Jelliffe, Paul Pangburn, Stefan Pichler, and Nicolas R. Ziebarth, “<a href="https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2107670118">Awareness and Use of (Emergency) Sick Leave: US Employees&#8217; Unaddressed Sick Leave Needs in a Global Pandemic</a>,” <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 118, no. 29 (July 20, 2021): e2107670118.</p>
<p data-note_number='49'><a href="#_ref49" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note49">49. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='50'><a href="#_ref50" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note50">50. </a> U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, <a href="https://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk2/1987/8730/873005.PDF"><em>Trade Adjustment Assistance: New Ideas for an Old Program</em></a>, 1987.</p>
<p data-note_number='51'><a href="#_ref51" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note51">51. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='52'><a href="#_ref52" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note52">52. </a> Bipartisan Policy Center, “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/article/administrative-failures-plague-state-unemployment-insurance-programs/">Administrative Failures Plague State Unemployment Insurance Programs</a>,” July 1, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='53'><a href="#_ref53" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note53">53. </a> Katelin P. Isaacs and Julie M. Whittaker, <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R42444"><em>Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC08): Status of Benefits Prior to Expiration</em></a>, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, CRS Product Number R42444, August 11, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='54'><a href="#_ref54" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note54">54. </a> U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee Democrats, <a href="https://democrats-waysandmeans.house.gov/hot-topics/unemployment-insurance"><em>Unemployment Insurance</em></a> (fact sheet), 2014.</p>
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		<title>Wages are lower in &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; states: These states have lower unionization rates and more anti-worker policies</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/wages-are-lower-in-right-to-work-states-these-states-have-lower-unionization-rates-and-more-anti-worker-policies/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 01 Sep 2026 12:00:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Emma Cohn]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=324607</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Workers in “right-to-work” (RTW) states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—double the 3.2% wage penalty in 2015. RTW laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies. &nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul style="margin-left: 20px !important; padding-left: 20px !important;">
<li style="list-style-type: circle !important; border-left: none !important;">Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>So-called right-to-work (RTW) laws undermine workers’ ability to form unions. Unionization rates are clearly lower in RTW states—and since unions raise wages, that suppression lowers pay.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>States with RTW laws are also more likely to have other anti-worker laws and generally weaker labor standards. This is likely because both RTW and other anti-worker policies stem from the same anti-worker political roots, and because RTW’s suppression of unions deprives these states of strong potential political champions (unions) for other pro-worker policies. &nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Non-RTW states are more likely to have pro-worker policies like higher minimum wages and prevailing wage laws, restrictions on noncompete agreements, pay transparency policies, and more protective unemployment insurance benefits.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>As a result, workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less on average than workers in non-RTW states—more than double the 3.2% wage penalty we found in 2015. That means the RTW wage penalty has increased in recent years and now translates to over $4,000 less per year for a median full-time worker in a RTW state.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The RTW wage penalty is steeper for women (7.3%) than for men (6.3%), and for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic workers (10.0%) than for white workers (5.4%).&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Lawmakers already have the policy tools they need to boost wages and improve other outcomes for workers:&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>At the state level, rolling back existing RTW laws is the most powerful lever.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>At the federal level, the Protecting the Right to Organize Act (which includes a ban on RTW) would be transformational for efforts to organize workers.&nbsp;&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Policymakers could also make progress on numerous other fronts, such as making UI systems more protective and raising minimum wages.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<hr>
</div>
<p><span class="dropped">I</span>n the United States, so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws are anti-union state policies promoted by big business interests to weaken unions and limit workers’ bargaining power. Despite the name, RTW laws do not provide any sort of job protection or right to a job. Rather, the deceptively named policy starves unions of resources, making it harder for them to negotiate collectively for better wages, benefits, and working conditions.</p>
<p>RTW laws emerged in the 1940s as part of anti-union campaigns to suppress worker organizing and maintain Jim Crow labor relations in Southern states; these campaigns worsened economic inequality and racial disparities (Childers 2024). Today, 26 states have active &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; statutes.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>As intended, RTW laws reduce union density (the share of workers who are either members of a union or covered by a union contract). These policies prohibit unions and employers from negotiating over union security—the contract terms under which workers covered by a union contract either join the union or pay an agency fee covering their share of representation costs. This deprives unions of critical resources and suppresses union membership (Sherer et al. 2026). RTW states—specifically those with RTW laws for at least 25 years—have an average union density rate of 6.2%, far less than half the union density rate in non-RTW states (16.0%) (see <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>).</p>
<p>RTW laws not only reduce the number of workers with collective bargaining agreements but also limit unions’ political power to advocate for stronger labor standards for workers more broadly. This is, in part, why states without anti-union restrictions are more likely to pass protections such as prevailing wage mandates, restrictions on noncompete agreements, higher minimum wages, and pay transparency laws.</p>
<p>To assess the effects of RTW laws on outcomes for workers, we analyze whether wages are lower in RTW states after controlling for key demographic-, job-, and state-level characteristics (see Appendix Table 1 for full demographic controls as well as median and average wages by RTW status). We find that wages in &#8220;right-to-work&#8221; states are, on average, 6.7% lower than in non-RTW states. This penalty is worse for Black and Hispanic workers, as well as young workers and those without college degrees. Notably, the penalty is also larger for nonunion workers. This is because strong unions benefit workers across the state, not just those in unionized workplaces (Shierholz et al. 2026). In RTW states with weaker unions, nonunionized workers do not experience these positive “spillover” effects.</p>
<h2>Pro-worker policies are more common in states without RTW laws</h2>
<p>The strong correlation between wages and states’ RTW status is not surprising. Not only do RTW states have lower unionization rates, leaving workers with less leverage to bid up wages, but they often maintain other anti-worker policies. Combined, these anti-worker policies tilt bargaining power toward employers, weakening workers’ ability to garner higher wages. States without RTW laws are more likely to have a wide array of stronger labor standards in place that raise pay, protect workers&#8217; ability to switch jobs, and support those who lose one. These same states—where unionization rates have not been suppressed by RTW laws—have a better safety net and stronger labor standards in part because stronger unions give workers more political power and the ability to better lobby for pro-worker policies writ large (Shierholz et al. 2026).</p>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong> displays the incidence of these labor standards for states with and without anti-union RTW laws.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This is far from a complete list of relevant policies that may correlate with RTW status and wage levels, but they are illustrative.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-324406 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324406" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324406-35912-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>Prevailing wage</h3>
<p>Prevailing wage laws apply to certain contracts for public works and require that contractors and subcontractors pay the employees performing such work a prevailing wage rate. The prevailing wage rate is defined as the average wage paid to similarly employed workers in a specific occupation in the area of intended employment. Federal law requires this of federal contracts while state and local laws may apply to state and local contracts.</p>
<p>Prevailing wage laws are more common in non-RTW states. Figure A shows that nearly all (96.0%) of non-RTW states have prevailing wage laws, while only 23.1% of RTW states have these protections for workers on state contracts.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Without prevailing wage requirements, contractors may reduce their workers’ wages to win bids on government contracts—putting contractors who pay their workers fair wages at a disadvantage.</p>
<h3><strong>Restrictions on noncompetes</strong></h3>
<p>Noncompete agreements are employment provisions that ban workers at a company from joining a competing business or starting their own for a set period after leaving a job. Noncompetes undermine economic dynamism and innovation; they depress business formation and labor mobility, hurt productivity and growth, raise prices, shrink workers’ wages, and restrict workers’ freedom (Shierholz 2024).</p>
<p>One of the most effective ways workers achieve higher wages is by securing another offer, and then either renegotiating their current salary or leaving for the new higher-paying job. It is not surprising then that workers in states that enforce noncompetes are paid less than similar workers in states that do not enforce noncompetes (Starr 2019). States without anti-worker RTW laws are nearly four times as likely to restrict noncompetes as RTW states (44.0% vs. 11.5%).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> In this analysis, we include only full bans on noncompetes and states with income-based restrictions. States with <em>only</em> small carve-outs for certain occupations provide a much weaker standard and are, by definition, less broad, so those aren’t included.</p>
<h3><strong>Minimum wage</strong></h3>
<p>Raising the minimum wage is particularly important for lower-wage workers. While the federal minimum wage has sat at $7.25 an hour since 2009, losing over 30% of its purchasing power, workers in 31 states enjoy a higher wage floor (Zipperer 2026). Non-RTW states are three times as likely to have minimum wages higher than the federal minimum compared with RTW states (92.0% vs. 30.8%). This is not a small difference. As of 2026, the average value of the minimum wage in non-RTW states is 60% higher—$5.36 more per hour—than in RTW states.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a></p>
<h3><strong>Pay transparency</strong></h3>
<p>Pay transparency laws prevent employers from lowballing wage offers by requiring them to include wage information in job postings. While they vary, all laws include some requirement that employers provide salary information in job postings or if directly requested by applicants. Lack of knowledge about wages and benefits keeps potential workers in the dark and limits their ability to learn about and apply for better paid opportunities. A study on Colorado’s newly passed wage transparency law found that wages increased 4.2% faster than those in neighboring states without such laws (Shedge 2025). Further, wage transparency has the potential to reduce gender- and race-based discrimination by arming jobseekers with more information and limiting employers’ ability to pay different amounts to similarly qualified candidates. Only two RTW states have a pay transparency law, compared with 64% of non-RTW states.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<h3><strong>Unemployment insurance</strong></h3>
<p>Access to unemployment insurance (UI) also shapes workers’ ability to seek better wages. When a worker is laid off and their household income falls, unemployment insurance supports them and their family until they find another job. UI is a joint federal-state program that relies on state UI systems to effectively deliver benefits to unemployed workers. States differ in their rules and approaches under the federal UI framework, leading to wide variation in the share of unemployed workers receiving UI benefits (the UI recipiency rate).</p>
<p>Better UI not only cushions workers and their families but also provides workers with additional leverage in the labor market. When UI access and generosity fall, job seekers are forced to settle for lower wages and employers leverage this by offering less (Dahl and Knepper 2026). On the flip side, research shows a positive relationship between more UI generosity and wages (Rinz and Wasser 2026). The UI recipiency rate is significantly higher in non-RTW states compared with RTW states (32.8% vs. 18.7%).<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> This is not surprising because non-RTW states have stronger unions, which fight to increase UI eligibility, ease of access, benefit levels, and benefit duration—to the benefit of all workers, union and nonunion (Hertel-Fernandez and Gould-Werth 2020). As with other pro-worker policies, better UI access can contribute to higher wages in non-RTW states.</p>
<h3><strong>Other policy levers</strong></h3>
<p>Not only do workers in non-RTW states enjoy higher wages, but they also benefit from increased economic security thanks to higher health insurance rates, higher public education spending, paid family and medical leave access, and no preemptions against higher labor standards. Every non-RTW state expanded Medicaid compared with fewer than two-thirds of RTW states (61.5%).<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> Unsurprisingly, the uninsured rate is higher in RTW states than in non-RTW states (8.9% vs. 6.2%).<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></p>
<p>Investments in public education deliver a more productive workforce and more informed and engaged society. Increased funding for schools not only improves educational attainment, but also increases wages and family incomes (Jackson, Johnson, and Persico 2016). Non-RTW states spend 45% more on public education than RTW states ($24,084 vs. $16,620).<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Paid family and medical leave provides essential benefits that help workers maintain their livelihoods while taking care of themselves and their families. These laws are also shown to increase labor force participation, job retention, and earnings (Glynn 2020). Only one RTW state has comprehensive paid family and medical leave provisions for private-sector workers, compared with 56% of non-RTW states.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>Finally, some cities, counties, and other local governments enact policies that raise standards for working people, but some state legislatures force those standards back down with preemption—the use of state law to void local ordinances. Preemptions apply to policies such as minimum wage, prevailing wages, paid leave, and fair scheduling (EPI 2025). Preemption laws interfere with local governments’ ability to set job quality standards. They suppress wages, exacerbate racial inequities, and reduce worker power (Sherer, Cohn, and Ahdoot 2025). These preemptions are more common in RTW states.</p>
<h2><strong>Workers in RTW states are paid less</strong></h2>
<p>Our analysis of the relationship between wages and RTW status puts states into three categories: long-term RTW states, always non-RTW states, and “switcher” states that have changed their RTW status since 2011.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for these three groups of states, and<strong> Appendix Figure A</strong> provides a map of states by RTW status. Our estimates focus on comparisons between long-term RTW states and always non-RTW states.</p>
<p>A simple comparison of hourly wages, the primary variable of interest, reveals that average wages are 22.9% higher in non-RTW states ($40.28 in non-RTW states vs. $32.78 in RTW states). Median wages are 19.2% higher in non-RTW states ($28.79 vs. $24.16). Because there are differences between worker-, job-, and state-level characteristics in RTW and non-RTW states, and since some of these characteristics will directly impact workers’ wages, it is important to control for these factors in a multivariate regression model. This allows us to more accurately identify the relationship between RTW status and wages.</p>
<p>We estimate log wage equations using Bureau of Labor Statistics Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group (CPS-ORG) data for 2023–2025. We pool three years of data to minimize any spurious year-specific economic relationships, thereby helping us achieve more precise estimates. The total sample consists of 234,155 workers, ages 16+, who earn wages and salaries. About 42% of the sample lives in states with RTW laws (see Appendix Table 1 for the sample’s full demographic breakdown).<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a></p>
<p>In <strong>Table 1</strong>, we construct a regression model, starting with an unadjusted framework and building up to a model that controls for the full range of explanatory variables. The dependent variable is the natural log of hourly wages.</p>
<p>The variable of interest is an indicator variable when the worker lives in a long-term RTW state. We also include an indicator in the regression for a switcher state, though that is not our focus of interest (see <strong>Appendix Table 2</strong> for a complete set of regression results, including the coefficient for switcher states). There are currently 26 states with RTW laws on the books and 25 without them including Washington, D.C. (see Appendix Figure A). There are five switcher states that have adopted RTW in recent years: Indiana (2012), Michigan (2013), Wisconsin (2015), West Virginia (2016), and Kentucky (2017). In 2023, Michigan became the first state to repeal its RTW statute. We separate the five switcher states from the analysis to better isolate the relationship between wages and the long-run effects of RTW.</p>
<p>The naïve model, without any controls, suggests that workers in RTW states are paid 17.8% less than workers in non-RTW states (Model I in Table 1).<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> But many factors contribute to wage differences: demographic characteristics such as age, race/ethnicity, gender, and level of education are relevant as well as job-related factors such as work hours, occupation, and industry. Since these vary across states, they reduce the measured relationship between RTW status and wages. Model II shows that when the analysis compares more similar workers with each other, the RTW penalty drops to 14.0%.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>
<p>There are other factors that are different in RTW states, aside from these individual and job-related characteristics. Most importantly, the cost of living. The cost of living in non-RTW states is higher than in RTW states, as shown in Appendix Table 1. In prior research, Gould and Kimball (2015) showed that choice of price indicator makes no material difference on the measured relationship between RTW and wages. Here we include the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ Regional Price Parity index: The regional price parity index is higher in non-RTW states.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Not surprisingly, this correlates with wage levels and therefore is important to include in the model. As with earlier studies, we also include state unemployment rates to control for differences in economic conditions.</p>
<p>After including the full set of demographic, individual-, and state-level labor market and cost of living controls (Model III), our analysis finds that workers in RTW states are paid 6.7% less than similar workers in non-RTW states. For the average worker, this is a difference of $2.70 per hour, or more than $5,600 for full-time workers at 2,080 hours over the year. However, because the average is skewed upward due to wage inequality, an assessment at the middle of the wage distribution provides a more conservative but perhaps more robust estimate of the RTW wage penalty. Acknowledging that this is a likely understatement of the full relationship, the RTW wage penalty for the median worker at full-time hours is over $4,000 for the year.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-324357 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324357" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324357-35913-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>This does not mean that RTW laws are a <em>causal</em> explanation for this 6.7% wage penalty. As demonstrated earlier in this report, RTW status correlates strongly with a number of other anti-worker policies. Other research has attempted to calculate the causal effects of RTW laws on wages. Using the switcher states in the most recent period, Fortin, Lemieux, and Lloyd (2022) found smaller wage penalties, which is to be expected given the shorter time frame for measurement post-adoption. Our wage penalty for switcher states—shown in the final column of Appendix Table 2—is much smaller (closer to zero) than the coefficient for long-term RTW states, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. Dasgupta and Merchant (2023) also examine states recently adopting RTW laws and find a statistically significant decline in annual wages by almost $1,900. Again, these states are more recent RTW <a name="_Int_YjhAwYo8"></a>adopters, so the full effects we find may take time to materialize.</p>
<p>We find that this relationship between long-term RTW status and wages remains economically and statistically significant under alternative specifications of our econometric model. For instance, removing major industries and occupations changes the coefficient to -0.071. Restricting the model to RTW status as of 2026—removing the separate indicator for states that switched since 2011—yields a coefficient estimate of -0.060. Doing the same but dropping Michigan (since its status changed in the measurement period) results in a coefficient of -0.064. In our final model, we do not include an indicator for unionization, unlike Gould and Kimball (2015). If we reintroduce that variable, the coefficient is -0.063.</p>
<p>In each of our regressions discussed above, we include a three-year average as it improves data reliability and allows us to run smaller groups of the data (see next section). When we run our analysis using just 2025, our results do not change. In fact, when we run our three-year final model for the periods 2021–2023, 2022–2024, and 2023–2025, our coefficients remain in the -0.070 to -0.068 range.</p>
<h2><strong>Wage penalties are steeper for women, Black, Hispanic, and nonunion workers in RTW states</strong></h2>
<p>The RTW penalty is not uniform across demographic groups and other labor market characteristics. <strong>Table 2</strong> below shows the results of a series of final-model regressions (comparable to Model III in Table 1) for a set of demographic groups.</p>
<p>We find that women’s wages in RTW states are penalized at a higher rate (7.3%) than men’s (6.3%). The wage penalty also persists across all racial and ethnic groups, but it is almost twice as large for Black (9.7%) and Hispanic (10.0%) workers as for similar white workers (5.4%) and more than twice as large as for Asian American and Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers (4.6%). Young workers between the ages of 16 and 24 face a greater penalty (8.4%) than older workers. And workers without a college degree experience a much higher penalty (7.8%) than workers with a college degree (4.7%).</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-324418 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324418" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324418-35914-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>It is particularly important to note that RTW laws have a statistically significant negative effect on the wages of nonunion workers, as shown in the last row of Table 2. Our analysis indicates that nonunion workers in RTW states have wages that are 6.3% lower, on average, than their counterparts in non-RTW states. Union members likely experience a smaller penalty (3.6%) because their wages tend to be higher than those in nonunionized workplaces, regardless of the state’s RTW status (McNicholas et al. 2025). However, the wage impact of unions extends beyond those directly covered by a union contract. Unions lift wage standards across entire industries, meaning that nonunion workers in states with higher union density are more likely to receive better pay.</p>
<h2><strong>As the gap in wages and labor standards between RTW and non-RTW states has grown, so has the wage penalty</strong></h2>
<p>Using our final model (Model III in Table 1) with pooled 2023–2025 data, we find a 6.7% RTW wage penalty—a larger penalty than we found in earlier examinations. For example, we found a 3.2% wage penalty using data for 2009 (Gould and Shierholz 2011) and pooled 2010–2012 data (Gould and Kimball 2015). Some of the increase in the current estimate of the RTW wage penalty reflects small changes (likely improvements) in our methods. But part of the higher estimate persists even when we apply our current methods to earlier data: Applying these methods to the 2010–2012 data yields an RTW wage penalty of 4.7%.</p>
<p>One method change concerns “switchers”—states that changed from non-RTW to RTW status (or back) since 2019. In the 2010–2012 period, there were no switchers to affect the data.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a> In our analysis, we isolate switchers from the long-term RTW group, but the RTW penalty remains negative and significant no matter how one deals with the issue of switcher states. For example, recategorizing the five switchers to match their 2012 status (all non-RTW) lowers the measured RTW wage penalty in the 2010–2012 period to 4.1%, but it remains significant.</p>
<p>Other changes relative to our earlier research include controlling for public-sector status; removing union as an independent variable from the regression; using the full working age range of 16 and up (as opposed to 18–64); and correcting an issue with nonrandom missing values to the metropolitan variable. We’ve further clustered standard errors at the state level as suggested by Douglas (2024), which does not affect the size of the coefficients, only the size of their standard errors and resulting statistical significance.<a href="#_note18" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='18' id="_ref18">18</a></p>
<p>Setting those minor model differences aside, a consistent comparison over time sees the RTW wage penalty rising from 4.7% in 2010–2012 to 6.7% in 2023–2025. One possible reason why this RTW wage penalty grew could be the increasingly divergent policy trajectories of RTW and non-RTW states over this period.</p>
<p>For example, the gap between minimum wages in RTW states and non-RTW states has grown since 2010, largely because policymakers in most RTW states have refused to increase their minimum wage despite the fact that the federal minimum wage has been stagnant in nominal terms since 2009. In that year, the average minimum wage in RTW states was $7.25 while the average minimum wage in non-RTW states was $7.54. That gap has grown enormously, from just $0.29 per hour in 2009 to $5.36 per hour by 2026 ($14.24 in non-RTW states vs. $8.89 in RTW states).</p>
<p>There were other potentially relevant policy changes between 2012 and 2025. The first state-level pay transparency law was passed in Maryland in 2020. Seventeen states followed suit in subsequent years, 15 of which were non-RTW states. On the flip side, six states have repealed their prevailing wage laws since 2012—all of which were RTW. Only one state, Michigan, reinstated its prevailing wage law. It did so in 2023, the same year it repealed RTW. While this is far from an exhaustive list, it’s not surprising that the measured RTW wage penalty has grown over time.</p>
<h2><strong>Repealing anti-union “right-to-work” laws and strengthening labor law is key to raising wages </strong></h2>
<p>The wage penalty for workers in RTW states has grown since the last time we conducted this research a decade ago. Long-standing and more recently enacted anti-union RTW laws in 26 states, in tandem with other anti-worker policies, have further eroded workers’ collective bargaining power, suppressed wages, and lowered labor standards. These outcomes are linked to clear policy choices, and lawmakers at every level of government have the tools they need to restore workers’ union rights, strengthen labor standards, and lift wages. Across the U.S., 56 million workers say they want a union in their workplace, yet only 10% of all workers have one (Shierholz et al. 2026). Current federal and state labor laws—including anti-union RTW laws—place too many obstacles in workers’ path to unionizing and give employers too much power to interfere with workers’ free choice.</p>
