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	<title>Manufacturing | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Manufacturing | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>Supporting manufacturing employment: No president has tried so of course it has never worked</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/supporting-manufacturing-employment-no-president-has-tried-so-of-course-it-never-worked/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 17:58:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=320084</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Quibbling with headlines is annoying, I know, but I was provoked by the title of economist Jason Furman’s New York Times piece last week: “Every President Tries It.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Quibbling with headlines is annoying, I know, but I was provoked by the title of economist Jason Furman’s <em><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/02/opinion/trump-manufacturing-industry-liberation-day.html">New York Times piece</a></em> last week: “Every President Tries It. It Never Works.” The “it” being referred to here is “reversing the loss of manufacturing jobs.”</p>
<p>The provocation was the “every president tries” part. If “trying” is defined as changing policy to consistently support employment growth in U.S. manufacturing, no president has tried in my lifetime to do this. Amazingly, doing nothing has indeed failed. Doing nothing was also the wrong choice.</p>
<p><span id="more-320084"></span></p>
<h4><strong>The loss of manufacturing jobs</strong></h4>
<p>First, some data to define the problem. Furman focuses on the <em>share</em> of total employment that is in manufacturing. He notes that many structural non-policy forces (like technology and what people demand as countries get richer) put steady downward pressure on this in any growing country. There’s a lot of truth in that.</p>
<p>But the U.S. got much richer between 1965 and 2000—in fact it got richer at a far <em>faster</em> pace than it has since, so both technology and the different demands of a richer society should have been operating a lot <em>less</em> intensely since then. And yet the level of U.S. manufacturing employment was steady during that period, fluctuating roughly between 17.0 and 19.5 million depending on the state of the business cycle (see <strong>Figure A</strong>). After 35 years of stability, manufacturing jobs then cratered: 3 million manufacturing jobs were lost after the recession of 2001, and the 2003–2007 recovery saw essentially no gain at all in manufacturing jobs—the first manufacturing jobless recovery we’ve ever experienced. Then another 3 million jobs were lost during the Great Recession of 2008–09.</p>
<p>After falling from over 17 million to just over 11 million between 2000 and 2010, the sector has seen only very slow growth since. The new high point of manufacturing employment in the recent past was 12.9 million workers in early 2023.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/chart/manuf-jobs-blog-post-figure-a-after-35-years-of-stability-manufacturing-jobs-crater-after-2000-total-employment-in-u-s-manufacturing-thousands-1965-present/">

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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-319900 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319900" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319900-35677-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</a></p>
<p>Manufacturing historically lost a disproportionate share of jobs during recessions, but what kept it from gaining jobs back quickly in the early 2000s and 2010s recoveries the way it usually had? One huge influence was the emergence of a large trade deficit in manufactured goods. In those decades, the deficit peaked at 4.4% of GDP in 2005 (see <strong>Figure B</strong>). After being forced into improvement by the Great Recession and the collapse of American spending on all goods and services (including imports), it has steadily moved back toward this peak and surpassed it in recent years.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/chart/manuf-jobs-blog-post-figure-b-trade-deficit-in-manufactured-goods-spikes-quickly-in-early-1980s-and-becomes-chronic-in-late-1990s-manufacturing-trade-deficit-as-share-of-u-s-gdp/">

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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-319918 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319918" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319918-35678-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</a></p>
<h4><strong>Policy measures can close the trade deficit and reshore manufacturing jobs</strong></h4>
<p>Tolerating this rise of the U.S. trade deficit was a policy choice. The deficit’s rise was driven by a dollar whose value is too high to allow balanced trade. A high dollar makes our exports expensive to foreign consumers and makes foreign imports cheap for U.S. residents. Hence, it leads directly to chronic trade deficits (see <strong>Figure C</strong>). Any serious effort at boosting manufacturing employment would require using policy levers to reduce the value of the U.S. dollar.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/chart/manuf-jobs-blog-post-figure-c-higher-dollar-value-drives-larger-manufacturing-trade-deficits-3-year-lagged-change-in-dollars-value-and-1-year-lead-change-in-trade-deficit-1973-2024/">

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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-319927 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="319927" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/319927-35679-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</a></p>
<p>What are these currency policy levers? First, policy would need to prevent other countries’ governments from actively managing the value of their currency to give their exports a competitive advantage against U.S.-produced goods. There are many ways to do this. Currency management is done through other countries’ governments (<a href="https://www.thewirechina.com/2025/12/14/the-u-s-must-put-pressure-on-china-to-let-the-yuan-strengthen/">or their proxies</a>) buying U.S. dollar-denominated assets (like Treasury bonds or mortgage-backed securities) to bid up the demand for dollars. There’s no particular reason the U.S. couldn’t undertake <a href="https://www.wita.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/pb20-15.pdf">countervailing currency intervention</a> and buy other countries’ assets whenever they bought ours in an effort to manage their currency’s value. Or we could <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/memorandum-on-u-s-trade-and-manufacturing-policy/">tax foreign purchases</a> of U.S. assets.</p>
<p>Second, we could raise taxes domestically to close fiscal deficits. In coming years unless we run into a recession (which the Iran conflict makes more likely), there is likely to be sustained upward pressure on interest rates stemming from the big increases in fiscal deficits locked in by the Republican mega tax and spending bill. Higher interest rates in the U.S. will attract foreign investors to U.S. assets, which will bid up the value of the U.S. dollar further and harm manufacturing.</p>
<p>Third, we could hasten the inevitable deflation of the AI-driven <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">stock market bubble</a>, which has attracted foreign investors looking to make high returns. All else equal, there would be less upward pressure on the U.S. dollar if foreign investors were not rushing in to buy dollars to purchase U.S. stocks.</p>
<p>Fourth, we could accelerate the transition to cleaner energy. The U.S. has swung from being a large net importer to a net exporter of oil and natural gas. This has greatly increased foreign demand for U.S. dollars simply to buy our energy supplies, which pushes up the value of the dollar and hurts U.S. manufacturing.</p>
<p>Finally, we could reform our corporate tax code to stop its bias toward offshoring both paper profits and real production. The swing toward a large <a href="https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Setser%20Senate%20Finance%20Testimony.pdf">trade deficit in the pharmaceuticals sector</a>, for example, can be linked directly to the first Trump administration’s changes in the corporate tax code.</p>
<p>In short, taking currency seriously would mean going against some very powerful economic interests—finance, tech, pharmaceuticals, and fossil fuels—in the name of helping U.S. manufacturing. But it would be a good trade to make. And to be clear, dollar weakness that is caused not by intentional policy decisions but is simply an <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2026/02/02/trump-economic-policies-dollar-decline/">outcome of erratic policy decisions</a> will not provide any sustained benefits to U.S. manufacturing. U.S. manufacturing needs a competitive value of the dollar <em>and </em>a healthy and stable domestic economy. Engineering dollar decline by sabotaging the stability of the domestic economy does not help.</p>
<p>How many jobs could be reshored if currency policy somehow closed the U.S. manufacturing trade deficit? Very roughly it would be <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/brad-delong-too-lenient-on-trade-policy-economic-distress/">close to 3 million</a>. This would not change the long-run trend in the manufacturing share of employment, but it would boost manufacturing-based communities around the country.</p>
<h4><strong>Indifference to manufacturing was bad for economic dynamism</strong></h4>
<p>The long-run gains to rebuilding <a href="https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/process-knowledge-is-crucial-to-economic">communities of manufacturing process knowledge</a> in the U.S. could be large. U.S. losses and China’s growing dominance in manufacturing are in large part a story of deconstructing communities of process knowledge in the U.S. and building them in China. These communities are geographic clusters where firms and workers specialize in particular manufacturing sub-sectors. The agglomeration of knowledge and skills leads to steady innovation which further locks in the competitive advantage of the cluster and raises productivity growth.</p>
<p>Currency policy destroyed these clusters in the U.S. and provided ample space for them to grow in China. The large and constant pressure of an overvalued dollar in the U.S. imposes a heavy drag on the prospects of new manufacturing firms setting up shop and becoming a center for clusters like these. The currency policy of China surely acted as the reverse of this, clearing huge competitive space for new entrants and for further growth in communities of process knowledge.</p>
<p>Currency management was not China’s only industrial policy measure, but it is the one that allowed an across-the-board competitive advantage in all manufacturing industries. And it is the only industrial policy in the U.S. that would reclaim some of the across-the-board manufacturing disadvantage we’ve allowed to be imposed on our domestic industry. Targeted protection and subsidies for particular sub-industries in manufacturing have been important in crafting the exact patterns of trade, but it is currency policy that largely explains the manufacturing-wide trade deficit that the U.S. runs with China and other countries that manage their currency.</p>
<p>How big is this problem of losing expertise and process knowledge in manufacturing for the overall economy? Another sign of the indifference towards manufacturing shown by successive U.S. policymakers is that we don’t even really know—and this indifference and the ignorance it generates has grown over the past year of the Trump administration. The manufacturing sector used to be a source of productivity dynamism in the U.S. economy, but recent data indicate that as we hemorrhaged millions of jobs we also saw <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MFGOPH">declining productivity</a> growth in the sector. This productivity decline <a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/BFI_WP_2025-127.pdf">might not be entirely genuine</a>—it might be a problem with statistical measurement. It would be nice to invest in our data-gathering infrastructure to shed more light on this issue, but instead the parts of the Bureau of Labor Statistics who have the expertise to do this <a href='https://www.bls.gov/ppi/notices/2025/bls-to-discontinue-selected-ppis.htm'>have been gutted by the Trump administration and longer-run cuts</a>. Another angle of taking manufacturing seriously would be supporting the public structures that provide needed inputs to know what’s even happening in the sector.</p>
<h4><strong>Doing nothing was a mistake</strong></h4>
<p>U.S. presidents have made the implicit judgement over the past 50 years that it’s a good trade for Americans to have a smaller domestic manufacturing sector in return for cheap imports of manufactured goods, even if that means we’re running chronic large trade deficits. It’s not so obvious to me that’s a good trade, and there’s one last angle that makes it even less obvious.</p>
<p>The foreign inflow of capital that is the <a href="https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/a-balance-of-payments-primer-part">mirror image of the trade deficit</a> in manufactured goods is essentially investors abroad bidding against Americans who are looking to buy stocks and bonds and other assets to build their wealth. Bidding up the price of these assets means long-run returns will be lower. In short, this current system of trade imbalances lowers the returns to holding wealth for U.S. residents. One could argue that this is mostly a problem for wealthy U.S. households, who own the lion’s share of assets.</p>
<p>But there is also the issue of <em>why</em> the valuation of U.S. assets has grown in recent decades even aside from increased foreign demand. A huge part of this growth is a zero-sum transfer of income from labor earnings to corporate profits: <a href="https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/734089">Recent estimates</a> have this transfer accounting for almost half of the entire nominal growth in the value of U.S. corporate equities in the last 40 years.</p>
<p>Absent foreign demand for U.S. assets, some of this loss to wages would have been counterbalanced for at least some subset of U.S. households by higher rates of return to their savings. To be clear, this zero-sum transfer from wages to wealth still would have been a negative development for the vast majority within the U.S. economy. But this transfer combined with the fact that most of the <em>gains</em> accrue to investors outside of the U.S. because of imbalances in trade and investment flows make it even more damaging. Essentially, U.S. households <em>as workers</em> feel all the pain of a <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">campaign of wage suppression</a>, but U.S. households <em>as investors</em> do not claim all of the benefits of this wage suppression.</p>
<h4><strong>Presidents have not tried to reverse manufacturing job loss</strong></h4>
<p>In the end, no president in my lifetime has made a serious and consistent effort to do what is necessary to make the U.S. dollar stay at values commensurate with balanced trade in manufacturing. Ronald Reagan famously negotiated the <a href="https://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/7113/overviewiie7113.pdf">Plaza Accord</a>, which pressured Germany and Japan (our two biggest trade-deficit partners at the time) to reflate their own economies and to stop currency intervention. But at the same time, Reagan ramped up military spending and made large tax cuts that put <a href="https://paulkrugman.substack.com/p/the-dollar-and-the-trade-deficit">huge upward pressure on interest rates</a> and led to huge trade deficits in the early 1980s. Bill Clinton oversaw smaller fiscal deficits but actively encouraged a <a href="https://www.policyarchive.org/download/20427">“strong dollar policy”</a> which saw the dollar hit some of its highest levels on record. This strong dollar policy and support for a <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2005/08/Blecker_Diminish_Paper.pdf">punitive rescue package</a> for countries slammed by the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s led to another large increase in U.S. trade deficits. The Clinton administration’s support for permanent normalized trade relations (PNTR) with China and for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) made it harder for subsequent administrations to apply pressure to China to abandon its significant currency management in the 2000s.</p>
<p>George W. Bush refused to address the Chinese currency management and undertook <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/downturn-and-legacy-of-bush-policies-drive-large-current-deficits">large tax cuts and increased military spending</a> again, pushing up interest rates and leading to another round of large trade deficits. Barack Obama similarly failed to address currency management, even leaving it out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement he pushed hard in his final years in office. Donald Trump passed corporate tax changes that <a href="https://www.epi.org/event/will-the-trump-tax-cuts-accelerate-offshoring-by-u-s-multinational-corporations/">actively incentivized offshoring</a> in his first term in office. His major trade policy change in the second term has been chaotic and fluctuating—though generally high and broad—tariffs across manufacturing. Manufacturing employment in 2025 averaged 157,000 lower than in 2024 even as the administration trumpeted these large tariff increases. That constitutes the worst non-recessionary year for manufacturing since 2004.</p>
<p>Furman is right that we have seen consistent presidential failure to support employment in manufacturing. And he’s right that most of these presidents made some <em>rhetorical</em> commitment to manufacturing that makes this failure jarring. But nothing serious was ever really tried, and that was a costly mistake.</p>
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		<title>Did Trump really fix NAFTA?: What USMCA failed to do and how to put workers first in North American trade</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/did-trump-really-fix-nafta-what-usmca-failed-to-do-and-how-to-put-workers-first-in-north-american-trade/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Dec 2025 13:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam S. Hersh]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=315041</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Trump replaced&#160;NAFTA&#160;with&#160;the&#160;United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement&#160;in 2020.&#160;But&#160;his&#160;USMCA&#160;has so far failed to make&#160;trade work for&#160;North American&#160;workers.&#160;]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="dropped">I</span>n his 2016 campaign, then-candidate Trump pledged to fix the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which he called &#8220;the worst trade deal ever made&#8221; (Wagner and Ries 2018). On July 1, 2020, President Trump enacted the deal he negotiated to replace NAFTA: the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) (USTR 2025a). This report examines how trade and manufacturing performed under Trump’s trade policies and what a path to a North American economy that puts workers first should look like.</p>
<p>At a core level, Trump’s USMCA did not fix the intense downward pressure on jobs and wages that has plagued U.S. manufacturing economies in the generation since NAFTA. USMCA made important advances over NAFTA but still failed to deliver on its promise to address systemic labor exploitation in Mexico—perpetuating instead the incentives for a race to the bottom in labor and pollution standards for producing goods that can compete duty free in North American markets.</p>
<p>USMCA actually expanded the back door to U.S. markets for unfairly traded products by allowing an expanded Chinese manufacturing footprint to penetrate the Mexican economy through imports and inbound foreign investment, allowing China to benefit from USMCA’s market access provisions. Essentially, USMCA became a way for Chinese-produced goods to masquerade as goods that should receive the preferential USMCA tariff rates. Additionally, USMCA expanded on NAFTA-granted corporate protections by advancing monopolistic property rights across the continental economy for the world’s largest digital economy and pharmaceutical industry interests. In short, there is no evidence that things have improved for U.S. workers and small businesses or their Mexican and Canadian counterparts under Trump’s trade rules for North America—and there is substantial evidence that things have gotten worse:</p>
<ul>
<li>After Trump signed USMCA on July 1, 2020, the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico and Canada widened sharply, increasing to a projected $263 billion in 2025, up from $125 billion in 2020 and $85 billion in 2017.</li>
<li>The USMCA trade deficit is largely a problem of oil imports from Canada and manufacturing imports from Mexico. Excluding petroleum, the U.S. actually ran a trade <em>surplus</em> of $55 billion with Canada in 2024, or $3 billion more than in 2020. With Mexico, imbalanced trade is about manufacturing, not oil: The non-petroleum trade deficit with Mexico accelerated after USMCA took effect, reaching $156 billion in 2024 (or $55 billion more than in 2020).</li>
<li>Although Trump’s USMCA sought to revitalize U.S. manufacturing industries, manufacturers across the country shed or furloughed more than 576,000 jobs since he signed the agreement, according to WARN Act notifications filed by employers.</li>
<li>In the critical automotive industry that Trump claimed to want to reshore, imports of motor vehicles and parts from Mexico nearly doubled following USMCA, rising to $274 billion in 2024, up from $196 billion in 2019. Imports of light-duty vehicles from Mexico increased by 36% while imports of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles increased a whopping 256%.</li>
<li>Despite novel labor reforms in USMCA—some worth preserving and expanding—the overall wage gap in manufacturing continues to drive corporate decisions to exploit Mexico’s low-wage, low-standard labor environment. At just $2.76 per hour, Mexican workers’ wages today are lower than they were in 2002—a mere 10% of U.S. and 12% of Canadian manufacturing wages. U.S. manufacturers expanded investment in Mexico by $155.4 billion through 2023, including $56 billion in transportation equipment production.</li>
<li>USMCA left a gaping loophole for Chinese manufacturers to exploit duty-free access to North American markets without offering reciprocal market access for U.S. manufacturers. First to evade Trump’s 2018 tariffs and later to take advantage of the USMCA loophole, Chinese firms expanded their direct investment footprint in Mexico by as much as 288% through 2023 while expanding the export of a range of industrial products to Mexico by 160–900%.</li>
</ul>
<p>Now USMCA faces a sunset review, requiring all three countries to agree by July 1, 2026, to extend the agreement another 16 years.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> But we don’t need to wait another 10 years to see if President Trump’s USMCA gambit will help workers and the U.S. economy—the data in this report show it has failed working people in all three countries and is in need of dramatic reform and renegotiation. One constituency—leaders from organized labor—has called for the sunset review to identify concrete revisions to address the problems of offshoring and content leakage while raising wages and standards for workers in Mexico (Shuler 2025). While the United States Trade Representative (USTR) is required to report to Congress and the president on its assessment of USMCA, the administration is duty-bound to remedy any flaws it finds in the agreement.</p>
<p>It’s unclear how the president might approach this statutory opportunity to reconfigure a key pillar of U.S. and global trade relations. Trump will be tempted to cast aside the trade agreement based on the rule of law in favor of his new improvisational and perpetual crisis approach to trade negotiations. As we’ve learned from Trump’s track record and thousands of years of trade history, a deal is not always a deal, artful as it may appear. It would seem Trump is not optimizing for general welfare, or even the benefit, generally, of the manufacturing sector he claimed to want to revive during his campaign, but rather to maximize and centralize trade rulemaking authority in the Oval Office.</p>
<p>Trump’s best play to achieve this is to continue delivering credible threats to disrupt the existing trade regime. So long as such threats exist, Trump can keep demanding ad hoc changes to trade policy. This dynamic and the poisonous uncertainty it creates for the economy is precisely why countries negotiate complex trade agreements—committing a shared set of economic rules to the parties’ agreed-upon gains, closer social and economic integration, and a predictable means to resolve conflicts when they inevitably arise. And that is what will be lost if Trump overturns a rules-based agreement and installs his extractive approach to trade relations as the United States’ new norm.</p>
<p>Of course, a rules-based trading system can reduce uncertainty but still contain extreme flaws. This was clearly the case with the pre-Trump status quo in the rules of the game governing globalization, most clearly typified by NAFTA; the rules were clear and binding, but they privileged powerful corporate interests over rank-and-file workers in all three North American economies.</p>
<p>The sunsetting of USMCA means the U.S., Canada, and Mexico now have a chance to put workers and their communities first, instead of representing the big business interests of the status quo. If the Trump administration fails to seize this opportunity and instead simply seeks to centralize its control over all trade policy, this will impose further severe economic disruption and hardship across North American manufacturing industries, cede technological and economic leadership to U.S. competitors, forsake the potential gains from deeper regional economic integration that most other parts of the world have embraced, and squander the recent post-COVID resurgence in U.S. manufacturing investments.</p>
<p>Uncertainty about the future of North American trade rules will cast a dark cloud over investments and jobs that bet on the idea of a regionally integrated North American economy. In 2024, that trade amounted to $1.6 trillion for the United States—nearly one-third of all U.S. trade—but reached far wider through direct supply chain linkages and indirect spending from the incomes earned producing, servicing, and moving goods around North America. Given the credible threat of disruption that President Trump brings to trade relations, one could anticipate that dark cloud to also remain a perpetual feature of U.S. and global macroeconomic expectations.</p>
<p>What’s worse, walking away will not end USMCA’s raw deal. Unless an amendment to the 2020 agreement is reached, the U.S. economy would still be bound by Trump’s failing USMCA for the next 10 years of the sunset. At any time before the end in 2036, a future president would be free to reopen the deal, potentially cementing even worse terms. Since USMCA’s rules will remain in force, it is imperative to win a trade model that creates a true worker-centered approach. Just as NAFTA became a model for subsequent agreements extending the lopsided, corporate-driven trade regime to scores of other U.S. trading partners (Bivens and Hersh 2025), a renegotiated USMCA could similarly be a model for protecting workers and communities from the excesses of trade. Without such changes, Trump’s USMCA will continue doing active economic damage and making it difficult, politically, to cultivate broader diplomatic relations important to the United States.</p>
<p>Hard bargaining on USMCA is the best chance to cement a model that embraces the mutual benefits of trade while protecting workers and their communities at the core of the economy. To do so, the president and his trade negotiators should:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Articulate the administration’s goals for renegotiating USMCA to Congress and the public. </strong>Establishing well-defined objectives will make clear to U.S. trading partners, businesses, workers, and communities just what President Trump is trying to achieve in reframing the economic relationship with the U.S.’ two largest trading partners. At minimum, this means adhering to the public and congressional consultations and disclosures required by statute. Such an approach would help build consensus and political support to press for necessary legislative changes in Congress. If instead Trump pursues the kind of informal, ill-defined, and unenforceable &#8220;deals&#8221; announced thus far, it will cast a cloud of uncertainty over U.S. international economic relations—and ensuing trade and investment activities—through July 2026 and beyond.</li>
<li><strong>Strengthen and expand regional value content (RVC) and labor value content (LVC) rules</strong>. USMCA established rules for the share of content that must be produced in North America and at a given minimum wage to qualify for preferential market access or otherwise face higher tariff rates. However, these rules only applied to select components in automotive manufacturing industries and the 2023 &#8220;rolling-up&#8221; decision (USTR 2023) undercut those provisions. The 2026 sunset review should make clear the higher content methodologies pertaining to these calculations, while expanding coverage of RVC rules to other industries such as aerospace, white goods (i.e., large electrical goods like washing machines and refrigerators), semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), critical minerals and materials, shipbuilding, and food manufacturing. The review should also reset the LVC minimum wage rate to a meaningful level, index it to inflation, and open a process to enact a coordinated, North American-wide minimum wage regime for targeted manufacturing industries.</li>
<li><strong>Create binding constraints for content rules and regional trade preferences</strong>. Since 2018, Chinese manufacturers in industries receiving widespread state support have taken advantage of USMCA loopholes to evade U.S. trade enforcement measures by rapidly expanding manufacturing footprints in Mexico, among other locales. When Most Favored Nation (MFN) rates in industries like passenger vehicles are a mere 2.5% compared with the USMCA rate of zero, it provides little incentive for manufacturers to adhere to USMCA’s rules for qualifying content. In effect, diverted trade flows from China can gain preferential access to North American markets whereas North American companies do not enjoy the same reciprocal offer to compete fairly in China. To close this gaping leak of content, a revised USMCA must raise the regional content thresholds (&#8220;rules or origin&#8221; or ROOs) and realign MFN tariff rates so that they provide a credible deterrent to nonconforming USMCA content in USMCA supply chains. Section 232 automotive tariffs are a step in this direction but they must be rationalized with a strategic approach to target key supply chain segments and account for near-term supply constraints. For the North American primary metals industries, a renegotiated USMCA must strengthen the &#8220;melted and poured&#8221; standard for traded steel and adopt a &#8220;smelt and cast&#8221; standard for traded aluminum as qualifying content.</li>
<li><strong>Strengthen the labor Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM)</strong>. USMCA’s RRM—negotiated by congressional Democrats to strengthen Trump’s initial draft deal—has helped improve wages and working conditions in a number of specific workplaces—covering roughly 60,000 workers. This is no doubt a meaningful outcome, but with more than 10 million manufacturing workers in the Mexican economy, it must be scaled to meaningfully move the needle on worker rights and wages. This should include sectoral enforcement in order to hold employers to collective accountability and to support sectoral bargaining. Because of its too narrow scope, the RRM has neither led to economy-wide improvements for Mexican workers nor eliminated the incentive for U.S. companies to offshore or use the threat of offshoring production to Mexico to undermine wages and working conditions in their U.S. factories. The RRM should apply equally in all three countries and expand the scope of violations to include all rights at work. Congress should restore and expand funding for Labor and State Departments and USAID labor rights experts needed to help monitor and enforce rising standards.</li>
<li><strong>Establish a rapid response mechanism for pollution. </strong>Workers and their communities across all three countries deserve the same protections from industrial- and trade-related air and water pollution. A renegotiated USMCA should include a pollution RRM, in parallel to an expanded and strengthened labor RRM, enforceable across all three countries.</li>
<li><strong>Eliminate exploitative IPR protections; Big Tech</strong>. A renegotiated USMCA must not compromise worker interests by prioritizing the agendas of Big Tech and Big Pharma. This means removing special &#8220;digital trade&#8221; rights and privileges that currently allow companies to preempt local laws addressing negative externalities from digital service provision and curbing expanded intellectual property rights with TRIPS-plus protections that benefit pharmaceutical companies with tighter monopolies and more limited competition.</li>
<li><strong>Institutionalize trilateral North American collaboration.</strong> Beyond President Trump’s efforts to tame opioid trafficking, the United States needs to collaborate more widely and deeply with the Canadian and Mexican for USMCA to succeed. President Trump must also institutionalize working trilateral relationships to cooperate on Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States-style foreign investment screening, economic security planning, forced labor import ban enforcement, tracing supply chains to enforce ROOs, and agricultural and environmental inspections, among a growing list of other fronts.</li>
</ul>
<p>Such wins in the USMCA sunset negotiations would achieve something meaningful for U.S. workers and manufacturing communities. But fixing USMCA is not only a job for the Trump administration. In addition to these negotiating objectives for the administration, Congress needs to:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Hold the administration accountable to the law on USMCA.</strong> Both USMCA and its U.S. implementing legislation specify a clear timetable for the administration to seek public comments, deliver a report to Congress on findings and recommendations, and articulate negotiating targets. Congress must ensure the administration follows this process specified in law to allow a more open process—relative to the president’s other bilateral deals—and hold the administration accountable to achieving specific outcomes.</li>
<li><strong>Reauthorize and expand Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA). </strong>The program intended to compensate trade-impacted workers and deliver countercyclical demand stimuli to impacted communities lapsed in 2022 (DOL 2022). In addition to retooling USMCA from an agreement that benefits multinational corporations and expanding Chinese manufacturing, the president should push Congress to reauthorize and expand TAA to protect incomes for displaced workers and the regional economies that rely on them.</li>
<li><strong>Check executive branch overreach on tariff-making powers</strong>, including by passing SJ Res 37,<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> to terminate the national emergency that was declared to justify tariffs on imports from Canada under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). When the executive overreaches, Congress should exercise its responsibility by responding with such a targeted approach to exercising its authority and that leverages its unique role in mediating interest groups.</li>
</ul>
<h2><strong>How did USMCA change—and not change—NAFTA?</strong></h2>
<p>President Trump negotiated USMCA from August 16, 2017, to September 30, 2018, and signed the revised agreement on November 30, 2018. His version of USMCA preserved &#8220;most of NAFTA’s market opening measures&#8221; (Villarreal 2024). Under the new rules, U.S. trade deficits in USMCA worsened sharply. The widening USMCA trade gap belied the widely different experiences with each partner: stable non-petroleum trade surpluses with Canada and rising goods trade deficits with Mexico, fueled in part by a rapid expansion of Chinese manufacturing trade and capital investment in Mexico after Trump’s 2018 tariffs. Despite tighter rules of origin that specify the share of an item that must be produced within North America to qualify for tariff-free access, the rules proved to be rather porous and insufficient to stem the tide of industrial migration to Mexico.</p>
<p>The underlying driver for these trends is the overwhelming incentive—that NAFTA created and USMCA continues—for large corporations to skirt fair wages, labor, and environmental regulations through offshoring and imports when wages in Mexico for comparable work are a mere 10% of U.S. wages and air and water pollution standards go unenforced. How did USMCA change the equation?</p>
<h2><strong>Trade deficits worsened under Trump’s USMCA</strong></h2>
<p>The United States’ North American trade deficit had been relatively stable over the preceding business cycle expansion starting in 2009 but increased sharply in 2018—coinciding with countervailing tariffs levied on U.S. imports from China and imports of steel and aluminum products more broadly—and increased even more dramatically after 2020 under Trump’s USMCA. We project that trade deficit will widen to $263 billion in 2025, up from $125 billion in 2020 when USMCA started, and $85 billion in 2017 before Trump’s overall first term trade strategy took effect—a more than 200% increase (<strong>Figure A</strong>). This was not how &#8220;fixing&#8221; NAFTA was supposed to work.</p>
<p><a name='fig-a'></a>

