Cleaning up the Kyoto Protocol: Emission permit trading would let developing nations reap profits from green policies
By James P. Barrett
Dean Baker
05-01-99
May 21, 1999 Issue Brief #131
CLEANING UP THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
Emission permit trading
would let developing nations reap profits from green
policies
by Dean Baker and James Barrett
Scientists overwhelmingly agree that if
world emission rates continue on their current trajectory, carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases will significantly raise global
temperatures and alter the climate during the next century. In
December 1997, the industrialized nations met in Japan and ratified
the Kyoto Protocol, an agreement to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases in order to slow the process of climatic change.
Currently, the Kyoto Protocol does not call on still-developing
countries to accept binding emission targets, primarily because
developed countries are responsible for the vast majority of
current greenhouse emission and atmospheric concentrations and
because developing countries, for obvious economic reasons, are
least able to combat emissions. Some U.S. businesses and
politicians, however, are worried that binding carbon targets will
impose unfair costs on developed economies, giving an advantage to
those companies located in the developing world and offering
incentives for U.S. firms to relocate abroad.
In order to incorporate the developing nations in the Kyoto
Protocol, the Clinton Administration pushed for the inclusion of
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Under the CDM, nations in
the developed world would be subject to caps on greenhouse gas
emissions while developing nations would not. Developed nations
would be allowed to exceed their caps as long as they found ways to
reduce emissions by an equal amount in developing nations. Such a
system (which will be examined in more detail later in this paper)
would attempt to track emission rates on a project-by-project basis
rather than on a national basis. But a worthwhile emissions
agreement would strive to put developing countries on a more
environmentally friendly development path while helping developed
countries meet their agreed-upon emission targets. Unfortunately,
the CDM system is inherently flawed in this regard. This paper
suggests a better mechanism for incorporating the developing
nations into the carbon reduction effort.
The exploding trade deficit and emission caps
As a result of the financial crisis in East Asia, the United States
faces the prospect of a rapidly growing trade deficit. In excess of
1 million manufacturing jobs may be lost due to the growing
imbalance. This will be bad news not only for the workers directly
affected, but also for tens of millions of other workers who will
experience downward wage pressure as a result of the massive
displacement of manufacturing workers.
This situation came about because of the conditions imposed on East
Asian economies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
designed bailout packages that encourage these countries to export
their way back to economic health. A huge decline in the value of
the currencies of the region has made their exports very cheap.
Restrictive labor laws will keep wages from rising and preserve the
cost advantage of the region's exports. The IMF has also insisted
on large cutbacks in government spending, which has led to
reductions in food subsidies and other forms of social welfare
spending. This means that the export boom needed to satisfy IMF
targets is not likely to do much to benefit most of the population
of East Asia.
The current shape of the global economy provides developing nations
with few alternatives to the path of export-led growth. Under
current conditions, these countries are able to get the capital
they need to sustain their development only through exports
produced with cheap labor.
The effort to restrict greenhouse gas emissions can provide an
alternative support for growth in developing nations. This can be
accomplished quite simply. In the first phase of a climate
agreement, the developing nations can be given emission caps based
on simple projections of current emissions growth rates, assuming
little or no reduction off this rate. Later phases would gradually
set caps that reduce growth off this trend, with the target being
an eventual convergence of per capita emissions in all nations. The
initial emissions caps - say for the first 20 years - will not by
themselves directly lower emissions in developing nations. But an
additional incentive could be thrown into the mix: insofar as the
developing nations reduced their emissions below their assigned
cap, they would be able to sell permits for the right to emit
greenhouse gases to other nations who want to exceed their own
caps. In this way developing nations could earn tens of billions of
dollars each year by finding ways to reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases. Instead of imposing an obstacle to development,
this system could provide the financing that developing nations
need to support their development. In short, the permits that
developing nations will be granted under this system can provide
them with an alternative to export-led growth.