<p>First and foremost, states with RTW laws should follow Michigan’s recent lead and repeal them. Repealing state RTW laws will enable workers to unionize and raise wages across the country. Indeed, recent EPI research finds that equalizing collective bargaining rights across all states by repealing RTW laws that affect private employees and ensuring collective bargaining rights for public employees would increase national union density by almost 50% (from 9.9 to 14.4%) (Shierholz et al. 2026). States should also consider passing constitutional amendments that affirm collective bargaining rights and explicitly bar RTW-style restrictions, such as the 2022 Workers’ Rights Amendment in Illinois (Sherer 2026).</p>
<p>At the federal level, lawmakers should pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act. The PRO Act is designed to address major weaknesses of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which has been severely eroded by amendments and court decisions. Among many other reforms, the PRO Act would eliminate the option for states to maintain anti-union RTW laws—restoring full bargaining rights to workers in all states as intended when the NLRA was originally passed in 1935 (McNicholas, Poydock, and Rhinehart 2021). Since its first introduction in 2019, the PRO Act has passed the House of Representatives twice with bipartisan support (Shierholz et al. 2026).</p>
<p><span class="TextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0" data-contrast='auto'><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">In addition to</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> proposed PRO Act reforms</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">that</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> would enable</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">newly unionized workers </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">to</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">pursue</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> arbitration to achieve a first contract (if an employer fails to negotiate in good faith)</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">, federal labor law</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> should set a minimum standard that </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">such</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> contracts include a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">To f</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">urther</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> expand</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> the benefits of collective </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW49082779 BCX0">bargaining</span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed SCXW49082779 BCX0">,</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">Congress should amend the NLRA to require </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">d</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">efault collective bargaining</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> at</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> any</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> firm </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">where</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> CEO-to-worker pay ratios exceed 100</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">times what a typical worker makes in their industry</span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0"> (</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">as this ratio would be one proxy for </span><span class="NormalTextRun ContextualSpellingAndGrammarErrorV2Themed CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">whether</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0"> conditions at an employer are particularly unequal</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">)</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW49082779 BCX0"> </span><span class="NormalTextRun SCXW49082779 BCX0">(Shierholz et al. 2026)</span><span class="NormalTextRun CommentStart CommentHighlightPipeRest CommentHighlightRest SCXW49082779 BCX0">.</span></span><span class="EOP CommentHighlightPipeRest SCXW49082779 BCX0" data-ccp-props='{&quot;134233117&quot;:false,&quot;134233118&quot;:false,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:1,&quot;335551620&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:0,&quot;335559737&quot;:0,&quot;335559738&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:278}'>&nbsp;</span></p>
<p>Legislators at both the state and federal level should also look to the list of anti-worker laws that are typically found in RTW states for more opportunities to rebalance unequal power in the labor market and improve wages and working conditions. These policies include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Raising the minimum wage;</li>
<li>Banning noncompete agreements;</li>
<li>Strengthening federal unemployment insurance guidelines and state UI systems;</li>
<li>Removing state restrictions that preempt local governments from raising wages and strengthening labor standards.</li>
</ul>
<p>These are among just a few of the policy levers states can use to raise wages and standards (EPI 2026b).</p>
<p>Our analysis suggests that repealing anti-union RTW laws and enabling workers to increase unionization levels are key to raising wages, both because RTW laws directly suppress unionization rates (and unions raise wages), and because weakening unions limits workers’ collective ability to shape other public policies.</p>
<h2><strong>Acknowledgements</strong></h2>
<p>The authors are grateful to Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Hilary Wething, and Ben Zipperer for their helpful comments and expertise.</p>
<h2><strong>Appendix</strong></h2>


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<a name="Appendix-Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-324428 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324428" data-anchor="Appendix-Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324428-35915-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-324432 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324432" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324432-35916-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-324246 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="324246" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/324246-35917-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> See Appendix Figure A for RTW status. As of 2026, these states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> States are categorized as “RTW” or “non-RTW” based on their status as of 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Authors’ analysis of prevailing wage laws from DOL (2023) and state legislative websites.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Authors’ analysis of noncompete restriction policies from EIG (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Authors’ analysis of minimum wage data from EPI (2026c).</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> Authors’ analysis of pay transparency laws from GovDocs (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Authors’ analysis of UI recipiency rate data from DOL-ETA.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Authors’ analysis of Medicaid expansion policies from KFF (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Authors’ analysis of uninsurance rates by state, 2023 through 2025, from Carter (2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Authors’ analysis of per-pupil education spending data from NCES-NPEFS (2024).</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Authors’ analysis of paid family and medical leave policies from Wielk (2026).</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Prior to 2012, the last state to change its status was Oklahoma in 2001.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> This analysis builds on earlier work by Gould and Kimball (2015); see the report for a full description of the methodology and list of controls.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> Interpreting the results from these semilogarithmic functions requires utilizing the exponential function on the coefficient. Specific to the binary variable coefficient (β1) for RTW, the percent change in workers’ wages resulting from a state being RTW can be calculated by the formula: 100*[exp(β1)-1]. Typically, the result of this equation will be very close to the coefficient itself but will differ more as the coefficient becomes larger. We show the coefficient in the first row of Table 1 and the exponentiated result as a percent in the third row.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Full regression results for covariates in all three models can be found in Appendix Table 2.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> Because the 2025 BEA RPP data were not yet available at the time of publication, we assign an average of 2022–2024 data to all years in our sample (2023–2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> Gould and Kimball (2015) classify Indiana as non-RTW as its RTW law had just taken effect.</p>
<p data-note_number='18'><a href="#_ref18" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note18">18. </a> We do not control for state-level fixed effects, as Douglas (2024) suggested, because state-level fixed effects perfectly correlate with RTW status and would deem our results uninterpretable.</p>
<h2><strong>References</strong></h2>
<p>Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Price Parities by State and Metro Area: All items (BEA-RPP). Various years [Release date: February 19, 2026]. Public data series accessed via the&nbsp;<a href="https://apps.bea.gov/itable/?ReqID=70&amp;step=1&amp;_gl=1*7wagie*_ga*OTAyNDAxOTEuMTc3NjE5NjE5NA..*_ga_J4698JNNFT*czE3ODYwMjY3NDgkbzE3JGcxJHQxNzg2MDI3MzgxJGo2MCRsMCRoMA..#eyJhcHBpZCI6NzAsInN0ZXBzIjpbMSwyOSwyNSwzMSwyNiwyNywzMF0sImRhdGEiOltbIlRhYmxlSWQiLCIxMDEiXSxbIk1ham9yX0FyZWEiLCIwIl0sWyJTdGF0ZSIsWyIwIl1dLFsiQXJlYSIsWyJYWCJdXSxbIlN0YXRpc3RpYyIsWyIxIl1dLFsiVW5pdF9vZl9tZWFzdXJlIiwiTGV2ZWxzIl0sWyJZZWFyIixbIjIwMjQiLCIyMDIzIiwiMjAyMiIsIjIwMjEiLCIyMDIwIl1dLFsiWWVhckJlZ2luIiwiLTEiXSxbIlllYXJfRW5kIiwiLTEiXV19">Regional Data interactive tool</a>. Accessed&nbsp;August&nbsp;1, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Carter, Caitlin. 2025. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2025/acs/acsbr-024.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Health Insurance Coverage by State: 2023 and 2024</a>.” U.S. Census Bureau, September 11, 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2024.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-racism-part1/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Evolution of the Southern Economic Development Strategy: Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: Part One</em></a>.&nbsp;Economic Policy Institute, May 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Dahl,&nbsp;B. Gordon, and Matthew Knepper.&nbsp;2026. “<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag056" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs: Evidence from Multi-state Firms</a>.” <em>The Review of Economic Studies,</em>&nbsp;rdag056.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag056" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdag056</a>.</p>
<p>Dasgupta, Kabir, and Zofsha Merchant. 2023. “<a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/understanding-workers-financial-wellbeing-in-states-with-right-to-work-laws-20230908.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Understanding Workers&#8217; Financial Wellbeing in States with Right-to-Work Laws</a>.”&nbsp;<em>FEDS&nbsp;Notes</em>&nbsp;(The Federal Reserve),&nbsp;September 8, 2023.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). 2023. “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/state/prevailing-wages" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dollar Threshold Amount for Contract Coverage Under State Prevailing Wage Laws</a>.” Last modified January 1, 2023.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (DOL-ETA). Various years. Unemployment Insurance Chartbook. Public data series accessed via&nbsp;<a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/chartbook.asp" target="_blank" rel="noopener">the interactive tool</a>. Accessed August 6, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Douglas, Christopher C. 2024.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.mackinac.org/s2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Right-to-Work States Do Not Have Lower Wages</em></a>.&nbsp;Mackinac Center, December 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Innovation Group (EIG). 2026. “<a href="https://eig.org/state-noncompete-map/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">State Noncompete Law Tracker</a>.” Last modified March 24, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/preemption-map/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Workers’ Rights Preemption in the U.S.</a>”&nbsp;Last modified February 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026a. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 2026.7.8, <a href="https://www.mackinac.org/s2024-11" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://microdata.epi.org</a>.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026b. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">Holding the Line: State solutions to the U.S. Worker Rights Crisis</a></em>.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2026c.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Minimum Wage Tracker</a>.”&nbsp;Last Modified July 1, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Fortin, Nicole, Thomas Lemieux, and Neil Lloyd. 2022. “<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Right-to-Work Laws, Unionization, and Wage Setting</a>.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no.&nbsp;30098,&nbsp;June&nbsp;2022.&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098" target="_blank" rel="noopener">http://www.nber.org/papers/w30098</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Glynn,&nbsp;Sarah Jane. 2020.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/rising-cost-inaction-work-family-policies/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Rising Cost of Inaction on Work-Family Policies</a>.”&nbsp;<em>Center for American Progress</em>,&nbsp;January 21, 2020.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Will&nbsp;Kimball.&nbsp;2015.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/right-to-work-states-have-lower-wages" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>“Right-to-Work” States Still Have Lower Wages</em></a><em>.</em>&nbsp;Economic Policy Institute, April 2015.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise,&nbsp;and&nbsp;Heidi&nbsp;Shierholz.&nbsp;2011.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp299/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2011.&nbsp;</p>
<p>GovDocs. 2026. “<a href="https://www.govdocs.com/pay-transparency-laws/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Pay Transparency Laws by State and Province</a>.” Last modified July 2026.</p>
<p>Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander, and Alix Gould-Werth. 2020. <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/labor-organizations-and-unemployment-insurance-a-virtuous-circle-supporting-u-s-workers-voices-and-reducing-disparities-in-benefits/"><em>Labor Organizations and Unemployment Insurance: A Virtuous Circle Supporting U.S. Workers’ Voices and Reducing Disparities in Benefits</em></a>. Washington Center for Equitable Growth, October 2020.</p>
<p>Jackson, C. Kirabo, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico. 2016.&nbsp;“<a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">The Effects of School Spending on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms</a>.” <em>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</em> 131, no. 1: 157–218. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv036</a>.</p>
<p>KFF. 2026. “<a href="https://www.kff.org/medicaid/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions</a>.” Last modified May 21, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Margaret Poydock, and Lynn Rhinehart. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/pro-act-problem-solution-chart/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">How the PRO Act restores workers’ right to unionize</a>” (fact sheet).&nbsp;<em>Economic Policy Institute</em>, February 4, 2021.&nbsp;</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine,&nbsp;Margaret&nbsp;Poydock,&nbsp;Heidi&nbsp;Shierholz, and&nbsp;Hilary Wething. 2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-arent-just-good-for-workers-they-also-benefit-communities-and-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Unions Aren’t Just Good for Workers—They Also Benefit Communities and Democracy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2025.</p>
<p>National Center for Education Statistics, National Public Education Financial Survey (NCES-NPEFS). 2024. Public data series accessed via the&nbsp;<a href="https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/files.asp#Fiscal:1,LevelId:2,Page:1" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Common Core of Data database</a>. Accessed July 1, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Rinz,&nbsp;Kevin, and&nbsp;David&nbsp;Wasser.&nbsp;2026. “<a href="https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Unemployment Insurance Generosity and Wage Determination</a>.”&nbsp;Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland&nbsp;Working Paper no.&nbsp;26-11,&nbsp;May&nbsp;2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.26509/frbc-wp-202611</a>.</p>
<p>Shedge, Nirav.&nbsp;2025.&nbsp;<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5649250" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Pay Transparency Laws and Wage Dynamics: Evidence from Colorado</em></a><em>.&nbsp;</em>Social Science Research Network, November 2025.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer. 2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rights-to-unionize-and-collectively-bargain-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Rights to Unionize and Collectively Bargain: State Solutions to the U.S. Workers Rights Crisis</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, February 2026.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer, Emma Cohn, and Ruby Ahdoot. 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/updated-epi-preemption-tracker/">Updated EPI Tracker Shows More States Obstructing Progress on Workers’ Rights: Harmful Preemption Laws are Increasing Inequality and Repressing Democracy.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), March 6, 2025.</p>
<p>Sherer, Jennifer, Nina Mast, Elise Gould, and Emma Cohn. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/everything-you-need-to-know-about-anti-union-right-to-work-laws"><em>Everything You Need to Know About Anti-Union “Right-to-Work&#8221; Laws</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, forthcoming 2026.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi.&nbsp;2024.&nbsp;“<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-prepared-for-the-u-s-senate-subcommittee-on-economic-policy-for-a-hearing-titled-banning-noncompete-agreements/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Banning Noncompete Agreements</a>.” Testimony&nbsp;before&nbsp;the U.S. Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcommittee on Economic Policy, July 30, 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Shierholz,&nbsp;Heidi,&nbsp;Celine McNicholas, Josh Bivens, Jennifer Sherer, Ben Zipperer, and Margaret Poydock.&nbsp;2026.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-case-for-tripling-union-membership-how-rebuilding-union-power-would-strengthen-workers-the-economy-and-our-democracy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>The Case for Tripling Union Membership: How Rebuilding Union Power Would Strengthen Workers, the Economy, and Our Democracy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, July 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Starr,&nbsp;Evan.&nbsp;2019.&nbsp;“<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0019793919826060" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete</a>.” <em>ILR Review</em>&nbsp;72, no. 4 (August): 783–817.&nbsp;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919826060" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793919826060</a>.</p>
<p>Wielk,&nbsp;Emily. 2026. “<a href="https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/state-paid-family-leave-laws-across-the-u-s/">State Paid Family Leave Laws Across the U.S.</a>” Bipartisan Policy Center. Last updated April 23, 2026.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Zipperer, Ben. 2026. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/setting-high-standards-for-a-federal-minimum-wage-raising-the-wage-to-two-thirds-of-the-national-median-wage-would-lift-pay-for-nearly-40-million-workers/"><em>Setting High Standards for a Federal Minimum Wage</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 2026.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>EPI comment on DOL&#8217;s proposed rule on &#8220;Employee or Independent Contractor Status&#8221;</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-dols-proposed-rule-on-employee-or-independent-contractor-status/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Apr 2026 17:58:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Heidi Shierholz, Samantha Sanders, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=320850</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Submitted via Daniel Navarrete, Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Wage and Hour U.S. Department of Labor, Room 200 Constitution Avenue Washington, D.C.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Submitted via <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical&nbsp;</a></em></p>
<p>Daniel Navarrete, Director<br />
Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation<br />
Wage and Hour Division<br />
U.S. Department of Labor, Room S-3502<br />
200 Constitution Avenue NW<br />
Washington, D.C. 20210</p>
<p><strong>Comments on </strong><a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/27/2026-03962/employee-or-independent-contractor-status-under-the-fair-labor-standards-act-family-and-medical"><strong>RIN 1235-AA46</strong></a><strong>: Employee or Independent Contractor Status under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, and Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act</strong></p>
<p>Dear Director Navarrete:</p>
<p>We submit these comments from the <a href="https://www.epi.org/">Economic Policy Institute</a> (EPI) on the Department of Labor’s (“Department” or “DOL”) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”) regarding the standard for determining who is an employee and who is an independent contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“MSPA”).</p>
<p>The Economic Policy Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank created in 1986 to include the needs of low- and middle-income workers in economic policy discussions. EPI conducts research and analysis on the economic status of working America, proposes public policies that protect and improve the economic conditions of low- and middle-income workers, and assesses policies with respect to how well they further those goals.</p>
<p>We strongly oppose the Department’s rule as proposed. We urge the Department to withdraw this rule and instead allow the long-standing test for determining employee status under the FLSA to stand.</p>
<p>EPI has conducted extensive research and analysis over the years on the harms of worker misclassification. As we have outlined, workers classified as independent contractors have no right to earn the federal minimum wage, or to earn overtime pay. They lose eligibility for unemployment insurance if they lose their work, and to workers’ compensation if they are injured on the job. They are less likely to receive employer-provided job benefits, such as health insurance and retirement benefits. They lose the right to paid sick or family leave in states and localities that extend those rights, and they would lose the right to even unpaid, but job-protected, family and medical leave under FMLA. Workers classified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/">We attach here an April 2026 EPI report</a><a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> estimating the concrete economic costs of misclassification for 11 commonly misclassified types of jobs, among those most likely to be negatively affected by this rule. These include lower-wage, labor intensive jobs such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers. Workers in these and other occupations stand to lose wages, benefits, and the basic labor protections they should be owed under the FLSA.</p>
<p>The FLSA has a plain-language definition of “employ,” which “includes to suffer or permit to work.” This is a deliberately broad definition that was intended to provide the FLSA’s protections to most workers. The NPRM also seeks to once again upend the clear, long-standing “economic reality” test, which examines multiple factors to get to the central issue of worker classification: is the worker <em>truly</em> in business for themselves, or do they depend economically on finding work in the business of others, under the control and terms of the employer?</p>
<p>Instead of examining all of the relevant factors in a worker’s situation, the NPRM proposes elevating the factors of the level of control the employer exerts, and the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss, above all others in making a determination about whether someone is truly in business for themselves.</p>
<p>This would fail to account for the economic realities of many working relationships: for instance, would the primary work of the employer be able to get done without the worker? How permanent or exclusive is the work being performed—is there a fixed ending date? Does the worker invest in their own tools and equipment, marketing, or business plan, or is it the employer making those investments? Does the worker rely on the employer for training on how to get the job done? All of these questions fall under the factors that the NPRM would deprioritize—even though they provide important information about whether or not someone is truly in business for themselves, and thus that the employer doesn’t have an obligation to them under the FLSA.</p>
<p>This would narrow the definition of who is a covered employee under these three statutes. DOL’s NPRM will encourage misclassification schemes and a race to the bottom, where employers will be able to reclassify their employees as independent contractors and evade their obligations under these laws. Further, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common.</p>
<h3>An analysis of the proposed rule’s potential costs to workers</h3>
<p>In the proposed rule, the Department egregiously fails to estimate the transfers between employers, workers, and the social insurance system that would occur if this proposal were finalized. The requirements that agencies must follow as a part of the rulemaking process are very clear, and among them is the requirement that agencies must assess all quantifiable costs and benefits “to the fullest extent that these can be usefully estimated.”<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> There is no question that DOL&nbsp;could&nbsp;have produced estimates; in what follows, we show that it is straightforward to produce estimates using data researchers routinely use and taking a methodological approach that is in the spirit of estimates the Department of Labor undertakes on a regular basis. One plausible explanation for why DOL left out the required estimate is that any good-faith estimate would have shown this rule will result in a substantial transfer from workers and the social insurance system to employers.</p>
<p>The Department only briefly touches on potential benefits to workers from their proposal. DOL estimates a 1-3% increase in the total number of independent contractors as a result of their proposed rule.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> However, DOL appears to assume that this increase will come entirely from people who were otherwise not engaging in paid work entering the workforce anew as independent contractors. This means the Department also assumes that there will not be significant reclassification of workers who are currently employees to independent contractor status. Given what we know about the scale of misclassification already occurring under current law, this seems to be, at best, a woefully naive understanding of what employers might do when faced with a weaker standard sanctioned by DOL. Further, our analysis of commonly-misclassified occupations shows that the independent contractor version of paid work actually has less value for the worker than the employee-status version that the same worker could find – in other words, the worker still bears costs because the independent contractor version of the work likely offers lower pay, fewer benefits, and fewer protections.</p>
<p>In this comment we will estimate these transfers from workers and the social insurance system to employers. The basic structure of this analysis is to take (1) the estimated change in the value of a job to a worker if they are classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and (2) the estimated change in payments to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee, and then multiply these figures by the estimated number of workers who will shift to independent contractor status if this rule is finalized. This approach will yield the aggregate impact of the rule on workers and on social insurance system coffers.</p>
<p>In a recent publication, EPI estimated (1) and (2) above for workers in lower-wage, labor intensive occupations most likely affected by the rule, such as call center workers, landscaping workers, janitors and cleaners, home health aides, truck drivers, delivery workers, manicurists, housekeeping cleaners, retail sales workers, security guards, and construction workers.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a></p>
<p>The cost to workers in these occupations of being classified as an independent contractor instead of a payroll employee ranges from $6,294 annually for retail sales workers (under extremely conservative assumptions), to $23,266 annually for truck drivers (under less conservative assumptions). Similarly, the annual cost to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor instead of an employee ranges from $600 for manicurists (again under extremely conservative assumptions), to $3,046 for construction workers (again under less conservative assumptions).</p>
