On May 17, 2011, EPI Vice President Ross Eisenbrey and Immigration Policy Analyst Daniel Costa submitted public comments to the U.S. Department of Labor on its proposed rule to overhaul the H-2B guestworker program. The new rule includes significant improvements to the program, including:

• Better worker protections for both U.S. and foreign workers;
• Increased recruiting requirements to attract unemployed U.S. workers for open positions;
• Requiring that employers pay transportation costs for U.S. workers to and from a worksite when the same benefit is provided to H-2B workers; and
• Provisions that protect H-2B workers who wish to organize, and shield them from retaliation by their employers for doing so.

EPI’s comments are supportive of the proposed regulatory changes but also outline ways in which the program could be improved in order to strengthen protections for both U.S. and foreign workers.

Read the public comments

Listen to this event: [listen to stream] [download MP3]

Internships, once a rare bonus for students, have become a standard component of a college graduate’s resume. Despite their near universality and their necessity for students entering the job market, the majority of internships at non-profits and in government are unpaid, putting many low- and middle-income students at a considerable disadvantage.

Join the Economic Policy Institute, Demos, and Campus Progress at a forum to discuss the economic challenges that prevent students from taking internships and how federal policy can make a difference.

This event coincides with the Economic Policy Institute and Dēmos release of Paving the Way through Paid Internships: A Proposal to Expand Educational Opportunities for Low-Income College Students, a paper that proposes federal financial aid to help fund public service internships for low-income students. In order to minimize administrative costs, the funding would be distributed to colleges through the existing, successful Federal Work-Study Program; colleges would then have discretion to disburse the funds to qualified, eligible students.

Location: Economic Policy Institute, Washington, D.C.

Presenters:

Shirley Sagawa, JD, Visiting Fellow at the Center for American Progress. A national expert on children and youth policy, Shirley Sagawa has been called a “founding mother of the modern service movement” for her work on national service.

Nancy K. Cauthen, PhD, Director of the Economic Opportunity Program at Dēmos. Dr. Cauthen brings two decades of experience researching and analyzing public policies that promote opportunity and reduce economic hardship.

Kathryn Edwards, Researcher at the Economic Policy Institute and co-author of “Paving the Way through Paid Internships.”

Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Researcher at the Economic Policy Institute and Visiting Researcher at the George Washington University, co-author of “Paving the Way through Paid Internships.”

VIDEO NOW AVAILABLE (BELOW)

Currency manipulation makes imports artificially cheap and artificially inflates the prices of U.S. exports. This puts U.S. manufacturers “at a huge competitive disadvantage,” as President Obama recently noted. Research by leading economists has consistently shown that five countries are the most egregious currency manipulators—China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Taiwan and Singapore. The EPI Forum on Currency Manipulation will feature economists Fred Bergsten and Paul Krugman, both of whom have recently called for major Chinese currency appreciation. Business and labor executives will also discuss the impacts of currency manipulation on U.S. manufacturers and workers.

Panel I:
Impacts of Chinese Currency Manipulation on U.S. Businesses and Workers

Moderator:
 Scott Paul – Executive Director, Alliance for American Manufacturing

Panelists:
 Leo W. Gerard – International President, United Steel Workers

 Laurie S. Moncrieff – President, Adaptive Manufacturing Services and Schmald Tool & Die, Inc.

 William J. Jones – Chairman, Cummins-Allison Corporation

Panel II:
Chinese Currency Manipulation: The case for change in U.S. policy

Moderator:
 Bruce Stokes – International Economics Columnist, National Journal

Panelists:
 Paul Krugman – Columnist, New York Times; Professor, Princeton University and Nobel Laureate

 C. Fred Bergsten – Director, Peterson Institute for International Economics

 Robert E. Scott – Senior Economist, Economic Policy Institute

Video now available:

Unemployment Rate

While no single number captures all the nuances in the health of the labor market, the unemployment rate is considered one of the most important economic indicators.

The unemployment rate measures the share of workers in the labor force who do not currently have a job but are actively looking for work. People who have not looked for work in the past four weeks are not included in this measure.  It is important to keep in mind that the rate measures the percent of unemployed job seekers in the labor force—the sum of employed and unemployed persons—and not the entire population.  