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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-303891 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303891" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303891-35465-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</p>
<p>The trade deficit is the difference between how much U.S. businesses sell to another country (exports) and how much U.S. businesses and consumers buy from that country (imports). A deficit with one country may be offset by a trade surplus with another country, or it may be &#8220;financed&#8221; by capital inflows, most often the purchase of U.S. financial assets by foreign investors. Overall, at the national level, these international payments for goods and finance balance out, so when the United States experiences a goods trade deficit, necessarily there are mirrored surpluses in the sale of financial assets abroad where foreign investors in essence &#8220;lend&#8221; to the U.S. economy.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a></p>
<p>This macroeconomic balance is what determines the overall level of the U.S. trade balance, which is linked mechanically to the U.S. dollar exchange rate that sets the relative competitiveness of U.S. tradable industries and to dollar interest rates. Trade policy measures tailored to particular trading partners (those of both the United States and other countries) may shift around the relative shares of that total trade balance among trading partner countries, but it doesn’t change the overall U.S. balance of trade.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Under chronic trade deficits that are driven by fundamental macroeconomic imbalances, across-the-board tariffs have very little purchase to enforce more balanced trade: They tend to push down both imports and exports instead (Hersh and Bivens 2025).</p>
<p>The president’s portrayal of trade deficits as a result of unequal exchange gets most of the details wrong. It is true these microeconomic relationships embody all sorts of exploitation, but a trade deficit is not a tribute paid to a trading partner country. It is the result of millions of business transactions, the lion’s share of which occur between companies within a related multinational corporate family. If one wanted to investigate exploitation in North American trading relations, it might make more sense to start with the trading corporations than with, say, Canada.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-303894 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303894" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303894-35466-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In fact, breaking down the USMCA trade deficit on a country-to-country basis reveals that the U.S. North American deficit is largely a problem of oil imports from Canada and manufacturing imports from Mexico (<strong>Figure B</strong>). Excluding petroleum, the U.S. actually ran a trade surplus with Canada of $55 billion in 2024, up just $3 billion since 2020. The non-petroleum trade deficit with Mexico accelerated after USMCA took effect, rising by $55 billion to $156 billion in 2024, but it is clear energy is not dominant in U.S.-Mexico trade—manufactures and agricultural products are. This begs the question: Why has the trade deficit with Mexico grown so rapidly under Trump’s USMCA?</p>
<h2><strong>USMCA rebooted NAFTA’s drain on manufacturing industries</strong></h2>
<p>Although Trump sought to revitalize U.S. manufacturing industries with his fix for NAFTA, manufacturers furloughed or shed more than 576,000 U.S. jobs in the time since he signed the agreement, according to WARN Act notifications filed by employers.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> The surge of imports from Mexico was boosted as North American multinationals reshored or &#8220;friendshored&#8221; manufacturing to Mexico as part of supply chain reallocation strategies for reducing exposure to Chinese dominance in certain sectors and as Chinese enterprises expanded in Mexico to dodge the impacts of U.S. tariffs.</p>
<p>Underlying all this are wages and working conditions, both of which are much lower in Mexico than they are in the U.S. or Canada; and China’s are even lower still. USMCA gives multinational corporations the best of both worlds: the ability to manufacture for the U.S. market in Mexico, using Chinese-made primary and intermediate components. USMCA creates these race to the bottom incentives for businesses to exploit thanks to its rules of origin. The rules allow non-originating content to be magically transformed into originating content and make its way into North American supply chains with duty-free market access, even when that content is produced under unfair competition and exploitation in third countries. These rules specify the share of local content in a good to qualify for duty-free market access, which is typically 50–60% but as high as 75% for key components of automotive supply chains, including for steel and aluminum content. However, corporations are allowed to &#8220;roll-up&#8221;—essentially, rounding off—the non-originating content to count as 100% North American originating content.</p>
<p>Suppose a steel spring manufactured in Mexico uses 49.9% Chinese steel wire feedstock and 50.1% local content. When that spring is sold to an auto parts manufacturer, an appliance manufacturer, or whomever, that 49.9% Chinese steel—made without the same commitments to worker, environmental, and consumer safety standards, and without extending similar reciprocal market access to North American producers—becomes 100% North American. The more complicated that a product is—i.e., the more underlying, lower-tier components that are required to make a final good—the more foreign content can masquerade as &#8220;Made in North America.&#8221; Even under USMCA RVC calculations, substantial non-originating content will enter at 0% duty. Thus, non-originating content qualifying for USMCA ROOs can expand at an exponential rate while still &#8220;rolling-up&#8221; to count as 100% North American content.</p>
<p>More specific commodities within the automotive industry carry higher content thresholds. In addition to finished vehicles, component steel and aluminum, and specified &#8220;core parts,&#8221; the rules of origin require production meet a labor value threshold of an average of $16 per hour wage for 40–45% of the vehicle’s content. But the same &#8220;rolling-up&#8221; loophole that allows non-conforming content into the market applies to these rules as well.</p>
<p>Additionally, the core parts list omits critical new technology goods for electric vehicle related components and autonomous vehicle related components. USMCA Article 3.10 provides a mechanism for the parties to expand the list of core components covered by North American content rules, though this is not a foregone conclusion and, in the meantime, content leakages deter the establishment of North American competition to illegally subsidized and market dominant Chinese technologies. Absent nimble and deeply informed monitoring by executive branch agencies, the faster automotive industry technology evolves, the more vehicle content will become uncovered by USMCA ROOs. To aid in implementation and make this game of ROOs whack-a-mole more manageable, the United States government should work with its Mexican and Canadian counterparts to implement a rigorous content tracing system to ensure that corporations are playing by the rules when it comes to the core parts that help underpin the USMCA bargain.</p>
<p>Besides weaknesses regarding ROOs, the $16 hourly wage rate for the Labor Value Content threshold is too low. Within the United States, $16 an hour is at or near a poverty wage. But because no inflation adjustment was negotiated as part of USMCA—a flaw obvious even in real time—the LVC wage has declined 25% in real terms since USMCA was signed into law. And this wage floor—which is on track to become largely irrelevant before Mexican wages converge on U.S. and Canadian wages—covers less than half of a vehicle’s content, meaning it is not a meaningfully binding wage standard.</p>
<p>Leaky ROOs are a big obstacle to realizing the nearshoring gains of production at a higher standard, but they are not the biggest problem. For the ROOs to bind effectively on business supply chain choices, there needs to be a significant price wedge between conforming to USMCA rules and the higher Most Favored Nation tariff rate paid on nonconforming content. However, more often than not, the higher MFN rate is a mere 2.5%, paling in comparison with the savings from choosing competing nonconforming content—particularly if that is subsidized Chinese inputs. In short, if there is little penalty to pay for not adhering to higher standards, then there is little incentive for corporations to practice higher standards. In fact, recent research from the Federal Reserve finds that compliance with USMCA ROOs in automotive trade has been declining over time as the Big Three and transplant manufacturers have shown preference for using non-North American content (Bowdle and Kamal 2025).</p>
<p>Finally, not only did USMCA leave these loopholes for non-originating content, but the agreement largely relies on these same corporate entities to self-certify their compliance with the ROOs regime. This creates a clear incentive and opportunity for manufacturers to cheat compliance. The less the government monitors and enforces these rules, the more incentive manufactures have to evade USMCA ROOs, although the Trump administration appears to be taking a strict approach to implementing stricter new ROOs on automotive trade.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<h2><strong>Wage and worker power gaps are why USMCA remains a drag on working families</strong></h2>
<p>The wage gap in manufacturing continues to drive corporate decisions to exploit low-wage, low-standard labor in Mexico. At just $2.76 per hour, Mexican workers today earn less than in 2002—a mere 10% of U.S. manufacturing wages and 12% of Canadian wages—after adjusting for price differences between countries (see <strong>Figure C</strong>).</p>
<p><a name='fig-c'></a>

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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-303914 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303914" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303914-35467-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</p>
<p>Labor provisions in USMCA, in particular the Rapid Response Mechanism, have helped hold the line on labor rights for thousands of workers who were covered in the RRM’s 12 cases so far where worker rights largely were ultimately upheld. But without broadening the scope and scale of enforcement across for the more than 10 million workers across Mexican manufacturing industries (INEGI 2024), continuing the RRM in current form poses more of a mild headwind in the race to the bottom than a forceful deterrent.</p>
<p>Under USMCA, U.S. manufacturers expanded investment in Mexico by $22 billion through 2024 according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data (BEA 2025). This included:</p>
<ul>
<li>$10 billion investments in transportation equipment manufacturing facilities (a 61% increase);</li>
<li>$3 billion in food manufacturing (87% increase);</li>
<li>$1.9 billion in computer and electronics manufacturing (163% increase);</li>
<li>nearly $520 million in appliance and electrical equipment manufacturing (30% increase); and</li>
<li>$225 million in chemicals manufacturing (5% increase).</li>
</ul>
<p>What’s remarkable is that corporations are moving investments to <em>lower </em>productivity uses as shown in <strong>Figure D.</strong> Productivity in Mexican manufacturing has been trending down for years relative to that of U.S. manufacturing productivity, in spite of substantial capital investments from U.S. and global firms. In the year before USMCA, Mexican manufacturing workers produced just 32% of what a U.S. manufacturing worker produced per hour. By 2024, they produced just 28%. For comparison, Chinese manufacturing productivity rose from 11% in 2010, to 21% in 2019, and 24% in 2004 relative to U.S productivity levels.</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-304037 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="304037" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/304037-35468-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Ostensibly, North American multinationals understand the wide and growing productivity differential with Mexican manufacturing workers but prefer to shift toward lower productivity anyway. Though the data indicate such decisions may not make sense for the long-term efficiency of the firm, they may make perfect sense for redistributing the profits of the firm to executives and shareholders by playing off workers against one another’s mutual interests. Businesses in other countries driving the surge in direct foreign investment to Mexico, most notably China, are less concerned with the productivity differential than with securing favorable access to U.S. markets, despite not being a member of the USMCA pact.</p>
<p>While the labor RRM is a significant innovation in USMCA, as noted above, it cannot be expected to compensate for institutional and implementation failures of the Mexican government to uphold worker rights. In fact, the government’s arguments in the recent Atento Servicios RRM case showed it is very much still working to constrain worker rights (USTR 2025b). Similar analyses by Mexican labor law experts find that USMCA is failing to transform Mexico’s fundamentally low-standard labor market institutions (Marroquín Bitar 2024).</p>
<h2><strong>Trump left open the backdoor for unfair trade through USMCA rules of origin</strong></h2>
<p>The first Trump administration imposed tariffs on a wide range of Chinese technological goods and on steel and aluminum products exhibiting unfair competition—along with the ever-present churn of U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duty trade enforcement actions. Together, these erected significant new barriers to entry to U.S. markets. Chinese producers responded, in turn, with new business strategies, diversifying into offshore direct investments in lower-tariffed locales, or sometimes relying on transshipment or a handful of other strategies to evade the true applied tariff rate. Initially, Chinese industry diversified into industries close by—Southeast Asia and India—but that quickly expanded to include Mexico.</p>
<p>Chinese firms have practiced this move before. In anticipation of and following U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) determinations of injury from Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from China in 2015, Chinese tire manufacturers quickly expanded offshore in countries like Thailand and Vietnam, among others, substituting Chinese production for U.S. markets.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> As a result, tire imports surged from these countries and led to subsequent ITC import injury investigations.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>


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<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-303986 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303986" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303986-35469-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>This same story unfolded on a much larger scale post-2018, particularly for Mexico, where Trump’s USMCA made it easy for Chinese industry to gain purchase.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> <strong>Figure E </strong>shows that Chinese firms expanded their direct investment footprint in Mexico by as much as 288% through 2023, while investment in the United States essentially flatlined. This ballooning outward direct investment position for China since 2018 indicates a rapidly expanding overseas footprint for production organized around Chinese value chains, signaling an influx of content originating from Chinese-owned and Chinese-affiliated firms—often the beneficiaries of robust government subsidization and procurement programs, regulatory and tax forbearance, preferential credit, and other means of competing on noncommercial terms with U.S. domestic firms.<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> Dallas Federal Reserve economists are correct to observe that, despite a rapid increase, China still trails U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico (Kelly 2025). However, unlike the broadly diversified supply chain integration between the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, China’s investments have concentrated in two categories: industries with chronic global surplus capacity (steel, aluminum, glass, etc.) and cutting-edge Chinese industries globalizing on the back of these kinds of industrial policies.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-303993 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303993" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303993-35470-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Close on the heels of Chinese FDI in Mexico came surging imports of industrial goods from China to Mexico—from raw materials to factory machinery, and component parts to semi-finished goods (<strong>Figure F</strong>). While China increased all goods exports to Mexico by 127% from 2017 to 2023, Mexican imports of Chinese iron and steel shot up 277%; aluminum products 265%; diesel engines 284%; motor vehicle parts 160%; and various categories of manufacturing equipment from 200–900%.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-303855 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="303855" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/303855-35471-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>And following the build-up of Chinese and others’ manufacturing capacity in Mexico since the onset of USMCA, U.S. imports of key manufactures from Mexico surged. <strong>Table 1</strong> details the trends in automotive trade deficits under USMCA, a critical foundation for North American trade and an industry Trump aims to reshore. Imports of motor vehicles and parts from Mexico nearly doubled following USMCA, rising to a total of $274 billion in 2024, up from $196 billion in 2019—a 40% increase. Imports of parts and light-duty vehicles from Mexico increased by 35% and 36%, respectively, while imports of medium- and heavy-duty vehicles increased a whopping 256%. U.S. exports to USMCA partners expanded in these categories, too, but at a lower level, such that the import growth drove widening of the automotive trade deficit to $153 billion in 2024, up 56%. The vast majority of these and other components in the North American supply chain enter duty free under USMCA’s rules of origin.<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2><strong>Conclusion</strong></h2>
<p>North American economic integration remains as critical to U.S. prosperity as the treaties negotiated to govern it are flawed. Millions of people in the United States—particularly workers in trade-exposed industries—understood this deeply as the 2016 election loomed. President Trump seized on this dissatisfaction and moved to renegotiate NAFTA and replace it with USMCA in 2020. But Trump’s USMCA created more problems than it fixed. Today the pressure on manufacturing jobs and deterioration in the trade balance with Mexico are worse than before USMCA and Chinese manufacturers are setting up shop next door to take advantage of the loopholes that Trump left in the rules. The ongoing failures of USMCA necessitate significant reform and renegotiation to truly make a North American economy that puts workers at the center.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> U.S. law requires that public comment on USMCA begin no later than October 4, 2025, and that the U.S. Trade Representative report recommendations to Congress no later than January 2, 2026. See Rethink Trade (2024) and U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement Article 34.7: Review Term and Extension, <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf">https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/34_Final_Provisions.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a>&nbsp;<a href="https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-joint-resolution/37">S.J. Res. 37</a>, 119th Cong. (2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> &#8220;Lending&#8221; may include international financial flows from (net) purchases of U.S. stocks and bonds, international bank loans, trade financing, and net repatriated incomes, among others.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Trade with individual countries may not balance for a variety of benign reasons, in addition to anticompetitive and unfair trading practices.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Analysis of <a href="https://layoffdata.com/data/">WARN Database</a> (2025).&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a>&nbsp;<a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/04/03/2025-05930/adjusting-imports-of-automobiles-and-automobile-parts-into-the-united-states">Proclamation No. 10908</a>, 90 Fed. Reg. 14705 (March 26, 2025).</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> See for example, &#8220;<a href='https://www.fleetowner.com/equipment/brakes-tires-wheels/article/21702216/thailand-made-double-coin-tires-arrive-in-us'>Thailand-made Double Coin Tires Arrive in U.S.</a>,&#8221; <em>FleetOwner,</em> March 30, 2018; &#8220;<a href='https://www.rubbernews.com/article/20140306/NEWS/140309976/linglong-opens-thailand-plant'>Linglong Opens Thailand Plant</a>,&#8221; <em>Rubber News, </em>March 6, 2014; &#8220;<a href='https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/qingdao/2016-01/21/content_23184812.htm'>Sentury Tire in Thailand: Establishing a World Class Tire Brand</a>,&#8221; <em>China Daily,</em> January 21, 2016.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> U.S. International Trade Commission, &#8220;Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tires from Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam,&#8221; Investigation Nos. 701-TA-647 and 731-TA-1517-1520, Publication 5212, July 2021. See also Hersh (2024).</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See also Meltzer and Barron Esper (2025) on China’s circumvention of the U.S. tariff regime through USMCA partners.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> For a recent survey, see Fang, Li, and Lu (2025).</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Arain, Omer. 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://layoffdata.com/data/'>WARN Layoff Data</a>&#8221; [Google sheet], WARN Database. Accessed July 6, 2025.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh, and Adam S. Hersh. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-u-s-approach-to-globalization-has-gone-from-bad-to-worse-under-trump-how-to-construct-a-progressive-policy-agenda-instead/"><em>The U.S. Approach to Globalization Has Gone from Bad to Worse Under Trump</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, May 29, 2025.</p>
<p>Canis, Bill, Vivian C. Jones, and M. Angeles Villarreal. 2017. <em><a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/R44907">NAFTA and Motor Vehicle Trade</a></em>. Congressional Research Service R44907, July 18, 2017.</p>
<p>Department of Labor (DOL). 2022. &#8220;<a href='https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osec/osec20220701'>Statement by Secretary Walsh on Termination of Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers Program</a>&#8221; (news release). July 1, 2022.</p>
<p>Fang, Hanming, Ming Li, and Guangli Lu. 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://www.nber.org/papers/w33814'>Decoding China&#8217;s Industrial Policies</a>.&#8221; National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper no. 33814, May 2025.</p>
<p>Hersh, Adam. 2024. &#8220;<a href='https://www.epi.org/publication/testimony-prepared-for-the-u-s-international-trade-commission-report-on-the-usmca-automotive-rules-of-origin/'>Testimony Prepared for the U.S. International Trade Commission Report on the USMCA Automotive Rules of Origin</a>.&#8221; Economic Policy Institute, October 16, 2024.</p>
<p>Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI). 2024. &#8220;<a href='https://www.inegi.org.mx/contenidos/saladeprensa/boletines/2024/IOE/IOE2024_04.pdf'>Indicadores de Ocupación Y Empleo</a>&#8221; (news release). April 26, 2024.</p>
<p>Kelly, Brendan. 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://www.dallasfed.org/research/pubs/25trade/a2'>China Expands Mexico Investment but Notably Lags U.S., Other G7 Economies.</a>&#8221; Dallas Federal Reserve, September 26, 2025.</p>
<p>Marroquín Bitar, Diego. 2024. &#8220;<a href='https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol49/iss2/5/'>Is USMCA Good for Mexican Labor? A Preliminary Analysis of USMCA and Labor Market Outcomes in Mexico</a>.&#8221; <em>Brooklyn Journal of International Law</em> 49, no. 2: 542–555.</p>
<p>Meltzer, Joshua P., and Maricarmen Barron Esper. 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-china-circumventing-us-tariffs-via-mexico-and-canada/'>Is China Circumventing US Tariffs via Mexico and Canada?</a>&#8221; Brookings Institution, September 23, 2025.</p>
<p>Rethink Trade. 2024. <em><a href="https://rethinktrade.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/USMCA_6_year.pdf">U.S. Domestic Process Starts Mid-2025 for U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement 2026 Mandatory Six-Year Review</a></em>.</p>
<p>Shuler, Liz. 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://www.brookings.edu/articles/unfinished-business-centering-workers-rights-and-fair-competition-in-the-usmca-joint-review/'>Unfinished Business: Centering Workers’ Rights and Fair Competition in the USMCA Joint Review</a>.&#8221; Brookings Institution, March 5, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/?ReqID=2&amp;step=1#eyJhcHBpZCI6Miwic3RlcHMiOlsxLDIsMyw0LDUsNywxMF0sImRhdGEiOltbIlN0ZXAxUHJvbXB0MSIsIjEiXSxbIlN0ZXAxUHJvbXB0MiIsIjEiXSxbIlN0ZXAyUHJvbXB0MyIsIjEiXSxbIlN0ZXAzUHJvbXB0NCIsIjMwIl0sWyJTdGVwNFByb21wdDUiLCIxIl0sWyJTdGVwNVByb21wdDYiLCIxIl0sWyJTdGVwN1Byb21wdDgiLFsiNjgiLCI2NiIsIjY1IiwiNjEiLCI2MCJdXSxbIlN0ZXA4UHJvbXB0OUEiLFsiMjAiLCIzIiwiMjE2Il1dLFsiU3RlcDhQcm9tcHQxMEEiLFsiMyIsIjc4Il1dXX0='>U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, U.S. Direct Investment Position Abroad on a Historical-Cost Basis, By Country and Industry</a>.&#8221; Accessed February 26, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. House of Representatives, Ways and Means Committee. 2019. &#8220;<a href='https://www.wita.org/atp-research/improvements-to-the-usmca-democrats-secure-wins-for-the-people-in-the-new-north-american-free-trade-agreement/'>Improvements to the USMCA Secured by Democrats in the ‘December 10 Agreement.’</a>&#8221; December 13, 2019.</p>
<p>U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 2025. &#8220;<a href='https://dataweb.usitc.gov/'>DataWeb U.S. Trade and Tariff Data</a>.&#8221; Accessed February 19, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2023. <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/FTA/USMCA%2031/USMCAAutomotive%20ROO.pdf"><em>The Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Article 31 of the Agreement Among the United States, Mexico, Canada Which Entered into Force on July 1, 2020 (USA-MEX-CDA-2022-31-01): Final Report</em></a>. January 1, 2023.</p>
<p>U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2025a. &#8220;<a href='https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement'>United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement</a>.&#8221; Accessed February 25, 2025.</p>
<p>U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). 2025b. <a href="https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Issue_Areas/Enforcement/DS/USMCA/Final%20Determination%20ATENTO%20ENG%20PUBLIC.pdf"><em>Rapid Response Labor Panel on the Atento Servicios Case (MEX-USA-2024-31A-01).</em></a> July 4, 2025.</p>
<p>Villarreal, M. Angeles. 2020. <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11391"><em>USMCA: Amendment and Key Changes</em></a><em>.</em> Congressional Research Service IF11391, January 30, 2020.</p>
<p>Villarreal, M. Angeles. 2024. <em><a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44981/13">NAFTA Renegotiation and the Proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA)</a></em>. Congressional Research Service R44981, February 26, 2019.</p>
<p>Wagner, Meg, and Brian Ries. 2018. &#8220;<a href='https://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/trump-us-mexico-canada-remarks-oct-18#h_2c0a8c6bad4dc7a2f98acda7c57ea454'>Trump Gives Remarks on US-Mexico-Canada Deal</a>.&#8221; CNN Online, October 1, 2018.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>What’s behind rising unemployment for Black workers?</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/whats-behind-rising-unemployment-for-black-workers/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2025 14:19:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=311336</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[For the last five years, I’ve given the same answer in response to questions about any one-month increase in the Black unemployment rate.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>For the last five years, I’ve given the same answer in response to questions about any one-month increase in the Black unemployment rate. Given the relatively small sample size used to calculate the number each month, we shouldn’t make too much of a single month’s increase but focus on longer-term patterns and see if the upward trend continues over the next few months. Well, as of August 2025, the Black unemployment rate has risen for three consecutive months and now stands at 7.5%. This post details three major conclusions I have drawn from this and supporting data:</p>
<ol>
<li>There has been a clear deterioration in the labor market for Black workers this year: the unemployment rate is rising and employment is falling.</li>
<li>The decline in Black workers’ employment appears to be concentrated among Black women while Black men’s employment rates appear more stable.</li>
<li>Since January 2025, overall women’s employment has fallen most in professional and business services, manufacturing, and federal government—suggesting likely culprits for the decline in Black women’s employment.</li>
</ol>
<p><span id="more-311336"></span></p>
<p>An important signal that the rising Black unemployment rate may actually be more than a temporary blip in a notably volatile data series is that the share of employed Black adults between the ages of 25 and 54 is down compared to the <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/benzipperer.org/post/3ly3z6mjdak2j">last couple of years</a>. After peaking at a historic annual high of 77.9% in 2024, the average so far this year is 76.6%. Until now, the rate had risen every year since 2021.</p>
<p>Another developing news story that has garnered increasing attention is the <a href="https://www.msnbc.com/know-your-value/business-culture/300000-black-women-left-labor-force-3-months-s-not-coincidence-rcna219355">reported</a> 300,000 Black women losing jobs and/or leaving the labor force in recent months. While a number that big certainly makes headlines, employment levels from the monthly household survey—especially those based on a small demographic slice of the monthly survey sample—should always be used with caution. While I’m not convinced that 300,000 is the most accurate accounting of the situation, Black women are uniquely experiencing a decline in employment that is not observed among other groups of women or Black men.</p>
<p>A clearer and more reliable indicator of how Black women are doing in the labor market is their employment-to-population ratio (EPOP). As <strong>Figure A</strong> shows, Black women’s employment has dropped sharply this year, but there has been a longer downward trend that started in early 2024. This stands in stark contrast to the trend for white women whose EPOP has changed little over the same time while Hispanic women have seen a slight increase.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-310705 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="310705" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/310705-35187-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Similarly, <strong>Figure B</strong> shows that the EPOP for Black men in the same age group has been much more stable over the last three years. Since the decline for Black women is not reflected in other group trends by gender or race alone, there appears to be something happening in the labor market that has been particularly damaging to Black women. Below, I explore possible explanations based on analysis of payroll employment data.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-310711 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="310711" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/310711-35189-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>The 2020 pandemic recession showed how occupational segregation can contribute to a larger decline in employment among groups overrepresented in industries with the largest job losses. While the Bureau of Labor Statistics does not report industry-specific job losses by race and gender, they do produce a series on women’s payroll employment using data collected in the monthly establishment survey. And although the data from the household and establishment surveys are not directly comparable, checking for similar or related trends can be informative. With those caveats in mind, <strong>Figure C</strong> shows that women’s payroll employment has declined in eight industries between January and August of this year. The largest of those losses have occurred in professional and business services (–83,000), manufacturing (–41,000), and federal government (–33,000). Close to half of all workers in federal government and professional and business services are women, as are 29% of manufacturing workers (see <strong>Table 1</strong>).</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-310718 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="310718" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/310718-35191-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Since federal job cuts have frequently been cited as a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/31/us/politics/trump-federal-work-force-black-women.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&amp;referringSource=articleShare">contributing factor for employment losses of Black women</a> due to <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/disinvestment-in-the-public-sector-undermines-opportunities-for-black-women-across-the-south-trump-cuts-further-threaten-key-services-for-working-people-across-the-nation/">overrepresentation in that sector relative to their share of the total workforce</a>, let’s start there. Table 1 shows that the year-over-year rate of decline in payroll employment of all women in federal government (–1.2%) was slower than the rate of decline in total employment (–2.4%) in that sector. This suggests that women aren’t losing jobs faster than men in the federal sector, but without additional information, we can’t rule out the idea that women’s federal losses are disproportionately falling on Black women.</p>
<p>The second-largest number of women’s job losses has been in manufacturing. As Table 1 shows, women are a smaller share of total employment in this industry compared with the federal government or professional and business services. However, unlike in the federal government, women have lost manufacturing jobs at a faster than average rate over the past year.</p>
<p>The largest number of women’s job losses has been in the professional and business services industry, which employs seven times more women than the federal government. As such, a higher rate of women’s job losses in this industry would be more likely to show up in declining EPOPs for Black women. Compared with the total year-over-year rate of job losses in the industry (–0.3%), women have lost jobs at a much faster pace (–1.3%).</p>
<p>As shown in Table 1, a closer look into the rate of employment decline in professional and business services shows that losses have been overwhelmingly concentrated in employment services—a decline of 3.2% between July 2024 and July 2025. Similarly, women’s losses within professional and business services were also skewed toward employment services.</p>
<p>Employment services accounts for roughly 15% of total employment within the professional and business services major industry. Women are nearly half (47.9%) of employment services workers and the most common occupation is human resource worker. This suggests the shedding of employment services jobs as a likely culprit behind large job losses among women in the industry. Again, additional information would be required to definitively conclude that those job losses are disproportionately falling on Black women. Well-documented <a href="https://www.nelp.org/insights-research/occupational-segregation-of-black-women-workers-in-the-u-s/">patterns of occupational segregation</a> often limit the representation of Black women in higher-level and higher-paying professional and management positions, resulting in overconcentration in service, administrative, and support occupations. Thus, it would not be a huge leap to assume that women’s job losses skewed toward employment services, over one of the subsectors beginning with “professional, scientific, and technical” or “management”, are probably having a negative impact on Black women’s employment.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-310939 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="310939" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/310939-35213-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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		<title>President-elect Trump is inheriting a historically strong economy</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/president-elect-trump-is-inheriting-a-historically-strong-economy/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jan 2025 15:49:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=294620</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[President-elect Trump will inherit unquestionably the strongest economy for an incoming administration since the George W. Bush administration. That strong economic performance heading up to the 2001 transition, moreover, was largely buoyed by an overvalued stock market that was about to deflate and cause a recession.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>President-elect Trump will inherit unquestionably the strongest economy for an incoming administration since the George W. Bush administration. That strong economic performance heading up to the 2001 transition, moreover, was largely buoyed by an overvalued stock market that was about to deflate and cause a recession. There are no such obvious macroeconomic imbalances that look set to drag on growth in 2025 or beyond.</p>
<p>While the labor market has slightly softened in recent months, job growth in December was <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-labor-market-sticks-the-landing-job-growth-averaged-186000-in-2024/">extremely rapid</a> and accompanied by wage growth that remained above inflation yet fully compatible with a return to 2% inflation—the Federal Reserve’s preferred target. In short, the labor market remains extremely strong yet in no need of policy measures to rein it in. All in all, it is hard to imagine an incoming administration wanting a stronger economic situation to inherit.</p>
<p><strong>Table 1</strong> below shows a range of measures indicating the trajectory of the economy for each incoming administration since Bill Clinton.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p><span id="more-294620"></span></p>
<h5>