<p>Given that we do not have a way to determine where the average impact for those affected by the proposed rule falls in those broad ranges, we simply take the lower bound in both cases, to be extremely conservative. <strong>Thus, we assume that the cost to workers is $6,294 annually, and the cost to social insurance programs is $600 per reclassified worker annually</strong><strong>. </strong></p>
<p>It should be noted that these lower-bound estimates assume that workers classified as independent contractors are paid not just the full regular pay of a W-2 employee, but also are fully compensated for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This is, however, highly unlikely in these occupations. The theory that businesses will not be able to pay less in total compensation to workers if their status shifts from employee to independent contractor—that their base pay will rise to make up for a reduction in benefits—is based on the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets. There is broad and growing evidence that perfect competition is rare, and that most labor markets do not function competitively—particularly low-wage labor markets like those under consideration here, where workers are more likely to lack the power to bargain for higher wages to compensate for their loss of benefits and increase in taxes when they become independent contractors.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Further, very low-wage employees whose wage is elevated by the minimum wage could easily see their wage drop when, as independent contractors, they no longer legally must be paid the minimum wage.</p>
<h4>How will the share of the workforce who are payroll employees and the share of the workforce that are independent contractors change as a result of this rule?</h4>
<p>To begin to answer that question, we need to know how many independent contractors there currently are. There is a great deal of uncertainty around this number (the Department notes that “there are a variety of estimates of the number of independent contractors, and these span a wide range based on methodologies and how the population is defined”).<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> The July 2023 Contingent Worker Supplement finds that there were 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. This number, however, drastically underestimates the total number of independent contractors by not including workers who do independent contracting on the side, in addition to a payroll job. The Department makes a correction for this issue and estimates that there are 24.8 million individuals working as contractors at a given time. For the sake of the calculations in this comment, we will limit the analysis to the 11.9 million workers the CWS finds are independent contractors in their main job, since workers who do independent contracting as a side job likely work fewer hours and therefore may lose less than the $6,294 we are conservatively assuming workers whose status changes as a result of this rule lose annually. It should be noted that this means we are leaving out many millions of independent contractors and our estimates will, as a result, be extremely conservative for this reason as well.&nbsp;</p>
<h4>How much will independent contracting increase as a result of this rule?</h4>
<p>The Department’s proposal would potentially allow companies to legally argue that workers who are now misclassified as independent contractors, or who are working “off the books,” would be legitimately classified as independent contractors under the narrow terms of the proposal. As such, one approach would be to use the percentage of workers misclassified or working off the books under current law to estimate the number of workers who could be reclassified as independent contractors under the proposed rule. However, due to severe data constraints, estimates of the share of workers who are misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books are limited. A 2020 paper estimates that between 12.4% and 20.5% of workers in the construction industry are either misclassified as independent contractors or working off the books.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> Conservatively assuming that the bottom of this range applies more broadly to the lowest-paid quartile of the U.S. labor market, that is<strong> 5.1 million low wage workers who may be affected by this rule</strong>.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a> Of course, these are workers who are already not getting the benefit of being a payroll employee, so the economic impacts described above would not apply. However, this exercise does provide a broad sense of the potential scope of workers affected. Further, even these workers lose something of value under this rule given the current enforcement regime, namely the legal right to the wages and benefits they would receive if they were properly classified. We do not attempt to quantify this effect.</p>
<p>To be exceedingly conservative, we will simply assume that there will be an increase as a result of this rule of 5% in the number of workers who are independent contractors in their main job.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> This translates into an increase of just 595,000 workers who are independent contractors at their main job, given the conservative CWS estimate of 11.9 million workers who are independent contractors in their main job. Multiplying that by our conservative estimate that these workers would lose $6,294 per year yields <strong>an aggregate loss to workers of over $3.7 billion annuall</strong>y. Further, <strong>social insurance funds would lose at least $357 million annually</strong> (595,000 times $600) in the form of reduced employer contributions, meaning this rule also results in a transfer of at least $357 million annually from social insurance funds to employers.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a></p>
<p>The NPRM would also have ripple effects in lost benefits and protections that employees are entitled to under other statues. The proposed rule would also extend the weakened definition of employee status to the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act (MSPA). Farm workers are already among the most vulnerable, low-paid workers in the U.S., and often face challenges at worksites including poor workplace safety conditions. If farm employers and farm labor contractors have the ability to offload more of their basic responsibilities under MSPA, more farm workers will be at risk of classification as independent contractors and lose even their basic rights under MSPA<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a>, such as to be paid on time or have their working conditions disclosed. More workers would also be at risk of losing access to the right to take job-protected, unpaid family and medical leave under FMLA, which also references the definition of “employee” under the FLSA to determine eligibility for FMLA coverage. The National Partnership for Women and Families has estimated that 15 million workers took advantage of FMLA leave in 2025 alone.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> Protections for break time for nursing mothers—recently expanded under the PUMP Act—are also tied to FLSA employee status. Losing the right to take job-protected time off for illness or the birth of a child, the right to take a break to pump milk, the right to know when you will be paid and to be paid on time—these all specifically conflict with DOL&#8217;s stated interest in improving flexibility and satisfaction for workers. This is false flexibility.</p>
<h3><strong>The reality of flexible work </strong></h3>
<p>The Department focuses on “flexibility and satisfaction” as important non-pecuniary attributes that workers may trade income to receive. However, it is difficult to imagine that there are a meaningful number of workers who would get more satisfaction from doing the same job for substantially less compensation as an independent contractor than for substantially more compensation as a payroll employee. Many workers indeed may value flexibility, but notably, employers are able to provide a huge amount of flexibility to payroll employees if they choose to; the “inherent” tradeoff between flexibility and payroll employment is greatly exaggerated. Workers also highly value other factors, like income stability, which are much less prevalent among independent contractors and are not taken into account here.</p>
<p>In 2024, EPI published a report reviewing the available research and survey data on worker preferences regarding flexibility, stability, and predictability.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> While workers do often prefer flexibility and control over their own schedules, they also want stable, full-time work with predictable pay and benefits.</p>
<p>Employers often incorrectly claim that the FLSA prevents flexible scheduling, but employers control scheduling decisions and can organize work schedules to meet FLSA’s requirements. Employers have long been able to provide flexible schedules and comply with wage and hour laws, and flexible schedules have been negotiated by employers and unions in compliance with the law. Scheduling decisions are the employer’s prerogative (in negotiation with their workers’ union, if there is one), and they can and do set and change schedules in accordance with production demands. Independent contractor status is hardly needed for employers to provide their workers with flexibility.</p>
<p>In conclusion, we urge DOL to withdraw this rule as proposed. The Department should not be in the business of weakening labor protections standards, and should instead seek to vigorously enforce laws against misclassification.</p>
<p>Sincerely,</p>
<p>Samantha Sanders<br />
Director of Government Affairs &amp; Advocacy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<p>Heidi Shierholz, Ph.D.<br />
President<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<p>Valerie Wilson, Ph.D.<br />
Director, Program on Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy<br />
Economic Policy Institute</p>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Maeve P. Carey, <a href="https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf"><em>Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Requirements in the Rulemaking Process</em></a>, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 2014.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 9967.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Ismael Cid-Martinez et al., <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/"><em>Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</em></a><em>, </em>Economic Policy Institute, April 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Alan Manning Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); Anna Sokolova and Todd Sorensen, <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/monopsony-in-labor-markets-a-meta-analysis/"><em>Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Meta-Analysis</em></a>, Washington Center for Equitable Growth, February 2020; Arindrajit Dube, Jeff Jacobs, Suresh Naidu, and Siddharth Suri, “Monopsony in Online Labor Markets,” American Economic Review: Insights 2, no. 1 (March 2020): 33-46, <a href="https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150">https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/aeri.20180150</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> 91 Fed. Reg. 9962.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Russell Ormiston, Dale Belman, and Mark Erlich, <a href="http://iceres.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/ICERES-Methodology-for-Wage-and-Tax-Fraud.pdf"><em>An Empirical Methodology to Estimate the Incidence and Costs of Payroll Fraud in the Construction Industry</em></a>, Institute for Construction Economics Research, January 2020.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Data from the Current Population Survey from the Bureau of Labor Statistics find that there were 163.0 million workers in the U.S. in the first quarter of 2026; 5.1 million = 163.0 million * .25 * .124.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> A 5% increase is a conservative assumption, given that the Department is proposing to amend the five-part economic realities test—which has always been interpreted by the Supreme Court in its totality, not weighing any one factor more than another—in a way that will place undue weight on two factors and then narrows those two factors further, making it more likely that workers will be classified as independent contractors and as a result likely leading to a substantial increase in the number of independent contractors.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Some might argue that social insurance funds wouldn’t be hurt by not having employers pay into unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation because independent contractors aren’t eligible for those benefits. However, low-paid independent contractors who lose their contracts and are without work, or get hurt on the job, will be likely to need to depend on safety net programs to survive, so the social insurance system as a whole would still be depleted.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Wage &amp; Hour Division, U.S. Department of Labor, “<a href="https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/fact-sheets/35-mspa-joint-employment">Fact Sheet #35: Joint Employment and Independent Contractors Under the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act</a>,” revised January 2020.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> National Partnership for Women &amp; Families. 2026. <a href="https://nationalpartnership.org/report/fmla-key-facts/"><em>Key Facts: The Family and Medical Leave Act</em></a> (fact sheet), January 2026.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> Margaret Poydock, Lynn Rhinehart, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/flexible-work/"><em>Flexible Work: What Workers, Especially Low-Wage Workers, Really Want And How Best To Provide It</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.</p>
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		<title>Misclassifying workers as independent contractors is costly for workers and social insurance systems</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-as-independent-contractors-is-costly-for-workers-and-social-insurance-systems/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 09:00:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ismael Cid-Martinez, Margaret Poydock, Nina Mast, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=319535</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Read fact sheets by state What is The type of misclassification addressed in this report occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="box clearfix  box" style="">
<h2><strong>Key findings:</strong></h2>
<ul>
<li>This analysis estimates the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 commonly misclassified jobs. We find, for example, that a typical construction worker misclassified as an independent contractor would lose as much as $20,399 in annual income and job benefits compared with what they would have earned as an employee. A typical truck driver, if misclassified as an independent contractor, would lose as much as $23,266 annually.</li>
<li>Lost compensation due to misclassification varies by state. Estimated annual per-worker costs in lost compensation are as high as $31,326 for truck drivers in New Jersey. On average, misclassified workers stand to lose more in higher-wage states and occupations because W-2 earnings are greater, but losses are substantial in all states.</li>
<li>Misclassification can happen in any occupation. However, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common, like most of the 11 occupations analyzed in this report.</li>
<li>Misclassification shifts the full burden of social insurance—like Social Security and Medicare—to workers, while also reducing the total revenues received by the social insurance system. We estimate that social insurance systems can lose up to roughly 30% of per-worker revenue when workers are misclassified as independent contractors.</li>
<li>In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in at least 12 states proposed or passed legislation to address worker misclassification. Most recent state efforts have focused on increasing accountability of employers that misclassify workers, bolstering remedies for workers subject to illegal misclassification, and strengthening enforcement capacity.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h4><a class="epi-button" href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet/"><strong>Read fact sheets by state here.</strong></a></h4>
<h2><strong>What is misclassification?</strong></h2>
<p>The type of misclassification addressed in this report occurs when an employer wrongly classifies an employee as an independent contractor. The problem of workers being misclassified as independent contractors is pervasive and widespread. An analysis from the National Employment Law Project focusing on state-level reports on misclassification estimated that as many as 10–30% of employers misclassify their workers.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>The way a worker is classified has serious implications for their labor rights and economic security. Federal, state, and local labor laws provide extensive protections for employees that are not available to independent contractors. For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>When a worker is misclassified as an independent contractor, they are stripped of minimum wage and overtime protections.</li>
<li>These misclassified workers are no longer eligible for unemployment insurance or workers’ compensation.</li>
<li>They do not qualify for paid&nbsp;sick or family leave, even in places where those benefits are statutorily prescribed for employees, and they are extremely unlikely to receive employer-provided health insurance or retirement benefits.</li>
<li>They are no longer protected by the National Labor Relations Act, which ensures workers’ rights to form unions and bargain collectively to improve their working conditions.</li>
<li>In most states, misclassified workers are not covered by anti-discrimination and sexual harassment protections.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a></li>
<li>Workers misclassified as independent contractors also must assume the full financial cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions, rather than split it evenly with their employer.</li>
</ul>
<p>Losing these benefits and protections leaves independent contractors in a far more vulnerable position than employees when it comes to their basic rights on the job. Employers have argued that many workers prefer being classified as independent contractors because they value “flexibility” over fundamental labor rights. But this so-called flexibility is often illusory, given the degree of control many employers retain over workers and their schedules.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<p>Misclassification remains pervasive in part because its costs to individual workers can be hard to quantify and thus easy to obscure. Prior research has estimated the costs of misclassification by quantifying the number of workers misclassified; the amount of wage theft experienced by misclassified workers; and the loss in federal and state tax revenues resulting from employers not paying payroll taxes and workers’ compensation insurance.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> This report presents estimates of two types of costs caused by misclassification for 11 commonly misclassified occupations:</p>
<ol>
<li>What workers lose when they are misclassified—that is, the difference in the value of a job to a worker if the worker is classified as an independent contractor rather than as an employee; and</li>
<li>What social insurance funds lose when workers are misclassified—that is, the difference in payments to social insurance funds if a worker is classified as an independent contractor rather than as an employee.</li>
</ol>
<p>Misclassification can happen to any worker. However, because of occupational segregation and other labor market disparities, people of color, women, and immigrants—and people at the intersections of these categories—are more likely to be in occupations where misclassification is common, such as most of the 11 occupations investigated in this analysis (see <strong>Appendix Table 1</strong>). Any policy conversations about worker classification status should center these types of occupations, as workers classified as independent contractors in these occupations are often not genuine independent contractors with full control over their work conditions and are more likely to be exposed to the harms of reduced earnings and loss of labor protections.</p>
<h2><strong>The cost to workers</strong></h2>
<p><strong>Table 1&nbsp;</strong>presents estimates of the cost to workers of being misclassified as an independent contractor for 11 occupations that are highly prone to misclassification.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a></p>
<p>For example, when classified as an employee, the typical construction worker had annual earnings of $58,360 in 2025 (column 1, top row of Table 1). This includes the average value of supplemental pay—overtime, shift differentials, and paid time off. When we also include the value of health insurance and retirement plans and subtract the worker contribution to Social Security and Medicare, the full value of the job to the worker&nbsp;when classified as an employee<em>&nbsp;</em>rises to $62,567 (column 2, top row).&nbsp;But when the typical construction worker is misclassified as an independent contractor—and therefore loses access to legal protections, supplemental pay, and employer contributions to Social Security and Medicare—we estimate that the value of that job falls to between $42,169 and $49,382 (columns 3 and 4, top row). That estimated range depends on the assumptions we make about the degree to which the employer increases the base pay of independent contractors, if at all, to offset the fact that the worker does not have access to many rights and benefits.</p>
<p>The estimates in columns 3 and 4 are based on two scenarios, described below, that together define the endpoints of this range and establish plausible estimates of the cost of misclassification to workers. It should be noted, however, that this range is conservative because it does not account for the loss independent contractors face of many rights associated with being an employee—for example, it excludes the impact of the loss of rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, such as the right to union representation.</p>
<p>In both scenarios, we assume that the worker—if classified as an independent contractor—receives the full regular pay of a W-2 employee but does not receive supplemental pay (like overtime or paid time off), must pay the full combined employer and employee contribution to Social Security and Medicare (15.3% of earnings), and must cover paperwork costs like invoicing, bookkeeping, and small business tax filings.</p>
<h2><strong>Scenario 1: No compensation for health and retirement benefits</strong></h2>
<p>In the first scenario, we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This generates our low estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs—along with the <em>high</em> estimate of the <em>cost</em> to workers of independent contractor jobs—in Table 1.</p>
<p>Under this assumption, we conservatively estimate the net value of a construction job done as an independent contractor falls to $42,169 per year. This is $20,399—or 32.6%—less than if that worker were a W-2 employee ($62,567 in column 2). Notably, misclassified truck drivers also see a massive decline in net value of the job. As a W-2 employee, a truck driving job is worth $64,474, while an independent contractor receiving the same wage, but no supplemental pay or benefits, earns $41,208, which is $23,266 less.</p>
<p class="chart-shortcode">

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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-319517 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319517" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319517-35661-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</p>
<h2><strong>Scenario 2: Full compensation for health and retirement benefits</strong></h2>
<p>In the second scenario, we assume employers fully compensate independent contractors for the value of health insurance and retirement benefits. This generates our high estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs, along with the low estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs, in Table 1.</p>
<p>Access to these benefits increases the annual earnings of an independent contractor, but not to the level of a W-2 employee. For a construction worker, the net value of the job as an independent contractor is only $49,382, or more than $13,000 below the net value of the same job done as an employee. For a truck driver, the switch to independent contractor status would cost $13,760.</p>
<p>Table 1 also shows estimates for nine other occupations with lower annual earnings than construction workers and truck drivers. As W-2 employees, these workers had median annual earnings between $33,690 and $44,140. Under the estimates in scenario 1 (no compensation for health and retirement benefits), being misclassified as an independent contractor would cost between $8,858 (retail sales workers) and $17,939 (light truck delivery drivers). Under scenario 2 (full compensation for health and retirement benefits), the costs would be $6,294 and $10,634, respectively.</p>
<h2><strong>Mapping cost to workers by state</strong></h2>
<p><em><strong>See <a href="https://www.epi.org/worker-misclassification-fact-sheet">fact sheets by state</a>. </strong></em></p>
<p>Because worker pay varies meaningfully across states, we also estimate the cost of misclassification to workers by state. We follow the same methodology we used for our national-level estimates but incorporate state-level data where available.</p>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong>&nbsp;maps the financial penalty that workers face when wrongfully misclassified as independent contractors. This figure uses estimates from scenario 1, where we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. (See&nbsp;<strong>Appendix Table 2 </strong>and&nbsp;<strong>Appendix</strong>&nbsp;<strong>Table 3 </strong>for a detailed breakdown of costs to workers by occupation and state for independent contractors with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits.)</p>
<p>The cost of misclassification ranges from $5,774 annually for housekeeping cleaners in Mississippi to $31,326 for truck drivers in New Jersey.&nbsp;This range of estimates reflects the fact that misclassified workers stand to lose more in higher-wage states and occupations where the W-2 earnings of employees are greater. Even so, losses are substantial across all states. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-319518 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319518" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319518-35662-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2><strong>The cost to social insurance</strong></h2>
<p>Social insurance consists of government programs funded by dedicated payroll taxes paid by workers and/or employers, which entitle workers to benefits when they experience qualifying events—such as reaching retirement age (Social Security and Medicare), being laid off (unemployment insurance), or being injured on the job (workers’ compensation). When a worker is misclassified as an independent contractor, the entire cost of Social Security and Medicare contributions is shifted to the worker.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> Misclassification also renders workers ineligible for participation in state and federal unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation programs.</p>
<p>Misclassification does not just shift the full burden of social insurance to workers—it also reduces the total revenues received by the social insurance system. This occurs for several reasons. First, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation systems receive no contributions from independent contractors—though it is worth noting that this in no way ensures that these workers will not need to rely on public safety net programs if they are laid off or injured on the job. Second, independent contractors in the occupations we analyze may earn less than they would as employees, because, for example, they are no longer legally entitled to the minimum wage, overtime protections, and are highly unlikely to receive any paid time off. Because Social Security contributions are a percentage of earnings (and the taxable maximum is not binding in these occupations), lower pay translates directly into lower contributions.</p>
<p><strong>Table 2</strong>&nbsp;illustrates the impact of worker misclassification on payments to social insurance funds in the 11 occupations analyzed above. For example, the typical construction worker classified as an employee and their employer jointly contributed a total of $10,663 toward these social insurance programs in 2025. When misclassified as an independent contractor, total payments toward social insurance programs fall to between $7,617 and $8,920 per construction worker (using the same two scenarios described above). This represents a decline in social insurance revenues&nbsp;between $1,743 and $3,046 per construction worker per year.</p>
<p>Under our scenario 1 assumptions (where employers do not increase pay to compensate independent contractors for their lack of employer-provided health and retirement benefits), total contributions to social insurance fall from between 21% ($1,220) for manicurists/pedicurists and 29% ($3,046) for construction workers. Under our scenario 2 assumptions (where employers increase pay enough to fully compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits), payments to social insurance drop by somewhat less—10% ($601) for manicurists/pedicurists and 16% ($1,743) for construction workers—due to the higher base pay.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-319516 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319516" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319516-35660-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2><strong>Mapping the cost to social insurance funds by state</strong></h2>