There are several reasons the unemployment rate rises or falls. Although a clear reason is a change in the number of job seekers, the unemployment rate may also be affected by a change in the size of the labor force. When workers become discouraged and stop looking for employment, they leave  the labor force. It is common in economic downturns for the labor force to decrease (or increase more slowly than usual) in size as many give up on finding work and are therefore no longer counted as officially unemployed. For that reason, economists often point out that the unemployment rate is misleading and understates the labor market’s weakness. Conversely, during an economic recovery, high unemployment rates can persist despite an increase in jobs as more workers begin looking for work and re-enter the labor market.

Underemployment Rate

Underemployment includes three groups of people:  unemployed workers who  are actively looking for work;  involuntarily part-time workers who want full-time work but have had to settle for part-time hours; and so-called marginally-attached workers  who want and are available to work,  but have given up actively looking. Together, these three groups  provide a more comprehensive measure of slack in the labor market. This  measure does not include people who have had to settle for employment below their skill or experience level, such as the mechanical engineer who is driving a cab.  There is currently no data that track this form of underemployment.

Compared to other labor force statistics, the underemployment rate is relatively new; the census only began to track underemployment as it is currently measured in  1994. The lack of historical data can make it difficult to put current numbers in context with past labor market performance. Regardless, underemployment’s broader definition of labor market underutilization makes it an important economic indicator.

Employment-to-Population Ratio

The Employment-to-Population Ratio is a useful, broad-brush measure. It simply shows the number of people currently employed as a share of the total working-age population, which is the number of civilian, non-institutionalized persons, age 16 and over. This measure does not typically  change dramatically from month to month, but even minor changes help  identify which segments of the population are experiencing the most job loss or gain.This ratio also compliments the  unemployment rate in assessing the health of the labor market. The unemployment rate has shortcomings that the employment-to-population ratio does not. As mentioned above, the unemployment rate is affected by the size of the labor force. As the labor market falters, the unemployment rate may actually fall if workers give up looking for work, and as the labor market is recovering, unemployment can rise because more people are entering the labor force as they start to look for work again. The employment-to-population ratio, because it is unaffected by voluntary changes in labor force participation, is a useful indicator of current labor market conditions. Lows in the employment-to- population ratio correspond with economic downturns. The employment-to-population ratio holds clear and discernible implications for the labor market, both among and between segments of the population.

Labor Force Participation Rate

The Labor Force Participation Rate shows the number of people in the labor force—defined as the sum of employed and unemployed persons—as a share of the total working-age population, which is the number of civilian, non-institutionalized people, age 16 and over. It is similar to the employment-to-population ratio but different in one important aspect:  it includes the numbers of people  with a job as well as the number actively looking for work.

Month-to-month changes in the employed and unemployed in the labor force  are relatively small compared to the size of the entire working-age population. Although minor changes in the labor force participation rate can be  informative, it is often used to study long-term trends among different segments of the population.  In 1973, for example, women had a 46% participation rate while men were near 80%. In the three and a half decades since, women have seen steadily increasing labor force participation, nearing 60% in 2007. Male labor force participation, on the other hand, has been decreasing, nearing 70% in 2007.

Comparing different segments of the population helps show  where the labor market succeeds or fails in incorporating the working-age population.

Payroll Employment

Payroll employment is taken from the Current Establishment Survey, which, unlike the household-based Current Population Survey used to track the  indicators described above, is a survey of employers. For this reason, the data is examined largely by industry, rather than by demographic subgroups of the population, showing the number of jobs in different sectors of the economy. Total nonfarm employment is the total number of jobs, part time or full time, in non-farm establishments. Total private employment excludes  jobs in federal, state, and local government. In order to compare between different time periods, the change in payroll employment is indexed to a benchmark. The number of jobs in the economy has grown substantially over time as the population has expanded, and losing or gaining 100,000 jobs in 1970 has a different impact than losing or gaining 100,000 jobs in 2000. This index shows  the percentage change in jobs from any point in time and provides  a way to compare payroll changes at different points in time.

