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	<title>Economic Growth | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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	<title>Economic Growth | Economic Policy Institute</title>
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		<title>A hot economy for billionaires, but not for everyone else: People are right to feel cold about the economy</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/a-hot-economy-for-billionaires-but-not-for-everyone-else-people-are-right-to-feel-cold-about-the-economy/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2026 13:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=328379</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[AI is the main driver of economic strength now, but its rewards aren’t equally shared. They’re going to the billionaire class.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="quick-card">
<p><span style="font-size: 18px;"><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; color: #1372ae;">Key takeaways&nbsp;</span></strong></span></p>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">Public sentiment about the economy and headline indicators seem at odds with each other again. Decent topline numbers reported in recent data releases are coinciding with growing dissatisfaction from households.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">Unlike earlier this decade, however, this divergence is easily explained since there is really only one source of strength in the economy right now—spending associated with the great race to build out AI tools.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-size: 16px;">The spending associated with this race concentrates its benefits narrowly in the economy while imposing costs broadly on typical families. And it has done little to boost the wider labor market, where softness has led to consistent decelerating wage growth over the past year.&nbsp;</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Starting this summer and even continuing past the midterm elections, President Trump has been <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/11/what-they-are-saying-blowout-october-jobs-report-smashes-expectations/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">trying to convince Americans</a> that the United States “has the hottest economy in the world.” And by some measures the U.S. economy does seem pretty warm: The Federal Reserve raised interest rates six weeks ago in response to stubbornly high inflation. While they held off raising rates at last week’s meeting, there were two dissenters arguing for higher rates.</p>
<p>Further, third-quarter growth in gross domestic product (GDP) <a href="https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/gdp-advance-estimate-3rd-quarter-2026" target="_blank" rel="noopener">picked up to 3.4%</a>, after averaging 2% for a few years, and both private investment and consumption growth were strong.</p>
<p>Yet the public seems unimpressed by all of this—the 12-month average of the <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UMCSENT" target="_blank" rel="noopener">University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment</a> series hit its lowest point in history in the past month.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This all raises the question of whether this is just <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-post-pandemic-recovery-is-an-economic-policy-success-story-policymakers-took-the-best-way-through-a-rocky-path/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">one more period of divergence between perceptions</a> and hard economic data that has been a feature of the economy since COVID-19. The short answer is “no.” Unlike in 2023 and 2024, the hard economic data just one step below the headlines actually provide plenty of reasons explaining why the public is sour on the economy. Specifically:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>All the heat in the economy is coming from the race to build data centers and other investments in artificial intelligence (AI).</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>Boom times and a modern gold rush for billionaires shouldn’t be expected to make normal people all that happy—particularly when the gold the billionaires are looking for is technology that will steal jobs from typical workers.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>The labor market—where normal people earn their incomes—is not hot. And it’s cooling noticeably. Nominal wage growth is now consistent with below 2% price inflation, yet inflation is a lot higher than that.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>This labor market coolness is driven in part by the damaging effects of the Trump administration’s policy of cruel and arbitrary mass deportations. Growth in the U.S. labor force has slowed significantly in the past 15–18 months, and cities subject to large-scale ICE operations have suffered demonstrable economic damage.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li>Despite a cool labor market and weak wage growth that should be pulling down prices, inflation has risen sharply over the past year. The sources of these price increases are obviously linked to Trump administration policy choices—most notably their bombing of Iran.</li>
</ul>
<p><span id="more-328379"></span></p>
<h4>The hot: The AI build-out and how it’s not great for typical families&nbsp;</h4>
<p>Over the past year or more, <a href="https://shared.outlook.inky.com/link?domain=www.epi.org&amp;t=h.eJxFjcsOwiAUBX-lYS0FbLHFlb_SwlVvrIA8bBrjv1s06vLkTGYeJIeJ7CtyTsnHPWPzPNfgsXbhxHweJ9RDQmfZgHSwhqYzUNDOuutCF5cDvWWIBYjrHWcIYBjZVORSnB8QNfVu9SwU7YqmnIBNI97BxsO3xEE2Tdspbrg2x6aDrZKdHtV2MMII3TLRqVZy3vO-5jvBlZSlAqXiL0vAFPFnK4959_8b1y2eLyDQTI8.MEQCICr-Ln7HVOfDgAi9tDJMNKiqTnmy7nbUdhSd1ZQQc3s9AiAInkqEl7mVfoEBt1JWvchcnv1wAxEiho5vY2bhDifbxg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">well over half the growth</a> in the U.S. economy was coming directly from spending associated with the race for AI dominance. Part of this spending is the capital expenditures on data centers, hardware, and research and development. The other part is consumption spending financed by rising wealth that is the result of the stock market boom—or bubble—that is being driven by the excess valuation of firms associated with the AI race.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Neither of these spending flows benefits typical families in the here and now, while both are currently imposing real costs on families. The boom in AI capital expenditure is combining with the large increase in deficits driven by the 2025 Republican tax and spending bill to <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">push up interest rates</a> and make inputs across a range of industries more expensive. Construction labor and materials, for example, are notably more expensive due to the AI data center build-out. Most notably, AI data centers have significantly increased <a href="https://www.nature.com/articles/s44458-026-00152-5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">electricity demand</a> in many localities across the country, often translating into notably higher electricity costs. The same holds true for hardware. Chips of all kinds, including those for consumer electronics like TVs and phones and computers, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/ai-inflation-federal-reserve-434f02e62a02f9b92e57995d9375df57" target="_blank" rel="noopener">have seen very rapid inflation</a>.&nbsp;</p>
<p>One could argue that while the AI build-out is pressuring typical families’ affordability by driving up interest rates and a range of costs, the payoff from this build-out will eventually be good for these families, if AI notably increases the pace of productivity growth in the economy. That could happen, but it’s <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/miracle-or-myth-assessing-macroeconomic-productivity-gains-artificial-intelligence" target="_blank" rel="noopener">far from guaranteed</a>. Further, the stated goal of many of the companies racing to build AI tools is to <a href="https://finance.yahoo.com/news/openais-altman-foresees-ai-replacing-145011803.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener">replace human labor at scale</a>. This likely makes plenty of typical workers understandably skeptical about what’s in it for them.</p>
<p>The consumption spending financed by the <a href="https://shared.outlook.inky.com/link?domain=www.epi.org&amp;t=h.eJxFjcsOwiAUBX-lYS0FbLHFlb_SwlVvrIA8bBrjv1s06vLkTGYeJIeJ7CtyTsnHPWPzPNfgsXbhxHweJ9RDQmfZgHSwhqYzUNDOuutCF5cDvWWIBYjrHWcIYBjZVORSnB8QNfVu9SwU7YqmnIBNI97BxsO3xEE2Tdspbrg2x6aDrZKdHtV2MMII3TLRqVZy3vO-5jvBlZSlAqXiL0vAFPFnK4959_8b1y2eLyDQTI8.MEQCICr-Ln7HVOfDgAi9tDJMNKiqTnmy7nbUdhSd1ZQQc3s9AiAInkqEl7mVfoEBt1JWvchcnv1wAxEiho5vY2bhDifbxg" target="_blank" rel="noopener">stock market bubble</a> is by definition mostly being enjoyed by wealthy, not typical, families. <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:147;series:Corporate%20equities%20and%20mutual%20fund%20shares;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7,9;units:shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">85% of corporate equities</a> are held by the wealthiest 10% of families, and <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/dfa/distribute/chart/#quarter:147;series:Corporate%20equities%20and%20mutual%20fund%20shares;demographic:networth;population:1,3,5,7,9;units:shares" target="_blank" rel="noopener">roughly half</a> are held by the top 1%. To the degree this extra consumption spending by the wealthy makes it harder to bring down overall inflation, it is affirmatively imposing a cost on typical families.</p>
<p>The Trump administration seems to understand none of this, or perhaps they don’t care. They are enormous boosters of AI companies. It is hardly a stretch to say that the industrial policy of the U.S. has switched from a push to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/industrial-policy/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">build out renewable energy and supply-chain resilience</a> under the Biden administration to a <a href="https://datasociety.net/research-library/the-big-ai-state-how-the-trump-administration-is-shaping-us-industrial-policy-toward-global-technological-dominance/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">push to build out AI as quickly as possible</a> under the Trump administration. Among other activities, they have tried to <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/08/31/trump-data-centers-midterms" target="_blank" rel="noopener">bully localities into accepting AI data centers</a>, regardless of the costs to communities; the administration has greatly <a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/assessing-trumps-executive-order-on-ai-oversight" target="_blank" rel="noopener">relaxed oversight of the industry</a>; they tried to <a href="https://ai-regulation.com/senate-removes-ai-moratorium-obbba-2025/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">insert a provision</a> into their 2025 tax and spending bill that would have preempted state governments from undertaking any AI regulation; and they have sought to open <a href="https://www.reuters.com/legal/litigation/least-17-data-center-campuses-proposed-us-public-lands-group-says-2026-10-20/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">public lands</a> to data center construction.</p>
<p>In short, the primary source of heat in the U.S. economy right now is associated with the race to build out AI. This race is having negative effects on typical families by driving up interest rates and making borrowing more expensive. And the combination of costs including electricity and hardware, and the extra spending the AI race is driving from the wealthiest families is a reason why inflation rates remain stubbornly high. Further, typical families are reminded again and again that the goal of this race is to make their working lives less secure, and they see the Trump administration applauding that race every day.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Is there any possible reason why it’s a surprise normal Americans aren’t impressed with the economy’s “heat”?&nbsp;</p>
<h4>The not: The labor market is downright cool&nbsp;</h4>
<p>While the AI race is a source of heat in the U.S. economy, the labor market—where typical families have to earn the vast majority of their money—is decidedly cool.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=20k25" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overall unemployment rate</a> and the <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.png?g=20k26&amp;height=490" target="_blank" rel="noopener">share of prime-age adults</a> (25–54 years old) with a job have been roughly stable over the past year, but both are worse than in 2023–2024. But what is striking is the continuing deceleration of nominal wage growth (wages not adjusted for inflation).</p>
<p>Nominal wage growth was running at roughly 4% in January 2025, but it has since decelerated to just over 3%, with most of that deceleration happening just in the past year. Nominal wage growth of 3.5%–4% is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/wage-growth-targets-are-good-economics-if-you-get-the-details-right-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">essentially consistent with the Federal Reserve’s inflation target in the long run</a> (because nominal wages can grow with both inflation and productivity, they can grow 1.5%–2% faster than prices without putting upward pressure on the 2% inflation target).</p>


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<p>But while nominal wage growth is now consistent with very low inflation, <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/fredgraph.png?g=20k28&amp;height=490" target="_blank" rel="noopener">we don’t actually have very low inflation today</a>. The huge progress made in tamping down post-pandemic inflation between 2022 and 2024 has decisively reversed. The large spike in inflation post-pandemic and Russian invasion of Ukraine peaked in mid-2022 at just under 9%. By the end of 2024 it was 2.7%. As of the third quarter of 2026, it stood at 3.5%, and the most recent October data <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cpi.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">saw it rise further</a>.</p>
<p>Much of this is obviously due to the Trump administration’s decision to begin bombing Iran and the subsequent spike in oil prices. But the downward march of inflation had clearly stopped even before this. The Trump administration’s strategy-free tariff policy and its mass deportation program likely contribute to some of this—both by pinching on key parts of the economy’s supply side. Some of the rise in inflation is also accounted for by the AI build-out (again—electricity and hardware prices are up noticeably due to this).</p>
<p>The combination of a sharp deceleration in wage growth and acceleration in inflation has led to falling real (inflation-adjusted) wages. Real wages in October are lower than they were for most of 2025 and 2026.</p>
<p>The extent of wage deceleration is large enough to be puzzling. Unemployment is not at historic lows, but it is substantially lower than post-1979 averages. One speculative reason why wage growth might be particularly tame even in the face of relatively low unemployment is workers’ anxiety about the wave of news regarding AI’s ability to replace jobs. There are plenty of good reasons to think that this ability is radically overstated, and the effect of AI in displacing jobs will be far more modest and “normal” than what many scenarios (particularly those aggressively marketed by AI companies themselves) might indicate. But if people <em>think</em> mass displacement is a possibility and imagine their own job is on a knife’s edge of being replaced by AI, they might preemptively moderate their wage demands. Again—it’s a very speculative idea, but hardly one that seems impossible. And it again would fit a story in which what some people see as welcome heat in the economy is not helping typical workers.</p>
<p>Finally, <a href="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/214250-26746.png" target="_blank" rel="noopener">overall employment growth</a> has slowed significantly during the Trump administration. Employment grew by 166,000 jobs per month on average in 2023 and 2024, but in 2025 and 2026, this has slowed to 44,000. Lots of this is a large decline in net immigration, spurred both by deportations but also by reduced inflows of immigrants. Crucially, this decline spurred by lower immigration flows <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">has not helped U.S.-born workers</a>: Their unemployment rates are clearly higher in 2026 than in previous years. Further, cities where <a href="https://www.epi.org/event/mass-deportations-an-anti-worker-agenda-that-harms-everyone/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">ICE activity has been pronounced</a> have suffered <a href="https://www.nber.org/papers/w35129" target="_blank" rel="noopener">notable economic damage</a>, both from lower labor supply of immigrant workers but also from lower demand caused by a reduction in mobility.</p>
<h4>Downright cold: Anybody needing help from the safety net&nbsp;</h4>
<p>Even worse than the labor market is income support coming from the U.S. public sector. Large cuts to Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), and subsidies to those receiving health insurance through the Affordable Care Act (ACA) exchanges were all part of the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Medicaid and SNAP cuts officially went into effect in October 2026, but states had preemptively adopted many of the required policy changes before this, and enrollment in both programs has already begun to crater. Analyst Charles Gaba <a href="https://charlesgaba.substack.com/p/republican-healthcare-disaster-update" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimates</a> that from January 2025 to May 2026, Medicaid enrollment dropped by 5.9 million, and enrollments in ACA exchanges dropped by somewhere between 4.5–6 million. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities <a href="https://www.cbpp.org/research/food-assistance/snap-tracker-people-are-losing-food-assistance-as-the-harmful-2025" target="_blank" rel="noopener">estimates</a> that 5.5 million people lost SNAP benefits between July 2025 and July 2026.</p>
<p>These are literally the largest cuts to income support programs in the nation’s history. Tens of millions of families rely on these programs to afford the necessities of life. It is far from a surprise that these families aren’t feeling much welcome heat from the economy.</p>
<h4>Conclusion&nbsp;</h4>
<p>So, is the U.S. economy hot or not? If you’re a billionaire with a big stake in AI companies, it’s very hot. Or if you’re a seller of computer chips to these companies, also very hot. For the vast majority of U.S. families, though, this economy feels pretty cool, at best. Their wage growth has slowed, and prices are up. Anybody needing help from the safety net is facing a much uglier path than a year ago. All of this struggle coexisting with decent headline economic numbers is <em>purely the result of policy decisions</em>.</p>
<p>If the Trump administration had not cut Medicaid, SNAP, and ACA subsidies, the safety net would be providing more help to tens of millions of families. If this administration had not instituted chaotic and strategy-free tariff and immigration policies, Main Street businesses would be investing more, labor markets would be healthier, and prices wouldn’t be as high. And if the administration had not chosen to bomb Iran for no compelling reason, gas prices would be lower.</p>
<p>The divergence between headline numbers and people’s perceptions just isn’t that puzzling today, unlike earlier this decade.&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>AI and the economy: Your questions, answered</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/ai-and-the-economy-your-questions-answered/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:00:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=327528</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><span class="dropped">T</span></strong>his FAQ addresses the potential effect of artificial intelligence (AI) on the U.S. economy, particularly on labor markets. Many recent concerns about advances in AI—for example, its implications for national security, cybersecurity, or media disinformation—are largely outside our areas of expertise. But we&nbsp;do&nbsp;have considerable expertise regarding AI’s potential effect on labor markets and the broader impacts of technological change on the economy.</p>
<p>Further, many of AI’s potential effects on the economy are largely distinct from its consequences in these other areas, making the economic effects amenable to separate, granular analysis. For example, if poorly regulated and recklessly deployed AI systems lead to disruptive cybersecurity incidents, this could obviously have some economic effects (imagine a large bank suffering a cyberattack and depositors’ funds being frozen or inaccessible for a time). But regulatory failures and irresponsible management of AI systems that lead to cyberattacks do not really signal anything about the economic potential for AI tools to replace human labor at large scale or about how a rapid evaporation of AI investment or stock market gains would ripple through the economy. Nor does the right policy to mitigate possible cybersecurity or disinformation problems exacerbated by AI have much at all to do with the optimal policy to ensure working families’ prosperity and economic security in an age of AI.</p>