<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-294623 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="294623" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/294623-34254-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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</h5>
<ul>
<li>The incoming Trump administration will inherit an unemployment rate of 4.1%, the lowest since George W. Bush was elected. Meanwhile, President Biden inherited an unemployment rate of 6.8%.</li>
<li>The share of adults between the ages of 25 and 54 with a job—also known as the prime-age employment-to-population ratio (EPOP)—sat at 80.5% at the beginning of November 2024. This is its highest handover value since the 2000 presidential election.</li>
<li>Overall and private-sector job growth are running at their fastest pace since Trump was first elected in 2016.</li>
<li>Manufacturing job growth has been running at a negative pace during every single election since Bill Clinton. But, the manufacturing decline being inherited by the incoming Trump administration is at its slowest pace since the first Trump administration.</li>
<li>Construction job growth is running at its fastest pace since the first Trump administration.</li>
<li>Inflation is a slightly different story: In 2024, inflation was running at a 2.7% pace in December before the inauguration, its highest pace since the George W. Bush administration inherited 3.4% inflation. The first Trump administration inherited a 1.8% inflation rate, and the Biden administration inherited a 1.2% inflation rate.</li>
<li>Perhaps most strikingly, the incoming Trump administration is inheriting extraordinarily fast real (inflation-adjusted) growth in the stock market. The stock market grew 28.8% over the past year, more than twice as fast as what was handed off to President Biden (the previous fastest pace at a presidential administration transition).</li>
<li>Growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita are both running at their fastest pace since 2000.</li>
<li>Growth in real private business investment is also running at its fastest pace since 2000.</li>
<li>Real wage growth is running at a pace (1.1%) comparable with the 2016 (1.3%) and 2020 (1.4%) elections. Real wage growth in pre-2016 elections was running at a much slower pace, even in the 2000 election.</li>
</ul>
<p>Besides the striking strength of the economy being handed off to the incoming Trump administration, the table also shows that Republican administrations inherit much stronger economies. On every measure tracked in the table except inflation, Republicans on average inherit economies on better trajectories—including faster measures of employment, real wage growth, GDP growth, and stock market appreciation, along with lower unemployment. Democrats, in turn, have inherited lower inflation rates on average.</p>
<p>This aligns with evidence from a <a href="https://epiaction.org/2024/04/02/economic-performance-is-stronger-when-democrats-hold-the-white-house/">previous report</a> showing the strong Democratic advantage in macroeconomic performance <em>during</em> their terms in office (i.e., not just at hand-off to changed administrations).</p>
<p>Those looking to make serious evaluations of how well the incoming Trump administration manages the economy need to keep this extraordinarily strong inheritance in mind as they make these judgments.</p>
<p><strong>Footnote</strong></p>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> For the monthly variables, we used data available until November of the presidential election years. For the unemployment rate and prime-age EPOPs, we used a rolling three-month average of each to reduce volatility. All other variables measured a year-over-year change comparing October in the election year with the previous October. The unemployment rate, the prime-age EPOP, employment growth (overall, private, manufacturing, and construction), and inflation (or the annual change in the overall consumer price index) were all obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) online databases. The real stock market data was obtained from Robert Shiller’s online database. For quarterly data, we used data from the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of the election year. We used the change relative to the 3<sup>rd</sup> quarter of the previous year to compare. The measures of GDP and business investment were both from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For measuring real wages, we used the change in hourly wage and salaries from the Employment Cost Index (ECI) from the Obama administration on. We deflated this by the overall consumer price index. For the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations the ECI data were not consistently available, so we used the average hourly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) of the BLS.</p>
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		<title>Southern economic policies undermine job quality for auto workers: Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: Spotlight</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-racism-auto-workers/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Sep 2024 09:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Chandra Childers]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=287086</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Summary: The growing auto manufacturing industry in the South offers a powerful opportunity to bring good jobs to the region. But as these jobs shift from the Midwest to the South, we see a decline in job quality in the sector.&#160;Why?]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card border-right web-only">
<p><strong>Summary: </strong>The growing auto manufacturing industry in the South offers a powerful opportunity to bring good jobs to the region. But as these jobs shift from the Midwest to the South, we see a decline in job quality in the sector.&nbsp;Why? The prevailing Southern economic development model disempowers workers, and as a result auto workers in the South:&nbsp;<br />
<img decoding="async" class="RootedinRacism-Logo-Transparent-2.png" style="float: right; margin-left: 10px; margin-top: 10px;" src="https://files.epi.org/uploads/RootedinRacism-Logo-Transparent-2.png" width="200"></p>
<ul>
<li>Are paid less than their counterparts in other regions, even when their income is adjusted for regional differences in the cost of living;</li>
<li>Report high levels of illness, injury, and even death, amid eroding worker safety protections;</li>
<li>Face anti-union hostility from policymakers and employers, including in the forms of&nbsp;right-to-work laws and union-busting activities.</li>
</ul>
<p>But this isn’t stopping workers from coming together to demand better conditions and union recognition. Recent labor wins, both inside and outside the South, are showing auto workers what a union can do for them, their families, and their communities.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<p><strong>Summary: </strong>The growing auto manufacturing industry in the South offers a powerful opportunity to bring good jobs to the region. But as these jobs shift from the Midwest to the South, we see a decline in job quality in the sector.&nbsp;Why? The prevailing Southern economic development model disempowers workers, and as a result auto workers in the South:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Are paid less than their counterparts in other regions, even when their income is adjusted for regional differences in the cost of living;</li>
<li>Report high levels of illness, injury, and even death, amid eroding worker safety protections;</li>
<li>Face anti-union hostility from policymakers and employers, including in the forms of&nbsp;right-to-work laws and union-busting activities.</li>
</ul>
<p>But this isn’t stopping workers from coming together to demand better conditions and union recognition. Recent labor wins, both inside and outside the South, are showing auto workers what a union can do for them, their families, and their communities. &nbsp;</p>
<hr>
</div>
<p>Policymakers in most states across the South uphold the Southern economic development model, which is characterized by low wages for workers; few regulations on businesses; low or no corporate taxes; and strong opposition to unions (Childers 2023; 2024a). Political leaders across the region advertise these exploitative, low-road policies as “business friendly,” and offer corporations massive subsidies to lure them into the South (AFL-CIO 2019; Erickson and Herbert 2023; Wakely, Anderson, and Freyer 2023; Whiton and LeRoy 2023).&nbsp;</p>
<p>Automobile manufacturing is among the key targets for subsidies in states like Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee (Eckert 2023; Erickson and Herbert 2023; Wakely, Anderson, and Freyer 2023; Whiton and LeRoy 2023).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> Whiton and LeRoy (2023) estimate that $641 million in state and local subsidies went to just one plant in Cartersville, GA, established by Hyundai Motor Group and battery giant SK On. These subsidies combined with additional federal tax credits mean these companies will receive an estimated $2 million dollar subsidy for each job created.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Shepardson (2023) reports that South Carolina provided $1.29 billion in subsidies to Volkswagen’s Scout Motors to build a truck and SUV factory. Across the region auto manufacturers have received similar subsidy packages.&nbsp;</p>
<p>These subsidies have effectively persuaded auto makers, especially foreign companies, to move significant production to the region (AFL-CIO 2019). However, because of the economic development model in place across the South, workers taking these jobs are being squeezed with low wages and a lack of regulation of these companies. And it is not just Southern auto workers who are harmed by this model; the bargaining power of auto manufacturing workers outside the South is also weakened. In states or regions where workers demand better wages and working conditions, employers threaten to leave to scare workers into accepting lower wages, less safe workplaces, and greater inequality.&nbsp;</p>
<h2>Will the South become the new heart of auto production?</h2>
<p>The Midwest has long been the heart of auto production in the United States. Detroit has been nicknamed the “Motor City.” The so-called “Big Three” U.S. automakers—Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler (now Stellantis)­—have all established their North American headquarters in Michigan (Palmer 2012). Numerous related parts suppliers and manufacturing facilities have long been key to many Midwest states’ economies (Abramson 2024). But since at least 2000, the domestic auto manufacturing industry has increasingly begun shifting elsewhere, particularly to Southern states.</p>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong> shows the number of auto manufacturing jobs in each region of the country in 2001, 2019, and 2022.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> For each year, most auto manufacturing jobs are in Midwestern states, with the second highest concentration in Southern states. While the Midwest continued to have the largest share of auto manufacturing jobs in 2022, Figure A shows a shift away from the region and into the South. In 2001, more than twice as many auto manufacturing jobs were in the Midwest versus the South—62.3% of all auto manufacturing jobs compared with just 25.3% in the South. But by 2022, the percentage of all auto manufacturing jobs in the Midwest had fallen to 52%, while the share in the South had risen to 36.4%.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-287100 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287100" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287100-33660-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Most of the auto manufacturing jobs moving to the South are concentrated in just a few states across the region. <strong>Figure B</strong> shows the 10 states nationally with the largest numbers of auto manufacturing jobs. While Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio are the top three, Tennessee and Kentucky round out the top five states for auto manufacturing jobs. Overall, five of the top 10 states for auto manufacturing are in the South.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-287104 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287104" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287104-33661-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Proponents of the Southern economic development model likely interpret auto manufacturing jobs shifting to Southern states as an illustration of the success of their policies. But unfortunately for workers across the region, low-wage, low regulation, anti-union policies have led to a marked decline in the quality of jobs that moved to Southern states.</p>
<h2>As jobs move South, job quality falls</h2>
<p>The most basic indicator of job quality is wages. Adequate wages allow workers to live a dignified life and provide for their families’ needs. Manufacturing jobs—and auto manufacturing jobs in particular—are generally hailed as well-paid jobs, especially for workers without a college degree. It is important to note, however, that manufacturing jobs were not inherently well-paid jobs. They became well paid because workers organized and formed unions, which enabled them to demand better wages (Krugman 2023). As more of these jobs have shifted to Southern states where the economic development model prescribes lower wages, less regulation, and aggressive opposition to unions, wages for the industry workforce overall have fallen.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The first panel in<strong> Table 1</strong> shows wages at the 25th percentile and at the median (50th percentile) for motor vehicle parts manufacturing workers in each of the 10 largest auto manufacturing states.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Column two of that panel shows that workers at the 25th percentile tend to have lower earnings in Southern states, with the lowest wages in Texas, Alabama, and Kentucky. The highest wages are in Illinois, Indiana, and California—states outside the South. We see a similar disparity with median annual wages: Texas, Alabama, and Tennessee have the lowest wages and Michigan, Ohio, and California have the highest. All five Southern states have lower median wages than states outside the South. Not only are motor vehicle parts manufacturing workers’ wages lower in Southern states, but median earnings in some Southern states are equivalent to the wages of workers at the 25th percentile in the Midwest: Median earnings in Texas ($37,390) and Alabama ($38,980) are what auto workers at the 25th percentile are paid in California ($38,060) and most Midwestern states.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-287109 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287109" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287109-33664-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The second panel in Table 1 show the same data for motor vehicle manufacturing workers. At the 25th percentile of earnings, we see no clear regional differences among states. At the median, however, these data show a similar pattern to auto parts manufacturing workers, with those in Southern states paid substantially less than those in other regions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lower wages in Southern states do not reflect a lower cost of living in those states. <strong>Table 2</strong> shows the median earnings in each state, along with the cost-of-living adjusted median. Even with this adjustment, Texas, Alabama, and Tennessee remain among the lowest-wage states for motor vehicle parts workers. While California and Illinois tend to have lower wages when adjusted for the cost of living, Michigan and Ohio continue to have the highest wages of all states. These are two of the three states with the largest numbers of auto manufacturing workers, and they have large, unionized auto manufacturing sectors. The difference in wages for workers in Michigan ($51,681) is a full $13,332 more than the $38,349 cost-of-living adjusted median in Texas. The gap between Michigan and other Southern states is smaller, but the difference remains in the thousands of dollars.&nbsp;</p>
<p>There is a similar pattern among motor vehicle manufacturing workers. While motor vehicle manufacturing workers in Illinois have the lowest cost-of-living-adjusted wages, Alabama, South Carolina, and Texas remain among the lowest-earning half of states.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-287113 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287113" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287113-33667-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>While auto manufacturing workers in states outside the South typically have higher wages than those in Southern states, wages declined in real terms for workers in both the South and the Midwest. <strong>Table 3</strong> shows median wages for workers in each state in 2012 and 2022, in 2022 dollars. When adjusted for inflation, wages for auto parts manufacturing workers rose in only two states—California and Illinois. Motor vehicle parts workers in all other states faced falling wages with the largest declines in Michigan, South Carolina, Alabama, and Texas.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-287118 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287118" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287118-33670-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Table 3 shows even larger declines in the wages of motor vehicle manufacturing workers. Workers in Tennessee experienced the largest decline at -$18,380 followed by Alabama (-$13,208), Kentucky (-$9,733), and South Carolina (-$9,345). Once again, wages rose only for workers in California.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The general decline in the earnings of auto manufacturing workers in Michigan reflect, in part, concessions auto workers made after the 2008 auto industry crisis that led General Motors and Chrysler (now Stellantis) to file for bankruptcy and reorganize. While Ford did not file for bankruptcy, the company’s workers were also included in the concessions. At the time, many believed these corporations might not survive. To save the industry, auto workers gave up cost-of-living raises; permitted newer hires to be paid at lower rates; and agreed to cuts to pensions and health benefits, among other concessions (Hersh 2023; Whalen 2023). As a result, these workers’ wages have declined in real terms and the quality of their benefits have deteriorated. This is despite auto sales skyrocketing by 92% for the Big Three auto makers between 2013 and 2022, soaring profits, and a 40% increase in CEO pay (Hersh 2023).&nbsp;</p>
<p>While not reflected in data in Table 3, unionized workers were able to use their leverage in late 2023 to force the Big Three auto makers—Ford, Stellantis, and General Motors—to raise wages for the highest paid workers by at least 25% over four and a half years; raise wages of the lowest paid to at least $40 an hour by the end of the contract; restore cost-of-living increases; and increase contributions to their 401(k) plans (Whalen 2023). This means the differences in wages between workers in the South and those in the Midwest could grow substantially, as the new contracts are implemented and the wages of unionized workers rise.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, wins by the United Auto Workers (UAW) do not just benefit unionized workers, as other nonunionized auto makers—including Toyota, Honda, and Hyundai—reported that they would also raise their wages following the announcement of the UAW contracts (Reuters 2023; Whalen 2023). This clearly illustrates that these companies could have raised workers’ wages and remained profitable much earlier. Yet they did not act until UAW was able to negotiate a better contract, which showed workers across the South what a union could do for them. These car companies’ proactive actions likely reflect, at least in part, an attempt to discourage their workers from seeking to unionize.</p>
<h3>Southern workers face unsafe workplaces</h3>
<p>The Southern economic development model is rooted in efforts of wealthy Southerners to extract the labor of Black Southerners without needing to provide them with fair compensation or consideration of their health or safety (Childers 2024a). Today this model is used to extract labor at the lowest cost possible from workers across the region—independent of race. In this model, workers are just another commodity, a cost to be minimized. As a result, employer practices to maintain worker safety decline as auto manufacturing jobs move to the South.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In states across the South, employers often demonstrate terrifyingly little regard for the wellbeing of their employees. For instance, there have been cases of employers denying heat and shade breaks for staff working outside in extremely hot temperatures that resulted in worker deaths, as well as instances of employers expecting staff to brave hurricanes to keep the business open (Barrett 2023; Childers 2024b). In many states outside of the South, policymakers have established more robust regulations to ensure worker safety. Those states embracing the Southern economic development model, however, typically shun state or local regulation of businesses, which leads to predictably negative outcomes for workers.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Worker safety in the South’s auto manufacturing industry tells a similar story. Auto industry workers across the South report high levels of illness, injury, and even death (Erickson and Herbert 2023; Waldman 2017). Erikson and Herbert (2023) report that as many as one in five workers (20%) reported being injured on the job in some of the Southern auto manufacturing plants they studied. This is compared with a national rate of 6.6 injuries per 100 full time workers.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Waldman (2017) details how unsafe working conditions have resulted in workers experiencing unnecessary deaths or the loss of their limbs. He reports that in 2015, the chances of losing a finger or a limb in an auto parts factory in Alabama were double the national risk for the industry and 65% higher than in Michigan. Caldwell (2019) explains that one reason for these injuries is that auto manufacturing employers are failing to train workers, who are then not following safety precautions like using lockout devices, machine guards, and energy control procedures, which would prevent machinery from starting during maintenance.&nbsp;</p>
<h3>The decline in job quality is possible thanks to the lack of unions across the South</h3>
<p>Auto manufacturing jobs have long been viewed as good jobs that paid workers well and provided great benefits. As these jobs have begun shifting from the Midwest to the South, we observe a decline in job quality. A key factor responsible for this decline is the prevailing economic development model in the South, notably the extreme opposition to unions prescribed by the Southern model.&nbsp;</p>
<p><strong>Figure C</strong> shows the union coverage rates for auto manufacturing workers by region in 2010, 2019, and 2022. The figure shows that auto manufacturing workers in the South have the lowest union coverage rate of any region. In 2022, the union coverage rate across the South was just 4.5%—compared with 7% in the West, 15.4% in the Northeast, and 25.8% in the Midwest. Figure C also shows that while union coverage rates among auto manufacturing workers saw a decline between 2010 and 2019, they were on the rise again by 2022 in all regions except the South.&nbsp;</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-287123 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="287123" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/287123-33673-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In the absence of worker-friendly policies that ensure workers are paid a living wage and have a safe work environment, unions empower workers to demand these basic benefits from their employers. The low union coverage rates shown in Figure C highlight obstacles preventing many Southern workers from coming together and collectively demanding these benefits.</p>
<p>Policymakers across the South understand that unions can counterbalance employer power and have been very intentional about blocking unions at all costs (Childers, Kamper, and Sherer 2024). They have explicitly expressed opposition to unions and passed right-to-work laws to undermine them (Daryani 2023; Harris 2024; Ivey 2024; Williams 2024). Lawmakers in the region have joined with employers to threaten workers and thwart their efforts to unionize. For example, workers at the Vance, AL, Mercedes plant described facing constant “union-avoidance” activities including a barrage of “captive audience” meetings where unions were disparaged (Kamper 2024; Leon and Slaughter 2024). These efforts were further supported by Alabama’s governor who joined with the governors of five other states to issue a statement claiming that unionizing the plant would cost the state jobs (Ivey et al. 2024).&nbsp;</p>
<p>Most recently, several states across the South have passed laws prohibiting companies from receiving state-provided economic subsidies if they voluntarily recognize a union (AP 2024; Wiener 2023). This is a particularly telling choice, given the region’s embrace of subsidizing employers with generous economic development incentives, not to mention the Southern economic development model’s general deference to businesses and opposition to regulation. These lawmakers’ purported “pro-business” philosophy seemingly only applies to companies where workers are disempowered.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Prohibiting economic subsidies to companies who support their workers’ desire to unionize also stands in direct contrast to recent federal laws passed by the Biden administration to help speed the country’s transition to clean energy and electric vehicles (EVs). The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law contained provisions offering more generous federal funding to energy projects and EV-related manufacturing plant construction projects adopting strong job quality standards, typical of projects utilizing unionized labor. By trying to discourage companies from adopting those high-road labor practices, Southern lawmakers are effectively telling businesses to forgo enormous federal financial subsidies rather than let the workers at those businesses potentially share in the benefits of that subsidy.</p>
<p>Still, with large federal investments pouring into the region, the auto manufacturing industry in the South is likely to grow rapidly. This provides a powerful opportunity to improve job quality in the South; bolster the labor movement in the region; and ensure that workers across the nation have good jobs that benefit workers, their families, and their communities.</p>
<p>Indeed, in the wake of the pandemic, as a strong labor market and low rates of unemployment have strengthened workers’ bargaining power, job quality has taken on increased salience for workers across the region (Gould 2024). This is happening amid strong and growing support for unions (Shierholz et al. 2024). Labor has renewed their efforts to organize the South. And they are winning. In April 2024, 73% of Volkswagen workers in Tennessee voted to join UAW (Eckert 2024). And in May 2024, workers in Georgia, North Carolina, and Tennessee won a record contract with Daimler Truck (Shepardson 2024).&nbsp;</p>
<p>Even in cases where union drives were ultimately unsuccessful, workers at those sites still won major concessions just by holding a union vote. For example, when UAW announced that 30% of Mercedes-Benz workers in Vance, AL, signed a union card, the company raised wages; eliminated the wage tiers among workers; and replaced the disliked CEO (Kamper 2024). The message from Mercedes and policymakers was that workers did not need to vote for the union, they could negotiate directly with management (Ivey et al. 2024)—a dubious claim since the workers’ concerns about leadership and pay were likely well-known by management prior to the union drive.</p>
<p>The Mercedes workers attempting to organize ultimately lost the union election, but they still won meaningful concessions because holding a union vote demonstrated their collective power. This promise of unions as a counterbalance to employer power is why proponents of the Southern model view them as such a threat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Importantly, the federal investments in the region are spurring growth in the industry and helping to bolster worker organizing. With billions of dollars pouring into new or upgraded manufacturing and energy production facilities, the threats from corporations and politicians that organizing and unionizing will lead companies to pull up stakes and leave the region ring hollow. Workers considering joining the union can see these threats for what they are: nothing more than scare tactics. These companies are not likely to walk away from the record levels of taxpayer-funded incentives.&nbsp;</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>Auto manufacturing jobs <em>became</em> good jobs in the United States because workers came together in unions, organized, and went on strike to make them good jobs. Over the last few decades, the secure, middle-class life previously promised by auto manufacturing jobs has come under threat. In the Great Recession, when automakers were facing financial difficulties, workers made significant concessions to save the industry. Once these corporations went back to making record profits, they did not restore workers’ wages and benefits. At the same time, as more of the industry has shifted to the South, policymakers’ emphasis on suppressing wages and hostility to unions—core to the Southern economic development model—has undermined job quality across the industry.</p>
<p>In the Midwest, auto workers once again came together to strike and were able to force the Big Three auto companies to do the right thing and fairly compensate them. The strong unions that empowered those workers to succeed in their demands for fair compensation are largely missing across the South.</p>
<p>Fortunately, workers across the region are demanding better job quality and union recognition (Price and Estwick 2024). The increased federal investment in electric vehicle manufacturing and in infrastructure empowers workers who now understand that companies are not likely to pick up and move. Workers have also seen what a union can do for them after UAW wins for its workers, as evidenced by successful union drive at the Volkswagen plant in Tennessee.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Together, these factors should inspire hope that even in the face of opposition from employers and politicians across the region, when workers come together to demand fair treatment, that can make all the difference.</p>
<hr>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Auto manufacturing in this report includes jobs in NAICS codes 3361 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing, 3362 Motor Vehicle bodies and trailer, and 3363 Motor vehicle parts manufacturing.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> The authors note that this is probably an underestimate because not all subsidies are disclosed publicly.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> We use the U.S. Census Bureau&#8217;s definition of the South Census Region, excluding the District of Columbia which has no auto manufacturing in the data. The states included are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> In analyses of the total number of workers in Figures A and B, all auto manufacturing workers in NAICS 3361, 3362, and 3363 were combined. In Tables 1 and 2, we are examining workers at the 25th and 50th percentiles and cannot combine across NAICS codes and therefore we examine the largest auto manufacturing sectors NAICS 3361 and 3363 separately.&nbsp;</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Their findings are based on surveys of workers in the plants they studied, 95% of whom were full-time workers. Some of the injuries they report would likely not be included in official statistics.</p>
<h2>References</h2>
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<p>AFL-CIO. 2019. &#8220;<a href="https://aflcio.org/reports/double-standard-work-european-corporate-investment-and-workers-rights-american-south">The Double Standard at Work: European Corporate Investment and Workers Rights in the American South</a>.&#8221; October 20, 2019.</p>
<p>Associated Press (AP). 2024. &#8220;<a href="https://accesswdun.com/print/2024/3/1233794">Some Georgia Workers Would Find It Harder to Become Union Members Under a New Bill</a>.&#8221; March 20, 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Caldwell, Carla. 2019. <em>Safety: OSHA Targets Southern Suppliers that Violate Workplace Safety Rules</em>. Southern Automotive Alliance, August 2019.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Childers, Chandra. 2023. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rooted-in-racism/">Rooted in Racism and Economic Exploitation: The Failed Southern Economic Development Model</a></em>. Economic Policy Institute, October 2023.</p>
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<p>Daryani, Connor. 2023. “<a href="https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/citylimits/anti-union-legislation-advances-through-state-house/article_ea2df42c-c774-11ed-9ffb-afcad18551cb.html">Anti-Union Legislation Advances Through State House.</a>” <em>Nashville Scene</em>, March 21, 2023.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Eckert, Nora. 2023. “<a href="https://www.wsj.com/business/autos/ev-plants-southern-states-ford-blueoval-city-2783da97">EV Boom Remakes Rural Towns in the American South</a>.”<em> Wall Street Journal</em>, August 31, 2023.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Eckert, Nora. 2024. “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/uaw-clinches-watershed-union-victory-volkswagen-tennessee-factory-2024-04-20/">UAW Wins Big in Historic Union Vote at Volkswagen Tennessee Factory</a>.” Reuters, April 22, 2024.</p>
<p>Erickson, Emily, and Berneece S. Herbert. 2023. <em><a href="https://jobstomoveamerica.org/resource/job-quality-and-community-well-being-in-mississippi-and-alabamas-manufacturing-facilities/">Job Quality and Community Wellbeing in Mississippi and Alabama’s Manufacturing Facilities</a></em>. Jobs to Move America, Feburary 2023.</p>
<p>Gould, Elise. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/jobs-report-indicates-a-strong-labor-market-unemployment-has-been-at-or-below-4-for-30-months-running/#:~:text=Jobs%20report%20indicates%20a%20strong%20labor%20market%20Unemployment%20has%20been,Read%20the%20full%20thread%20here.">Jobs Report Indicates a Strong Labor Market</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), June 7, 2024.</p>
<p>Harris, Javon L. 2024. “<a href="https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article284652175.html">Gov. Henry McMaster Pushes Against Labor Unions in SC. What Other Issues Top His 2024 Agenda</a>?” <em>The State</em>, January 24, 2024.</p>
<p>Hersh, Adam. 2023. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/uaw-automakers-negotiations/">UAW-Automakers Negotiations Pit Falling Wages Against Skyrocketing CEO Pay</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), September 12, 2023.</p>
<p>Ivey, Kay. 2024. “<a href="https://www.madeinalabama.com/2024/01/gov-ivey-unions-want-to-target-one-of-alabamas-crown-jewel-industries-but-im-standing-up-for-alabamians-and-protecting-our-jobs/">Unions Want to Target One of Alabama’s Crown Jewel Industries, But I’m Standing UP for Alabamians and Protecting Our Jobs</a>.” Made in Alabama, January 10, 2024.</p>
<p>Ivey, Kay, Brian Kemp, Tate Reeves, Henry McMaster, Bill Lee, and Greg Abbott. 2024. “<a href="https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2024/04/governor-ivey-other-southern-governors-issue-joint-statement-in-opposition-to-united-auto-workers-uaws-unionization-campaign/">Governor Ivey and Other Southern Governors Issue Joint Statement in Opposition to United Auto Workers (UAW)’s Unionization Campaign</a>” (news release). The Office of Alabama Governor Kay Ivey, April 16, 2024.</p>
<p>Kamper, Dave. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/just-by-having-a-union-vote-mercedes-workers-in-alabama-won-major-concessions-and-proved-the-importance-of-worker-power/">Just by Having a Union Vote, Mercedes Worker in Alabama Won Major Concessions and Proved the Importance of Worker Power</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog </em>(Economic Policy Institute), May 22, 2024.</p>
<p>Krugman, Paul. 2023. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/22/opinion/union-manufacturing-jobs-wages.html">Wonking Out: Making Manufacturing Good Again</a>. <em>New York Times</em>, September 22, 2023.</p>
<p>Leon, Luis Feliz, and Jane Slaughter. 2024. “<a href="https://labornotes.org/2024/05/alabama-mercedes-workers-lose-first-union-election-vow-fight">Alabama Mercedes Workers Lose First Union Election, Vow to Fight On</a>.” Labor Notes, May 17, 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Palmer, Brian. 2012. “<a href="https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2012/02/why-are-all-the-big-american-car-companies-based-in-michigan.html">Why Are all the Big American Car Companies Based in Michigan?</a>” <em>Slate</em>, February 29, 2012.</p>
<p>Price, Todd A., and Gary Estwick. 2024. “<a href="https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2024/04/19/tennessee-workers-vote-to-join-uaw-union/73382830007/">Tennessee Workers at VW Plant Vote to Unionize with UAW</a>.” <em>The Tennessean</em>, April 22, 2024.</p>
<p>Reuters. 2023. “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/automakers-with-non-union-workforce-race-bump-pay-after-uaws-record-deals-2023-11-21/">Automakers with Non-Union Workforce Race to Bump Pay After UAW’s Record Deals</a>.” December 19, 2023.</p>
<p>Shepardson, David. 2023. “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/volkswagens-scout-unit-wins-13-bln-incentives-south-carolina-factory-2023-03-20/">Volkswagen’s Scout Unit Wins $1.3 bln in Incentives for South Carolina Factory</a>.” Reuters, March 20, 2023.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Shepardson, David. 2024. “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/united-auto-workers-ratify-contract-with-daimler-truck-2024-05-05/">UAW Workers Ratify Labor Deal with Daimler Truck</a>.” Reuters, May 6, 2024.</p>
<p>Shierholz, Heidi, Celine McNicholas, Margaret Poydock, and Jennifer Sherer. 2024. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/union-membership-data/">Workers Want Unions, But the Latest Data Point to Obstacles in Their Path</a>. Economic Policy Institute, January 2024.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Wakely, Dev, Akiesha Anderson, and Allan M. Freyer. 2023. <em><a href="https://www.alarise.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Alabama-Arise-State-of-Working-2023.pdf">A Wheel in the Ditch: A Closer Look at Alabama’s Big Bet on the Auto Manufacturing Industry</a></em>. Alabama Arise, November 2023.</p>
<p>Waldman, Peter. 2017. “<a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-03-23/inside-alabama-s-auto-jobs-boom-cheap-wages-little-training-crushed-limbs">Inside Alabama’s Auto Jobs Boom: Cheap Wages, Little Training, Crushed Limbs, the South’s Manufacturing Renaissance Comes with a Heavy Price</a>.” Bloomberg, March 23, 2017.</p>
<p>Whalen, Jeanne. 2023. “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/20/uaw-contract-ford-general-motors-stellantis/">UAW Members Ratify Record Contracts with Big 3 Automakers</a>.” <em>Washington Post</em>, November 20, 2023.</p>
<p>Whiton, Jacob, and Greg LeRoy. 2023. <em><a href="https://goodjobsfirst.org/power-outrage-will-heavily-subsidized-battery-factories-generate-substandard-jobs/">Power Outrage: Will Heavily Subsidized Battery Factories Generate Substandard Jobs</a></em><em>?</em> Good Jobs First, July 2023.</p>
<p>Wiener, Don. 2023. “<a href="https://www.exposedbycmd.org/2023/07/24/alec-considers-blacklisting-companies-that-voluntarily-recognize-unions/">ALEC Considers Blacklisting Companies that Voluntarily Recognize Unions</a>.” Center for Media and Democracy, July 24, 2023.</p>
<p>Williams, Ross. 2024. “<a href="https://georgiarecorder.com/2024/02/01/georgia-senate-panel-advances-bill-aimed-at-making-the-state-even-less-hospitable-to-union-workers/">Georgia Senate Panel Advances Bill Aimed at Making the State Even Less Hospitable to Union Workers</a>.” <em>Georgia Recorder</em>, February 1, 2024.</p>
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		<title>American rescue, infrastructure, and inflation-reduction acts are big steps in right direction: But much more infrastructure investment is needed to secure a prosperous and equitable future</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/big-steps-in-right-direction-but-much-more-infrastructure-investment-needed/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Sep 2022 14:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam S. Hersh]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=257468</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Testimony prepared for House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure&#160;Hearing, “Investing in our Nation’s Transportation Infrastructure and&#160;Workers: Why it Matters,”&#160;September 29, Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, committee members, thank you for inviting me to talk with you today.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Testimony prepared for House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure&nbsp;Hearing, “Investing in our Nation’s Transportation Infrastructure and&nbsp;Workers: Why it Matters,”&nbsp;September 29, 2022</em></p>
<p>Chairman DeFazio, Ranking Member Graves, committee members, thank you for inviting me to talk with you today. I am Adam Hersh, Ph.D., Senior Economist at the Economic Policy Institute, a nonpartisan, 501(c)3 nonprofit think tank in Washington, DC.</p>
<p>Today, I will talk about 2 things:</p>
<ol>
<li>Why infrastructure matters, and</li>
<li>What impacts we can see and expect from recent major legislation to expand infrastructure investment.</li>
</ol>
<p>First, I want to recognize that this Congress, over the past 18 months, passed three monumental pieces of legislation that are critical for American transportation and infrastructure and by so doing have started America on a path to higher, more broadly shared, and more sustainable prosperity. These are the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA).</p>
<p>Considering that the previous administration along with the 115th and 116th Congresses failed to advance any new infrastructure agenda—despite grandiose pledges and repeated “Infrastructure Weeks”—these three acts mark not just monumental political achievements, but also the promise to fundamentally transform the American economy and improve everyone’s quality of life.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> When these spending plans are fulfilled, you will have touched the lives of every single person in America with upgraded and expanded access to safer roads, less time spent in traffic congestion, cleaner drinking water and sanitation, modernized schools, dependable and sustainable energy grids, cleaner air and better health, lower costs of doing business, a revitalized manufacturing sector, more money in their pockets because of the investments in America this Congress has made.</p>
<p>Still, all you have done is far from enough. We need to be doing much more to meet the needs of our current economy and provide the foundation for America’s future prosperity and security. America faces a yawning infrastructure deficit and if we don’t rise to meet this moment, we risk being left behind economically.</p>
<h3>1. Why infrastructure matters</h3>
<p>Infrastructure constitutes the essential public goods at the heart of our economy that allow people, goods, and ideas to be more easily exchanged, as well as to address the costs of negative externalities arising in such complex social organization.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> This is the “truck, barter, and trade,” that Adam Smith wrote about in his book, <em>The Wealth of Nations</em>; infrastructure lowers the cost of moving people and goods as well as creating more opportunities to trade information and spark innovation. Policy debates often focus on infrastructure’s impact in terms of the jobs and investment that can be created today. Yes, every job created directly in infrastructure construction creates an additional 17.8 jobs in other sectors of the economy and fuels domestic manufacturing.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> But infrastructure is even more essential to creating the opportunity and productivity that propels economic activity into the future, yielding economic dividends for years to come by connecting people, goods, and information together more efficiently.</p>
<p>Consider your own consumption of a very basic infrastructure good like bridges. You may have crossed a dozen or more to get to this hearing today. You probably cross dozens more on every trip home for your district work periods. You probably don’t notice them passing by while you are busy on your mobile phone, but they are essential to everyday life in America and they are in trouble. A Department of Transportation survey of nearly 620,000 bridges nationally finds that 3 in 5 are in less than “good” condition, while 2 in 5 are more than 50 years old.<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> Practically, this means most American bridges have reached or are approaching structural deficiency or functional obsolescence. Some states are significantly worse off than the average: In West Virginia 77% of bridges are in less than good condition, and the shares drop to 73% in Kentucky and 66% in Pennsylvania (see <strong>Table 1</strong>). Even in relatively well-situated states like Ohio and Florida, 39% and 38% of bridges, respectively, are still problematic—totaling more than 15,000 bridges.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-257472 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="257472" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/257472-30940-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Bridges are just one type of critical infrastructure. There are many more that are also essential in everyday life for American families and businesses. Until now, Congress has allowed America’s infrastructure to go to rot, failed to supply it in adequate amounts, and—whether by design or malign neglect—too often forced select communities most in need of affordable transportation to bear the costs of infrastructure projects while excluding them from the benefits. These include:</p>
<ul>
<li>Roads and other surface transportation assets</li>
<li>Drinking, waste, and irrigation water systems</li>
<li>Energy generation and transmission</li>
<li>Public transit, passenger rail, and airports and aviation systems</li>
<li>Coastal and inland waterways and ports</li>
<li>Access to high-speed internet</li>
<li>Conservation and public recreation space</li>
</ul>
<p>America has been disinvesting in infrastructure assets for years, and our growing deficiencies impose staggering economic costs.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates that the loss of functionality from America’s depreciated infrastructure assets will cost the United States $10 trillion in GDP, 3 million jobs, and $2.4 trillion in lost exports by 2039 due to increased costs of doing business, lost time and wasted fuel, health impacts, and other individual costs that add up to a big deal in the aggregate.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a></p>
<p>The ASCE projects that the U.S. economy will need $6 trillion in infrastructure investment, sustained over 10 years, may be too low. The aging infrastructure we have is ill-prepared to cope with increasingly frequent severe weather events, wildfires, and flooding we can expect moving forward as the climate warms—and certainly if we fail to limit that warming to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels—which will cause it to deteriorate faster. And the ASCE analysis did not factor in additional investments that will be needed to deploy decarbonization technologies at the ambitious pace and scale needed to meet emissions targets. The U.S. Global Change Research Program estimated that, if unabated, climate change will permanently reduce U.S. GDP by 10 percent.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> Economic losses will result from harm to physical assets, reduced industrial and agricultural productivity, increased mortality and health impacts on labor force participation, and sociopolitical destabilization around the world. Other researchers estimate an additional $400–600 billion investment a year is needed to achieve carbon net neutrality.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>
<p>The good news is that you have the power to change this in ways that will yield outsized effects on the U.S. economy and the lives of families across this country. Research on the longer-term return on investment from public infrastructure finds that, on average, every $100 spent on infrastructure generates an additional $17 benefit, though some research finds a return on investment as high as 73%.<a href="#_note9" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='9' id="_ref9">9</a> The broad economic benefits may be even larger than these estimates suggest. Typical economic models, such as those used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to score legislation, can paint a misleading picture by accounting for costs but not the full range of real-world benefits, making unrealistic assumptions about how people and markets behave, and assessing investment returns over too short a time horizon.</p>
<p>In the real world, infrastructure investments deliver an immediate economic surge, but also simultaneously achieve other objectives, for example:</p>
<ul>
<li>Expanding broadband internet access to rural and other neglected communities not only will create immediate jobs installing communications equipment, but also help bring to every corner of the country employment, education, health care, and social opportunities afforded by connectivity.</li>
<li>Overhauling public water systems to eliminate lead and other toxics not only will create a lot of jobs and lower utility prices for families and businesses, but also yield lifelong impacts on educational attainment, earnings, and productivity for those living in affected communities.</li>
<li>Reinvesting in and expanding sustainable public transportation systems not only will create direct jobs, but also open new opportunities for labor force participation and higher wages and productivity—connecting people to jobs that were literally out of reach—while reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving air quality and therefore health and education outcomes.</li>
</ul>
<p>This Congress has taken significant steps in the right direction to do this with ARPA, IIJA, and IRA, allocating new resources to these long-neglected foundations of national economic prosperity. But it is also important to note that the foundations of a dynamic and efficient economy go deeper than hard physical infrastructure assets. The pandemic “she-cession”—job losses disproportionately affecting women—has laid bare how essential caregiving “soft” infrastructure also is for the overall economy and that inadequate and unequal access to quality care has caused preventable harm to individuals, families, and on aggregate economic performance. America’s lack of paid caregiving infrastructure represents a glaring obstacle to achieving the country’s full economic potential that future Congresses must address.</p>
<h3>2. Benefits of ARPA, IIJA, and IRA Infrastructure Measures</h3>
<p>ARPA delivered critical resources to American state, local, tribal, and territorial governments in a time of acute crisis so that they could maintain continuity in essential public and private transportation and infrastructure services when revenue streams tanked;<a href="#_note10" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='10' id="_ref10">10</a> expanded and accelerated local infrastructure projects to offset demand losses in other sectors of the economy; and provided support for struggling small businesses and families to keep the lights on. Moody’s analytics found that ARPA increased employment by more than 4 million jobs and nearly doubled the rate of GDP growth in 2021, and delivered sufficient aggregate demand to ensure that the Great Lockdown of 2020 did not repeat in a double-dip recession.<a href="#_note11" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='11' id="_ref11">11</a></p>
<p>The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act reauthorized funding for existing infrastructure and provided nearly $550 billion in new investments in surface transportation, public transit and rail, water, and broadband internet infrastructure, along with new investments in renewable energy and electric vehicles.<a href="#_note12" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='12' id="_ref12">12</a> By my estimates, the additional infrastructure spending in IIJA supports 772,400 jobs annually.<a href="#_note13" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='13' id="_ref13">13</a> <strong>Table 2</strong> details the number of jobs associated with each program under the IIJA, with most jobs coming from road and surface transportation projects, though all program areas provide significant job creation effects.<a href="#_note14" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='14' id="_ref14">14</a> <strong>Table 3</strong> looks at the kinds of jobs that IIJA will create broadly across the economy. Of course, the construction industry accounts for the largest share of employment, with nearly 176,000 jobs annually. But the investments also stimulate 175,000 jobs annually in the manufacturing sector, nearly 100,000 jobs in transportation industries, and more broadly across other industries through induced demand. Critically, Buy America and prevailing-wage provisions in this and other legislation help set a high standard for contractors to ensure that America’s investments create good jobs with fair wages and contribute to the revitalization of our manufacturing base. Moody’s Analytics estimates that, at the peak of the expenditures, U.S. GDP will be roughly 0.8 percentage points higher as a result of IIJA.<a href="#_note15" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='15' id="_ref15">15</a></p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-257479 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="257479" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/257479-30941-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-257481 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="257481" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/257481-30942-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Ink is still drying on the Inflation Reduction Act, but it is clear this is the most ambitious action Congress has taken to confront the impending climate change crisis with more than 100 programs that will restore, expand, and modernize a broad range of infrastructure systems. These investments will bring the costs of transportation, electricity and other utilities, building heating and cooling for families and businesses in America. The spending will do so while supporting domestic manufacturing and development of new domestic industries where U.S. businesses will lead innovation and critical components of energy goods and systems will better insulated from disruption in global supply chains. University of Massachusetts economists estimate that IRA will generate 912,000 jobs per year, on average, for 10 years from the public and private investments that the policies incentivize.<a href="#_note16" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='16' id="_ref16">16</a> Rhodium Group economists estimate that IRA will reduce energy costs for the average household by $730 to $1135 annually.<a href="#_note17" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='17' id="_ref17">17</a></p>
<h3>Conclusion</h3>
<p>While this Congress has taken great strides to tackle pressing crises while reinvesting in the infrastructure at the foundation of America’s long-term economic prosperity. Achieving our economic goals will require not just significantly more resources, but embracing new approaches to the public role in how we fund and incentivize infrastructure and technological investments. Thank you.</p>
<h3>Endnotes</h3>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Emily Cochrane and Eileen Sullivan, “The Many Times It’s Been ‘Infrastructure Week’ in Washington.” <em>New York Times</em>. April 1, 2020. Accessed September 15, 2022. <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/politics/coronavirus-infrastructure-week-timeline.html">https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/us/politics/coronavirus-infrastructure-week-timeline.html</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Technically, economists define a “public good” as non-rival and non-excludable, although in common usage public goods may also refer to rival, non-excludable goods.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Josh L. Bivens,&nbsp; <em>Updated Employment Multipliers for the U.S. Economy</em>. Economic Policy Institute, January 23, 2019.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> EPI analysis of Department of Transportation, <em>National Bridge Inventory: Bridge Condition by County 2022</em>. June 15, 2022. Accessed September 15, 2022. <a href="https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi/no10/county22.cfm">https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/nbi/no10/county22.cfm</a>; ASCE, <em>Making the Grade: America’s Infrastructure Report Card 2021: Bridges</em>. Accessed September 15, 2022. <a href="https://infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Bridges-2021.pdf">https://infrastructurereportcard.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Bridges-2021.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> Sarah Ayres Steinberg and Adam Hersh. “New Ryan Budget Cuts Investments in America’s&nbsp;Future.” Center for American Progress. March 13, 2013. <a href="https://www.americanprogress.org/article/new-ryan-budget-cuts-investments-in-americas-future/">https://www.americanprogress.org/article/new-ryan-budget-cuts-investments-in-americas-future/</a>; Josh L. Bivens, “The Potential Macroeconomic Benefits from Increasing Infrastructure Investment.” <em>E</em>conomic Policy Institute. July 18, 2017.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> American Society of Civil Engineers. <em>2021</em> <em>Infrastructure Report Card</em>. 2022. <a href="https://infrastructurereportcard.org/">https://infrastructurereportcard.org/</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP). <em>Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United&nbsp;</em><em>States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II</em>. 2018. <a href="https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/">https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Robert Pollin, Shouvik Chakraborty, and Jeanette Wicks-Lim, <em>Employment Impacts of Proposed U.S. Economic Stimulus Programs: Job Creation, Job Quality, and Demographic Distribution Measures</em>. Political Economy Research Institute, 2021. <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1397-employment-impacts-of-proposed-u-s-economic-stimulus-programs">https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1397-employment-impacts-of-proposed-u-s-economic-stimulus-programs</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='9'><a href="#_ref9" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note9">9. </a> See Josh L. Bivens, <em>The Potential Macroeconomic Benefits from Increasing Infrastructure Investment</em>, Economic Policy Institute. July 2017. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-potential-macroeconomic-benefits-from-increasing-infrastructure-investment/">https://www.epi.org/publication/the-potential-macroeconomic-benefits-from-increasing-infrastructure-investment/</a>; James Heintz, “The Impact of Public Capital on the U.S. Private Economy: New Evidence and Analysis.” <em>International Review of Applied Economics </em>24, no. 5 (2010), 619–32; Joseph Berechman, Dilruba Ozmen, and Kaan Ozbay, “Empirical Analysis of Transportation Investment and Economic Development at State, County and Municipality Levels.” <em>Transportation</em> 33 (2006), 537–551.</p>
<p data-note_number='10'><a href="#_ref10" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note10">10. </a> In addition to supporting public health, public security, and education services, and providing aggregate demand support more generally—through the business and household sectors—with indirect economic benefits for transportation and infrastructure industries.</p>