<p>Expanding this methodology to states reveals how misclassification deprives social insurance funds of crucial dollars needed to maintain crucial programs, such as unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation.&nbsp;<strong>Figure B</strong>&nbsp;maps the difference in contributions to social insurance funds between W-2 employees and independent contractors under scenario 1, where we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. The median cost to social insurance funds ranges from $654 per person annually for housekeeping cleaners in Mississippi to $4,008 for construction workers in Hawaii. See&nbsp;<strong>Appendix Table 4</strong><strong>&nbsp;</strong>and&nbsp;<strong>Appendix</strong>&nbsp;<strong>Table 5 </strong>for a detailed breakdown of costs to social insurance funds by occupation and state for the full range of estimates for independent contractors with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits.</p>
<p class="chart-shortcode">

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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-319519 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319519" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319519-35663-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</p>
<h2><strong>Recent state and federal policy changes</strong></h2>
<p><em>Strong statutory language, like the ABC test,&nbsp;provides the legal foundation&nbsp;for&nbsp;identifying&nbsp;misclassification&nbsp;</em></p>
<p>Given the&nbsp;high stakes&nbsp;of misclassification&nbsp;for workers’ access to fundamental rights and protections,&nbsp;embedding strong legal definitions in state and federal law is fundamental to ensuring that employees are not improperly classified as independent contractors.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>The ABC test is the strongest, most protective test for determining employee status. The test establishes a presumption that an individual performing services for an employer is an employee—not an independent contractor—unless the employer can establish three factors:&nbsp;</p>
<ol>
<li>The work is done without the direction and control of the&nbsp;employer;&nbsp;</li>
<li>The work is performed outside the usual course of the employer’s business; and&nbsp;</li>
<li>The work is done by someone who has their&nbsp;own,&nbsp;independent business or trade doing that kind of work.&nbsp;</li>
</ol>
<p>The ABC test differs from&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/?fbclid=IwY2xjawQsHYJleHRuA2FlbQIxMQBicmlkETExRllhY2NtUEVwREt5cGlmc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQQMjIyMDM5MTc4ODIwMDg5MgABHiJ8q4cpIV1Ilgc7Zo6WRP3BkONms53X1725ZIrRtNZ3-SXhxZzf2UizZNz0_aem_XYZSYwHaTCUi3gSL7KNrRg">other “tests” of employee status</a>&nbsp;such as the&nbsp;National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)&nbsp;“common law” test and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) “economic realities” test because the ABC test shifts&nbsp;the presumption to one of employee status, places the burden on the employer to prove independent contractor status, and&nbsp;provides a clear,&nbsp;narrow definition of&nbsp;independent contractor status.&nbsp;In turn, this reduces the likelihood that workers are misclassified and lose protections they should be guaranteed under the law as employees.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>The strength of frameworks used to determine employee status is highly varied across states. At least <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">18 states</a>&nbsp;and the District of Columbia&nbsp;currently use&nbsp;the ABC test for determining employee status for certain workplace laws.&nbsp;Some states have taken action recently. In addition to pursuing strong, innovative&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nelp.org/new-jerseys-worker-classification-crackdown-could-have-broad-impact/">enforcement strategies</a>&nbsp;to combat misclassification,&nbsp;New Jersey’s&nbsp;labor department proposed a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comment-on-new-jerseys-proposed-regulation-codifying-its-interpretation-of-the-states-statutory-abc-test/">new administrative rule</a> in 2025&nbsp;to codify into state law the agency’s existing ABC test for preventing independent contractor misclassification&nbsp;(the rule&nbsp;has since been paused). This year, a&nbsp;<a href="https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4571%20intr.htm&amp;yr=2026&amp;sesstype=RS&amp;i=4571">West Virginia bill</a>&nbsp;proposed establishing a new ABC test&nbsp;into state law.&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, the number of states with&nbsp;ABC tests&nbsp;has decreased in the past decade, with some states <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/state-misclassification-of-workers/">weakening or repealing</a> their statutory definitions as a result of&nbsp;lobbying efforts by&nbsp;digital platform&nbsp;companies&nbsp;(e.g. Uber)&nbsp;and other&nbsp;industries&nbsp;whose business models depend on&nbsp;designating large numbers of workers as “independent contractors.”&nbsp;While most&nbsp;states&nbsp;with ABC tests apply them to&nbsp;determine&nbsp;workers’ eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits,&nbsp;only a few states&nbsp;apply them to wage and hour&nbsp;standards like&nbsp;the minimum wage and overtime compensation, and some states&nbsp;have them in place only for workers in certain&nbsp;occupations.</p>
<p><em>Strong&nbsp;enforcement&nbsp;mechanisms&nbsp;allow lawmakers to protect workers and hold employers accountable&nbsp;</em></p>
<p>While strong legal tests provide&nbsp;a&nbsp;basis&nbsp;for&nbsp;determining&nbsp;whether an employee has been&nbsp;misclassified&nbsp;as&nbsp;an&nbsp;independent contractor,&nbsp;they must be paired with strong enforcement mechanisms to&nbsp;uphold workers’ rights and&nbsp;deter employers from&nbsp;violating the law.&nbsp;Many states are taking steps to&nbsp;strengthen enforcement.&nbsp;In 2025 and 2026, lawmakers in at least 12 states proposed or passed legislation to address worker misclassification. For example, Delaware&nbsp;<a href="https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/141896">passed a law</a>&nbsp;in 2025 to hold&nbsp;contractors liable when their subcontractors misclassify workers,&nbsp;Colorado&nbsp;<a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/HB25-1001">enacted a&nbsp;law</a>&nbsp;to penalize employers that willfully misclassify workers, and Minnesota&nbsp;<a href="https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/94/2025/1/SF/17/">enacted a law</a> requiring the state labor agency to study the impact of misclassification on workers and state revenue. In 2026, lawmakers in at least eight additional states<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> have proposed legislation to address worker misclassification, and two states (Virginia and Washington) have sent approved legislation to the governor.&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, attacks also continued in 2026.&nbsp;Bills in several states proposed weakening&nbsp;existing ABC tests and excluding certain occupations&nbsp;from being subject to the tests. Other bills proposed establishing <a href="https://www.nelp.org/app/uploads/2025/05/NELP-Testimony-Empowering-Modern-Worker-US-House.pdf">corporate-backed&nbsp;sham</a> “portable benefits” schemes that promise some limited (but often inaccessible) benefits for gig workers while locking them out of full coverage under standard state programs and protections by treating them as “independent contractors.”<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<p>Strong enforcement is&nbsp;important,&nbsp;<em>and</em> whether a given situation will be subject to enforcement depends on the strength of a state’s statutory definitions of employment. Both strong legal tests and enforcement are critical to protecting workers from being misclassified.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<h2><strong>Policy recommendations&nbsp;</strong></h2>
<p>Policymakers at the federal, state, and local levels should act to curb misclassification and enforce the rights to which all workers should be entitled. Unfortunately, federal protections from misclassification are&nbsp;limited, and recent progress&nbsp;to address misclassification&nbsp;has been undermined.&nbsp;For example,&nbsp;the&nbsp;ABC test&nbsp;is not currently part of any federal workplace laws. In 2024, the Department of Labor <a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20240109-1">finalized a rule</a> to combat misclassification by adopting a six-factor test to determine&nbsp;worker classification&nbsp;under wage and hour laws. However, the Trump administration stopped enforcing the 2024 rule and <a href="https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/whd/whd20260226">recently</a> proposed replacing it with a weaker standard. Given federal retrenchment, state lawmakers have an opportunity and responsibility to strengthen existing state standards.</p>
<p>State and federal policymakers should:</p>
<ul>
<li>Establish or expand the use of a strong, uniform protective legal test for determining employee status, such as the ABC test;<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a></li>
<li>Strengthen enforcement and increase penalties to deter the misclassification of workers as independent contractors;&nbsp;</li>
<li>Pass the Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act,<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> which would make it harder for employers to misclassify employees in order to prevent them from forming a union and bargaining collectively;</li>
<li>Strengthen enforcement of wage theft and misclassification, and fully fund the federal and state agencies responsible for enforcing workers’ wage and hour rights;</li>
<li>Require employers to provide workers with transparent statements of their employment status and a justification for their classification;</li>
<li>Extend basic wage and hour protections, workplace health and safety protections, paid sick leave, and other protections to independent contractors to discourage misclassification as a “race to the bottom” for workers&#8217; rights; and</li>
<li>Improve coordination among state and federal tax and labor enforcement agencies by establishing interagency misclassification task forces with dedicated resources and staff and strong co-enforcement partnerships capable of effectively cracking down on misclassification in targeted industries.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></li>
</ul>
<h2>Methodology</h2>
<p>Since there are no comprehensive private or public data sources on workers misclassified as independent contractors, we apply a methodology that makes use of available employee total compensation and earnings data to estimate the costs of misclassification. For each of the 11 occupations included in our analysis, we begin with the average compensation profile drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) database. This profile provides a breakdown of average employer costs for employee compensation in the private sector. As an example,&nbsp;<strong>Table 3</strong>&nbsp;presents the average hourly compensation profile for construction workers broken into its component parts. We take the ratio of the individual compensation components to regular pay—which includes wages, salaries, supplemental pay, and paid leave—to estimate the ratio of compensation to pay.</p>
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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-319528 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319528" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319528-35665-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Next, we apply the ratios of total compensation to pay to median annual earnings obtained from the BLS’ Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics data (OEWS). This gives us estimates of the regular pay, supplemental pay, paid leave, and insurance and retirement benefits for a W-2 employee. We then calculate the net value to the worker as an employee based on the sum of all pay, paid leave, insurance and benefits, minus Social Security and Medicare taxes.</p>
<p>From here, we model two possible ways that the value of a job to a worker can change if the employee is misclassified as an independent contractor. In both scenarios, we assume that the worker, if classified as an independent contractor, receives the full regular pay of a W-2 employee, does not receive supplemental pay (like overtime or paid time off), must pay the full employer and employee contribution to Social Security and Medicare (15.3% of earnings), and must cover paperwork costs like invoicing, bookkeeping, and small business tax filings. We calculate paperwork costs by updating the methodology used in 2020 comments on independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> The difference in the two scenarios is in our assumptions about the degree to which the employer increases the base pay of independent contractors, if at all, to offset the fact that the worker does not have access to many rights and benefits.</p>
<ol>
<li>In the first scenario, we assume employers do not compensate independent contractors for health and retirement benefits. This generates our low estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs—along with the <em>high</em> estimate of the <em>cost</em> to workers of independent contractor jobs.</li>
<li>In the second scenario, we assume that employers fully compensate independent contractors for the cost of health insurance and retirement benefits that employers would have paid to the same worker working as an employee.&nbsp;This generates our high estimate of the value to workers of independent contractor jobs, along with the low estimate of the cost to workers of independent contractor jobs.</li>
</ol>
<h2>State estimates</h2>
<p>Estimates of the cost of misclassification by state and occupational group are produced similarly to national estimates, using compensation data from the BLS’ ECEC data and state earnings data from the BLS’ OEWS data.</p>
<p>Compensation profiles can be obtained from the ECEC that detail the total hourly cost of compensating a worker, including the share of total compensation derived from regular pay, insurance and retirement benefits, and legally required benefits. A ratio of compensation to pay can be calculated from these profiles by dividing each compensation component by regular pay, as in Table 3.</p>
<p>The ECEC does not have compensation profiles for occupational groups at the state level. They do, however, have compensation profiles for all workers, for all workers by occupation, and for all workers by census division, which we combine to estimate compensation profiles for occupational groups at the census division level. <strong>Table 4</strong>&nbsp;illustrates this procedure using construction workers in New England as an example. First, we create compensation to pay ratios for private-sector workers at the national level, for each occupational group (e.g. construction workers), and for each census division (e.g. New England). Next, we divide the occupation-specific ratio by the national ratio and multiply this quotient by the census division ratio. This yields a unique compensation to pay ratio for New England construction workers, which is then mapped onto all states within this respective census division. This procedure is followed for all occupational groups and census divisions to produce compensation to pay ratios for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.</p>
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<a name="Table-4"></a><div class="figure chart-319526 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319526" data-anchor="Table-4"><div class="figLabel">Table 4</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319526-35664-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p style="text-align: justify; line-height: 16.8pt; vertical-align: baseline; margin: 12.0pt 0in 12.0pt 0in;"><span style="color: #333333;">We apply the state- and occupation-specific compensation to pay ratios to state and occupation median annual earnings obtained from BLS’ OEWS data. This gives us estimates of total compensation that comes from regular pay, supplemental pay, paid leave, and insurance and retirement benefits for W-2 employees across all states and occupations.</span></p>
<p style="text-align: justify; line-height: 16.8pt; vertical-align: baseline; margin: 12.0pt 0in 12.0pt 0in;"><span style="color: #333333;">As in the national estimates, the cost of misclassification to both workers and to social insurance funds is calculated by comparing the net value of a job for a W-2 employee with that of an independent contractor under two scenarios: with and without compensation for health and retirement benefits. Appendix Tables 2–5 provide detailed breakdowns of these costs in both net dollar amounts and percentage differences relative to W-2 employees.</span></p>
<h2><strong>Notes</strong></h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> National Employment Law Project<em>,&nbsp;</em><a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/"><em>Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries</em></a>, October 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Meghan Racklin, Molly Weston Williamson, and Dina Bakst, “<a href="https://www.abetterbalance.org/state-leadership-on-anti-discrimination-protections-for-independent-contractors/">State Leadership on Anti-Discrimination Protections for Independent Contractors</a>,”&nbsp;<em>Future of Work Blog</em><em>&nbsp;</em>(A Better Balance), April 22, 2020.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Margaret Poydock, Lynn Rhinehart, and Celine McNicholas, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/flexible-work/"><em>Flexible Work: What Workers, Especially Low-Wage Workers, Really Want And How Best To Provide It</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, July 2024.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Françoise Carré, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification/"><em>(In)dependent Contractor Misclassification</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, June 2015; Government Accountability Office,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-717.pdf"><em>Employee Misclassification: Improved Coordination, Outreach, and Targeting Could Better Ensure Detection and Prevention</em></a>, GAO-09–717, August 2009.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> For discussions of occupations where workers are particularly vulnerable to misclassification as independent contractors, see Annette Bernhardt, Sarah Thomason, Chris Campos, Allen Prohofsky, Aparna Ramesh, and Jesse Rothstein, <a href="https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Independent-Contracting-in-CA.pdf"><em>Independent Contracting in California: An Analysis of Trends and Characteristics Using Tax Data</em></a>, UC Berkeley Labor Center and California Policy Lab, March 2022; Françoise Carré,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification/"><em>(In)dependent Contractor Misclassification</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, June 2015; National Employment Law Project,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/independent-contractor-misclassification-imposes-huge-costs-workers-federal-state-treasuries-update-october-2020/"><em>Independent Contractor Misclassification Imposes Huge Costs on Workers and Federal and State Treasuries</em></a>, October 2020; and Lisa Xu and Mark Erlich<em>,</em><em>&nbsp;</em><a href="https://lwp.law.harvard.edu/files/lwp/files/wa_study_dec_2019_final.pdf"><em>Economic Consequences of Misclassification in the State of Washington</em></a>, Harvard Labor and Worklife Program, December 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> When workers are employees, they pay the employee share of Social Security and Medicare (7.65% of W-2 earnings). Their employers also make identical payments to Social Security and Medicare.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> Arizona HB 2463, Illinois HB 2794, Iowa HB 2385, Kentucky HB 449, Virginia SB 644, Washington SB 6302, West Virginia HB 4571, and Wisconsin AB 1160.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> See, for example, New Jersey A 1184, California SB 527, and Georgia HB 987.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> Lynne Rhinehart et al. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-the-abc-test-and-employee-status-the-california-experience-and-its-relevance-to-current-policy-debates/"><em>Misclassification, the ABC Test, and Employee Status</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, June 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Lynne Rhinehart, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/why-workers-need-the-pro-act-fact-sheet/"><em>Why Workers Need the Protecting the Right to Organize Act</em></a>, Economic Policy Institute, February 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> For more on interagency misclassification task forces, see Rebecca Smith, <a href="https://www.nelp.org/publication/public-task-forces-take-on-employee-misclassification-best-practices/"><em>Public Task Forces Take on Employee Misclassification: Best Practices</em></a>&nbsp;(policy brief), National Employment Law Project<em>,&nbsp;</em>updated August 2020. For more on co-enforcement partnerships, see Janice Fine, Daniel Galvin, Jenn Round, and Hana Sheperd, “<a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/strategic-enforcement-and-co-enforcement-of-u-s-labor-standards-are-needed-to-protect-workers-through-the-coronavirus-recession/">Strategic Enforcement and Co-enforcement of U.S. Labor Standards Are Needed to Protect Workers Through the Coronavirus Recession</a><em>,” Boosting Wages for U.S. Workers in the New Economy&nbsp;</em>series<em>,&nbsp;</em>Washington Center for Equitable Growth, January 2021.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Heidi Shierholz, “EPI comments on independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act,” comments submitted on behalf of the Economic Policy Institute to Division of Regulations, Legislation, and Interpretation (Wage and Hour Division) Director Amy DeBisschop, October 26, 2020.</p>
<p>The IRS estimates that business taxpayers spend 13 more hours than nonbusiness taxpayers doing their taxes. If we conservatively assume that independent contractors spend 30 minutes per week on other (non-tax) paperwork costs that they wouldn&#8217;t have to spend if they were a payroll employee, that, plus the additional 13 hours spent on taxes, is an additional 39 hours of paperwork per year. This is equivalent to 1.8% of pay, or $880 annually for an independent contractor who earns $48,887 in regular pay annually.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Additionally, we estimate these paperwork costs as the annual purchase of basic bookkeeping software ($114 on the lowest end, using FreshBooks, see https://www.freshbooks.com/pricing, accessed October 16, 2024), self-employed tax filing software for federal taxes ($129, using TurboTax, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/online/live/, accessed October 16, 2024) and state taxes ($64, using TurboTax).</p>
<h2 style="vertical-align: baseline; margin: 12.0pt 0in 6.0pt 0in;"><b><span style="font-size: 22.0pt; font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; color: #333333;">Data appendix</span></b></h2>
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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-320285 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="320285" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/320285-35697-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-319533 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319533" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319533-35669-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-319532 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319532" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319532-35668-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-4"></a><div class="figure chart-319531 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319531" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-4"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 4</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319531-35667-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-5"></a><div class="figure chart-319530 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319530" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-5"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 5</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319530-35666-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 5" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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]]></content:encoded>
											
	</item>
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		<title>How ARPA State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds helped ensure a swift post-COVID recovery</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 12:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Kamper]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=319224</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&#160;$350 billion&#160;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="web-only">
<div class="quick-card">
<p><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 18px;">Key takeaways</span></strong></p>
<p>The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&nbsp;$350 billion&nbsp;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments. These State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) went directly to each government to spend on public health, economic recovery, infrastructure, and more.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>SLFRF&nbsp;was&nbsp;an ambitious and successful program that should serve as a model during future economic downturns. Among the key findings of this report:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='1' data-aria-level='1'>The most important policy choice was&nbsp;giving&nbsp;wide flexibility to state and local governments in how to use the funds. This allowed&nbsp;governments to spend the funds in ways that best&nbsp;met&nbsp;their needs.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='2' data-aria-level='1'>Fiscal recovery funds helped keep the COVID-19&nbsp;recession from getting&nbsp;worse, and&nbsp;helped state and local governments recover&nbsp;substantially faster&nbsp;than they did after the Great Recession.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='3' data-aria-level='1'>Governments in Southern states were far more likely than others to use the funds for infrastructure work&nbsp;to help combat&nbsp;decades of underinvestment in basic public services across the South.&nbsp;</li>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='4' data-aria-level='1'>SLFRF supported public services without contributing to inflation.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<h4>Key takeaways</h4>
<p>The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&nbsp;$350 billion&nbsp;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments. These State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) went directly to each government to spend on public health, economic recovery, infrastructure, and more.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>SLFRF&nbsp;was&nbsp;an ambitious and successful program that should serve as a model during future economic downturns. Among the key findings of this report:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='1' data-aria-level='1'>The most important policy choice was&nbsp;giving&nbsp;wide flexibility to state and local governments in how to use the funds. This allowed&nbsp;governments to spend the funds in ways that best&nbsp;met&nbsp;their needs.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='2' data-aria-level='1'>Fiscal recovery funds helped keep the COVID-19&nbsp;recession from getting&nbsp;worse, and&nbsp;helped state and local governments recover&nbsp;substantially faster&nbsp;than they did after the Great Recession.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='3' data-aria-level='1'>Governments in Southern states were far more likely than others to use the funds for infrastructure work&nbsp;to help combat&nbsp;decades of underinvestment in basic public services across the South.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='4' data-aria-level='1'>SLFRF supported public services without contributing to inflation.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was enacted on March 11, 2021. Among other provisions, ARPA allocated $350 billion for State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF). SLFRF was a recognition of the stark reality that the COVID-19 pandemic had wreaked havoc on state and local government finances (McNicholas, Bivens, and Shierholz 2020). SLFRF was also a reflection of lessons that policymakers learned from recent history. In the years following the Great Recession, inadequate fiscal support to state and local governments resulted in massive budget cuts, public-sector job losses, and reduced spending that dragged on the economy, delaying economic recovery by years (Shierholz and Bivens 2013). With the prospect of potentially devastating COVID-19-induced state and local budget shortfalls, Congress and the Biden administration made the decision to spend at the scale of the problem by making sure SLFRF was large enough to meet its recipients’ needs.</p>
<p>Of the $350 billion in fiscal recovery funds, $195.3 billion went to state governments, $65.1 billion to counties, $45.6 million to cities, $20 billion to tribal governments, $4.5 billion to territories, and $19.5 to small units of local government, mostly towns and villages. They could use the funds for five purposes: responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19; responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19; providing premium pay to “essential” workers; improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure; and replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19. Recipient governments had until December 31, 2024, to obligate those funds and until December 31, 2026, to spend them.</p>
<p>By any objective assessment, SLFRF was a transformative success. It averted a potential crisis. It empowered state and local leaders to address long-standing community needs. It helped millions of working families. It saved lives during the COVID-19 pandemic. The design and implementation of SLFRF offer many important lessons to future policymakers.</p>
<p>This report will highlight the smart design of SLFRF, which made it well positioned to address the needs of state and local governments in 2021 and beyond. The report will also note ways in which future policymakers could improve upon SLFRF’s design. The report will describe how SLFRF funds were deployed, showcasing the breadth and variety of uses to which they were put. State and local fiscal recovery funds were a vital part of the U.S. economic recovery post-2020. They provide a shining example of what government can achieve when it has adequate resources, and when the needs of communities and families are the main drivers of investment decisions.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>SLFRF played a vital role in preventing a second Great Recession</h2>