<p>Across all realms of AI policy, much attention has been paid to regulations that are specifically tailored to AI. This might be appropriate in some fields. However, we suggest that not enough attention has been paid to simply applying protections, norms, and institutions that predate AI to its uses. For example, tort law already makes it possible to hold companies liable for harms their products create. While the application of these existing legal remedies to AI hacking incidents could potentially be clarified, it doesn’t seem to require a huge new field of law or legislation to make this possible. Further, we should significantly <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/federal-ai-legislation/">strengthen</a> the application and enforcement of existing protections for workers. For example, employers should be held liable when they discriminate against workers, rather than being able to evade accountability because the discriminatory impact stemmed from their use of an algorithm or other automated system.</p>
<p>This notion that existing best practices, policies, and ideas are likely to be the best solutions to the problems AI may cause holds particularly true when it comes to its economic effects. The single largest concern expressed in this realm is AI’s potential to permanently displace very large amounts of human labor in a short period of time, causing economy-wide joblessness and wage declines. This FAQ will examine the economic evidence surrounding many of these concerns, but one key conclusion to state here is that even if such a scenario seemed plausible, it is highly unlikely that policies tailored specifically to AI tools’ potential uses in workplaces could ever keep up with, let alone proactively block, the ways that millions of private-sector firms are adopting these tools. What would reduce the most harm in such scenarios is implementing ideas already firmly on the policy agenda for many: keep the macroeconomy well managed and unemployment rates very low; provide effective protection for workers’ rights to form unions and bargain in the workplace over issues like how technology is implemented; offer a more protective social safety net that makes spells of joblessness less devastating for workers experiencing them; and implement progressive taxes—particularly higher tax rates on income derived from capital.</p>
<p>It is understandable that people are anxious about what AI could do to workers’ jobs and wages in coming years; the U.S. labor market has been rigged by policy for decades to make most workers insecure and keep their wages suppressed. AI deployed into this rigged labor market, as is happening currently, is unlikely to provide much benefit to most workers and could inject more churn and uncertainty. But making the policy changes noted above and deploying AI in a high-road economy where policy forces labor markets to perform better could allay many of these worries. In fact, if power were rebalanced in our economy to ensure workers are protected and empowered, AI might deliver real tangible benefits to most workers in the form of faster wage growth.</p>
<p>To be clear, arguing that broad, pre-existing ideas for how to unrig labor markets and generate shared prosperity are the best response to the economic concerns of AI does not mean we’re not taking AI “seriously” or recognizing its potential harms across many other realms. Instead, our recommendation stems from granular analysis of how AI might affect the economy and labor markets.</p>
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<h2>How should we think about AI&#8217;s likely effects on jobs and wages?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>The effect of AI on the wages and employment of typical U.S. workers will, like most technological advances, hinge almost entirely on the broader economic, social, and political context. Crucially, the U.S. labor market has been largely rigged by policy to suppress wages and opportunities for most workers. In this context, there is little upside for U.S. workers from widespread deployment of AI tools. There are also widespread fears that AI might threaten jobs and wages on a large scale. But were the labor market substantially unrigged, AI tools could well raise the living standards of working people. Nothing inherent to AI lets us forecast its potential effects on U.S. workers, for good or bad. This will be determined by policy.</p>
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<p>Being relatively agnostic about the direct effect of technology and AI on labor markets does not imply that we think labor markets have been working well for U.S. workers. On the contrary, unemployment has been too high and wage growth too low for <em>most</em> years in recent decades. But the roots of labor market dysfunction—both past and future—have very little to do with technological changes. Instead, this dysfunction is driven by the concerted policy push to exacerbate the extreme imbalance of power between typical workers and the corporate managers and capital owners who hire and supervise them.</p>
<p>It is important to get the facts and analysis right on the questions of why labor markets have not delivered enough jobs or acceptable wage growth, and what the real threats are to decent jobs in the future. The current fixation on AI—and the resulting pressures to respond with policies that wrap tightly around AI-specific parameters—distracts from the more fundamental problem of imbalanced power in labor markets, pulling policy in less useful directions.</p>
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<h2>What’s AI’s most immediate threat to the U.S. economy?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>AI-related spending accounts for roughly half of U.S. growth in recent quarters—a narrow and fragile base for economic growth. That spending comes from two sources: (1) tangible investment in data centers, hardware, and research, and (2) consumption financed by the AI-driven stock bubble. Both spending flows could reverse quickly if expectations change about the future profitability of AI tools. If this reversal happens, the economy may well enter recession unless policymakers react nimbly and smartly.</p>
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<p>There are two main spending flows associated with the race to develop and sell AI tools for mass-market use. The first is tangible business investment—what we’ll call capital expenditures, or <em>capex</em>. Many firms are hoping to be in the first wave of companies whose AI products are adopted, so they are currently investing heavily in data centers, servers, racks, and research. This wave of AI-related spending is driving demand for land, hardware and software components, construction materials, and the labor needed to build data centers, develop the models, and market them.</p>
<p>The other spending flow comes from the sharp rise in the market valuation of AI-related companies, which has driven a stock market boom—or, likely, bubble—in recent years. Part of households’ annual consumption spending comes from wealth (not just income). According to <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/jep.14.2.99.pdf">general estimates</a>, $1 in increased stock market wealth leads to around 3 cents in additional consumption spending. To the degree AI is driving above-normal valuations of the stock market relative to current fundamentals, the extra consumption spending out of this “excess” wealth can be attributed to AI.</p>
<p>To measure the AI effect on capex, macroeconomic observers have looked at the categories of business investment where the AI build-out is concentrated—data centers, information processing equipment, software, and R&amp;D—and calculated how much these categories are contributing to GDP growth over and above historical norms. This excess contribution has recently reached roughly 0.7% of GDP. In an economy where growth runs at roughly 2%, this would constitute roughly a third of all <em>increases</em> in GDP. That said, some portion of this capex spending—likely a third to a half—probably stems from increased imports, which are then subtracted out of the contribution to domestic growth. Very roughly, we estimate that the AI capex build-out has likely contributed 0.5% to GDP growth in the past year.</p>
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<p>For the consumption effect associated with AI, we look at today’s ratio of price to earnings (P/E ratio) in the overall stock market (the S&amp;P 500 specifically). This measures how expensive it is to buy a dollar’s worth of earnings. Today, it is more expensive than in any period in history except the very late 1990s–2000, an unambiguous bubble that was also driven by wild enthusiasm about tech and saw a very large correction. Today’s P/E ratio is close to 40. A more normal ratio—though still high in historical terms—would be 30. If the stock market fell from a P/E ratio of 40 to one of 30 in a relatively short period of time, that would constitute a 25% decline in household wealth in corporate equities. That decline in wealth would imply a consumption reduction of about $200 billion, or roughly 0.7% of GDP.</p>
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<p>Combined, the contributions of these two AI-related spending flows to GDP growth likely exceed 1% of GDP. Since the first quarter of 2025, growth <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1XYEd">has averaged roughly 2%</a>, which implies that over half of all growth in the past year was being propelled by AI-related spending.</p>
<p>But this AI-related spending is a narrow and fragile base for overall growth. A genuinely healthy economy should be able to generate enough demand to keep unemployment low and stable without a stock market bubble. And both the stock market valuations and the determination to keep spending heavily on data centers and other capex hinge on the belief among companies and investors that AI companies’ eventual profits will justify them.</p>
<p>If the potential profitability of this investment in AI ever appears lower than expected, this could lead to a sharp deflation of the current stock market bubble. A drop in the market value of AI companies would almost surely also convince at least a few of the big capex spenders that their investments will not pay off, and they will likely cut back. All this means that the AI contribution to GDP growth could evaporate quickly if just one or two dominoes fall.</p>
<p>This would leave a large hole in aggregate demand (spending by households, businesses, and governments) that would cause a recession unless policymakers reacted nimbly to fill it. This could largely be accomplished with <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">standard recession-fighting monetary and fiscal policy</a>. But there would still be pain. And if political obstacles prevented the quick deployment of standard recession-fighting policy, the recession could linger and cause lasting damage.</p>
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<h2>Is the current fixation on AI the first time a technology-driven stock market bubble has threatened the broader economy?</h2>
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<p>Today’s AI boom bears striking parallels to the internet build-out and stock market bubble of the late 1990s. That episode clearly led to a stock market bubble, and the resulting deflation of that bubble led to a very stubborn recession. But the late 1990s boom also gave the U.S. labor market four to five very strong years before the bubble burst—something the current AI frenzy has largely failed to do.</p>
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<p>The parallels between today’s AI frenzy and the late 1990s build-out of the internet are striking. The late 1990s <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">boost to GDP from tech-related capex</a> was even larger than today’s, and by a significant amount. The late 1990s stock market bubble (measured by P/E ratios) was the only one in history larger than today’s AI bubble, and it was even more <a href="https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/unpacking-us-tech-valuations-agnostic-assessment">concentrated</a> in tech-related stocks than today’s is.</p>
<p>Taken together, the productivity boost delivered by the internet boom from the mid-1990s through the mid-2000s was very large—roughly in line with the more optimistic projections of how much AI could boost productivity growth in the decades ahead. By 2005, the economy was <a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c11074/c11074.pdf">about 15% larger</a> than projecting forward from the early 1990s would have suggested.</p>
<p>In short, the introduction of the internet was a huge economic story. We don’t think of it that way for the same reason that fish don’t notice water: It’s now so fundamental to daily life that it no longer registers. But it was a mammoth change with measurable, obvious economic effects.</p>
<p>One important difference, however, is that the internet boom lifted the labor market broadly. The late 1990s saw large reductions in unemployment relative to the previous five (or 10) years, and inflation-adjusted wages grew strongly up and down the wage distribution <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">for the first time in a generation</a>.</p>
<p>The AI boom has not benefited the broader labor market in the same way. Since late 2022, when ChatGPT was first introduced, the U.S. labor market <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">has clearly softened</a>, and wage growth has decelerated, most sharply for the bottom half of the wage distribution. The AI boom began with lower unemployment and tighter labor markets than the internet boom did, so it is striking that it has not been associated with a stronger—or even an equally strong—labor market.</p>
<p>Part of the reason is policy—not AI-specific policy but broader policy decisions. Many <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">policy choices over this year slowed growth</a> in the large parts of the economy outside the AI boom. For example, in normal times, much of the Trump administration’s agenda in 2025 would have been seen as very bad for business investment. Its tariff policy was extreme and chaotic; its mass deportation policy threatened to weigh heavily on both the labor supply and the customer base of very specific industries; the large deficit increases locked in by the 2025 Republican tax and spending megabill (even with the large spending cuts) seemed likely to keep upward pressure on interest rates; and the administration’s historically unprecedented meddling with the Fed’s policy independence also put upward pressure on rates and increased uncertainty.</p>
<p>AI-related investment has been strong in recent years even in the face of these poor broader policy choices simply because this happened to be the historical moment when the technology matured enough for firms to race to deploy it.</p>
<p>But non-AI-related investment—over half of all business investment—has clearly been hurt by the policy trajectory of the past year and a half. This non-AI investment decelerated through 2025 and then turned firmly negative by year-end. In short, the policy headwinds for investment really do seem to be binding on all areas of the economy not being swept along by the AI build-out.</p>
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<h2>Is AI inevitably bad for the jobs and wages of typical workers over the longer run?</h2>
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<p>There’s no obvious reason to think so. Economists’ best summary measure of how rapidly technological change is moving forward is the pace of <em>productivity growth</em>—growth in the average output and income created in an hour of work. Throughout history, periods of fast productivity growth (that is, periods of rapid technological advance) have been <em>good</em>, not bad, for the wages and jobs of typical workers. What has overwhelmingly determined how workers fare is <em>policy</em>, not the pace or nature of technological change, and there is no sign yet that AI will break that pattern. Current policy is notably bad for workers’ jobs and wages and should be fixed, but that poor policy environment predates AI by decades.</p>
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<p>U.S. labor markets have performed poorly for most workers for decades. But the root of this poor performance has largely <em>not</em> been technological change that displaced workers or made their skills obsolete. Instead, the main drivers of dysfunctional labor market performance for most U.S. workers have been intentional policy changes meant to tilt the balance of bargaining power in labor markets away from typical workers and toward the owners and managers of corporate business. These policy changes tore down institutions (like the minimum wage and unions) that had supported workers’ leverage and bargaining power in earlier decades and introduced new institutions (like <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/">noncompete agreements</a>) that further eroded workers’ ability to win pay increases that matched overall economic growth.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/">Too slow wage growth for the bottom 80% of workers</a>—and the rise in inequality that came with it—began in the late 1970s and accelerated through the 1980s and 1990s. The early conventional wisdom about this inequality, especially among economists, was that labor markets are generally competitive and efficient, so inequality must stem from deep market forces shifting the relative demand and supply for different types of workers—things like technology and the pace of educational attainment. According to this view, policy institutions like the minimum wage and unions could affect only the small sliver of workers they touched directly, and any such effect introduced its own costly distortions. If one believed this, then the 30-year period of equal and fast wage growth after World War II could not have been driven by distortionary institutions like unions and a robust minimum wage, and the attack on unions and minimum wages could not be a convincing explanation of why inequality increased after 1979.</p>
<p>A tide of <a href="https://jhr.uwpress.org/content/57/s/s1">cutting-edge labor market research</a> has overturned most of this conventional wisdom and shown that while technology—including AI—is a prime determinant of how fast the overall economy grows, how that growth is <em>distributed</em> as jobs and wages is mostly a function of <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/home/">policies and institutions</a>. Like any technology, AI will help set the pace of growth, but whether typical workers share in it or whether today’s inequality widens even further will be decided by the policies and institutions that govern workers’ wages and labor market power.</p>
<p>The political and economic implications of this shift in understanding can hardly be overstated. If inequality were simply the product of rapid technological changes interacting with competitive and efficient markets, then it would be regrettable but essentially nobody’s fault, and little could be done about it. That is a very convenient story for the powerful. But it does not fit the historical record or economic evidence. Instead, across history, rapid technological progress has generally been <em>good</em> for workers, not bad: Periods of fast productivity growth have been periods of lower unemployment and slower growing inequality.</p>
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<p>Whether U.S. workers thrive in an era of AI remains mostly a policy question. The decisions that will determine it have to do with the level of labor market power available to typical workers through policies like the level of minimum wages, the determination of macroeconomic policymakers to sustain full employment, the effectiveness of labor law in allowing workers to unionize and bargain collectively, and how robust the U.S. welfare state is.</p>
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<h2>Won’t AI automate many jobs away?</h2>
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<p>AI will likely destroy some <em>specific jobs</em> through automation—but it is also highly likely to create jobs more broadly over time by boosting incomes for those in the non-automated sectors. How much any particular group of workers suffers when displaced from their jobs will be determined by policy decisions. Throughout U.S. history, we have generally been terrible at managing these transitions in worker-friendly ways. It would obviously be better if we changed that and put in place the policy supports workers need to get through them.</p>
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<p>Rapid technological change concentrated in any one sector can reduce employment <em>in that sector</em>. So perhaps AI really will, say, reduce the number of software coding jobs.</p>