<p data-note_number='11'><a href="#_ref11" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note11">11. </a> Moody’s Analytics. “Global Fiscal Policy in the Pandemic.” <em>Moody’s Analytics</em>. February 24, 2022. Accessed <a href="https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2022/global-fiscal-policy-in-the-pandemic.pdf">https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2022/global-fiscal-policy-in-the-pandemic.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='12'><a href="#_ref12" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note12">12. </a> Adam S. Hersh, <em>Build Back Better’ Agenda Will Ensure Strong, Stable Recovery in Coming Years</em>. Economic Policy Institute. September, 2021. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/">https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='13'><a href="#_ref13" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note13">13. </a> To be clear, these average annual number of jobs supported cannot be summed together over 10 years. If, for example, all of the spending ramped up in Year 1 and then persisted, then 772,400 jobs would be supported in the first year and then this number would persist but not grow. Over the 10-year window, one could cumulate these job numbers and classify them as “job-years”—a measure of total hours of work supported by this spending over the next decade. For more on the estimation methodology, see Adam S. Hersh, <em>Build Back Better’ Agenda Will Ensure Strong, Stable Recovery in Coming Years</em>. Economic Policy Institute. September, 2021.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/">https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='14'><a href="#_ref14" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note14">14. </a> These tables are reproduced from a report that also analyzed the potential effects of President Biden’s broader Build Back Better agenda.</p>
<p data-note_number='15'><a href="#_ref15" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note15">15. </a> Moody’s Analytics, “Macroeconomic Consequences of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act &amp; Build Back Better Framework.” <em>Moody’s Analytics</em>. November 4, 2021. <a href="https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2021/macroeconomic-consequences-of-the-infrastructure-investment-and-jobs-act-and-build-back-better-framework.pdf">https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2021/macroeconomic-consequences-of-the-infrastructure-investment-and-jobs-act-and-build-back-better-framework.pdf</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='16'><a href="#_ref16" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note16">16. </a> Robert Pollin, Chirag Lala, and Shouvik Chakraborty, <em>Job Creation Estimates Through Proposed Inflation Reduction Act</em>. Political Economy Research Institute. August 2022. Accessed <a href="https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1633-job-creation-estimates-through-proposed-inflation-reduction-act">https://peri.umass.edu/publication/item/1633-job-creation-estimates-through-proposed-inflation-reduction-act</a>.</p>
<p data-note_number='17'><a href="#_ref17" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note17">17. </a> John Larsen, Ben King, Hannah Kolus, Naveen Dasari, Galen Hiltbrand, and Whitney Herndon, <em>A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean Energy Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act</em>. Rhodium Group. August 2022. Accessed <a href="https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-energy-inflation-reduction-act/">https://rhg.com/research/climate-clean-energy-inflation-reduction-act/</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Botched policy responses to globalization have decimated manufacturing employment with often overlooked costs for Black, Brown, and other workers of color: Investing in infrastructure and rebalancing trade can create good jobs for all</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/botched-policy-responses-to-globalization/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jan 2022 16:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Daniel Perez, Jori Kandra, Robert E. Scott, Valerie Wilson]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=239189</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[The mismanaged integration of the United States into the global economy has devastated U.S. manufacturing workers and their communities. Globalization of our economy, driven by unfair trade, failed trade and investment deals, and, most importantly, currency manipulation and systematic overvaluation of the U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The mismanaged integration of the United States into the global economy has devastated U.S. manufacturing workers and their communities. Globalization of our economy, driven by unfair trade, failed trade and investment deals, and, most importantly, currency manipulation and systematic overvaluation of the U.S. dollar over the past two decades has resulted in growing trade deficits—the U.S. importing more than we export—that have eliminated more than five million U.S. manufacturing jobs and nearly 70,000 factories. These losses were accompanied by a shift toward lower-wage service-sector jobs with fewer benefits and lower rates of unionization than manufacturing jobs. The loss of jobs offering good wages and superior benefits for non-college-educated workers has narrowed a once viable pathway to the middle class.</p>
<p>This chartbook shows that the loss of manufacturing jobs has been particularly devastating for Black and Hispanic workers and other workers of color, who represent a disproportionate share of those without a college degree, and for whom discrimination has limited access to better-paying jobs. It calls for creating millions of good jobs for workers at every level of education by investing in infrastructure and rebalancing trade. When implemented with clearly defined racial and gender equity goals, these investments can help raise living standards for men and women workers of color without a college degree.</p>
<p>This chartbook comes at a crucial time. The bipartisan infrastructure bill signed into law in November, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), invests about $550 billion in new federal funding for roads and bridges, railways, broadband, and other infrastructure. And an even larger social safety net and climate change bill awaiting a vote in the Senate—the Build Back Better Act (BBBA)—would invest roughly $2 trillion in child care, long-term care, universal pre-K, renewable energy, electric cars, and other human and climate infrastructure. But although these job-creating investments are welcome, they constitute just a down payment on a much larger agenda of investments needed over the coming decades to rebuild the American economy and complete the conversion to a zero-carbon, clean-energy future by 2050. And the current investments are already at risk: If steps are not taken to rebalance trade so that more of the goods consumed in the United States are made domestically, much of the new spending and new jobs will leak away to foreign suppliers. The threat is real: We continue as a country to import more than we export, and the surging imports mean that the reported U.S. trade deficit in manufactured goods for 2021 is likely to exceed $1.1 trillion.</p>
<h4>Following are some key data points in the chartbook:</h4>
<ul>
<li><strong>Nearly 7 million jobs would be supported by a four-year, $2 trillion </strong><strong>infrastructure and climate change investment program combined with trade and industrial policies that dramatically boost U.S. exports and eliminate the U.S. trade deficit.</strong> This includes at least three million good jobs (with high wages and benefits) in manufacturing and construction. If implemented with policies to help ensure that workers of color and women can access these jobs, this program would help reduce racial and gender inequities in the job market.</li>
<li><strong>Rebalancing trade, investing in infrastructure, and addressing climate change would help rebalance the economy back from lower-paying service- sector jobs to higher-paying jobs in manufacturing and construction. </strong>Essentially all of the net new jobs created in the economy over the last two decades were in services. In contrast, 45.7% of jobs supported by investing in climate and infrastructure and 40.8% of the jobs supported by rebalancing trade would be in manufacturing and construction.</li>
<li><strong>Supporting new manufacturing jobs is important for </strong><strong>Black workers, who have been particularly hard hit by globalization and the decline in manufacturing employment.</strong> While Black workers’ share of total employment increased from 11.3% to 12.3% between 1998 and 2020, their share of manufacturing employment was essentially unchanged. Meanwhile, they experienced the loss of 646,500 good manufacturing jobs during that time period, a 30.4% decline in total Black manufacturing employment as part of the overall loss of more than 5 million manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2020.</li>
<li><strong>Black, Hispanic, Asian American/Pacific Islander (AAPI), and white workers without a college degree all earn substantially more in manufacturing than in nonmanufacturing industries. </strong>For median-wage, non-college-educated employees, Black workers in manufacturing earn $5,000 more per year (17.9% more) than in nonmanufacturing industries; Hispanic workers earn $4,800 more per year (+17.8%); AAPI workers earn $4,000 more per year (+14.3%); and white workers earn $10,100 more per year (+29.0%). Manufacturing wage premiums are also substantially larger for all workers at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution.</li>
<li><strong>Surging</strong><strong> imports from China and the resulting growing trade deficit with China have had a key role in manufacturing job loss. Reducing that deficit is critical to bringing jobs back. </strong>Between 2001, when China entered the World Trade Organization, and 2018, the growing bilateral trade deficit displaced 3.7 million U.S. jobs, including 2.8 million jobs in manufacturing.</li>
<li><strong>Historically</strong><strong>, growing trade deficits have displaced a disproportionately large number of good jobs for workers of color.</strong> Between 2001 and 2011 alone, the growth of the trade deficit with China displaced 958,800 jobs held by workers of color—representing 35.0% of total jobs displaced by the growing trade deficit with China. About three-fourths of jobs displaced were manufacturing jobs, which feature high pay and excellent benefits.</li>
<li><strong>Growing trade deficits have hit workers of color in the pocketbook.</strong> In 2011 alone, workers of color displaced from higher-earning jobs in manufacturing and other traded industries into lower-earning jobs in nontraded industries earned $10,485 less in annual wages because of the growing trade deficit with China. This trade-related average annual wage loss per worker translates into a total loss of $10.4 billion per year for the 958,800 workers of color affected by growing trade deficits with China.</li>
</ul>
<h3>Policymakers should heed the data on globalization’s impact and boost investment and rebalance trade</h3>
<p>As the charts in this chartbook show, investments in infrastructure, domestic manufacturing capacity, and addressing climate change would create millions of good jobs for workers who have been hardest hit by globalization and the shift toward more low-wage service-sector jobs. The jobs created through these investments would offer better pay and benefits than average service industry jobs, with the potential to improve living standards for a broad group of racially and ethnically diverse, non-college-educated women and men.</p>
<p>At this writing, physical and human infrastructure investments approved or under debate in 2021, while welcome, are down payments on a much larger agenda of investments needed to rebuild the American economy and complete the conversion to a zero-carbon, clean-energy future by 2050. The job of rebuilding the American economy will not be completed in the first year of the Biden administration.</p>
<p>Policymakers must implement smart trade and industrial policies to maximize the jobs and benefits created by the current investments in infrastructure and clean energy and significantly boost those investments to match the scale of the need. These policies include aggressive and expanded use of Buy America programs, which should be applied to as much of new investments as possible. And any investments must be accompanied by substantial investments in research and development, training, and extension services, which will increase the supply of skilled workers for these good jobs and the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing and construction industries.</p>
<p>These recommendations align with the Alliance for American Manufacturing’s American Manufacturing Plan, a plan calling for measures to increase domestic competitiveness, improve trade enforcement and trade agreements, and carefully shift the value of the dollar so that U.S. goods are competitive (Paul 2020). The recommendations also would operationalize the EPI policy agenda for trade, which states that we should “restore and protect American manufacturing by using policy levers to ensure that American manufacturers’ ability to compete on global markets is not hamstrung by a chronically overvalued dollar, as it has been for decades” (Economic Policy Institute 2018). Ways to realign the dollar and rebalance U.S. trade and capital flows are explained by Scott (2020a, 2020b).</p>
<p>This report shows the employment impact of infrastructure investments at the scale of the need combined with smart trade policies designed to eliminate the U.S. goods trade deficit with the rest of the world. Specifically, we illustrate the employment impacts of investing roughly $500 billion per year in climate and infrastructure over four years (as originally proposed by President Biden during his 2020 election campaign) and eliminating the U.S. goods trade deficit of $854.3 billion (which was projected to likely reach $1.1 trillion in 2021 according to the U.S Census Bureau (2021b)), which would dramatically increase demand for American-made manufactured goods. We draw on Scott, Mokhiber, and Perez (2020), which showed that these investments, and the increased spending on domestic goods, could support at least 6.9 million jobs over four years, including at least three million good direct and indirect jobs in manufacturing and construction. Rebalancing U.S. trade alone could support 3.5 million of those 6.9 million jobs, including 1.4 million good jobs in manufacturing and 44,000 good jobs in construction.</p>
<p>The investments called for are scaled to the need. Every four years, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates the investment needed in each infrastructure category to maintain a state of good repair and earn a B grade. ASCE’s 2021 Infrastructure Report Card estimates that the U.S. infrastructure investment gap—how much less the U.S. will invest in its infrastructure than it needs to over the next decade—is $2.59 trillion (ASCE 2021). Since the recently enacted IIJA includes only $548 billion in new funding for both infrastructure and climate investments, and the bulk of the investments in the proposed Build Back Better Act (included in the reconciliation bill still being considered at this date) are for safety net and climate expenditures, with relative small and still-indeterminant amounts for infrastructure, it is clear that there will be substantial infrastructure needs remaining to be addressed during the balance of President Biden’s first term. Furthermore, even if President Biden’s full $6 trillion proposal to upgrade America’s physical and social infrastructure, first unveiled in June 2021, were eventually fully funded, much more is needed to meet our infrastructure needs and fully fund the transition to a zero-carbon economy over next 30 years (Tankersley 2021).</p>
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<h3>Future research should focus on women’s access to manufacturing and construction jobs</h3>
<p>As the charts in this chartbook show, manufacturing and construction offer good jobs for women, but women make up a smaller share of total employment in these two industries (29.2% and 10.6%, respectively) than men. Women hold a disproportionately large (56.4%) share of service industry jobs—a notoriously low-paying sector—despite being less than half (48.8%) of the overall workforce (EPI 2021a). Women employed in manufacturing earn $183 more per week (22.2%) than women employed in service industries, on average, and women manufacturing workers earn much more than women workers in rapidly growing service industry subsectors such as restaurants and retail trade, where average weekly earnings are much lower than the overall average for service industries. (Data on average weekly earnings for all workers by industry are reported in Appendix Table 1.) Future research should explore ways in which public policies can help expand employment opportunities for women in high-wage manufacturing and construction industries. Boosting women workers’ share of higher-paying jobs would help close the persistent gender pay gap. Despite some narrowing of the gap, women workers overall are paid a lot less than men with comparable backgrounds. The regression-adjusted wage gap was 22.6% in 2019 (down slightly from 23.9% in 2000), meaning women were making 22.6% less than men with comparable backgrounds (that is, adjusting for differences in education, age, and region) (Gould 2020, Appendix Table 1).&nbsp;</p>
<h3>A quick note about the data and definitions</h3>
<p>The data in the charts and tables in this report are drawn from a number of sources, and specific sources are provided for each chart and table. This note provides a general introduction to the data and time periods covered in this analysis. For the broad overview of trends in employment, trade, and compensation by major industry, we use detailed historical data on employment by industry for 1998 to 2019 obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employment Projections program (BLS-EP 2020). These data were supplemented with monthly data from the BLS’s Current Employment Statistics (BLS-CES various years). Data on overall compensation, including wages and benefits shown in Chart 3, are from the BLS’s Employer Cost for Employee Compensation series (BLS 2021a).</p>
<p>All of the data in this report refer to the number of workers employed (that is, people with a job), so estimates of total employment are a measure of the total workforce. Workforce measures (as used here) are distinct from estimates of the domestic “labor force,” which are derived from the monthly household (CPS) surveys of employment, unemployment, and labor force participation rates. To provide a more comprehensive look at the economy, we did not restrict the sample to only those who are working full time. &nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>We use industry-based definitions of employment in this study to break the economy into three basic types of jobs: construction, manufacturing, and services. These sectors are responsible for the vast majority (99.2% in 2019) of total nonfarm employment (estimated from Appendix Table 1 at the end of the report) in the United States, and for an even larger (99.8%) share of net job creation or destruction over the 1998–2019 period in the nonfarm economy (also derived from Appendix Table 1). In 2019, the construction industry employed about 7.5 million workers, or about 4.9% of total nonfarm employment of 151.7 million.&nbsp; While the number of construction workers has increased slightly over the past two decades (as shown in Appendix Table 1), the number and share of manufacturing workers has fallen steadily for the past two decades (Table 2 and Chart 2), to 12.8 million workers in 2019, or 8.5% of total nonfarm employment. The vast majority of all jobs in the economy are then included in the service industries, which employed 130.1 million workers in 2019, or 85.8% of total nonfarm employment. The service sector encompasses a broad set of industries ranging from very low-wage sectors such as retail trade, restaurants, and other segments of the hospitality industry—sectors dominated by minimum wage labor—to high-wage sectors dominated by professionals such as law, accounting, and financial services. But even large, relatively skill-intensive sectors such as health care include vast numbers of workers with less than a college degree (roughly half of total employment in this industry), and these health care workers have average earnings of less than $800 per week.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Data on average hourly wages and average weekly hours by industry, and head counts for different demographic and ethnic groups—shown in Charts 4 and 13 and Tables 1 through 3—were based on a pooled four-year sample of Current Population Survey (CPS) data covering the years 2017 to 2020 from EPI Microdata Extracts (EPI 2021a). Estimates of average hourly wages in real 2020 dollars (wages only, not including benefits), average weekly hours by industry, and head counts by demographic group were used to compute average weekly earnings. Those data were used to compare average weekly earnings by industry and demographic group in Charts 12 and 15, and Tables 1,2, and 3. Average weekly earnings in construction and manufacturing are higher than in the service industry both because hourly wages are higher and because workers in these industries are employed for more hours per week. Separately, benefits are substantially higher in manufacturing and construction than in services, as shown in Chart 3.</p>
<p>Broad estimates of annual earnings of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers by race and ethnicity, shown in Charts 6 and 7, were estimated using the March CPS Annual Earnings estimates file (also known as the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups or CPS ORG), using a data set compiled by Flood et al. (2021).&nbsp; Estimates of union wage premiums in Chart 9 also use CPS ORG data but from EPI’s Current Population Survey Extracts (EPI 2021a), while benefit coverage for all workers in manufacturing, construction, and service industries, shown in Charts 10 and 11, were estimated with CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (SEC) data compiled by EPI (U.S. Census Bureau CPS-ASEC 2021).</p>
<p>Data on average weekly earnings by industry were combined with estimates of jobs supported by investments in infrastructure and clean energy and by rebalancing trade (Scott, Mokhiber, and Perez 2020) to estimate the average weekly earnings by race and ethnicity associated with these investments shown in Chart 15. The distribution of jobs supported by climate and infrastructure investments and by rebalancing trade are shown in Chart 14.</p>
<p>The demographic groups and breakdowns shown in these charts are broadly inclusive. They cover four major racial and ethnic categories: White, Black, Hispanic (to include Latina, Latino, Latine, and/or LatinX workers), and Asian American/Pacific Islander (abbreviated AAPI, which include indigenous and other Pacific Islanders) workers. These breakdowns are based on the EPI (2021b) Current Population Survey Extracts race/ethnicity variables, drawn from the CPS “wbhao” variable (white, Black, Hispanic, AAPI and other variable). (Results for “other” workers, who make up 1% of the sample, were excluded from these charts because of the small sample size, because this group includes workers from a wide variety of racial and ethnic backgrounds that do not self-identify as white, Black, Hispanic, or AAPI, and because of the high variability and low reliability of the results.)</p>
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<h3><a id="jumptocharts"></a>Charts</h3>
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<a name="1"></a><div class="figure chart-239192 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239192" data-anchor="1"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">As trade deficit soared past $1 trillion, the U.S. lost more than five million manufacturing jobs</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Manufactured goods trade deficit (billions$) and manufacturing employment (millions), 1998–2021</span></h4><div class="figLabel">1</div><div class="figLabel">1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239192-29144-email.png" width="608" alt="1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>From 1998 to 2021, the U.S. lost more than 5 million manufacturing jobs thanks to the growing trade deficit in manufactured goods with China, Japan, Mexico, the European Union, and other countries. Not shown in the chart are the loss of more than 70,000 manufacturing plants over roughly the same period (1998 to 2019). Mismanaged global competition led to rapidly growing imports of manufactured products and the failure to grow foreign demand for U.S. products enough to offset the declining demand for domestic goods. The resulting job losses devastated local economies and workers in the industrial heartlands. The exploding trade deficit is the result of unfair trade practices (by China, South Korea, the European Union, and other foreign governments) and substantial overvaluation of the U.S. dollar, which makes U.S. goods more expensive than our competitors’ products. The dollar needs to fall about 25% to 30% to rebalance trade and rebuild U.S. manufacturing.</p>
<p><em>Data on plant losses come from Scott 2020c and U.S. Census Bureau 2021a. For more on the causes of growing trade deficits, see Scott, Mokhiber, and Perez 2020; Scott 2020a; and Scott 2020b. See <a href="#chartnotes">Supplemental chart notes</a> at the end of the charts for more details on the data.</em></p>
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<a name="2"></a><div class="figure chart-239195 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239195" data-anchor="2"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">As manufacturing lost about five million jobs in two decades, the low-wage service sector gained almost 30 million jobs</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Change in U.S. employment overall and for construction, manufacturing, and service industries (millions), 1998–2019</span></h4><div class="figLabel">2</div><div class="figLabel">2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239195-29149-email.png" width="608" alt="2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The elimination of nearly five million manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2019 was accompanied by explosive job growth in service industries—growth that accounted for all U.S. employment growth in the nonfarm economy in this period. Most of the manufacturing jobs were shed between 1998 and 2007, the so-called China Shock period shortly after China entered the World Trade Organization and imports from China grew most rapidly. However, manufacturing job losses continued in the wake of the Great Recession (2007–2019). Meanwhile, jobs increased slightly in construction, a sector that, like manufacturing, has historically offered higher wages to non-college-educated workers than has the service sector.</p>
<p>Prior EPI research has shown that growing trade deficits with China displaced a disproportionately large number of good jobs for workers of color. Between 2001 and 2011 alone, the growth of the trade deficit with China displaced 958,800 jobs held by workers of color—representing 35.0% of total jobs displaced by the growing trade deficit with China. About three-fourths of jobs displaced were manufacturing jobs, which feature high pay and excellent benefits. As a result, in 2011 alone, those 958,800 workers of color displaced from higher-earning jobs in manufacturing and other traded industries into lower-earning jobs in nontraded industries earned $10,485 less in annual wages, which translates into a total loss of $10.1 billion per year.</p>
<p>Also not shown in the graph, the big shift toward service-sector jobs lowered average wages for all workers without a four-year college degree. First there is the composition effect; as the share of lower-wage service-sector work in the U.S. labor market increases, the average wage overall falls. In addition, growing competition with low-wage workers in countries such as China and Mexico also pulled down wages not just in manufacturing but for all workers with a similar skill set. As a result, earnings fall not only for manufacturing workers but for all workers without a college degree—by nearly $2,000 per year, according to one estimate. This wage suppression affected essentially all 100 million non-college-educated workers in the U.S. labor force in this period. As wages for workers without college degrees fall, the gap between their pay and the pay of college-educated workers grows. The college wage premium measures what college-educated workers make relative to those without a college degree. One study of the growth of the college wage premium from 1995 to 2011 found that the rapid growth of imports from China in that period explained more than half of the growth in the college wage premium, as described above.</p>
<p><em>For more on the China Shock, see Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2016. For more on manufacturing job losses after the Great Recession, see Scott and Mokhiber 2020. For more on wage suppression of non-college-educated workers and its causes, see Bivens 2017, Scott 2015, and Bivens 2013b, and for the impacts of China trade on Black and Brown workers, see Scott 2013.</em></p>
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<a name="3"></a><div class="figure chart-239201 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239201" data-anchor="3"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Manufacturing and construction jobs have higher wages and better benefits than jobs in the exploding service sector</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Average hourly compensation in construction, manufacturing, and service industries, 2021</span></h4><div class="figLabel">3</div><div class="figLabel">3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239201-29150-email.png" width="608" alt="3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The decline in manufacturing employment and simultaneous rise in service industry employment means good middle-class jobs in America are being replaced by jobs with lower pay and benefits. Average wages and benefits in manufacturing are $40.71 per hour, 13.9% higher than in service industries. Wages and benefits in construction average $41.24 per hour, 15.4% more than in services. The gap is particularly wide in benefits. Relative to service jobs, the dollar value of manufacturing benefits per hour is 41.7% higher and construction benefits are 30.0% higher.</p>
<p><em>See <a href="#appendixtable1">Appendix Table 1</a> for employment change from 1998 to 2019 and mean wages for all 52 industries in the United States.</em></p>
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<a name="4"></a><div class="figure chart-239199 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239199" data-anchor="4"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Manufacturing and construction offer good employment opportunities for the non-college-educated workers who make up nearly two thirds of the workforce</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Shares of jobs held by workers with given education level, by industry and overall, 2017–2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">4</div><div class="figLabel">4</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239199-29151-email.png" width="608" alt="4" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The shift away from manufacturing and construction employment to more service industry employment has meant lost opportunities for non-college-educated workers. That’s because manufacturing and construction industries employ a significantly larger share of workers with less than a four-year college degree: 84.6% of construction workers and 69.3% of manufacturing workers do not have a four-year college degree or more education, while 62.6% of service workers are non-college-educated workers. The disparities are even greater for workers with a high school diploma or less education, who make up 59.2% of construction, 43.0% of manufacturing, and only 33.3% of service workers. When good jobs with less restrictive educational requirements are readily available, that means more workers and families have an opportunity to attain a higher standard of living. Though not shown in the chart, investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and energy-efficiency improvements totaling $2 trillion combined with policies to rebalance trade could add at least three million good jobs in manufacturing and construction over a four-year period.</p>
<p><em>For more on the job-creating potential of a combined investment and trade rebalancing initiative, see Scott, Mokhiber, and Perez 2020.</em></p>
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<a name="5"></a><div class="figure chart-239207 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239207" data-anchor="5"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Black workers were especially hard hit by manufacturing job losses associated with globalization</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Black share of workforce, total and manufacturing, 1977–2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">5</div><div class="figLabel">5</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239207-29152-email.png" width="608" alt="5" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>The overall loss of more than 5 million manufacturing jobs during the past two decades hurt all of the workers who depended on those jobs to support themselves and their families. However, the losses among Black workers were uniquely troubling. The chart shows that until the early 1990s, as Black workers increased their share of the workforce, they were securing a roughly commensurate share of the higher-wage jobs available in manufacturing. The Black share of the manufacturing workforce peaked at 10.6% in 1992, which exactly equaled their share of the workforce. But in the 1990s, Black workers’ share of manufacturing jobs began to flatline and then fall. In 2020, Black workers made up 12.3% of all workers but only 10.2% of manufacturing workers. In raw numbers of jobs lost, the data behind the graph are startling: Black workers lost 646,500 manufacturing jobs between 1998 and 2020, a 30.4% decline in Black manufacturing employment.</p>
<p>Though not shown in the graph, the increasing underrepresentation of Black workers in manufacturing jobs relative to their share of the workforce since the 1990s occurred alongside the shift of a substantial share of U.S. manufacturing employment to Southern states, where black workers accounted for a much larger share of the population relative to other regions of the country.</p>
<p>Given the workforce-share declines Black workers suffered in the 2001 recession, the Great Recession that began in 2007, and the COVID-19 recession, it is important that the rebuilding underway today include a focus on Black workers, who experienced disproportionately large job losses in the last three U.S. recessions.</p>
<p>Also not shown here but available in <a href="#appendixtable3">Appendix Table 3</a>: The number and share of Hispanic and Asian American/Pacific Islander (AAPI) workers in manufacturing both rose rapidly over the past 20 years, in line with their dramatic rise in overall shares of the workforce. However, Hispanic workers make up a disproportionately large share (30.0%) of workers in the low-wage and high-risk meatpacking and other food manufacturing industries.</p>
<p><em>For more on the substantial share of U.S. manufacturing employment moving to Southern states, see BLS 2021c.</em></p>
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<a name="6"></a><div class="figure chart-239217 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239217" data-anchor="6"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">The lowest-earning workers without a college degree make twice as much in manufacturing as in other industries</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle"> Average annual earnings of manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers without a four-year college degree and in the 10th percentile of earnings, by race and ethnicity, 2019</span></h4><div class="figLabel">6</div><div class="figLabel">6</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239217-29153-email.png" width="608" alt="6" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Manufacturing provides good, steady employment, even for some of the lowest earners in the workforce. If you are a non-college-educated worker at the 10th percentile of earnings in manufacturing, you are making at least twice as much as your peers working outside manufacturing. This manufacturing pay advantage—which holds true for Black, Hispanic, Asian American/Pacific Islander, and white workers—is in part because average weekly hours are much higher in manufacturing and in part because unionization rates for these groups are higher in manufacturing. The advantage is substantial. Among the lowest paid Black and Hispanic workers, average annual earnings in manufacturing are twice as high as earnings in other industries, while white manufacturing workers’ annual earnings are 2.5 times as high and AAPI manufacturing workers’ annual earnings are three times as high as earnings in other industries. Note that in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing industries, earnings of Black, Hispanic, and AAPI workers at the 10th percentile are lower than those of white workers at the 10th percentile. These racial and ethnic earnings differentials may reflect disparities in average weekly hours, occupations, or job responsibilities. While we cannot conclude discrimination from this data, it can be reflected in differences in hours, job assignments, opportunities for overtime, etc.</p>
<p><em>For more on how discrimination may appear in earnings differentials, see Wilson 2020. </em></p>
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<a name="7"></a><div class="figure chart-239246 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239246" data-anchor="7"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Typical non-college-educated workers in manufacturing are paid much more than noncollege workers in other industries</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Annual earnings of workers without a four-year degree at the 50th percentile of earnings, by race and ethnicity, 2019</span></h4><div class="figLabel">7</div><div class="figLabel">7</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239246-29154-email.png" width="608" alt="7" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>A typical non-college-educated worker—i.e., a worker without a bachelor’s degree whose annual earnings fall at the 50th percentile or median—earns much more employed in manufacturing than in other industries, no matter what major racial or ethnic groups the worker belongs to. Among workers with less than a bachelor’s degree, median AAPI, Hispanic, and Black workers earn an additional $4,000 to $5,000 per year in the manufacturing industry compared with noncollege median workers in other industries. White noncollege median workers earn over $10,000 more. These dollar differences translate to a manufacturing pay advantage (how much more manufacturing workers make in percentage terms) of 14.3% for typical noncollege AAPI workers, 17.8% for typical noncollege Hispanic workers, 17.9% for typical noncollege Black workers, and 29.0% for typical noncollege white workers.</p>
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<a name="8"></a><div class="figure chart-239256 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239256" data-anchor="8"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Workers in construction and manufacturing are much more likely to be unionized (thus enjoying higher wages and better benefits)</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of workers represented by a union, by industry, 2019</span></h4><div class="figLabel">8</div><div class="figLabel">8</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239256-29155-email.png" width="608" alt="8" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Manufacturing and construction provide excellent jobs, in part because more of these jobs are unionized. As much research shows, unions give workers more power to bargain for higher pay, better benefits and working conditions, training, and promotional opportunities, as well as protections against discrimination and harassment. Unions also help reduce racial- and gender-based economic disparities, and they support families with better benefits and job protections as well as better retirement security. Historically, unions have disproportionately benefited low- and moderate-income workers, as well as those with lower levels of education and workers of color.</p>
<p><em>For more on how unions raise pay and improve benefits and reduce disparities, see EPI 2021c. For more on the benefits of unionization for workers of color and workers with lower incomes and less education, see Mishel 2021.</em></p>
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<a name="9"></a><div class="figure chart-238332 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="238332" data-anchor="9"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Unionized manufacturing and construction workers get a bigger pay boost from union representation than their unionized peers in service industries</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Union hourly wage premium, by select industries</span></h4><div class="figLabel">9</div><div class="figLabel">9</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/238332-29156-email.png" width="608" alt="9" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Unionized workers in construction and manufacturing earn much higher hourly wages than nonunionized workers with similar characteristics in these industries. These union wage premium estimates control for the effects of education, occupation, experience, race, ethnicity, and other factors that help explain individual wage differences. The union wage premium in construction was 35.6%, more than four times as large as the union wage premium in service industry jobs (8.0%). The union premium in manufacturing (17.9%) is more than twice as large as the union wage premium in services jobs.</p>
<p>If the chart showed the overall union pay premium including benefits, the manufacturing and construction premiums would settle a little bit closer together because manufacturing workers get more in benefits than construction workers (as shown in Chart 3). But the gap would still be substantial.</p>
<p>Does unionization really offer a much bigger boost to construction workers than manufacturing workers? Yes, but the reason has little to do with unionization per se and much to do with globalization.</p>
<p>First, manufacturing workers must compete with low-wage workers in countries such as China, Mexico, South Korea, and Vietnam, meaning that even when in unions, they have much less bargaining power than construction workers, who do not face the competitive pressures from offshoring and unfair trade that make foreign goods and workers artificially cheap. Second, manufacturing work has been increasingly outsourced to less unionized staffing and temporary help services, which also puts substantial downward pressure on wages of U.S. manufacturing workers.</p>
<p>In short, the excess union wage premium in construction relative to manufacturing is another data point in support of the argument for investments and trade policies that bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States.</p>
<p><em>For more on the causes of unfair trade and how it artificially depresses wages of U.S. workers, see EPI 2018, Scott 2020a and 2020b, and Bivens 2013b and 2017. For more on the union status of the manufacturing temp help and staffing agencies, see BLS 2021b, and for more on increasing domestic outsourcing of manufacturing jobs to staffing firms, see Mishel 2018 and 2021. See <a href="#chartnotes">Supplemental chart notes</a> at the end of the charts for more details on the data.</em></p>
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<a name="10"></a><div class="figure chart-239281 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239281" data-anchor="10"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Manufacturing workers are much more likely to have health insurance than service workers, unionized or not</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of workers with health insurance by select industry and union status</span></h4><div class="figLabel">10</div><div class="figLabel">10</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239281-29157-email.png" width="608" alt="10" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Manufacturing workers, both union and nonunion, have higher rates of health insurance than comparable workers in services or construction. More than three-quarters (76.7%) of unionized manufacturing workers, 73.8% of unionized construction workers, and 73.7% of unionized service workers have employer-provided health insurance. Among nonunion workers, 66.6% of those in manufacturing have health insurance coverage compared with 53.6% of service industry workers and 44.9% of construction workers.</p>
<p>These data show another reason why an investment in and trade policies that support revitalizing manufacturing are critical to improving the lives of U.S. workers. By supporting the creation of more manufacturing jobs, more workers will have access to high-quality, company-provided health insurance, which will also reduce the demand for Medicaid and other forms of publicly subsidized health insurance, including American Care Act plans.</p>
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<a name="11"></a><div class="figure chart-239334 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239334" data-anchor="11"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Unionized workers are much more likely to have employer-provided pensions in all sectors</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Share of workers with pension coverage, by union status</span></h4><div class="figLabel">11</div><div class="figLabel">11</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239334-29158-email.png" width="608" alt="11" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Unionized workers are also much more likely to have employer-provided pensions than non-union workers—more than twice as likely in construction, 39% more likely in manufacturing (59.8%/43.0%), and 74.3% more likely in services (65.0%/37.3%). As is the case for health insurance, even nonunion manufacturing workers are much more likely to receive employer-provided pensions than nonunion construction or service industry workers. This is likely a spillover effect from higher rates of union membership among manufacturing workers (as shown in <a href="#chart8">Chart 8</a>). Employer-provided pensions and health insurance are valuable benefits that contribute significantly to workers’ total compensation and family economic security.</p>
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<a name="12"></a><div class="figure chart-239336 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239336" data-anchor="12"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Construction and manufacturing jobs offer higher wages for women as well as men</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Average weekly earnings in three selected industries, by gender, 2017–2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">12</div><div class="figLabel">12</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239336-29159-email.png" width="608" alt="12" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Women employed in manufacturing earn $183 more per week (22.1%) than women employed in service industries, on average. And, though not shown, women working in manufacturing are paid much higher wages than women in rapidly growing service subsectors such as accommodations and food services and retail trade, where average weekly earnings for all workers are $480 and $715 respectively, compared with $1,215 in manufacturing, according to Appendix Table 1). Women in construction earn $105 more per week (12.7%) on average than women in service industry jobs.&nbsp;Men in manufacturing also earn more than men in services, while male construction workers make about the same a male service workers. (Data on average weekly earnings for all workers by industry are reported in <a href="#appendixtable1">Appendix Table 1</a>.)</p>
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<a name="13"></a><div class="figure chart-239283 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239283" data-anchor="13"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Women are much less likely to be in the higher-wage jobs found in manufacturing and construction</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Shares of employment in select industries, by gender, 2017–2020</span></h4><div class="figLabel">13</div><div class="figLabel">13</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239283-29160-email.png" width="608" alt="13" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>While women employed in the construction and manufacturing industries earn more than women employed in services, they are severely underrepresented in these higher-paying sectors. Women make up only 10.6% of workers in construction and 29.2% of manufacturing employment. The underrepresentation of women in construction and manufacturing industries is a missed opportunity for women without a college degree to earn a middle-class income comparable to that of similarly educated men.</p>
<p>Women’s limited access to good jobs in manufacturing and construction contributes to the gender pay gap. Though not shown in the chart, past EPI research shows that on average, in 2019 women were paid 22.6% less than men with comparable backgrounds (that is, adjusting for differences in education, age/experience, and region of the country). Given the gender pay gap and the potential of manufacturing and construction employment to close that gap, gender equity should be considered alongside racial equity when developing and implementing public policies to create more good jobs in manufacturing and construction.</p>
<p><em>For more on the gender pay gap, see Appendix Table 1 in Gould 2020.</em></p>
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<a name="14"></a><div class="figure chart-241269 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="241269" data-anchor="14"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Nearly half of the jobs supported by climate and infrastructure investment and rebalancing trade would be good middle-class jobs in manufacturing and construction</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Industry shares of jobs supported by trade rebalancing and by infrastructure and climate investments</span></h4><div class="figLabel">14</div><div class="figLabel">14</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/241269-29161-email.png" width="608" alt="14" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Low-wage service industry employment replaced good manufacturing jobs over the last two decades, accounting for all of net jobs added to the U.S. economy from 1998 to 2019, as shown in Chart 2. In contrast, investing in climate and infrastructure at the scale of the need, coupled with trade and financial policies that make U.S. goods competitive on global markets, and thereby eliminating U.S. goods trade deficits, would support a much higher share of good jobs in manufacturing and construction, helping reverse two decades of declining job quality. Nearly half (45.7%) of the jobs supported by investing in climate and infrastructure and 40.8% of the jobs supported by rebalancing trade would be in manufacturing and construction.</p>
<p>These estimates are based on EPI analysis in Scott, Mokhiber, and Perez 2020 of the job-creation potential of a two-pronged strategy for rebuilding the economy that includes $2 trillion of investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and energy-efficiency improvements over four years combined with trade and industrial policies that eliminate the U.S. trade deficit.</p>
<p><em>See <a href="#appendixtable2">Appendix Table 2</a> for an industry breakdown of jobs that would be supported by climate and infrastructure investments and rebalancing trade and average wages in those jobs.</em></p>
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<a name="15"></a><div class="figure chart-239291 figure-screenshot figure-theme-chartcard" data-chartid="239291" data-anchor="15"><div class="figInner"><h4><span class="title-presub">Jobs created by rebuilding the U.S. economy around high-wage jobs and manufacturing  support much higher pay than service sector work</span><span class="colon">: </span><span class="subtitle">Average weekly earnings in jobs supported by trade rebalancing and by infrastructure and climate investments compared with services jobs, by race and ethnicity</span></h4><div class="figLabel">15</div><div class="figLabel">15</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239291-29162-email.png" width="608" alt="15" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="chartcard-info">
<p>Jobs gained through rebalancing trade and expanding public investments in infrastructure, clean energy, and energy efficiency would offer higher average earnings than average service-sector jobs for workers in all major racial and ethnic groups. The average earnings shown in each bar are weighted average earnings for rebalancing trade and for infrastructure and climate investments versus weighted average earnings in service industries only, as shown on the services bar for each group.</p>
<p>Black workers in the new jobs supported by trade rebalancing and infrastructure and climate investment would earn roughly $100 per week more than in the service industry jobs, an earnings gain of 12.2% in jobs from new investments and 13.4% in trade rebalancing jobs. Hispanic workers would earn $145 to $149 more per week (from 19.9% to 20.4% more). Asian American/Pacific Islander workers would earn $93 to $166 per week more (from 8.3% to 14.7% more), and white workers would earn $146 to $212 more per week (from 14.4% to 20.8% more). Though not shown in the chart, gains in could push wages up throughout the economy. That’s because the types of jobs created by infrastructure and clean-energy investments and boosting U.S. exports include higher-paying manufacturing and construction jobs historically open to non-college-educated workers. Raising demand for these workers raises their pay. When combined with a strong emphasis on ensuring that Black, Hispanic, and other workers of color can access these jobs, the rebuilding plan would contribute to greater racial equity in the economy.</p>
<p><em>See <a href="#appendixtable3">Appendix Table 3</a> for an industry breakdown of the potential jobs gained, average earnings in those jobs, and the shares of jobs held by workers in different ethnic and racial groups. Detailed sectors that employ above-average shares of Black workers and/or other workers of color are bolded in the table.</em></p>
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<h3><a id="chartnotes"></a>Supplemental chart notes</h3>
<h4>Chart 1</h4>
<p>As shown in Chart 2, the U.S. lost 4.7 million manufacturing jobs between 1998 and December 2019. Chart 1 extends the data through the first quarter of 2021, an additional 388,000 manufacturing jobs were lost, for a total loss of 5.1 million jobs (BLS-CES various years).&nbsp;</p>
<p>For readers familiar with our previous factory-loss estimates (more than 91,000 manufacturing establishments lost between 1997 and 2018, as reported in Scott 2020c), it is important to note that those estimates were based on earlier data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) through 2016, supplemented with County Business Patterns data on manufacturing establishment counts. Updated BDS statistics were released in September 2021 (U.S. Census Bureau 2021), which used NAICS-based industry definitions for the 1978–2019 period. The new NAICS-based establishment data reduced the total number of manufacturing plants by 23,2019 establishments in the base year of 1997 (a decline of 6.4%). The earlier BDS statistical series was based on a combination of Standing Industrial Classification (SIC) and NAICS (or census industry codes). In addition, the peak year in the number of manufacturing establishments in the 2021 BDS data occurred in 1998 (rather than 1997, as in the earlier data series). As a result of these changes and adjustments in industry coverage, the overall loss of manufacturing establishments between 1998 and 2019 declines to slightly less than 70,000 total establishments (from 91,000 in our earlier estimates). The switch from SIC- to NAICS-based industry definitions moved about 500,000 workers (and an unknown number of establishments) from manufacturing into service industries, in part through reclassification of contract manufacturing into the service sector.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Our colleague Josh Bivens points out that failure by U.S. policymakers to ensure U.S. competitiveness abroad was not the only thing that suppressed demand for U.S. exports over the past two decades. Japan and the European Union did too little to support their own economic growth in the early 2000s and in the wake of the Great Recession, and their resulting slow aggregate demand growth suppressed potential demand for U.S. exports (see Bivens 2013a).</p>
<p>Finally, it is important to note that workers employed by staffing agencies, which subcontract workers to manufacturing establishments, are not counted as part of manufacturing employment in the BLS establishment surveys. Thus, about 11% of the decline in manufacturing employment shown in Chart 1 is explained by the rising numbers of workers paid by staffing and other temporary-help agencies that work in manufacturing establishments. These workers typically receive much lower pay and benefits than workers directly employed by manufacturing firms (Mishel 2018, Table 6).&nbsp;</p>
<h4>Chart 9</h4>
<p>The chart reports the coefficient on union status from a regression of the log of the hourly wage on union status and a quintic polynomial in age (used as a measure of experience), and it uses dummies for race and ethnicity, education, citizenship, major industry, major occupation, state, and year. We exclude observations with imputed wages because the imputation process does not take union status into account and therefore biases the union premium toward zero. This analysis does not account for nonwage benefits.</p>
<p>To understand why wage premiums are larger in construction than in manufacturing, several factors should be considered. First, the charts only reports hourly wage premiums (excluding benefits). As shown in Chart 3, the average hourly value of employer-provided benefits in manufacturing ($10.78) is greater than those in construction ($9.89). The higher dollar value of nonwage benefits would compensate manufacturing workers for relatively lower wage premiums in manufacturing.</p>
<p>On the other hand, the construction industry employs a much larger share of workers with a high school diploma or less than the manufacturing industry (59.2% versus 43.0%, respectively) as shown in Chart 4, and yet the union wage premium in construction is clearly higher than in manufacturing, as shown in Chart 9. Thus, the fact that the wage premium for construction workers is larger than in manufacturing is particularly remarkable, since the wage premium for workers with a high school diploma or less would otherwise tend to be much smaller than that of a more educated pool of workers, such as manufacturing workers. Thus, something else is clearly sheltering construction workers from the competitive pressures felt by workers in manufacturing. Workers with a high school diploma or less would earn much less in service industry jobs, where two thirds of workers have higher levels of education (Chart 4, above), than they do in either manufacturing or construction.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Exposure to international competition is clearly the most important factor exerting downward pressure on manufacturing wages. While construction workers are largely insulated from competition with low-wage workers in other countries, manufacturing workers are directly exposed to international competition, via massive and rapidly growing imports of manufactured goods from low-wage countries such as China, Vietnam, and Mexico. Total goods imports, which are dominated by trade in manufacturers, will reach nearly $2.9 trillion in 2021, an increase of 21.9% over import levels in 2020. Unfair foreign trade policies—along with currency manipulation and excessive foreign capital inflows, which together are responsible for the 25% to 30% overvaluation of the U.S. dollar—are the most important causes of soaring imports and U.S. goods trade deficits. In addition to boosting the cost of U.S. exports, an overvalued dollar makes the wages of foreign workers artificially cheap and increases the cost of U.S. labor relative to workers in countries with undervalued currencies. See EPI 2018, Scott 2020a, and Scott 2020b for more; this section is based on EPI analysis of U.S. Census Bureau 2021b.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>The authors thank Josh Bivens, and Riley Olson for comments, and Lora Engdahl for editing assistance. This research was made possible by support from the Alliance for American Manufacturing.</p>
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<p><a id="appendixtable1"></a>