For example, Mexico presently emits approximately 110 million tons
of carbon-equivalent gas; it is projected to emit 220 million tons
a year by 2020 if it follows its current trajectory. If Mexico were
assigned caps matching this projected growth in emissions, with the
option of selling emissions permits if it undercut its annual
limit, then Mexico would be in a situation in which it could only
gain. If Mexico were able to reduce its emissions by just 10% below
its cap, it would have 22 million tons of emission permits to sell
in 2020. What would this mean in actual revenue? There is a huge
range of estimates as to the price that these permits will command,
but credible projections put the price at about $60 per ton (in
1999 dollars). At this price, Mexico would be able to earn $1.2
billion a year, equal to approximately 0.5% of its GDP (or the
equivalent of roughly $40 billion for the U.S. economy).
Earnings of this magnitude will not be sufficient to fully finance
Mexico's needs for capital, but they will provide a substantial
boost. Furthermore, the system sets a path on which earnings can be
increased by further reductions in emissions. For example, if
Mexico is able to reduce its emissions by 25% below its targets, a
realistic goal, then it would be able to earn $3 billion a year
(the equivalent of $96 billion to the U.S. economy), an amount that
would go far toward supporting Mexico's development. In addition,
as soon as it became clear that countries would have permits to
sell, they could then borrow against this future source of revenue
on international financial markets. The incentive to begin reducing
emissions would thus be felt immediately, and additional money to
finance development could start flowing soon thereafter.
Getting developing nations to sign on to a global agreement of this
sort is an important step in reducing emissions worldwide. In fact,
it will be possible to reduce emissions most easily in developing
nations, since the adoption of relatively simple energy efficiency
measures can have a huge impact. Also, more advanced alternatives
like solar and other clean technologies may actually be more
competitive in developing than in the industrialized nations, since
many developing countries do not already have a fully established
electric power grid. The sooner that developing nations are brought
under the agreement, the easier it will be for them to pursue a
long-run clean development path. This system would only bolster the
fight against global warming, since emissions have the same impact
regardless of their source.
Signing on to emissions caps under these conditions should be
extremely attractive for Mexico and other developing countries. By
agreeing to caps, these nations will have the opportunity to pursue
an alternative path to development. Instead of trying to earn
foreign exchange by having the lowest cost labor in factories, they
can do so by cleaning up the environment, which would be a far
healthier path to development.
Workers in the United States would also gain in this scenario. The
developing nations would have billions of dollars with which to
purchase U.S. exports of capital goods and clean technology
products. Also, insofar as the selling of permits can push
developing nations onto an alternative development path, it would
alleviate the pressure from low-cost imports that has depressed the
wages of non-college-educated workers in advanced countries and has
been an important factor in the growth of wage inequality.
Furthermore, the opportunity to purchase emissions permits from
developing countries will reduce the cost of meeting the emissions
targets the U.S. agreed to in the Kyoto Protocol.
In short, by getting developing countries on board in this manner,
this plan will create a situation in which we can be assured that
worldwide targets for emissions reductions can be met. Furthermore,
it will provide a far better development path for these nations
than the one they are currently pursuing. This plan also will have
the effect of increasing demand for U.S. manufactured goods,
helping to improve the situation of the bottom three-quarters of
the U.S. workforce who have been the losers in the "new
economy."
Having developing nations agree to caps with a system of tradable
permits ensures that low cost emissions reductions in these nations
will be achieved at the earliest possible date. In the longer term,
national caps can be adjusted to allow a convergence between
historic emissions patterns and an equal per capita distribution of
greenhouse gas emissions. Such an adjustment would gradually
increase the portion of the permits going to developing nations and
decrease the portion going to the developed world, including the
United States. This shift would not actually require greater
reductions in emissions in the United States; rather, the United
States would simply have to buy a larger portion of its emission
permits, instead of being endowed with them by an international
body. Since permits are tradable, and in that way a form of wealth,
any alternative mechanism would imply that the world should give
nations money in proportion to the amount that they had been
polluting in previous years. This would be an enormous transfer of
wealth from the poorest nations to the richest, and it is unlikely
that the developing nations would agree to such a massive
commitment of foreign aid to the United States, Europe, and other
industrialized regions of the world.
The problem with the Clean Development Mechanism
It is worth contrasting this plan with the Clean Development
Mechanism being pushed by the Clinton Administration. Under the
CDM, developing nations are not subject to any overall cap.