<p>But if this technological change allows the same output to be produced with fewer hours of work, it raises incomes across the economy. Sticking with software coders, if the price of software design stays the same as its productivity rises, incomes within the sector will rise, and the workers and capital owners within the sector will have higher incomes they can use to buy <em>other</em> sectors’ goods and services. More likely, competition pushes the price of software design down, and those who purchase software design services (including purchasing indirectly as consumers buying goods and services from other businesses) will see their real (inflation-adjusted) incomes rise.</p>
<p>This increased demand stemming from these productivity gains means that job losses within the AI-using sector can be counterbalanced (or more than counterbalanced) by expanding employment in other sectors <em>as long as aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) is maintained.</em></p>
<p><a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/is-automation-labor-displacing-productivity-growth-employment-and-the-labor-share/">Autor and Salomons (2018)</a> analyzed these cross-cutting effects of technological changes within particular economic sectors. They found that the <em>own-effect</em> of a positive productivity shock—its effect on jobs within the sector where it happens—is indeed negative: Fewer hours of work are needed to produce the sector’s output, and rising demand for that now less expensive output doesn’t fully make up the difference. However, the <em>cross-effect</em>—the boost that sector’s productivity growth gives to employment <em>in other sectors</em>—is strongly positive and generally large enough to outweigh the negative own-effect for total employment.</p>
<p>This offset is not always automatic. Market mechanisms could fail, at least in part, to channel higher incomes driven by technological advance into higher demand elsewhere in the economy. If the initial large income gains in the AI-using sector flow to already wealthy households, for example, these households are unlikely to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/inequalitys-drag-on-aggregate-demand/">spend rather than save all of these gains</a>. That is why policymakers should keep aggregate demand high enough to keep unemployment low. They have <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/next-recession-bivens/">ample tools to do it</a>, from lower interest rates set by the Federal Reserve to redistributive fiscal policy that funds more generous public benefits out of progressive taxes.</p>
<p>In reality, however, market mechanisms likely will do much of the work in terms of maintaining aggregate demand in the face of productivity increases. Recessions and damagingly high increases in unemployment rates are overwhelmingly <em>not</em> caused by bursts of productivity growth. Instead, as the economy’s productivity potential grows year after year, those gains tend to translate relatively smoothly into growth in demand. When demand does falter, it is usually because of an outside shock, like an asset bubble popping or central bankers deliberately slowing the economy to forestall inflation.</p>
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<h2>If AI can both create and destroy jobs, does this mean policymakers can totally ignore its effects?</h2>
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<p>No. If anything, the opposite is true: Policymakers should be doing far more to protect working families from the hardship and uncertainty of earning a living in labor markets that are volatile and offer little protection. If AI-induced technological change turns out to be large and causes significant job displacement, it will hit a U.S. labor market with few worker protections and create real pockets of concentrated harm—as every other economic change of the past several decades has. But the main driver of this harm is the weakness of U.S. labor market protections, not the specifics of the technology.</p>
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<p>To understand the scale, start with how much churn the labor market already absorbs. About 1.5 million workers involuntarily <a href="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/JTSLDL">lose their jobs <em>every single month</em></a> in the U.S. economy—about 18 million jobs lost involuntarily each year. If AI raised the growth of productivity by 0.5 percentage points over the next decade <em>and</em> there were no countervailing job creation from increased incomes, this would very roughly translate into another 700,000 jobs each year being shed, with workers in those jobs needing to find alternative employment. Compared with the 18 million separations the economy already churns through, that is a real but manageable increase.</p>
<p>Even so, many individual workers may suffer from sector-specific job displacements due to AI, even in years when overall unemployment is low. The harm these displacements cause is real and significant: The labor market is not frictionless, and it can be a painful stretch of time before a displaced worker finds comparable work elsewhere. Some workers (particularly older workers) may never find a specific job as good as the one they lost.</p>
<p>But, again, most of this suffering is <em>not an AI-specific problem</em>. The <em>vast majority</em> of painful, forced job separations are not about AI currently and likely won’t be in the future. <em>Workers displaced for reasons not due to AI deserve protection too.</em> The solution is not a search for novel AI-specific policies but the broad, labor market-wide policies that help in every case: stronger social insurance, more widespread collective bargaining, and sustained high-pressure labor markets. These policies are all highly desirable regardless of the pace of technological change.</p>
<p>It is the absence of these broad-based labor market and social insurance policies that makes losing a <em>specific job</em> so damaging for some U.S. workers. Because the guaranteed baseline of job quality and social protection is so low for U.S. workers, a job that does provide some of those things is rare, and workers know it will be hard to replace. This imparts a strong sense of <em>rational</em> loss aversion for workers who happen to hold a high-quality job.</p>
<p>One reason specific jobs are occasionally highly valued in the U.S. labor market is that they come bundled with nonwage compensation—like health and retirement benefits, which are not universally available. Making those benefits universal through more protective social insurance would make losing any particular job far less damaging. Another key social insurance system—unemployment insurance (UI)—is too stingy in the U.S., imposing large income losses while workers search for alternative employment after a layoff. Making UI more generous would directly reduce the pain of a layoff.</p>
<p>Another reason some specific jobs can be highly valued in the U.S. economy is that they are unionized. Union jobs should be much more common than they currently are, but decades of employer hostility and policy indifference have made large-scale organizing in newly created jobs incredibly challenging. The sectors that remain unionized do so largely because of a historical legacy that saw their unions formed decades ago, so a worker separated from one today has little chance of finding another union job elsewhere. <em>Anything</em> that destroys today’s union jobs, technological progress included, will leave their former holders worse off. If policy changed to make it more likely for newly created jobs to be unionized, much of the damage from loss of union jobs spurred by technological churn could be ameliorated.</p>
<p>Additionally, the U.S. economy has spent much of the past four decades <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/focus-on-the-boom-not-the-slump-the-feds-new-policy-framework-needs-to-stop-cutting-recoveries-short-epi-macroeconomics-newsletter/">with excessively high unemployment</a>, which radically increases the cost of losing a job. When unemployment is low and vacancies are high, a laid-off worker can find a new job quickly, putting employers under constant pressure to keep job quality high enough to retain and attract new employees.</p>
<p>If U.S. policymakers built a more protective social insurance system, restored the effective right to organize unions, and maintained high-pressure labor markets with low unemployment, then a large part of the damage done by <em>any</em> job displacements—including any driven by AI—would disappear.</p>
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<h2>Will AI lead to mass unemployment across the U.S. economy?</h2>
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<p>Almost surely not. The historical evidence is clear that business cycles with faster productivity growth see <em>lower</em> unemployment, not higher. And the ease with which AI or any capital investment can substitute for human labor at scale is often overstated.</p>
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<p>Throughout modern history in advanced economies, mass unemployment has never been caused by technological advances that accelerate productivity growth. Unemployment crises are instead caused by a shortfall in aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments). Within a given business cycle, faster productivity growth is accompanied by lower, not higher, unemployment.</p>
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<p>It is worth stepping back from this historical evidence to think through <em>why</em> technological advance has never led to mass unemployment. The rest of this answer walks through some of that logic. We offer these illustrations to take the current fears of mass unemployment seriously, not to suggest that any of these scenarios are likely or have characterized the real economic history of the U.S.</p>
<p>One important economic reason why AI or any technological change is unlikely to cause mass unemployment is simply that technology is not free. Firms will replace labor with capital (including AI tools) only when the costs of doing so are less than the savings. But while shedding labor saves firms money, investing in new capital <em>costs</em> money.</p>
<p>And if the demand for AI tools rises rapidly as businesses across the economy try to replace large swathes of their workforce, the price of these tools will rise, and eventually (or even quickly) the price of investing in AI tools will exceed the benefits to firms.</p>
<p>Because so much of what is called “technological change” in recent years has occurred in online spaces that seem unconstrained by capital costs, it is easy to underestimate how costly AI tools will likely be if a broad swathe of U.S. employers try to buy them at scale to economize on labor costs. But AI tools require vast amounts of capital, labor, and energy to build and maintain (see <strong>Figure A</strong> about the scale of investments being made to build up AI capacity and enter the race to try to sell AI tools across the U.S. economy).</p>
<p>Further, if AI opened up historically large-scale possibilities for the replacement of human labor in the future, this would radically raise economy-wide productivity <em>and</em> reduce the <em>relative</em> cost of labor, as unemployment reduced workers’ leverage to demand wage growth that keeps pace with productivity. This reduction in the relative cost of labor would provide some businesses a large incentive to figure out how to profitably employ some of the now-jobless workers—who, again, are now quite a bit cheaper relative to other inputs into production (i.e., AI tools).</p>
<p>In short, mass unemployment due to technological change is highly unlikely to be an <em>equilibrium</em> in the economy—a place the economy remains at for long periods—unless policymakers completely fail at keeping aggregate demand (economy-wide spending by households, businesses, and governments) stable. Have policymakers failed in the past at this fundamental part of their jobs, allowing excess unemployment to linger far longer than necessary? Definitely. But that had nothing to do with AI, and the toleration of mass unemployment that might occur due to an AI-driven acceleration of productivity would be a failure of these policymakers, not an inevitability of the technology.</p>
<p>Also, this scenario—where AI generates extremely rapid productivity growth and the <em>relative</em> price of labor must fall to keep unemployment in check in the face of this AI-biased technological change—does not imply <em>absolute</em> reductions in wages. Instead, it only implies wages fall further behind productivity growth. But if productivity growth is supercharged by AI (and that’s the entire root of this scenario), workers’ wages and living standards could still grow in absolute terms, even more rapidly than they have in the recent past. Only wages <em>relative</em> to capital costs have to fall. To be clear, this isn’t a particularly happy scenario: Rising inequality is objectively bad, even if all incomes see some absolute gains. But it’s not a purely pessimistic scenario either.</p>
<p>Finally, much of the discourse that seems to assume a very easy replacement of human labor with AI tools underappreciates the complexity of most jobs in the economy. <em>Jobs</em> are a bundle of specific <em>tasks</em> that are often hard to clearly describe (let alone fully replace). AI will replace many tasks, but this will often just allow workers to focus more time and attention on the other tasks their jobs entail. Many of the tasks of modern jobs are extremely hard to define in binary terms that would allow easy automation. This difficulty in crisply describing many job tasks often leads to sneering about the alleged worthlessness of “<a href="https://www.programmablemutter.com/p/ai-isnt-management-try-explaining">middle managers</a>” or “<a href="https://substack.jurgenappelo.com/p/how-ai-will-achieve-peak-bullshit-work">bullshit jobs</a>” (to borrow anthropologist David Graeber’s term), but it stems from the fact that we have an amazingly complex economy built on ever-finer divisions of labor and information across workers and functions. Just because any single person has <a href="https://messyjobs.ai/">almost no idea what the key tasks</a> are for most of the workforce <em>doesn’t mean these tasks are unimportant or easy to replace</em>. It just means the economy is complex.</p>
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<h2>How much might AI boost productivity growth—and has the U.S. labor market ever absorbed that fast a productivity acceleration before?</h2>
<div class="callout-text">
<p>Most credible estimates project that AI could boost productivity growth over the next decade by an average of 0.5–1.5 percentage points per year. Even at the high end of 1.5 percentage points per year, that implies an acceleration of productivity growth that the U.S. economy has easily absorbed in the past with no labor market distress. In fact, periods of productivity acceleration have been good for U.S. workers; it is productivity slowdowns that have coincided with bad outcomes.</p>
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<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Read more">Read more</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>The effect AI will have in boosting productivity growth is still genuinely unclear. There are clear reasons to think it could run faster for a stretch as AI is incorporated into firms’ workflow, but as with all technological innovations, the pace and the ultimate depth of that penetration remain highly uncertain.</p>
<p>As of the first quarter of 2026, there is very little reason to think AI has contributed anything measurable to U.S. productivity growth. Since the last business cycle peak (the last quarter of 2019), productivity growth has averaged 1.96%. Looking only at the period since the third quarter of 2022 (when ChatGPT was introduced to the public), productivity growth has averaged 2.08%—a small acceleration in a very noisy data series. The pre-2022 numbers also include the large productivity declines stemming from the supply chain bottlenecks caused by the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the early 2020s. <strong>Figure F</strong> shows the simple level of productivity over time, along with an extrapolated trend for recent years that shows what the level of productivity would be today if the 2017–2019 productivity trend held after the rollout of ChatGPT. Two things stand out: the large drop in the level of productivity as the early 2020s supply chain snarls formed, and the fact that as of the first quarter of 2026, the level of productivity is only about 0.2% higher than what would have been extrapolated from it following its immediate pre-Covid trend.</p>
<p>Further, even this small edge over projection is entirely driven by the first quarters of 2023—the gap between actual productivity and trend productivity has actually declined in the past two years. None of this looks like evidence of a large technological innovation that is diffusing rapidly across ever-larger shares of the U.S. economy.</p>
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<a name="Figure-F"></a><div class="figure chart-326014 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326014" data-anchor="Figure-F"><div class="figLabel">Figure F</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326014-36070-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure F" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>Finally, even the quite optimistic projections of how much AI might add to U.S. productivity growth in the coming decade do not imply a pace of productivity growth the U.S. labor market has never successfully absorbed before. <strong>Figure G</strong> shows a range of projections of how much AI could raise productivity growth over the next decade and compares the implied acceleration with past episodes of rising and falling productivity growth in the U.S. economy. We intentionally choose historical periods that have seen sharp changes in productivity growth to compare with projections of AI-driven productivity growth.</p>
<p>

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<a name="Figure-G"></a><div class="figure chart-326010 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="326010" data-anchor="Figure-G"><div class="figLabel">Figure G</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/326010-36071-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure G" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<p>U.S. history has clearly seen sharp changes in productivity growth roughly as large as the more optimistic projections of AI’s effect on productivity. Importantly, the historical period that saw a rapid acceleration of productivity growth—the late 1990s and early 2000s—was an unusually strong period in the U.S. labor market, with lower unemployment and faster, broader wage growth than had been seen in a generation. The beginning of wage suppression, in contrast, followed the sharp productivity slowdown of 1973–1979. The other sharp productivity slowdown, from 2007 to 2019, was also a long period of extreme dysfunction in U.S. labor markets, with extended periods of excess unemployment and many years of near-stagnant wage growth.</p>
<p>In short, the actual history of the U.S. economy and credible projections of AI’s effect on productivity do not warrant extreme concern about AI-caused labor displacement.</p>
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		<title>The economics of deficits, debt, and interest rates: Part 2: Structural deficits today are too large</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/</link>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 13:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327691</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond.]]></description>
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<p><em>This is part two of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today&#8217;s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/deficits-debt-and-interest-rates-some-questions-answered/">part one here.</a>&nbsp;</em></p>
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<p>The effects of deficits and debt on the broader economy are largely straightforward—with one big exception: They differ radically depending on whether the economy is operating near its productive potential or is instead operating well below it (which occurs most notably during recessions).<span id="more-327691"></span></p>
<p>The main economic effects of deficits in these two states of the world are essentially as follows:</p>
<ul>
<li>Large deficits during times when the economy is operating near its productive potential (or during times of <em>full employment</em>) put upward pressure on either interest rates (more likely) or inflation (less likely).
<ul>
<li>The higher interest rates in turn can “crowd out” productive private-sector capital investments. If this happens chronically, this can shrink the size of the capital stock U.S. workers have available to them—with the capital stock being factories and other buildings, equipment, software, and research and development efforts. This smaller capital stock in turn reduces productivity, or the income generated in an average hour of work in the U.S. economy, hence shrinking the growth of potential living standards.</li>
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</li>
<li>Large deficits when the economy is operating well below potential actually stabilize the economy and aid its return to potential.