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<a name="Appendix-Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-239322 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none shrink-table" data-chartid="239322" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239322-29148-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-239313 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none shrink-table" data-chartid="239313" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239313-29044-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Appendix-Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-239301 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none shrink-table" data-chartid="239301" data-anchor="Appendix-Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Appendix Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/239301-29043-email.png" width="608" alt="Appendix Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h3>References</h3>
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<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2021c. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unions-help-reduce-disparities-and-strengthen-our-democracy/"><em>Unions Help Reduce Disparities and Strengthen Our Democracy</em>. </a>Economic Policy Institute, April 2021.</p>
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<p>Mishel, Lawrence. 2018.&nbsp; <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/manufacturing-still-provides-a-pay-advantage-but-outsourcing-is-eroding-it/"><em>Yes, Manufacturing Still Provides a Pay Advantage, but Staffing Firm Outsourcing is Eroding it</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, March 2018.</p>
<p>Mishel, Lawrence. 2021. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/eroded-collective-bargaining/"><em>The Enormous Impact of Eroded Collective Bargaining on Wages</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, April 2021.</p>
<p>Paul, Scott. 2020. <a href="https://www.americanmanufacturing.org/blog/our-american-manufacturing-plan-would-create-millions-new-jobs/"><em>Our American Manufacturing Plan Will Create 6.9 to 12.9 Million New Jobs by 2024</em></a>. Alliance for American Manufacturing, October 2020.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E. 2013. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trading-manufacturing-advantage-china-trade/"><em>Trading Away the Manufacturing Advantage: China Trade Drives Down U.S. Wages and Benefits and Eliminates Good Jobs for U.S. Workers</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, September 2013.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E. 2015. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unfair-trade-deals-lower-the-wages-of-u-s-workers/"><em>Unfair Trade Deals Lower the Wages of US Workers</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, March 2015.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E. 2020a. “<a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/525288-bidens-trade-policy-must-focus-on-creating-good-jobs#bottom-story-socials">Biden&#8217;s Trade Policy Must Focus on Creating Good Jobs</a>.” <em>The Hill</em>, November 10, 2020.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E. 2020b. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/memorandum-on-u-s-trade-and-manufacturing-policy/"><em>Memorandum on U.S. Trade and Manufacturing Policy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, November 2020.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E. 2020c.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/reshoring-manufacturing-jobs/"><em>We Can Reshore Manufacturing Jobs, but Trump Hasn’t Done It: Trade Rebalancing, Infrastructure, and Climate Investments Could Create 17 Million Good Jobs and Rebuild the American Economy</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, August 2020.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., and Zane Mokhiber. 2020. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/growing-china-trade-deficits-costs-us-jobs/"><em>Growing China Trade Deficit Cost 3.7 Million American jobs Between 2001 and 2018: Jobs Lost in Every U.S. State and Congressional District</em></a><em>.</em>&nbsp;Economic Policy Institute, January 2020.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., Zane Mokhiber, and Daniel Perez. 2020.&nbsp;<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rebuilding-american-manufacturing-potential-job-gains-by-state-and-industry-analysis-of-trade-infrastructure-and-clean-energy-energy-efficiency-proposals/"><em>Rebuilding American Manufacturing—Potential Job Gains by State and Industry: Analysis of Trade, Infrastructure, and Clean Energy/Energy Efficiency Proposals</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, October 2020.</p>
<p>Tankersley, Jim. 2021. “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/27/business/economy/biden-plan.html">Biden to Propose $6 Trillion Budget to Make U.S. More Competitive</a>.” <em>New York Times,</em>&nbsp;June 17.</p>
<p>U.S. Census Bureau. 2021a. <em><a href="https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/econ/bds/bds-tables.html">2019 Business Dynamic Statistics Data Tables</a></em>. CSV datasets. Accessed November 2021. <a href="https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/econ/bds/bds-tables.html">https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/econ/bds/bds-tables.html</a></p>
<p>U.S. Census Bureau. 2021b. “<a href="https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/index.html">U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services (FT900)</a>” [Excel file, data for October 2021]. Accessed December 7, 2021.&nbsp;</p>
<p>U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement microdata (U.S. Census Bureau CPS-ASEC). 2021. Survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics [machine-readable microdata file]. Accessed September 13, 2021, at https://thedataweb.rm.census.gov/ftp/cps_ftp.html.</p>
<p>U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 2021.&nbsp;<a href="https://dataweb.usitc.gov/"><em>USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb</em></a>&nbsp;[database]. Accessed September 2021.</p>
<p>Wilson, Valerie. 2020. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/racism-and-the-economy-fed/">Racism and the Economy: Focus on Employment</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 21, 2020.</p>
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		<title>Cutting the reconciliation bill to $1.5 trillion would support nearly 2 million fewer jobs per year</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/cutting-the-reconciliation-bill-to-1-5-trillion-would-support-nearly-2-million-fewer-jobs-per-year/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Oct 2021 19:18:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam S. Hersh]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=237714</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Congress may have bought itself another month to negotiate over the Biden-Harris administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) agenda, but one thing is clear: Further reducing the scale and scope of the budget reconciliation package unequivocally means the legislation will support far fewer jobs and deliver fewer benefits to lift up working families and boost the economy as a How much will such compromise cost the U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Congress may have bought itself another month to negotiate over the Biden-Harris administration’s Build Back Better (BBB) agenda, but one thing is clear: Further reducing the scale and scope of the budget reconciliation package unequivocally means the legislation will support far fewer jobs and deliver fewer benefits to lift up working families and boost the economy as a whole.</p>
<p>How much will such compromise cost the U.S. economy? We crunched the numbers to find out what compromising on the BBB plan will mean for every state and congressional district in the United States. If the budget reconciliation package is cut from $3.5 trillion to $1.5 trillion—as Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.V.) has called for—nearly 2 million fewer jobs per year would be supported.</p>
<p><span id="more-237714"></span></p>
<p>In a previous analysis, we showed that the BBB agenda—combining the Bipartisan Infrastructure Framework and the proposed $3.5 trillion budget reconciliation package—would <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/">support more than 4 million jobs</a> annually. It would also make critical investments that would deliver relief to financially strained households, raise productivity, and dampen inflation pressures to enhance America’s <a href="https://www.epi.org/press/nobel-laureate-economist-joseph-stiglitz-issues-statement-in-support-of-build-back-better-agenda/">long-term economic growth prospects</a>. David Brooks, the center-right <em>New York Times</em> columnist, recently captured the significance of these initiatives <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/30/opinion/federal-spending-democrats.html">when he wrote </a>that these are “economic packages that serve moral and cultural purposes. They should be measured by their cultural impact, not merely by some wonky analysis. In real, tangible ways, they would redistribute dignity back downward.”</p>
<p>Sen. Manchin and Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) are intent on scaling back Build Back Better’s purpose. While Sen. Sinema has not publicly staked a position outlining her objections, Sen. Manchin has telegraphed a <a href="https://static.politico.com/1e/ef/159cabd547868585f9b1a8f06388/july-28-2021.pdf?nname=playbook-pm&amp;nid=0000015a-dd3e-d536-a37b-dd7fd8af0000&amp;nrid=0000014f-88f9-d780-a9ef-9dfbf85b0000&amp;nlid=964328">top-line spending figure of $1.5 trillion</a> as the maximum he would support.</p>
<p>The $2 trillion gap left by Manchin’s proposal cuts far deeper than any of the policy specifics he proposes eliminating. Even if he succeeded in eliminating <em>all</em> climate-related funding in the BBB agenda budget resolution, for example, Manchin’s plan would still fall nearly $1.8 trillion short. Thus, for the purpose of our analysis, it makes most sense to assume that hewing to Sen. Manchin’s demands would mean a proportional cut across all of the BBB agenda’s individual initiatives (more on the methodologies used <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/iija-budget-reconciliation-jobs/">here</a> and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/growing-china-trade-deficits-costs-us-jobs/">here</a>).</p>
<p>Besides delivering fewer tangible benefits to typical families, scaling back Build Back Better also severely compromises the package’s value as macroeconomic insurance against recovery waning in the coming years.</p>
<p>Absent the Build Back Better package, there is no guarantee of robust growth once the provisions of the American Rescue Plan—enacted in March of this year—begin fading out in earnest in mid-2022. The U.S. economy is not out of the woods yet. In past instances, <a href="https://groundworkcollaborative.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/GroundworkCollaborative_RoomToRun.pdf">policymakers have too often erred</a> on the side of withdrawing fiscal support too early, resulting in protracted recoveries and prolonged spells of elevated unemployment, which ultimately undercut America’s future economic potential. The BBB package would counter a potential slump and effectively support millions of jobs, especially if a host of plausible scenarios occur, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>if private spending fails to sustain growth after the American Rescue Plan fades;</li>
<li>if the pandemic evolves and continues weighing on economic activity; or</li>
<li>if other unforeseen shocks to the economy emerge and threaten a robust recovery.</li>
</ul>
<p>Scaling back the plan now, as Sens. Manchin and Sinema would like, will support millions fewer than the original package. In total, Sen. Manchin’s proposal would support nearly 1.9 million fewer jobs per year than the Build Back Better agenda. Full results for each state and congressional district <a href="https://files.epi.org/uploads/BBB_manchin_comparison.xlsx">can be downloaded here</a> and viewed in the figures and table below.</p>
<ul>
<li>Every state and Washington, D.C., would see fewer jobs supported under Sen. Manchin’s proposal than the BBB agenda. The largest states would experience the largest absolute losses in jobs potential. California would see 211,853 fewer jobs per year, while Texas, New York, and Florida would see 149,050, 116,584, and 106,205 fewer jobs per year, respectively.</li>
<li>West Virginia would see 9,880 fewer jobs annually under Manchin’s plan, equivalent to 1.33% of the state’s overall employment. West Virginia would be no better off in terms of jobs in fossil fuel industries, but would see 900 fewer manufacturing jobs, 400 fewer construction jobs, and 3,800 fewer health care and social assistance jobs.</li>
<li>Arizona would see 35,564 fewer jobs per year, equal to 1.17% of state employment, including 2,500 fewer manufacturing jobs, 1,600 fewer construction jobs, and 11,400 fewer health care and social assistance jobs.</li>
<li>Alaska would be most impacted by fewer jobs under Manchin’s proposal relative to the size of its economy, losing out on jobs equivalent to 1.39% of its total employment, but all states and D.C. would forgo more than 1% of total employment.</li>
<li>All congressional districts would see fewer jobs supported under Manchin’s proposal than under the BBB plan, ranging from 0.9% to 1.5% fewer jobs supported as a share of overall district-level employment.</li>
<li>Districts represented by <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-bills-5e45e96c8396af38157dc292b20fc49e">so-called moderate House Democrats</a> would take material hits to jobs under Manchin’s plan relative to the BBB reconciliation plan. Rep. Josh Gottheimer’s (D-N.J. 5th) would see support for 7,700 fewer jobs per year in his district under Manchin’s proposal and Rep. Stephanie Murphy (D-Fla. 7th) would see 7,600 fewer jobs. Altogether, the <a href="https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-business-bills-5e45e96c8396af38157dc292b20fc49e">bloc of 10 moderate Democratic members</a> would see 70,700 fewer jobs supported across their districts relative to the BBB plan.</li>
<li>Manchin and Sinema have become linchpins in this legislative negotiation to a large extent because of an ideological hollowing out of the “center” of Republican party officials. Supposedly moderate Senate Republicans would not even entertain engagement over the broader Biden-Harris economic agenda, but their constituencies, too, would be worse off under Sen. Manchin’s proposal to cut the BBB agenda.
<ul>
<li>Maine would see 8,300 fewer jobs supported per year, or 1.3% of state employment.</li>
<li>Utah would see 16,600 fewer jobs per year.</li>
<li>Ohio would miss out on economic support for an additional 71,900 jobs annually.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>