Job Seekers per Job Opening

The number of job seekers per job opening is another indicator of the strength of the labor market. It is the ratio of unemployed persons—those workers who do not have a job but are actively looking for work—to the number of job openings. Data on unemployment are from the Current Population Survey.  Job openings are measured in the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).

The JOLTS series is very new, with the data only available since the year 2000. The lack of historical data makes it difficult to put recent numbers into a larger context. However, it remains an important indicator that measures the number of unemployed people in relation to the availability of new jobs, and offers a sense of how easy or hard it is to find employment at any given time.

Gross Domestic Product

Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the mark
et value of all goods and services produced in the United States. Many would consider GDP to be the most important measure of a nation’s economic performance. Generally speaking, national economic performance is considered strong if GDP is rising but weak if GDP is falling.  When defining a recession, the National Bureau of Economic Research closely looks at the length and magnitude of GDP decline.

As an economic indicator, GDP is unrivaled in its comprehensiveness, but it nevertheless has significant shortcomings. It places paramount importance on the quantity, but not the quality, of growth. It also  fails to capture the distribution of economic growth or the sustainability of growth. For example, the housing bubble was captured as a pure economic gain. Residential investment including the building of new homes and home renovations surged to historic highs, but the overinvestment in homes eventually caused a deep recession that has left in its wake thousands of empty, unused houses. This GDP growth was unsustainable.  Moreover, the 2001-07 business cycle was  the first expansion  on record where the typical family did not see a rise in income: median household income over this period was essentially flat even as GDP rose. This combination of overall growth and flat median incomes necessarily implies rising inequality between the country’s top earners and everyone else, but that disparity was not reflected in GDP, which grew steadily during this time.

GDP has four major components. Personal consumption expenditure measures the market value of goods and services consumed by individuals. Gross domestic private investment includes the value of new residential investments, non-residential investment in structures and equipment, and the change in the value of business inventories. Net Exports are defined as the value of exports less the value of imports. Government consumption expenditures and gross investment includes government spending on goods and services; this spending, however does not include transfer payments (such as Social Security), which are captured in other components of GDP, such as consumer spending.

In order to compare between different time periods, the change in GDP, much like payroll employment explained above, is indexed to a certain benchmark. This index provides  the percentage change in GDP from any point in time and gives a way to compare GDP changes at different points in time.

Capacity Utilization

Capacity utilization measures the share of industrial capacity in the United States currently in use. It is one of the chief measures of the output gap, or the difference between how much the country is producing and  how much it could be producing.  For a simple example, if  there were 100 factories in the United States, and only 50 were open and operating,  capacity utilization would be at 50%. The Federal Reserve, when calculating the monthly measurements, provides more detail than whether a factory is open or closed.

The optimal capacity utilization rate is not 100%; that would imply every factory in the nation running flat-out, day and night. A more reasonable “target” capacity utilization rate is either the long-run average of the last 40 years (80.5%) or the average prevailing in non-recessionary years during that time (81.0%).

Note: To see more recent labor market numbers, visit the State of Working America website, updated every month as new data becomes available.

Jobs and Unemployment

• Unemployment Rate (xls)
• Underemployment Rate (xls)
• Payroll Employment – Level and Changes (xls)
• Employment to Population Ratio (xls)
• Labor Force Participation Rate (xls)
• Job Seekers per Job Opening (xls)

Economic Activity

• Gross Domestic Product (xls)
• Capacity Utilization (xls)

State Statistics

• Unemployment (xls)
• Employment (xls)

The State of Working America Data Library provides researchers, media, and the public with easily accessible, up-to-date, and comprehensive historical data on the American labor force.

It is compiled from Economic Policy Institute analysis of government data sources. Use it to research wages, inequality, and other economic indicators over time and among demographic groups.

State of Working America Data Library

Comprehensive economic data on jobs, wage and compensation trends, and consumer prices from EPI’s flagship publication that debuted in 1988.

Economy Track Data

Recent comparison data across recessions (between 1973-2009), including unemployment, underemployment, labor force participation, and other economic indicators covered on the Economy Track website.

The State of Working America Data Library provides researchers, media, and the public with easily accessible, up-to-date, and comprehensive historical data on the American labor force. All the data, none of the confusion at <a href=”https://data.epi.org” target=”_blank” rel=”noopener”>data.epi.org</a>.