<ul>
<li>Economies start operating below full employment when aggregate demand—spending by households, businesses, and governments—falls short of what is needed to fully employ productive resources. By increasing spending and lowering taxes (hence boosting private-sector disposable income that can be spent), higher deficits boost aggregate demand and push the economy closer to potential.</li>
<li>Because private-sector investment responds to income growth as well as interest rates, deficits run during times of less than full employment can actually “crowd in” productive private-sector investment.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<h4><strong>The one noncontroversial effect of budget deficits: They raise aggregate demand</strong></h4>
<p>If there is one noncontroversial statement about budget deficits, it is that <em>they raise the economy’s aggregate demand</em>. Whether this increase in aggregate demand is good or bad depends on the broader economy.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is strong</strong></h5>
<p>When private-sector sources of demand are strong—consumers are buying a lot, businesses are demanding lots of new capital goods to undertake production, and imports and exports are roughly balanced—all available productive resources (like workers) are fully employed and the economy does not need the public sector to inject extra demand into circulation with larger deficits; additional increments to demand will not bring forth more output. Instead, additional demand sent into a full employment economy will bid up <em>prices </em>rather than cause more output to be produced.</p>
<p>If the Federal Reserve is determined to not let strong demand bid up prices and push inflation above its preferred 2% target, it will respond to this excess of demand by raising its short-term policy rates to try to tamp down private sources of demand. Higher interest rates <a href="https://economics.mit.edu/sites/default/files/publications/Semiparametric%20Estimates%20of%20Monetary%20Policy-V2.pdf">are generally effective in reducing demand</a> through lower consumption, business investment, and larger trade deficits.</p>
<p>Besides the Fed’s response, higher deficits in a full employment economy can also put upward pressure on interest rates through financial crowding out. At full employment, the supply of savings available to be loaned to households or businesses looking to make long-lived investments is largely fixed. Federal deficits <em>by definition</em> mean that the government has to go into financial markets, where supplies of savings and demands for investment meet, and increase <em>its own</em> demand for a share of these savings. Deficits are financed by selling government bonds to households and businesses—that is, by convincing savers to lend their money to the government for a period of time. The extra demand for borrowing meets the fixed supply of savings and pushes up the price of loans, or interest rates.</p>
<p>Because most capital investment by businesses (building new factories and buildings, purchasing new equipment and software, and paying salaries of workers engaged in research and development) is financed by borrowing, higher interest rates stemming from large budget deficits in economies that are already strong will slow capital investment over time. As the price of something rises—in this case, the price of borrowing to finance new investment—less of it will be demanded.</p>
<p>This reduction in capital investment slows long-run economic growth. A key contributor to growth in productivity—the amount of income generated in an average hour of work in the economy—is how much capital workers have available to them to do their jobs. Construction workers today are far more productive than 50 years ago because they’re more likely to use mechanized earth movers rather than shovels for excavation.</p>
<p>If deficits crowd out capital investment, this can slow productivity growth. Productivity growth is the ceiling on how fast average living standards can rise in an economy. So when large deficits during full employment crowd out of investment, this can damage economic growth. A key point in this analysis is that it is higher interest rates that are the transmission mechanism for this damage: If interest rates do not rise, there is no damage being done.</p>
<h5><strong>Deficits when private spending is weak</strong></h5>
<p>When private spending is too low to fully employ all available productive resources, the boost to aggregate demand from large deficits actually helps to employ these resources and move the economy closer to its productive potential.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy closer to its productive potential during downturns <a href="https://www.cbo.gov/publication/62568">happen automatically</a>. Spending rises on safety net programs like unemployment insurance, and this supports private consumption. Tax collections fall as private incomes fall, buffering disposable incomes from the full fall in pre-tax incomes.</p>
<p>Some increases in deficits that push the economy back to its potential come from discretionary legislation passed by Congress in direct response to the downturn—relief packages like the <a href="https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/cea_8th_arra_report_final_draft.pdf">American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009</a> and the <a href="https://bfi.uchicago.edu/insight/research-summary/cares-impact-on-welfare/">CARES Act of 2020</a>.</p>
<p>Weak private spending places sharp downward pressure on inflation and interest rates as it generates idle resources (like rising unemployment). Given this, a boost to demand from larger deficits tends to <em>not</em> manifest as faster inflation or higher interest rates. A boost to demand when there are idle resources mostly causes output, not prices, to rise. And the higher output and income generated by higher deficits <em>create</em> savings that keep interest rates from rising in response to greater demand for investment.</p>
<p>Because this scenario sees no rise in interest rates, and because investment responds positively to output growth, larger deficits that boost economic activity <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/2012a_delong.pdf">almost certainly “crowd in” private investment</a>, leading to more investment and higher productivity than would have occurred had deficits not been allowed to rise.</p>
<h4><strong>Excessive structural deficits are hurting the U.S. economy today</strong></h4>
<p>The upshot is that deficits can hurt if they’re too large when the economy is already near full employment, and that the data signature for this damage is rising interest rates. For decades, large budget deficits have not been accompanied by higher interest rates, making it very hard to argue that the economy’s long-run growth prospects were being damaged by crowded out private investment.</p>
<p>Over the past year, however, interest rates have risen noticeably. In fact, as of September 2026, 10-year Treasury rates have reached their highest levels since the early 2000s (though still far below highs reached between the mid-1970s and mid-1990s when—among other things—inflation expectations were much higher). Because inflation is a bit higher now than in the early 2000s, real (inflation-adjusted) rates have not risen quite as fast, but they are always noticeably higher than the average of the past 20 years. Between this and the fact that unemployment is likely not too far above full employment at the moment and the fact that inflation remains above the Fed’s 2% target level, it seems clear that too large U.S. deficits are putting unwelcome pressure on the larger economy.</p>
<p><iframe style="overflow: hidden; width: 540px; height: 433px;" src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=20dZ0&amp;width=540&amp;height=383" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p>Too large U.S. deficits are not the only driver of recent interest rate increases. Another contributor is <a href="https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-euro-indicators/w/2-21102026-cp">larger deficits being run by many European countries</a>. Many of these countries have <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2025/07/08/council-activates-flexibility-in-eu-fiscal-rules-for-15-member-states-to-increase-defence-spending/">loosened fiscal rules to spend more on the military</a> in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The Japanese economy is also stronger than it has been in decades, and <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/17/business/japan-interest-rates.html">interest rates there are rising</a> for the first time in decades. Finally, there has been a huge surge in <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">private investment demand</a> driven by the race between AI companies to dominate the market.</p>
<p>On the one hand, it seems hard to worry that higher interest rates are crowding out private-sector investment if it is precisely strong private investment contributing to higher rates. But the investment in AI is clearly not interest-sensitive (at least so far). It is driven by exogenous events and factors: Now just happens to be the time that the technology has reached tipping points where scalability and profitability seem possible, hence sparking a race between private companies to be the first to capitalize on this. Additionally, investment in sectors in the U.S. not being pulled along by the AI boom is <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">notably weak in 2026</a>, posting negative growth. If U.S. fiscal deficits were lower and this led to lower interest rates, this would help <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">investment in non-AI sectors</a>.</p>
<p>Noting that too large structural deficits are likely slowing U.S. growth today does not map directly onto policy solutions. It’s not the case that the damage from too large deficits right now is so overwhelming that anything that reduces deficits should be done in response. In a later post, I will walk through the considerations about how policymakers should optimally respond to too high structural deficits. They definitely should do <em>something—</em>but it’s not the case that they should just do <em>anything</em>.</p>
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		<title>The economics of deficits, debt, and interest rates: Part 1: What rising interest rates say about today’s structural deficits</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/deficits-debt-and-interest-rates-some-questions-answered/</link>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2026 12:00:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=327689</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[This is part one of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond.]]></description>
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<p><em>This is part one of a series on the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and how policymakers should respond. Read <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-simple-economics-of-deficits-and-debt-structural-deficits-today-are-too-large/">part two here</a>.&nbsp;</em></p>
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<p>Long-term interest rates have been rising steadily over the past six months and have now reached their highest levels since before the Great Recession of 2008. These higher rates, combined with inflation that remains above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, are likely driven in part by unsustainably high federal budget deficits.<span id="more-327689"></span></p>
<p><iframe style="overflow: hidden; width: 540px; height: 433px;" src="https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/graph-landing.php?g=20dZ0&amp;width=540&amp;height=383" frameborder="0" scrolling="no"></iframe></p>
<p>In an upcoming series of blog posts, I will examine some of the economics of debt, deficits, and today’s high interest rates—and close with how policymakers should respond. The posts will examine the following questions, sketched out briefly below:</p>
<h4>How do we know when deficits are too high—or too low?</h4>
<p>Today’s deficits are too high, but the same size of deficit (or an even larger one) might be fine and useful in times when the economy is weak and needs stimulus. But unemployment is just over 4%, <strong>the economy does not need significant fiscal stimulus,</strong> and interest rates are rising. These are all good signals that too high deficits are contributing to higher interest rates and pressuring the economy.</p>
<h4>What’s the best way to measure the pressure that excessive deficits and debt are putting on the U.S. economy?</h4>
<p>The best measure is <strong>the real debt service ratio</strong>—inflation-adjusted interest payments as a share of GDP.</p>
<h4>Is the rise of interest rates in 2026 just chickens coming home to roost from decades of too high deficits and debt?</h4>
<p>Deficits in the 2010s and early 2020s were either a function of or a useful response to economic conditions of the time. Today’s problems would be just as bad had we run more austere fiscal policy in those years.</p>
<h4>How do too high structural budget deficits harm typical families?</h4>
<p>The harm almost always comes gradually. Too high structural deficits reduce capital investment and lead to slower productivity growth. A crisis driven simply by the economics of U.S. debt is extremely unlikely. A crisis driven by deranged political choices and dysfunction that intersect with U.S. debt is sadly imaginable.</p>
<h4>What’s the optimal policy response to today’s too high structural deficits?</h4>
<p>Raising revenue significantly from the richest households and corporations is the best path forward.</p>
<h4>Does today’s too high structural deficit significantly constrain policymakers from doing the right things if the economy enters recession?</h4>
<p>Putting measures in place to solve the <strong>structural</strong> deficit should not preclude policymakers from responding to the next recession with fiscal relief that <strong>temporarily</strong> boosts deficits.</p>
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		<title>Data accountability dashboard</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/data-accountability-dashboard/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 15:00:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Zipperer, Elise Gould, Joe Fast, Josh Bivens, Zane Mokhiber]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=313926</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Federal statistical agencies (FSAs) produce the gold standard economic data that employers, investors, job seekers, workers, and policymakers rely on to assess the health of the U.S.]]></description>
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<p>Federal statistical agencies (FSAs) produce the gold standard economic data that employers, investors, job seekers, workers, and policymakers rely on to assess the health of the U.S. economy. Today, FSAs face historically unprecedented threats to their capacity and even their independence. This raises the specter of a future where FSA data cannot be relied upon to honestly report whether the U.S. economy is experiencing dysfunction.</p>
<p>This dashboard was initially created to display a range of data not collected or disseminated by FSAs to shed some light on the economy during the pause in federal data collection during the 2025 government shutdown. Now—perhaps even more importantly—it serves to provide an accountability check against efforts to manipulate FSA data in the future.</p>
<p>This set of “next-best” data sources is clearly inferior to the datasets that have historically been collected and analyzed by the nonpartisan, expert professionals who staff FSAs. Among many other relative weaknesses, these next-best data offer no insights on how the economy is affecting U.S. households differently by race, gender, or ethnicity.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-KZbTB" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Job postings from Indeed track job openings from BLS JOLTS" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/KZbTB/19/" height="484" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Indeed job postings vs. BLS JOLTS">Indeed job postings vs. BLS JOLTS</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Indeed job postings correlate strongly with total job openings from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). JOLTS job openings tend to fall in recessions and rise in expansionary periods.</p>
<p>The <a title="Economic research from Indeed.com" href="https://www.hiringlab.org/">Indeed Hiring Lab</a>, the research arm of job search website <a title="Indeed.com is a job search website" href="https://www.indeed.com/">Indeed.com</a>, publishes a <a title="Change in level of job postings on Indeed (7-day trailing average) since February 1, 2020." href="https://data.indeed.com/#/postings">job postings data index</a> that aggregates a complete count of all job postings on the Indeed website. This includes a measure of new job postings, which only counts job postings the first time they are visible. The data&#8212;available starting in February 2020&#8212;are collected daily and reported as a seven-day average. For this comparison, we take monthly averages of the seasonally adjusted daily data.</p>
<p>In the figure, we show that Indeed new job postings track closely with job openings from JOLTS. The correlation between these measures between February 2020 and August 2025 is quite high (0.95).</p>
<p>While Indeed data are only available for the last five years, JOLTS data go back to 2000 and show a clear relationship between job openings and business cycles. Job openings tend to fall in recessions and rise in expansionary periods. That relationship is clearest in the <a title="Also see EPI's discussion of JOLT data" href="https://staging.epi.org/chart/economic-indicators-average-jolts-job-openings-levels-and-unemployment-levels-2000-2023/">2001 and 2007 recessions and expansions</a>, where a fall in job openings preceded the start of the recession.</p>
<p>In the wake of the government shutdown, the Indeed new job postings can give use some information on the state of new positions needed by employers. Moving forward, a strong and sustained divergence of trends between the Indeed and BLS measures could provide a worrying signal of degraded data quality or integrity in BLS reports.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Fq7yo" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="ADP employment tracks BLS private-sector payrolls" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Fq7yo/18/" height="471" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="ADP employment vs. BLS private-sector payrolls">ADP employment vs. BLS private-sector payrolls</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Monthly changes in ADP employment levels tend to track changes in private-sector payroll employment from the BLS Current Employment Statistics, and both measures show that private-sector employment growth falls in recessions and rises in expansionary periods.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://adpemploymentreport.com/">ADP National Employment Report</a> is a monthly measure of the private-sector labor market based on aggregated payroll data of more than 26 million U.S. workers. <a href="https://www.adpresearch.com/">ADP Research</a>, a research arm of the ADP payroll processing firm, releases the report monthly. While the report provides much detail of employment by firm characteristics, the topline number in the report is private-sector employment changes, available since January 2010.</p>
<p>ADP employment changes track closely with the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) measure of private-sector payroll employment in the Current Employment Statistics survey, data that is published every month as part of the Employment Situation Summary, also known as jobs day. In the figure, we compare seasonally adjusted monthly changes in employment for each measure smoothed to three-month moving averages. These smoothed changes are highly correlated (0.76).</p>
<p>While ADP data are only available as of 2010, BLS private-sector employment data goes back to 1938 and shows a clear relationship between the number of jobs and business cycles. Employment falls in recessions and rises in expansionary periods. The close relationship between these measures allows us to track any notable and sustained divergence, which would indicate a concern about the quality of government data.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-XY6Wr" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Revelio and BLS employment data both show sharp slowdown in job growth in recent years" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/XY6Wr/19/" height="603" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Revelio vs. BLS employment data">Revelio vs. BLS employment data</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Revelio Labs generates monthly U.S. employment <a href="https://www.reveliolabs.com/public-labor-statistics/employment/">estimates</a> by counting social networking profiles on sites like LinkedIn. Total nonfarm employment changes from Revelio generally track BLS-based estimates.</p>
<p>Seasonally adjusted and nonseasonally adjusted estimates from Revelio are released monthly by industry, occupation, and geographic region. National data are available as of 2021. The data are normally published the day before the BLS employment report is released. Historically, Revelio’s monthly change usually falls below the BLS estimate, but over relatively short periods of time, the data series do tend to rise and fall together.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-V8H4a" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Announced job cuts from Challenger, Gray &amp;amp; Christmas have risen sharply in last three recessions" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/V8H4a/20/" height="504" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Challenger, Gray &amp; Christmas vs. BLS unemployment rate">Challenger, Gray &amp; Christmas vs. BLS unemployment rate</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">The Challenger job cut report data are somewhat noisy on a month-to-month basis, but spike noticeably during recessions.</p>
<p>Challenger, Gray &amp; Christmas collects its <a href="https://www.challengergray.com/blog/category/job-cuts-report/">job cut data</a> by tracking public announcements made by U.S. companies in both the private and public sectors. The job cuts can include cuts in multinational plants (i.e., outside the United States). The report has been published monthly since 1994 and is typically released at the end of every month or the first week of the following month. The figure shows that large increases in announced job cuts occur in recessions (and when the unemployment rate spikes).</p>
<p>Of note, the spike in layoffs in spring 2025 was partially driven by announced layoffs in the federal government.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-MnaKg" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Continued UI claims track with the unemployment rate and spike during recessions" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/MnaKg/19/" height="464" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="State-level UI claims vs. BLS unemployment rate">State-level UI claims vs. BLS unemployment rate</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Monthly changes in unemployment insurance claims track the unemployment rate and provide a useful indication of recessionary periods.</p>