However, they will be able to basically sell permits to the U.S. as
a result of specific projects that are supposed to reduce
emissions. For example, if a U.S. firm buys an old, inefficient
steel factory in India, shuts it down, and replaces it with a
less-polluting factory, the U.S. firm can claim credit for the
reduction in emissions and sell these credits in the U.S. or other
industrialized countries. Alternatively, if a U.S. firm buys
agricultural land and plants a forest, the carbon dioxide pulled
out of the atmosphere by the forest can also earn emissions credits
that can be sold internationally.
The most important problem with this system is that there is no way
of determining when real reductions in emissions are actually
occurring as a result of such projects. In the case of the steel
factory, it is possible that an old steel factory would have been
shut down, even without the incentive of obtaining emission
permits. And in the case of reforestation, while the new forest may
withdraw greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, the displaced
farmers might just cut down trees elsewhere, leading to no net
greenhouse gas reductions. Under this arrangement, then, emissions
credits will be given even if there is no real worldwide reduction
in emissions. In a situation in which emissions are examined
project-by-project, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine
when real reductions are occurring. The fact that this process
would generate valuable permits at a low cost provides a powerful
incentive for multinational corporations to search out false
opportunities like this throughout the developing world.
The CDM can also have a negative impact on the U.S. trade balance.
The price of energy in the U.S. will rise somewhat as a result of
emissions restriction, providing an additional incentive for
industry to move into developing nations where the restrictions do
not apply. The CDM may, in many cases, provide an additional bonus
to corporations: if a U.S. company buys an antiquated steel factory
in Mexico and shuts it down, the company will have emissions
permits that it can sell to support the construction of a new steel
factory in Mexico. This will lead to a further loss of U.S.
manufacturing jobs. It is also likely that such actions will
actually lead to increased emissions, since facilities in
developing nations are likely to emit more than factories in the
industrialized nations, and shipping materials between countries
will require substantial additional use of energy.
By contrast, if the developing nations are actually subject to
caps, exploiting the system in this manner will be impossible.
While the true increase or reduction in emissions from a specific
project may be difficult to measure, emissions from a nation as a
whole can be monitored more accurately and could be administered by
the same mechanism used for developed countries. If a country
failed to adopt an effective system of reducing emissions, it would
not have any permits to sell, and it would lose a huge potential
source of capital. Developing nations will be able to get permits
only as a result of real reductions in emissions.
Furthermore, getting the developing nations under the caps would
have the effect of raising the price of energy in these nations,
much as in the industrialized nations, thereby reducing incentives
to shift production to developing countries to take advantage of
lower energy prices. As noted earlier, such shifts would hurt
workers in the United States without producing any gains for the
environment at all. From the standpoint of both the environment and
workers in the United States, having the developing nations subject
to caps will be far better than the CDM.
But the most important problem with the CDM may be the long-term
incentive structure it puts in place. Under the CDM, capital can
begin flowing to developing countries (or more correctly, to
wealthy corporations within developing countries), regardless of
whether or not real emissions reductions are occurring. With an
ongoing flow of revenue from CDM projects, which may or may not
actually reduce emissions, developing nations will have little
incentive to agree to come under binding caps. If the CDM is not an
option, the only way these countries will be able to earn money
through emissions reductions is by actually agreeing to caps.
This system may seem coercive, and to an extent it is, but it pales
in comparison to the U.S./IMF efforts to bludgeon developing
nations into reorganizing their economies to meet the needs of
multinational corporations, often at tremendous human cost. In this
context, telling the developing nations that they will not get
additional development assistance until they make a commitment to
help solve the world's climate problem hardly seems like cause for
complaint, especially when the currently proposed CDM offers
rewards to large corporations rather than the nations
themselves.
There are clearly many political obstacles to bringing the
developing nations into a Kyoto-type agreement, but this proposal
could offer them enormous benefits for signing on. This fact was
not lost on Argentina and Kahzakstan, who volunteered in Buenos
Aires this year to take on binding emissions caps that would allow
them to take part in the global trading system. By signing on to
the plan laid out here, the leaders of these two countries set an
example for the rest of the developing world. This plan can offer
these countries substantial economic rewards for protecting the
environment, while simultaneously providing benefits for workers in
the United States. It may not eliminate the trade deficit, but it
can significantly improve the U.S. trade balance, creating hundreds
of thousands of additional manufacturing jobs. Most importantly, it
would get the world on a path of emissions reduction that will
significantly lessen the danger of global warming.
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