Compiled from Economic Policy Institute analysis of government data sources, use it to research wages, inequality, and other economic indicators over time and among demographic groups. <a href=”https://data.epi.org” target=”_blank” rel=”noopener”><strong>Explore the new Data library →</strong></a>

<hr>

The State of Working America, an ongoing analysis published since 1988 by EPI, includes a wide variety of data on family incomes, wages, jobs, unemployment, wealth, and poverty that allow for a clear, unbiased understanding of the economy’s effect on the living standards of working Americans.

2008/2009 Edition

Download individual tables in Microsoft Excel (.xls) or Zip (.zip) format below:

Jobs

• Unemployment rate by age, January 1948 to July 2009
  [zip] [xls]
• Part-time employment as a percent of total employment, January 1973 to August 2008
  [zip] [xls]
• Employment rates by gender (persons age 25-54), 1979-2008q1
  [zip] [xls]
• Long-term unemployed as a share of unemployed, and the unemployment rate, 1979 to 2008q2
  [zip] [xls]
• Unemployment rate, January 1948 to August 2008
  [zip] [xls]
• Gross Job gains and losses, 1990q2 to 2007q4
  [zip] [xls]
• Labor force and total non-farm employment, 1979-August 2008
  [zip] [xls]

Wage and Compensation Trends

• Real and current values of the minimum wage, 1960-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Share of all workers earning poverty-level hourly wages, 1973-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Dimensions of wage inequality, log wage differentials, 1973-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Hourly wage decile cutoffs for all workers, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Hourly wage decile cutoffs for male workers, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Hourly wage decile cutoffs for female workers, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Hourly and weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers, 1947-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Real hourly wage for all by education, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Men’s real hourly wage by education, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Women’s real hourly wage by education, 1973-2007 (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers (25 years and older), annual averages (2007 dollars)
  [zip] [xls]
• Estimated wage premium for college and high school graduates, 1973-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Productivity and median and average compensation, 1973-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Decomposition of total and within-group wage inequality, 1973-2007
  [zip] [xls]
• Change in private sector employer-provided health insurance coverage, 1979-2006
  [zip] [xls]
• Change in private sector employer-provided pension insurance coverage, 1979-2006
  [zip] [xls]

Prices

• Consumer price index — all urban consumers (CPI-U) (1982-84=100)
  [zip] [xls]
• Consumer price index research series using current methods (CPI-U-RS), (1977=100)
  [zip] [xls]

Archived data: View and print all tables from The State of Working America 2006/2007 in Adobe Acrobat (pdf) or Microsoft Excel (xls) format.

[THIS PIECE ORIGINALLY APPEARED IN TAPPED, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE BLOG, ON MAY 9, 2007.]

By Jared Bernstein

As predicted, those wild and crazy members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decided to keep their feet off both the brake and the accelerator, holding interest rates steady at 5.25%, where it has been stuck since June last year. That was widely expected. The important thing is that, despite new evidence that the economy is slowing, their accompanying statement was virtually unchanged from that of their last meeting.

I think they’re falling behind the curve, and that could have serious negative consequences for economic growth.

Perhaps you have a life that doesn’t involve fascination with a bunch of high-powered economists who have gotten together every six weeks for the past year, decided not to do anything, written a few paragraphs to that effect, and gone home.

I don’t have that life. We Fed watchers troll those statements for signs that even though the tune’s the same, the words are different. That is, though they left rates alone, did the Fed suggest that their view of the economy has shifted at all?

Not at all. Today’s statement was almost a carbon copy of March’s statement.

Before we get to the significance of no change, a quick comment on context. The FOMC, under the leadership of Fed chairman “Big Ben” Bernanke, meets periodically to decide whether they should try to goose or restrain the pace of economic growth by lowering or raising the federal funds rate.

That’s the interest rate that banks charge each other for loans, and when it goes up, as it did 17 times since mid-2004, it raises the cost of borrowing throughout the economy. That, in turn, usually dials economic activity down a bit, with the ultimate target being inflation. Bernanke and company are solidly on record saying that they’ll sleep better when core inflation is growing in a range of 1-2 percent. (They like the core because it leaves out food and energy prices, which are both more volatile and less amenable to Fed rate changes).