<p>While the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) aggregates unemployment insurance (UI) claims data and is the source of the national data, it relies on administrative data processed at the state level that are generally posted on state government websites, potentially allowing a real-time accuracy check if concerns are raised about the accuracy of data released through the DOL portal. During the shutdown, the number of initial and continued claims has been updated weekly on the <a href="https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/DataDownloads.asp">539 report</a>, a DOL-compiled dataset based on information submitted by state unemployment insurance offices. Right now, the data are only available on a nonseasonally adjusted basis because of the shutdown. The figure displays continued (or insured) UI claims and the unemployment rate, both as 12-month moving averages to remove some volatility and seasonality.</p>
<p>Continued UI claims closely track the unemployment rate: They spike during recessions and fall during economic recoveries. The close relationship between UI claims and the unemployment rate allows us to track any notable and sustained divergence, which could indicate a concern about the quality of government data. More information on the UI claims data, including initial claims, federal claims, and state-specific data, is updated weekly on <a href="https://staging.epi.org/indicators/unemployment-insurance-claims/">EPI’s UI claims page</a>.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-ccGpL" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Google searches related to unemployment correlate with BLS measures of unemployment" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/ccGpL/17/" height="478" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Google Trends vs. BLS unemployment measures">Google Trends vs. BLS unemployment measures</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Google Trends provides real-time data on the relative frequency of search terms for a given keyword, category of keywords, or a topic. With the right search terms, we can construct an index that tracks the overall unemployment rate</p>
<p>Google Trends is <a href="https://trends.google.com/trends/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">a publicly available database</a> maintained by Google that provides Search Volume Indices. Search Volume Indices are a measure from 0–100 of the relative search intensity (number of searches for a given keyword divided by total searches) by geographic location and period. The data are updated in real time and are available from 2004 onward.</p>
<p>Google Trends data can be benchmarked to several different economic indicators. In fact, academics have used Google Trends data to “nowcast” <a href="https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/tracking-activity-in-real-time-with-google-trends_6b9c7518-en.html">GDP</a>, <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/for.1213">private consumption</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0169207017300389">unemployment</a>, <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0165176517303993">recessions</a>, and <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165032721006741">health outcomes</a>. The figure shows the monthly average of select labor market-related search terms and the unemployment rate. The Google Trends relative search frequency for these terms tracks the unemployment rate and spikes during recessions. The close relationship between these measures allows us to track any notable and sustained divergence. Any prolonged increase in the search frequency of these select search terms could indicate a recessionary period.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-It8hZ" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Economic policy uncertainty index rises as recessions loom" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/It8hZ/19/" height="464" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Economic policy uncertainty vs. recession indicators">Economic policy uncertainty vs. recession indicators</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">The economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index clearly responds to business cycle downturns—spiking sharply during the recessions of the early 1990s, early 2000s, late 2000s, and the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://www.policyuncertainty.com/">EPU index</a> is calculated by Baker, Bloom, and Davis, and their full methodology can be found <a href="https://www.policyuncertainty.com/media/EPU_BBD_Mar2016.pdf">here</a>. The index aggregates information from three basic components: search results from 10 large national newspapers measuring the volume of news articles discussing economic policy uncertainty; the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire over the next year; and the degree of disagreement among economic forecasters about future levels of key economic variables.</p>
<p>While the EPU is clearly cyclical, it does rise during some non-recessionary periods, most notably in the early 2000s and from 2011–-2013. The early 2000s increase is almost surely driven by the Iraq War. From 2011–2013, a rolling series of economic crises in the Eurozone, as well as short-term extensions of expiring provisions from the tax cuts passed in the first George W. Bush administration explain the spikes. The very large spike in early 2025 was related to the “Liberation Day” tariff announcements.</p>
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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-Zbpq8" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Consumer sentiment falls during economic downturns" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/Zbpq8/18/" height="465" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="University of Michigan consumer sentiment data vs. recession indicators">University of Michigan consumer sentiment data vs. recession indicators</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">Sharp falls in consumer sentiment are often followed shortly by recessions.</p>
<p>The University of Michigan consumer sentiment index has been calculated since 1960 (and has been calculated monthly since 1978). The index is derived from answers to five survey questions that have categorical answers (that is, their questions provide survey respondents with two to three possible responses to choose from, for example, “Would you say that your (and your family) are better off, or worse off financially than you were a year ago?”).</p>
<p>For each question, the University of Michigan researchers calculate a relative score for answers that subtracts the unfavorable responses from favorable responses. The sum of responses is then compared with a base value from 1966.</p>
<p>The index reached lows in 2022 that were comparable with most recessionary periods, despite a very strong economy. The clear explanation for that was the sharp inflation spike in late 2021 through mid-2022. Early 2025 saw similarly low measures, likely driven by concerns over the potential effects of tariffs.</p>
<p>Because the 1966 base year was a long time ago, it seems fair to ask if there are structural changes that might reliably change the level of consumer sentiment over time. For example, if rising inequality (or anything else) made U.S. households consistently less happy about their relative economic situation over time, they might generally have a lower &#8220;baseline&#8221; level of favorable sentiment.</p>
<p>To assess this, and to evaluate whether the University of Michigan consumer sentiment index might be useful for assessing the broader health of the economy, the figure below shows <em>changes</em> in the level of consumer sentiment and <em>changes</em> in inflation-adjusted personal consumption expenditures (the broadest level of household spending). The theory is that consumers’ sentiment about the economy should correlate positively with their actual spending patterns. The pattern is clear: Changes in consumer sentiment do indeed coincide tightly with changes in consumer spending.</p>


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<div class="chart-body"><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-rfnHC" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Chicago Fed’s flow-consistent unemployment rate tracks the official rate" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/rfnHC/18/" height="464" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><br />
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Chicago FED's flow consistent unemployment rate (FCR) vs. BLS unemployment">Chicago FED's flow consistent unemployment rate (FCR) vs. BLS unemployment</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="callout-text">The Chicago Federal Reserve flow-consistent unemployment rate (FCR) combines several sources of labor market data to predict monthly unemployment rates. The Chicago Fed FCR closely predicts the official unemployment rate published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).</p>
<p>Twice a month, the Chicago Federal Reserve publishes the <a href="https://www.chicagofed.org/research/data/chicago-fed-labor-market-indicators/release-schedule" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Real-Time Unemployment Rate Forecast</a>, which predicts the BLS unemployment rate in advance of its official release. The key ingredient in this prediction is the Chicago Fed’s flow-consistent unemployment rate, which is in turn a prediction of Current Population Survey job finding and separation rates using real-time data like UI claims; Google Trends index for unemployment; Bloomberg consensus unemployment rate forecasts; Indeed and Lightcast job openings; ADP employment levels; weekly Morning Consult unemployment and job search activity; Conference Board labor market differentials; and JOLTS layoffs, discharges, and hiring rates. As a result, the Chicago Fed labor market indicators are partially based on U.S. government data, but they can be extended even in the absence of government data releases.</p>
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<div class="accordion"><h5>About the Data Accountability Dashboard</h5>

<h6>UPDATED October 20, 2026</h6>

<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Why wouldn’t you use the best data to track such important things?">Why wouldn’t you use the best data to track such important things?</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
	<h5>Why wouldn’t you use the best data to track such important things?</h5>
	<p>The best data are collected by federal statistical agencies—like the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We use them a lot in all of our other work. But the second Trump administration is compromising these data in unprecedented ways. The federal government shutdown has choked off the normal flow of data from federal statistical agencies. Even before the shutdown, the Trump administration threatened the expertise and independence of federal statistical agencies in ways not seen before.</p>
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<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Whose experiences fall through the cracks without FSA data?">Whose experiences fall through the cracks without FSA data?</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
	<h5>Whose experiences fall through the cracks without FSA data?</h5>
	<p>Only FSAs run consistent and high-quality surveys of actual households. These household surveys give us crucial information about not just average outcomes in the U.S. economy, but also information about the full distribution of outcomes. Crucially, these household surveys provide needed texture on the economic experience of households and workers by income or wage level, age, gender, race, or ethnicity. In short, these household surveys let us know who is doing better and who is doing worse than average in the U.S. economy.</p>
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<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Is there any real use to carefully tracking next-best data?">Is there any real use to carefully tracking next-best data?</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
	<h5>Is there any real use to carefully tracking next-best data?</h5>
	<p>Despite the obvious and fundamental weaknesses of data collected outside of FSAs, we need something that will provide a signal—even a very fuzzy one—if the economy begins deeply malfunctioning and official data sources are suppressed or manipulated to deny it. The first line of defense against this political manipulation will be the staffers at the federal statistical agencies. They are dedicated and public-spirited and take pride in the accuracy of their work. But should any whistleblowers raise concerns, there will be reflexive denials from the administration. Having data that can backup claims that the true state of the economy is diverging from what manipulated data are reporting could be helpful in this troubling scenario.</p>
	<p>The data collected by the federal statistical agencies are an incredibly valuable public good. While there would never be a good time to squander it, the absolute worst time to degrade data quality is when the economy is being buffeted by policy shocks that threaten to cause either a recession or an uptick of inflation. Given this urgency, we’re collecting all data we can to assess the economy’s health in this time when the gold standard data is under attack.</p>
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<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="When has there ever before been a need for a dashboard of next-best data?">When has there ever before been a need for a dashboard of next-best data?</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
	<h5>When has there ever before been a need for a dashboard of next-best data?</h5>
	<p>Essentially never. Today’s threats to the gold standard data collected by FSAs are unprecedented. </p>
	<p>Even those statistical agencies that have not been fatally gutted by indiscriminate and illegal layoffs are still being squeezed of resources to do the job well. Worst of all, agencies that accurately reported data seen as politically inconvenient to the administration have been subject to retaliation, like the <a href="https://www.epi.org/policywatch/firing-bls-commissioner-erika-mcentarfer/" title="The president’s belief that the BLS commissioner personally ‘produced’ the jobs numbers is preposterous and shows a complete misunderstanding of how government statistical agencies operate, Heidi Shierholz, EPI President, said in a statement. Trump’s move also risks politicizing the office of Commissioner in the future, by threatening their removal if any economic statistical data released does not seem favorable to the White House.">firing of the BLS commissioner</a>. Political retaliation for accurately reporting economic data has never happened in U.S. history—not even during the first Trump administration. President Nixon raised the idea of firing BLS staffers as political retaliation, but he never acted on it. But political retaliation is a reality of the second Trump administration.</p>
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<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="How should I understand this information based on second-best data?">How should I understand this information based on second-best data?</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
	<h5>How should I understand this information based on second-best data?</h5>
	<p>In this dashboard, we highlight the measures we used and note their relationship to either recessions or other official data sources. If the coming year sees many of these next-best data sources flashing red and signaling an economic recession, this will be useful to compare against what the statistical agencies are reporting. In each chart we explain the measure being used, how it traditionally behaves during recessions, if it tends to mirror any data series collected by the federal statistical agencies, and what we would expect it to do should the economy slow significantly or enter recession.</p>
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		<title>Arkansas county’s ARPA troubles are the exception that proves the rule: Fiscal relief funds provided to state and local governments during the pandemic were a wise investment</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/arkansas-countys-arpa-troubles-are-the-exception-that-proves-the-rule-fiscal-relief-funds-provided-to-state-and-local-governments-during-the-pandemic-were-a-wise-investment/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2026 16:27:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Kamper]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=323192</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Over the weekend, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette ran a deeply reported analysis of Pulaski County’s use of the $76 million it received in fiscal recovery funds under the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA).]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Over the weekend, the <em>Arkansas Democrat-Gazette</em> ran a deeply reported <a href="https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2026/jul/05/pulaski-county-received-76-million-in-federal/">analysis</a> of Pulaski County’s use of the $76 million it received in fiscal recovery funds under the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA). This legislation, among many other things, gave $350 billion to state and local governments to fight the pandemic and deal with the economic fallout, averting a prolonged recession. The paper found the county—which is the largest in Arkansas and includes the state capitol of Little Rock—failed to document how it spent the funds, and that lack of documentation raises questions about whether the use of funds were in line with ARPA’s rules. By contrast, thousands of cities and counties used ARPA funds to bolster economic recovery and improve the lives of working families. The missed opportunity in Pulaski County case is the exception, not the rule, and demonstrates how important federal oversight of the program was.</p>
<p><span id="more-323192"></span></p>
<p>As part of the passage of ARPA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued extensive <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/new-u-s-treasury-final-rule-supports-state-and-local-spending-for-an-equitable-economic-recovery/">rules</a> outlining both how State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) could be spent and how the spending should be tracked. Unlike most other federal disbursements to state and local governments, recipients had great discretion in how they used their SLFRF allocation. This was one of the <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/">great strengths</a> of the program, as it allowed each recipient to tailor its use of the funds to meet their specific needs.</p>
<p>Because of the wide flexibility they were given, state and local governments had to follow very clear procedures in accounting for the funds. Passing a budget alone was insufficient; governments had to formally obligate their ARPA funds through written contracts or interagency memoranda.</p>
<p>While this process did indeed cause some <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/cities-and-counties-might-be-at-risk-of-losing-billions-if-they-dont-obligate-american-rescue-plan-funds-correctly-advocates-should-pay-close-attention-to-the-2024-obligation/">confusion</a>, especially among smaller local governments with less experience dealing with federal funds, Treasury provided local governments with regular <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/July-2026-PE-Report-User-Guide.pdf">updates</a>, held <a href="https://youtu.be/Tf9IZZHvjAA?si=yr1vNAR5wU_xUKps">informative</a> <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xfxm55DN_WM">webinars</a>, and created an extensive <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SLFRF-Final-Rule-FAQ.pdf">FAQ document</a> to address the many issues that arose. Additionally, groups like the <a href="https://www.nlc.org/covid-19-pandemic-response/american-rescue-plan-act/arpa-local-relief-frequently-asked-questions/">National League of Cities</a> and the <a href="https://www.naco.org/resource/arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-fund-obligation-updates-guidance">National Association of Counties</a> provided extensive assistance to local governments to help them navigate SLFRF.</p>
<p>Pulaski County, like all other cities, counties, states, and tribal governments, was required to fully obligate its fiscal recovery funds by December 31, 2024. Despite this, the <em>Democrat-Gazette</em> found that the county could not account for over half of the funds it received—at least $38.6 million of the $76 million—and much of the information the county did provide the paper did not meet the Treasury Department’s reporting standards.</p>
<p>An EPI analysis of the county’s most recent <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/coronavirus/assistance-for-state-local-and-tribal-governments/state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds/public-data">filings</a> with Treasury, from the end of 2025, bear this out. Pulaski County reported over $41 million falling under “Administrative Expenses,” but that category is supposed to be used only for the costs of “<a href="https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/SLFRF-Compliance-and-Reporting-Guidance.pdf">administering</a> the SLFRF program.” Only five governments (out of more than 30,000 total state and local governments receiving funds) reported spending more than $41 million on administrative expenses: Three were states/commonwealths, and the other two were the City of Detroit and Fulton County, Georgia, whose SLFRF allocations were much larger than Pulaski County’s. It is difficult to imagine that Pulaski County needed to use 54% of its total SLFRF funds just to administer its use of SLFRF funds.</p>
<p>Moreover, the <em>Democrat-Gazette</em> reported the county’s reserve fund ballooned by almost $40 million during the same period. Treasury’s rules specifically prohibit SLFRF from being used for rainy-day funds or to replenish reserves. The funds were intended to be spent to address the myriad challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<h4><strong>SLFRF was a vital resource</strong></h4>
<p>It is important that state and local governments are held to account for their use of fiscal recovery funds. The case of Pulaski County illustrates that accountability safeguards for the program are necessary and effective rather than being bureaucratic burdens. Pulaski County’s apparent failure to follow the guidelines for using SLFRF funds is a rare exception. The Treasury Department implemented a novel, flexible program with guardrails and responsibilities that the vast majority of state and local governments were able to abide by. SLFRF was a vital component of ARPA, and did much to speed the economic recovery and <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/#epi-toc-1">prevent</a> a Great Recession like the U.S. saw in 2008–2009.</p>