<p>The pandemic recession that began so suddenly in March 2020 was the biggest economic shock the country has seen since the Great Recession that started in 2008. Comparing the distinctly different policy responses to those two crises demonstrates how important SLFRF was to speeding the economic recovery and to preventing a second Great Recession.</p>
<p>First, SLFRF was vital in preserving and rebuilding the public-sector workforce. In the wake of the Great Recession, state and local governments faced devastating budget cuts that resulted in significant reductions in staffing and services. All faced fiscal crises because of sharp revenue declines caused by the Great Recession, but public services were further strained in many states by deliberate policy decisions, predominantly by Republican-controlled state governments, to cut taxes and slash public services (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). State and local government employment peaked in July 2008, then fell for five straight years. It took a total of 11 years to reach July 2008 levels again (Cooper 2020). By contrast, the peak in state and local governments jobs before the pandemic was in February 2020. By October 2023—just three years and eight months later—state and local public sector employment had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels.</p>
<p>In the first year following the passage of ARPA, there is evidence that the pace of a state’s SLFRF spending was positively correlated to the recovery of its public workforce:</p>


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<p>After that, the direct correlation between SLFRF spending and public-sector jobs faded, but that is hardly surprising, given all the other variables that impact job markets.</p>
<p>Second, this rapid recovery mirrored the recovery of the overall job market. The typical U.S. state needed 77 months after the start of the Great Recession for its job numbers to recover; it only took 29 months after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic for the same level of recovery. Of course, SLFRF was hardly the biggest factor in the overall economic recovery, but Cooper (2020) has shown that disinvestment in the public sector drags on growth in the private sector as well, and on economic growth overall. SLFRF supported conditions that made the private-sector economic recovery possible.</p>
<p>Third, SLFRF allowed states and localities to enact programs of social insurance and income support that directly responded to immediate community needs. In just the first two years of SLFRF’s operation alone, more than 4.5 million households received mortgage, rent, or utility assistance. Emergency programs offered housing to people who had been displaced by the pandemic and direct government assistance to food pantries and other programs that helped people facing food insecurity. These programs were valuable tools for helping working families in need.</p>
<p>Fourth, SLFRF has helped state and local governments and communities become more resilient against future downturns. Many states upgraded their unemployment insurance (UI) systems to make it easier to cope with an influx of claimants in the future. Some local governments created greater tenant protections and used recovery funds to give tenants facing eviction the right to free legal counsel. Several cities invested in pre-apprenticeship programs to help people in underserved communities gain access to high-quality infrastructure and climate jobs. These investments and others like them will help state and local governments to quickly distribute social insurance benefits when the next crisis hits and provide additional safety for working families put in jeopardy through job loss, illnesses, or natural disasters. (Kamper 2025).</p>
<h2>SLFRF’s innovative program design meant funds could be used where they did the most good</h2>
<p>The SLFRF program had two unusual characteristics that helped make it successful.</p>
<p>First, unlike previous iterations of state and local aid, SLFRF funds went directly to individual state and local governments. While payments to smaller cities were distributed first to states and then passed on to those cities, states were prohibited from imposing conditions on that distribution and could not hold back the payments; their role was purely administrative.</p>
<p>On previous occasions when federal money was allocated to local governments, it was much more common for the state government to hold federal aid on behalf of local governments. This was, for example, the mechanism behind the COVID-19-era financial assistance to school districts: the Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER, which had three iterations in 2020 and 2021, called ESSER I, ESSER II, and ESSER III respectively). A state’s department of education held ESSER funds and only parceled them out to school districts <em>after</em> the district had made a qualifying expenditure. The districts were not free to spend ESSER funds on their own. With SLFRF, however, recipients received funds <em>before</em> they needed to make expenditures and had complete control over how to use them.</p>
<p>This leads to a second important characteristic of SLFRF: Recipients were given broad latitude in how to use their funds. Under the legislation and the rules put out by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, SLFRF could be used for:</p>
<ol>
<li>responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19</li>
<li>responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19</li>
<li>providing premium pay to “essential” workers</li>
<li>improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure</li>
<li>replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19</li>
</ol>
<p>In 2023, the eligible uses for local governments were broadened to include government-built (or renovated) housing, surface transportation projects, and natural disaster relief, though in the end only a small share of recovery funds was used for those purposes.</p>
<p>Treasury rules also made the process simpler for smaller local governments by allowing up to $10 million to be used as public-sector revenue replacement without having to account for specific losses of funding—the SLFRF equivalent of the standard deduction on one’s taxes. Those rules also made clear that “negative economic impacts” could include existing inequities that predated the pandemic, such as long-standing racial employment and wage gaps (Economic Policy Institute 2025).</p>
<p>The combination of these two characteristics—state and local governments had the money within their control before making spending decisions, and great latitude in how to use it—meant that recipients could tailor the focus and pace of SLFRF spending to meet particular local needs. Given the extremely fluid state of the pandemic and the economy when ARPA was passed, this was the right decision to meet the pressing needs of the COVID-19 crisis. Overly prescriptive rules or additional bureaucratic hurdles to accessing and disbursing funds would have made it much harder for state and local recipients to respond rapidly to their specific needs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
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<h2>Lessons to apply for future policy design</h2>
<p>Despite the great freedom given to recipients to use SLFRF in ways that best met their needs, of the roughly 31,000 local government recipients, almost 600 local government recipients did not report using their fiscal recovery funds at all and a further 600 reported using less than 99%. Another 220 local governments failed to file a single report on their use of fiscal recovery funds, and 1,089 more have been delinquent in filing for at least a year.</p>
<p>At least part of the explanation is that while ARPA guidance allowed for fiscal recovery funds to be used for myriad reasons, recipients (especially smaller local governments) with little experience in receiving money directly from the federal government often struggled to understand Treasury rules on allowed uses of funds. Unlike state governments with experienced personnel deeply versed in Treasury’s complex rules and how to navigate them, many local governments had no such in-house expertise. Advocacy organizations reported, again and again, that even in 2024, as the deadline to obligate ARPA funds was approaching, many local policymakers were still raising questions about how funds could be used and what was allowed (Rochford, Bauer, and Wallace 2024).</p>
<p>Relatedly, Treasury officials who talked with EPI noted that many of the smallest local governments did not have a website or internal email system. Because all SLFRF reporting was supposed to be done electronically, some of these recipients struggled to properly report their expenditures. Sometimes the departure of a single municipal official created significant problems because that person was the only one who knew the electronic passwords.</p>
<p>An abundance of reports from across the country make clear recipients struggled to choose from among many appealing options, creating a kind of paralysis of choice. This is completely understandable; the needs communities were facing at this time were myriad and diverse, and prior to SLFRF, most local government officials had likely never had access to such flexible resources before then.</p>
<p>These challenges were exacerbated because the Treasury Department made a conscious decision not to offer specific technical assistance regarding recipient governments’ possible uses of fiscal recovery funds. When local government officials reached out to Treasury to seek guidance on whether a particular idea was within the scope of the law, Treasury rarely offered definitive answers. This was understandable given that more than 31,000 governmental units received their own fiscal recovery funds; Treasury could not possibly handle detailed queries from more than a fraction of them. What this meant, though, is that many opportunities to use fiscal recovery funds in innovative and imaginative ways were missed. Many local governments chose caution over ambition, out of fear that particular uses of the funds would not be permitted and the funds rescinded.</p>
<p>To prevent a similar situation in the future, policy designers might do well to study Colorado’s Regional Grant Navigator program. Colorado chose 13 community and nonprofit organizations across the state to help local governments find ways to best access funds from the 2021 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. These navigators helped local governments understand the complex regulations around the laws, helped them design proposals to apply for funding, and offered advice on which programs might be best suited to the needs of those communities (Colorado n.d.). A similar model might allow local governments to get unbiased and timely assistance from organizations committed to helping them make the most of their funds.</p>
<p>A final challenge of the SLFRF policy design was the lack of clear definition of what “obligating” the funds meant. As advocates, policymakers, and others reported throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024, many local governments understood “obligation” to mean something similar to “budgeting” or “allocating”—making a formal decision as to how to use the funds (Kamper 2024). Recipients unfamiliar with the language used by Treasury could and did make that mistake. It was not until May of 2024 that Treasury explicitly stated in a webinar that “obligating” funds is not the same thing as budgeting (Treasury 2024). “Obligation” required not just a budgetary decision, but concrete steps to implement the decision, such as signing a contract with a vendor or an interagency agreement to send the funds to a particular department. Future fiscal recovery efforts should be more conscious of the need to clearly define terms, especially when plain-language definitions may not match Treasury’s technical definition.</p>
<h2>How were fiscal recovery funds used?</h2>
<div class="quick-card">
<p><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 16px;">A note on methodology</span></strong></p>
<p>When it comes to analyzing SLFRF usage, a complicating factor is that state and local governments sometimes made public statements about their use of fiscal recovery funds that were not accurate. For example, Alabama announced in September of 2021 that it would spend $400 million of ARPA funds to help finance prison construction (Wakeley 2021). However, Alabama’s reports of SLFRF spending do not show any money obligated for building prisons. Treasury data in September 2024 list nearly 1,900 spending projects that were absent from the December 31, 2024, data. This does not mean those projects have been abandoned. It may simply mean that recipients switched the project to another funding source and repurposed their fiscal recovery funds for something else.</p>
<p>As such, it’s also almost certain fiscal recovery funds allowed state and local governments to take other actions that do not appear in this data. When the Minnesota legislature debated (and eventually enacted) a $500 million frontline worker pay measure in 2021 and 2022, news reports indicated that the funding for it would come from state fiscal recovery funds (Callaghan 2021, 2022). In the end, however, Minnesota did not use fiscal recovery funds for their frontline worker pay program. Given the context, however, it seems likely that, without SLFRF, Minnesota policymakers might not have felt that they could afford to launch such a program. No doubt this is also true for other state and local government spending decisions over the past four years.</p>
</div>
<h3>General spending trends</h3>
<p>The primary use of fiscal recovery funds—approximately 50% of state allocations and 60% of local government allocations—was revenue replacement, (replacing state and local funds that were lost because the economic shock of COVID-19 reduced tax and fee revenues). Revenue replacement had not been an allowed use of previous iterations of COVID-19 fiscal relief funds. Most notably the CARES Act, the first COVID-19 relief measure passed in 2020, did not allow use of Coronavirus Relief Funds for revenue replacement.</p>
<p>State and local governments face considerable constraints on their ability to raise revenues. Measures like Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights and California’s Proposition 13 often prohibit states from raising taxes or require legislative supermajorities to do so (Jefferson 2025). Local governments face even more constraints, with few policy levers available to raise revenues. As such, any shock to state and local government revenues can take a long time to reverse, a lesson we learned in the aftermath of the Great Recession. By allowing revenue replacement, SLFRF made it much easier for state and local governments to maintain adequate levels of funding, even as the pandemic recession lowered income from taxes. Revenue replacement was an important innovation in ARPA that should be replicated in the future.</p>
<p>Although the interim rules for ARPA put out by Treasury soon after the law was enacted required complex accounting of lost revenue, the final Treasury rule made the process much easier. For amounts less than $10 million, recipients did not need to calculate lost revenue. They could simply designate funds as revenue replacement and use them as needed. The appeal of this rule to local governments is evident in data summarizing subsequent uses of SLFRF; the smaller a recipient government, the more likely they were to use their fiscal recovery funds for revenue replacement.</p>


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<p>After revenue replacement, the next most popular use of SLFRF was addressing negative economic impacts of the pandemic. Once again, the flexibility given to recipients under this category was almost certainly a key factor encouraging use of funds for such purposes.</p>


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<p>Infrastructure was the third-largest use of fiscal recovery funds, and here there is a notable regional variation—state and local governments in the South allocated a far greater share of their funds to infrastructure than those in the rest of the country. In particular, 82% of all state funds obligated for broadband were in Southern states (not shown in Figure A).</p>
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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-316127 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="316127" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/316127-35516-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Not only is water and sewer infrastructure essential for people’s health, these investments are vital to a well-functioning economy. As EPI has extensively documented in its <em>Rooted in Racism</em> series, Southern states have long underinvested in in basic physical infrastructure (Childers 2023–2025). These spending choices likely reflect, at least in part, a need to address the long-standing underinvestment in the region—underinvestment driven by Southern lawmakers’ antipathy toward raising adequate revenue.</p>
<p>Aside from infrastructure spending in the South, there are no clear regional trends in how fiscal recovery funds were used. This is not surprising, given the flexibility of the funding (a feature EPI has long supported) (Bivens 2020). When ARPA was enacted in early 2021, there was simply no way for the federal government, or state and local governments, to know what their needs would be. ARPA’s flexibility was the right decision. The ability of recipient governments to immediately fill unanticipated budget holes via revenue replacement meant hundreds of thousands of state and local jobs were preserved, vital public programs were maintained, and a deeper economic crisis averted. The most notable success of ARPA SLFRF lies in what did not happen: a collapse in basic public services, massive long-term unemployment, and an extended economic depression.</p>
<h2>Innovative SLFRF investments supported working families</h2>
<p>In all, SLFRF funded more than 159,000 different projects across the country. Some were gigantic, like a $787 million program in New Jersey to provide rental assistance to low- and moderate-income tenants, and some were very small, like the $28 that St. Clair County, Michigan, provided to help renovate the Port Huron Township Museum.</p>
<p>There are many examples of state and local governments using fiscal recovery funds to make transformative investments to build an economy that supports working families. Several types of uses deserve special attention: fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, investing in public health, and addressing problems with food access and nutrition.</p>
<p>First, ARPA SLFRF went a long way to address the health emergency the country faced in 2021. States, cities, and counties were on the front lines of keeping people safe, providing access to new vaccines once they became available, and saving lives throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>Over $1.8 billion in SLFRF was used to test, trace, and vaccinate people against COVID-19. Much of this money was used to deal with the practical and logistical challenges of testing and vaccination. Cities and counties, especially, bought personal protective equipment for government employees, especially first responders. Scores of governments purchased testing kits and lab equipment and worked to engage the public to encourage vaccination and tracing outbreaks. For example, Milan, Illinois, rented a meeting hall in town for $43,200 to host their vaccine clinic. Jefferson County, Missouri, hired a nurse for every public school district to oversee a contact-tracing program to track COVID-19’s progress through schools. Monroe County, Indiana, was one of many governments that instituted wastewater monitoring to check for COVID-19 surges While any individual expenditure may seem minor, together these measures did much to reduce COVID-19 infections and deaths.</p>
<p>Second, SLFRF allowed recipient governments to make long-term upgrades to infrastructure that both mitigated COVID-19 threats and made public spaces permanently safer, healthier, and more accessible. Almost $4.3 billion was obligated to upgrade the air quality and safety of public and private facilities. At least 550 projects upgraded HVAC systems in schools, nursing homes, public buildings, and correctional facilities. Governments invested in digital communications tools to reduce the need for in-person meetings. Typical examples include Peoria, Arizona, which allocated $124,996 to install touchless drinking fountains in public buildings, and Stafford County, Virginia, which spent $115,255 to add a glass partition to the entrance of the Commissioner of Revenue’s office so that the administrative staff could be protected from visitors’ virus transmission.</p>
<p>The freedom given to local governments to innovate was particularly evident in the way multiple localities sought to address problems related to food access and nutrition—an issue that has received tremendous public attention resulting from New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s plan to establish municipally operated grocery stores. While one commentator claimed such a project would resemble &#8220;the old Soviet Union” (McArdle 2025), the fact is that many SLFRF recipients used public funds to increase access to food for low-income communities, including by opening their own stores.</p>
<p>For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>Sioux Falls, South Dakota, set up a mobile grocery market that would operate in underserved parts of the city.</li>
<li>The small town of Cutler, Illinois, set up a Community Commissary to make it easier to buy food without having to travel a long way.</li>
<li>Branson, Colorado (population 74 in the 2010 census), constructed a community greenhouse to grow and sell fresh fruits and vegetables for the town and school.</li>
<li>Charleston, West Virginia, opened a community grocery store that would provide access to fresh groceries for 14,000 residents, and the city of Austin, Texas, did something similar.</li>
</ul>
<p>There were, in addition, scores of grants to food pantries and other nonprofits that help people find the food they need. The proposal for New York City fits well with how these communities used SLFRF to address food access.</p>
<p>Above are just a handful of the tens of thousands of useful projects made possible by fiscal recovery funds. Some uses were more effective than others, however. For example, although modernizing state unemployment insurance systems was a useful endeavor (see above), more than $22 billion was also spent replenishing state unemployment insurance trust funds, which was unnecessary. UI trust funds hold UI taxes paid by businesses, to make sure funds are available to pay UI claims during spikes in unemployment. While those funds had, indeed, been depleted by the pandemic recession, state UI trust funds are designed to be self-correcting.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> They have automatic mechanisms to raise employer payroll taxes when the trust fund has been drawn down, to rebuild the funds and be prepared for future downturns. It was wholly unnecessary to use fiscal recovery funds to refill trust funds that would have returned to full strength on their own. Spending SLFRF to refill trust funds was a missed opportunity to support economic growth and strengthened public services (Banerjee, Martinez Hickey, and Sawo 2021). Future fiscal recovery projects should not make refilling UI trust funds an allowed use, though they should continue to support modernization of and upgrades to UI systems.</p>
<h2>SLFRF accomplished its goals without driving inflation</h2>
<p>Finally, it is worth noting that, despite politically motivated claims to the contrary, there is little evidence that SLFRF, or indeed the entire $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, was a significant contributor to inflation. As Bivens, Banerjee, and Dzholos (2022) show, the rise in inflation starting in 2022 was a global phenomenon, one that impacted countries, regardless of whether they provided fiscal relief to their economies during COVID-19. Nor was inflation correlated with the rapid decrease in unemployment the U.S. saw, thanks in part to ARPA. Rather, inflation was primarily driven by the dramatic supply shocks to various sectors of the economy caused by COVID-19, and then exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Given the scale of the crisis policymakers were confronted with in early 2021, they were right to spend at the scale of the problem, and critiques blaming that spending for inflation are not backed up by the data. Moreover, policy measures that prioritized lowering inflation would have led to either lower employment or lower real wage growth, as there was no policy option that would have lowered inflation, increased wage gains, and supported the strong job growth of 2021–2024 (Bivens 2024).</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>ARPA’s State and Local Fiscal Recovery Fund was a great success. By spending at the scale of the problem, the federal government aided the economic recovery, supported the maintenance of public services, and gave myriad governments the chance to make innovative choices that have improved the well-being of their communities. A smaller SLFRF would have slowed our economic recovery and made governments more cautious about enacting bold policies to protect working families.</p>
<p>By giving recipient governments so much flexibility in using the funds, the Biden administration allowed every state, county, city, territory, and tribal government to fashion the response most appropriate to their particular needs. When faced with a crisis that had so much unpredictability, this was the right decision.</p>
<p>We don’t know when the next economic downturn, global pandemic, or climate disaster will hit. Whenever it does, federal policymakers should seek to emulate the model set by ARPA.</p>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a>The devastating Flint, Michigan, water crisis of the 2010s is a prime example of a situation in which too many bureaucratic hurdles worsened a disaster. Flint was facing a serious fiscal crisis and therefore lacked the internal capacity to apply for federal funding (which they would have received) that might have prevented lead contamination of the water supply. See GAO 2015 for more details.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a>At least they should be, provided policymakers have set adequate UI tax base rates. See Perez 2025 for more information.</p>
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<h2>References</h2>
<p>Banerjee, Asha, Sebastian Martinez Hickey, and Marokey Sawo. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/states-are-choosing-employers-over-workers-by-using-covid-relief-funds-to-pay-off-unemployment-insurance-debt-policymakers-shouldnt-be-afraid-to-increase-taxes-on-employers-to-improve-unempl/">States Are Choosing Employers over Workers by Using COVID Relief Funds to Pay Off Unemployment Insurance Debt: Policymakers Shouldn’t Be Afraid to Increase Taxes on Employers to Improve Unemployment Insurance.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 19, 2021.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh. 2020. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/getting-serious-about-the-economic-response-to-covid-19/">Getting Serious About the Economic Response to COVID-19.”</a> <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), March 9, 2020.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-post-pandemic-recovery-is-an-economic-policy-success-story-policymakers-took-the-best-way-through-a-rocky-path/">The Post-Pandemic Recovery Is an Economic Policy Success Story: Policymakers Took the Best Way Through a Rocky Path.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 1, 2024.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh, Asha Banerjee, and Mariia Dzholos. 2022. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/rising-inflation-is-a-global-problem-u-s-policy-choices-are-not-to-blame/">Rising Inflation Is a Global Problem: U.S. Policy Choices Are Not to Blame.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), August 4, 2022.</p>
<p>Callaghan, Peter. 2021. “<a href="https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2021/08/the-minnesota-legislature-approved-250-million-for-pandemic-worker-bonuses-should-the-state-give-away-more-than-that/">The Minnesota Legislature Approved $250 Million for Pandemic Worker Bonuses. Should the State Give Away More Than That</a>?”<em> Minnpost, </em>August 12, 2021.</p>
<p>Callaghan, Peter. 2022. “<a href="https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2022/05/how-the-legislatures-deal-on-pandemic-worker-bonuses-and-unemployment-insurance-got-done/">How the Legislature’s Deal on Pandemic Worker Bonuses and Unemployment Insurance Got Done</a>.” <em>Minnpost</em>, May 4, 2022.</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2023–2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/rooted-in-racism-and-economic-exploitation-the-failed-southern-economic-development-model/"><em>Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation</em></a> (report series). Economic Policy Institute, October 2023–June 2025.</p>
<p>Colorado, State of. n.d. “<a href="https://federalfunds.colorado.gov/regional-grant-navigators">Regional Grant Navigators</a>” (web page). Accessed December 3, 2025.</p>
<p>Cooper, David. 2020. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/without-federal-aid-many-state-and-local-governments-could-make-the-same-budget-cuts-that-hampered-the-last-economic-recovery/">Without Federal Aid, Many State and Local Governments Could Make the Same Budget Cuts That Hampered the Last Economic Recovery</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), May 27, 2020.</p>
<p>Cooper, David, Mary Gable, and Algernon Austin. 2012. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp339-public-sector-jobs-crisis/">The Public-Sector Jobs Crisis: Women and African Americans Hit Hardest by Job Losses in State and Local Governments</a>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, May 2012.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/"><em>Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the United States: An Interactive Chartbook</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute. October 2025.</p>
<p>Jefferson, Rita. 2025. <a href="https://itep.org/effects-of-property-tax-limits/"><em>Anti-Tax Revolts Backfire: What We’ve Learned from 50 Years of Property Tax Limits</em></a>. Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, July 2025.</p>