By holding steady for the past year, the Fed has been signaling that they view the economy as not too hot, not too cold. However, Fed rate changes take some time to work through the system, so to be effective they’ve got to be forward looking.

Ergo, the importance of their statement, which tells us what they see down the pike, and hints at where rates might be heading. In March they wrote that their “predominant policy concern” was that “inflation will fail to moderate as expected.” Today, they said … are you ready? … “the Committee’s predominant policy concern remains the risk that inflation will fail to moderate as expected.” (For this they get the big money?)

In fact, things economic have changed for the worse since their last meeting. The two big numbers are gross domestic product, which came in at 1.3% for the first quarter of the year, and last month’s employment report, which revealed a significant slowdown in the rate of hiring. In the GDP report, slumping housing shaved a point off of the economy’s growth, as it had in the prior two quarters. On the jobs side, the private sector added 63,000 jobs, the worst showing in a couple of years.

Moreover, wage growth slowed, which is big for the Fed, since they worry that tight labor markets could lead to higher wages that get passed through to prices. With slower wage growth and fewer employment opportunities, a forward-looking Fed needs to start worry less about inflation and more about growth.

In other words, we want them to start thinking seriously about cutting rates to offset the various drags on economic growth right now. By failing to adjust their statement, they showed that they’re down-weighting these factors, and that’s leads me to worry that they’re already behind the curve.

Despite the fact that wage growth has been steady, not accelerating, Fed officials have expressed too much concern about what, in a global economy with severely diminished worker bargaining power, is the phantom menace of wage-push inflation. Also, as noted, these guys and gals are targeting inflation, not job growth, and most inflation readings have been in or only slightly above the upper level of their (awfully cramped, IMHO) comfort zone.

So, Big Ben et al: this is no time to be hawkish on price growth. Sure, the stock market is frothy, but every other important sector of the economy — housing, investment, manufacturing, jobs — is showing weakness that is sure to show up as slower inflation sooner than later. The housing slump, by shutting down the stimulus of mortgage equity withdrawals, is a particular source of concern, especially with wage growth slowing. Ask yourselves, oh great ones, if economic activity doesn’t soon accelerate, won’t consumption, that one consistently stalwart component of recent GDP reports, stumble?

So, get to work FOMC, and stop xeroxing last month’s statement. Times are changing and you need to reflect that in your June meeting so you can cut rates at your August meeting.

Jared Bernstein is a senior economist at the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C.

[ POSTED TOV IEWPOINTS ON MAY 10, 2007. ]

[ THIS OP-ED ORIGINALLY APPEARED IN THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE  AND THE JACKSON (MS) CLARION-LEDGER ON OCTOBER 19, 2006. ]

The U.S. economy’s on the table

By  Jared Bernstein

How about a little election year Jeopardy? Answer: “Are you better off than you were four weeks ago?” Question: “How are the Republicans hoping to play the economy in the upcoming midterm election?”

For the party that controls the White House and both houses of Congress, the fact that retail gas prices are down 70 cents over the past two months is unquestionably a boon. Sure, there’s a lot going on right now that’s making conservative strategists as jumpy as spit on a skillet. But incumbents are hoping that the drop in the price of oil takes the economy off the table as a resonant issue for challengers to exploit.

It’s true that voters have a lot on their minds right now: the Iraq war and terror are at the top of issue-priority polls. But the economy is consistently right behind them, typically in second or third place (http://www.pollingreport.com/prioriti.htm). And this is significant, given a) Karl Rove’s strategy of raising the terror threat to the point where it crowds out any other concerns, and b) the gas price decline.

There are at least two good reasons why the economy remains solidly in play as an election issue: first, the negative trends affecting working families, and second, the way the administration has tried to spin those trends.

Start with the second point. When asked recently about why the administration’s good news on the economy was failing to reach the public, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson responded “That’s the $64,000 question.”

Well, Paulson’s $64,000 question has a $3,000 answer. That’s how much the inflation-adjusted income of the typical working-age household is down since 2000.

Rob Portman, the head of the Office of Management and Budget, said the problem was that “we probably haven’t done as good a job communicating the strength of our economy.”