<p>SLFRF was vital in preserving and rebuilding the public-sector workforce. In the wake of the Great Recession, it took <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/without-federal-aid-many-state-and-local-governments-could-make-the-same-budget-cuts-that-hampered-the-last-economic-recovery/">11 years</a> for state and local government employment to recover. Because of SLFRF, it took a fraction of that time (just three years and eight months) for the public sector to recover from the COVID-19 downturn. This rapid recovery mirrored the recovery of the overall job market. The typical U.S. state needed 77 months after the start of the Great Recession for its job numbers to recover; it only took 29 months after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic for the same level of recovery.</p>
<p>Additionally, SLFRF allowed states and localities to enact programs of social insurance and income support that directly responded to immediate community needs. In just the first two years of SLFRF’s operation alone, more than 4.5 million households received mortgage, rent, or utility assistance. Emergency programs offered housing to people who had been displaced by the pandemic and direct government assistance to food pantries and other programs that helped people facing food insecurity. These programs were valuable tools for helping working families in need.</p>
<p>Pulaski County, therefore, missed a tremendous opportunity to use its fiscal recovery funds to spur economic recovery and provide assistance to working families. The $350 billion SLFRF program was a vital resource during the pandemic and its aftermath. The example of Pulaski County demonstrates the importance of federal accountability requirements for largely unrestricted funds, not the failure of the program. Lessons from the vast majority of localities that successfully used SLFRF funds and the rare exceptions in which local governments failed to do so should continue to inform<a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/#epi-toc-3"> future</a> policy design for similar programs.</p>
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		<title>Trump’s war in Iran has wiped out 1.5 years of wage growth</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/trumps-war-in-iran-has-wiped-out-1-5-years-of-wage-growth/</link>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:17:08 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Zipperer]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=322626</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[The Trump administration’s decision to start a war with Iran has imposed disastrous costs—both economic and humanitarian—around the world. The U.S.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Trump administration’s decision to start a war with Iran has imposed disastrous costs—both economic and humanitarian—around the world. The U.S. has been more insulated from these costs than most other countries, yet even here they are extremely large. The war’s effect in pushing up U.S. energy prices has erased all the real (inflation-adjusted) wage gains workers have made during his second term.</p>
<p>According to today’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) <a href="https://www.bls.gov/news.release/cpi.htm">release</a>, overall inflation was 4.2% over the last year. The sudden burst in inflation, along with <a href="https://bsky.app/profile/elisegould.bsky.social/post/3mnwvn4gn4c2x">slowing</a> nominal wage growth, means that the average hourly real wage for private-sector workers is now no higher than it was in January 2025.</p>
<p>So far, excessive inflation has been limited to energy and airfares. But as long as the war continues, there is a heightened threat that price increases will spill over to the broader economy, triggering a more permanent increase in the cost of living and further reductions in real earnings.</p>
<p><iframe id="datawrapper-chart-cj8JZ" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" title="Trump has erased all the wage gains of his term" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/cj8JZ/1/" height="470" frameborder="0" scrolling="no" aria-label="Line chart" data-external='1'></iframe><script type="text/javascript">(function(){function e(){window.addEventListener(`message`,function(e){if(e.data[`datawrapper-height`]!==void 0){var t=document.querySelectorAll(`iframe`);for(var n in e.data[`datawrapper-height`])for(var r=0,i;i=t[r];r++)if(i.contentWindow===e.source){var a=e.data[`datawrapper-height`][n]+`px`;i.style.height=a}}})}e()})();</script></p>
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		<title>Taking affordability seriously: Even with recent oil shocks, affordability remains mostly an issue of incomes, not prices </title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/blog/taking-affordability-seriously-even-with-recent-oil-shocks-affordability-remains-mostly-an-issue-of-incomes-not-prices/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 14 May 2026 18:34:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=blog&#038;p=321572</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Affordability has been the policy buzzword of recent years. Much of the affordability discourse—both among policymakers and the public—has focused near-exclusively on prices as the big affordability problem.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="box clearfix  box" style="">
<h4><strong>Key takeaways:</strong></h4>
<ul>
<li>Affordability is not just about prices; it’s the outcome of a race between income growth and price inflation. When income growth is slower than price inflation, affordability worsens. When income growth is faster, affordability improves.</li>
<li>Focusing just on prices is bad for understanding how the economy works and how it has performed in the recent past, and it leads to an overly restrictive policy menu for improving families’ affordability.</li>
<li>Policy can more reliably address income growth for typical families. This growth has been stunted for decades by the rise of inequality. Closing this gap by ensuring more equitable distribution of future growth is the strongest tool we have for improving affordability.</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p>Affordability has been <em>the</em> policy buzzword of recent years. Much of the affordability discourse—both among policymakers and the public—has focused near-exclusively on <em>prices</em> as the big affordability problem. But affordability is not a problem of high prices, instead it’s the outcome of a race between incomes and prices. And the reason typical families have faced an affordability crunch in recent decades is not because prices have grown exceptionally fast, it’s because incomes for the vast majority have grown too slowly. This income growth has been suppressed mostly by rising inequality that has put a growing wedge between overall economic growth and the income growth of typical families.</p>
<p>Getting the drivers of affordability right is important—it’s not just quibbling. If you only examine price growth and try to infer what has happened to affordability over periods of economic history, you’ll usually get the story wrong. And if policymakers only look at how to change the trajectory of prices while ignoring what they can do to change the trajectory of incomes, they will be far less effective in providing useful relief to U.S. families. There are far more ways to use policy to raise incomes in a targeted and effective way than there are to suppress price growth.</p>
<p>Below, we provide some more background on why analyses of affordability need to include incomes, why policymakers have much more scope to raise incomes in a useful way as opposed to pushing down prices, and why focusing just on prices can obscure whether affordability has improved or worsened.</p>
<p><span id="more-321572"></span></p>
<h4><strong>Why do prices dominate today’s affordability debates? </strong></h4>
<p>In modern capitalist economies, prices rise essentially every year (though at quite different rates), but so do incomes. Determining what has happened to families’ ability to afford a decent and secure life requires looking at measures that take into account both sides of the affordability equation, such as real (inflation-adjusted) income growth. Nobody really disputes this. After all, Americans could <a href="https://libraryguides.missouri.edu/pricesandwages/1930-1939">buy a new car for $600</a> in the 1930s, but nobody thinks society was generally richer back then.</p>
<p>The narrow focus on prices in assessing one’s own economic struggles likely stems from several factors.</p>
<p>First, inflation was very fast in the early 2020s. Americans hadn’t experienced inflation rates that high in decades, and they didn’t like them, so prices remain front of mind for many.</p>
<p>Second, it is true that price changes can dominate what happens to real incomes over <em>very</em> short time periods (say a year or less). This recognition is why we can be so sure that the oil price shock inflicted by the U.S. bombing of Iran is going to be so damaging to U.S. families. The rise in oil prices so far this year has likely baked in at least a 1.5% increase in inflation over the next 6–12 months. In 2025, real wage growth for <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">the large majority of workers</a> was slower than 1.5% (which was the outcome of roughly 4% nominal wage growth minus 2.5% inflation). Given this, a sharp and unexpected 1.5% jump in prices will likely erase any prospective real wage gains for workers in 2026.</p>
<p>Finally, it <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/policy-choices-did-not-cause-recent-years-inflation-but-did-deliver-strong-wage-growth/">has been noted</a> that many Americans see wage gains as something they accomplished themselves through hard work, while prices are out of their immediate control. Inflation is hence seen as damage done <em>to</em> them and something they need relief from. But <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/policy-choices-did-not-cause-recent-years-inflation-but-did-deliver-strong-wage-growth/">this is mostly wrong</a>—policy choices impact wage growth at least as much as inflation, and the most effective policy relief for living standards will come through measures that raise wages, not restrain prices.</p>
<h4><strong>Policy can target incomes more effectively and precisely than prices</strong></h4>
<p>One person’s income is another person’s cost, which means prices are a bundle of different stakeholders’ incomes. The bill you pay at the grocery store must cover payments the store makes to its shareholders, the salary of the CEO and managers, the wages of cashiers, and the cost of buying food from producers. We don’t want <em>all</em> these incomes to be forced down. Given extreme levels of inequality in the U.S., we would likely be fine with lower CEO pay and payments to shareholders, but we would want wages of cashiers and many in the food production supply chain to rise. Efforts to simply clamp down on this price will have uncertain effects on incomes.</p>
<p>In the jargon of economists, focusing on prices is <em>sector-based</em> policy but to genuinely improve affordability we need <em>factor-based</em> policies, where factors of production like capital, rank-and-file workers, and corporate management can be specifically targeted by policies that aim to raise or restrain their incomes.</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are many good policy options for targeted affordability policy specifically toward low- and middle-income families. Incomes for these families—and for anybody without dynastic wealth—are dominated by wages and public benefits. We talk about each of these in turn below.</p>
<p><strong><em>Boosting public benefits is affordability policy</em></strong></p>
<p>Public benefits are entirely under policymakers’ control. If policymakers really cared about the affordability of groceries or health care or energy, they could boost benefits for food stamps, Medicaid, and the low-income heating energy assistance program. These programs currently deliver needed assistance to tens of millions of families to make life more affordable—and they do this with vanishingly small administrative costs, meaning they are highly efficient. Yet all <a href="https://www.ibo.nyc.gov/assets/ibo/downloads/pdf/community-and-social-services/2025/2025-october-focus-on-lower-income-households.pdf">of these programs</a> are slated for steep cuts in the coming decade due to the Republican tax and spending megabill passed in 2025. This bill will inflict large damage to the most vulnerable families’ ability to afford decent and secure lives.</p>
<p>Further, Congress and the Trump administration chose to not extend the Biden administration’s more-generous subsidies for people to buy health insurance through the marketplace exchanges of the Affordable Care Act. The failure to extend these subsidies—even after a full federal government shutdown engineered by congressional Democrats aimed at prioritizing this issue—means that average out-of-pocket costs <a href="https://www.kff.org/quick-take/aca-insurers-are-raising-premiums-by-an-estimated-26-but-most-enrollees-could-see-sharper-increases-in-what-they-pay/">will double</a> for those buying insurance in the exchanges.</p>
<p>Besides just reversing these cuts, making the U.S. welfare state more robust could also greatly boost the affordability of a decent life. Things like making <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/medicare-for-all-would-help-the-labor-market/">health coverage more universal</a> with lower out-of-pocket costs, <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unemployment-insurance-reform/">reforming unemployment insurance</a> to make it more protective, and providing all families with children a generous <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/presenting-epis-budget-for-shared-prosperity/">universal child allowance</a> could dramatically improve affordability.</p>
<p><strong><em>Policy can boost affordability through higher wages as well</em></strong></p>
<p>The link between policy changes and wage growth is slightly less direct than for public benefits, but <a href="https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/wage-suppression-inequality/">it remains very strong</a>. Capitalist labor markets are <em>inherently</em> tilted toward employers and against workers. The only periods of history that have seen strong and equal rates of wage growth across the workforce have been periods where policy supported institutions that boosted workers’ leverage with employers.</p>
<p>The 30 years after World War II saw the creation of policies and institutions that successfully spread the gains from rising productivity equitably among workers up and down the wage distribution, with low- and middle-wage workers seeing growth rates as fast as high-wage workers. This equitable distribution of wage growth was a crucial way that income growth more broadly was kept equitable in this period.</p>
<p>Since 1979, however, these institutions have been steadily attacked and weakened with no new institutions being stood up to take their place in ensuring an equitable distribution of economic growth. The result has been that wages and incomes of typical families have lagged far behind <em>average</em> income and wage growth (or productivity). The wedge between income growth experienced by the vast majority of families and average growth is simply income being generated in the economy that is not helping typical families’ affordability struggles. Instead, it is income being funneled reliably away to the top.</p>
<p>There’s no reason that the institutions that equalized wage growth cannot be built back up and modernized.</p>
<p>The federal minimum wage is the most obvious policy institution for raising wages at the low end of the labor market. Raising the federal minimum wage from its current shamefully low $7.25 would directly boost affordability for <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/rtwa-2025-impact-fact-sheet/">tens of millions of workers</a>. In the middle of the wage distribution, unions have proven to be the institution that has historically counteracted employer power and given typical workers increased leverage. However, unions are in a far weaker position today relative to their high points because of intentional policy choices—specifically because policymakers failed to act to curb <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/unlawful-employer-opposition-to-union-election-campaigns/">employers’ growing hostility</a> (and often their illegal activities) toward union organizing. If stronger policy boosted union density, unions would <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/union-decline-lowers-wages-of-nonunion-workers-the-overlooked-reason-why-wages-are-stuck-and-inequality-is-growing/">raise wages for both members and non-members</a> alike.</p>
<p>Low- and middle-wage workers also benefit enormously from a determined effort to <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-importance-of-locking-in-full-employment-for-the-long-haul/">keep unemployment low for extended periods of time</a>. In recent decades, policymakers have tolerated excess unemployment to keep inflation in check, but this is far too costly a strategy to keep potential inflation in check. Besides locking out millions of willing workers from job opportunities, long periods of excess unemployment <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-should-we-assess-and-characterize-workers-wage-growth-in-recent-decades/">were periods when real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth became literally stagnant</a>.</p>
<p>Policymakers often seem skeptical of the effectiveness of these wage-boosting policies, arguing that the effects are too indirect and will take too long to provide benefits to workers. It’s true that efforts to boost unionization and sustain full employment will take some time to push up wages. <em>But they will do this reliably. </em>Further, many policies advanced in the name of reducing prices would also take a long time to come to fruition. For example, calls to tighten antitrust restrictions against corporate mergers and to break up established monopolies often have lots of merit. However, they are not policies that happen instantly and have purely predictable effects.</p>
<h4><strong>Focusing too hard on prices can obscure when affordability is actually improving</strong></h4>
<p>Finally, one key reason to broaden the affordability debate beyond prices is simply to make sure the public and policymakers can correctly identify periods of improvement or degradation of affordability. As an example of how focusing only on prices can lead to an incorrect diagnosis of affordability trends, take the example of two five-year stretches in recent economic history, both measured from a business cycle peak and going five years forward from there: In the years between 2007 and 2012, annual inflation averaged 1.8% and peaked at 5.5%, while between 2019 and 2024, inflation averaged 4.2% and peaked at 9%. Based on price growth alone, one would expect affordability to have eroded more rapidly in that second period, and indeed the popular narrative is that the early 2020s inflation was particularly destructive for affordability.</p>
<p>But between 2007 and 2012, the nation’s unemployment rate averaged 8.3%, while it averaged less than 5% between 2019 and 2024. After 2007, it took 93 months to re-attain the pre-recession unemployment rate, while it took just 29 months after the 2019 business cycle peak. In short, the labor market was far stronger in the second period.</p>
<p>And when it comes to real (inflation-adjusted) wage growth, the second period—largely because of its lower unemployment—saw far better outcomes than the first. In the 2019–2024 period, inflation-adjusted wages for low-wage workers (those at the 10th percentile) and the median worker rose by a cumulative 15.3% and 5.8%, respectively. In short, contrary to most conventional wisdom, affordability <em>improved</em> in this time. Between 2007 and 2012, real wages outright fell for both low-wage and median workers. Even with very slow inflation, affordability was demonstrably worse in that earlier period.</p>


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<p>More recently, inflation averaged slightly lower in 2025 (2.5%) than 2024 (2.9%). Yet for many workers—and particularly low-wage workers—2025 <a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/low-wage-workers-faced-worsening-affordability-in-2025/">saw <em>weaker</em> (or even negative) real wage growth</a>. This is largely due to some slight cooling in the labor market as unemployment rose from 4.0% to 4.4% over the course of 2025. Hence, even as inflation decelerated, the cooling labor market led to an even faster deceleration in nominal wages, which meant that affordability worsened for many workers.</p>


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<h4><strong>Reducing inequality is the key to improving affordability </strong></h4>
<p>Because many policymakers believe that affordability concerns are a new problem caused by inflation of recent years, they are now on a frenzied search for new and creative solutions to this price problem. But because the real affordability problem for U.S. families did <em>not</em> emerge in the past few years (remember, affordability was improving in the five years before 2025) and because the genuine long-run problem of affordability was about the inequality of income and wage growth, not excess inflation, most of these new and creative solutions just won’t hit the mark.</p>
<p>It’s understandable why many policymakers seem frustrated with being reminded of the long-diagnosed problem of inequality and the proven remedies—such as sustained full employment, higher wage standards like minimum wages, protecting workers’ fundamental rights to organize unions and bargain collectively, and a more robust welfare state.</p>
<p>Some, of course, just don’t believe in some of these solutions, while many who do would argue that these proven remedies are politically unrealistic in the current moment. But because the real affordability problem is an inequality problem that requires those at the top of the income and wealth scales having to accept less growth going forward (less than the stratospheric gains they’ve gotten used to, it should be said), <em>any</em> genuine solution is going to seem impossible in today’s political system that is dominated by the wealthiest families and corporations. <em>Any</em> policy—whether old and well-tested or new and creative—that actually aims to redistribute income, wealth, and power away from where it sits today will face a wall of opposition that must be politically overcome one way or the other. There’s no “one weird trick” where you can develop a policy creative and neat enough that it will somehow fool the rich and powerful about what its end result will be. And if the end result of the new and creative policy does not threaten the prerogatives of the rich, it’s not a real solution.</p>