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		<title>The stakes for workers in how policymakers manage the coming shift to all-electric vehicles</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/ev-policy-workers/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Sep 2021 12:45:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jim Barrett, Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=232751</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Rapid technological change, new market dynamics, and global action to mitigate climate change is driving a historic shift toward electric vehicles (EVs) in the automotive sector. Although hybrid electric vehicles have been part of the U.S. vehicle fleet for more than two decades, and some mass-market EVs have been available for over a decade, battery electric vehicles (BEVs), which are powered exclusively by a battery and an electric motor, currently make up a small part of U.S. auto sales. And the batteries and other drivetrain components in BEVs are largely made by non-U.S. suppliers. The coming shift toward BEVs is a transformational change to the industry that is by now inevitable.

Given that this shift is coming, the most important question for policymakers is how the shift will be managed. Smart policy can transform this industry upheaval into a new beginning for U.S. producers and the rebuilding of a foundation for good jobs. If instead policy remains on autopilot through the upcoming transformation, the shift will instead reduce U.S. employment and further batter job quality in the auto sector.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>Executive summary</h2>
<p>Rapid technological change, new market dynamics, and global action to mitigate climate change is driving a historic shift toward electric vehicles (EVs) in the automotive sector. Although hybrid electric vehicles have been part of the U.S. vehicle fleet for more than two decades, and some mass-market EVs have been available for over a decade, battery electric vehicles (BEVs), which are powered exclusively by a battery and an electric motor, currently make up a small part of U.S. auto sales. And the batteries and other drivetrain components in BEVs are largely made by non-U.S. suppliers. The coming shift toward BEVs is a transformational change to the industry that is by now inevitable.</p>
<p>Given that this shift is coming, the most important question for policymakers is how the shift will be managed. Smart policy can transform this industry upheaval into a new beginning for U.S. producers and the rebuilding of a foundation for good jobs. If instead policy remains on autopilot through the upcoming transformation, the shift will instead reduce U.S. employment and further batter job quality in the auto sector. The policy actions needed to boost job quality and employment in the auto sector in coming years are not radical. Instead, they are commonsense measures like ensuring that any taxpayer subsidies or rebates to incentivize auto purchases come attached with specific requirements on labor standards in the industry, and with measures to boost investment in domestic auto capacity of U.S. producers and suppliers. If policymakers pass such commonsense measures, the U.S. can regain leadership in auto production in coming decades, and the benefits of this leadership will accrue to workers in the industry.</p>
<p>This report lays out the stakes involved. We report on the likely employment and job-quality implications of a large-scale shift to BEVs under various scenarios that are shaped by policy. By policy, we refer to measures to strengthen U.S. leadership in BEV production, including providing manufacturing incentives to onshore investments, enhancing the share of BEV drivetrain components that are produced domestically, securing and strengthening advanced manufacturing capacity, and crafting better trade agreements with more reliable enforcement measures.</p>
<p>We find that if this shift to BEVs is done without any policy efforts to shore up U.S. leadership in BEV production or to enhance job quality and equitable access to good jobs, then this sector will see employment decline and job quality continue a downward march. But if the shift to BEVs is accompanied by strategic investments in manufacturing and job quality in the U.S. auto sector, then the number and quality of jobs can rise together with BEV production. More specifically, the key findings are:</p>
<ul>
<li>Employment in the U.S. auto sector could rise by over 150,000 jobs in 2030 if:
<ul style="list-style-type: circle;">
<li>Battery electric vehicles rise to 50% of domestic sales of autos in 2030 and</li>
<li>Due to smart policy measures, an increase in U.S. production of electric vehicle powertrain components brings U.S. manufacturers&#8217; share of the EV powertrain market up to their share of the market of internal combustion engine (ICE) powertrains for today’s gas-powered cars, and the U.S.-assembled share of the overall vehicle market increases by 10 percentage points (to 60%).</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>Interim production of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) alongside BEVs could significantly ameliorate sources of downward pressure on jobs as BEV penetration expands.</li>
<li>Due to manufacturing policy inaction, a rise in BEVs to 50% of domestic auto sales by 2030 could see losses of roughly 75,000 jobs by 2030. These losses would stem from policy failures that stunted investment in domestic capacity of U.S. producers to build the batteries and drivetrains of BEVs, and from a failure to regain market share in overall vehicle sales.
<ul>
<li>Should the U.S. fail to act on both EV deployment and manufacturing, fall further behind other nations as an EV market and location for EV production investment, and lose further market share, job losses could be even greater.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>For the auto sector to continue providing good jobs for U.S. workers, strong labor standards&#8212;including affirmative efforts to encourage unionization&#8212;will be needed. Wages in the auto sector continue to be higher than in the rest of the economy, but this relative pay premium is driven by the unionized segment of the sector, and the unionization rate in autos has declined in recent decades. To ensure that U.S.-based producers maintain the technological leadership that will see auto assembly and parts production remain in the U.S., policy measures to encourage investment in all segments of the auto sector (including BEVs and PHEVs) will also be needed.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Black workers, and workers with less than a bachelor’s degree, are likely to have the most to gain from policy action to boost U.S. market share in electric vehicle production—and the most to lose from inaction. That is because Black workers and workers without a four-year college degree make up a disproportionate share of auto parts and assembly employment. Concretely, Black workers account for 12.5% of workers economywide, but 16.6% of workers in the auto sector, while workers without a four-year degree account for 62.2% of workers economywide but 74.6% in the auto sector.</li>
</ul>
<p>The jobs embedded in the U.S. automobile supply chain once provided a key foundation for middle-class growth and prosperity. A cascade of poor policy decisions has eroded employment and job quality in this sector and this has helped to degrade labor standards across U.S. manufacturing and throughout the overall economy (Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Brooks, and Mulloy 2015). The industry transformation coming due to the widespread adoption of BEVs provides an opportunity to reverse these trends. The transformations necessary to ensure that this shift to BEVs supports U.S. employment and job quality—investment in advanced technology production and strengthening supply chains—will redound widely throughout manufacturing and aid growth in other sectors as well. The shift to BEVs is a key part of mitigating the dire consequences of global climate change, and the more this shift is supported by complementary policies and has clear benefits for workers’ job quality and economic security, the more useful it will be as a model for transforming other key economic sectors in ways necessary to combat climate change and ensure prosperous, fair, and equitable outcomes for working people.</p>
<h2>Potential employment impacts of a shift to EVs: Policy will matter greatly</h2>
<p>This report summarizes the results of an analysis aimed at estimating the potential impacts of increased adoption of electric vehicle (EV) technology on employment in U.S. auto and component manufacturing sectors. Our analysis focuses on how three factors in the transition impact employment in the manufacturing sector: (1) the portion of the fleet that is made up of traditional gas-powered vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs) only, battery electric vehicles (BEVs) powered solely by a battery and an electric motor, and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs), which are powered by a battery and an electric motor but also include a backup ICE; (2) the domestic content of the EV powertrains that are installed in both PHEVs and BEVs relative to the domestic content of ICEs; and (3) the share of the domestic car market produced by auto manufacturers in the U.S.</p>
<p>In contrast with other studies (Hibbard and Darling 2021; Goldman School 2021) that look at the economywide impacts of increased BEV deployment, this study focuses more narrowly on the impacts on employment in the auto assembly and auto parts sectors. Given the importance of these sectors to the broader economy and the health of hundreds of U.S. communities, this “narrow” focus—which we label the “auto sector” in tables and figures—does not imply outcomes are of limited importance.</p>
<p>We find substantial potential challenges and opportunities related to increased EV deployment for workers in the auto manufacturing and related sectors. Critically, if the coming shift toward BEVs progresses with current rates of imported EV powertrain parts and domestic auto market share, significant numbers of well-paying manufacturing jobs in the auto sector will be at risk. Very roughly, the current share of BEV powertrain components produced in the U.S. is just under 45%, while for ICE powertrains it is closer to 75% (authors’ analysis from IMPLAN). Conversely, if the U.S. develops stronger domestic industries in key EV supply areas such as battery production, and adds to domestic manufacturers’ market share, there is the potential for significant growth in auto-sector employment and improvements in job quality.</p>
<p>Our analysis models the impacts of increased penetration of both BEVs and PHEVs on auto-sector employment. Modeling the employment implications of manufacturing BEVs and PHEVs at scale is difficult because neither technology has achieved a significant level of penetration in either the car or the light-duty truck and sport utility vehicle (LDT/SUV) market segment.</p>
<p>To overcome this challenge, we adapted a model of the existing auto industry to create models of domestic BEV and PHEV manufacturing at scale. To model BEVs, we removed purchases of ICE drivetrain components from the supply chain of the existing input-output model and replaced them with EV drivetrain parts. Based on public comments from auto industry leaders regarding the fewer hours needed to assemble EV drivetrains, we further modified the existing auto-sector model by reducing labor requirements in auto assembly by 30% per vehicle (Hackett 2017; Vellequette 2019). To model PHEVs, we started with the existing ICE manufacturing model and added EV powertrain purchases equivalent to 25% of the BEV labor requirement for the class of vehicle (car or LDT/SUV) to reflect PHEV powertrain labor requirements. Additionally, we increased the direct labor associated with PHEV assembly by 20% above their ICE equivalents to reflect the increased assembly costs associated with the more complex powertrain (Harbour Consulting 2007).</p>
<p>We conducted our analysis using the IMPLAN input-output model (IMPLAN 2019). Like other input-output models, IMPLAN contains detailed interindustry relationships that indicate how much of various inputs are required to create a certain amount of a given output. In this case, for example, the IMPLAN model shows how an increase in auto-sector output increases demand for intermediate goods and services such as glass, steel, rubber, advertising, etc. IMPLAN also maintains data that indicate how much labor is required to produce a given amount of auto-sector output (direct jobs) as well as the labor associated with the supply chain (indirect jobs) and the economywide employment that is created when auto-sector and supply-chain employees spend their income (induced jobs).</p>
<p>Like other input-output models, IMPLAN abstracts from dynamic impacts, such as how changes in the price of cars and trucks might change total demand for cars or the price of inputs. To hold these influences largely constant and to abstract from other exogenous factors such as changes in overall economic growth, potential changes in raw material costs, and future gasoline prices, we compared employment in the auto industry of 2019 with employment under various EV market penetration scenarios, assuming identical overall domestic market size and cost structure. That is, rather than providing a comparison of <em>today’s</em> auto sector against <em>potential future</em> scenarios, our analysis essentially compares employment in today’s auto sector against estimates of what employment would be if EVs represented various shares of today’s auto market. As such, our analysis isolates the impact of the different manufacturing requirements of EVs from exogenous factors such as those identified above.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a> Additionally, we analyze a total domestic auto market based on the average combined light-duty fleet sales between 2015 and 2019.</p>
<h2>Modeling different scenarios for the rise of EVs</h2>
<p>Our analysis examines various scenarios of BEV and PHEV penetration in the new light-duty vehicle fleet (cars, SUVs, and light-duty trucks). Because we anticipate a long-term trend toward BEVs, we consider PHEVs in a limited context only, with a maximum market share of 25% in one of our scenarios to represent a near-term option in the shift away from ICEs.</p>
<p>In addition to various penetration scenarios, we also examine the impact of changes in the domestic content of EV powertrain parts and changes in the share of domestic auto demand met by domestic automakers.</p>
<p>Our first alternative scenario assesses the impacts if U.S. production of EV powertrain components (largely batteries and battery packs) could achieve the same domestic content that ICE powertrain components currently have. Today, the U.S. has much more limited domestic capacity to produce EV powertrain components than it does in engines and transmissions, which are largely domestically produced. Hence, modeling the effect of large-scale introduction of electric vehicles leads to fewer domestic jobs supported by these vehicles, because more of the powertrain parts are supplied by foreign producers. If smarter policy leads to an increase in U.S. capacity to produce EV powertrain components, then the negative employment impact of a large-scale introduction of BEVs is greatly mitigated.</p>
<p>Our next set of alternative scenarios simply examines the employment implications of a 10-percentage-point increase or decrease in overall domestic market share of automobiles. Obviously, an increase in domestic market share leads to more domestic employment and a reduction in this market share leads to lower domestic employment. It is worth noting that a 10-percentage-point increase in U.S. market share for these types of vehicle sales should not be seen as an unrealistic goal. Over the past decade, the share of U.S. vehicle sales produced in the U.S. has varied between 44% and 56%.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> We model a 10-percentage-point gain from 50% in the base model—to a 60% market share.</p>
<p>These alternative scenarios regarding the extent of domestic EV powertrain production and the overall domestic market share are highly conditional on the acts of policymakers in supporting—or failing to support—the growth of the future U.S. auto sector.</p>
<p>As mentioned above, this analysis is narrowly focused on the impacts of increased EV technology deployment on employment in car and LDT/SUV auto and parts manufacturing. We do not consider the impact of electric vehicle technologies on heavy-duty vehicle manufacturing, the impact of BEV adoption on auto maintenance and repair industries, the potential impact on retail sales of consumer goods at fueling stations, or the impact on the broader economy due to changes in oil and electricity consumption associated with BEV penetration. We make no effort to predict the overall size of the domestic auto market, or the impact of specific subsidies for BEV purchasing or manufacturing. Finally, we did not model any of the infrastructure requirements likely necessary with an increasing BEV fleet, such as public charging stations and upgrades to electricity transmission and distribution systems. Our analysis does not assess the costs or benefits of any particular policy approach to achieve the various outcomes we analyze, opting instead to look only at the economic implications of the outcomes themselves.</p>
<h2>Results: Employment impacts under different scenarios</h2>
<p>The results of our analysis are represented in the charts below. We break our results into two categories, Assembly and Parts. Assembly represents employment at auto-manufacturing plants themselves, while Parts represents employment in the auto-sector supply chain. For this analysis, we include in the Parts category only those supply chain elements that become a physical part of the autos themselves, including things like tires, glass, and electronics, but excluding things like expenditures on real estate, advertising, and machinery.</p>
<h3>The employment impact of growth in electric vehicle market share under different scenarios</h3>
<p><strong>Figure A</strong> shows the potential job changes for a range of scenarios regarding the growth of market share of electric vehicles—namely battery electric vehicles—by 2030. The first scenario assumes all-electric vehicles (BEVs) account for 30% of the auto market by 2030, with traditional gas-powered (internal combustion engine powered) vehicles retaining 70% of the market. The second scenario assumes a 50/50 split between BEVs and ICEs. The third scenario assumes that ICEs retain 50% of the market but the remaining 50% is split between BEVs and hybrids (PHEVs). The fourth scenario assumes that ICEs retain 50% of the market, BEVs account for 40%, and PHEVs account for the remaining 10%.</p>
<p>These scenarios assume no change in the share of electric vehicle powertrain components that are manufactured in the U.S. and no change in the U.S. share of the global auto market. Specifically, under our model, the domestic content of EV powertrain components are set to the IMPLAN default values for those commodities and also assume a 50% domestic manufacturer market share for both cars and light trucks/SUVs. In short, these estimates represent job changes under differing penetrations of EVs in a business-as-usual scenario where nothing is done to increase domestic production of EV powertrains or to improve domestic producers’ overall share in the auto market.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-232857 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="232857" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/232857-28282-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>In the first scenario, with 30% BEV penetration and 70% ICE market share, about 20,000 assembly jobs are lost and almost 25,000 parts jobs are lost. Assembly jobs are lost because BEV assembly is less complex and requires fewer person-hours than ICE assembly. The lost parts jobs are mostly due to the fact that the U.S. currently lags Europe and Asia in domestic battery and battery cell and materials production capacity, resulting in lost domestic employment in powertrains.</p>
<p>In the second scenario, with 50% BEV and 50% ICE market shares, the losses proportionately scale up relative to the first scenario. In the third scenario, with BEVs accounting for 25% of the market, PHEVs accounting for 25% of the market, and ICE retaining 50% of market share, the job losses for both assembly and parts are substantially reduced. PHEVs actually require more assembly jobs and slightly more parts than even ICE vehicles, hence the very substantial reduction in assembly jobs lost relative to the second scenario. PHEVs also require an ICE-type powertrain, so more of the powertrain is supplied by domestic producers and hence the job losses in parts is also blunted relative to other scenarios.</p>
<p>In the fourth scenario, with lower PHEV penetration than the third scenario (10% instead of 25%), the job losses from 40% penetration of BEVs is again blunted, but less so—over 50,000 jobs are lost, with nearly 30,000 of these in parts.</p>
<p><strong>Figure B </strong>highlights how important one aspect of policy will be in shaping the job implications of a large-scale shift to electric vehicles. It shows the same scenarios as Figure A regarding market penetration by auto type, but changes the assumption regarding domestic content of EV powertrains. If policy supports increasing domestic production of EV powertrain components to levels comparable with domestic content of ICE powertrains, then a huge share of job losses embedded in the scenarios of Figure A can be avoided. All of these job-loss reductions are accomplished by reducing job losses in auto parts. In the first scenario, job losses that reached nearly 25,000 under the business-as-usual assumptions of Figure A would be reduced to roughly 1,500 if domestic content in EV powertrains could match current domestic content in ICE powertrains. Under the third scenario (the one that includes a 50% market share for ICEs but with BEVs and PHEVs each satisfying 25% of the market), there would be no job losses at all in parts production: Again, the parts requirements of PHEVs are actually slightly greater than even for ICEs, so&nbsp;the boost to parts employment stemming from greater parts use of PHEVs would very slightly outstrip the small parts losses due to the shift to BEVs.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-232868 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="232868" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/232868-28396-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure C</strong> shows that improving domestic capacity in powertrain components for BEVs and boosting the market share of U.S.-based producers will lead to job gains in the auto sector regardless of the extent of BEV penetration in 2030. In short, what will determine how much employment in the U.S. auto sector will grow is not the growth of BEVS&#8212;which is inevitable at this point. Instead, it is the policy response.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-234693 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="234693" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/234693-28490-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure D</strong> shows the importance of policies by presenting a range of outcomes depending on market share and policy assumptions. Each scenario in Figure D assumes a 50% penetration of ICEs. The base scenario assumes that the other 50% of the market is satisfied by BEVs and no policy changes affect the status quo in terms of market share of all vehicles and powertrain components. Under this scenario, which is the same as the second scenario in Figure A, there is a loss of nearly 75,000 jobs. From here, the influence of changing other assumptions is examined. The “hybrid” scenario starts from the base of 50% ICEs but then assumes that 25% of the market is satisfied by PHEVs (as is one of the scenarios examined in Figure A), with the remaining 25% satisfied by BEVs.</p>
<p>The “equivalent domestic content” scenario starts from the base but then assumes that the domestic market share of EV powertrains reaches the current domestic market share of ICE powertrains (as is one of the scenarios examined in Figure B). The “+10 ppt. market share” scenario starts from the base but then assumes that domestic auto producers boost their share of overall vehicle sales by 10 percentage points. The “–10 ppt.&nbsp;market share” scenario starts from the base and assumes a 10-percentage-point decline in domestic auto producers’ share of overall vehicle sales.</p>
<p>The final scenario starts from the base scenario and then assumes <em>both</em> that the domestic market share of EV powertrains matches current ICE powertrain production <em>and</em> that domestic auto producers boost their share of overall vehicle sales by 10 percentage points.</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-233029 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="233029" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/233029-28491-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The results show how dramatically the future market share claimed by the U.S. auto sector—both in parts production and in overall sales—will shape the job-market implications of a shift toward BEVs in the future. For example, a 10-percentage-point across-the-board <em>increase</em> or <em>decline</em> in domestic auto producers’ share of vehicle sales is the difference between over 100,000 jobs gained or more than 250,000 jobs lost as BEVs are introduced. If a 10-percentage-point increase in overall vehicle sales market share could be matched with domestic competitive parity in producing EV and ICE powertrains, then the introduction of BEVs could lead to job gains exceeding 150,000.</p>
<p>Figure D highlights how powerful it would be for creating good jobs to regain U.S. leadership in auto production&#8212;both in powertrain components for BEVs and in regaining previous levels of overall market share.</p>
<h3>Reviewing the distribution of job gains or losses to understand their implications</h3>
<p><strong>Table 1</strong> suggests how the job change estimates from the various scenarios above would affect workers by showing the current demographic makeup of the workforce in the automobile production sector (the workforces of auto assembly and parts), the share that are unionized (i.e., covered by a collective bargaining agreement), and, for those with less than a four-year college degree, their wages. The composition of workers affected by the job changes could of course be affected by policy. For example, at current rates of unionization the jobs created under the smarter policy scenarios implied by Figure D (policies that boost market share overall as well as market share of EV drivetrain production) would be less than 15% unionized. But policy can boost this share significantly if fundamental labor law reforms are enacted and if public funds used to guide the EV transition are contingent upon strong labor standards.</p>
<p>For now, however, as Table 1 shows, the incumbent automobile production workforce skews quite heavily male. Black workers make up a disproportionate share of autoworkers, and autoworkers are less likely to have a four-year college degree than workers overall. Specifically, the overall workforce is 51.8% male and 12.5% Black, and 24.1% have a four-year college degree as their highest level of educational attainment. In the automobile production sector, 74.2% of workers are male, 16.6% are Black, and 17.2% have a four-year college degree but not an advanced degree.</p>
<p>Automobile workers are also heavily concentrated regionally. The seven states of the Upper Midwest<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> account for 54.8% of automobile jobs, the 11 states of the South<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> account for 30.1% of auto jobs, California accounts for 4.5% of auto jobs, and the remaining 32 states (which includes the District of Columbia) account for just 10.6% of these jobs.</p>
<p>Table 1 also highlights the auto sector’s high unionization rate and higher wages—at the 10th, median, and 90th percentiles—relative to other sectors of the economy and the workforce overall. In the automobile sector, the share of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement is 17.0%, compared with 11.8% in the overall workforce, 9.3% in all of manufacturing, and 7.1% in the private sector (not shown in table).<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> These facts are surely related: The higher wages paid by the automobile sector are particularly striking given the lower share of the auto workforce with a four-year college degree.</p>


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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-232753 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="232753" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/232753-28387-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Table 2</strong> compares the unionized and nonunionized automobile sectors along many of the same dimensions. The share of women is lower in the unionized sector, 23.6% compared with 26.2% in the nonunionized sector. Strikingly, the share of Black workers is significantly lower in the nonunionized sector, despite the fact that a much larger share of nonunion auto production occurs in the South, a region with a much higher share of Black workers economywide. <strong>Table 3</strong> shows the share of workers by race and ethnicity in each of the four “regions” constructed for this analysis.</p>
<p>It is worth highlighting as well that the job quality of the nonunionized auto sector might be even worse than Table 2 suggests, as there has been a shift in that sector toward hiring from temporary staffing agencies: By 2014, unpublished estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau indicated that roughly 14% of all workers engaged in automobile production were actually hired from temporary staffing agencies (Ruckelshaus and Leberstein 2014). The temp workers would be classified as in the automobile sector in the Current Population Survey (CPS) data used to construct Table 2, but other research has documented that pay for these temp workers is significantly lower than pay for permanent automobile sector workers (even nonunionized workers).</p>
<p>As the tables show, Black workers’ share of the unionized automobile production workforce (25.5%) is substantially higher than Black workers&#8217; share of the overall workforce in the Upper Midwest (10.5%), while the share of nonunionized automobile production workers who are Black (14.8%) is substantially lower than Black workers&#8217; share of the overall workforce in the South (18.9%). This strongly suggests that, given the racial composition of the regional economy, the unionized segment of the auto-production sector has done a much better job of making job opportunities available to Black workers.</p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-232764 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="232764" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/232764-28388-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-233827 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="233827" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/233827-28342-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>As shown in Table 2, wages at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles are significantly higher for workers without a four-year college degree in the unionized automobile sector. The same holds true for the shares of workers covered by employer-provided health insurance and pension plans. In short, the association between higher job quality and unionization is, not surprisingly, strong. <strong>Figure E</strong> highlights this in more detail, with the dark blue line showing how much higher median wages are in the automobile sector than median wages economywide, and the light blue line showing the ratio of unionization rates in the automobile sector to unionization rates economywide. The association between these lines is clear: As the auto sector’s high union coverage relative to coverage overall erodes rapidly in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, the relative pay advantage of working in the automobile sector declines as well. In the late 1980s, auto workers were nearly three times as likely to be unionized as workers overall and earned roughly 60% higher wages at the median; in 2020, they were only slightly more likely to be unionized and had median wages just 7% higher.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-232772 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="232772" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/232772-28393-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The decline of unionization in the automobile sector was driven by policy failures both within the auto supply chain and throughout the economy. Within the sector, policy failures to help U.S. producers invest and maintain their competitive position in the face of oil price shocks in the 1970s led to lost market share for the unionized automakers once known as the Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Fiat Chrysler). Poorly structured trade agreements and lack of trade enforcement put further downward pressure on industry employment and job quality. In the broader economy, contractionary macroeconomics policy, failure to keep the U.S. dollar at a competitive level, and an assault on labor standards all spilled over to do great damage to workers in the U.S. auto supply chain (Scott and Glass 2016). These processes should not be allowed to repeat in coming decades as an even larger (albeit potentially better-planned) transformation in the auto sector looms with the introduction of EVs.</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>U.S. automotive workers have had their economic opportunities and job quality battered for decades by harmful policy decisions. The massive coming shifts in automotive sales toward EVs present new challenges and opportunities for these workers. If policymakers ignore the opportunity to build the sector back stronger, large job losses and further degradation of job quality is the most likely outcome. If instead policymakers help meet this coming transformation with strong investment targeted at boosting the U.S. position in the electric vehicle market and in advanced vehicle technology manufacturing, and if these investments are accompanied by measures aimed at strengthening bargaining power for workers, then employment will expand in the U.S. auto sector and the number of unionized jobs will grow. With a smart policy push, the long downward slide in job quality will reverse at the same time that the U.S. leads in building the vehicles of the future and combating climate change.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>This report was produced in collaboration with the BlueGreen Alliance, AFL-CIO Industrial Union Council, United Auto Workers, United Steelworkers, and The Greenlining Institute. Luke Tonachel of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Erin Falquier of Chicane Labs provided expert advice and consultation. Daniel Perez provided research assistance and data analysis. Lora Engdahl and Krista Faries were invaluable editors.</p>
<h2>Endnotes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> This is an important, and we think valuable, aspect of this study. The automobile production sector has seen rapid productivity growth in recent decades and likely will continue to see this going forward—it has benefited from automation as much as any other industrial sector. This rapid automation and productivity growth by itself puts substantial downward pressure on employment levels in the sector. Even if nothing changed with regard to the composition of the auto fleet in coming decades, projections of employment in the sector would likely show nontrivial declines, largely driven by the intersection of rapid productivity growth and slowing consumer demand. Such projections highlight real challenges for autoworkers, but they are not challenges introduced by EVs, and disentangling these substantial effects from those stemming strictly from EVs is a useful exercise.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Analysis provided in correspondence by Kristin Dziczek of the Center for Automotive Research (CAR).</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Upper Midwest states are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> Southern states are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> EPI analysis of BLS Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) 2016–2020 pooled data (EPI 2021).</p>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Cutcher-Gershenfeld, Joel, Dan Brooks, and Martin Mulloy. 2015. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-decline-and-resurgence-of-the-u-s-auto-industry/"><em>The Decline and Resurgence of the U.S. Auto Industry</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute. May 2015.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute (EPI). 2021. Current Population Survey Extracts, Version 1.0.18,&nbsp;<a href="https://microdata.epi.org/">https://microdata.epi.org</a>.</p>
<p>Goldman School of Public Policy. 2021. <a href="https://www.2035report.com/transportation/"><em>2035 The Report: Transportation</em></a><em>.</em> April 2021.</p>
<p>Hackett, Jim. 2017. <a href="http://s22.q4cdn.com/857684434/files/doc_presentations/2017/CEO-Strategic-Update-12.pdf"><em>CEO Strategic Update</em></a><em>. </em>Ford Motor Company, October 2017.</p>
<p>Harbour Consulting. 2007. <a href="https://www.autonews.com/assets/PDF/CA2018861.PDF"><em>The Harbour Report</em></a><em>.</em> 2007 North America Press Release.</p>
<p>Hibbard, Paul, and Pavel Darling. 2021. <a href="https://info.aee.net/economic-impact-of-stimulus-investment-in-transportation-electrification"><em>Economic Impact of Stimulus Investment in Transportation Electrification</em></a><em>. </em>Advanced Energy Economy, June 2021.</p>
<p>IMPLAN Group, LLC. 2019. <em>IMPLAN US Total, Model Year 2019</em>.</p>
<p>Ruckelshaus, Catherine, and Sarah Leberstein. 2014. <em><a href="https://s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Manufacturing-Low-Pay-Declining-Wages-Jobs-Built-Middle-Class.pdf">Manufacturing Low Pay: Declining Wages in the Jobs That Built America’s Middle Class</a></em>. National Employment and Law Project (NELP), November 2014.</p>
<p>Scott, Robert E., and Elizabeth Glass. 2016. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/trans-pacific-partnership-currency-manipulation-trade-and-jobs/"><em>Trans-Pacific Partnership, Currency Manipulation, Trade, and Jobs: U.S. Trade Deficit with TPP Countries Cost 2 Million Jobs in 2015, with Job Losses in Every State</em></a>. Economic Policy Institute, March 2016.</p>
<p>Vellequette, Larry. 2019. “<a href="https://www.autonews.com/automakers-suppliers/vw-accelerates-electric-push-more-models-more-production">VW Accelerates Electric Push with More Models, More Production.” </a><em>Automotive News</em>, March 12, 2019.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Aluminum producing and consuming industries have thrived under U.S. Section 232 import measures</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/aluminum-producing-and-consuming-industries-have-thrived-under-u-s-section-232-import-measures/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 May 2021 18:30:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Adam S. Hersh, Robert E. Scott]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=227032</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Executive Four years ago, the U.S. primary aluminum industry was hanging on by a thread. Between 2010 and 2017, 18 of 23 domestic aluminum smelters shut down production, eliminating roughly 13,000 good jobs (Scott 2017).]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[</p>
<div class="resize-90 ">
<div class="box clearfix  box" style="">
<p><strong>What this report finds:</strong> This report demonstrates that import measures imposed in 2018 under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 enabled U.S. aluminum output, employment, and capital investment to rebound, while creating no adverse effects for aluminum-consuming industries such as motor vehicle parts, construction goods, and canned beverages. Despite dire predictions of import measure critics, aluminum-consuming industries and the broader U.S. economy thrived under these measures.</p>
<p><strong>Why it matters:</strong> By 2017, the U.S. aluminum industry was hanging by a thread in the face of massive global overcapacity in aluminum production—driven by subsidies and other anti-competitive policies in China and other nations—that flooded U.S. and global markets with exports. In 2018, the United States imposed a 10% tariff and other trade remedies on aluminum imports under Section 232, finding that depressed global prices under conditions of chronic overcapacity posed material harm to U.S. aluminum production, and risked the U.S. industry’s ability to maintain operations, grow, and invest in areas essential to national security and broader economic welfare.</p>
<p><strong>What can be done about it:</strong> The Biden&#8211;Harris administration should continue and limit exclusions to Section 232 import measures on an interim basis until it can achieve a permanent, multilateral solution to the chronic problem of excess global aluminum production capacity.</p>
</div>
</div>
<p>