Or maybe it’s the fact that the buying power of the typical, full-time worker’s weekly paycheck is down 3 percent since this recovery got underway in late 2001.

On this point, two top Bush economic officials recently assured readers of The Wall Street Journal that real wages would be rising were it not for higher energy costs, and helpfully reminded wage earners of all the wonderful attributes of the energy bill the president signed last year.

Among the millions of workers who’ve lost ground in recent years, I’d be amazed if you could find one person who was moved by that argument. “Gee, it’s been tough paying the bills lately – were it not for that sweet energy bill last year, I’d be feelin’ pretty disappointed about now.”

It’s not that these officials are wrong about some impressive aspects of the current economy. Productivity growth, a vital indicator of our increased efficiency in producing goods and services, has been quite stellar in recent years. But put that together with these wage and income trends, and you see the problem: These officials are praising the bigger and better pie baked by the American work force, but they’re missing the fact that the bakers are walking away with smaller slices.

Granted, we in the electorate have short memories and we’re easily distracted. And sure, we’re better off than we were a few weeks ago when prices at the pump were higher. But the protracted gap between the economy that the elites are crowing about and the economy working families live in every day remains fair game.

For those who want to win that game, the challenge is clear: Tell us what you’re going to do to help reconnect growth and living standards.

Jared Bernstein is the Director of the Living Standards program at the Economic Policy Institute in Washington, D.C.

[ POSTED TO VIEWPOINTS ON OCTOBER 20, 2006. ]

This is an archive page — click here for the current data.

Download a spreadsheet containing all tables presented below:
[Download in Excel (xls) format ]

View and print individual tables in Microsoft Excel (xls) and Adobe Acrobat (pdf) formats:

Jobs

Labor force participation rates, 1954-2004 [pdf] [xls]

Employment by full-time and part-time status, 1955-2004 [ pdf] [xls]

Part-time employment as a percent of total employment by gender, 1968-2004 [pdf] [xls]

Unemployment: rate and share unemployed for 27 months or more [pdf] [xls]

Unemployment rates, 1948-2004 [pdf] [xls]

Average weeks of unemployment and the unemployment rate, 1948-2004 [pdf] [xls]

Underemployment rate and its components, 1994-2004 [pdf] [xls]

Change in private sector employer-provided health insurance coverage, 1979-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Change in private sector employer-provided pension insurance coverage, 1979-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Wage and Compensation Trends

Real and current values of the minimum wage, 1960-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Share of all workers earning poverty-level hourly wages, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Dimensions of wage inequality, log wage differentials, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Hourly wage decile cutoffs for all workers, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Hourly wage decile cutoffs for male workers, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Hourly wage decile cutoffs for female workers, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Hourly and weekly earnings of production and nonsupervisory workers, 1947-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Real hourly wage for all by education, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Men’s real hourly wage by education, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Women’s real hourly wage by education, 1973-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Median usual weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers (25 years and older), annual averages (2004 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Estimated wage premium for college and high school graduates, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Productivity and median and average compensation, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Decomposition of total and within-group wage inequality, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Unionization

Union coverage in the United States, 1973-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Family Earnings and Income Trends

Median family income, 1947-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Annual work hours for middle-income husbands and wives with children, age 25-54, 1979-2002 [pdf] [xls]

Mean family income by quintile and top 5%, 1966-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Family income limits by quintile and top 5%, 1947-2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Share of aggregate family income by quintile and and top 5%, 1947-2003 [pdf] [xls]

Families by median and mean income by race of householder, 1947 to 2003 (2003 dollars) [pdf] [ xls]

Growth of family work hours compared to average weekly hours, 1975-2002 (1975=100) [pdf] [xls]

Average real after-tax income levels, 1979-2001, by income group (2001 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Average real pre-tax income levels, 1979-2001, by income group (2001 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Growth of average hourly wages, benefits, and compensation, 1948-2002 (2002 dollars) [pdf] [xls]

Prices

Consumer price index all urban consumers (CPI-U) (1982-84=100) [pdf] [xls]

Consumer price index research series using current methods (CPI-U-RS), (1977=100) [pdf] [xls]

See also Appendix A and Appendix B from The State of Working America 2004-05.