<p>Kamper, Dave. 2025. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/some-states-and-localities-will-be-better-prepared-to-fight-a-possible-recession-because-of-how-they-used-arpa-fiscal-recovery-funds/">Some States and Localities Will Be Better Prepared to Fight a Possible Recession Because of How They Used ARPA Fiscal Recovery Funds</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), April 30, 2025.</p>
<p>Kamper, Dave, and Emma Cohn. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/time-is-running-out-for-state-and-local-governments-to-obligate-american-rescue-plan-funds/">Time Is Running out for State and Local Governments to Obligate American Rescue Plan Funds</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 17, 2024.</p>
<p>McArdle, Megan. 2025. “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/01/new-york-mamdani-grocery-stores/">Zohran Mamdani Has a Seriously Bad Idea—for Grocery Stores</a>.” <em>Washington Post, </em>July 1, 2025.</p>
<p>McNicholas, Celine, Josh Bivens, and Heidi Shierholz. 2020. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-next-coronavirus-relief-package-should-provide-aid-to-state-and-local-governments-protect-employed-and-unemployed-workers-and-invest-in-our-democracy/">The Next Coronavirus Relief Package Should Provide Aid to State and Local Governments, Protect Employed and Unemployed Workers, and Invest in Our Democracy</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), April 27, 2020.</p>
<p>Perez, Daniel. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/"><em>Holding the Line: Unemployment Insurance</em>.</a> Economic Policy Institute, September 29, 2025.</p>
<p>Rochford, Patrick, Julia Bauer, and Michael Wallace. 2024. “<a href="https://www.nlc.org/article/2024/10/01/obligate-it-or-lose-it-preparing-for-the-upcoming-arpa-slfrf-obligation-deadline/">Obligate It or Lose It! Preparing for the Upcoming ARPA SLFRF Obligation Deadline.</a>” National League of Cities, October 1, 2024.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi, and Josh Bivens. 2013. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/years-recovery-austeritys-toll-3-million/">Four Years into Recovery, Austerity’s Toll Is at Least 3 Million Jobs</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), July 3, 2013.</p>
<p>U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2024. “<a href="https://youtu.be/Tf9IZZHvjAA?si=yr1vNAR5wU_xUKps">State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: New Obligation FAQs Webinar</a>” (web page). Accessed December 3, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2025. “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds/public-data">Public Data: State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds</a>” (web page). Accessed December 11, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2015. <a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669134.pdf"><em>Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis: Federal Agencies Monitored Grants and Assisted Grantees, but More Could Be Done to Share Lessons Learned</em></a>. Publication number 15-222, March 2015.</p>
<p>Wakeley, Dev. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/alabama-is-making-a-costly-mistake-on-covid-19-recovery-funds-heres-a-better-path-forward/">Alabama Is Making a Costly Mistake on COVID-19 Recovery Funds. Here’s a Better Path Forward</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 8, 2021.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Amid the shutdown data blackout, state unemployment insurance claims continue to shed light on the labor market</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/amid-the-shutdown-data-blackout-state-unemployment-insurance-claims-continue-to-shed-light-on-the-labor-market/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 15 Oct 2025 18:56:35 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Elise Gould, Joe Fast]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=313048</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[On Friday, October 3, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) did not publish the September Employment Situation Summary report. The monthly “jobs report” provides policymakers, businesses, and the public with the most rigorous and timely employment data on the labor market.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On Friday, October 3, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) did not publish the September Employment Situation Summary report. The monthly “jobs report” provides policymakers, businesses, and the public with the most rigorous and timely employment data on the labor market. The absence of official data comes at a crucial time, as several Trump administration policies—including immigration enforcement, chaotic tariffs, and federal workforce cuts—have heightened uncertainty about the current labor market. The suspension of all BLS activities related to labor market data is unnecessary and harms the economy as it delays vital information about the labor market. These data delays can lead economic actors (e.g., the Federal Reserve, Congress, investors, and employers) to fall behind the curve of economic events and hence make suboptimal decisions.<span id="more-313048"></span></p>
<p>During the last federal shutdown in 2018–2019, <a href="https://www.bls.gov/bls/shutdown_2019_empsit_qa.pdf">the BLS did not suspend its activities</a> and released its <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_01042019.pdf">employment situation report as normal</a>. In fact, this is the first time in <a href="https://www.bls.gov/bls/updated_release_schedule.htm">12 years</a>&nbsp;that an employment situation report was delayed.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> In addition, the BLS is meant to start collecting data for the October employment report next week. If the shutdown continues, it’s possible that, for the first time in at least six decades, there will be a full month gap in data about jobs and unemployment in the U.S. economy. While nongovernment datasets can provide some limited insights into employment levels, none can replicate the supply side of the labor market, which is particularly important as immigration flows have slowed dramatically. In short, the shutdown (and potentially the attempted politicization of key government data-collection agencies) could leave policymakers flying blind just as the economy encounters real turbulence.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there is one government dataset—collected at the state level—that still offers a useful and up-to-date read on one key angle of the labor market: unemployment insurance claims records. Every week, the Department of Labor’s (DOL) <a href='https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf'>Unemployment Insurance (UI) Weekly Claims News Release</a> tells us how many people filed for unemployment insurance (initial claims) and how many people received unemployment insurance benefits (continued or insured unemployment).<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> These data are reported separately for regular state programs, federal programs, and other smaller categories. Because of the government shutdown and ceased activities, DOL has stopped releasing the Weekly Claims News Release (the last one was on <a href="https://www.dol.gov/ui/data.pdf">September 25</a>). However, each state’s labor department has continued to collect the information and by and large these data are available on <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/DataDownloads.asp">the DOL website</a> for researchers to access.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Therefore, we here at EPI have continued to analyze the present the data on EPI’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment-insurance-claims/">Unemployment Insurance Claims landing page</a>.</p>
<p>The fingerprints of Trump policy decisions are most clearly found in the distinct rise in federal claims—claims filed specifically by workers laid off from federal agencies. However, we are also seeing troubling trends in UI claims in regular state programs, particularly in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. <strong>Figure A</strong> illustrates continued (insured) unemployment insurance claims for federal workers now compared with the same week in the prior year. The latest data show significantly higher continued unemployment insurance claims for federal workers than this time last year: Nearly 8,500 claims the week ending September 20, 2025, compared with only about 4,000 claims the same week in 2024. Claims are more than double what they were a year ago. The figure clearly shows when the divergence in trend began.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-313159 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313159" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313159-35322-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Not surprisingly, those federal layoffs and subsequent federal UI claims are felt more acutely in the Washington, D.C., metro area. For these numbers (as shown in <strong>Figure B</strong>), we construct four-week moving averages, compared with the same four weeks in the prior year, to smooth out some volatility in the data. In D.C. proper, federal continued claims increased over 1,000% from the same time last year. In nearby Maryland, federal claims are up over 500% and federal claims in Virginia are double compared with the same period in 2024.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-313162 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313162" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313162-35323-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>With thousands of workers leaving federal payrolls on September 30, we expect these numbers to continue to climb in the coming weeks. According to Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Director Scott Kupor, 2025 will end with&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/22/us/politics/trump-federal-workers.html">300,000 fewer federal workers</a>. There are some signs that <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/assessing-the-strength-of-the-labor-market-preliminary-downward-revisions-do-not-necessarily-signal-a-weaker-2024-labor-market-but-there-are-warning-signs-for-2025/">economic weakness has extended beyond the federal workforce</a>. In the latest jobs report released, payroll employment growth has slowed dramatically, the hires rate has softened, and Black and young adult unemployment rates have ticked up over the last several months.</p>
<p>So far, the continued regular state claims (excluding federal workers) are only up slightly from last year. Over the last three months, continued claims have averaged 90,000 higher than those the same period last year (about a 5% increase), but that’s not unusual so it remains more an indicator to watch rather than anything alarming at this point in time. <strong>Figure C</strong> shows continued UI claims now compared with the same time last year. Given seasonality in these data, it’s useful to compare year over year to identify trends. If the level of claims continues to break away from last year, it will mean we may be heading toward an even weaker labor market.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-313169 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="313169" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/313169-35324-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>While the national numbers of continued UI claims are not yet showing up as recessionary, there are clearly pockets of this country that are experiencing greater labor market weakness. For example, year-over-year percentage increases in continued claims for the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland are 53%, 29%, and 25%, respectively. These states represent three of the five highest year-over-year increases, with Connecticut (47%) and Oregon (27%) being the other two states according to the latest data for the week ending September 27, 2025.</p>
<p>UI claims are essentially a signal about the pace of layoffs in the labor market. Increased layoffs would obviously signal a deteriorating labor market, but there are clearly ways for labor markets to weaken substantially even before large increases in layoffs. For example, if firms largely avoid layoffs but significantly reduce new hiring, then unemployment will rise as new labor market entrants fail to secure employment. Hence, as valuable as UI data are, they only give us one angle of potential labor market weakness. For the 360-degree view of the labor market needed to make informed policy decisions, the federal statistical agencies need to come back online and be allowed to do their work with ample resources and free of any political interference.</p>
<p>All the data above and more will be updated weekly every Thursday on EPI’s new <a href="https://www.epi.org/indicators/unemployment-insurance-claims/">UI claims landing page</a>. UI data will continue to play an important role throughout the government shutdown and serve as one of the timeliest indicators of the labor market moving forward. Hopefully, vital BLS workers will be called back to work as soon as possible to collect and process data for the monthly jobs report so we don’t miss an entire month’s worth of essential complementary labor market data.</p>
<h4><strong>Notes</strong></h4>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> During the October 2013 federal shutdown, the September employment situation report was delayed 18 days and was released six days after <a href="https://www.bls.gov/bls/updated_release_schedule.htm">the shutdown ended</a>. The subsequent October report was released seven days late due to delays <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_11082013.htm">in data collection</a>. During the 1995–1996 federal shutdown, the December report came out <a href="https://www.bls.gov/bls/histreleasedates.pdf">14 days late on January 19, 1996.</a> These are the only three occurrences of delays in the BLS employment situation report due to federal shutdowns.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Unemployment insurance receipt should not be confused with a count of the unemployed, which is measured as workers without a job who are actively seeking work through a separate BLS survey. To be counted among those with continued (or insured) unemployment insurance, a claim has to be filed and approved. The&nbsp;<a class="c-link" href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/chartbook.asp" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-stringify-link='https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/Chartbook/a13.asp' data-sk='tooltip_parent'>recipiency rate— the insured unemployed in regular programs as a percentage of the total unemployed—is only 27%</a>&nbsp;nationwide, which means the count of workers receiving unemployment insurance misses most unemployed workers.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> There have been some minor exceptions and minor delays in reporting. For instance, Massachusetts and Arizona were released with a delay two weeks ago, but then the data was eventually filled in. For last week’s data, Massachusetts was still missing but we were able to input the data straight from the <a href="https://lmi.dua.eol.mass.gov/lmi/ClaimsData">MA Department of Economic Research website</a>. Hawaii and Virgin Islands also had missing data for the latest release so we imputed using data from the prior week. Our state analysis is done on a four-week moving average to smooth out some volatility so this imputation is likely not a large assumption to the trends we are seeing.</p>
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		<title>Unemployment insurance: State solutions to the U.S. worker rights crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2025 12:00:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Perez]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=310948</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[What does current federal law say about unemployment Established in the wake of the Great Depression through the Social Security Act of 1935, unemployment insurance (UI) is a critical safety net program that provides a partial replacement of wages to workers who have separated from employment.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>What does current federal law say about unemployment insurance?</h2>
<p>Established in the wake of the Great Depression through the Social Security Act of 1935, unemployment insurance (UI) is a critical safety net program that provides a partial replacement of wages to workers who have separated from employment. UI helps workers and their families afford their basic needs during spells of unemployment. It also helps stabilize the macroeconomy by <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/fact-sheet-whats-stake-states-cancel-federal-unemployment-benefits/">keeping dollars flowing to local economies</a> where layoffs and job losses could otherwise result in harmful drops in aggregate demand. UI is a forward-funded reserve, accumulating tax dollars during periods of economic stability to support workers during economic downturns.</p>
<p>Federal law establishes UI as federal-state partnership. Under the existing framework, the federal government sets baseline program parameters and raises revenue through Federal Unemployment Tax Act taxes to cover state administrative costs (e.g., processing claims or maintaining state unemployment trust funds), provide technical assistance, and conduct performance monitoring. States are responsible for paying worker benefits, although the federal government typically covers at least half of the cost of “extended benefits” during recessions. States have significant discretion to determine key features of their UI programs, such as eligibility criteria, benefit amounts and durations, and financing mechanisms.</p>
<h2>What are the threats to state UI programs?</h2>
<p>Unemployment insurance programs face mounting threats—some that are new, some from long-standing structural weaknesses that have left many state UI programs chronically underfunded and ill-prepared for economic downturns. In particular:</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>The Trump administration aims to weaponize UI systems to advance its mass deportation agenda:</strong> All workers in the U.S. with legal status (regardless of citizenship or nationality) are eligible for UI benefits, though immigrants who lack work authorization are not. Despite this distinction, in April 2025, Secretary of Labor Lori Chavez-DeRemer issued <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OPA/newsreleases/2025/04/ETA20250661.pdf">letters</a> warning state governors against granting UI benefits to noncitizen workers, including those legally authorized to work. The letters threatened to withhold federal funds and directed states to verify the immigration status of UI applicants. Further, the U.S. Department of Labor recently <a href="https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2025-16645.pdf">proposed a rule change</a> around UI data collection that <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/punching-in-trumps-crackdown-on-ui-fraud-brings-new-fraud-risk-28">poses risks to applicant privacy</a> and could expand the risk of UI data being used for immigration enforcement.</li>
<li><strong>The Trump administration’s rollback of merit staffing opens the door to UI privatization: </strong>Project 2025 calls for states to “innovate” with their UI programs by <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24088042-project-2025s-mandate-for-leadership-the-conservative-promise/?mode=document#document/p637">approving “non-public” organizations</a> to administer benefits. This would dismantle <a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/merit-staffing-in-state-employment-service-and-unemployment-insurance-programs-putting-the-toothpaste-back-into-the-tube/">long-standing merit staffing guidelines</a> that require benefits to be administered by impartial career civil servants. Weakening merit staffing risks putting UI administration in the hands of actors who may not be impartial or accountable to the public. Although privatization of UI is explicitly prohibited by the Social Security Act, this backdoor approach erodes the public nature of UI administration. Research shows that introducing <a href="https://inthepublicinterest.org/profiting-from-public-dollars-how-alec-and-its-members-promote-privatization-of-government-services-and-assets/">a profit motive</a> for vital public services often results in <a href="https://inthepublicinterest.org/privatizing-the-va-lessons-from-privatized-medicaid-in-kansas-and-iowa/">reduced service quality</a>, <a href="https://inthepublicinterest.org/the-high-costs-of-privatization/">little cost savings</a>, and less transparency, oversight, and accountability.</li>
<li><strong>UI programs suffer from long-standing weaknesses that undermine their effectiveness as a safety net and economic stabilizer: </strong>Although unemployment insurance is a critical lifeline for unemployed workers, benefit levels <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/ui_replacement_rates.asp">replace less than 40% of wages</a> on average, leaving many workers <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/the-unemployed-worker-study/">unable to meet their basic needs</a> and <a href="https://nwlc.org/resource/when-hard-work-is-not-enough-women-in-low-paid-jobs">disproportionately discouraging UI take-up among women and workers of color</a> in <a href="https://www.workrisenetwork.org/working-knowledge/challenges-unemployment-insurance-claims-some-businesses-limit-access-ui-income">low-wage jobs</a>. Many states have also <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/how-many-weeks-of-unemployment-compensation-are-available">shortened benefit durations</a> below the historical standard of 26 weeks, despite research showing such cuts <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-low-can-we-go-state-unemployment-insurance-programs-exclude-record-numbers-of-jobless-workers/">reduce recipiency</a> without <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-low-can-we-go-state-unemployment-insurance-programs-exclude-record-numbers-of-jobless-workers/">improving employment rates</a> or <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/state-cuts-unemployment-insurance-boost/">program solvency</a>. At the same time, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-2-financing-reform-financing-of-ui-to-eliminate-incentives-for-states-and-employers-to-exclude-workers-and-reduce-benefits/">taxable wage bases and employer tax rates</a> have eroded, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/strong-and-equitable-unemployment-insurance-systems-require-broadening-the-ui-tax-base/">starving trust funds</a>. Most states now fail to meet <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/trustFundSolvReport2025.pdf">federal solvency standards</a>. Many states also rely on outmoded technology and understaffed state agencies to administer UI benefits and federal funding to modernize state UI systems was recently <a href="https://www.nextgov.com/modernization/2025/05/labor-cancels-unemployment-modernization-grants-states/405582/">rescinded by the Trump administration</a>. Finally, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-3-eligibility-update-ui-eligibility-to-match-the-modern-workforce-and-guarantee-benefits-to-everyone-looking-for-work-but-still-jobless-through-no-fault-of-their-own/">restrictive eligibility rules</a> exclude large swaths of the workforce, including <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/reforming-unemployment-insurance-is-a-racial-justice-imperative/">part-time and low-wage workers, women, Black and brown workers</a>, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-2025-update/">misclassified workers</a>, independent contractors, undocumented workers, and the self-employed. These weaknesses leave UI programs chronically underfunded, inaccessible to millions, and ill-equipped to protect workers or stabilize the economy during downturns.</li>
<li><strong>Project 2025 seeks to weaken UI eligibility criteria by circumventing suitable work standards:</strong> Under federal law, workers can remain eligible for UI if they decline job offers that don’t meet a reasonable standard of suitability. Suitability definitions can vary by state but often consider factors such as health and safety conditions, wages, skills match, commuting distance, or other job characteristics when determining suitability. Some states’ suitable work requirements weaken the longer a worker is unemployed. Despite evidence that continued UI eligibility leads to better job matches and job quality, Project 2025 proposes providing states with <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24088042-project-2025s-mandate-for-leadership-the-conservative-promise/?mode=document#document/p651">waivers to suitable work requirements</a>. Should waivers to this critical UI standard be adopted, workers could be disqualified from UI for turning down <em>any</em> job offer, no matter how unsafe, low-paid, or ill-suited to their experience. This would fundamentally weaken UI’s ability to facilitate good job matching, while putting workers in a precarious financial position following a job separation.</li>
</ol>
<h2><strong>State lawmakers must act now to strengthen UI programs ahead of the next crisis</strong></h2>
<p>States lawmakers have broad authority over UI benefits, eligibility, and the financing of their states’ unemployment insurance trust fund, meaning they wield substantial power to ensure programs’ solvency and effectiveness when an economic crisis materializes. In light of the Trump administration’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-macroeconomics-of-the-trump-administration-chaotic-and-harmful-policies-will-make-the-united-states-poorer-either-rapidly-or-gradually/">anti-growth, inflationary economic policy</a> and a <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/another-weak-jobs-report-fuels-fears-of-a-recession/">softening labor market</a>, policymakers must act with urgency to fortify UI programs.</p>
<h3>Step I: Update state funding mechanisms to solidify trust funds and set basic minimum benefit standards</h3>
<p>In recent decades, <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/state-cuts-continue-to-unravel-basic-support-for-unemployed-workers">lawmakers in many states</a> have sought to replenish unemployment trust funds by paring back benefits and restricting eligibility criteria. These efforts have largely failed to restore fund solvency or improve employment rates and have instead caused considerable harm to workers. State policymakers have the authority and tools to modernize their programs in ways that protect solvency without undercutting protections for workers. Policymakers should:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Raise and index the taxable wage base to reflect the typical worker’s income: </strong>States have broad discretion in setting their taxable wage base (TWB), provided it meets or exceeds the exceptionally low federal minimum of $7,000. (As of 2025, the <a href="https://taxnews.ey.com/Login/TurnstileLandingPage.aspx?returnUrl=%2fLogin%2fViewEmailDocument.aspx%3fNumber%3d2025-0171-2025-state-unemployment-insurance-taxable-wage-bases&amp;alertTitle=2025+state+unemployment+insurance+taxable+wage+bases&amp;imagePath=%2fResources%2fImages%2fLinkedInSharePreview%2fGettyImages-115970447.jpeg">median state TWB</a> is only $14,000.) States should link or index their TWBs to typical wages in their state. Currently, 18 states index their TWBs to the state’s average weekly wage, including <a href="https://www.oregon.gov/employ/Businesses/Tax/Pages/Current-Tax-Rate.aspx">Oregon</a> (TWB of $54,300), <a href="https://labor.hawaii.gov/ui/tax-rate-schedule-and-weekly-benefit-amount/">Hawaii</a> ($62,000), and <a href="https://esd.wa.gov/employer-requirements/unemployment-taxes/how-we-determine-tax-rates/taxable-wage-base">Washington</a> ($72,800). This ensures UI revenues keep pace with growth in the state economy, while creating a more equitable tax base and strengthening trust fund solvency. Adjusting taxable wage bases also allows states to generate more revenue at lower State Unemployment Tax Act (SUTA) rates. For instance, applying a 5.7% rate to a $7,000 tax base generates $400 in revenue per worker, while a much lower rate of <a href="https://calbudgetcenter.org/resources/revitalizing-unemployment-insurance-in-california/">3.8% applied to a $21,000 tax base generates $800</a>—twice the revenue.&nbsp;</li>
<li><strong>Guarantee a minimum of 26 weeks of potential benefit duration: </strong><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-4-benefit-duration-expand-ui-benefit-duration-to-provide-longer-protection-during-normal-times-and-use-better-measures-of-labor-market-distress-to-automatically-extend-and-sustain-benefits-d/#:~:text=Common%20criticisms%20of%20extended%20potential%20benefit%20durations">An extensive body of research</a> finds that longer UI benefits do not meaningfully discourage work and any resulting increase in unemployment duration is offset by improved job matching, as workers find jobs with higher pay or that better match their skills. Prior to the Great Recession, all states <a href="https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-15-281.pdf">offered at least 26 weeks of potential benefit duration</a> (PBD) to eligible workers. Policymakers should ensure UI programs guarantee a minimum of 26 weeks of PBD.</li>
<li><strong>Raise benefit levels to afford workers a minimum standard of living: </strong>Low benefit levels mean low-wage workers—should they even qualify for benefits—often receive benefits that are unlivable. As a stepping stone to more ambitious and meaningful benefit level increases, lawmakers should set <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-5-benefit-levels-increase-ui-benefits-to-levels-working-families-can-survive-on/">minimum benefit levels</a> that working families can survive on: a benefit amount of at least 30% of the state’s average weekly wage or $300 per week (indexed to median wage growth), whichever is greater.</li>
</ul>
<div class="quick-card">
<h4>Getting started: Key questions for state unemployment insurance laws</h4>
<ul>
<li>How many weeks of benefits are available to workers?</li>
<li>What is the maximum weekly benefit available to workers?</li>
<li>Is there a dependent allowance?</li>
<li>Does the program utilize all available extended benefit programs?</li>
<li>What is the taxable wage base? Is it flexible? How is it calculated?</li>
<li>What is the SUTA tax rate?</li>
<li>Does the unemployment trust fund meet the recommended minimum adequate solvency level as defined by the Department of Labor?</li>
<li>How are employers experience rated?</li>
<li>Which workers are eligible?