<h2>Executive summary</h2>
<p>Four years ago, the U.S. primary aluminum industry was hanging on by a thread. Between 2010 and 2017, 18 of 23 domestic aluminum smelters shut down production, eliminating roughly 13,000 good jobs (Scott 2017). By 2016, the U.S. industry was down to three alumina refineries; by 2017, only one remained in operation. In 2017 the Commerce Department launched an investigation under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to determine whether aluminum (and steel) imports could pose a national security threat, leading to import restrictions on aluminum products in March 2018 from countries other than Canada and Mexico—initially a 10% tariff, and later import quotas for a selection of countries (Commerce 2018).<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<p>This report demonstrates that U.S. aluminum producers rebounded following implementation of the Section 232 import measures, with negligible impact on consumers of downstream aluminum products. Domestic producers of both primary aluminum and downstream aluminum products have made commitments to create thousands of jobs, invest billions of dollars in aluminum production, and substantially increase domestic production.</p>
<p>Key conclusions of this report include:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Aluminum is essential for national defense and critical to the orderly operation of the broader economy.</strong> Dwindling U.S. production capacity poses a high risk for costly supply disruptions. Currently there is only one operating U.S. smelter capable of producing high-purity aluminum required for military and aerospace applications—and it is the only one in a NATO country.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Projects, investments, jobs, and capacity are on the rise since the initiation of the Section 232 aluminum tariffs.</strong> At least 55 new and expansion projects are in downstream aluminum industries producing extruded (rod and bar, pipe and tube, and extruded shapes) and rolled (sheet and plate) products. These new and expanded facilities will employ nearly 4,500 additional workers, generate $6 billion in new investments, and add nearly 1 million metric tons of annual rolling and extrusion capacity to the downstream domestic aluminum industry.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>U.S. production of primary aluminum has increased.</strong> In the two years from the March 2018 implementation of the Section 232 aluminum import measures to the February 2020 pre-COVID-19 economic peak, U.S. production of primary aluminum increased by 37.6% compared with the preceding two-year period. This increase was a result of restarts or production increases at five of the six remaining smelters. Domestic aluminum production reached 1.14 million metric tons at an annualized rate before the COVID-19 economic shock took hold, up from 741,000 metric tons in 2017.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>U.S. and Canadian shipments of semi-finished products, industries that are closely intertwined with primary aluminum production, also rebounded.</strong> Shipments of all extruded products increased 2.7% (281.2 million pounds), and total sheet and plate shipments increased 7% (1.2 billion pounds) relative to the preceding two-year period.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>Section 232 measures led to an uptick in employment.</strong> Since implementing the Section 232 import measures, U.S. employment in primary and downstream aluminum industries increased by 1,200 on net by February 2020, at the start of the COVID-19 crisis. Employment in the industry was buttressed by 5,570 jobs created by restarted and newly expanded primary aluminum production and secondary rolling and extrusion mills.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>There is no evidence of a meaningful adverse effect of Section 232 on industries or consumers.</strong> Econometric analysis of the causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and prices of aluminum-consuming end-use goods&#8212;including canned beer and other beverages, construction goods, furniture, and motor vehicle bodies&#8212;shows the effects are statistically zero to economically trivial. The lack of a meaningful causal relationship indicates Section 232 import measures had no adverse effect on downstream industries or consumers.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>There also is no evidence of a causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and domestic industrial output of semi-finished aluminum products. </strong>Price changes in raw aluminum exhibit no causal effect on production of aluminum extrusions or sheeting.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><strong>A booming domestic market offset falling exports for tariff-impacted U.S. whiskey.</strong> The U.S. aluminum import policy elicited retaliatory tariffs by the European Union (EU) against U.S. whiskey and bourbon exports. While U.S. whiskey exports to the EU fell, exports to the rest of the world fell more. Waning U.S. whiskey exports to countries not imposing new tariffs indicates that producers diverted production to capitalize on the booming domestic market for “super premium” spirits, which grew 11% in 2019, or faster than any year since 2015.</li>
</ul>
<p>When the tariffs on aluminum (and steel) imports were imposed, critics claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, hundreds of thousands of jobs would be eliminated in the rest of the economy. These critics referenced a 2018 study by the Trade Partnership, which wildly exaggerated the impacts of the tariffs (Francois and Baughman 2018; Scott 2018a). This report demonstrates that the negative effects claimed in the Trade Partnership study and feared by other critics have yet to be found in the U.S. economy.</p>
<p>In total, the U.S. manufacturing sector added 210,000 new jobs between February 2018, the month before the tariffs took effect, and February 2020, the month before the onset of the COVID-19 economic shock.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> Outside of manufacturing, the economy added more than 4 million new jobs in this same period. Looking more specifically at the industries aluminum producers supply, there remains no evidence that the imposition of tariffs on aluminum have had the kinds of negative employment impacts—in downstream manufacturing or other parts of the economy—that were predicted by critics of those tariffs.</p>
<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>In spring 2017, the U.S. aluminum industry was in a precarious position, prompting the U.S. Department of Commerce and the president to initiate a Section 232 National Security Investigation, authorized by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, into threats posed by aluminum (and steel) imports. The root cause of this threat was, and continues to be, the growth of excess capacity and overproduction in China and other countries where government supports distort global markets and put the survival of U.S. aluminum production at stake.</p>
<p>The risks of a diminished aluminum industry extend far beyond the harm done to U.S. businesses and their workers. Aluminum is an essential input for military uses ranging from armor plating for vehicles and naval vessels, to aircraft and other aerospace applications. Currently, there is only one operating U.S. smelter capable of producing the high-purity aluminum required for defense applications (the other comparable smelters are located in China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates). Dwindling U.S. aluminum capacity also poses a risk to broader economic security, should defense needs crowd out nondefense uses and disrupt production chains in other sectors essential to economic activity and governance, such as power transmission and transportation systems, manufacturing machinery, and construction.</p>
<p>The global excess capacity crisis began when China directed massive subsidies toward a significant expansion of its aluminum industry. Due to the economics of highly capital-intensive industries that require large economies of scale in production (Hersh and Scott 2021), China’s moves forced other nations to follow suit, taking actions to support their own aluminum production in order to counter the adverse effects of China’s expansion. Chinese primary aluminum production capacity increased more than 1,400% from 2000 to 2017 and is responsible for 83% of the total increase in global aluminum production capacity in this time (CRU 2021).</p>
<p>China’s growth in aluminum production has been fueled both by massive subsidization delivered through concessional financing, tax and environmental regulatory forbearance, and access to key inputs like bauxite ore and electricity at below-market prices (WTO 2017a, 2017b). Additionally, Chinese trade measures restricting the export of primary aluminum and subsidizing semi-finished processed aluminum products with WTO-prohibited export tax rebates are succeeding in capturing a growing global market share of both the primary and secondary aluminum market, as well as advantaging other aluminum-consuming goods produced in China (OECD 2019).</p>
<p>Though the largest offender, China is not alone in delivering subsidies that distort the global aluminum market. As the Chinese capacity mushroomed, primary aluminum producers in other regions, such as India and the Persian Gulf states, also expanded capacity with similar types of government supports. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “[g]overnment interventions appear widespread all along the aluminum value chain,” including subsidization valued at between $20 billion and $70 billion during 2013–2017 (OECD 2019). In addition to China, the OECD identified India, Russia, and Middle East producers Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as providing significant subsidies to support their primary aluminum industries (<strong>Figure A</strong>). Unsurprisingly, capacity and production expansions have occurred primarily in the subsidizing countries. India&#8217;s aluminum production nearly doubled from 2013 to 2017, while its production capacity increased by almost 20%. Over the same period, China&#8217;s capacity expanded by 51% and its production increased by 46%; in absolute terms, China’s aluminum capacity and production, as the world’s largest industry, was still 11 times the size of India&#8217;s. Amid such heavily subsidized growth, the U.S. aluminum industry bled capacity and production, contracting by 40% and 62%, respectively, from 2013 to 2017.</p>


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<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-227289 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227289" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227289-27582-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>The continued expansion and maintenance of excess capacity both inside and outside of China suppressed global aluminum prices, transmitting injury directly to domestic aluminum producers in the United States. Aluminum is a global commodity, and prices are primarily driven by total global supply and demand and set on the London Metal Exchange (LME), regardless of where the aluminum is produced, sold, or stored. Thus, even if the United States does not experience direct changes in aluminum imports, the U.S. aluminum market effectively imports the adverse price and volume effects of subsidized production and surplus global capacity through changes in LME aluminum prices.</p>
<p>Collapsing prices have decimated U.S. primary aluminum production, capacity, and employment. The LME market price of aluminum fell 39% between 2007 and 2016. In an industry with high fixed costs, most domestic producers were unable to weather this long-term sustained price collapse. Between 2000 and 2017, 18 of 23 domestic smelters shut down, and more than 13,000 good domestic production jobs disappeared (Scott 2017).</p>
<p>On March 8, 2018, President Trump used Section 232 authority to impose a 10% tariff. The positive effects were notable. Following imposition of Section 232 import measures and prior to the global economic shock from the COVID-19 pandemic, domestic production in both the primary aluminum (including both alumina refining and secondary smelting and alloying of aluminum) and downstream aluminum rolling and extruding industries were up. Section 232 measures helped these producers hire workers and expand operations&#8212;adding capacity, making large investments, and increasing production, as is shown in this report. Then came the COVID-19 economic shock, which hit the aluminum industry as well. As the world recovers from the pandemic and looks to build back stronger and more resilient—and with growing attention to the need to build and support secure, reliable domestic supply chains—Section 232 measures remain a critical tool to counter surging overcapacity in countries with the worst-polluting producers of this critical commodity.</p>
<p>The resurgence of the U.S. aluminum industry—with minimal apparent knock-on effects in other parts of the economy—belies claims by critics, pundits, and representatives of many firms in downstream industries, who argued that the Section 232 tariffs would have a devastating negative impact on a wide range of domestic industries (Francois and Baughman 2018). For example, according to <em>Bloomberg</em>, Ford Motor Co. “began the year by warning that rising costs for raw materials like steel and aluminum, coupled with unfavorable exchange rates, would add $1.6 billion to its costs this year” (Naughton 2018). Of course, increases in the real value of the dollar, which gained nearly 8% from before the Section 232 measures until the start of the pandemic, raise the cost of everything that domestic automobile manufacturers import from the rest of the world (including finished vehicles and parts), and changes in the cost of metals are a tiny fraction of their overall costs (Scott 2018a). In fact, econometric evidence presented in this report shows that changes in primary aluminum prices have statistically insignificant or economically negligible causal impacts on downstream aluminum-using goods such as canned beverages, construction materials, motor vehicle parts, kitchen utensils, and furniture. Complementary data compiled here demonstrate that Section 232 aluminum measures have had no significant, industry-specific or economywide negative impacts on employment or output in U.S. manufacturing or other domestic industries.</p>
<p>Despite benefiting U.S. aluminum producers and having no discernible impact on aluminum consumers, country exemptions and excessive product-specific exclusions to Section 232 import measures increasingly undermine the efficacy of the policy—particularly for downstream products—significantly curtailing the quantity of aluminum goods covered by the measures and the benefits of these measures for the U.S. industry. That the quantity of aluminum products excluded from import measures far outstrips actual U.S. imports of aluminum products indicates how broken the exclusion process has become (<strong>Figure B</strong>). For example, the Trump administration granted exclusions for 12,873 MMT of aluminum sheet product imports when, in 2017, U.S. consumers imported a mere 1,102 MMT. The exclusions exempted 1,663 MMT of sheet imports from the European Union, even though U.S. consumers imported only 143 MMT of aluminum sheet goods from the European Union in 2017 (USITC 2021). Continually whittling away at the program with such excessive product exclusion requests destroys downstream demand for U.S. primary aluminum and undermines the effectiveness of the policy. Maintaining the Section 232 aluminum import measures remains critical to stabilizing and expanding U.S. aluminum production.</p>


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<a name="Figure-B"></a><div class="figure chart-227305 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227305" data-anchor="Figure-B"><div class="figLabel">Figure B</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227305-27584-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure B" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Section 232 tariffs yield positive impact on U.S. aluminum industries</h2>
<p>After suffering decades-long declines, U.S. primary aluminum production shot up by 60% immediately after implementation of the Section 232 tariffs in March 2018 through January 2019 (<strong>Figure C</strong>). Thereafter, primary aluminum production remained stable until the COVID-19 economic shock weighed on demand for durable goods in the spring of 2020. While still far from historical capacity, improving market conditions under the Section 232 policy have led to substantial new investments to reopen or expand U.S. primary aluminum production facilities, as shown in <strong>Table 1</strong>. Combined, these projects restarted 530,000 metric tons of primary aluminum capacity and brought back 1,095 jobs with new investments of $335 million in upgraded and expanded facilities and other fixed cofsts necessary to start production.</p>


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<a name="Figure-C"></a><div class="figure chart-227031 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227031" data-anchor="Figure-C"><div class="figLabel">Figure C</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227031-27585-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure C" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-227122 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none shrink-table" data-chartid="227122" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227122-27877-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Critics of the Section 232 aluminum measures warned that tariffs would jeopardize downstream producers of secondary aluminum products—semi-finished extrusion, casting, and rolling operations that further transform raw aluminum for production in myriad aluminum-consuming industries. <strong>Table 1 </strong>further shows this was not the case. U.S. producers of downstream semi-finished aluminum invested in restarts or expanded capacity at 55 facilities. These projects will create 4,475 new jobs, with a capital investment of $6.0 billion. In total, U.S. primary and secondary aluminum producers have committed $6.4 billion in new investments to restart and expand capacity, adding 5,570 new jobs.</p>
<p><strong>Figures D </strong>and<strong> E </strong>illustrate why U.S. primary and downstream producers are restarting or expanding operations: Demand for aluminum produced in the United States and Canada was growing prior to COVID-19.<a href="#_note3" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='3' id="_ref3">3</a> Shipments of aluminum extruded products (<strong>Figure D</strong>) increased by 281 million pounds (2.7%) following implementation of Section 232 measures and up to February 2020, relative to the same period preceding the measures. Shipments in all segments in this market increased significantly, including rods and bars, up more than 54 million pounds (5.3%); pipes and tubes, up more than 19 million pounds (2.3%); and other extruded shapes, up nearly 208 million pounds (2.4%).</p>


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<a name="Figure-D"></a><div class="figure chart-227034 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227034" data-anchor="Figure-D"><div class="figLabel">Figure D</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227034-27586-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure D" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<a name="Figure-E"></a><div class="figure chart-227038 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227038" data-anchor="Figure-E"><div class="figLabel">Figure E</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227038-27587-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure E" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p><strong>Figure E</strong> shows that shipments also grew strongly in aluminum sheet and plate production as well in the same March 2018 to February 2020 time frame, relative to the equivalent period before Section 232 measures. Total sheet production has increased more than 1.2 billion pounds (7.0%). Non-heat-treatable sheet increased 586.1 million pounds (10.1%) and “other” sheet and plate (including heat-treatable) increased a whopping 1.1 billion pounds (35.1%). The only segment of the industry that declined was aluminum can stock, in which shipments decreased by 6.4%; however, this appears to be the result of increasing import penetration largely due to the excessive aluminum sheet product exclusions discussed above.</p>
<p>Figures D and E report trends on shipments of downstream aluminum products from plants throughout the United States and Canada. More detailed data from the Federal Reserve (2021) on U.S.-only industrial production of aluminum and aluminum products also show the aluminum industry rebounding after implementation of Section 232 measures for aluminum imports. These data provide estimates of real output, based on measures of physical output, or (where output data are not available) total production-worker hours, by industry. Overall, U.S. production in the primary and secondary industries increased by 16.3% through December 2018. In the following year, production waned with relaxation of the Section 232 import measures, but by December 2019 U.S. output still remained more than 6% above the level prior to implementation of Section 232. In contrast, U.S. production of nonferrous metals other than aluminum declined by 2.5% over the same time period, offering a parallel case without the support of Section 232 measures against which to compare effects on the U.S. aluminum industry (Federal Reserve 2021).</p>
<h2>Beer industry making bogus claims</h2>
<p>The beer industry has cried foul regarding the effect of the Section 232 duties on beer sales, but it’s the industry’s deceptive analysis of basic economic trends in the processed food and beverage industries that smells rotten. The Section 232 duties have had virtually no impact on the beer industry or other canned beverage industries and, as discussed in further detail below, careful statistical analysis shows that the price of aluminum has no discernible causal effect on the price of canned beer and other beverage products. A private consulting study prepared for the beer industry reports that the aluminum used in beverage cans represents only 5.7% of the manufacturers’ cost of beer in cans (John Dunham &amp; Associates 2018).<a href="#_note4" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='4' id="_ref4">4</a> In other words, even assuming that a 10% tariff passes entirely through to the costs of cans, that would equal less than 0.6% of beer production costs—immaterial in an industry that spends tens of billions of dollars annually on marketing and sponsorships. Price data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2021d) show that in the two years after Section 232 measures were implemented, canned beer prices increased less than 0.5% annually—far below overall consumer price inflation—while sales maintained a stable, rising trend (Census 2021).</p>
<p>The beer industry’s ongoing strength is reflected in the steady growth of employment overall in breweries, wineries, and distilleries since the end of the Great Recession in 2009. In fact, <strong>Figure F </strong>shows that employment in the industry more than doubled to 155,300 in February 2018—before the Section 232 aluminum import measures took effect—from 72,700 in June 2009. Following the aluminum import measures, trend growth in breweries, wineries, and distilleries was unbroken, increasing by a further 17%, or 26,500 more jobs. Examining the beer industry claims of harm from the aluminum tariffs in more detail, most of the job losses claimed in the industry’s private consultant report were in downstream distribution sectors, with 91% of the 20,300 jobs lost in “retailing, supplier and induced” segments (John Dunham &amp; Associates 2018). As shown below, there is no evidence of job losses to date in these broader segments of the economy. Much like the aggregate modeling analysis by the Trade Partnership, referenced above, such models bear no relationship to observed impacts of the aluminum tariffs on the domestic economy to date (see our analysis of Francois and Baughman 2018, below). This report concludes with an examination of these broader claims about the impacts of the Section 232 import measures on the U.S. economy.</p>


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<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-227040 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227040" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227040-27544-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>If anything, the beer industry has been a victim of its own continued success during the pandemic. While robust consumption has continued, there was a sudden shift toward consumption of beer and other beverages in cans, displacing demand for beer in glass bottles and stainless steel kegs (Beverage Information Group 2018). A recent <em>Washington Post</em> article makes clear this has little to do with Section 232 import measures, and everything to do with demand for canned beverages far outpacing supply from can manufacturers that can’t scale production capacity fast enough (Reiley 2020).</p>
<h2>Aluminum consumers face negligible effects from Section 232 measures</h2>
<p>An important concern in assessing the impacts of Section 232 measures on imported aluminum products is how these measures affect downstream industries and consumers of products that use aluminum inputs. Harm to downstream industries would occur if Section 232 measures significantly increased aluminum prices, causing increased costs for producers or consumers of primary aluminum-embodying goods, and then those costs squeezed profit margins or consumer welfare—by forcing consumers to either pay more for or consume less of a given product. To assess this linkage between aluminum input prices and end-user prices, we employ standard, related, and time-tested econometric techniques known as Granger causality analysis and vector autoregression (Granger 1969; Sims 1980).</p>
<p>Vector autoregression (VAR) is a statistical method for modeling a system of variables and their interrelationship and co-evolution over time. Granger causality analysis uses the VAR model to test for evidence of a statistically causal relationship between the variables in the model. If past values of variable 1 are shown to significantly predict current values of variable 2, then it can be concluded that variable 1 “Granger-causes” variable 2. While the price variable used in this modeling (variable 1) includes the effects of Section 232 tariffs and quotas, the results of the statistical test are not limited to the effects of Section 232 measures, but rather evaluate whether a change in prices resulting from any factor causes a change in the price of the aluminum-using good (variable 2). Technical discussion of this methodology and detailed results are presented in the appendix.</p>
<p>In this case, we model (1) the price of primary aluminum products, (2) the price of aluminum-consuming products, and (3) the effective federal funds interest rate.<a href="#_note5" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='5' id="_ref5">5</a> Results of the statistical relationships are reported in <strong>Appendix</strong> <strong>Table 1</strong>. The end-use products investigated represent the U.S. industries consuming the largest volume of aluminum products as a share of their overall value added, including beverage manufacturing, construction materials, motor vehicle bodies and parts, kitchen utensils, and furniture. First, our results find no discernible statistical relationship between a change in the price of primary aluminum and changes in the prices of canned beer and ale case goods, aluminum cans and can components, or beverage manufacturing. Even though aluminum inputs make up 10% of the value added in beverage manufacturing, according to input-output tables produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2021b), aluminum prices do not have a causal effect on beverage prices.</p>
<p>Similarly, we find no causal effect of aluminum prices on motor vehicle body manufacturing—where aluminum accounts for 14% of the value chain—nor do we find a causal effect for nonresidential construction goods (6%) or commercial furniture (3%). The econometric results indicate that any change in primary aluminum prices is expected to result in no change in the price of the end-use product. We do find evidence of a causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and motor vehicle parts, as well as for aluminum kitchen utensils. However, while these results are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effect is, in essence, economically negligible. In both cases, a 1% increase in the price of primary aluminum is expected to elicit a less than 0.1% change in the price of the end-use good.</p>
<p>Second, we test whether the price of primary aluminum production has a causal effect on industrial production of secondary aluminum products that transform raw aluminum into intermediate semi-finished aluminum products—the extrusions, castings, sheets, and plates illustrated in Figures B and C above. Evidence of a causal relationship between primary prices and measures of secondary aluminum production would indicate that Section 232 aluminum import measures could be harming downstream segments of the U.S. aluminum industry. However, here too we find no statistically significant relationships (see Appendix Table 1).</p>
<p>Finally, if Section 232 aluminum import measures were skewing primary aluminum prices, we would expect to see effects in the market prices for scrap aluminum products, which would be in higher demand. However, our results definitively indicate no statistically causal relationship between primary prices and the price of aluminum base scrap, or the price of used beverage can scrap.</p>
<p>To recap, economic injury from Section 232 aluminum import measures could be caused if price increases passed through to prices of goods produced in downstream industries, causing other businesses to lose profitability or cut back on production, or for consumers to pay higher prices or curtail purchases. Analysis of the data does not support such conclusions. While conceptually a relationship exists between input prices and final goods prices, econometric analysis of the causal relationship between prices finds effects ranging from statistically zero to essentially nothing.<a href="#_note6" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='6' id="_ref6">6</a> In most cases, there is no statistically significant causal relationship between prices or production in the industries downstream from primary aluminum; where there is evidence of a relationship, the effect is so small as to be economically trivial. It is also possible that increasing prices of primary aluminum inputs could induce downstream consumers to increase their productivity, offsetting costs by becoming more efficient. This would be a positive outcome, too, though we have insufficient evidence to draw such a conclusion.</p>
<h2>Aluminum tariffs show no impact on broader U.S. employment</h2>
<p>The lack of a causal relationship between primary aluminum prices and downstream industries is reflected in the fact that employment outcomes show no indication of the negative effects predicted by Section 232 critics. <strong>Table 2</strong> compares two studies (Francois and Baughman 2018; Francois, Baughman, and Anthony 2018) produced for the Trade Partnership, a special interest group, that projected expected employment impacts of the steel and aluminum tariffs against the actual performance of the economy between February 2018 and February 2020—the eve of the COVID-19 economic shock, and equivalent to the time horizon for the 2018 projections.<a href="#_note7" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='7' id="_ref7">7</a> The table covers total U.S. employment in 27 detailed and four aggregate industries, and overall nonfarm employment in the domestic economy.<a href="#_note8" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='8' id="_ref8">8</a></p>


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<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-227123 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none shrink-table" data-chartid="227123" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227123-27874-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>An earlier critique of the first study explained why the actual impacts of the tariffs would be quite minor and why the study should be treated as an outlier in studies of tariffs, not as a guide to policy decision (Scott 2018b). In particular, the study’s modeling exercise deviates from standard assumptions that the economy always adjusts rapidly to maintain full employment via realignment of prices in response to tariffs or other trade measures. These standard assumptions are not grounded in reality, but the alternative assumptions chosen by modelers for the Trade Partnership err in the other direction, presuming hyper labor market inflexibility with the result that the model necessarily predicts massive employment dislocations—also not grounded in reality, particularly in an economy that had grown steadily for the preceding eight years, pushing the unemployment rate well below 4% prior to the COVID-19 shock (Scott 2018a; BLS 2021c). Finally, the macroeconomic effects of tariffs on aggregate demand are ambiguous, not clearly contractionary, as the Trade Partnership report implies.</p>
<p>These two reports are representative of the anti-tariff hysteria that often pervades policy debates. Now, with the benefit of hindsight, history reveals the hyperbole of such claims. The Trade Partnership studies claimed that while the tariffs would save thousands of jobs in primary metals industries, several hundred thousand jobs would be lost in the rest of the economy. In fact, the U.S. economy added nearly 4.3 million jobs on net. A majority of the actual job gains, 3.8 million, came from service-sector industries, although the Trade Partnership studies estimated that a majority of their projected job losses, nearly 377,000, would occur in the service sector. The Trade Partnership projections were no more accurate when it came to manufacturing employment. In the real world, the U.S. economy added 210,000 manufacturing jobs following Section 232 import measures, whereas the Trade Partnership predicted manufacturing would lose nearly 20,000 jobs.</p>
<p>The actual employment results in Table 2 show the extent of anti-tariff hyperbole. The Trade Partnership also vastly overestimated the employment costs to downstream industries reliant on inputs of primary metals. The Trade Partnership predicted job losses in industries like fabricated metals (-12,877) and motor vehicles and parts (-4,917), as well as in sectors of the economy farther afield from metals and manufacturing like personal and recreational services (-35,033); in actuality, these industries added 19,100, 12,100, and 1.78 million respectively. Among other flaws in these predictions, the Trade Partnership did not take account of how appreciation of the international value of the U.S. dollar and extensive exclusions to the Section 232 measures granted to U.S. importers of steel and aluminum eroded the effectiveness of the policy. The employment results presented in this table make two things clear. First, such predictions, though compelling in public debates, were wildly off base. Second, the Section 232 measures worked as intended without harm to other segments of the U.S. economy.</p>
<h2>Cry me a whiskey river</h2>
<p>In response to the U.S. Section 232 aluminum measures, the European Union imposed retaliatory tariffs on imports of U.S.-made whiskies, bourbon, and rye. While the industry has voiced opposition to the Section 232 measures, there is little evidence that EU retaliation is dampening the party for U.S. whiskey producers. As the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (2021), an industry lobbying group, put it, “America’s native spirit has been enjoying a resurgence in recent years.” In fact, sales of American whiskey, by volume, grew at an annualized rate of 6.8% from 2017 to 2020, notably faster than the growth of 6% the industry registered in the preceding three years (2014 to 2017).</p>
<p><strong>Figure G </strong>shows that, indeed, exports of U.S.-made whiskey, bourbon, and rye fell after June 2018. But exports to the rest of the world—which, unlike the EU, did not impose retaliatory tariffs—fell even more. We can conclude from the common trend seen in disparate export markets in Figure G that this did not result from tariffs, but from some other common factor. It is possible the entire world experienced a shift in preferences away from American whiskey all at the same time. But a more plausible explanation would be that U.S. whiskey producers found more profitable uses in domestic markets for the whiskey they were already producing. Because whiskey improves and increases in value with aging, producers cannot quickly adjust the quantity produced to respond to changing market conditions. They can, however, change the quality of the product to compete in higher-value market segments with higher profit margins, chasing the booming “super premium” market. In 2019, revenues from sales of U.S. super premium whiskeys grew 11% year over year, compared with 6.7% growth in 2018 (Distilled Spirits Council 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic slowed super premium growth as it disrupted global supply chains, but at 8.2% in 2020, sales of U.S. super premium whiskeys still grew faster than in any other year since 2015.</p>