<p>Today’s affordability concerns are indeed rooted in objective facts about the material circumstances of middle- and working-class families in the United States. Precisely because of this, they deserve more serious analysis and policy responses than they have been getting. This means focusing more on incomes than prices, and it means being clear-eyed that it has been the upward redistribution of income to the top—abetted by policy decisions—that is the drag on typical families’ affordability. Until solutions address that, they’re mostly just noise.</p>
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		<title>State of Working America Q1 Economic Briefing</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/event/state-of-working-america-q1-economic-briefing/</link>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 17:00:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ben Zipperer, Chandra Childers, Josh Bivens]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=event&#038;p=319461</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Economic Policy Institute Chief Economist Josh Bivens and Senior Economist Ben Zipperer, in conversation with Senior Policy and Economic Analyst Chandra Childers, on how current policies are impacting working people and families, along with solutions that create a more affordable life for Originally held Thursday, April 9, Webinar links, notes and Timestamped themes, discussion, and resources mentioned in the Listen on The State of Working America If you are an academic, student, non-profit researcher or advocate, or a journalist, you may view and use the content of this webinar and its related materials without requesting any further This is permitted under a non-commercial use Creative Commons license CC BY-NC-SA If you are a commercial enterprise looking to this information or data in any product that will be sold or as part of services and data you provide to paying customers, request commercial use by contacting Find out about upcoming webinars first!]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Economic Policy Institute Chief Economist <strong>Josh Bivens</strong> and Senior Economist <strong>Ben Zipperer</strong>, in conversation with Senior Policy and Economic Analyst <strong>Chandra Childers</strong>, on how current policies are impacting working people and families, along with solutions that create a more affordable life for everyone.</p>
<p>Originally held <strong>Thursday, April 9, 2026</strong>.</p>
<p><iframe title="State of Working America Economic Briefing Q1 2026 | Economic Policy Institute" width="600" height="338" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/76fCqNaqRdU?feature=oembed" frameborder="0" allow="accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share" referrerpolicy="strict-origin-when-cross-origin" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<h4>Webinar links, notes and discussion</h4>
<p>Timestamped themes, discussion, and resources mentioned in the webinar</p>
<div class="epi-togglable-container  "><div><a href="#" class="epi-togglable-link toggler" data-close-text="Close" data-open-text="Open">Open</a></div><div class="epi-togglable-target togglee" style="display:none;">
<p>2:39 <strong>We are through the first year of the Trump administration. What’s the big picture on policy changes they’ve undertaken over that time?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/the-trump-administrations-macroeconomic-agenda-harms-affordability-and-raises-inequality/">The Trump administration’s macroeconomic agenda harms affordability and raises inequality</a></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/tariffs-everything-you-need-to-know-but-were-afraid-to-ask/">Tariffs—Everything you need to know but were afraid to ask</a></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/the-macroeconomics-of-the-trump-administration-chaotic-and-harmful-policies-will-make-the-united-states-poorer-either-rapidly-or-gradually/">The macroeconomics of the Trump administration</a></p>
<p>6:54 <strong>What are some key economic outcomes of the first year we should know about?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">For more on the race between income, or pay, and prices, check out our Affordability webinar, <a href="https://www.epi.org/event/whats-missing-from-the-affordability-debate/">What&#8217;s missing from the affordability debate?</a></p>
<p>10:01 <strong>Can you say more about what the delayed effect of some of Trump&#8217;s policies might be on economic outcomes as we move forward?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-trump-has-dismantled-the-federal-workforce-in-his-first-100-days/">How Trump has dismantled the federal workforce in his first 100 days</a></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/you-cant-starve-the-public-sector-to-excellence/">You can’t starve the public sector to excellence</a></p>
<p>13:42 <strong>What role has immigration policy played in measurable trends over the past year, and what effects should we expect from it going forward?</strong></p>
<p>16:44 <strong>Sometimes we hear that this immigration policy has led to greater opportunities for U.S.-born workers. Is there any truth to that?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/unemployment-has-increased-for-u-s-born-workers-in-the-face-of-mass-deportations-trumps-draconian-immigration-enforcement-is-harming-all-workers/">Unemployment has increased for U.S.-born workers in the face of mass deportations</a></p>
<p>19:47 <strong>Where does AI fit into what&#8217;s happening in the U.S. economy over the past year?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/how-ai-spending-is-impacting-the-u-s-economy/">How AI spending is impacting the U.S. economy</a></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/ai-adoption-and-firms-job-posting-behavior-20260327.html#fn5" target="_blank" rel="noopener">AI Adoption and Firms&#8217; Job-Posting Behavior</a></p>
<p>24:10 <strong>You’ve mentioned the conflict with Iran a couple of times. What can we expect in terms of the effect of this on U.S. economic outcomes in the next 6-12 months?</strong></p>
<p>31:01 <strong>Are you still seeing evidence of a K-shaped economy?</strong></p>
<p>33:30 <strong>What is the current state of the productivity-pay gap, and where do you see it heading in the age of AI?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/productivity-pay-gap/">The productivity-pay gap</a></p>
<p>36:46 <strong>Can you compare U.S. economic performance to other countries&#8217; economies?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/supporting-manufacturing-employment-no-president-has-tried-so-of-course-it-never-worked/">Supporting manufacturing employment</a></p>
<p>40:46 <strong>Why are states like Texas so reluctant to raise the minimum wage and address affordable housing?</strong></p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;"><a href="https://www.epi.org/minimum-wage-tracker/">Minimum Wage Tracker</a></p>
<p>43:15 <strong>If incomes lag inflation, will that affect performance of housing, consumer, and student load debt? And if so, what are the likely knock-on effects?</strong></p>
<p>46:51 <strong>A large percentage of U.S. G.D.P is from money spent by the top 5 or so percent of income earners. What happens when they pull back on spending?</strong></p>
<p>48:36 <strong>The unemployment gap seems to be narrowing greatly between recent college graduates and other workers. Why is that the case? Is AI driving that?</strong></p>
<p>50:52 <strong>How reliable is the data from the federal government, and what other sources are available for economic analysis?</strong></p>
<p>53:51 <strong>Is there data to show what percent of consumer growth is based on credit card debt? How much longer can consumers support shopping with debt, and are defaults growing?</strong></p>
</div></div>
<p>&nbsp;<br />
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<h4>Listen on The State of Working America Podcast</h4>
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		<title>How ARPA State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds helped ensure a swift post-COVID recovery</title>
		<link>https://www.epi.org/publication/how-arpa-state-and-local-fiscal-recovery-funds-helped-ensure-a-swift-post-covid-recovery/</link>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2026 12:00:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Dave Kamper]]></dc:creator>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.epi.org/?post_type=publication&#038;p=319224</guid>
					<description><![CDATA[Key The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&#160;$350 billion&#160;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div class="web-only">
<div class="quick-card">
<p><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 18px;">Key takeaways</span></strong></p>
<p>The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&nbsp;$350 billion&nbsp;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments. These State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) went directly to each government to spend on public health, economic recovery, infrastructure, and more.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>SLFRF&nbsp;was&nbsp;an ambitious and successful program that should serve as a model during future economic downturns. Among the key findings of this report:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='1' data-aria-level='1'>The most important policy choice was&nbsp;giving&nbsp;wide flexibility to state and local governments in how to use the funds. This allowed&nbsp;governments to spend the funds in ways that best&nbsp;met&nbsp;their needs.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='2' data-aria-level='1'>Fiscal recovery funds helped keep the COVID-19&nbsp;recession from getting&nbsp;worse, and&nbsp;helped state and local governments recover&nbsp;substantially faster&nbsp;than they did after the Great Recession.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='3' data-aria-level='1'>Governments in Southern states were far more likely than others to use the funds for infrastructure work&nbsp;to help combat&nbsp;decades of underinvestment in basic public services across the South.&nbsp;</li>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='4' data-aria-level='1'>SLFRF supported public services without contributing to inflation.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<div class="pdf-only">
<hr>
<h4>Key takeaways</h4>
<p>The American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA), signed into law by President Biden in 2021, included&nbsp;$350 billion&nbsp;for states, cities, counties, territories, and tribal governments. These State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF) went directly to each government to spend on public health, economic recovery, infrastructure, and more.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>SLFRF&nbsp;was&nbsp;an ambitious and successful program that should serve as a model during future economic downturns. Among the key findings of this report:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='1' data-aria-level='1'>The most important policy choice was&nbsp;giving&nbsp;wide flexibility to state and local governments in how to use the funds. This allowed&nbsp;governments to spend the funds in ways that best&nbsp;met&nbsp;their needs.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='2' data-aria-level='1'>Fiscal recovery funds helped keep the COVID-19&nbsp;recession from getting&nbsp;worse, and&nbsp;helped state and local governments recover&nbsp;substantially faster&nbsp;than they did after the Great Recession.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='3' data-aria-level='1'>Governments in Southern states were far more likely than others to use the funds for infrastructure work&nbsp;to help combat&nbsp;decades of underinvestment in basic public services across the South.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li aria-setsize="-1" data-leveltext='' data-font='Symbol' data-listid='1' data-list-defn-props='{&quot;335552541&quot;:1,&quot;335559685&quot;:720,&quot;335559991&quot;:360,&quot;469769226&quot;:&quot;Symbol&quot;,&quot;469769242&quot;:[8226],&quot;469777803&quot;:&quot;left&quot;,&quot;469777804&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;469777815&quot;:&quot;hybridMultilevel&quot;}' data-aria-posinset='4' data-aria-level='1'>SLFRF supported public services without contributing to inflation.&nbsp;</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<p><span class="dropped">T</span>he American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) was enacted on March 11, 2021. Among other provisions, ARPA allocated $350 billion for State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds (SLFRF). SLFRF was a recognition of the stark reality that the COVID-19 pandemic had wreaked havoc on state and local government finances (McNicholas, Bivens, and Shierholz 2020). SLFRF was also a reflection of lessons that policymakers learned from recent history. In the years following the Great Recession, inadequate fiscal support to state and local governments resulted in massive budget cuts, public-sector job losses, and reduced spending that dragged on the economy, delaying economic recovery by years (Shierholz and Bivens 2013). With the prospect of potentially devastating COVID-19-induced state and local budget shortfalls, Congress and the Biden administration made the decision to spend at the scale of the problem by making sure SLFRF was large enough to meet its recipients’ needs.</p>
<p>Of the $350 billion in fiscal recovery funds, $195.3 billion went to state governments, $65.1 billion to counties, $45.6 million to cities, $20 billion to tribal governments, $4.5 billion to territories, and $19.5 to small units of local government, mostly towns and villages. They could use the funds for five purposes: responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19; responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19; providing premium pay to “essential” workers; improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure; and replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19. Recipient governments had until December 31, 2024, to obligate those funds and until December 31, 2026, to spend them.</p>
<p>By any objective assessment, SLFRF was a transformative success. It averted a potential crisis. It empowered state and local leaders to address long-standing community needs. It helped millions of working families. It saved lives during the COVID-19 pandemic. The design and implementation of SLFRF offer many important lessons to future policymakers.</p>
<p>This report will highlight the smart design of SLFRF, which made it well positioned to address the needs of state and local governments in 2021 and beyond. The report will also note ways in which future policymakers could improve upon SLFRF’s design. The report will describe how SLFRF funds were deployed, showcasing the breadth and variety of uses to which they were put. State and local fiscal recovery funds were a vital part of the U.S. economic recovery post-2020. They provide a shining example of what government can achieve when it has adequate resources, and when the needs of communities and families are the main drivers of investment decisions.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>SLFRF played a vital role in preventing a second Great Recession</h2>
<p>The pandemic recession that began so suddenly in March 2020 was the biggest economic shock the country has seen since the Great Recession that started in 2008. Comparing the distinctly different policy responses to those two crises demonstrates how important SLFRF was to speeding the economic recovery and to preventing a second Great Recession.</p>
<p>First, SLFRF was vital in preserving and rebuilding the public-sector workforce. In the wake of the Great Recession, state and local governments faced devastating budget cuts that resulted in significant reductions in staffing and services. All faced fiscal crises because of sharp revenue declines caused by the Great Recession, but public services were further strained in many states by deliberate policy decisions, predominantly by Republican-controlled state governments, to cut taxes and slash public services (Cooper, Gable, and Austin 2012). State and local government employment peaked in July 2008, then fell for five straight years. It took a total of 11 years to reach July 2008 levels again (Cooper 2020). By contrast, the peak in state and local governments jobs before the pandemic was in February 2020. By October 2023—just three years and eight months later—state and local public sector employment had fully recovered to pre-pandemic levels.</p>
<p>In the first year following the passage of ARPA, there is evidence that the pace of a state’s SLFRF spending was positively correlated to the recovery of its public workforce:</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-1"></a><div class="figure chart-264911 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none float-bottom" data-chartid="264911" data-anchor="Table-1"><div class="figLabel">Table 1</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/264911-35651-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 1" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

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<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<p>After that, the direct correlation between SLFRF spending and public-sector jobs faded, but that is hardly surprising, given all the other variables that impact job markets.</p>
<p>Second, this rapid recovery mirrored the recovery of the overall job market. The typical U.S. state needed 77 months after the start of the Great Recession for its job numbers to recover; it only took 29 months after the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic for the same level of recovery. Of course, SLFRF was hardly the biggest factor in the overall economic recovery, but Cooper (2020) has shown that disinvestment in the public sector drags on growth in the private sector as well, and on economic growth overall. SLFRF supported conditions that made the private-sector economic recovery possible.</p>
<p>Third, SLFRF allowed states and localities to enact programs of social insurance and income support that directly responded to immediate community needs. In just the first two years of SLFRF’s operation alone, more than 4.5 million households received mortgage, rent, or utility assistance. Emergency programs offered housing to people who had been displaced by the pandemic and direct government assistance to food pantries and other programs that helped people facing food insecurity. These programs were valuable tools for helping working families in need.</p>
<p>Fourth, SLFRF has helped state and local governments and communities become more resilient against future downturns. Many states upgraded their unemployment insurance (UI) systems to make it easier to cope with an influx of claimants in the future. Some local governments created greater tenant protections and used recovery funds to give tenants facing eviction the right to free legal counsel. Several cities invested in pre-apprenticeship programs to help people in underserved communities gain access to high-quality infrastructure and climate jobs. These investments and others like them will help state and local governments to quickly distribute social insurance benefits when the next crisis hits and provide additional safety for working families put in jeopardy through job loss, illnesses, or natural disasters. (Kamper 2025).</p>
<h2>SLFRF’s innovative program design meant funds could be used where they did the most good</h2>
<p>The SLFRF program had two unusual characteristics that helped make it successful.</p>
<p>First, unlike previous iterations of state and local aid, SLFRF funds went directly to individual state and local governments. While payments to smaller cities were distributed first to states and then passed on to those cities, states were prohibited from imposing conditions on that distribution and could not hold back the payments; their role was purely administrative.</p>
<p>On previous occasions when federal money was allocated to local governments, it was much more common for the state government to hold federal aid on behalf of local governments. This was, for example, the mechanism behind the COVID-19-era financial assistance to school districts: the Elementary and Secondary Schools Emergency Relief Fund (ESSER, which had three iterations in 2020 and 2021, called ESSER I, ESSER II, and ESSER III respectively). A state’s department of education held ESSER funds and only parceled them out to school districts <em>after</em> the district had made a qualifying expenditure. The districts were not free to spend ESSER funds on their own. With SLFRF, however, recipients received funds <em>before</em> they needed to make expenditures and had complete control over how to use them.</p>
<p>This leads to a second important characteristic of SLFRF: Recipients were given broad latitude in how to use their funds. Under the legislation and the rules put out by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, SLFRF could be used for:</p>
<ol>
<li>responding to the public health emergency caused by COVID-19</li>
<li>responding to the negative economic impacts of COVID-19</li>
<li>providing premium pay to “essential” workers</li>
<li>improving water, sewer, and broadband infrastructure</li>
<li>replacing public-sector revenue lost by the economic downturn that accompanied COVID-19</li>
</ol>
<p>In 2023, the eligible uses for local governments were broadened to include government-built (or renovated) housing, surface transportation projects, and natural disaster relief, though in the end only a small share of recovery funds was used for those purposes.</p>
<p>Treasury rules also made the process simpler for smaller local governments by allowing up to $10 million to be used as public-sector revenue replacement without having to account for specific losses of funding—the SLFRF equivalent of the standard deduction on one’s taxes. Those rules also made clear that “negative economic impacts” could include existing inequities that predated the pandemic, such as long-standing racial employment and wage gaps (Economic Policy Institute 2025).</p>
<p>The combination of these two characteristics—state and local governments had the money within their control before making spending decisions, and great latitude in how to use it—meant that recipients could tailor the focus and pace of SLFRF spending to meet particular local needs. Given the extremely fluid state of the pandemic and the economy when ARPA was passed, this was the right decision to meet the pressing needs of the COVID-19 crisis. Overly prescriptive rules or additional bureaucratic hurdles to accessing and disbursing funds would have made it much harder for state and local recipients to respond rapidly to their specific needs.<a href="#_note1" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='1' id="_ref1">1</a></p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>Lessons to apply for future policy design</h2>
<p>Despite the great freedom given to recipients to use SLFRF in ways that best met their needs, of the roughly 31,000 local government recipients, almost 600 local government recipients did not report using their fiscal recovery funds at all and a further 600 reported using less than 99%. Another 220 local governments failed to file a single report on their use of fiscal recovery funds, and 1,089 more have been delinquent in filing for at least a year.</p>