<div class="eligibility">
<h6>Monetary eligibility criteria</h6>
<ul>
<li>How is labor force attachment defined? Are there hours or earnings thresholds workers must meet to be eligible for UI?</li>
<li>What is the base period for measuring sufficient hours or earnings?</li>
<li>Does your state have an Alternative Base Period (ABP)? Is it automatically applied, or must it be requested?</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="eligibility">
<h6>Nonmonetary eligibility</h6>
<ul>
<li>What must unemployed workers do to maintain eligibility?</li>
<li>What are the work search requirements for workers?</li>
<li>How is suitable work defined?</li>
<li>How are “good cause quits” defined?</li>
</ul>
</div>
</li>
<li>Does the state have a well-functioning short-term compensation program?</li>
</ul>
</div>
<h3>Step II: Improve program access and benefits to levels that make UI fulfill its core objectives</h3>
<p>Unemployment insurance is one of the most important tools for reducing the harmful, reverberating effects of unemployment and one of the most effective programs for combatting recessions. Providing adequate benefits to unemployed workers leads to better reemployment outcomes, keeps dollars flowing in local economies, and ultimately lends itself to a more productive and dynamic economy. To this end, state policymakers should:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Strengthen program administration and remove barriers to UI access:&nbsp;</strong>Applying for UI benefits is often a complex process and serves as a barrier to entry to workers who are navigating job loss. Underfunding and inadequate staffing of state and local UI administrative offices can compound these problems. Lawmakers should ensure that state agencies and UI offices have adequate resources to help applicants navigate the process and quickly process claims. In addition, the Century Foundation and Philadelphia Legal Assistance provide a&nbsp;<a href="https://tcf.org/content/report/improving-state-unemployment-insurance-technology-a-guide-for-advocates/">comprehensive set of recommendations</a>&nbsp;for state policymakers and agencies seeking to modernize UI systems and reduce barriers to access.</li>
<li><strong>Automatically extend UI benefits in difficult economic conditions to strengthen the program’s role as a macroeconomic stabilizer: </strong>When UI programs do not scale with market conditions, this <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-to-boost-unemployment-insurance-as-a-macroeconomic-stabilizer-lessons-from-the-2020-pandemic-programs/#:~:text=UI%20as%20an%20income%20stabilizer%20during%20the,in%20the%20face%20of%20sudden%20earnings%20losses.">deepens the damage caused by recessions</a>. To better leverage UI’s stabilizing potential, states should utilize the optional Total Unemployment Rate (TUR)-based extended benefit program to guarantee workers can receive up to 20 weeks of extended benefits during severe economic crises. As of 2023, only <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-4-benefit-duration-expand-ui-benefit-duration-to-provide-longer-protection-during-normal-times-and-use-better-measures-of-labor-market-distress-to-automatically-extend-and-sustain-benefits-d/">27 states and territories</a> utilize the optional TUR-based trigger. Although optional state extended benefit programs carry some budgetary costs, they can <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-4-benefit-duration-expand-ui-benefit-duration-to-provide-longer-protection-during-normal-times-and-use-better-measures-of-labor-market-distress-to-automatically-extend-and-sustain-benefits-d/">help mitigate the long-lasting scarring effects of an economic contraction</a>.&nbsp;</li>
<li><strong>Set benefit levels that offer real protection for workers: </strong>State laws governing wage replacement and benefit maximums vary widely, but <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2023/monetary.pdf">some states have adopted benefit formulas that provide much stronger protection</a>. For instance, in 2024, Hawaii’s program provided an average weekly benefit of $653 (57% of worker wages), Washington’s average weekly benefit was $722 (51% of wages), and Massachusetts’s was $704 (48% of wages.) The National Employment Law Project’s <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/benefit-amounts/">policy brief</a> describes optimal formulas for computing benefits.</li>
<li><strong>Establish a dependent allowance to allow parents and caregivers to fulfill their obligations: </strong>Households with children are much <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/number-of-families-struggling-to-afford-food-rose-steeply-in-pandemic-and">more likely to face food and housing insecurity</a> when a job is lost. Dependent allowances, already enacted in <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/dependent-allowance/">13 states</a>, can help mitigate these harms by recognizing the added burdens that caregivers face. Policymakers should <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/model-state-legislation-dependent-allowance/">adopt similar measures</a> and define dependents broadly to reflect the diversity of family structures and care responsibilities.</li>
<li><strong>Make short-term compensation (“work-sharing”) more appealing for employers and workers</strong>: During economic downturns, employers often resort to layoffs to reduce costs, harming workers financially and businesses in lost skilled labor. Under a short-time compensation (STC) (or “work-sharing” arrangement), firms can reduce employee hours instead eliminating jobs, while UI benefits partially offset lost wages for workers. Currently <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/docs/factsheet/STC_FactSheet.pdf">33 states</a> have STC programs in place, but utilization remains uneven and low relative to <a href="https://wol.iza.org/articles/short-time-work-compensations-and-employment">comparable programs</a> in OECD nations. States can strengthen STC programs by making firms of all sizes eligible, removing experience rating penalties, allowing employers to certify reductions in hours on behalf of workers, and ensuring earnings from other jobs are not counted against workers’ STC benefits. The Washington Center for Equitable Growth <a href="https://equitablegrowth.org/research-paper/making-short-time-compensation-work-for-the-low-wage-service-sector/">provides additional recommendations</a> for reducing administrative barriers and engaging in employer outreach and education.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Step III: Modernize unemployment insurance to reflect the needs of a 21st century economy</h3>
<p>The unemployment insurance system, designed in the 1930s, no longer reflects the realities of today’s workforce. It excludes many gig, part-time, and irregular workers, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-3-eligibility-update-ui-eligibility-to-match-the-modern-workforce-and-guarantee-benefits-to-everyone-looking-for-work-but-still-jobless-through-no-fault-of-their-own/">inherits frameworks that are rooted in racism and sexism</a>. Lawmakers should adopt more expansive frameworks for UI eligibility and accessibility by taking action to:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Set progressive benefit levels that truly alleviate economic hardship:</strong> Policymakers can ensure UI systems truly alleviate economic hardship and strengthen worker bargaining power, while targeting those workers most in need, by progressively structuring benefits. A smart approach <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-5-benefit-levels-increase-ui-benefits-to-levels-working-families-can-survive-on/">would replace at least 85% of wages for the lowest earners, gradually scaling down to 50% for high earners</a>, and 30% for very high earners.</li>
<li><strong>Increase benefits duration to ensure workers have sufficient runway and better prospects when reentering the workforce:</strong> <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w27574">Evidence shows</a> that when workers have a longer benefit runway, they have better reemployment outcomes, find jobs that better match their skills, earn higher wages, and are more likely to remain on the job. States should guarantee a minimum of 30 weeks of potential regular UI benefit duration.</li>
<li><strong>Raise or remove the ceiling on the taxable wage base</strong>: Policymakers can truly address solvency concerns by dynamically increasing or eliminating caps on taxable wage bases. States should set the TWB to <a href="https://tcf.org/content/commentary/increasing-taxable-wage-base-unlocks-door-lasting-unemployment-insurance-reform/?agreed=1">at least half of the Social Security taxable wage limit</a> ($176,100 as of 2025). Several states have successfully increased their TWBs by <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/financing-and-solvency-basics/">indexing</a> to a high proportion of the average worker’s wage. Whether by raising the cap, indexing it to wages, or relinking it to the Social Security base, modernizing the taxable wage base would strengthen trust fund solvency and create fairer contributions across employers of low- and high-wage workers.</li>
<li><strong>Reform experience rating to eliminate harmful incentives to fight legitimate UI claims: </strong>Federal law requires states to adopt rules such that employers with higher rates of separations pay higher UI taxes. This approach, known as “experience rating” <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilaws_exper_rating.pdf">encourages</a> workforce stability and helps ensure equity among employers by charging more of those who draw more heavily against unemployment trust funds. However, these rules create the perverse incentive for employers to block legitimate claims by encouraging workers to not file, challenging claims, or structuring their workforce to minimize the number of employees eligible for UI, such as relying on part-time or contract labor. States can remove these harmful incentives by experience rating employers based on <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-2-financing-reform-financing-of-ui-to-eliminate-incentives-for-states-and-employers-to-exclude-workers-and-reduce-benefits/">changes in the number of hours worked</a> by their employees or the number of workers they employ. Alaska, for example, implemented a “<a href="https://live.laborstats.alaska.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/UI%20finance%20system%20overview.pdf">payroll decline quotient</a>” method which ties tax rates to changes in payroll over time instead of the number of claims made by workers. Further, since some firms are indifferent to additional layoffs because of a capped experience rating tax, states can <a href="https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/legacy/files/A-Comparative-Analysis-of-Unemployment-Insurance-Financing-Methods-Final-Report.pdf">impose penalties</a> on firms that persistently remain at the cap.</li>
<li><strong>Expand eligibility to all workers with demonstrated attachment to the labor force: </strong>State monetary eligibility rules should be reformed to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-3-eligibility-update-ui-eligibility-to-match-the-modern-workforce-and-guarantee-benefits-to-everyone-looking-for-work-but-still-jobless-through-no-fault-of-their-own/#:~:text=Policy%20proposal%3A%20Require%20300%20hours%20of%20work%2C%20and%20work%20in%20two%20quarters%20of%20the%20base%20period%2C%20for%20program%20eligibility">guarantee coverage for all workers who demonstrate clear labor force participation</a>. Rather than relying solely on workers meeting specific earnings thresholds, states should also allow workers to qualify based on hours worked. Specifically, any individual who works at least 300 hours during two quarters of a base period should qualify. This means a worker who performed 15 hours of work per week for 20 weeks across two quarters would be eligible for UI. Hours from all work arrangements should be counted toward the 300-hour minimum, given that low-paid workers often hold multiple jobs across different employers. States should also extend the base period for determining eligibility to six quarters of work, to prevent low-paid, seasonal, and temporary workers from falling through the cracks. Oregon is currently the only state with a <a href="https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_657.150">hybrid model</a> allowing workers to qualify based on either earnings or hours.</li>
<li><strong>Reform work-search requirements to account for issues that workers commonly face:</strong>&nbsp;Overly&nbsp;<a href="https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Closing-Doors-on-the-Unemployed12_19_17-1.pdf">onerous work-search requirements</a>&nbsp;increase benefit denials while failing to save money for UI programs.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/section-3-eligibility-update-ui-eligibility-to-match-the-modern-workforce-and-guarantee-benefits-to-everyone-looking-for-work-but-still-jobless-through-no-fault-of-their-own/">States should ensure work-search requirements are not so burdensome</a>&nbsp;that active jobseekers lose UI benefits before finding a new and suitable job. For instance, states should allow workers to continue receiving benefits if they have good cause for missing an appointment or work-search verification. If a worker falls short of work-search requirements, they should lose benefits only for that week, instead of being permanently removed from the program. States should also allow workers engaged in education or training programs that may boost their employment prospects to continue receiving UI benefits. Further, they should ensure continuing eligibility for workers available for part-time work, not just those seeking full-time work.</li>
<li><strong>Enact</strong><strong> strong suitable work requirements to boost worker reentry prospects</strong>: A core function of UI is to promote stable, quality reemployment; workers should remain eligible for UI if they decline a job that is a poor match for their skills or of substandard quality. The National Employment Law Project <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/suitable-work/">provides recommendations</a> that states can adopt to ensure strong suitable work criteria, including: 1) comparing the wage offered by a new job to the occupation’s prevailing wage and factoring in the worker’s expertise, training, and experience; 2) maintaining standards of suitable work that do not weaken based on the length of unemployment; and 3) reviewing offers for temporary employment under a lens of prevailing labor market conditions.</li>
<li><strong>Expand</strong><strong> eligibility criteria to cover workers compelled to leave their jobs for valid reasons: </strong>Historically, the UI program has failed to account for many of the reasons that might compel a worker to leave their job. States should adopt <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/good-cause-quits/">stronger good-cause quits provisions</a> that include reasons such as leaving due to unsafe conditions, caregiving responsibilities, or harassment, while exploring broader eligibility criteria that <a href="https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2025/how-unemployment-insurance-access-and-benefits-vary-by-state">provide benefits to workers who quit</a>.</li>
<li><strong>Extend UI eligibility to striking workers: </strong>Allow <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ui-striking-workers/">workers engaged in labor disputes</a> to access UI benefits under the same rules as other unemployed workers. While some states impose extra waiting periods for striking workers, policymakers should adopt no or minimal additional delays.</li>
<li><strong>Establish joblessness protections for independent contractors, self-employed, and undocumented workers: </strong>To function as a true safety net UI should cover all labor force participants, including self-employed workers, independent contractors, and undocumented workers who lose work. In recent years, California, Colorado, and New York have <a href="https://immresearch.org/publications/providing-unemployment-insurance-to-immigrants-and-other-excluded-workers-a-state-roadmap-for-inclusive-benefits/">pioneered successful initiatives for covering contractors, self-employed, and undocumented workers</a>. States should explore options for establishing similar programs to ensure workers excluded from traditional UI have access to similar safety net protections.</li>
<li><strong>Adopt clear legal standards to combat worker misclassification: </strong>When workers are wrongfully classified as independent contractors, they <a href="https://inequality.org/article/worker-misclassification-is-costly/">lose the labor protections of W-2</a> employees, including UI eligibility. Misclassification <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-2025-update/">imposes heavy costs on both workers and state trust funds</a>. Policymakers can address this by adopting <a href="https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dli/resources/compliance-laws-and-regulations/misclassified-workers">Pennsylvania’s model</a>, which presumes that any worker performing services is an employee unless the employer proves that 1) the worker is free from the employer’s control or direction in performing work and 2) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade or business.</li>
<li><strong>Design programs to protect workers’ privacy: </strong>While some states have <a href="https://www.urban.org/research/publication/job-quality-and-wage-records">expanded wage records</a> to include details such as occupation, industry, or work hours to better evaluate job quality and improve services, UI programs should ensure workers can apply for benefits without risking retaliation or exposure of sensitive personal data. The Century Foundation and Immigration Research Initiative <a href="https://immresearch.org/publications/providing-unemployment-insurance-to-immigrants-and-other-excluded-workers-a-state-roadmap-for-inclusive-benefits/">recommend</a> limiting data collection to what is necessary, prohibiting disclosure for nonprogram purposes, and requiring data safeguards, while allowing applicants to self-attest wherever possible. To ensure accountability, violations of privacy rules should carry clear penalties. This year, Maryland lawmakers introduced <a href="https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/sb0977?ys=2025RS">legislation to protect state databases</a> from unauthorized sharing and immigration inquiries, offering model language for policymakers seeking to protect state data more broadly.</li>
</ul>
<h2>Additional recommended resources</h2>
<ul>
<li>National Employment Law Project (NELP)’s&nbsp;<u><a href="https://www.nelp.org/explore-the-issues/unemployment-insurance/ui-policy-hub/">State Unemployment Insurance Policy Hub</a>;</u></li>
<li><em><u><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/">Reforming Unemployment Insurance: Stabilizing a System in Crisis and Laying the Foundation for Equity</a></u></em>—a joint report of the Center for American Progress, Center for Popular Democracy, Economic Policy Institute, Groundwork Collaborative, National Employment Law Project, National Women’s Law Center, and Washington Center for Equitable Growth;</li>
<li>The Century Foundation&#8217;s <a href="https://tcf.org/content/data/unemployment-insurance-data-dashboard/">Unemployment Insurance Data Dashboard</a>.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<p><em><strong>Editor’s note:</strong> This piece was revised on October 8, 2025, to add an “Additional recommended resources” section and clarify the need to increase UI funding both to strengthen benefits and ensure effective UI program administration.</em></p>
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		<title>2025 worker-led state policy victories show how states can—and must—do more to hold the line against escalating federal attacks on workers’ rights</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/2025-worker-led-state-policy-victories-show-how-states-can-and-must-do-more-to-hold-the-line-against-escalating-federal-attacks-on-workers-rights/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 06 Aug 2025 18:06:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Emma Cohn, Jennifer Sherer]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=308494</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[State action to strengthen worker rights and protections has become critically important at a moment when long-standing U.S. labor standards are under acute threat.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>State action to strengthen worker rights and protections has become critically important at a moment when long-standing <a href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">U.S. labor standards are under acute threat</a>. Escalating threats include Trump administration attempts to roll back (or <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/department-of-labor-halts-enforcement-of-minimum-wage-overtime-rights-for-home-care-workers/">stop enforcing</a>) standards that set a national floor for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">minimum wage</a>, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/overtime-pay-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis-overtime-pay/">overtime pay</a>, <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/too-many-workers-die-on-the-job-every-year-trumps-attacks-on-osha-will-kill-more/">health and safety</a>, nondiscrimination, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/child-labor-standards-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">child labor</a>, and other rights and protections long taken for granted in most U.S. workplaces.</p>
<p>Amid this crisis, states have urgent obligations to shore up basic protections. The crisis also presents states with big opportunities to remedy long-standing weaknesses and exclusions in outdated labor laws and take leadership in addressing major economic challenges like wage suppression, growing income inequality, racial and gender wage gaps, and declining job quality.<span id="more-308494"></span></p>
<p>Below we summarize some of the actions states have taken so far in 2025 to raise wages, prevent harmful child labor, combat wage theft and worker misclassification, guarantee the right to unionize, expand paid leave, protect worker health and safety, and improve unemployment insurance. These examples from across the country show how state policymakers can assume more expansive, effective roles in enacting and enforcing key worker rights and protections.</p>
<h4><strong>Wages</strong></h4>
<p>The federal minimum wage—now officially <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-federal-minimum-wage-is-officially-a-poverty-wage-in-2025/">a poverty wage</a>—is just $7.25 per hour and has <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/why-17-minimum-wage/">not increased since 2009</a>. Moreover, federal law continues to allow employers to pay subminimum wages to tipped workers, workers with disabilities, youth under 18, and others, while excluding certain occupations (e.g., farmworkers) from coverage. Resulting wage suppression hurts all workers and is particularly harmful to Black workers and other workers of color. In the absence of federal action, states continue to lead important progress on raising the minimum wage to levels that <a href="https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker/">address inflation and regional costs of living</a>; eliminating subminimum wages; and closing loopholes that deny some groups of workers minimum wage coverage.</p>
<p>This year Rhode Island enacted <a href="https://nmd.nyc3.cdn.digitaloceanspaces.com/epi/documents/testimonies/Testimony-in-support-of-H5029-and-H5508-minimum-wage.pdf">legislation</a> (<a href="https://legiscan.com/RI/bill/H5029/2025">H5029</a>) to progressively raise the minimum wage to $17 by 2027. Virginia also passed <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB1928">legislation</a> to increase the minimum wage to $17 by 2027, but it was ultimately vetoed by Governor Youngkin.</p>
<p>Following a <a href="https://www.mecep.org/blog/progress-for-farmworkers-but-full-justice-still-denied/">years-long campaign</a>, Maine expanded <a href="https://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=SP0273&amp;item=3&amp;snum=132">its state minimum wage law</a> to include farmworkers who are <a href="https://www.mecep.org/blog/farmworker-rights-an-explainer/">otherwise excluded</a> from most federal labor protections. (Maine legislators also passed related legislation [<a href="https://legislature.maine.gov/legis/bills/display_ps.asp?LD=588&amp;snum=132%22%20\t%20%22_blank">LD 588]</a> to extend anti-retaliation protections to farmworkers, but it was vetoed by Governor Mills). And this year, Georgia joined <a href="https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/its-legal-some-employers-pay-disabled-workers-less-minimum-wage-ending-practice-just">26 states</a> that have taken action to prohibit or disincentivize paying subminimum wages to workers with disabilities.<a href="https://gbpi.org/support-georgians-economic-security/"> Georgia’s new law</a> (<a href="https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/69634?mc_cid=c997636556&amp;mc_eid=5b1d51f6aa">SB 55</a>) will phase out the disability subminimum wage by 2027.</p>
<p>Ongoing efforts to eliminate the tipped minimum wage met with setbacks in D.C., Michigan, and Colorado:</p>
<ul>
<li>In <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/d-c-council-should-support-tipped-workers-by-maintaining-i-82/">Washington, D.C.</a>—where voters overwhelmingly supported measures to phase out the tipped minimum wage in both 2018 and 2022—the City Council voted to delay planned 2025 increases, extend the timeline for phasing in future increases to seven years, and eventually <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/food/2025/07/29/dc-tipped-wage-law-i82-overhaul/">cap the tipped minimum wage at 75%</a> of the minimum wage.</li>
<li>Seven years after Michigan legislators <a href="https://apnews.com/article/michigan-minimum-wage-increase-9c9a63a92b2cc29b521a9fa9a7dfc711">blocked voters</a> from weighing in on a highly popular ballot measure that would have phased out the tipped minimum wage, and a year after the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the ballot measure’s benefits for low-wage workers, state legislators <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/conservative-michigan-lawmakers-are-threatening-to-undermine-minimum-wage-increases-for-tipped-workers/">once again acted against voters’ wishes</a> with compromise legislation (<a href="https://legislature.mi.gov/Bills/Bill?ObjectName=2025-SB-0008">SB 8</a>) that accelerates the schedule of minimum wage increases but maintains the state’s tipped subminimum wage.</li>
<li>In response to intense lobbying from the restaurant industry, <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb25-1208">Colorado changed its law</a> to allow localities with higher minimum wage rates to maintain relatively lower tipped minimum wages. Previously, Colorado cities with higher minimum wages were required to maintain a tipped minimum of $3.02 less than the local minimum wage (equivalent to the current $3.02 gap between the state tipped and full minimum wage). The new law allows for gaps larger than $3.02 between a local tipped and full minimum wage (providing that the local tipped minimum remains at least equivalent to the state tipped minimum). This compromise replaced <a href="https://copolicy.org/news/cclp-testifies-in-opposition-of-wage-cuts-for-tipped-workers/">an even worse bill</a> that would have <em>required </em>all localities to <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/harmful-colorado-bill-would-lower-the-minimum-wage-for-tipped-workers-in-denver-and-other-cities-house-bill-1208-would-prevent-localities-from-setting-higher-tipped-wages-for-their-own-workers/">lower their tipped minimum wage</a> <a name="_Int_LXKlzo16"></a>to match the state tipped minimum.</li>
</ul>
<p>State prevailing wage standards—which require contractors on public works projects to pay workers at least the local median wage for a given type of work—help ensure that public investments <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/epi-comments-on-davis-bacon-updates-nprm/">yield good jobs with fair, equitable pay and benefits</a>. This year, New Jersey strengthened its prevailing wage law by <a href="https://legiscan.com/NJ/text/S3041/2024">expanding prohibitions</a> on public contracts with firms that have previously failed to pay prevailing wage. Oregon enacted <a href="https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025R1/Measures/Overview/HB2688">HB 2688</a>, extending prevailing wage requirements to some off-site manufacturing. A bill extending the <a name="_Int_NlA0C374"></a>state’s <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB2743">prevailing wage requirement</a> to contractors working on underground infrastructure works passed in Virginia but was vetoed by Governor Youngkin.</p>
<h4><strong>Child labor</strong></h4>
<p>Despite&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/coordinated-attacks-on-state-labor-standards-are-laying-the-groundwork-for-dangerous-project-2025-proposals-to-undermine-all-workers-rights/">ongoing federal- and state-level attempts</a>&nbsp;to erode the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, advocates in several states succeeded in blocking new threats to <a href="https://www.epi.org/research/child-labor/">weaken child labor protections</a>. For example, EARN network affiliate Florida Policy Institute helped block two related bills (<a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/1225">HB 1225</a> and <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/session/bill/2025/918">SB 918</a>) that would have allowed employers to schedule some 14- and 15-year-olds and all 16- and 17-year-olds for <a href="https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/fast-facts-hb-1225-and-sb-918-would-further-erode-child-labor-protections-in-florida">unlimited hours of work without breaks</a>. Florida advocates also stopped passage of a bill (<a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/676/">SB 676</a>) that threatened to exempt student internships and work-study programs from the state minimum wage.</p>