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<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-227047 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="227047" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/227047-27545-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<h2>Conclusion: Section 232 tariffs have aided aluminum producers</h2>
<p>This report has demonstrated that, to date, the aluminum tariffs have had their intended effect: The domestic producers of both primary aluminum and downstream aluminum products have made commitments to create thousands of jobs, invest billions of dollars in aluminum production, and substantially increase domestic production since Section 232 tariffs were imposed on March 8, 2018. The Biden&#8211;Harris administration should continue and limit exclusions to Section 232 import measures on an interim basis until it can achieve a permanent, multilateral solution to the chronic problem of excess global aluminum production capacity.</p>
<h2>Acknowledgments</h2>
<p>The authors thank Jori Kandra for technical and research assistance and Colleen O’Neill for editing assistance. This research was made possible by support from the American Primary Aluminum Association.</p>
<h2>About the authors</h2>
<p><strong>Adam S. Hersh, PhD,</strong> is a Visiting Economist at the Economic Policy Institute. Previously, Hersh was a research associate at the Political Economy Research Institute, University of Massachusetts Amherst; chief economist for the Congressional Joint Economic Committee, Democratic staff; senior economist at the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute and the Center for American Progress; a visiting scholar at Columbia University’s Initiative for Policy Dialogue and the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics; and a research fellow at the University College, London’s Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. He is a contributing author with Joseph Stiglitz of <em>Rewriting the Rules of the </em><em>American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity</em> (2015).</p>
<p><strong>Robert E. Scott</strong> joined the Economic Policy Institute in 1996 and is currently director of trade and manufacturing policy research. His areas of research include international economics, trade, and manufacturing policies and their impacts on working people in the United States and other countries; the economic impacts of foreign investment; and the macroeconomic effects of trade and capital flows. He has published widely in academic journals and the popular press, including <em>The Journal of Policy Analysis and Management</em>, <em>The International Review of Applied Economics</em>, and <em>The Stanford Law and Policy Review</em>, as well as <em>The Los Angeles Times</em>, <em>Newsday</em>, <em>USA Today</em>, <em>The Baltimore Sun</em>, <em>The </em><em>Washington Times,</em> and other newspapers. He has also provided economic commentary for a range of electronic media, including NPR, CNN, Bloomberg, and the BBC. Mr. Scott has a PhD in economics from the University of California, Berkeley.</p>
<h2>Appendix: Methodology for analyzing causal relationship between aluminum prices and aluminum-consuming industries</h2>
<p>This appendix outlines the methodological approach for assessing how Section 232 measures on imported primary aluminum products may affect downstream industries and consumers of products that use aluminum inputs. Harm to downstream industries and consumers could occur if Section 232 measures caused an increase in prices for aluminum products paid by U.S. users of aluminum and those price increases pass through to producer or consumer prices for aluminum-embodying goods. In order to assess this possibility, we evaluate a more basic question: Do changes in the price of primary aluminum cause changes in aluminum-using products? This question asks whether any change in aluminum price is a significant determinant of prices for goods that use aluminum as an intermediate input, irrespective of what factors cause a change in prices.</p>
<h3>Data and methodology</h3>
<p>To evaluate this question, we estimate reduced form vector autoregressions (VARs) that model the variables of interest as an interrelated system that co-evolves over time (Sims 1980). The VAR is an attractive analytical tool because it does not force an assumed structural form onto the data. Each variable in the system is modeled jointly as a function of its past values and the past values of the other related variables in the system. After estimating the system, we can evaluate causal relationships between the variables by testing whether past values of one variable are statistically significant determinants of the current value of another variable, following Granger (1969).</p>
<p>Our variables of interest are (1) prices for primary aluminum, (2) prices for aluminum-using products, and (3) the effective federal funds rate—the interest rate at which depository institutions borrow and lend reserve balances held at Federal Reserve Banks. This interest rate is the primary target for Federal Reserve monetary policy actions and is linked both in theory and in practice to changes in general price levels, as well as to the level of demand for goods and services across the economy via the Taylor Rule (Taylor 1993). Separately, we also test whether primary aluminum prices and the federal funds rate have a causal relationship with industrial production of secondary, semi-finished aluminum products and aluminum scrap prices.</p>
<p>Data are observed monthly and drawn from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED Economic Data, spanning January 2005 to January 2020. Univariate analysis with a modified Dickey-Fuller test (Cheung and Lai 1995) fails to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for each variable under consideration. While the individual variables are nonstationary (integrated of order one, or first-difference stationary), tests with Johansen’s procedure show that there is no cointegration—or, a stable, long-run relationship—between the variables (Johansen 1995), and the system can be modeled with a VAR, as opposed to a vector error correction model.</p>
<p>The VAR model consists of</p>
<p><img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Cleft%5B%5Cbegin%7Barray%7D%7Bl%7D++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B1%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B2%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+i_%7Bt%7D++%5Cend%7Barray%7D%5Cright%5D%3D%5Cboldsymbol%7B%5Calpha%7D_%7B0%7D%2B%5Cboldsymbol%7BA%7D_%7B%5Cmathbf%7B1%7D%7D%5Cleft%5B%5Cbegin%7Barray%7D%7Bc%7D++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt-1%7D%5E%7B1%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt-1%7D%5E%7B2%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+i_%7Bt-1%7D++%5Cend%7Barray%7D%5Cright%5D%2B%5Ccdots%2B%5Cboldsymbol%7BA%7D_%7Bk%7D%5Cleft%5B%5Cbegin%7Barray%7D%7Bc%7D++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt-k%7D%5E%7B1%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+p_%7Bt-k%7D%5E%7B2%7D+%5C%5C++%5CDelta+i_%7Bt-k%7D++%5Cend%7Barray%7D%5Cright%5D%2B%5Cleft%5B%5Cbegin%7Barray%7D%7Bc%7D++%5Cvarepsilon_%7B1%2C+t%7D+%5C%5C++%5Cvarepsilon_%7B2%2C+t%7D+%5C%5C++%5Cvarepsilon_%7B3%2C+t%7D++%5Cend%7Barray%7D%5Cright%5D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\left[\begin{array}{l}  \Delta p_{t}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t}  \end{array}\right]=\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{0}+\boldsymbol{A}_{\mathbf{1}}\left[\begin{array}{c}  \Delta p_{t-1}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t-1}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t-1}  \end{array}\right]+\cdots+\boldsymbol{A}_{k}\left[\begin{array}{c}  \Delta p_{t-k}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t-k}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t-k}  \end{array}\right]+\left[\begin{array}{c}  \varepsilon_{1, t} \\  \varepsilon_{2, t} \\  \varepsilon_{3, t}  \end{array}\right]' title='\left[\begin{array}{l}  \Delta p_{t}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t}  \end{array}\right]=\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{0}+\boldsymbol{A}_{\mathbf{1}}\left[\begin{array}{c}  \Delta p_{t-1}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t-1}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t-1}  \end{array}\right]+\cdots+\boldsymbol{A}_{k}\left[\begin{array}{c}  \Delta p_{t-k}^{1} \\  \Delta p_{t-k}^{2} \\  \Delta i_{t-k}  \end{array}\right]+\left[\begin{array}{c}  \varepsilon_{1, t} \\  \varepsilon_{2, t} \\  \varepsilon_{3, t}  \end{array}\right]' class='latex' /></p>
<p>where <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B1%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p_{t}^{1}' title='p_{t}^{1}' class='latex' />  is the natural log of price at time <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=t&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='t' title='t' class='latex' /> of primary aluminum, <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p_{t}^{2}' title='p_{t}^{2}' class='latex' /> is the natural log of the price of the aluminum-using product, and <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p_{t}^{2}' title='p_{t}^{2}' class='latex' /> is the natural log of the effective federal funds interest rate. The model estimates parameters <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Calpha_%7B0%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\alpha_{0}' title='\alpha_{0}' class='latex' />,  <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Cboldsymbol%7BA%7D_%7B%5Cmathbf%7B1%7D%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\boldsymbol{A}_{\mathbf{1}}' title='\boldsymbol{A}_{\mathbf{1}}' class='latex' />to <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Cboldsymbol%7BA%7D_%7B%5Cboldsymbol%7Bk%7D%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{k}}' title='\boldsymbol{A}_{\boldsymbol{k}}' class='latex' />, and  <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Cvarepsilon_%7Bt%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\varepsilon_{t}' title='\varepsilon_{t}' class='latex' />, which are, respectively, a vector of constant terms, 3 × 3 matrices of coefficients relating the current dependent variable to past values of the independent variables, and a vector of randomly distributed residual with mean zero and uncorrelated across time.</p>
<p>The specific number <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Cboldsymbol%7Bk%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\boldsymbol{k}' title='\boldsymbol{k}' class='latex' /> lags of the dependent and independent variables specified varies for each set of aluminum product and aluminum-consuming goods modeled, and are chosen with some subjectivity, though guided by minimizing a battery of statistical tests, including the likelihood ratio test, the final prediction error, Akaike’s information criterion, Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion, and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (Neilsen 2001; Lütkepohl 2005). Results were robust to alternative lag-length specifications. The VAR parameters were estimated simultaneously by the “seemingly unrelated regression” method of Zellner and Theil (1962). Post-estimation, the statistical assumptions were tested to confirm that the VAR parameters are stable (with eigenvalues lying within the unit circle) and that the residual is normally distributed and not serially correlated, indicating that the models are well specified.</p>
<p>The specific parameters estimated that define the structures of VARs are typically of less concern than how the system behaves when there is an exogenous change in one of the variables. In this case, we are concerned whether a change in the price <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p%5E%7B1%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p^{1}' title='p^{1}' class='latex' /> causes a change in <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p^{2}' title='p^{2}' class='latex' />, evaluated with a Granger (1969) causality test. This evaluates the hypothesis that the coefficients on <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Ctriangle+p_%7Bt-1%7D%5E%7B1%7D%2C+%5Ccdots%2C+%5Ctriangle+p_%7Bt-k%7D%5E%7B1%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\triangle p_{t-1}^{1}, \cdots, \triangle p_{t-k}^{1}' title='\triangle p_{t-1}^{1}, \cdots, \triangle p_{t-k}^{1}' class='latex' /> are jointly statistically significant in determining <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Ctriangle+p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\triangle p_{t}^{2}' title='\triangle p_{t}^{2}' class='latex' /> against the null hypothesis that the coefficients are all equal to zero. If the test statistic exceeds a critical value at a 95% probability or higher, we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Ctriangle+p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B1%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\triangle p_{t}^{1}' title='\triangle p_{t}^{1}' class='latex' /> Granger-causes <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=%5Ctriangle+p_%7Bt%7D%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='\triangle p_{t}^{2}' title='\triangle p_{t}^{2}' class='latex' />. In the event we identify a significant causal relationship, then the system of equations making up each VAR can be used to simulate the effect on <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p%5E%7B2%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p^{2}' title='p^{2}' class='latex' /> of a shock to <img src='https://s0.wp.com/latex.php?latex=p%5E%7B1%7D&#038;bg=ffffff&#038;fg=000000&#038;s=0' alt='p^{1}' title='p^{1}' class='latex' /> by simulating an impulse response function.</p>
<p><strong>Appendix Table 1</strong> reports the Wald test statistic χ<sup>2</sup> and the associated probability for rejecting the null hypothesis of zero causal effect for each pair of prices (or industrial production). For the majority of end-use products considered, we find no statistical evidence that primary aluminum prices affect the price of end-use products (&lt;95% probability). This means that a change in aluminum prices is expected to have zero effect on the price of end-use goods. We do find statistically significant causal effects (&gt;95% probability) of the aluminum price on the prices of motor vehicle parts and stamped and spun aluminum kitchen utensils. For these goods, we estimate the impact of a 1% increase in aluminum input prices using an orthogonalized impulse response function, with results summarized in the final column of Appendix Table 1. For each end-use good, the shock from an initial change in aluminum prices reaches its maximum impact on end-use prices in the following one to three months, then gradually dissipates to zero over the ensuing months, meaning there is no permanent effect on prices.</p>
<p>These were not the only statistically significant causal relationships identified in the VAR modeling. In a majority of the models, Granger analysis finds that the effective federal funds interest rate has a causal effect on aluminum price levels, by moderating aggregate demand, as theory would predict.</p>


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<h3>Table notes</h3>
<h4>Table 1, U.S. aluminum restarts/expansions since Section 232 implementation, February 2018–April 2021</h4>
<p>The sources for each plant announcement are as follows:</p>
<h5>Primary aluminum plants</h5>
<p><strong>Alcoa (Warrick, Indiana): </strong>Business Facilities, “<a href="https://businessfacilities.com/2017/07/alcoa-restarting-indiana-aluminum-smelting-operations/">Alcoa Restarting Indiana Aluminum Smelting Operations</a>,” July 12, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Century Aluminum Company (Mount Holly, South Carolina):</strong> Terri Errico Griffis, “<a href="https://charlestonbusiness.com/news/manufacturing/80121/">Century Aluminum rebuilds with 3-year power agreement</a>,” <em>Charleston Regional Business Journal,</em> March 3, 2021.</p>
<p><strong>Century Aluminum Company (Sebree, Kentucky): </strong>Michelle Fox, “<a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/tariffs-allow-us-to-invest-100-million-hire-300-century-aluminum-ceo.html">Trump’s tariffs allow us to invest $100 million and hire hundreds: Century Aluminum CEO</a>,” <em>CNBC Online</em>, March 1, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Magnitude 7 Metals (Marston, Missouri):</strong> David Jenkins, &#8220;<a href="https://standard-democrat.com/story/2827305.html">Magnitude 7 Metals CEO praises reinstatement of import tax</a>,&#8221; <em>Standard Democrat</em>, August 7, 2020.</p>
<h5>Secondary aluminum facilities</h5>
<p><strong>Aleris (Lewisport, Kentucky): </strong>Lane Report, “<a href="https://www.lanereport.com/83776/2017/11/aleris-opens-400m-aluminum-rolling-mill-expansion-in-hancock-county/">Aleris opens $40M aluminum rolling mill expansion in Hancock County</a>,” November 16, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Alexandria Industries (Alexandria, Minnesota): </strong>Dee DePass, “<a href="https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-aluminum-plant-breaks-ground-on-16-million-expansion/509914462/">Minnesota aluminum plant breaks ground on $16 million expansion</a>,” <em>Star Tribune, </em>May 14, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Arconic (Knoxville, Tennessee): </strong>Jim Gaines, “<a href="https://www.knoxnews.com/story/money/business/2019/02/13/arconic-adds-70-jobs-100-mil-alcoa/2860842002/">Arconic to bring 70 new jobs to Alcoa plant</a>,” <em>Knox News, </em>February 13, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Arconic (Texarkana, Texas): </strong>Junius Stone, “<a href="https://www.texarkanagazette.com/news/texarkana/story/2018/aug/08/arconic-add-35-jobs-next-year/737957/">Arconic to add 35 jobs next year</a>,” <em>Texarkana Gazette, </em>August 7, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Ardagh Metal Beverage (Huron, Ohio): </strong>Michael Harrington, “<a href="https://sanduskyregister.com/news/292736/company-to-create-200-jobs-in-huron/">Company to create 200 jobs in Huron</a>,” <em>Sandusky Register, </em>December 10, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Ardagh Metal Beverage (Winston-Salem, North Carolina): </strong>Ardagh Group, “<a href="https://www.ardaghgroup.com/news-centre/ardagh-group-s-a-fourth-quarter-and-full-year-2020-results">Ardagh Group S.A.—fourth quarter and full year 2020 results</a>,” n.d.</p>
<p><strong>Ardagh Metal Beverage (Olive Branch, Mississippi): </strong>Area Development News Desk, “<a href="https://www.areadevelopment.com/newsitems/11-11-2020/ardagh-group-manufacturing-olive-branch-mississippi.shtml">Ardagh Group expands manufacturing at Olive Branch, Mississippi factory</a>,” November 11, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Ball Corporation (Goodyear, Arizona): </strong>City of Goodyear Arizona Economic Development, “<a href="https://www.developgoodyearaz.com/Home/Components/News/News/8602/769?npage=7&amp;arch=1">Largest capital investment in Goodyear’s history</a>,” July 30, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Ball Corporation (Pittston, Pennsylvania): </strong>Melina Druga, “<a href="https://pennbizreport.com/news/17507-ball-corporation-to-build-packing-plant-in-pittston/">Ball Corporation to build packing plant in Pittston</a>,” <em>Pennsylvania Business Report, </em>September 4, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Ball Corporation (Rome, Georgia): </strong>Staff reports, “<a href="https://www.albanyherald.com/jobs/aluminum-packaging-manufacturer-to-expand-rome-operation/article_890e91fa-f02d-11e9-8694-f7c3f2807079.html">Aluminum packaging manufacturer to expand Rome operation</a>,” <em>Albany Herald, </em> October 16, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Benada Aluminum (Sanford, Florida): </strong>Bill Zimmerman, “<a href="https://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/os-bz-aluminum-tariffs-benada-expansion-sanford-20180718-story.html">Benada expands Sanford aluminum plant, says tariffs boost demand</a>,” <em>Orlando Sentinel, </em>July 18, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Bharat Forge Aluminum USA (Sanford, North Carolina): </strong>North Carolina Department of Commerce, “<a href="https://www.nccommerce.com/news/press-releases/global-automotive-parts-manufacturer-selects-lee-county-major-aluminum-forging">Global automotive parts manufacturer selects Lee County for major aluminum forging facility in North Carolina</a>,” September 17, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Bodine Aluminum (Troy, Missouri): </strong>John Raby and Bruce Schreiner, “<a href="https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/toyota-investing-million-at-u-s-plants-including-its-troy/article_2d16b61d-63ad-5964-871d-4c8a45163c19.html">Toyota investing $750 million at 5 U.S. plants, including its Troy aluminum plant</a>,” <em>St. Louis Post-Dispatch, </em>March 14, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Bodine Aluminum (Jackson, Tennessee): </strong>John Raby and Bruce Schreiner, “<a href="https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/toyota-investing-million-at-u-s-plants-including-its-troy/article_2d16b61d-63ad-5964-871d-4c8a45163c19.html">Toyota investing $750 million at 5 U.S. plants, including its Troy aluminum plant</a>,” <em>St. Louis Post-Dispatch, </em>March 14, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Bonnell Aluminum (Niles, Michigan): </strong>Business Wire, “<a href="https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170614006034/en/">Bonnell Aluminum announces start-up of new extrusion line</a>,” June 14, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>BR Metal Products (Livingston, Tennessee): </strong>Tennessee Department of Economic &amp; Community Development, “<a href="https://www.tn.gov/ecd/news/2020/9/21/governor-lee--commissioner-rolfe-announce-br-metal-products-to-expand-livingston-operations.html">Governor Less, Comissioner Rolfe announce BR Metal Products to expand Livingston operations</a>,” September 21, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Braidy Industries (Ashland, Kentucky): </strong>Morgan Watkins, “<a href="https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/01/braidy-industries-breaks-ground-aluminum-mill-eastern-kentucky/646290002/">Braidy Industries breaks ground on Bevin-backed, $1.5B aluminum mill</a>,” <em>Courier Journal, </em>June 1, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Central Motor Wheel of America (Paris, Kentucky): </strong> Lane Report, “<a href="https://www.lanereport.com/114591/2019/06/cmwa-announces-112m-expansion-in-paris-145-full-time-jobs-added/">CMWA announces $112M expansion in Paris, Ky.; 145 full-time jobs</a>,” June 27, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Century Aluminum (Sebree, Kentucky): </strong>Global News Wire, “<a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/11/28/1658545/0/en/Century-Aluminum-Announces-Expansion-of-Sebree-Casthouse.html">Century Aluminum announces expansion of Sebree casthouse</a>,” November 28, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Crown Holdings (Henry Count, Virginia): </strong>Crown, “<a href="https://www.crowncork.com/news/press-room/crown-holdings-build-new-beverage-can-plant-henry-county-virginia">Crown holdings to build new beverage can plant in Henry County, Virginia</a>,” January 28, 2021.</p>
<p><strong>Crown Holdings (Bowling Green, Kentucky): </strong>Business Facilities, “<a href="https://businessfacilities.com/2020/05/crown-holdings-building-148m-plant-bowling-green-kentucky/">Crown Holdings begins building $148M plant in Kentucky</a>,” May 15, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Crown Holdings (Olympia, Washington): </strong>Zacks Equity Research, “<a href="https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/heres-why-should-you-retain-crown-holdings-at-the-moment-2020-09-15">Here’s why should you retain Crown Holdings at the moment</a>,” <em>NASDAQ</em> September 15, 2020.</p>
<p><strong>Dajcor Aluminum (Perry County, Kentucky): </strong>KAM, “<a href="https://kam.us.com/dajcor-aluminum-to-create-265-full-time-jobs-in-eastern-kentucky/">Dajcor aluminum to create 265 full-time jobs in eastern Kentucky</a>,” May 13, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Elixir Extrusions (Douglas-Coffee County, Georgia): </strong>Area Development News Desk,<strong> “</strong><a href="https://www.areadevelopment.com/newsItems/8-23-2018/elixir-extrusions-douglas-coffee-county-georgia.shtml">Elixir Extrusions expands Douglas-Coffee County, Georgia, plant</a>,” August 23, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Ellwood Group (Hubbard, Pennsylvania): </strong><em>Business Journal Daily</em>, “<a href="https://businessjournaldaily.com/ellwood-group-to-build-60m-plant-in-hubbard/">Ellwood Group to build $60M aluminum plant in Hubbard</a>,” September 19, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Florida Can Manufacturing (Winter Haven, Florida): </strong>Kevin Bouffard, “<a href="https://www.theledger.com/business/20191205/winter-haven-clears-way-for-can-manufacturing-plant---110-new-jobs">Winter Haven clears way for can manufacturing plant—110 jobs</a>,” December 6, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Gateway Extrusions (Union, Missouri): </strong>The USGlass News Network, “<a href="https://www.usglassmag.com/2018/10/gateway-extrusions-marks-expansion-and-15th-year/">Gateway Extrusions marks expansion and 15th year</a>,” October 10, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Granco Clark (Belding, Michigan): </strong>Brandon Schreur, “<a href="https://thedailynews.cc/articles/misunderstood-industry/">‘Misunderstood industry’: Lt. Gov. Brian Calley visits Belding’s Granco Clark in light of expansion</a>,” <em>The Daily News, </em>May 26, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Gränges (Huntingdon, Tennessee): </strong>Brian Taylor, “<a href="https://www.recyclingtoday.com/article/granges-aluminum-casting-recycling-rolling-tennessee-expansion/">Gränges to expand aluminum casting capacity in Tennessee</a>,” <em>Recycling Today, </em>March 26, 2021.</p>
<p><strong>Gränges (Huntingdon, Tennessee): </strong>Gränges Innovative Aluminum Engineering, “<a href="https://www.granges.com/newsroom/press-releases/2017/granges-to-invest-usd-110-million-in-us-capacity-expansion/">Gränges to invest USD 110 million in US capacity expansion</a>,” September 15, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Gränges (Newport, Arkansas): </strong>George Jared, “<a href="https://talkbusiness.net/2018/05/granges-to-restart-newport-plant-hire-100-new-employees/">Gränges to restart Newport plant, hire 100 new employees</a>,” <em>Talk Business &amp; Politics,</em> May 3, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Hydro (Schuylkill, Pennsylvania): </strong>Stacy Wescoe, “<a href="https://www.lvb.com/aluminum-manufacturer-announces-100m-expansion-60-jobs-could-be-added/">Aluminum manufacturer announces $100M expansion; 60 jobs could be added</a>,” <em>Lehigh Valley Business, </em>September 28, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Jupiter Aluminum (Brooke County, West Virginia): </strong>Connor Griffith, “<a href="https://www.wvnews.com/news/wvnews/jupiter-aluminum-announces-expansion-of-brooke-county-presence/article_d60b7e7b-025d-5c85-b512-2cad06f16b48.html">Jupiter Aluminum announces expansion of Brooke County presence</a>,” <em>West Virginia News,</em> March 27, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>JW Aluminum (Goose Creek, South Carolina): </strong>Aluminum Insider, “<a href="https://aluminiuminsider.com/first-phase-of-jw-aluminums-us300-mm-expansion-at-se-south-carolina-plant-nearing-completion/">First phase of JW Aluminum’s US$300MM expansion at SE South Carolina plant nearing completion</a>,” August 28, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>JW Aluminum (Russellville, Arkansas): </strong>Global News Wire, “<a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/09/20/1573869/0/en/JW-Aluminum-to-invest-over-30-million-in-equipment-upgrades-for-foil-production.html">JW Aluminum to invest over $30 million in equipment upgrades for foil production</a>,” September 20, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Kobelco Aluminum Products &amp; Extrusions (Bowling Green, Kentucky): </strong>Team Kentucky, “<a href="https://ced.ky.gov/Newsroom/NewsPage/12192018_Kobelco">Newly opened Kobelco Aluminum plant in Bowling Green to grow by $42 million</a>,” December 19, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Kobelco Aluminum Products &amp; Extrusions (Bowling Green, Kentucky): </strong>Don Sergent, “<a href="https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2018/09/20/1573869/0/en/JW-Aluminum-to-invest-over-30-million-in-equipment-upgrades-for-foil-production.html">Kobelco Aluminum expanding, adding 90 employees</a>,” <em>Big Daily News, </em>December 19, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Logan Aluminum (Logan County, Kentucky): </strong>Sydny Anderson, “Tri-Arrows Aluminum to invest $125 million in Logan County Facility,” 91.3WKMS Murray State’s NPR Station<em>,</em> May 25, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Magnode (Butler County, Ohio): </strong>Eric Schwartzberg, “<a href="https://www.journal-news.com/news/already-been-big-month-for-this-butler-county-company/qs0FuedilwfvV25KfQDJ0K/">It’s already been a big month for this 70-year-old Butler County company, and a $13M expansion is coming</a>,” <em>Journal-News, </em>January 24, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Matalco (Franklin, Kentucky): </strong>Brian Taylor, “<a href="https://www.recyclingtoday.com/article/matalco-aluminum-recycling-plant-kentucky-2021-canada/">Matalco to add Kentucky location</a>,” <em>Recycling Today, </em>March 22, 2021.</p>
<p><strong>Matalco (Wisconsin Rapids, Wisconsin): </strong>Caitlin Shuda, “<a href="https://www.wisconsinrapidstribune.com/story/money/2019/01/30/wisconsin-rapids-matalco-build-aluminum-factory-80-jobs/2715917002/">Aluminum manufacturer Matalco to build plant in Wisconsin Rapids, hire 80 full-timers</a>,” <em>Wisconsin Rapids Daily Tribune, </em>January 30, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Matalco (Various): </strong>Matalco, “<a href="https://www.matalco.com/pdf/Matalco%20Press%20Release%20Re%20Greenfield%20Expansion,%20March%2006%202018.pdf">Matalco Inc announces multiple Greenfield aluminum plants for production in Q-3, 2019</a>,” March 6, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Mid-States Aluminum (Fond du Lac, Wisconsin): </strong>Mid-States Aluminum Corp., “<a href="https://midstal.com/pr_new_press_line.html">Mid-States Aluminum invests in new press line and expands facility</a>,” December 6, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Nippon Light Metal Georgia (Adairsville, Georgia): </strong>Georgia Office of the Governor, “<a href="https://gov.georgia.gov/press-releases/2019-11-21/nippon-light-metal-georgia-build-facility-create-110-jobs-bartow-co">Nippon Light Metal Georgia to build facility, create 110 jobs in Bartow Co.</a>,” November 21, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Northern Indian Anodize (Fort Wayne, Indiana): </strong>96.3 XKE Fort Wayne’s Classic Rock, “<a href="https://963xke.com/startup-aluminum-company-will-create-up-to-48-new-jobs/">Startup aluminum company will create up to 48 new jobs</a>,” June 20, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Novelis (Guthrie, Kentucky): </strong>Novelis, “<a href="https://www.novelis.com/contact/guthrie/">Guthrie, Kentucky</a>,” n.d.</p>
<p><strong>Novelis (Greensboro, Georgia): </strong>PR Newswire, “<a href="https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/novelis-invests-36-million-to-expand-upgrade-aluminum-recycling-capabilities-in-greensboro-ga-300948282.html">Novelis invest $36 million to expand, upgrade aluminum recycling capabilities in Greensboro, Ga.</a>,” October 30, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Owl’s Head Alloys (Bowling Green, Kentucky): </strong>Nicole Burton and Jack Mazurak, “<a href="http://www.columbiamagazine.com/index.php?sid=95826">Owl’s Head, aluminum recycler, expanding in Bowling Green</a>,” <em>Columbia Magazine,</em> February 22, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Pennex Aluminum (Columbiana County, Ohio): </strong>Tom Giambroni, “<a href="https://www.morningjournalnews.com/news/local-news/2018/09/pennex-aluminum-moves-ahead-with-expansion/">Pennex Aluminum moves ahead with expansion</a>,” <em>Morning Journal News,</em> September 30, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Service Center Metals (Prince George County, Virginia): </strong>John Reid Blackwell, “<a href="http://www.richmond.com/business/local/prince-george-based-service-center-metals-plans-million-expansion-creating/article_c40e452c-b376-5540-b89a-0659b637a27e.html">Prince George-based Service Center Metals plans $45 million expansion, creating 58 jobs</a>,” <em>Richmond Times-Dispatch, </em>January 11, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Sundaram-Clayton Limited (Dorchester County, South Carolina): </strong>Business Facilities, “<a href="https://businessfacilities.com/2018/11/sundaram-clayton-dorchester-county-south-carolina-expansion/">Sundaram-Clayton Limited investing $40M in South Carolina expansion</a>,” November 29, 2018.</p>
<p><strong>Superior Extrusion (Gwinn, Michigan): </strong>Lisa Bowers, “<a href="https://www.miningjournal.net/news/front-page-news/2017/09/u-p-company-solidifies-expansion-plans-with-10-5-million-investment/">U.P. company solidies expansion plans with $10.5 million investment</a>,” <em>The Mining Journal,</em> September 28, 2017.</p>
<p><strong>Texarkana Aluminum (Texarkana, Texas): </strong>Rob Sitterley, “<a href="https://artxredi.com/texarkana-aluminum/">Texarkana Aluminum highlights record facility investment</a>,” <em>ARTX Regional Economic Development Inc. (REDI), </em>October 17, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Western Extrusion (Carrollton, Texas): </strong>Light Metal Age, “<a href="https://www.lightmetalage.com/news/industry-news/casthouse/western-extrusions-orders-complete-billet-casthouse/">Western Extrusions order complete billet casthouse</a>,” August 22, 2019.</p>
<p><strong>Western Extrusion (Carrollton, Texas): </strong>Western Extrusion, “<a href="https://www.westernextrusions.com/capabilities/">Western Extrusion announces expansion to include new 5,100 ton 14-inch press</a>,” January 24, 2018.</p>
<h2>Endnotes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a> Section 232 provisions allow for the imposition of tariffs if the Commerce Department finds that imports are threatening America’s industrial base. See Commerce 2018.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a> Employment effects data in this report measure February 2018 through February 2020, except as otherwise noted.</p>
<p data-note_number='3'><a href="#_ref3" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note3">3. </a> Data are reported jointly for U.S. and Canadian shipments of semi-finished aluminum products, due to the closely integrated nature of the North American industry; however, U.S. production of semi-finished goods far outstrips Canadian production, and market shares have remained in stable proportion in recent years. See USITC 2017, Tables 2.4&#8211;2.7.</p>
<p data-note_number='4'><a href="#_ref4" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note4">4. </a> In fact, the consultant’s finding of 5.7% aluminum content in the canned beer industry is lower than the 10% content reported in official U.S. industry input-output analysis data. Still, we find zero statistical evidence of a causal relationship in assessing whether aluminum prices lead to price increases in canned beer and other products.</p>
<p data-note_number='5'><a href="#_ref5" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note5">5. </a> The Federal Funds Rate—the interest rate at which depository institutions borrow and lend federal balances held at Federal Reserve Banks—is the primary target for Federal Reserve monetary policy actions, and is linked both in theory and in practice to changes in price levels, as well as to the level of demand for goods and services across the economy.</p>
<p data-note_number='6'><a href="#_ref6" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note6">6. </a> In fact, the market for secondary semi-finished aluminum products—extrusions and sheet that will be consumed as inputs to further downstream manufactured products—are typically produced at a “conversion price,” a fixed rate above the market price for aluminum combining the global London Metal Exchange (LME) price and the U.S. Midwest premium. Although increases in primary aluminum pass through to semi-finished products mechanically due to this market structure, the evidence presented here shows negligible effects on downstream consumers of these intermediate aluminum products.</p>
<p data-note_number='7'><a href="#_ref7" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note7">7. </a> The Trade Partnership produced two studies of the effects of the steel and aluminum tariffs. The first, published in March, covered the tariffs only, and the second, published in June, considered the possible impacts of retaliation on U.S. employment, by industry.</p>
<p data-note_number='8'><a href="#_ref8" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note8">8. </a> Estimates of agricultural employment are available only on an annual basis. No comparative data are available yet for trends in farm employment. Employment data for some sectors (NAICS four-digit and lower) is available only through September 2018, as shown in Table 2.</p>
<h2>References</h2>
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