<p>At least part of the explanation is that while ARPA guidance allowed for fiscal recovery funds to be used for myriad reasons, recipients (especially smaller local governments) with little experience in receiving money directly from the federal government often struggled to understand Treasury rules on allowed uses of funds. Unlike state governments with experienced personnel deeply versed in Treasury’s complex rules and how to navigate them, many local governments had no such in-house expertise. Advocacy organizations reported, again and again, that even in 2024, as the deadline to obligate ARPA funds was approaching, many local policymakers were still raising questions about how funds could be used and what was allowed (Rochford, Bauer, and Wallace 2024).</p>
<p>Relatedly, Treasury officials who talked with EPI noted that many of the smallest local governments did not have a website or internal email system. Because all SLFRF reporting was supposed to be done electronically, some of these recipients struggled to properly report their expenditures. Sometimes the departure of a single municipal official created significant problems because that person was the only one who knew the electronic passwords.</p>
<p>An abundance of reports from across the country make clear recipients struggled to choose from among many appealing options, creating a kind of paralysis of choice. This is completely understandable; the needs communities were facing at this time were myriad and diverse, and prior to SLFRF, most local government officials had likely never had access to such flexible resources before then.</p>
<p>These challenges were exacerbated because the Treasury Department made a conscious decision not to offer specific technical assistance regarding recipient governments’ possible uses of fiscal recovery funds. When local government officials reached out to Treasury to seek guidance on whether a particular idea was within the scope of the law, Treasury rarely offered definitive answers. This was understandable given that more than 31,000 governmental units received their own fiscal recovery funds; Treasury could not possibly handle detailed queries from more than a fraction of them. What this meant, though, is that many opportunities to use fiscal recovery funds in innovative and imaginative ways were missed. Many local governments chose caution over ambition, out of fear that particular uses of the funds would not be permitted and the funds rescinded.</p>
<p>To prevent a similar situation in the future, policy designers might do well to study Colorado’s Regional Grant Navigator program. Colorado chose 13 community and nonprofit organizations across the state to help local governments find ways to best access funds from the 2021 Infrastructure, Investment and Jobs Act and the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act. These navigators helped local governments understand the complex regulations around the laws, helped them design proposals to apply for funding, and offered advice on which programs might be best suited to the needs of those communities (Colorado n.d.). A similar model might allow local governments to get unbiased and timely assistance from organizations committed to helping them make the most of their funds.</p>
<p>A final challenge of the SLFRF policy design was the lack of clear definition of what “obligating” the funds meant. As advocates, policymakers, and others reported throughout 2022, 2023, and 2024, many local governments understood “obligation” to mean something similar to “budgeting” or “allocating”—making a formal decision as to how to use the funds (Kamper 2024). Recipients unfamiliar with the language used by Treasury could and did make that mistake. It was not until May of 2024 that Treasury explicitly stated in a webinar that “obligating” funds is not the same thing as budgeting (Treasury 2024). “Obligation” required not just a budgetary decision, but concrete steps to implement the decision, such as signing a contract with a vendor or an interagency agreement to send the funds to a particular department. Future fiscal recovery efforts should be more conscious of the need to clearly define terms, especially when plain-language definitions may not match Treasury’s technical definition.</p>
<h2>How were fiscal recovery funds used?</h2>
<div class="quick-card">
<p><strong><span style="font-family: 'Harriet Display', serif; font-size: 16px;">A note on methodology</span></strong></p>
<p>When it comes to analyzing SLFRF usage, a complicating factor is that state and local governments sometimes made public statements about their use of fiscal recovery funds that were not accurate. For example, Alabama announced in September of 2021 that it would spend $400 million of ARPA funds to help finance prison construction (Wakeley 2021). However, Alabama’s reports of SLFRF spending do not show any money obligated for building prisons. Treasury data in September 2024 list nearly 1,900 spending projects that were absent from the December 31, 2024, data. This does not mean those projects have been abandoned. It may simply mean that recipients switched the project to another funding source and repurposed their fiscal recovery funds for something else.</p>
<p>As such, it’s also almost certain fiscal recovery funds allowed state and local governments to take other actions that do not appear in this data. When the Minnesota legislature debated (and eventually enacted) a $500 million frontline worker pay measure in 2021 and 2022, news reports indicated that the funding for it would come from state fiscal recovery funds (Callaghan 2021, 2022). In the end, however, Minnesota did not use fiscal recovery funds for their frontline worker pay program. Given the context, however, it seems likely that, without SLFRF, Minnesota policymakers might not have felt that they could afford to launch such a program. No doubt this is also true for other state and local government spending decisions over the past four years.</p>
</div>
<h3>General spending trends</h3>
<p>The primary use of fiscal recovery funds—approximately 50% of state allocations and 60% of local government allocations—was revenue replacement, (replacing state and local funds that were lost because the economic shock of COVID-19 reduced tax and fee revenues). Revenue replacement had not been an allowed use of previous iterations of COVID-19 fiscal relief funds. Most notably the CARES Act, the first COVID-19 relief measure passed in 2020, did not allow use of Coronavirus Relief Funds for revenue replacement.</p>
<p>State and local governments face considerable constraints on their ability to raise revenues. Measures like Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights and California’s Proposition 13 often prohibit states from raising taxes or require legislative supermajorities to do so (Jefferson 2025). Local governments face even more constraints, with few policy levers available to raise revenues. As such, any shock to state and local government revenues can take a long time to reverse, a lesson we learned in the aftermath of the Great Recession. By allowing revenue replacement, SLFRF made it much easier for state and local governments to maintain adequate levels of funding, even as the pandemic recession lowered income from taxes. Revenue replacement was an important innovation in ARPA that should be replicated in the future.</p>
<p>Although the interim rules for ARPA put out by Treasury soon after the law was enacted required complex accounting of lost revenue, the final Treasury rule made the process much easier. For amounts less than $10 million, recipients did not need to calculate lost revenue. They could simply designate funds as revenue replacement and use them as needed. The appeal of this rule to local governments is evident in data summarizing subsequent uses of SLFRF; the smaller a recipient government, the more likely they were to use their fiscal recovery funds for revenue replacement.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-2"></a><div class="figure chart-316119 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="316119" data-anchor="Table-2"><div class="figLabel">Table 2</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/316119-35514-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 2" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>After revenue replacement, the next most popular use of SLFRF was addressing negative economic impacts of the pandemic. Once again, the flexibility given to recipients under this category was almost certainly a key factor encouraging use of funds for such purposes.</p>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Table-3"></a><div class="figure chart-316124 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="316124" data-anchor="Table-3"><div class="figLabel">Table 3</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/316124-35515-email.png" width="608" alt="Table 3" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Infrastructure was the third-largest use of fiscal recovery funds, and here there is a notable regional variation—state and local governments in the South allocated a far greater share of their funds to infrastructure than those in the rest of the country. In particular, 82% of all state funds obligated for broadband were in Southern states (not shown in Figure A).</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>


<!-- BEGINNING OF FIGURE -->

<a name="Figure-A"></a><div class="figure chart-316127 figure-screenshot figure-theme-none" data-chartid="316127" data-anchor="Figure-A"><div class="figLabel">Figure A</div><img decoding="async" src="https://files.epi.org/charts/img/316127-35516-email.png" width="608" alt="Figure A" class="fig-image-from-url rsImg"><div class="fig-features donotprint"></div></div><!-- /.figure -->

<!-- END OF FIGURE -->


<p>Not only is water and sewer infrastructure essential for people’s health, these investments are vital to a well-functioning economy. As EPI has extensively documented in its <em>Rooted in Racism</em> series, Southern states have long underinvested in in basic physical infrastructure (Childers 2023–2025). These spending choices likely reflect, at least in part, a need to address the long-standing underinvestment in the region—underinvestment driven by Southern lawmakers’ antipathy toward raising adequate revenue.</p>
<p>Aside from infrastructure spending in the South, there are no clear regional trends in how fiscal recovery funds were used. This is not surprising, given the flexibility of the funding (a feature EPI has long supported) (Bivens 2020). When ARPA was enacted in early 2021, there was simply no way for the federal government, or state and local governments, to know what their needs would be. ARPA’s flexibility was the right decision. The ability of recipient governments to immediately fill unanticipated budget holes via revenue replacement meant hundreds of thousands of state and local jobs were preserved, vital public programs were maintained, and a deeper economic crisis averted. The most notable success of ARPA SLFRF lies in what did not happen: a collapse in basic public services, massive long-term unemployment, and an extended economic depression.</p>
<h2>Innovative SLFRF investments supported working families</h2>
<p>In all, SLFRF funded more than 159,000 different projects across the country. Some were gigantic, like a $787 million program in New Jersey to provide rental assistance to low- and moderate-income tenants, and some were very small, like the $28 that St. Clair County, Michigan, provided to help renovate the Port Huron Township Museum.</p>
<p>There are many examples of state and local governments using fiscal recovery funds to make transformative investments to build an economy that supports working families. Several types of uses deserve special attention: fighting the COVID-19 pandemic, investing in public health, and addressing problems with food access and nutrition.</p>
<p>First, ARPA SLFRF went a long way to address the health emergency the country faced in 2021. States, cities, and counties were on the front lines of keeping people safe, providing access to new vaccines once they became available, and saving lives throughout the COVID-19 pandemic.</p>
<p>Over $1.8 billion in SLFRF was used to test, trace, and vaccinate people against COVID-19. Much of this money was used to deal with the practical and logistical challenges of testing and vaccination. Cities and counties, especially, bought personal protective equipment for government employees, especially first responders. Scores of governments purchased testing kits and lab equipment and worked to engage the public to encourage vaccination and tracing outbreaks. For example, Milan, Illinois, rented a meeting hall in town for $43,200 to host their vaccine clinic. Jefferson County, Missouri, hired a nurse for every public school district to oversee a contact-tracing program to track COVID-19’s progress through schools. Monroe County, Indiana, was one of many governments that instituted wastewater monitoring to check for COVID-19 surges While any individual expenditure may seem minor, together these measures did much to reduce COVID-19 infections and deaths.</p>
<p>Second, SLFRF allowed recipient governments to make long-term upgrades to infrastructure that both mitigated COVID-19 threats and made public spaces permanently safer, healthier, and more accessible. Almost $4.3 billion was obligated to upgrade the air quality and safety of public and private facilities. At least 550 projects upgraded HVAC systems in schools, nursing homes, public buildings, and correctional facilities. Governments invested in digital communications tools to reduce the need for in-person meetings. Typical examples include Peoria, Arizona, which allocated $124,996 to install touchless drinking fountains in public buildings, and Stafford County, Virginia, which spent $115,255 to add a glass partition to the entrance of the Commissioner of Revenue’s office so that the administrative staff could be protected from visitors’ virus transmission.</p>
<p>The freedom given to local governments to innovate was particularly evident in the way multiple localities sought to address problems related to food access and nutrition—an issue that has received tremendous public attention resulting from New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s plan to establish municipally operated grocery stores. While one commentator claimed such a project would resemble &#8220;the old Soviet Union” (McArdle 2025), the fact is that many SLFRF recipients used public funds to increase access to food for low-income communities, including by opening their own stores.</p>
<p>For example:</p>
<ul>
<li>Sioux Falls, South Dakota, set up a mobile grocery market that would operate in underserved parts of the city.</li>
<li>The small town of Cutler, Illinois, set up a Community Commissary to make it easier to buy food without having to travel a long way.</li>
<li>Branson, Colorado (population 74 in the 2010 census), constructed a community greenhouse to grow and sell fresh fruits and vegetables for the town and school.</li>
<li>Charleston, West Virginia, opened a community grocery store that would provide access to fresh groceries for 14,000 residents, and the city of Austin, Texas, did something similar.</li>
</ul>
<p>There were, in addition, scores of grants to food pantries and other nonprofits that help people find the food they need. The proposal for New York City fits well with how these communities used SLFRF to address food access.</p>
<p>Above are just a handful of the tens of thousands of useful projects made possible by fiscal recovery funds. Some uses were more effective than others, however. For example, although modernizing state unemployment insurance systems was a useful endeavor (see above), more than $22 billion was also spent replenishing state unemployment insurance trust funds, which was unnecessary. UI trust funds hold UI taxes paid by businesses, to make sure funds are available to pay UI claims during spikes in unemployment. While those funds had, indeed, been depleted by the pandemic recession, state UI trust funds are designed to be self-correcting.<a href="#_note2" class="footnote-id-ref" data-note_number='2' id="_ref2">2</a> They have automatic mechanisms to raise employer payroll taxes when the trust fund has been drawn down, to rebuild the funds and be prepared for future downturns. It was wholly unnecessary to use fiscal recovery funds to refill trust funds that would have returned to full strength on their own. Spending SLFRF to refill trust funds was a missed opportunity to support economic growth and strengthened public services (Banerjee, Martinez Hickey, and Sawo 2021). Future fiscal recovery projects should not make refilling UI trust funds an allowed use, though they should continue to support modernization of and upgrades to UI systems.</p>
<h2>SLFRF accomplished its goals without driving inflation</h2>
<p>Finally, it is worth noting that, despite politically motivated claims to the contrary, there is little evidence that SLFRF, or indeed the entire $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan, was a significant contributor to inflation. As Bivens, Banerjee, and Dzholos (2022) show, the rise in inflation starting in 2022 was a global phenomenon, one that impacted countries, regardless of whether they provided fiscal relief to their economies during COVID-19. Nor was inflation correlated with the rapid decrease in unemployment the U.S. saw, thanks in part to ARPA. Rather, inflation was primarily driven by the dramatic supply shocks to various sectors of the economy caused by COVID-19, and then exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. Given the scale of the crisis policymakers were confronted with in early 2021, they were right to spend at the scale of the problem, and critiques blaming that spending for inflation are not backed up by the data. Moreover, policy measures that prioritized lowering inflation would have led to either lower employment or lower real wage growth, as there was no policy option that would have lowered inflation, increased wage gains, and supported the strong job growth of 2021–2024 (Bivens 2024).</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>ARPA’s State and Local Fiscal Recovery Fund was a great success. By spending at the scale of the problem, the federal government aided the economic recovery, supported the maintenance of public services, and gave myriad governments the chance to make innovative choices that have improved the well-being of their communities. A smaller SLFRF would have slowed our economic recovery and made governments more cautious about enacting bold policies to protect working families.</p>
<p>By giving recipient governments so much flexibility in using the funds, the Biden administration allowed every state, county, city, territory, and tribal government to fashion the response most appropriate to their particular needs. When faced with a crisis that had so much unpredictability, this was the right decision.</p>
<p>We don’t know when the next economic downturn, global pandemic, or climate disaster will hit. Whenever it does, federal policymakers should seek to emulate the model set by ARPA.</p>
<h2>Notes</h2>
<p data-note_number='1'><a href="#_ref1" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note1">1. </a>The devastating Flint, Michigan, water crisis of the 2010s is a prime example of a situation in which too many bureaucratic hurdles worsened a disaster. Flint was facing a serious fiscal crisis and therefore lacked the internal capacity to apply for federal funding (which they would have received) that might have prevented lead contamination of the water supply. See GAO 2015 for more details.</p>
<p data-note_number='2'><a href="#_ref2" class="footnote-id-foot" id="_note2">2. </a>At least they should be, provided policymakers have set adequate UI tax base rates. See Perez 2025 for more information.</p>
<div class="pdf-page-break "></div>
<h2>References</h2>
<p>Banerjee, Asha, Sebastian Martinez Hickey, and Marokey Sawo. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/states-are-choosing-employers-over-workers-by-using-covid-relief-funds-to-pay-off-unemployment-insurance-debt-policymakers-shouldnt-be-afraid-to-increase-taxes-on-employers-to-improve-unempl/">States Are Choosing Employers over Workers by Using COVID Relief Funds to Pay Off Unemployment Insurance Debt: Policymakers Shouldn’t Be Afraid to Increase Taxes on Employers to Improve Unemployment Insurance.</a>” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 19, 2021.</p>
<p>Bivens, Josh. 2020. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/getting-serious-about-the-economic-response-to-covid-19/">Getting Serious About the Economic Response to COVID-19.”</a> <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), March 9, 2020.</p>
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<p>Callaghan, Peter. 2022. “<a href="https://www.minnpost.com/state-government/2022/05/how-the-legislatures-deal-on-pandemic-worker-bonuses-and-unemployment-insurance-got-done/">How the Legislature’s Deal on Pandemic Worker Bonuses and Unemployment Insurance Got Done</a>.” <em>Minnpost</em>, May 4, 2022.</p>
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<p>Cooper, David, Mary Gable, and Algernon Austin. 2012. <em><a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/bp339-public-sector-jobs-crisis/">The Public-Sector Jobs Crisis: Women and African Americans Hit Hardest by Job Losses in State and Local Governments</a>. </em>Economic Policy Institute, May 2012.</p>
<p>Economic Policy Institute. 2025. <a href="https://www.epi.org/publication/disparities-chartbook/"><em>Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the United States: An Interactive Chartbook</em></a><em>.</em> Economic Policy Institute. October 2025.</p>
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<p>Kamper, Dave, and Emma Cohn. 2024. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/time-is-running-out-for-state-and-local-governments-to-obligate-american-rescue-plan-funds/">Time Is Running out for State and Local Governments to Obligate American Rescue Plan Funds</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), October 17, 2024.</p>
<p>McArdle, Megan. 2025. “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2025/07/01/new-york-mamdani-grocery-stores/">Zohran Mamdani Has a Seriously Bad Idea—for Grocery Stores</a>.” <em>Washington Post, </em>July 1, 2025.</p>
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<p>U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury). 2024. “<a href="https://youtu.be/Tf9IZZHvjAA?si=yr1vNAR5wU_xUKps">State and Local Fiscal Recovery Funds: New Obligation FAQs Webinar</a>” (web page). Accessed December 3, 2025.</p>
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<p>U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). 2015. <a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669134.pdf"><em>Municipalities in Fiscal Crisis: Federal Agencies Monitored Grants and Assisted Grantees, but More Could Be Done to Share Lessons Learned</em></a>. Publication number 15-222, March 2015.</p>
<p>Wakeley, Dev. 2021. “<a href="https://www.epi.org/blog/alabama-is-making-a-costly-mistake-on-covid-19-recovery-funds-heres-a-better-path-forward/">Alabama Is Making a Costly Mistake on COVID-19 Recovery Funds. Here’s a Better Path Forward</a>.” <em>Working Economics Blog</em> (Economic Policy Institute), November 8, 2021.</p>
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