<p>Continuing a <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/more-states-have-strengthened-child-labor-laws-than-weakened-them-in-2024-this-year-state-advocates-were-better-equipped-to-organize-in-opposition-to-harmful-bills/">growing trend</a>, several states passed proactive legislation to shore up child labor protections. New York’s <a href="https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy26/ex/artvii/elfa-bill.pdf">budget bill</a> drastically increases civil penalties and adds criminal homicide charges for employers who cause the death of a child due to negligence on the job, while Washington passed legislation (<a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/BillSummary/?BillNumber=1644&amp;Year=2025">HB 1644</a>) increasing penalties for child labor violations, limiting an employer’s ability to hire minors following repeated violations, and strengthening state agency oversight of employers seeking permits to supervise student learning that involves potentially hazardous work.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, West Virginia <a href="https://mountainstatespotlight.org/2025/03/12/labor-permits-child-work/">eliminated their youth work permit system</a> for 14–15-year-olds and replaced it with a mandatory age certification process which transfers sole approval authority and recordkeeping responsibilities from schools to the state labor division. Though <a href="https://westvirginiawatch.com/2024/02/20/wv-house-advances-bill-that-would-repeal-work-permits-for-14-15-year-olds/">an improvement on a previous bill</a>, this law means school officials will no longer have the authority to reject work arrangements they believe are not in a student&#8217;s best interest.</p>
<h4><strong>Preventing wage theft and worker misclassification</strong></h4>
<p>State roles in enforcing strong wage payment standards are more important than ever at a moment when the Trump administration is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-department-of-labor-is-dismantling-key-workplace-protections/">rolling back federal wage and hour standards</a> and the number of federal Department of Labor (DOL) Wage and Hour Division investigators is already at an&nbsp;<a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/WJL_immigration_databrief_May2025.pdf">all-time low</a>. This year, several states passed legislation to prevent <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-year">wage theft</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Building on an impressive multi-year <a href="https://smlr.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/Documents/Centers/WJL/24.08.09%20OR%20MWV%20Memo%20FINAL.pdf">initiative to strengthen state labor standards enforcement</a>, Oregon’s <a href="https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025R1/Measures/Overview/SB426">SB 426</a> <a href="https://www.ocpp.org/2025/02/26/sb-426-strengthen-protection-consruction-workers/">strengthens protections</a> for construction workers by holding both project owners and contractors liable for unpaid wages. Oregon also passed <a href="http://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025R1/Measures/Overview/HB5015">HB 5015</a> to strengthen and increase funding for the state agency responsible for enforcing standards, the Bureau of Labor and Industries.</li>
<li>Minnesota continued progress on combating wage theft with an <a href="https://www.revisor.mn.gov/bills/bill.php?b=senate&amp;f=SF1417&amp;ssn=0&amp;y=2025">amendment</a> to existing laws that gives county attorneys authority to subpoena records of employers in wage theft investigations.</li>
<li>Colorado enacted a new version of legislation (<a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/hb25-1001">HB 1001</a>) previously vetoed by Governor Polis, that will now <a href="https://copolicy.org/news/cclp-testifies-in-support-of-enforcement-of-wage-and-hour-laws/">expand state agency authority</a> to penalize employers who commit wage theft and publicize violations on a state agency website.</li>
<li>New York’s <a href="https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy26/ex/artvii/elfa-bill.pdf">budget bill</a> gives the state’s DOL more power to enforce wage theft laws, including the <a href="https://citylimits.org/3-changes-to-new-york-labor-laws-included-in-the-latest-state-budget/">ability to seize a violator’s financial assets</a> following an unpaid wage theft judgment.</li>
</ul>
<p>Growing recognition of the costs of&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassifying-workers-2025-update/">worker misclassification</a> continued to generate important state policy advances in 2025. Employers who illegally misclassify employees as “independent contractors” skirt payroll tax, unemployment, and workers’ compensation payments, while depriving workers of fundamental workplace rights and increasing the likelihood of wage theft.&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Though ultimately vetoed by the governor, Virginia lawmakers passed <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB2561">HB2561</a>, which would have extended the timeframe for filing wage and misclassification claims and held employers liable for damages awarded in lawsuits.</li>
<li>In Delaware, a <a href="https://legis.delaware.gov/BillDetail/141896">bill</a> currently awaiting the governor’s signature would hold contractors liable when their subcontractors misclassify workers and allow the state’s DOL to enforce compliance.</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong>Rights to unionize and collectively bargain </strong></h4>
<p>Several states acted this year to strengthen workers’ rights to organize and bargain or to hold the line against new attacks on the right to unionize. State policies are especially critical for determining whether workers have the freedom to form unions at a moment when the Trump administration is <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/firing-nlrb-board-member-gwynne-wilcox/">hobbling</a> the federal government’s ability to adjudicate labor law violations, <a href="https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/5433509-federal-employees-trump-order-union-ruling/">attacking union rights</a> of federal employees, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/targeting-elimination-of-federal-mediation-and-conciliation-service/">eliminating</a> capacities to mediate contract negotiations. Even prior to these escalating attacks, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/millions-of-workers-millions-of-workers-want-to-join-unions-but-couldnt/">millions of workers</a> interested in unionizing faced daunting obstacles to organizing under weak, outdated federal laws that <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/corporate-union-busting/">employers routinely violate</a>.</p>
<p>This year, Washington (<a href="https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary/?BillNumber=5041&amp;Year=2025&amp;Initiative=false">SB 5041</a>) and <a href="https://www.ocpp.org/2025/02/06/testimony-in-support-of-sb-916/">Oregon</a> (<a href="https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025r1/Measures/Overview/SB916">SB 916</a>) took steps to encourage fairer labor negotiations by extending eligibility for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/ui-striking-workers/">unemployment insurance to striking workers</a>. <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/asp/CGABillStatus/cgabillstatus.asp?selBillType=Bill&amp;bill_num=SB8">Connecticut legislation</a> to do the same passed for the <a href="https://ctaflcio.org/press-room/labor-responds-lamont-veto-legislation-aid-striking-workers">second year in a row</a> but was again vetoed by Governor Lamont. Rhode Island (<a href="https://legiscan.com/RI/bill/S0126/2025">SB 126</a>) joined the now <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/nlrb-rules-anti-union-captive-audience-meetings-an-illegal-abuse-of-employer-power-states-must-also-continue-to-broaden-protection-of-workers-freedom-from-employer-coercion-on-political-rel/">13 states protecting employees’ freedom</a> to opt out of employer-sponsored “captive audience” meetings on political or religious matters unrelated to work duties. Such mandatory meetings are frequently used by employers to communicate anti-union views amid highly coercive, retaliatory campaigns to block workers from unionizing.</p>
<p>Several states took affirmative steps to safeguard collective bargaining rights for groups of workers otherwise excluded from federal coverage, or to resist attempts to limit workers’ collective bargaining rights with <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/data-show-anti-union-right-to-work-laws-damage-state-economies-as-michigans-repeal-takes-effect-new-hampshire-should-continue-to-reject-right-to-work-legislation/">so-called right-to-work (RTW) laws</a>. Vermont legislators approved placing a <a href="https://vermontbiz.com/news/2025/may/01/may-day-house-passes-labor-rights-amendment-heads-2026-ballot">constitutional amendment guaranteeing collective bargaining rights</a>&nbsp;on the ballot in 2026. Two other New England states—<a href="https://gc.nh.gov/bill_status/legacy/bs2016/billText.aspx?sy=2025&amp;id=317&amp;txtFormat=html">New Hampshire</a> and <a href="https://maineaflcio.org/news/labor-committee-rejects-right-work-less-party-lines">Maine</a>—rejected unpopular proposals to pass RTW legislation.</p>
<p>Colorado legislators passed the <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb25-005">Worker Protection Act</a> in an attempt to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/co-union-law/">reverse an 80-year-old law</a> that imposes <em>de facto</em> RTW conditions in the state. Unlike any other state, Colorado requires unionizing private-sector workers to undergo a state-sanctioned “second election” in order to gain full bargaining rights. Despite passage by large margins and a robust campaign demonstrating <a href="https://coloradofiscal.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Strong-Unions-Report.pdf">economic benefits of strengthening unions</a>, the Worker Protection Act was <a href="https://copolicy.org/news/press-release-cclp-statement-on-worker-protection-act-veto/">vetoed</a> by Governor Jared Polis.</p>
<p>Virginia attempted a significant expansion of <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB2764">collective bargaining coverage</a> for state and local public employees (building on <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-public-sector-workers-are-building-power-in-virginia/">2021 legislation</a> that lifted a state ban on local government collective bargaining), but Governor Youngkin vetoed the legislation.</p>
<p>In Ohio, a <a href="https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2025/06/23/new-ohio-higher-education-law-banning-diversity-efforts-and-faculty-strikes-takes-effect-this-week/">new law</a> curtailing freedom of speech in higher education also stripped faculty of their right to strike. In other states where legislators continued attacking rights of public employees this year, workers largely succeeded in resisting. For example, some Florida legislators attempted to make it even harder for public-sector workers to form or maintain unions, building on an already <a href="https://www.orlandoweekly.com/news/florida-republicans-file-bills-to-make-it-harder-for-government-workers-to-form-and-keep-unions-38953017">extreme anti-union law enacted in 2023</a>. But this year, no new anti-union bills (<a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/1217">HB 1217</a>, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/1387">HB 1387</a>, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/1328">HB 1328</a>, <a href="https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/1766#:~:text=Drug%2DFree%20Workplace%20Act.&amp;text=Adverse%20action%20against%20employee%20for,prohibited%3B%20employee%20remedy%20and%20relief.&amp;text=Exceptions%20and%20special%20requirements%3B%20agencies">SB 1766</a>) were enacted in Florida. Most notably, after Utah passed unpopular <a href="https://le.utah.gov/~2025/bills/static/HB0267.html">legislation banning public-sector collective bargaining</a>, over 300,000 Utahns successfully petitioned for a <a href="https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2025/04/16/utah-labor-unions-organizers/">ballot measure to repeal</a> the ban. The question will now go before voters in 2026.</p>
<h4><strong>Paid leave</strong></h4>
<p>Fed up with decades of lawmakers’ failure to enact paid leave legislation, voters approved paid <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/a-review-of-key-2024-ballot-measures-voters-backed-progressive-policy-measures/">sick leave ballot measures</a> by wide margins in Alaska, Nebraska, and Missouri last November. All three of these ballot measures then came under fire during 2025 legislative sessions. Republican-majority legislatures <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/missouri-legislators-repealed-paid-sick-leave-a-bad-policy-decision-that-will-hurt-working-families/">repealed the paid sick leave portion</a> of Proposition A in Missouri and weakened <a href="https://nebraskaexaminer.com/2025/07/28/nebraska-legislature-embraced-culture-wars-pushed-back-against-voter-approved-laws-in-2025-session/">Nebraska</a>’s paid sick leave program with new exclusions denying coverage to seasonal agricultural workers, young workers, and those working for small businesses. Attempts to do the same in <a href="https://alaskabeacon.com/2025/04/18/bill-seeks-to-cover-fewer-workers-with-paid-sick-leave-recently-approved-by-alaska-voters/">Alaska</a> were unsuccessful, and Alaska workers have now <a href="https://www.abetterbalance.org/exciting-news-paid-sick-time-takes-effect-for-alaskans/">begun to accrue paid sick leave</a> under the new program.</p>
<p>Several states—including <a href="https://alarise.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Alabama-Arise-Paid-Parental-Leave-2025.pdf">Alabama</a>, <a href="https://arkleg.state.ar.us/Bills/Detail?id=hb1017">Arkansas</a>, and <a href="https://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/2025/pdf/history/HB/HB1063.xml">Mississippi</a>—took small but important steps to extend paid parental leave to some public employees, continuing a <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/progress-on-paid-leave-in-the-south-new-state-parental-leave-policies-are-a-small-but-welcome-step-toward-comprehensive-paid-leave-for-all-southern-workers/">multi-year trend</a> in the South. Signaling potential for much bigger breakthroughs on paid leave in the South, Virginia legislators passed <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB2531">HB2531</a>, which would have established a statewide comprehensive paid family and medical leave program, if it had not been vetoed by Governor Youngkin.</p>
<h4><strong>Workplace health and safety</strong></h4>
<p>The Trump administration’s dangerous <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/too-many-workers-die-on-the-job-every-year-trumps-attacks-on-osha-will-kill-more/">war on workplace health and safety standards</a> was replicated in some state legislatures this year and actively resisted in others. Two new laws in Kentucky will increase dangers workers face on the job: The first (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/25RS/HB196.html">HB 196</a>) reduces the <a href="https://www.newsfromthestates.com/article/kentucky-bill-weakening-miner-safety-protection-gains-committee-approval">number of emergency medical technicians</a> <a name="_Int_mpWzkfj9"></a>required on site at active coal mines. The second (<a href="https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/record/25rs/hb398.html">HB 398</a>) <a href="https://kypolicy.org/hb-398-would-weaken-kentucky-worker-health-and-safety-protections/">cripples the state’s OSHA program</a> by prohibiting the state from enforcing existing safety laws above the federal floor, limiting who can request safety inspections, and restricting the time in which an employee can file a complaint of retaliation after reporting a safety hazard. Florida legislation (<a href="https://flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2025/6033">HB 6033</a>) threatening to repeal a 1995 state law that extends rights and protections to temporary and day laborers ultimately died in the House after a fierce campaign by grassroots group Beyond the Bars. Its repeal would have left these laborers <a href="https://www.orlandoweekly.com/news/worker-advocates-manage-to-kill-florida-bill-that-would-have-eliminated-labor-protections-for-temp-workers-39449957">without a number of health and safety protections</a> not guaranteed at the federal level.</p>
<p>Other states are taking important steps to close loopholes in federal law or to anticipate potential erosion of federal OSHA standards. Maryland established a new<a href="https://mgaleg.maryland.gov/mgawebsite/Legislation/Details/SB0026"> state OSHA</a> program to cover public-sector workers (who are otherwise excluded from federal OSHA coverage) and <a href="https://www.multistate.us/insider/2025/7/16/state-extreme-weather-laws-18-states-propose-heat-safety-legislation-in-2025">18 states proposed standards</a> to protect workers exposed to extreme heat. Though none have passed yet in 2025, these bills signal the <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/states-must-lead-the-way-to-protect-workers-from-extreme-heat/">dire need for heat exposure regulations</a> (which <a href="https://www.nrdc.org/resources/occupational-heat-safety-standards-united-states">already exist in seven states</a>) as a proposed <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-prepared-for-oshas-heat-injury-and-illness-prevention-in-outdoor-and-indoor-work-settings-rulemaking/">federal OSHA heat standard</a> currently under consideration could take years to reach approval and is at risk of being weakened or abandoned by the Trump administration.</p>
<h4><strong>Unemployment insurance</strong></h4>
<p>This year, several states passed positive expansions and improvements to their unemployment insurance (UI) systems, while others weakened theirs.</p>
<p>Virginia <a href="https://thecommonwealthinstitute.org/tci_blog/how-virginias-legislature-is-investing-in-communities-2025-session-recap/">enacted two UI improvements</a>. The first, <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/SB1056/text/SB1056">SB 1056</a>, increased UI benefits, while <a href="http://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/SB1057/text/SB1057">SB 1057</a> increased the amount of “disregarded” income people can earn from part-time jobs without reducing their benefits. VA legislators also considered—but failed to pass—a <a href="https://lis.virginia.gov/bill-details/20251/HB1767">related bill</a> that would have allowed unemployed federal contractors to qualify for unemployment insurance. Georgia enacted <a href="https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/70405?mc_cid=e881ad6bfa&amp;mc_eid=5b1d51f6aa">updates to its UI system</a> with the goal of allowing quicker and more efficient communication with UI recipients, and legislators in Maine created an <a href="https://www.mainebiz.biz/article/new-maine-law-will-protect-state-and-federal-workers-during-government-shutdowns">interest-free loan system</a> to help cover lost income for public employees during government shutdowns. The North Carolina House passed <a href="https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookUp/2025/H48/True">an increase to UI benefits</a>, but the bill stalled in the Senate.</p>
<p>Continuing a <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/state-cuts-continue-to-unravel-basic-support-for-unemployed-workers">long-standing trend</a> of attacks on already fragile <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/executive-summary-reforming-unemployment-insurance/">unemployment insurance systems</a>, several states further weakened UI despite vocal opposition. West Virginia and Louisiana made it harder for workers to access benefits, passing legislation to <a href="https://www.wvlegislature.gov/Bill_Status/Bills_history.cfm?input=2441&amp;year=2025&amp;sessiontype=RS&amp;btype=bill">require drug tests</a> to qualify for benefits and increasing <a href="https://www.billtrack50.com/billdetail/1879264">work search requirements</a> respectively. Louisiana&#8217;s bill also slashed overall benefit amounts. After <a href="https://www.commongoodiowa.org/media/cms/220324UI_double_dip_B006D5A7DA5C6.pdf">slashing UI benefits</a> in 2023, this year Iowa enacted <a href="https://www.legis.iowa.gov/legislation/BillBook?ga=91&amp;ba=SF607">SF 607</a>, drastically lowering employers’ contribution rates and putting the <a name="_Int_7krfOpf4"></a>state’s <a href="https://www.commongoodiowa.org/moduledocuments/embed/106/250424__Proposed_federal_cuts_will__C96196FE57252.pdf">UI trust fund at high risk</a> for future insolvency. Workers and advocates had to fend off many other harmful UI bills in other states. Texas’s <a href="https://www.capitol.state.tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=89R&amp;Bill=HB199">HB 199</a>, for example, would have indexed Texans’ maximum number of UI benefits to the statewide average unemployment rate, <a href="https://everytexan.org/2025/04/03/short-changing-working-texans-unemployment-insurance-program-costs-us-all-hb-199-is-unnecessary-unfairly-targets-texas-rural-counties/">slashing up to 12 weeks of unemployment insurance coverage for workers</a> and unfairly punishing rural workers. Thanks to opposition from groups including EPI’s EARN affiliate <a href="https://everytexan.org/">EveryTexan</a>, this bill was killed in committee.</p>
<h4><strong>Conclusion</strong></h4>
<p>While the Trump administration’s attacks on workers and unions continue to escalate, some states are stepping in to shore up and expand workers’ rights and protections. While much more remains to be done, 2025 state legislative sessions provide powerful reminders that states can and should, at a minimum, resist threats to erode labor standards and lock in existing worker protections. The national worker rights crisis also calls for more states to push beyond minimum standards, fix gaps and exclusions in weak labor laws, ensure all workers can build power, and <a href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/">lay the policy foundation necessary</a> to rebuild an economy that works for all.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
											
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		<item>
		<title>Holding the line: State solutions to the U.S. worker rights crisis</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2025 15:29:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?page_id=306956</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Federal worker protections are under Long-standing U.S. worker rights and protections are under acute threat. These include attempts to roll back standards that set a national floor for minimum wages, health and safety, nondiscrimination, unemployment insurance, and other rights and protections long taken for granted in most U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Federal worker protections are under attack</h2>
<p>Long-standing U.S. worker rights and protections are under acute threat. These include attempts to roll back standards that set a national floor for minimum wages, health and safety, nondiscrimination, unemployment insurance, and other rights and protections long taken for granted in most U.S. workplaces.</p>
<h4>Jump to the state solutions</h4>
<div class="state-solutions htl-page">
	<a id="right-to-organize" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rights-to-unionize-and-collectively-bargain-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Union rights</a>
	<a id="min-wage" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/minimum-wage-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="Minimum wage state solutions">Minimum wage</a>
	<a id="ot" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/overtime-pay-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis-overtime-pay/" title="">Overtime pay</a>
	<a id="child-labor" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/child-labor-standards-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Child labor</a>
	<a id="wage-pay" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/wage-payment-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Wage payment</a>
	<a id="misclass" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/misclassification-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Misclassification</a>
	<a id="nondiscrimination" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/workplace-nondiscrimination-protections-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Nondiscrimination</a>
	<a id="unemployment" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Unemployment insurance</a>
	<a id="osha" href="https://www.epi.org/publication/workplace-health-and-safety-standards-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Health &amp; safety</a>
	<a id="missclass" href=" " title="" style="display: none">Worker Misclassification</a>
	<a id="htl" href="https://www.epi.org/holding-the-line-state-solutions-to-the-u-s-worker-rights-crisis/" title="">Series main page</a>
</div>
<!-- <div>
	<h4>Coming soon</h4>
	<div class="state-solutions htl-page">
		<div class="topic nondiscrimination">Nondiscrimination</div>
		<div class="topic unemployment">Unemployment insurance</div>
		<div class="topic osha">Workplace health &amp; safety</div>
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<p>Under the second Trump administration, intense attacks have proliferated by the day and taken many forms. Cuts to federal agency funding and mass firings of federal civil servants—targeting agencies like the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the CDC’s National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, the National Labor Relations Board, and U.S. Department of Labor units like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Wage and Hour Division—have quickly imperiled the federal government’s capacity to ensure U.S. workers get paid what they&#8217;re owed, stay safe at work, have the freedom to form a union, and work in environments free from discrimination. Simultaneously, executive actions have directly targeted rights of workers for elimination. Examples include decisions to <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-blatant-attack-on-workers-you-may-not-have-heard-about-cutting-the-wages-of-nearly-half-a-million-workers/">lower wages </a>of federal contractors; strip <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/executive-order-on-exclusions-from-federal-labor-management-relations-programs/">union rights</a> of federal employees; <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/dhs-revokes-protections-for-532000-in-chnv-parole-program/">revoke work authorization</a> for hundreds of thousands of migrant workers; and <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/quick-fixes-to-lock-in-wins-for-workers-how-states-can-preserve-new-federal-protections/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">block the implementation of</a> new standards to safeguard workers’ overtime wages, freedom to change jobs, and right to organize. Most recently, the administration has &nbsp;taken initial steps to roll back scores of wage and hour and health and safety standards via <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-department-of-labor-is-dismantling-key-workplace-protections/">proposed regulatory changes</a>.</p>
<p>At the same time, Trump’s escalating and often lawless <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/house-republican-budget-bill-gives-trump-185-billion-to-carry-out-his-mass-deportation-agenda-while-doing-nothing-for-workers-immigration-enforcement-would-have-80-times-more-funding-than-la/">attacks on migrant workers</a> are fostering a climate of fear that will <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-enforcement-and-the-workplace/">worsen workplace conditions</a> across the country and make it harder for workers to report labor abuses. The&nbsp;administration has also cancelled programs that <a href="https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uscis-quietly-ends-program-to-shield-workers-reporting-abuse">protected workers</a> from immigration-related retaliation when speaking up about labor violations or that helped prevent exploitative, illegal forms of child labor by allowing migrant youth fleeing neglect or abuse to <a href="https://imprintnews.org/child-welfare-2/lawsuit-challenges-trump-administrations-about-face-on-protecting-abused-and-neglected-immigrant-youth-from-deportation/262678">petition for legal work authorization</a> and a pathway to citizenship.</p>
<p>Trump’s attacks on workers run parallel to industry-backed attempts to ratchet down state labor standards while building pressure to erode federal standards for the whole country. For example, lawmakers in Ohio have repeatedly paired legislation to extend hours children can be scheduled to work on school nights (contradicting current federal guidelines) with <a href="https://www.ohiohouse.gov/legislation/134/scr14/status" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">concurrent resolutions</a> calling on Congress to “change [the] Fair Labor Standards Act” to bring federal standards in line with weaker state rules. Project 2025, the policy roadmap closely followed so far by the second Trump administration, <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24088042-project-2025s-mandate-for-leadership-the-conservative-promise/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">proposes allowing states to “opt out”</a> of federal minimum wage, overtime, and child labor standards. If pursued, this drastic step would put workers at risk of extreme forms of exploitation.</p>
<p>The crisis calls for urgent action. At a minimum, states must be equipped to maintain and enforce basic protections should at-risk federal standards disappear. The crisis also presents opportunities for states to do much more to:</p>
<ul>
<li>remedy longstanding gaps and exclusions in weak or outdated labor and employment laws;</li>
<li>advance new policies that address the pressing challenges of eroding worker power, growing income inequality, persistent racial and gender wage gaps, and declining job quality; and</li>
<li>position states over the long term to assume more expansive, effective roles in enacting and enforcing key protections that form the bedrock of an economy that works for all.</li>
</ul>
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